N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2

Section 56:8-2 covers knowing omissions of material facts made with intent that consumers rely on them; actual reliance is not required.

Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. · filed 2000-06-14

A defendant who violates the Act because of an unlawful "method, act, or practice" that results from an omission of a material fact with the "intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission," N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, is "liable for [such] misrepresentations whether `any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.' " Gennari, supra, 148 N.J. at 607-608, 691 A.2d 350 (quoting N.J.S.A. 56:8-2).

Section 56:8-2 does not require proof that a person making an affirmative misrepresentation knew it was false or intended to deceive.

Ji v. Palmer · filed 2000-08-01

In order to establish an affirmative misrepresentation violative of the Consumer Fraud Act, plaintiffs were not required to show Catrambone's knowledge of the falsity of his statement or an intent to deceive.

Section 56:8-2 treats a material affirmative misrepresentation as an unlawful practice even if no person was actually misled, deceived, or damaged.

Talalai v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2001-04-16

The plain language of section N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, with respect to violations of the CFA by affirmative misrepresentations, provides that it does not matter whether "any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Proof of an affirmative misrepresentation of a fact material to the transaction is sufficient to establish a violation of the Act.

Section 56:8-2 does not require proof of the defendant's knowledge or intent, or a misrepresentation of a material fact, when the claim rests on an affirmative act of fraud or deception.

Leon v. Rite Aid Corp. · filed 2001-05-30

However, when a plaintiff's claim is that there was an affirmative act such as fraud or deception, it is not necessary that plaintiff show either defendant's knowledge or intent or that the misrepresentation was of a material fact.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat nondisclosure as knowing concealment when the seller has no duty to disclose the fact.

Judge v. Blackfin Yacht Corp. · filed 2003-02-13

Our review of the evidence here provides no basis for the imposition of a duty on defendant to have disclosed Blackfin's Chapter 11 status to plaintiff. There being no duty to disclose, there can be no finding that defendant knowingly concealed a material fact with the intent that plaintiff rely on the concealment.

Section 56:8-2 requires proof that the defendant acted with knowledge when a consumer fraud claim rests on an omission.

Szczubelek v. Cendant Mortgage Corp. · filed 2003-03-31

In contrast, when the alleged consumer fraud consists of an omission, a plaintiff must show the defendant acted with knowledge, thereby making intent an essential element of the fraud.

Section 56:8-2 does not require proof of intent to deceive, knowledge of a misrepresentation, or actual deceit or fraud for an affirmative act.

DEBRA F. FINK v. Ricoh Corp. · filed 2003-07-31

Where the alleged violation of the NJCFA involves an affirmative act, plaintiff is not required to prove defendant's intent to deceive or knowledge of the misrepresentation, nor to prove actual deceit or fraud.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim based on a septic system certification when evidence supports that its assurance of working order was false for the reasonably foreseeable future.

Mango v. Pierce-Coombs · filed 2004-06-24

The critical issue for summary judgment analysis thus becomes whether a jury issue is presented as to whether Streets made a "statement of fact, found to be false," in the reformed certification. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Mango, and giving her the benefit of all inferences that could be reasonably drawn in her favor, we are satisfied she has made a prima facie showing that the septic system was not in good working order in the reasonably foreseeable future after Streets' certification was issued.

Section 56:8-2 covers a realtor's material misstatement about a house's location even if the realtor did not intend to mislead the buyer.

Vagias v. Woodmont Properties · filed 2006-03-22

Because plaintiffs' proofs, viewed in the most favorable light, would support a conclusion that Dingle made an affirmative misrepresentation concerning the location of the house, and because such a misrepresentation would violate the Act even if she did not intend to mislead them, we reverse the order of dismissal and the award of counsel fees and remand this case for trial.

Section 56:8-2 covers knowing misrepresentations and material omissions that induce a consumer to contract for services.

Carton v. Choice Point · filed 2007-04-18

N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants made knowing misrepresentations and omitted material facts concerning the value of the “asset” in question, inducing Plaintiffs to enter into the contract for “investigatory and research services” to locate and recover the asset. (O’Connor Cert., Ex. 4) Such evidence, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence at trial, would establish an unlawful practice under the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires a claimant alleging a fraudulent omission to prove intentional concealment of material information with the intent that the claimant rely on it.

Marrone v. G & P CONSTRUCTION, INC. · filed 2009-02-04

Further, to the extent plaintiffs assert that Sto violated the CFA through an omission rather than an affirmative misstatement, their claim fails. "To prove that ... acts of omission constituted consumer fraud, plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally concealed the information... with the intention that plaintiff would rely on the concealment, and that the information was material to the transaction." Judge v. Blackfin Yacht Corp., 357 N.J.Super. 418, 426, 815 A.2d 537 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 428, 824 A.2d 157 (2003). That proof was absent here.

Section 56:8-2 requires a misrepresentation or material omission intended to induce reliance, with a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the purchase.

Dean v. Barrett Homes, Inc. · filed 2009-04-15

We adopt the reasoning in Marrone and conclude that the motion judge properly dismissed the CFA cause of action. As in Marrone, plaintiffs here neither received nor relied on any misrepresentation by Sto. The statute requires, among other things, misrepresentation or omission of material fact with intention of reliance, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, and none of those elements are present here. There is no nexus between plaintiffs' purchase of the house and Sto's conduct or lack thereof.

Section 56:8-2 permits an unlawful practice claim based on allegations that a manufacturer intentionally concealed a known defect expected to cause failure before the product’s expected useful life, even when the product lasted past its warranty.

Maniscalco v. Brother International Corp. · filed 2009-06-19

If the New Jersey Supreme Court were faced with a situation where a manufacturer or seller of a product knew that its product had a defect which would cause it to fail before its expected useful life, and intentionally concealed that information from a purchaser, with the purpose of maximizing profit, I predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not be willing to find, as a matter of law, that the CFA was categorically inapplicable. Therefore, this Court will not extend the holding in Perkins to cover the very different factual scenario in the present case. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the first element of a CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 covers affirmative misrepresentations of material fact and knowing omissions of material fact made with intent that others rely on them.

Stoecker v. Echevarria · filed 2009-08-04

In our judgment, plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Unicasa and Gracia violated the CFA. Plaintiff has not shown that these defendants made an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact or knowingly failed to disclose a material fact with intent that plaintiff rely thereon.

Section 56:8-2 treats a misleading product message as an affirmative misrepresentation even when the seller also fails to disclose related information.

Arcand v. Brother International Corp. · filed 2009-11-30

Here, the Court agrees that an active misrepresentation may be found in the “Toner Life End” message displayed on the printers. The fact that BIC simultaneously failed to disclose that the cartridge was not empty does not convert the claim into one of omission.

Claims based on allegedly false or misleading product representations fall within the affirmative acts category under Section 56:8-2.

Loreto v. Procter & Gamble Co. · filed 2010-09-03

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the “affirmative acts” category.

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff alleging an affirmative deceptive act to plead with particularity how the seller’s statement was false or deceptive.

Mason v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 2011-03-31

Without more specificity as to how defendant made false or deceptive statements to plaintiffs regarding the healthiness or nutritional value of the soda, plaintiffs have failed to plead the “affirmative act” element with sufficient particularity to state a viable NJCFA claim.

Section 56:8-2’s unlawful conduct element can be pleaded through product label misrepresentations and knowing omissions about the lack of clinical support.

Lieberson v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. · filed 2011-09-21

Turning to the first prong, Plaintiff appears to allege unlawful conduct comprising both misrepresentations and omissions under the NJCFA. ... Specifically, Plaintiff contends that although the Product labels claimed that the Products were “clinically proven” to help babies sleep better, after using these Products with two of her children, she found that the Products did not, in fact, help her babies sleep better. ... In addition, with regard to the omissions, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew no clinical studies existed to substantiate their claims about the Products’ ability to help babies sleep and that Defendants intended these misrepresentations to deceive consumers. ... For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently plead unlawful conduct under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff alleging a wrongful omission to show that the defendant acted knowingly and intended to mislead consumers.

In re Cablevision Consumer Litigation · filed 2012-03-28

Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges a wrongful omission, “the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with knowledge, and intent is an essential element of the fraud.” ... Plaintiffs have not alleged that Cablevision intended to mislead its customers by not timely advising them of the impending service change, and thus their omission-based claim fails.

An alleged false promise of a loan modification does not support a § 56:8-2 consumer fraud claim when the plan documents contradict it.

DeLuca v. Citimortgage · filed 2013-10-11

As to their assertions of consumer fraud, common law fraud, and promissory estoppel, the Trial Period Plan documents underlying the allegations provide dispositive evidence contradicting the assertion that Citimortgage falsely promised the DeLucas a loan modification if they defaulted on their loans.

Section 56:8-2 requires an actionable misrepresentation in a real estate sale to be a false statement of fact material to the transaction; an opinion or puffery does not qualify.

Cydnee Phoenix v. U.S. Homes Corp. · filed 2015-10-20

Phoenix’s fraud, CFA, and PREDFDA6 claims based on Lennar’s affirmative misrepresentations fail because she did not establish that Lennar’s agent, DeChristie, made a statement of fact that is false.

Section 56:8-2 covers knowing misrepresentations and omissions about a car’s condition and the extended service coverage sold with it as unconscionable commercial practices.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOHN HELLER (06-04-0336, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2017-08-10

These material knowing misrepresentations and omissions constitute the type of unconscionable commercial practices the CFA was intended to deter by awarding the victims of such practices treble damages.

Section 56:8-2 treats a knowing concealment or omission of a material fact, intended for others to rely on, as an unlawful practice.

Catena v. Raytheon Company · filed 2016-08-18

Likewise, the "unlawful practice" element...of a CFA violation encompasses a knowing concealment or omission of material fact with the intent that others rely on it.

An omission of material information is unlawful under § 56:8-2 only if the defendant intended to deceive consumers.

MZL Capital Holdings Inc v. TD Bank NA · filed 2018-05-08

None of the plaintiffs’ allegations establish such intent with particularity as required by Rule 9(b).

Section 56:8-2 does not impose liability for a seller’s failure to discharge a buyer’s prior lease when the seller made no representation or promise to do so.

TBF FINANCIAL, LLC VS. ROBER PICCIANO VS. STRATEGIC PRODUCTS AND SERVICES, INC. (L-7676-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-06-20

That conduct includes "the use of unconscionable commercial practices, deception, fraud, and misrepresentations 'in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise.'" DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 338 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting N.J.S.A. 56:8-2). As stated, Picciano failed to demonstrate Guzman misrepresented or falsely promised that SPS would fulfill the remaining obligations under the TBF agreement.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud violation based on concealing vehicle damage even if the defendant did not cause the damage.

GARGUILO VS. TRI-STATE CLASSIC CAR RESTORATION (DC-008812-16, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-12-11

We add that it is immaterial whether the trial judge considered Phillips' opinion regarding causation because the judge's findings were not based on causation, but rather defendant's role in the concealment of the damage to the engine and tailshaft. Phillips' testimony, and the judge's findings, regarding causation are irrelevant to our consideration of whether a CFA violation could be determined based on the grounds of the concealment from the evidence presented.

Section 56:8-2 makes a seller's knowing concealment of material facts about a vehicle unlawful when the seller intends the buyer to rely on the concealment.

AMBER MONSERRATE VS. B&D AUTO SALES, INC. (DC-000080-17, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-06-12

There is sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court's finding that defendant misrepresented and concealed material facts concerning the condition of the Expedition, with the intent that plaintiff would rely thereon and purchase the vehicle. The record supports the court's determination that defendant engaged in a knowing omission or concealment, which is an unlawful practice under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 requires knowledge and intent to deceive for a claim based on failure to disclose a material fact.

HUSSAIN VS. CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. (L-3379-15, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-02-08

Plaintiff did not sustain his CFA claim because defendant could not "knowingly" and "with the intent to deceive the purchasers" fail to disclose a letter it never received.

Section 56:8-2 requires proof of knowing conduct and intent that others rely on it for concealment, suppression, or omission of a material fact.

Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc. · filed 1991-07-01

The second category — concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact — requires proof that the offending conduct occurred knowingly and with an intent that others rely on the concealment, suppression, or omission.

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff alleging concealment of a defect that surfaced after the warranty expired to plead that the manufacturer knew with certainty the product would fail.

DAWSON v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC. · filed 2019-07-22

In a case such as this, Plaintiffs have the heavy burden of pleading that Defendant knew with certainty that the fuel pumps would fail. Because Plaintiffs have not carried their burden here, their NJCFA claim is dismissed.

Section 56:8-2 permits a claim based on an affirmative misrepresentation about a product even when a separate Products Liability Act claim concerns a product defect.

Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation (082815)(Statewide) · filed 2020-07-29

The failure to warn of a product defect is likewise cognizable under the PLA, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2 (identifying as actionable the failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions for a product), while an affirmative misrepresentation that a specific flaw did not exist or a product had never failed may be brought under the CFA, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 (identifying as actionable a “misrepresentation or the knowing[] concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact”).

Section 56:8-2 permits a deceptive-advertising claim concerning a casino poker tournament; the Casino Control Act does not preempt that claim.

BANDLER VS. LANDRY'S INC., GOLDEN NUGGET ATLANTIC CITY (L-0026-16, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-07-22

We discern no legislative intent to preempt plaintiff's CFA or common law claims in Superior Court.

A claim under Section 56:8-2 seeking only economic damages from harm to the product itself is not subsumed by the Products Liability Act.

GORCZYNSKI v. ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS, INC. · filed 2019-10-18

Thus, where a CFA claim relates exclusively to economic damages resulting from harm to the product itself, it cannot be precluded and subsumed by the PLA.

Section 56:8-2 allows claims based on affirmative misrepresentations about a product even when the Products Liability Act could apply, so long as the claim rests on the misrepresentation rather than a product defect.

Sun Chemical Corp v. Fike Corp · filed 2020-11-27

In sum, four of Sun’s five CFA misrepresentation claims survive summary judgment. The PLA does not subsume those claims because they are premised on Fike’s affirmative misrepresentations rather than on a deficiency in the suppression system itself.

Section 56:8-2 does not support a consumer fraud claim against a bank that would impose a standard of reasonableness and ordinary care different from the UCC standard.

DROSOS & ASSOCIATES, PC v. TD BANK NA · filed 2024-02-29

As an initial matter, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ NJCFA claim is merely a veiled attempt to hold TD Bank “to a standard of reasonableness and ordinary care different [from] the UCC standard,” it will be dismissed.

Section 56:8-2 does not provide a separate consumer fraud claim for alleged misrepresentations about a product’s safety when the Products Liability Act subsumes the claim.

McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc. · filed 2008-05-29

We agree with Merck's first argument—that the PLA subsumes plaintiffs' CFA claims—and thus find no need to address Merck's additional contentions.

Section 56:8-2’s regulatory-violation category does not allow a consumer fraud claim based solely on a violation of New Jersey’s food-adulteration statute.

BOCCHINFUSO v. THE WONDERFUL COMPANY LLC · filed 2025-07-25

Consistent with the above authorities, the Court finds that an alleged violation of N.J.S.A § 24:5-1 does not constitute a regulatory violation of the CFA. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs cannot rely on N.J.S.A § 24:5-1 to plead their CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 is constitutional under the rationale supporting the Consumer Fraud Act.

Kugler v. Market Dev. Corp. · filed 1973-04-26

A detailed analysis of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 which the defendant likewise alleges to be unconstitutional is not required. Upon the same reasoning consonant with the rationale supporting the Consumer Fraud Act, I find that section to be constitutional.

A landlord’s prompt repairs to reported apartment problems, without evidence of deceptive, unconscionable, or fraudulent conduct, do not establish an unlawful practice under section 56:8-2.

Serra v. Midland Realty Associates, LLC · filed 2025-08-01

Accordingly, the unrefuted evidence in the motion record demonstrates defendants promptly remedied the issues cited by plaintiff. And there is no evidence to suggest defendants affirmatively acted to commit any deceptive, unconscionable, or fraudulent practices regarding the habitability of plaintiff's apartment.

Section 56:8-2 applies to fraudulent inducement claims involving timeshare sales; RETA does not preempt its application.

Palmer v. Flagship Resort Development Corp., Etc. · filed 2025-04-14

We conclude no conflict between RETA and CFA exists. Defendant's conflict claim is based upon RETA's requirement that a plaintiff prove intent to succeed, and it is necessarily grounded in the plain language of both statutes. The record shows no specialized or technical areas in plaintiffs' fraud in the inducement claims which would prevent the CFA's general provisions from applying.

Section 56:8-2 does not make the lease and sale of a condominium unit unlawful when the seller owns the unit and the master deed permits the transactions.

Wedgewood Gardens Condominium Association, Inc., Etc. v. Wedgewood Gardens Developers, Inc. · filed 2025-02-05

We further conclude defendant did not commit any unlawful conduct under the CFA by the leasing and sale of the unit because WGD owned the unit, and their actions were permitted by the master deed.

Section 56:8-2 applies to landlord-tenant rentals, but a disclosed lack of a certificate of occupancy did not establish the extreme landlord conduct or false statement needed for this consumer fraud claim.

Rojas-Gomez v. Tyliczka · filed 2025-01-23

Here, we see no extreme conduct by the landlord. ... Based on our de novo review of the record, we agree with the trial court's findings and thus conclude that considering the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, he has failed to establish that defendant made any false statement of fact and therefore cannot establish the first element of a CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to a non-professional seller of real estate who does not advertise real estate services to the public.

MARIA TLATELPA v. MAURICIO TORRES (L-2829-19, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-02-28

Here, the CFA does not apply because the Defendant was not a professional seller of real estate. There is no evidence to suggest that the Defendant is a professional who advertises real estate services to the public. ... We agree with the trial court's finding and conclusion.

A landlord’s failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy does not state a claim under § 56:8-2 without facts showing conduct that rises to a condemned commercial practice.

RODRIGUEZ v. MAHARAJ · filed 2021-02-11

Second, even if a cause of action did exist against Kalinowski, the NJCFA “will only apply to extreme conduct . . . sufficient to meet the condemned commercial practices set forth in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.” 49 Prospect Street, 227 N.J. Super. at 469. Rodriguez has not pled any facts alleging that Kalinowski’s failure to obtain an occupancy certificate rises to that level.

Before the January 1976 amendment, § 56:8-2 did not cover ordinary home sales or real estate brokerage services.

Neveroski v. Blair · filed 1976-03-03

Similarly, in the absence of clear and explict language in the statute, a broker who negotiates the sale of real estate and thereby renders "services" is nevertheless outside the scope of persons sought to be covered by the Act. ... In the absence of a clear expression of intent to include the normal sale of real estate by a home-owner within the compass of the statute, we find that the act, as articulated, does not cover such a sale.

Section 56:8-2 may cover a bank’s resale of foreclosed property, and a consumer fraud claim about the bidding process can proceed even without a sale contract.

Jackson v. Manasquan Sav. Bank · filed 1993-09-20

It cannot be said at this stage that the Bank was not engaged in a "commercial" practice. Indeed, the opposite seems true. ... On the present record, this court is not prepared to say that DiBernardo bars the application of the Act to the Bank in this case or that the Jacksons have not stated a maintainable consumer fraud claim even though the alleged actions of the Bank never resulted in the creation of a contract between the parties.

Section 56:8-2 covers unconscionable commercial practices in the sale of real estate.

Cybul v. Atrium Palace Syndicate · filed 1994-04-21

There is, first, no question but that its scope expressly encompasses unconscionable commercial practices in connection with the sale of real estate. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 applies to real estate brokers, agents, and salespersons.

Arroyo v. Arnold-Baker & Associates, Inc. · filed 1985-01-08

The 1976 amendment, adding "the sale or advertisement of ... real estate" to the *297 provisions of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, requires an opposite conclusion. ... It brings real estate brokers, agents and salespersons within the coverage of the Act.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover an isolated sale of a single-family home by its owner.

DiBernardo v. Mosley · filed 1986-01-03

It is therefore concluded that the Act was intended as a response only to the public harm resulting from "the deception, misrepresentation and unconscionable practices engaged in by professional sellers seeking mass distribution of many types of consumer goods," Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 536 (1971), and not to the isolated sale of a single family residence by its owner.

Section 56:8-2 covers a commercial landlord’s prohibited practices during an ongoing residential tenancy, including subsequent performance even if the landlord did not induce the tenant to enter the tenancy.

49 Prospect Street v. Sheva Gardens, Inc. · filed 1988-08-22

The plain language of the statute in its present form requires a conclusion that it applies to landlords as "sellers" and tenants as "consumers" since it applies to the rental of real estate. ... While this is true, it ignores significant language of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, in which the Legislature has declared that use of the condemned practices, not only in connection with the "sale or advertisement of ... real estate," but also "with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid" to be an unlawful practice.

Section 56:8-2 allows a tenant's consumer fraud claim to proceed when disputed facts about option payments, termination language, and lease signing could establish an unlawful practice.

316 49 ST. ASSOCIATES LTD. v. Galvez · filed 1994-01-05

In this case, there are sufficient questions of fact regarding the legality of the option payments, the inclusion of the 60-day termination language and the circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement[5] to defeat plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendant's counterclaim is therefore remanded for trial.

For purposes of a § 56:8-2 claim arising from a tax sale, the certificate is the merchandise sold; the underlying real estate is not sold.

Kahn Pension Plan v. Moorestown Tp. · filed 1990-01-30

Assuming, without deciding, that the Act applies to tax sales, reliance thereon is misplaced. The Plan bought only a Tax Sale Certificate. There is no defect in the Certificate or in any of the proceedings involved in its sale. The Certificate was the only "merchandise" sold and no impropriety occurred in connection with that sale. No real estate was sold.

Section 56:8-2 applies to residential rentals; its application is not confined to the facts of earlier landlord-tenant cases.

De La Cruz v. Cohen (In Re Cohen) · filed 1996-02-07

The Court finds nothing in either of these opinions which states or implies that the Act’s applicability to the rental of residential real estate is confined to the facts of these cases.

Section 56:8-2 makes a real estate broker liable for an affirmative, material misrepresentation of fact without proof that the broker knew it was false or intended to deceive.

Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors · filed 1996-03-15

Where a broker or merchant makes an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, the Act does not require a showing of knowledge of falsity or intent to deceive in order to hold the offender liable to the purchaser.

Section 56:8-2 applies to professional real estate brokers and agents even when they represent non-professional sellers.

Byrne v. Weichert Realtors · filed 1996-04-30

Furthermore, the purpose of the Act, to protect consumers against "commercial" practices, clearly applies to professional brokers and agents who, regardless of whether their clients are professional sellers, are acting in a professional, "commercial" capacity. We, therefore, proceed to apply the Act here.

Section 56:8-2 covers an architect who participates in marketing real estate by offering services that help induce a buyer to enter into or maintain a purchase contract.

Blatterfein v. Larken Associates · filed 1999-07-15

But where the architect has involved himself either as a principal or a retained professional in a real estate marketing venture wherein he permits his services to be held out as part of what is being sold, or provided by way of influencing purchasers to enter into contracts, or to maintain contractual relationships, he becomes subject to the Consumer Fraud Act just as every other person involved in inducing the sale or preserving the transaction may be.

Section 56:8-2 claims by real estate purchasers remain available under the Disclosure Act.

Nobrega v. Associates · filed 2000-01-21

The primary issue before us is whether "any other statutory provision" includes the provisions of section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Since we conclude that it does and hence that the Disclosure Act preserves intact the rights of real estate purchasers afforded by the Consumer Fraud Act, we need not decide in this action whether the retroactivity provision of the Disclosure Act passes constitutional muster.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to an owner's isolated sale of a residence.

Cinalli v. Kane · filed 2002-03-12

As stated above, the NJUTPA provision at issue is not applicable to the isolated sale of a residence by its owner.

Section 56:8-2 covers a landlord's affirmative act of raising rent above the limits set by a municipal rent control ordinance.

Wozniak v. Pennella · filed 2004-12-07

Here, Judge Dumont properly found that defendant violated the CFA through an affirmative act; i.e. raising plaintiffs' rent in excess of limitations established by Clifton's rent control ordinance.

Section 56:8-2 requires examining the nature of the transaction when a sale includes both a business and real estate; a motel purchased for continued operation can be classified as an ongoing business sale.

539 Absecon Boulevard, LLC v. Shan Enterprises Limited P'ship · filed 2009-03-26

The core legal issue that arises here is whether the CFA was intended by the Legislature to apply to a sale of an ongoing business, where the sale includes real property connected to that business. The trial court did not squarely resolve that legal issue. Instead, the court determined that although elements of the transaction here involved the sale of a business, it was essentially one for the sale of real estate with improvements attached to it. We disagree with the court's legal classification. The record as a whole shows that what defendants essentially sold to plaintiffs was an ongoing business, i.e., a motel, along with the land on which it was situated and an adjoining parcel.

Section 56:8-2 applies to realtors in connection with the sale or advertisement of real estate.

Lombardi v. Masso · filed 2011-08-26

First, as the judge himself pointed out in his November 16 order, his conclusion that the CFA did not apply to realtors was erroneous. See N.J.S.A 56:8-2 (declaring CFA applies to fraud and misrepresentation “in connection with the sale or advertisement of ... real estate”).

Section 56:8-2 can cover a foreclosure rescue plan that combines a property conveyance, real estate services, a trust, and a buy-back option.

D'agostino v. Ricardo Maldonado (068940) · filed 2013-10-03

The complex transaction crafted by defendant here — combining the conveyance of title to the Property, an agreement for real estate related services, a trust with the authority to manage the property and a buy-back option — is not exempt from the CFA by virtue of its unique combination of terms. To the contrary, we affirm the trial court’s finding that defendant’s foreclosure rescue plan is governed by N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, as adequately supported by the evidence.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to a nonprofessional, casual seller of real estate.

ABDM PROPERTIES, LLC VS. BOHDAN O. MEUSZ(L-0272-16, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-08-23

The CFA does not apply to "the non-professional, casual seller of real estate." ... The allegations are, therefore, insufficient to support a CFA claim against Sellers as a matter of law, and that claim against them is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 56:8-2 treats misrepresentation of property ownership and intentional omission of an engineering map in connection with a real estate sale as unlawful practices.

DOUGLAS MARTIN VS. BANK OF AMERICA (L-4030-08, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-30

Here, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict as to the first CFA element. For example, BOA's predecessor committed unlawful acts in misrepresenting to the Board its ownership of lots 2-6 in section II, and in omitting, with the intent to deceive M.G.C.C., an engineering map depicting "the proposed and required regrading of [s]ection II, lots 2 through 6."

Section 56:8-2 permits an unconscionable business practice claim against a real estate developer who contracts to sell property while falsely representing that he owns it, when the facts present a genuine issue for trial.

Minzberg v. Grinberger · filed 2026-02-27

This testimony establishes Grinberger's occupation as a real estate developer, presenting a genuine question of material fact as to whether he engaged in an "unconscionable business practice" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. This is particularly relevant because Grinberger did not own Lot 1.12 at the time he executed the purchase contract with Minzberg, yet represented himself as the owner.

Section 56:8-2 does not provide a consumer fraud claim against a regulated public utility when consumers have administrative recourse before the P.U.C. and subsequent judicial review.

Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co. · filed 1976-06-24

More importantly, the existence of a well-established forum wherein plaintiffs may obtain redress for any excess charges paid to a public utility militates against the assertion that the Consumer Fraud Act applies to public utilities. The Legislature, in enacting the Consumer Fraud Act, intended to provide a public remedy in areas of mass consumer transactions where none had previously existed. Kugler v. Romaine, supra. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to provide an alternate forum and additional remedies to a consumer who, as in the present factual context, has adequate administrative recourse to the P.U.C. coupled with a right to judicial review thereafter.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a regulated gas utility’s billing adjustments under a Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause.

Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Company · filed 1978-06-29

It seems clear that Elizabethtown, by using its Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause in its monthly billings, did not engage in a selling or advertising practice within the meaning of the Consumer Eraud Act.

Section 56:8-2 does not impose liability on architects for services within their profession under the learned professionals exception.

Borough of Caldwell v. Cozzarelli Cirminiello Architects, LLC · filed 2025-10-31

We conclude that where architects provide services consistent with the tenets of their profession and do not venture into unrelated endeavors outside of their field, they are exempt from liability under the CFA under the learned professionals exception.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a nursing home's advertising about the professional care it provides.

EMERSON · filed 2025-11-05

Defendants are learned professionals. Their advertising does not fall within the sweep of the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover consumer fraud claims against veterinarians because their services fall within the learned professional exception.

RIAD v. DEY EQUINE VETERINARIANS, P.A. · filed 2023-11-15

However, the Court concludes that veterinarians are exempt from NJCFA claims.

The learned professional exception to § 56:8-2 cannot support dismissal when the record does not establish whether the challenged billing was within a learned professional's professional capacity.

Williams-Hopkins v. Medwell, LLC · filed 2024-04-05

Here, based on the liberal standard under which we review a motion to dismiss, we are convinced the record was insufficient to permit the court to conclude the learned professional exception applied at this early stage without further information.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to an initial insurance coverage dispute.

BUI v. MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2021-08-09

However, New Jersey courts have consistently held that the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to initial coverage disputes. ... For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ Consumer Fraud Act claim fails as a matter of law, and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 42) will be granted on the Consumer Fraud Act claim.

Section 56:8-2 does not provide a claim for an insurer’s denial of benefits when the alleged fraud is part of the coverage dispute.

RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION v. FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2021-05-12

Here, Plaintiff does not assert an NJCFA claim wholly independent from its breach of contract claims. ... For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish that Defendant engaged in unlawful conduct.

Section 56:8-2 covers fraudulent performance of an insurance contract or a benefits denial that is part of a fraudulent scheme.

T-Mobile USA Inc v. Selective Insurance Company of America · filed 2021-05-11

If the claim is predicated on fraudulent performance of the insurance contract or the denial is part of a fraudulent scheme, then the CFA applies.

Section 56:8-2 permits violations of energy pricing and marketing regulations to support a consumer fraud claim based on an affirmative act or knowing omission.

MARSHALL v. VERDE ENERGY USA, INC. · filed 2020-10-05

Yet, the Court concludes that the Marketing and Pricing Regulations are nevertheless sufficient to support a claim pursuant to either an affirmative act or knowing omission theory.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat a credit card issuer’s refusal to provide a chargeback as an unlawful affirmative act when the purchase fails the card agreement’s geographic requirement.

BULUT v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. · filed 2020-04-29

Thus, Plaintiff’s purchases do not satisfy a basic, threshold requirement. Defendants’ failure to not provide Plaintiff with the requested chargeback, therefore, does not equate to an unlawful affirmative act.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover an insurer’s denial of policy benefits absent an unconscionable practice in the policy’s sale or marketing.

Speedwell Ventures, LLC v. Berley Associates, Ltd. · filed 2019-12-05

Absent a showing of an unconscionable business practice in the sale or marketing of the Policy, the Court cannot find that Stewart Title’s denial of coverage falls within the scope of the NJCFA.

A verbal confirmation of a home improvement change order that must be in writing is an unlawful practice under § 56:8-2.

MYCWHOME, LLC VS. SHINIKEQUA WHITE (DC-003785-17, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-23

The verbal confirmation of the change order was insufficient and amounted to an unlawful practice under the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 applies to licensed home inspectors; their separate regulation does not exempt them from Consumer Fraud Act liability absent a direct and unavoidable conflict.

SHAW VS. BRIAN SHAND (L-0408-16, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-08-15

Accordingly, because home inspectors are not historically recognized learned professionals and because no direct and unavoidable conflict exists between the CFA and the regulations governing home inspectors, we conclude that the CFA applies to the activities of licensed home inspectors.

Section 56:8-2 can apply to unlawful practices in the sale of a prescription IUD through a physician; prescription status does not exclude the sale.

Jones v. Sportelli · filed 1979-02-14

The lack of a duty to warn ultimate consumers may be relevant to the issue of whether a manufacturer of a prescription-legend product engaged in conduct violative of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 by knowingly concealing, suppressing or omitting a material fact with the intent that ultimate consumers rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission. However, in light of the possibility that a manufacturer might engage in unlawful practices regardless of whether it has a duty to warn, the principle of law does not serve to exclude the sale of a prescription-legend product from the protection afforded by the act.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover secondary mortgage transactions governed by the Secondary Mortgage Loan Act.

Westervelt v. Gateway Financial Service · filed 1983-06-27

I also hold, however, that secondary mortgage transactions governed by N.J.S.A. 17:11A-34 et seq. are not also subject to the provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to an insurer's handling of PIP benefit claims.

Pierzga v. Ohio Cas. Group of Ins. Companies · filed 1986-02-03

We see no reason to review the judge's factual findings (and thus we have not set out the facts at length) as we are convinced that he properly dismissed the claim for the legal reason that the act is inapplicable. ... This case does not involve a case of a consumer being victimized by unscrupulous or fraudulent marketing practices. Further, the insurance industry is already heavily regulated by the Department of Insurance. It thus appears that exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of insurance companies, at least with respect to the payment of claims, is within the Department of Insurance.

Section 56:8-2 applies to sales of merchandise for business use regardless of the buyer’s identity.

Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp. · filed 1986-09-11

Nothing in that statutory language suggests that the Act is inapplicable to the sale of merchandise for use in business operations. To the contrary, the language on its face makes the Act applicable to all sales of "merchandise" without regard to its intended use or the nature of the buyer.

Section 56:8-2 covers deceptive acts by remote suppliers, including component suppliers, when their products reach a buyer and their representations are made to or intended for that buyer.

Perth Amboy Iron Works v. Am. Home · filed 1988-06-30

We therefore interpret the Consumer Fraud Act to encompass the acts of remote suppliers, including suppliers of component parts, whose products are passed on to a buyer and whose representations are made to or intended to be conveyed to the buyer.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover fraud in the sale of shares of stock or other securities.

Stella v. Reynolds · filed 1990-04-24

However, we agree with the trial court that Sykes was not entitled to recover for a violation of the New Jersey Consumers Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 and N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, because a fraud in the sale of shares of stock or other securities is not within the compass of that statute.

Section 56:8-2 does not apply to the sale of securities.

Bramblewood v. C & G ASSOC. · filed 1992-06-26

Bramblewood and the other parties who have filed these motions against defendants are also entitled to summary judgment with respect to C & G's claims under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, because the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to the sale of securities.

Section 56:8-2 can apply to alleged fraud in a commercial lending transaction when no Uniform Commercial Code provision governs the transaction.

International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp North America, Inc. · filed 1990-04-27

While IMMCO has not identified any specific provision of the Consumer Fraud Act as a source for its claims against Citicorp, it is apparent that the only provision of the Act which would encompass the behavior currently under review is N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, which provides, in pertinent part, that: ... However, I can discern no provision of the Uniform Commercial Code which would govern the transaction at hand, and therefore find the cases Citicorp relies on for dismissal on these grounds to be inapposite. ... Accordingly, I see no basis for dismissal on this ground.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover the sale of a specialized industrial process that is not merchandise offered to the public.

BOC GROUP v. Lummus Crest · filed 1990-08-03

For the foregoing reasons, this court finds that the design in question does not fall within the definition of "merchandise" within the parameters of the Consumer Fraud Act and that the plaintiff is not a "consumer" within the purpose and intent of the Act.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover political fundraising solicitations, even when contributors are offered inclusion in a publication.

Del Tufo v. National Republican Senatorial Committee · filed 1991-03-26

Additionally, in this case, the use by the NRSC of an appeal to one's vanity by the inclusion of the contributor's name in a publication to be entitled "Who's Who in the Republican Party" does not convert the political solicitation into the commercial practice contemplated by N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover hospital services rendered to patients pursuant to medical judgment.

Hampton Hosp. v. Bresan · filed 1996-03-13

Our decision today is limited to an exclusion of hospitals from the purview of the Consumer Fraud Act for services rendered to its patients, pursuant to medical judgment.

Section 56:8-2 applies to fraudulent practices in the advertisement, sale, and making of loans.

Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management · filed 1996-04-19

Moreover, the Act prohibits fraudulent practices "in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. ... The Act must therefore be read to apply to the advertisement, sale, and making of loans.

Section 56:8-2 applies to deceptive practices in the sale and marketing of insurance policies.

YOURMAN BY & THROUGH YOURMAN v. People's SEC. Life Ins. Co. · filed 1998-01-28

Because the Court finds that the CFA does apply to the sale and marketing of insurance policies, defendant’s motion is denied.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat the mere denial of insurance benefits as an unconscionable commercial practice.

Van Holt v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1998-11-25

The mere denial of insurance benefits to which the plaintiffs believed they were entitled does not comprise an unconscionable commercial practice.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a client's claim about an accountant's professional tax advice when the advice is unrelated to a sale or transaction covered by the Consumer Fraud Act.

S & D ENVIRONMENTAL v. Rosenberg Rich Baker Berman & Co. · filed 1999-09-24

The Neveroski and Vort decisions thus make clear that the Act does not apply to claims based on allegations that a member of a regulated profession provided negligent or wrongful advice. The Act has been amended to permit claims to be stated against real estate brokers but it has not been amended to cover claims against attorneys or other regulated professionals, such as accountants. Thus, the Act does not apply to the claims stated against Rosenberg and its accountants in this action.

Section 56:8-2 applies to medical professionals’ commercial activity aimed at attracting patients, including deceptive representations about their services.

MacEdo v. Dello Russo · filed 2003-03-27

When professionals engage in common commercial activity designed to attract the patronage of the public, they should be held to the same standards of truth and completeness that govern the sales activities of all other persons or entities.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat the mere denial of an insurance claim, without more, as an unconscionable commercial practice.

NN&R, Inc. v. One Beacon Insurance Group · filed 2005-03-15

Without more, the mere denial of claims does not support a claim of unconscionable conduct.

Section 56:8-2 covers the sale of insurance policies, but a specialized business insurance policy is outside its consumer-oriented protection.

Great American Insurance v. Subranni (In Re Tri-State Armored Services, Inc.) · filed 2005-10-03

The sale of an insurance policy is covered under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. ... However, for two reasons, I conclude that the trustee does not have recourse under the Consumer Fraud Act in this case. ... First, the Comprehensive Employee Dishonesty, Crime and Disappearance Insurance Polices at issue here are not the types of insurance policies generally “available to the public at large and sold in large quantities.” ... This is not the typical type of insurance purchased for the protection of an individual consumer, but rather a specialized business oriented insurance contract.

Section 56:8-2 applies to deceptive billing for shorthand reporting services and deposition transcripts, including transcripts prepared for federal litigation.

Quigley v. ESQUIRE DEPOSITION SERV., LLC · filed 2008-05-19

Consequently, any "deception" or other violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 in the conduct of the shorthand reporting business could support a claim under the Act. ... We are satisfied that these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief under the Consumer Fraud Act that is not dependent upon the statute and regulations governing shorthand reporting.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a hospital’s billing practices for professional medical services.

DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hospital · filed 2008-06-24

In light of these cases, the contention that Defendants’ billing practices are covered by the Consumer Fraud Act is unsupportable, and this Count will be dismissed.

Section 56:8-2 can reach deceptive handling of funds for a securities purchase when the misconduct concerns the broker's services.

Lee v. First Union Nat. Bank · filed 2008-08-27

Because Mack's occupation is not among the class of "learned professionals" exempt from the CFA, his services constitute "merchandise." Therefore, his alleged conduct would be prohibited by N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, which bars "deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, [or] misrepresentation . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of . . . merchandise."

Section 56:8-2 can cover financial planning services because financial planners without uniform professional regulation do not qualify for the learned professionals exemption.

Finderne Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett · filed 2008-09-09

We are convinced that self-proclaimed "professionals" offering financial planning services, like Barrett and Papetti, are not the "learned professionals" identified by the court in Neveroski who are beyond the reach of the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 can cover agreements by a non-debtor mortgagor to cure a mortgage default after foreclosure when the agreements are closely allied to mortgage default cures.

Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp. · filed 2010-02-01

While we would hesitate greatly to hold that most "settlements" are subject to the CFA's strictures, we regard these particular agreements to be so closely allied to the cures of default recognized in N.J.S.A. 2A:50-57 as to warrant coverage. There is little doubt that, if Gonzalez had been the initial debtor and her attempts to cure default had taken place before entry of the order of foreclosure, the transactions would have been covered by the CFA under Lemelledo and Troup. We find no principled reason to distinguish the present structurally identical transactions, albeit by a non-debtor mortgagor, executed after a judgment of default had been entered.

Section 56:8-2 does not make an insurer’s failure to pay benefits under an enforceable contract a consumer fraud violation.

Daloisio v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2010-12-09

Such a claim, though, is a claim for breach of contract, and the breach of an enforceable contract does not constitute a violation of the CFA.

Absent a special relationship with the customer, Section 56:8-2 does not cover a bank's check processing practices that are commercially reasonable under the UCC.

Paley v. Bank of America · filed 2011-04-29

In short, we hold observance of practices deemed commercially reasonable by the UCC simply does not invoke the CFA and its laudable remedies.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a state-regulated nursing home's services, including its billing and collection practices, under the learned professional exception.

Manahawkin v. O'Neill · filed 2012-05-31

On that basis, we conclude that defendant's nursing home does not fall within the purview of CFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a nursing home's requirement that a responsible party sign an admission agreement an unlawful practice when the agreement complies with the Nursing Home Act.

Manahawkin Convalescent v. Frances O'neill (071033) · filed 2014-03-11

In light of the Admission Agreement’s compliance with the NHA, Manahawkin did not engage in the unlawful practice alleged by O’Neill when it required O’Neill to execute the Admission Agreement as a “Responsible Party.”

Section 56:8-2 covers insurance sales practices but does not provide damages for an insurer's refusal to pay benefits.

Myska v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. · filed 2015-05-08

Further, while the CFA "encompass[es] the sale of insurance policies as goods and services that are marketed to consumers," it was not intended as a vehicle to recover damages for an insurance company's refusal to pay benefits.

Whether insurance solicitation materials are fraudulent or deceptive under § 56:8-2 is a question of fact.

Hawkins v. Globe Life Insurance · filed 2015-05-13

Because the Court finds that whether or not Globe violated the CFA is a question of fact, Globe is not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 56:8-2 covers alleged misrepresentations about insurance coverage and failure to provide promised insurance documents when they cause an ascertainable loss.

Castro v. Sovran Self Storage, Inc. · filed 2015-07-16

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff has stated an ascertainable loss caused by Defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs CFA claim based on the alleged misrepresentations regarding the scope of insurance coverage and the failure to provide insurance contracts or a Certificate of Insurance will therefore be denied.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim based on fraudulent inducement in a mortgage loan modification, even when the allegations also support a breach of contract claim.

Block v. Seneca Mortgage Servicing · filed 2016-10-31

In short, although Plaintiffs allegations state a claim for breach of contract, they may also support an NJCFA cause of action. Because the alleged breach in this case also involved a fraudulent inducement of Plaintiff to incur legal detriments, Defendant Seneca’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs NJCFA claim is denied.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover ambulance services rendered under a professional license when the provider is regulated by the Department of Health.

ATLANTIC AMBULANCE CORPORATION VS. JOHN G. CULLUM ATLANTIC AMBULANCE CORPORATION VS. HALA HITTI(L-264-12 AND L-2097-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED) · filed 2017-06-29

Whether labeled "professionals" or "semi-professionals," we find that ambulance service providers are excluded from liability under the CFA for services rendered consistent with their professional license because they are regulated by the Department.

Section 56:8-2 can support a consumer fraud claim based on alleged unconscionable or deceptive conduct in the sale of insurance coverage.

BANACH VS. ALEX TARAKANOV(L-6238-13, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-09-12

These allegations not only loosely track the exception to the immunity statute, N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.9, they also allege conduct that would violate the CFA's broad proscription "of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception . . . , misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a negatively amortized adjustable rate mortgage loan predatory per se.

U.S. BANK, ETC. VS. JIN CHOI (F-015615-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-03-06

We have previously explained that a negatively amortized adjustable rate mortgage loan is not a per se predatory loan.

Section 56:8-2 does not make an insurer’s continued use of its repair pricing model an unlawful practice merely because other shops charge more, where insureds remain free to choose those shops.

Mikhail v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company · filed 2024-08-07

Therefore, if plaintiffs' prices were higher than those of the shops or facilities with which NJM had the most generous ... arrangement, it was not unlawful for NJM to continue offering a pricing model that lowers coverage costs for its insureds.

For a claim under section 56:8-2, the discovery rule requires considering when the plaintiff discovered, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts supporting the claim.

Medimatch, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies Inc. · filed 2000-10-24

Thus, having rejected defendants’ numerous arguments against the discovery rule, the Court next applies the rule to the facts of this case. ... While plaintiffs focus on the date of notification of the defect, they fail to address whether in the exercise of reasonable diligence they should have uncovered the defect earlier.

A claim under Section 56:8-2 has a six-year limitations period, and the discovery rule delays accrual until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known facts supporting the claim.

Hood v. Matt Blatt, Inc. · filed 2024-02-07

Plaintiff was required to bring her claims of Consumer Fraud Act violations, negligent misrepresentation, equitable fraud and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing within six years of when they accrued. ... Therefore, plaintiff did not know, nor should she have known, sufficient facts to commence the statute of limitations until she brought the vehicle to the other mechanics after the transmission failed in 2021.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim against persons involved in a real estate sale without requiring the buyer to pierce the seller's corporate veil.

Soltero v. M2m Ventures Group, LLC · filed 2024-07-09

Thus, the motion court should not have automatically dismissed plaintiffs' CFA claim simply because plaintiffs had not sufficiently pierced the corporate veil.

Section 56:8-2 permits liability for a corporate officer or employee who personally participates in a Consumer Fraud Act regulatory violation.

Allen v. v. AND a BROS., INC. · filed 2010-06-23

Liability can be imposed only upon proof of personal participation by an individual in a particular regulatory violation.

Section 56:8-2 does not impose personal liability based on being an agent or officer alone; the person must personally engage in an unlawful practice.

MULLER VS. FRED ALLEN BUILDERS (L-0289-16, GLOUCESTER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-05

Being an agent or officer, however, without more, does not establish an unlawful business practice under the CFA. Instead, to be liable, plaintiffs were required to prove that Sands engaged in an affirmative act; a knowing omission; or violated an administrative regulation. Dugan, 231 N.J. at 51. Plaintiffs did not satisfy this requirement.

Section 56:8-2 permits individual liability for a principal who personally commits a consumer fraud violation without piercing the corporate veil.

Dattolo v. Emc Squared, LLC · filed 2025-08-20

In addition, Morgan's argument that imposing individual liability would violate piercing doctrines is contrary to the Allen Court's holding that fees can be imposed in the "absence of veil-piercing." 208 N.J. at 133.