N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2

Section 56:8-2 does not make fraudulent nonperformance of a contract actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act without conduct beyond the contractual breach.

LOCKHART v. DORRANCE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. · filed 2023-01-11

In essence, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant fraudulently breached its obligations under the contract by failing to provide Plaintiff with accurate sales records; however, that is insufficient to establish a claim under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits affirmative misrepresentations about merchandise sold to a consumer.

Sitnikov v. Lebedinsky · filed 2026-05-18

Here, Vysotski cannot avoid liability under the CFA because he made an affirmative misrepresentation to plaintiff.

Section 56:8-2 defines unlawful practices to include unconscionable or abusive commercial practices, deception, misrepresentation, false statements and promises, and omissions.

Mucaj v. Coughlin · filed 2025-06-12

The primary definition of "unlawful practice" is contained in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, and includes unconscionable or abusive commercial practices, deception, misrepresentation, false statements and promises, and omissions.

Section 56:8-2 treats a fraudulent filing as an affirmative act of misrepresentation when it falsely represents the integrity of the filed documents.

MIGLIORE v. SEIBERT · filed 2024-03-28

This act satisfies the NJCFA’s “unlawful conduct” requirement because a fraudulent filing constitutes a “misrepresentation” regarding the integrity of the documents, which is an “affirmative act” of misconduct under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 permits a claim based on alleged misrepresentations about a drug’s effectiveness in connection with its sale.

ZAMFIROVA v. AMAG PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. · filed 2024-03-28

Here, Plaintiffs allege that AMAG “misrepresented Makena’s effectiveness at preventing preterm births[,]” constituting in part “unconscionable commercial conduct, deception, fraud, . . . misrepresentation, . . . or omission of a material fact with intent or reliance in connection with consumer sales of Makena . . . .” (SAC ¶¶ 190-91). Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged unlawful conduct.

Section 56:8-2 treats deception in connection with the advertisement or sale of merchandise as an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud Act.

GONZALEZ v. EASTERN INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE (L-2287-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2022-08-12

Plaintiff's amended complaint pled a cause of action for "deceptive trade practices," which is within the rubric of the CFA. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 (defining an unlawful practice as the "act, use or employment . . . of . . . deception . . . in connection with" the advertisement or sale of merchandise).

Section 56:8-2 treats affirmative deceptive acts in a vehicle purchase as unlawful practices.

CHEN VS. NORTHEAST MOTOR CARS, INC. (L-7271-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-10-05

Instead, the judge aptly characterized the case as one involving affirmative acts by the Venture defendants, which ultimately amounted to unlawful practices under the CFA. The judge was correct in her analysis.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim when a card issuer allegedly promises automatic account review after seven months but delays it for two years.

CAMPAGNA v. TD BANK, N.A. · filed 2021-08-18

Assuming, as the Court must, the veracity of Plaintiffs’ allegations, Defendant engaged in wrongful conduct when it promised Plaintiffs that their accounts would be automatically reviewed for graduation after seven months, only to not actually do so for two years. Defendant makes no argument that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy an any of the statutes’ other elements—generally, that Plaintiffs suffered losses because of Defendant’s wrongful conduct. Therefore, Plaintiffs have adequately stated claims under the state statutes.

Section 56:8-2 can support a consumer fraud claim when a dealer allegedly finances a vehicle in a customer's name without her authorization.

MARIA PIEMONTESE VS. THREE COUNTY VOLKSWAGEN CORPORATION (L-8975-18, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-04-21

Plaintiff's alleged facts also implicated a Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) claim, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20. CFA provides, in part, that it is unlawful for persons to use or employ any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise . . . whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby. [N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.] Although plaintiff's complaint was "bare bones" in nature, we are satisfied from the particular claims she asserted that the complaint was legally sufficient to withstand a dismissal under Rule 4:6-2(e).

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff alleging an affirmative misrepresentation to plead the specific misrepresentation with enough detail to satisfy Rule 9(b).

HOLSTON v. PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY · filed 2019-09-30

To the extent her negligent misrepresentation claim and her claim under the NJCFA allege an affirmative misrepresentation, Plaintiff has not pleaded what misrepresentation PHEAA made to Plaintiff. If Plaintiff fails to assert sufficient facts to assert a negligence claim it follows that her NJCFA claim, which has a heightened pleading standard, must fail as well. Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim fails to meet both the Rule 8 Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard and the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard required to state a viable NJCFA claim based on affirmative misrepresentations.

Section 56:8-2 does not require a buyer to prove reasonable reliance or the seller's knowledge of falsity for an affirmative misrepresentation claim.

CLIFFORD VS. CLIFTON COLFAX AUTO MALL (DC-000348-19, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2021-02-08

Unlike the elements of a common law fraud claim, the CFA does not require the plaintiff to have reasonably relied on the misrepresentation or that the defendant have knowledge or belief of the statement's falsity.

A claim under § 56:8-2 requires plausible factual allegations; bare allegations that an online forum concealed advertiser relationships and favored advertisers do not suffice.

East Coast Test Prep LLC v. Allnurses.com, Inc. · filed 2020-08-19

Test Prep claimed that Allnurses committed common law misrepresentation and violated the New Jersey and Minnesota Consumer Fraud Acts. See N.J. Stat. § 56:8- 2; Minn. Stat. § 325F.69. The complaint alleged that Allnurses held itself out to be a fair and impartial forum that “promote[d] the idea of lively debate,” but failed to disclose its relationship with Excelsior College and other advertisers. Test Prep claimed that Allnurses used the forum to advance the interests of those advertisers, as shown by Dukes’s like of monkeyhq’s post and by Allnurses’s actions in closing the thread, removing certain posts by a Test Prep employee, and disabling that employee’s account. We agree with the district court that these bare factual allegations do not state common law or statutory claims for fraud that are plausible on their face.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits fraud in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise; a claim under it is a Consumer Fraud Act claim.

CELGENE v. CENTRALUX LTD. · filed 2020-03-12

However, Plaintiff cites to N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2, which prohibits “fraud . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise.” Such a claim “is actionable under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.” See Celgene Corp. v. Distinct Pharma, No. 17-5303, 2019 WL 1220320, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2019). As such, the Court will treat this claim as being brought under the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not support a claim against a financing company when it neither engaged in an unconscionable commercial practice nor had an agency relationship with the vendor alleged to have done so.

ASCENTIUM CAPITAL LLC VS. A&A MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (L-1419-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-10-28

Here, there was no evidence that plaintiff employed any unconscionable commercial practice. Therefore, in order for defendants to have succeeded on their CFA claim they had to establish the agency relationship between plaintiff and Kunish or Helios, which the motion judge and we have found to not exist. Without such evidence, defendant's CFA claim was not viable and the motion judge properly dismissed the counter-claim with prejudice.

Section 56:8-2 does not require intent to deceive for an affirmative misrepresentation.

CUDJOE v. VENTURES TRUST 2013I-H-R BY MCM CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLP · filed 2019-08-16

These stray remarks are not enough to shake Gennari’s thoughtful discussion concluding that intent is not required to show a misrepresentation under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 lists alternative unlawful practices; allegations that a lender misrepresented and concealed its loan valuation formula can state a consumer fraud claim.

Professional Cleaning & Innovative Building Services, Inc. v. Kennedy Funding, Inc. · filed 2007-08-07

The conduct specified in the NJCFA as amounting to an unlawful practice is disjunctive. ... We hold that these allegations are sufficient to state an NJCFA claim under the liberal standard applied to a motion to amend.

Section 56:8-2 treats intentional concealment or omission of a product defect as unlawful conduct when the seller intends consumers to rely on it; allegations of affirmative misrepresentation must satisfy Rule 9(b) particularity.

Asp v. TOSHIBA AMERICA CONSUMER PRODUCTS, LLC · filed 2008-12-31

While Plaintiff fails to allege fraudulent misrepresentation with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), he sufficiently pleads fraudulent concealment and intentional omissions by Toshiba.

Section 56:8-2 covers alleged misrepresentations that a product was FDA approved and safe and effective for its advertised uses.

In Re Bayer Corp. Combination Aspirin Products Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation · filed 2010-03-30

“Unlawful practices” include “deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression, or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2. ... Plaintiffs easily meet the first requirement. As detailed at length above, plaintiffs have charged defendant with falsely implying that the FDA had approved the combination products and that they were safe and effective for their advertised uses.

Section 56:8-2’s unlawful-conduct element is adequately pleaded when a calling-card seller allegedly fails to disclose per-minute charges and fees and the complaint supplies an example card.

Ramirez v. STi Prepaid LLC · filed 2009-03-18

First, the Complaint alleges Defendants’ calling cards were marketed in a deceptive manner because they failed to adequately disclose the per-minute charges and the fees and costs associated with using the cards. ... The combination of this allegation and the example calling card is sufficient to claim “unlawful conduct” under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff alleging an omission to show that the defendant acted knowingly.

Viking Yacht Co. v. Composites One LLC · filed 2009-06-02

In order to prevail on NJCFA claim based on an omission, Plaintiffs must show that CCP acted “knowingly.”

Section 56:8-2 does not require proof of intent to mislead for affirmative acts of misrepresentation.

Bonnieview Homeowners Ass'n v. Woodmont Builders, L.L.C. · filed 2009-09-22

Both of these allegedly unlawful acts are “affirmative acts” that do not require proof of intent to mislead.

Section 56:8-2 requires a false statement of fact for an affirmative misrepresentation claim.

Viking Yacht Co Inc v. Composites One LLC · filed 2010-07-01

The District Court was correct that the statement CCP made was not false, and therefore it could not have been an affirmative misrepresentation.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim against a title agency for charging for services not performed when the charges fall outside reasonable business practice.

LANNIN v. NRT TITLE AGENCY, LLC · filed 2019-08-27

Drawing all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court finds these allegations sufficient to establish that NRT Title’s conduct “stand[s] outside the norm of reasonable business practice,” such that it would “victimize the average consumer.”

A complaint fails to state a claim under § 56:8-2 when it alleges no conduct constituting consumer fraud.

Abulkhair v. Citibank and Associates · filed 2011-06-28

Abulkhair’s amended complaint failed to state a claim under the CFA because it did not allege any behavior that would constitute fraud under that statute.

A claim of unlawful conduct under § 56:8-2 based on an NJCFA regulation requires an alleged violation of a specific regulation.

Crozier v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. · filed 2012-09-28

The only possible unlawful conduct here is either an affirmative act or a knowing omission on Defendants’ part because Plaintiffs have not alleged “violations of specific regulations promulgated under the NJCFA,” which are required to establish regulation violations.

A warranty covering a potential defect does not, by itself, bar a claim under § 56:8-2 that the seller knowingly concealed that defect.

Mickens v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2012-10-01

But at the motion-to-dismiss stage, I cannot say that the courts of New Jersey would hold generically, as a matter of law, that a warranty covering a potential defect precludes a material-omission claim under the CFA that the defendant knowingly concealed that defect.

A claim based on an omission requires knowing concealment of a material fact with the intention that the plaintiff rely on the concealment.

Coba v. Ford Motor Co · filed 2019-07-08

A plaintiff asserting a claim based on an omission must demonstrate that the defendant “(1) knowingly concealed (2) a material fact (3) with the intention that plaintiff rely upon the concealment.”

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff alleging an omission to show that the defendant knowingly concealed a material fact intending the plaintiff to rely on the concealment.

Coba v. Ford Motor Co · filed 2019-07-26

A plaintiff asserting a claim based on an omission must demonstrate that the defendant “(1) knowingly concealed (2) a material fact (3) with the intention that plaintiff rely upon the concealment.” Judge v. Blackfin Yacht Corp., 815 A.2d 537, 541 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.

An omission-based claim under § 56:8-2 requires facts showing that the seller knew of a material defect when it sold the product and concealed it with intent to deceive the purchaser.

PRIANO-KEYSER v. APPLE, INC. · filed 2019-12-30

Apple’s second and third arguments regarding the unlawful-conduct element are more persuasive. I agree that the CAC does not contain facts sufficient to demonstrate that Apple knew of the purported Defect when it sold Plaintiff her watch and that it concealed that knowledge with the intent to deceive the Plaintiff as purchaser.

Section 56:8-2 does not support a statutory fraud claim based solely on a later refusal to perform an agreement without facts showing an intended misrepresentation when the agreement was made.

Mankodi v. Trump Marina Associates · filed 2013-05-06

Finally, Counts 11 and 12 (common law and statutory fraud) fail because Mankodi alleged no facts showing that the Casino intended to rescind the blackjack hand at the time it represented that it would play it.

Section 56:8-2 requires factual support that a seller knew of and concealed a material defect to plead an unlawful practice based on concealment.

Gotthelf v. Toyota Mtr Sales USA · filed 2013-05-21

Because Gotthelf cannot demonstrate that Toyota engaged in “an unlawful practice” through its alleged omission or concealment of the HID headlamp defect, his NJCFA claim fails.

Section 56:8-2 treats an Energy Star logo as an affirmative misrepresentation when the product allegedly fails to meet Energy Star standards.

Dzielak v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 2014-06-16

Accordingly, I find Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to set forth a claim that the Energy Star logo was an affirmative misrepresentation under the NJCFA.

A lender can commit an affirmative misrepresentation under § 56:8-2 by promising to evaluate a loan modification, inducing the borrower to pay, and then failing to conduct the promised evaluation.

Sarlo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-03-24

Under these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant offered to evaluate Plaintiffs for a loan modification within twelve weeks; that this statement induced Plaintiffs to submit payment; and that Defendant failed to properly assess Plaintiffs as they said they would do. Defendant could reasonably be found to have engaged in misrepresentation under the NJCFA.

A claim based on an affirmative misrepresentation under § 56:8-2 must meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

Ferring Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Braintree Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2014-08-04

That position is unsupported by the case law. Numerous courts have stated that a heightened pleading standard applies to NJCFA claims and have not distinguished between affirmative acts and omissions.

Section 56:8-2 supports a consumer fraud claim based on a breach of contract when the breach is accompanied by substantial aggravating circumstances.

In re Lincoln National Coi Litigation · filed 2017-09-11

a plaintiff must allege that the breach was accompanied by “substantial aggravating circumstances.” ... For the same reasons discussed in Sub-part IX.A, Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to state a claim.

A claim under § 56:8-2 requires unlawful conduct, an ascertainable loss, and causation; a casino does not misrepresent a promotional offer when its stated terms match what it provides.

Abramowitz v. Tropicana Atlantic City Corp · filed 2018-09-20

The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act requires proof of (1) a defendant’s unlawful con- duct, (2) a plaintiff’s ascertainable loss, and (3) a causal relationship between the two. ... Here, there is no evidence that either casino misrepresented anything. So all three claims fail.

A claim based on affirmative misrepresentations under § 56:8-2 must identify with specificity the false statements the consumer saw or relied upon.

SURIAGA v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY · filed 2019-12-12

Without specific allegations as to what false statements Plaintiff saw or relied upon, Plaintiff’s allegations based on affirmative acts are too conclusory to state a claim under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires facts showing an unlawful practice, such as deception or a material nondisclosure, to support a Consumer Fraud Act claim.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2022-12-23

The Claimant has not alleged facts to satisfy any of these elements, nor has he pleaded facts to support an assertion of unlawful conduct by Ditech directly attributable to loss he suffered.

Section 56:8-2 requires particularized allegations of unlawful conduct; general accusations that a vehicle maker misrepresented or concealed a defect do not suffice.

STRATIS v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC · filed 2023-04-26

Here, Stratis has failed to plead unlawful conduct with the particularity required to sustain a claim under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2’s unlawful-conduct element is sufficiently pleaded by allegations that an auction house misrepresented its intent to complete a consigned sale to induce the owner to enter an agreement.

SPIEGEL v. GOLDIN AUCTIONS, LLC · filed 2023-11-21

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege misrepresentation on the part of Goldin LLC to complete the sale of the Card. Compl. ¶ 234. Plaintiffs further allege that Goldin LLC intended that Plaintiffs rely on the misrepresentation to enter into an agreement, whereby Goldin LLC would market and sell the Card. Id. ¶ 235. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the first element of a CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 requires facts supporting an unlawful consumer practice; a conclusory assertion that conduct violated the consumer fraud statute does not state a claim.

KATZ v. AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC. · filed 2020-09-16

First, Katz’s NJCFA claim merely alleges Ambits alleged “actions constitute a violation of the consumer fraud statute.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 5.) Katz does not allege any of the elements to satisfy a NJCFA claim. Instead, Katz makes a conclusory allegation that is devoid of facts sufficient to meet the both the elements of the NJCFA and the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). As such, Katz’s NJCFA claim must be dismissed.

A consumer fraud claim under § 56:8-2 alleging misrepresentations must plead them with the particularity required by Rule 9(b); a general allegation spanning years is insufficient.

QUALITY EYE ASSOCIATES, LLC v. ECL GROUP, LLC · filed 2022-07-25

Both Common Law Fraud and Consumer Fraud claims are subject to heightened pleading requirements. ... Both fraud claims fail the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement for the same reasons. ... Plaintiff only alleges that the misrepresentation occurred from 2013 onwards. They do not plead specific days that misrepresentations were made, which of Defendant’s employees made them, where they made them, or provide anything further to substantiate them. ... Accordingly, the fraud claims are dismissed.

A claim under § 56:8-2 for false advertising or concealment must identify facts describing the challenged conduct; conclusory allegations do not state a plausible claim.

JAMES v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY · filed 2023-07-20

The TAC includes allegations that Defendants violated New Jersey state law, namely the New Jersey Tort Claims Act; NJLAD; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:19 “for trying to [get him] to commit an illegal act of paying for a disability accommodation”; and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 “for false advertising and for concealment.” (ECF No. 53 at 5, 17 (cleaned up).) These allegations, lacking any meaningful detail, are “mere conclusions” and thus “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges no facts in support of these tort claims. Nor does Plaintiff explain how the act of paying for transcripts was illegal or describe what actions amounted to false advertising or concealment.

An affirmative act violating § 56:8-2 does not require proof that the defendant intended to commit an unlawful act.

CDK GLOBAL, LLC v. TULLEY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC. · filed 2020-09-25

Unlike a claim for common law fraud, if the alleged consumer-fraud violation consists of an affirmative act under the NJCFA, intent is not an essential element, and the plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendant intended to commit an unlawful act.

Section 56:8-2 requires allegations beyond a mere breach of contract to state an unconscionable commercial practice claim.

GALGANO v. TD BANK, N.A. · filed 2021-06-17

In other words, allegations of breach of contract, alone, are insufficient to state a claim for violation of the NJCFA, and a plaintiff may not merely repurpose a breach of contract claim into an “unconscionable commercial practice” claim under the NJCFA.

A breach of contract violates § 56:8-2 only when substantial aggravating circumstances accompany the breach.

VITA v. VITA · filed 2022-02-08

To find that a breach of a contract violates the NJ CFA, a court must conclude that “substantial aggravating circumstances” are present in addition to the breach.

Fraud-based claims under § 56:8-2 must plead the circumstances of the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b).

TWIN CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC v. WICKSTROM · filed 2021-09-30

Applying Rule 9(b) scrutiny to Wickstrom’s CFA claims, the Court finds that Wickstrom has failed to properly allege a claim against TCP, Pappalardo or Kwasny. Wickstrom offers no facts to evince the “circumstances of the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity[.]” Frederico, 507 F.3d at 200.

A deceptive trade practices claim under § 56:8-2 must plead the alleged fraud with particularity, including the defendant’s specific actions, when and where they occurred, and the participants’ roles.

SANTIAGO v. TOTAL LIFE CHANGES LLC · filed 2022-07-07

NJCFA claims are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), which requires a plaintiff to identify specific actions taken by a defendant, when and where those actions were taken, and the identity and role of individual actors participating in the allegedly fraudulent scheme.

Section 56:8-2 requires facts showing an unlawful practice, such as a misrepresentation, knowing omission, or regulation violation; an unsupported allegation that promised commissions went unpaid does not suffice.

KZ ENTERTAINMENT LLC v. SULEKHA USA LLC · filed 2024-12-30

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a claim for a violation of the NJCFA because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant engaged in an unlawful practice in violation of the NJCFA, i.e., Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a misrepresentation, omission, or regulation violation by Defendant.

A claim under § 56:8-2 based on alleged misrepresentations must plead the misconduct with particularity; a formulaic recitation of the elements is insufficient under Rule 9(b).

ABIRA MEDICAL LABORATORIES, LLC v. METRO RISK MANAGEMENT, LLC · filed 2024-07-29

Because Plaintiff’s allegations amount to no more than a formulaic recitation of the elements, Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim is deficient under Rule 9(b).

A claim under § 56:8-2 based on a misrepresentation or omission requires an actionable statement or omission attributable to the defendant.

REINKRAUT v. FCA US LLC · filed 2024-09-05

Neither Reinkraut nor Solimando identify actionable misrepresentations or omissions attributable to FCA.

An affirmative misrepresentation claim under § 56:8-2 may turn on whether disputed language in a rental agreement has the capacity to mislead consumers.

VALLI v. AVIS BUDGET RENTAL CAR GROUP, LLC · filed 2024-09-30

Thus, the Court finds Defendants have offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether an affirmative misrepresentation and the capacity to mislead exists based the use of the term “violation” in either agreement.

A misrepresentation claim under § 56:8-2 must identify the particular representations, who made them, to whom, and when.

ABIRA MEDICAL LABORATORIES, LLC v. BPA BESTLIFE BENEFIT PLAN ADMINISTRATORS AND THEIR AFFILIATES · filed 2024-10-30

Plaintiff does not allege what specific representations Defendant made, who made them and to whom, and when they were made. Because Plaintiff’s allegations amount to no more than a formulaic recitation of the elements, Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim is deficient under Rule 9(b).

Section 56:8-2 requires an actionable misrepresentation; a statement about intended future conduct can qualify if the speaker had the opposite intent when making it.

Phillips · filed 2026-01-29

A statement of intent to do something (or not do something) in the future can be a misrepresentation if the speaker had the opposite intent. But Plaintiffs do not plead facts plausibly suggesting that, at the time Defendant said the 2021 Hellcat would be a single-year run, it did not actually intend for it to be a single-year run. And Plaintiffs have not cited to the Court any case finding a consumer fraud violation (under any of the relevant state statutes) where the alleged “misrepresentation” pertained to intended future conduct and was true when made. Counts I through IX will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Section 56:8-2 does not make it an unlawful practice for a vehicle dealer to withhold a second key until the buyer meets conditions stated in their agreement.

BARATTA · filed 2026-02-17

Accepting the allegations in the TAC as true and considering the express terms of the contracts Plaintiff signed, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that Defendants engaged in unlawful conduct by withholding the second key prior to Plaintiff delivering the title for the trade in, securing funding, and delivering a valid insurance card.

A claim alleging an unlawful practice must identify the practice with sufficient factual detail, including timing when timing determines whether the conduct was deceptive.

Frederico v. Home Depot · filed 2007-11-09

Without information as to when Frederico attempted to return the vehicle, whether before the closing listed on the Agreement (10 PM) or after, the grounds for and contours of the alleged unlawful practice are unclear. ... Frederico therefore failed to sufficiently allege an unlawful practice with requisite specificity.

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim based on a material affirmative misrepresentation or a material omission made with knowledge and intent that others rely on it.

International Union v. Merck & Co. · filed 2006-03-31

To establish consumer fraud in this case, plaintiff must prove either that Merck affirmatively misrepresented a fact material to the placement of Vioxx on a formulary or that Merck omitted a material fact knowing and intending that others would rely on the omission to place the drug on their formularies.

Section 56:8-2 lists alternative forms of unlawful conduct; an unconscionable commercial practice can violate it without fraud.

Wanland & Associates Inc. v. Nortel Networks Ltd. (In Re Norvergence) · filed 2008-02-28

The text of the statute and applicable case law indicate that wrongful conduct outlined in the NJCFA is to be read disjunctively.

Section 56:8-2 treats proof of any one of its prohibited acts or omissions as sufficient to establish unlawful conduct.

Francis E. Parker Memorial Home, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific LLC · filed 2013-05-20

Next, GP argues that the conduct here does not qualify as an unconscionable commercial practice, which is only one of the forbidden types of acts listed under N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2, supra at 556-57, in addition to fraud, deception, or misrepresentation. To be sure, proof of any one of the acts or omissions forbidden by the CFA is sufficient to establish unlawful conduct.

Section 56:8-2’s unlawful-practice requirement is not satisfied by predicate acts that fail as a matter of law.

Houck v. Ferrari · filed 2014-10-22

The NJCFA defines an “unlawful practice” to include: “any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Plaintiffs contend that their false imprisonment, assault, and conversion claims constitute the “unlawful conduct” element of their NJCFA claim. Because those predicate “unlawful” acts fail as a matter of law, so does plaintiffs’ NJCFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff to identify unlawful conduct, such as an unconscionable practice, a material misrepresentation causing damages, or material concealment inducing action.

Paul and Barbara Miller v. Bank of America Home Loan Servicing, L.P. · filed 2015-03-05

Plaintiffs' CFA claim fails because they fail to identify defendant's unlawful conduct, which they claim encompassed an unconscionable practice or violation of law; detail material misrepresentations they reasonably relied upon resulting in damages; or proffer facts demonstrating a business practice to materially conceal information that ultimately induced them to act.

Section 56:8-2 can cover a misleading indemnification clause in a consumer contract when the consumer plausibly incurs costs defending against its enforcement.

Martinez-Santiago v. Public Storage · filed 2014-08-14

The provision plausibly has the capacity to mislead the average consumer, because the average consumer may believe that such a provision in a standard form contract is enforceable under New Jersey law. That Public Storage would seek to make Martinez-Santiago responsible for money Defendant owed to Colon based on Defendant’s alleged failure to clear snow and ice in front of its own storage unit stands outside the norm of reasonable business practice. The costs that Martinez-Santiago incurred defending against the indemnification action plausibly constitute an ascertainable loss directly attributable to the allegedly unlawful conduct.

Section 56:8-2 encompasses three categories of unlawful practices: affirmative acts, knowing omissions, and regulation violations.

In re Residential Capital, LLC · filed 2014-10-06

In other words, “[u]nlawful practices fall into three general categories: affirmative acts, knowing omissions, and regulation violations.” Frederico, 507 F.3d at 202 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Section 56:8-2 requires adequately pleaded unlawful conduct; clear notice of an insurance coverage change did not support such an allegation.

DeGennaro v. American Bankers Insurance Co · filed 2018-06-08

DeGennaro fails to plead unlawful conduct because, inter alia, Defendants clearly put him on notice of the policy change through the initial revised declaration sheet, an email, accurate declaration sheets at renewal time, and even two notices indicating a possible coverage gap. Simply put, he fails to adequately plead any “affirmative act[], knowing omission[], [or] regulatory violation[]” as required under the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires a consumer fraud plaintiff to plead the defendant’s unlawful conduct with particularity; conclusory allegations of fraud and deception are insufficient.

SALZANO v. ARMT 2007-2 · filed 2019-06-06

At minimum, both claims require Plaintiff to allege, with particularity, a material misrepresentation or unlawful conduct by Defendants.

Section 56:8-2 requires proof of unlawful conduct to sustain a Consumer Fraud Act claim.

SHAH v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION · filed 2020-10-06

Plaintiff has failed to provide facts showing any unlawful conduct by the Defendants, and in some instances, has demonstrated that Defendant’s conduct was completely proper. Because he cannot satisfy an essential element of the CFA, Plaintiff’s fraud claim must fail.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits fraud connected with the sale of goods, services, or real estate; a bare allegation of inducement into a fraudulent mortgage does not adequately allege an unlawful practice.

PARADISO v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. · filed 2022-11-23

Turning to the first element, plaintiffs claim that Bank of America’s actions give rise to a violation of both N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, which prohibits fraud in connection with the sale of goods, services, or real estate, and N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.2, which provides that “[t]he advertisement of merchandise as part of a plan or scheme not to sell the item or service so advertised or not to sell the same at the advertised price is an unlawful practice and a violation of the [CFA].” ... Plaintiffs’ CFA claims fail at the first step of the inquiry, as their allegations fall short of asserting an “unlawful practice” under Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. Albeit they assert they were “induced” into a fraudulent mortgage, there are no facts describing how that inducement came about.

Section 56:8-2 requires a claimant to plead specific facts showing fraudulent conduct or an unconscionable commercial practice; bare allegations of a contract breach are insufficient.

Ms Services, LLC v. Calabria · filed 2024-02-26

Because Calabria's CFA claims lacked averment of a fraudulent conduct or an unconscionable practice by BOTW that was prohibited under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, dismissal for failure to state a claim was warranted.

A plaintiff alleging an unlawful practice under § 56:8-2 must plead specific facts identifying that practice; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Owoh v. Phh Mortgage Services, LLC · filed 2024-03-14

Similarly, here plaintiff asserts only conclusory statements and does not plead the elements of a CFA claim, warranting dismissal under Rule 4:5-8(a). Plaintiff's complaint lacks specificity as to what unlawful practice under the CFA is alleged.

Section 56:8-2 requires the alleged misrepresentation, concealment, or omission to be connected with a sale; allegations based on the stated lease terms did not establish such conduct.

AJAYI v. CULA, LLC · filed 2024-05-09

As to unlawful conduct, Plaintiff did not allege false “misrepresentation[s][,]” “knowing concealment[s],” or “omission[s] of any material fact” in “connection with the sale” of the Lease ... because the basis of Plaintiff’s claim are provisions stated in the Lease.

Section 56:8-2's unlawful-practice requirement can be met by allegations of deceptive automotive repair conduct, including violations of CFA regulations.

BRITTANY McHUGH AND CINDY OZIEGBE v. CARLOS ORTIZ AND ORTIZ TRANSMISSIONS, LLC · filed 2024-05-16

As such, we disagree with the judge's finding that plaintiffs' complaint did not allege a CFA claim. To the contrary, plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleges violations of the CFA, including violations of its regulatory provisions.

Section 56:8-2 requires evidence of an unlawful commercial practice to establish a Consumer Fraud Act violation; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Discover Bank v. Podurgiel · filed 2024-10-18

Defendant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment was devoid of any basis for the motion judge to conclude plaintiff violated the TILA, CARD, Regulation Z, TCCWNA, or CFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires facts demonstrating unlawful conduct to support a Consumer Fraud Act claim.

Spectrum Capital North Bergen, LLC v. Crown Bank · filed 2025-02-27

Setting aside the issue of whether a commercial loan is considered the sale of "merchandise" under the CFA, we agree with the judge's determination that plaintiff's amended complaint5 and statement of material facts are bereft of any facts demonstrating the unlawful conduct necessary to support a CFA claim against defendant.

Section 56:8-2 requires a CFA claimant to identify an unlawful practice; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Stonefield Investment Fund III, LLC v. L and J Enterprises 1, LLC · filed 2024-09-24

Plaintiffs' complaint lacks specificity as to what unlawful practice under the CFA is alleged.

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff alleging unlawful conduct in recommended upgrades to identify the upgrades and explain how the seller’s actions were unlawful.

JJ Bada 464 Operating Corp., Etc. v. Advance Security Systems, Etc. · filed 2025-09-15

It further claimed Advanced recommended upgrades to the system, which failed to rectify the false alarm issue, but likewise did not identify which ... upgrades were implemented, when such upgrades occurred, or how Advanced's actions in connection with the purported upgrades constituted unlawful conduct under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 requires facts showing deceptive, fraudulent, or misrepresentative conduct; conclusory allegations based on a breach of contract do not suffice.

22ND CENTURY TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. ILABS, INC. · filed 2022-03-18

Here, on this record, the Court is not convinced Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts for its consumer fraud act claims to proceed. Namely, patently absent from the Complaint are facts as to Defendant’s actions that were deceptive, fraudulent, or a misrepresentation.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a mortgage fee unfair or deceptive when the fee complies with New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9.

Skypala v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. · filed 2009-09-01

As already explained, the fees assessed were not in violation of New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9, and therefore there can be nothing unfair or deceptive about that fee as a matter of law.

Section 56:8-2 does not prohibit a bank from reordering withdrawals when its account agreement clearly discloses that practice.

Hassler v. Sovereign Bank · filed 2010-03-15

The terms of the Account Agreement here clearly explained the actions that Sovereign eventually undertook. Therefore, there is no jury question, but only the legal question of whether those terms and actions violate the NJCFA in light of having been explained in the Account Agreement. ... This claim was properly dismissed. The Account Agreement explicitly provided for the reordering of charges of which Hassler complains.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat a disclosed destination charge as deceptive merely because it includes profit; calling an amount a “charge” does not imply that it equals the seller’s cost.

ENRIGHT v. FCA US LLC · filed 2024-10-24

These third-party statements do not alter this Court’s prior conclusion that the term “charge” does not imply an absence of profit.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits a dealer from falsely stating that it paid the entire extended-warranty charge to another company when it retained part of the charge.

Cannon v. Cherry Hill Toyota, Inc. · filed 2001-08-29

The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is that Cherry Hill violated TILA and the NJCFA because it made material misrepresentations on form contracts used in connection with the sale of extended automobile warranties, stating that the entire charge for the warranty was paid to others when in fact Cherry Hill Toyota retained a substantial portion for itself as profit or commission. ... However, although plaintiff is not entitled to actual or ascertainable damages in this case, defendant’s conduct nonetheless violated TILA and NJCFA, and thus plaintiff is entitled to recover statutory damages under TILA and attorneys’ fees, as explained below.

Section 56:8-2 does not provide relief for general advertising claims of product quality that amount to puffery.

Shore Star Properties, LLC v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co., Inc. · filed 2025-09-22

We are satisfied the court properly determined Kolbe's advertising statements that its products are "high[-]end windows and doors" made with the "finest materials" and "crafted with attention to detail and thoughtful engineering," and that its products are "water-tight" are nothing more than puffery or exaggerated claims of product quality that will not support relief under the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a general advertisement describing a restaurant as a “neighborhood restaurant” actionable because the description is puffery.

Arefin v. the Doherty Group, Inc. · filed 2025-11-18

Furthermore, an advertisement generally stating Applebee's is a "neighborhood restaurant" is "puffery" that is not actionable pursuant to the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 uses an objective average consumer standard to assess whether product labeling is false, deceptive, or materially misleading.

DIEBLER v. SANMEDICA INTERNATIONAL, LLC · filed 2021-12-30

Under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”), the issue of whether a particular statement on a product’s packaging or labeling is false, deceptive, or materially misleading is evaluated according to an objective “average consumer” standard.

Section 56:8-2 treats false claims about a product’s therapeutic efficacy in its sale or advertising as an unlawful practice.

HOFFMAN VS. KING BIO, INC. (L-2981-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-07-30

Although improperly parceled out across five counts of his amended complaint, see R. 4:5-7; R. 1:4-2, plaintiff has clearly alleged that King Bio's claims for the efficacy of its Flu Relief product are false, thus constituting an unlawful ... practice in connection with its sale or advertisement, see N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 permits a false-advertising claim alleging that a product does not work as advertised; a lack of scientific substantiation alone does not state that claim.

DIEBLER v. SANMEDICA INTERNATIONAL, LLC · filed 2020-09-22

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pleaded falsity, not just lack of substantiation. ... As such, the Court finds that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act does recognize Plaintiff’s claim.

A claim under § 56:8-2 based on misleading product packaging fails when the explanatory disclaimer’s language and placement are not misleading to a reasonable consumer.

JOHNSON v. SHOP-VAC CORPORATION · filed 2020-06-29

Therefore, the Court does not find the placement of the explanatory language misleading to the reasonable consumer. In sum, nine of the eleven causes of action alleged in the Complaint require a plausible allegation of either a false statement or misrepresentation of material fact.8 Because the Court finds neither the language contained in the disclaimer nor the disclaimer’s placement misleading, Shop-Vac’s Motion to Dismiss Counts Three through Eleven of the Complaint is GRANTED.

Section 56:8-2 can reach product labels that are literally true if they mislead the average consumer.

Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co. · filed 2011-03-23

And second, even if the Court could consider the facts Defendants ask it to consider, the fact that the labels were literally true does not mean they cannot be misleading to the average consumer.

Section 56:8-2 can reach law school employment-rate advertising that is literally true but plausibly misleads prospective students into believing the rate refers to law-related jobs.

Harnish v. Widener University School of Law · filed 2013-03-20

Within this context, it is not implausible that a prospective law student making the choice of whether or which law school to attend, would believe that the employment rate referred to law related employment.

Section 56:8-2 reaches advertising that is misleading or deceptive to an ordinary consumer even if the statement is literally true.

Eberhart v. LG Electronics USA, Inc. · filed 2016-05-24

As to the first point, Judge Arleo already concluded that Plaintiff “adequately alleged unlawful conduct under- the CFA.” Opinion at 7-8. As Judge Arleo correctly noted, a statement can still be misleading and deceptive to an ordinary consumer even if it is not literally false.

A claim under § 56:8-2 based on deceptive credit-card solicitations fails when the plaintiff cannot identify a misleading or deceptive representation.

In re Capital One Bank Credit Card Interest Rate Litigation · filed 2014-11-03

Again, Mancuso cannot point to any misleading or deceptive representation made by Capital One because she does not have the original solicitations.

Section 56:8-2 does not prohibit the nearby sale of products merely because their packaging colors and prices differ when their ingredients and amounts are listed on the packages.

Boris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2016-04-25

The fatal flaw in all of Boris’ claims is his assertion that the mere fact of the proximate presentation of the two products with their different colors and prices is sufficient to run afoul of those laws, even though the ingredients and their amounts are listed on the packages. He cites no case from those states which so holds. We see no reason to declare that those states would extend the protection of their already protective laws to cover the claims pled by Boris.

Section 56:8-2 permits a deception or misrepresentation claim based on misleading ACH transfer disclosures even when the bank disclosed its fee schedule.

Bruin v. Bank Of America, N.A. · filed 2022-03-31

Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants have not disclosed their ACH fee schedule, instead, Plaintiffs assert that these disclosures are deceptive and mislead the accountholders. These allegations are sufficient.

Section 56:8-2 supports a consumer fraud claim when a solar-panel seller deceptively represents the financing terms and conceals the actual loan contract.

SHOUKAT v. GOODLEAP, LLC · filed 2025-04-23

The well-pleaded factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint favor entering default judgment against Defendant for violating the provisions and regulations of the CFA. Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that in November 2022, he was visited at his home by Defendant’s representative, who offered to install solar panels on his property in exchange for a 25-year loan for $25,000, for which Plaintiff understood he would be reimbursed by state and federal incentives. ... Plaintiff also alleges that he repeatedly requested that Defendant supply him with copies of the contract, and that he did not receive any such documentation of the transaction until August 9, 2023, when he received the Loan Contract for $148,948.38. (Id. ¶¶ 35-48.) Taken as true, these allegations sufficiently plead a claim that Defendant violated the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits advertising and representations that have the capacity to mislead consumers about the services offered.

Fleet v. United States Consumer Council, Inc. (In Re Fleet) · filed 1989-01-11

Applying this standard to the present case, we have no difficulty in concluding that the advertisements of USCC and the representations made by its employees not only had the capacity to, but did, in fact, mislead the financially-troubled consumers who turned to USCC for help.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits sales presentations that use false or unsubstantiated claims and conceal facts to induce purchases of distributorships.

Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. · filed 1972-07-26

I find that the presentations at the Golden Opportunity meetings and GO Tours were fraught with misrepresentations, unsubstantiated or false statements and concealments of fact, the details of all of which are set out above. They were designed and calculated, with the aid of the contrived manner in which the meetings and tours were conducted, to inveigle not only the gullible but the skeptical as well to purchase distributorships. I conclude that they constituted unlawful practices in violation of section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 exempts publishers from liability for unconscionable commercial advertising when they have no knowledge of the advertiser’s intent, design or purpose.

Yuhas v. Mudge · filed 1974-07-01

It is a significant to note that the condemnation of the unlawful practice of unconscionable commercial advertising exempts publishers when they have "no knowledge of the intent, design or purpose of the advertiser." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits deceptive auto repair pricing, including giving firm prices and then charging substantially more.

Levin v. Lewis · filed 1981-04-30

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 prohibits: ... [t]he act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, [or] misrepresentation ... in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise.... There was adequate support in the record to uphold the violations of the Consumer Fraud Act. Desert and Farrell both testified that they were originally given firm prices for the completion of work. In Desert's case he was subsequently billed more than twice the original price and Lewis refused to set a price for the completion of work, and to date the car is incomplete. Farrell was told the engine would cost $1,000 and later, when he received notice that the engine was finished, the bill would be twice the estimated price.

Section 56:8-2 covers advertisements capable of misleading consumers without proof that anyone was actually deceived.

Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc. · filed 1985-07-18

As indicated, there is no requirement that the State prove that consumers have actually been deceived. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Whether an advertisement is misleading to the average consumer is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact.

Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc. · filed 1987-01-30

Although there may be some circumstances in which an advertisement is so patently deceptive that a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act may be found as a matter of law, the determination whether an advertisement is misleading is ordinarily for the trier of fact — here the jury — to decide.

Section 56:8-2 prohibits unconscionable business practices, including a scheme to advertise a vehicle at one price and then refuse to sell it at that price.

Truex v. Ocean Dodge, Inc. · filed 1987-07-15

Plaintiff presented a prima facie case of a plan or scheme not to sell a motor vehicle as advertised or not to sell it at the advertised price, see N.J.A.C. 13:45A-2.2(a)1ii(1), (2), (3), (6), and given our scope of review, we do not disturb the trial court's findings that defendant engaged in an unconscionable business practice in violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.

Section 56:8-2 applies to allegedly deceptive casino promotions offering cash incentives to visit when applying it does not directly conflict with casino advertising regulations.

Smerling v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2006-12-13

Indeed, for purposes here relevant, both the consumer fraud and casino control schemes regulate with a mutual view toward "assuring that such advertisements are in no way deceptive." Compare N.J.S.A. 5:12-70(o) and N.J.A.C. 19:43-14.2 *176 with N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Thus, to the extent, if at all, that plaintiffs' consumer fraud claims implicate advertising regulations under the Casino Control Act, we discern "no direct and unavoidable conflict" between the dual regulatory schemes despite the trial court's speculative and unsupported finding to the contrary; nor do we perceive that judicial construction would affect the uniformity of the interpretation or application of the Casino Control Act's statutory or regulatory requirements.

Section 56:8-2 permits a false advertising claim without alleging that the buyer used the product, but requires facts showing that the seller's promises were false.

Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc. · filed 2009-01-30

In any event, a private party need not allege that he used a product in order to state a claim that the product was advertised and sold based on false promises in violation of the CFA. In fact, one person's experience with a product would not necessarily show that claims made about a product are false. Nevertheless, a plaintiff asserting such a claim must plead sufficient facts that, if proven, would establish the seller's promises about the product are false.

Section 56:8-2 permits repeated assurances and a package label describing meat-filled food as vegetarian to serve as prima facie evidence of misrepresentation.

Gupta v. Asha Enterprises, LLC · filed 2011-07-18

We conclude that the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, together with their supporting evidence, provide prima facie evidence of misrepresentations by Moghul Express's employees under either N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 or N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.10. In particular, we note plaintiffs' allegations that they were assured that Moghul Express did not make meat samosas, that they were repeatedly told that the samosas purchased by them were vegetarian, and that "VEG Samosa" was written on the container in which their order was packaged.

Section 56:8-2 does not impose liability based solely on a product’s price and package color, which are not actionable statements or omissions.

Boris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2014-04-09

As discussed above, neither Equate Migraine’s price nor its red packaging constitutes a statement or omission. Plaintiffs have presented no authority supporting the implausible premise that a product’s price and package color is a sufficient basis for liability under the NJCFA or the NYGBL.

For an advertised representation about a used car's condition, the car's condition at the time of sale matters; an earlier test drive without problems does not settle the issue.

TOPOLESKI VS. OLIGERT VESHI (DC-000171-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-01-08

Although the performance of the car on the test drive is undisputed, it is also immaterial. It is the condition of the vehicle at the time of sale, and not at the time of the test drive, that is at issue here.

Section 56:8-2 covers unconscionable practices in collecting on a mortgage-backed loan.

Td Bank, Etc. v. Farrendale Investments, LLC · filed 2024-08-01

The bank's assertion that there is no case law supporting application of the Consumer Fraud Act to mortgage-backed loans is incorrect. Our Supreme Court recognized the applicability of the Act to such loans in Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 584 (2011) (holding "[l]ending institutions and their servicing agents are not immune from the CFA"). There, the Court determined that unconscionable practices "in fashioning and collecting on" a loan constitute commercial practices "in connection with . . . the subsequent performance" of a loan that violates the CFA. Id. at 587; N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not make a creditor’s legally required filing of Form 1099-C an unlawful practice merely because the filing does not discharge the debt.

GERICKE v. TRUIST · filed 2021-03-26

Frustrating though that may be, it is clear that Truist was required by law to issue the Form 1099-C in this case. Doing so did not result in the actual discharge of Gericke’s debt. Truist made this clear to Gericke in their negotiations after the filing of the Form 1099-C. Therefore, there is no basis to find that Truist committed an “unlawful practice” as required by the CFA or “violated any clearly established legal right” as required by the TCCWNA.

Section 56:8-2 does not treat a lender's filing and prosecution of a foreclosure action to enforce its rights against a defaulting borrower as an unlawful practice.

D'ANGELO VS. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC (L-1934-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-05-08

Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the CFA claim based on the 2008 foreclosure action because the filing and prosecution of the action did not constitute an unconscionable business practice under the CFA.

Seeking payment on a valid but unenforceable debt is not fraud under § 56:8-2 without allegations of false or misleading representations.

Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Management · filed 2011-04-11

Huertas‟s CFA claims also fail because the fact that defendants sought payment on a valid, even if unenforceable, debt does not equate to fraud absent allegations indicating that they made false or misleading representations. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover debt collection by a debt buyer or servicer that did not participate in the underlying extension of consumer credit.

GOMEZ v. FORSTER & GARBUS LLP · filed 2019-10-22

Absent any participation in the underlying extension of consumer credit, neither LVNV nor Resurgent’s alleged malfeasance is covered by the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 applies to misrepresentations made during an offer to sell a product or negotiations to modify an existing obligation; debt collection efforts on an existing loan alone do not support a claim.

Browne v. National Collegiate Student Loan Trust · filed 2025-06-16

Because Browne’s claims all center around collection efforts on a 2007 loan without any allegations of subsequent agreements or inducements to modify the loan, the collection actions cannot support a CFA violation.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a debtor’s challenge to debt collection activities because a debt transaction is not a sale of merchandise.

Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, PC · filed 2011-02-10

The Nicholls court reasons that a debtor, such as Plaintiff, is not a “consumer,” a debt transaction is not a “sale,” and a debt is not “merchandise.” I find this reasoning persuasive and consistent with the plain language of the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2’s text does not itself establish whether it applies to debt buyers.

Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, PC · filed 2011-03-22

Turning to the NJCFA, the plain language of the statute does not indicate whether it applies to debt buyers.

Section 56:8-2 does not make an assignee directly liable for the assignor’s alleged unlawful practices merely because it received the mortgage and note.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC. VS. SILVANA SOTILLO(F-4359-14, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-06-05

Defendant claimed Wells Fargo was the "person" using unlawful practices, but she brought her counterclaim only against plaintiff. ... Thus, plaintiff has no direct liability under the CFA for Wells Fargo's alleged unlawful conduct.

Section 56:8-2 covers unconscionable loan collection by a lender or its assignee as subsequent performance of the loan.

BOROUGH OF WEST WILDWOOD VS. HERBERT C. FREDERICK,ET AL. VS. MUNICIPAL EXCESS LIABILITY JOINT INSURANCE FUND (C-0057-13, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2017-07-14

We are further convinced the court erred in finding plaintiff failed to state a claim against defendants because they were assignees of the note and mortgage. As noted, loan collection efforts undertaken by the "lender or its assignee" fall within the protections of the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 does not support a claim against a debt collector when no misrepresentation made directly to the consumer results in a sale or transaction.

Diana v. Lvnv Funding LLC · filed 2024-09-26

We find no reason to depart from our rationale in DepoLink in this case, which, unlike Gonzalez, presents a CFA claim against a debt collector where there was no misrepresentation made directly to plaintiff which resulted in a sale or transaction.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover a debt purchaser’s collection actions when they do not constitute a sale of merchandise.

Yvette McQueen, Etc. v. Razor Capital, LLC · filed 2025-05-06

We are satisfied the trial court correctly aligned its decision with our holding in DepoLink, concluding there was no basis for plaintiff's CFA claim because defendant's collection actions did not constitute the sale of merchandise.

Section 56:8-2 does not cover debt collection on behalf of a third party when the collection is unconnected to a sale of merchandise or real estate.

Viebrock v. Transworld System, Inc. · filed 2025-08-28

The CFA's scope is limited to fraud "in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise or real estate." N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. Debt collection activities on behalf of a third-party are not connected to the sale of merchandise and fall outside the scope of the CFA.

Section 56:8-2 reaches affirmative misrepresentations and omissions in merchandise sales that cause an ascertainable loss.

Vibra-Tech Engineers, Inc. v. Kavalek · filed 2012-03-29

Unlawful conduct under the Consumer Fraud Act can consist of affirmative acts or acts of omission. ... Vibra-Tech suffered an ascertainable loss in that it paid unnecessary sums to Geoteeh for items which it could have purchased on its own, all due to the misrepresentations of Geotech and its owners and operators, Scott and Roberta Kavalek.

Section 56:8-2 does not require a casino rewards promotion to specify the play levels needed to retain status when its materials disclose that abuse of offers may cause a loss of benefits.

Epps v. Dgmb Casino, LLC · filed 2026-01-08

We appreciate that plaintiff and other players would want to have more information about what levels of play were required to be maintained to keep Red Carpet status. Even so, defendant had no legal obligation to do so, and its practices and communications—although arguably ambiguous—were not fraudulent.

Section 56:8-2 treats affirmative misrepresentations and intentional, knowing omissions of material facts as unlawful practices.

Wright v. Fenix Towing LLC · filed 2025-11-19

"The language of the CFA specifically identifies a variety of affirmative acts, including 'deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, [and] misrepresentation,' and it also identifies as actionable 'the knowing[ ] concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact,' if intentional."

Section 56:8-2 permits a consumer fraud claim based on an alleged misleading review or material omission to proceed against the individual who made it when she received sufficient notice of the claim before trial.

Baux-Johnson v. Norkia Home Improvements, LLC · filed 2024-10-23

It was not until months later after a comparison of the picture on Lisa's Facebook page with the picture accompanying the review that plaintiff realized Lisa was the author of the yelp.com review and that it contained obvious omissions and, arguably, constituted false advertising and fraud under the CFA and common law. ... We have carefully considered the record and conclude it was error for the trial court to dismiss the common law fraud and CFA claims alleged against Lisa in her individual capacity.

A claim under § 56:8-2 based on an affirmative statement or an omission requires proof that the defendant knew the material fact at issue.

Teixeira v. Triarsi · filed 2024-05-01

Whether the claim was based on an affirmative statement or an omission is irrelevant because both theories require a plaintiff to establish defendant had knowledge of a material fact. Ibid. Here, plaintiff plainly conceded defendant was unaware the addition had been constructed without permits, and this admission was fatal to either avenue of his CFA claim.

Section 56:8-2 makes a knowing omission intended to induce reliance unlawful without requiring a separate duty to disclose.

FLYNN-MURPHY v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC · filed 2023-07-28

Thus, under the NJCFA, a knowing omission coupled with intent that a person rely on such omission is unlawful conduct, and no additional duty to disclose is required.

Section 56:8-2 covers the knowing concealment of a material fact with the intent that consumers rely on the concealment.

BELL v. DAVE · filed 2022-07-11

Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Defendants (i) knowingly concealed (ii) the alcohol content of Synergy Kombucha (iii) with the intention that the consumer rely upon the concealment.

Section 56:8-2 requires a vocational school to disclose material concerns about its program’s accreditation when withholding them could mislead prospective students.

SHIRLEY POLANCO, ETC. VS. STAR CAREER ACADEMY (L-0415-13, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2018-07-26

From these facts we conclude that an individual seeking an education from a for-profit school like Star has the inherent right to know, prior to enrollment, that the school does not hold both programmatic and institutional credentials if for no other reason than to give students the choice to attend another institution that possesses both accreditations.

Section 56:8-2 requires evidentiary support for a claim that material misrepresentations or omissions in a real estate transaction violated the Consumer Fraud Act.

C & R HOLDINGS AND INVESTMENTS, LLC, VS. MARY ELLEN WALKER (L-0218-18, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2020-12-15

We likewise concur with the trial court that there is no merit to plaintiff's claims that KW and its employees and agents, along with Van Embden, violated the Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"), N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, by making alleged material misrepresentations and omissions. Even viewing the record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the record is barren of tenable support for a CFA violation, particularly since no dual agency relationship was established and no fiduciary duties were owed by defendants to plaintiff.

Section 56:8-2 requires intent and reliance for a knowing omission claim, but not for an affirmative act claim.

DEFILLIPPO v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION · filed 2019-08-30

First, only Scachetti’s “knowing omission” claim requires intent and reliance, and not his “affirmative act” claim.

Section 56:8-2 covers affirmative acts and knowing omissions; a claim based on a misstatement or omission requires evidence that the defendant made one.

SILBERBERG VS. FEDERATED HOMES (L-7971-16, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) · filed 2019-12-20

There is no support in the record that demonstrates either defendant affirmatively made a misstatement or omission.

Section 56:8-2 requires intent for a Consumer Fraud Act claim based on an omission, but not for one based on an affirmative act or regulatory violation.

EUBANKS v. RIDGELINE MOTORS LLC · filed 2021-11-29

Finally, the Court notes that “[a] showing of intent is not essential if the claimed CFA violation is an affirmative act or a regulatory violation, but such a showing is necessary if the claimed violation is an omission pursuant to [N.J. Stat. Ann. §] 56:8- 2.” Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 171 A.3d 620, 636 (N.J. 2017).

Section 56:8-2 does not support an intentional concealment claim when the defendant expressly disclosed the information to the consumer.

WILKINS v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2023-10-18

Plaintiff, then, cannot plausibly allege that Defendant intentionally concealed that which it had already disclosed to her.

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff asserting fraud by omission to show that the defendant intended to deceive.

THE ESTATE OF LESTER COTTON v. SENIOR PLANNING SERVICES, LLC · filed 2020-11-30

In order to state a NJCFA claim based on a fraudulent omission, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intended to deceive.

A fraudulent omission claim under § 56:8-2 involving a product defect must allege that the manufacturer knew of the defect before sale and failed to disclose it to consumers.

GEORGE v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA LLC · filed 2021-11-08

Thus, a plaintiff asserting fraudulent omission claims in the defective product context must plead sufficient allegations to show, among other things, that the manufacturer knew of the alleged defect before sale and failed to disclose those material facts to consumers.

An omission is not an unlawful practice under § 56:8-2 when the claimant alleges no facts supporting the asserted duty to act.

THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. YEON · filed 2021-08-25

If Hanam had such a duty, the Estate must allege supporting facts and state the basis in law for finding such a duty. ... Without such facts, I cannot conclude that Hanam’s omission constituted an unconscionable or fraudulent practice.

Section 56:8-2 requires a material omission; failing to disclose profit in a destination charge is immaterial when an average consumer would not expect the charge to exclude profit.

Romoff v. General Motors LLC · filed 2021-12-02

To be actionable under the CLRA, UCL, or NJCFA, the omitted fact must be material. ... The Court has concluded that a reasonable or average consumer would not expect the Destination Charge to exclude profit. ... GM’s omission of additional information regarding the Destination Charge is not material.

Section 56:8-2 requires a plaintiff alleging an omission to show that the defendant intended to deceive.

SCATTAGLIA v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC · filed 2021-12-15

To state a NJCFA claim based on an omission, the plaintiff must show the defendant intended to deceive.

Section 56:8-2 treats knowing concealment of a product defect as unlawful conduct under the Consumer Fraud Act.

KAPLAN v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY · filed 2023-06-30

Kaplan has also alleged sufficient facts to sustain an NJCFA claim at the motion to dismiss stage. Kaplan’s allegation that Defendants knowingly concealed the Alarms defective nature adequately pleads unlawful conduct.

Section 56:8-2 does not support a consumer fraud claim without a plausibly alleged unlawful practice by the defendant that caused the plaintiff an ascertainable loss.

HURST v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA LLC · filed 2023-07-26

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he justifiably relied on any specific misrepresentation by Defendant, or that Defendant acted unlawfully in any manner that caused him an ascertainable loss.

Section 56:8-2 does not require an insurer that discloses policy premiums and coverage limits to disclose how it calculated those amounts.

Trocki v. Penn National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co · filed 2023-09-13

Trocki was fully informed of the price and policy limits, and Penn National is not required to disclose precisely how it reached those numbers. Trocki has therefore failed to show, at a minimum, either a material misrepresentation, as required for a claim of common law fraud, or unlawful conduct, as required by the NJCFA.

An omission or concealment claim under the NJCFA requires knowledge of the concealed defect, which may be inferred from technical service bulletins and warranty claims.

BURD v. SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC. · filed 2021-03-31

Taken together and construed in favor of Plaintiffs, the facts and evidence which Plaintiffs cite in the Consolidated Complaint permit a plausible inference that Defendants knew of the Battery Defect when they sold vehicles to Plaintiffs. ... Plaintiffs do not dispute that knowledge is a common element of state consumer protection statutes for omission, concealment, or deception, or for common-law fraudulent concealment.

Section 56:8-2 can cover the sale of a vehicle with an allegedly defective system unknown to the buyers when the unlawful practice causes an ascertainable loss.

CILLUFFO v. SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC. · filed 2024-03-26

The Hennessy Plainitffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants, in selling the Plaintiffs an allegedly defective Starlink system without their having any knowledge of its problems, engaged in an unlawful practice as defined by the NJCFA that caused the Hennessy Plaintiffs an ascertainable loss.

Section 56:8-2 does not support a consumer fraud claim based on attenuated statements in insurance policies, warranties, and a newsletter that do not amount to partial disclosures of a vehicle defect.

REINKRAUT v. FCA US LLC · filed 2025-06-29

Plaintiffs argue that FCA had a duty to disclose the defect because FCA allegedly made partial disclosures about the windshield in insurance policies, warranties, and a newsletter, but the Court does not find adequate these attenuated statements noted in Plaintiff’s Opposition to be partial disclosures sufficient to allow the NJCFA claim to survive.

Section 56:8-2 permits an omission claim for knowing concealment of a material fact intended to induce consumer reliance; disclosure of the fact defeats that theory.

Georgion v. Bank of America Corporation · filed 2025-08-18

Plaintiffs’ omission-based claim under the NJCFA fails as well. An alleged omission is actionable under the NJCFA where “the defendant (1) knowingly concealed (2) a material fact (3) with the intention that the consumer rely upon the concealment.” Arcand v. Brother Int’l Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 282, 297 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing Judge v. Blackfin Yacht Corp., 815 A.2d 537, 542 (N.J. App. Div. 2003)). As stated supra Section III.C.2, plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails at step one: defendant disclosed in the OBSA the material facts surrounding the capability of Zelle to facilitate the immediate transfer of funds as well as the risks of fraud posed by Zelle’s integration with defendant’s online banking.

Section 56:8-2 claims based on an alleged vehicle defect require plausible allegations that the defendant knew of the defect before sale.

SNOWDY · filed 2025-10-14

As articulated in this Court’s prior Opinion, pre-sale knowledge of the defect is an essential element of every count of the Complaint, and the same is true here. ... As such, the Court dismisses all counts for which pre-sale knowledge is a necessary element: every count of the Complaint. These include all the statutory, common law, and common law fraud claims: Counts 1-7, 10, 13, 14, 19, 22, and 25.

Section 56:8-2 covers a knowing omission of a material renewal premium in apartment leasing when the omission and intent are plausibly alleged.

SITTOL · filed 2025-10-31

Therefore, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged unlawful conduct—here, a knowing omission—under the NJCFA.

Section 56:8-2 requires a knowing omission of a material fact with intent that others rely on it; inadvertent nondisclosure is not an unlawful practice.

Fenwick v. Kay American Jeep, Inc. · filed 1975-09-05

As a consequence, the nondisclosure of a material fact unknowingly and by reason of inadvertence does not constitute an unlawful practice under the Act.

Section 56:8-2 requires a factual finding that the defendant intended others to rely on a fraud or misrepresentation to sustain liability.

Slowinski v. Valley Nat. Bank · filed 1993-05-11

The language of this provision necessitates a factual finding that the defendant "inten[ded] that others rely upon" a fraud or misrepresentation to sustain liability.

Section 56:8-2 requires a knowing act for a consumer fraud claim based on an omission, but no showing of intent for an affirmative act.

STRAWN EX REL. STRAWN v. Canuso · filed 1994-02-22

This statute creates two categories of prohibited acts. The first category (unconscionable commercial practices, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation) consists of affirmative acts, while the second category (concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact) consists of acts of omission. Affirmative acts require no showing of intent, while an essential element of a consumer fraud claim resting on an act of omission is that the defendants' act be "knowing." Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 243 N.J. Super. 590, 598, 581 A.2d 91 (App.Div. 1990), aff'd, 124 N.J. 520, 591 A.2d 943 (1991).

Section 56:8-2 permits liability for an affirmative act without proof of intent, but requires a knowing act for liability based on an omission of material fact.

Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc. · filed 1990-09-24

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 thus creates two categories of prohibited acts. The first category (unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation) consists of affirmative acts, and the second category (concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact) consists of acts of omission. ... However, by the express terms of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, an essential element of a consumer fraud consisting of an act of omission is that a defendant's act be "knowing."

Section 56:8-2 does not require proof of intent for an affirmative act that violates one of its listed standards.

Miller v. American Family Pub. · filed 1995-03-01

Proof that a defendant's action contravenes any one of those standards will establish a violation of the Act — regardless of any proof of intent.