Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions with no other limitations period to be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues; for these insurance claims, accrual occurred no later than written denial of coverage.

Oaks v. Sellers · filed 2007-04-12(1)

For the above reasons, we find that the three-year statute of limitations, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49, began to run at the latest on August 26, 1997, when Sellers received written notice that American States denied his insurance claim.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions with no other limitations period to be filed within three years after accrual, with accrual when the enforceable right to sue becomes vested.

Anderson v. LaVere · filed 2012-02-23(1)

Section 15-1-49 states that “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” ... Under Section 15-1-49, the three-year statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues, and we have held that the “cause of action accrues when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue becomes vested.” ... We find that Anderson’s and Harris’s claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Section 15-1-49, so we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Section 15-1-49(1) generally gives three years from accrual to bring an action, and in these real-estate claims accrual could not be fixed before closing as a matter of law because damages and discovery of injury presented factual questions.

Fletcher v. Lyles · filed 2009-01-29(1)

These asserted causes of action involve acts which were continuing up to and through the consummation of this real-estate transaction. ... The Fletchers were without any cause of action until they suffered damages. ... In analyzing a statute-of-limitations issue under Section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code, this Court has held that "the statute of limitations commences upon discovery of an injury, and discovery is an issue of fact to be decided by a jury when there is a genuine dispute." ... Whether the Fletchers knew or should have known of the alleged defects or misrepresentations prior to closing is a disputed question of fact. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Fletchers, as we must for summary judgment purposes, we find the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that the statute of limitations accrued prior to the date of closing.

Section 15-1-49(2) starts the limitations period when an insured discovers or should have discovered alleged misrepresentations if the policy did not clearly put the insured on notice.

Weathers v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2009-07-02(2)

On the other hand, if the plain language of the policy does not clearly contradict the agent’s representations such that the insured is put on notice, a fraud claim accrues when the insured becomes aware of the misrepresentation. ... In other words, the discovery exception of Section 15-1-49(2) applies, so that the statute of limitations begins to run when the insured discovers or should have discovered the alleged misrepresentations.

Subsection 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period for actions without another prescribed period, accruing when the injury is discovered rather than when both the injury and its cause are discovered.

Kinsey v. Pangborn Corporation · filed 2010-05-17(1)

The applicable statute of limitations provides that “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2003). ... Watkins’s “survival-type” claims actually accrued on the date of discovery of the injury. See Lincoln Elec. Co. v. McLemore, 54 So. 3d 833, 836 (Miss. 2010) (quoting Angle v. Koppers, Inc., 42 So. 3d 1, 5 (Miss. 2010)) (“the plain language of Section 15-1-49 supports an interpretation ‘that the cause of action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.’”) (emphasis in original).

Under subsection (2), a cause of action involving latent injury accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury; whether discovery occurred may present a jury question when facts are genuinely disputed.

Johnson Trucking Co. v. Peterbilt of Mississippi, Inc. · filed 2014-05-20(2)

This statute provides in pertinent part that, for “actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” ... Nonetheless, we find that reasonable minds could differ regarding the conclusion of whether or not Johnson Trucking’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. ... We conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist as to the accrual date of Johnson Trucking’s claims and as to whether the representations that were made by Peterbilt and Caterpillar to Johnson Trucking conflicted with the terms of the extended-service coverage. As such, we find that summary judgment was premature.

Section 15-1-49’s catch-all limitations period accrues when the plaintiff discovers the injury, not when the plaintiff discovers the injury’s cause; for latent injury or disease, accrual occurs upon discovery or when the injury reasonably should have been discovered.

Robert Hammons, Jr. v. C. Wade Navarre, II · filed 2017-04-18(2)

Section 15-1-49(2) provides that “[i]n actions . . . which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” ... In Angle, the Supreme Court held that based on “the plain language” of section 15-1-49, a cause of action subject to the catch-all statute of limitations “accrue[s] upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.” ... Therefore, Hammons’s claims all accrued on the date of his injury, which means that claims he asserted three years and six months later were barred by the statute of limitations.

Subsection (2) delays accrual of a claim involving latent injury until the plaintiff discovered, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

Patsy B. White v. White · filed 2019-05-21(2)

Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012) provides a three-year statute of limitations for a breach-of-contract claim. Subsection two of section 15-1-49 states: “In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ... Patsy should have discovered the failure to transfer title long before the three-year statute of limitations expired. Reasonable diligence would have revealed the title defect before her breach-of-contract claim became barred. Because Patsy failed to timely pursue her breach-of-contract claim, it is barred under section 15-1-49 of our code.

Under the discovery rule, a cause of action involving latent injury or disease accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, not when the plaintiff discovers its cause.

Shawn Pettis and Ann Pettis v. Northeast Mississippi Electric Power Association, Justin Smith and Jason Long · filed 2024-04-02(2)

Here, Pettis’s injury was not “latent,” hidden, or undiscoverable. He knew of the injury the moment the dogs attacked him. Indeed, Pettis sued the homeowners over those injuries within the statute of limitations. Pettis’s allegation that he later discovered additional information about “the cause of the injury is irrelevant to the analysis; rather, the inquiry is when the plaintiff knew or should have known of an injury.” W. World Ins. Grp., 372 So. 3d at 467-68 (¶17) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the discovery rule does not apply to Pettis’s claims. His claims accrued and the statute of limitations began to run when he was injured on June 2, 2017.

Section 15-1-49(1) gives three years from accrual to bring an action for which no other limitations period is prescribed; a claim based on drainage problems accrues when those problems are discovered.

Baldwin v. Holliman · filed 2005-04-26(1)

A catch-all statute of limitations, Section 15-1-49(1) of the Mississippi Code dictates that all actions for which no statute of limitations is prescribed shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued. ... The Baldwins' claim accrued in 1992, and the statute of limitations began to run. The Baldwins claim expired three years later.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a general three-year limitations period for actions not governed by a more specific limitations provision.

Kennedy v. Thomas M. Kennedy, Jr. · filed 2014-09-30

Thus, we agree with the chancellor that the statute of limitations was an available defense against the estate’s recovery of Timothy’s debts. ... While there is a specific limitations period for “unwritten contracts,” which is what these loans appear to be, the time period is the same as the general statute—three years. Compare Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-29 (Rev. 2012) (action on unwritten contracts) with § 15-1-49 (all other actions); see also Morgan v. Stevens, 989 So. 2d 482, 484 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (holding “[w]hether these claims [for loan repayments] were founded upon unwritten contracts, making them subject to the three-year limitations of section 15-1-29, or whether these claims fall within the general three-year limitations of section 15-1-49, the result is the same”).

Section 15-1-49 gives a three-year limitations period for enforcing a breach-of-contract claim, measured from when the cause of action accrues and becomes enforceable.

Barriffe v. Lawson v. Nelson · filed 2014-10-02

Under Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract, the Barriffes must have filed suit to recover their interest in the landfill within three years of Eugene’s retirement.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Breeden v. Willie Faye Breeden Buchanan · filed 2015-02-03

Breeden’s claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are subject to the three-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012). The circuit court was in error when it determined that Breeden’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was filed outside of the limitations period. The circuit court’s decision to dismiss the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Buchanan is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year catch-all limitations period for common-law claims.

Lenoir v. Nissan North America, Inc. · filed 2019-06-21

All of Plaintiffs’ remaining common law claims are subject to the catch-all three-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. ... These common law claims are time-barred. Accordingly, Counts VII-XII of the Complaint are dismissed and there is no need for the Court to entertain the substantive arguments regarding those claims.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions for which no other limitation period is prescribed to be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues.

McCain v. Vance · filed 2020-04-21(1)

In Mississippi, § 1983 suits are governed by the general statute of limitations, which requires the commencement of an action within three years of the action’s accrual. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15–1–49; see also James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir.1990) (finding in § 1983 suit that “the three year residual period provided by Section 15–1–49, Miss.Code Ann. applies”). ... The statute of limitations for McCain’s claim of false imprisonment under § 1983 began to accrue once her alleged false imprisonment of “three hours” ended on September 20, 2016.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for general personal-injury claims in Mississippi.

McCreary v. State of Mississippi · filed 2020-07-10

The applicable Mississippi statute of limitations period is three years. See James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding Mississippi’s three-year general personal injury limitations period applicable to § 1983 cases); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972).

Section 15-1-49(1) sets a three-year limitations period, and subsection (2) delays accrual for latent injuries until discovered or reasonably discoverable, but does not apply when the plaintiff knows of the injury but not its cause.

Bracy v. Pfizer Inc · filed 2020-12-10(1), (2)

The applicable statute of limitations in Mississippi is three years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1). Bracy was injured in 1994 and brought suit in 2016. Absent tolling, Bracy’s claims became time-barred under Mississippi law in the late 1990s. Bracy argues that his claims should be tolled due to either the discovery rule or Pfizer’s alleged fraudulent concealment. Tolling is not warranted under either doctrine. Mississippi’s discovery rule statute provides that a cause of action for “latent” injuries “does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). This provision applies only when the injury itself is unknown to the plaintiff; it does not toll the limitations period where, as here, a plaintiff is aware of her injury but not the cause of that injury. See Angle v. Koppers, Inc., 42 So.3d 1, 5 (Miss. 2010). Bracy’s injury was not latent — he was aware of it when it occurred in 1994. Nor does the discovery rule help Bracy if we treat his specific “injury” as the SJS diagnosis, of which Bracy claims he was unaware until he obtained his medical records in 2015. As the District Court observed, Bracy could have learned of this diagnosis in 1994 by requesting his medical records from CMMC following discharge. Bracy was not reasonably diligent in waiting until 2015 to request those records. Mississippi’s discovery rule does not toll the statute of limitations on Bracy’s claims.

Section 15-1-49 gives litigants three years to file a personal-injury action, with the period beginning when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury or has enough information to know of it.

Nance v. City of West Point · filed 2021-05-04

In Mississippi, that statute is Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, which allows a litigant only three years to file such an action, and the statute begins to run “at the moment the plaintiff becomes aware he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know he has been injured.” Russel v. Board of Trustees of Firemen, etc., 968 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993) (citations omitted).

Section 15-1-49's catch-all three-year limitations period applies to a claim for unpaid professional services when no other limitations period governs, and the claim accrues when the right to sue becomes enforceable.

O'Brien v. Rose Marie Pegues, Isaac Daniel Scott, Vivian Aurita Chatmon, Edward Logan Scott, III, Willena Ver · filed 2021-09-07

Nevertheless, as already addressed, there was no evidence of a valid, enforceable contract for payment of any services not paid by the USDA; thus the “catch-all” three-year statute of limitations under section 15-1-49 would be applicable. ... We find no error in the chancery court’s ruling that O’Brien’s claim was statutorily barred.

Subsection (1) gives actions with no other prescribed limitations period three years from accrual, which occurs when all elements of the cause of action are present.

Walter Cooley and Tammy Cooley v. Pine Belt Oil Co., Inc. · filed 2022-03-03(1)

A cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when all the elements of the action are present. Here, all the elements for implied indemnity were satisfied on March 5, 2009, when Pine Belt was ordered to pay cleanup costs for an underlying wrong in which Pine Belt appeared not to have been an active participant. The statute of limitations for an implied indemnity action is three years. Thus, Pine Belt’s implied indemnity claim ran on March 5, 2012. Pine Belt did not file its claim until April 15, 2016, which was approximately three years too late. This Court finds that Pine Belt’s action for implied indemnity is time barred and that the Cooleys were entitled to summary judgment. All other arguments are moot.

Section 15-1-49 provides Mississippi’s general three-year limitations period, which applies to § 1983 claims through federal borrowing.

McGilBerry v. Morris · filed 2022-07-20

See Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1993) (federal court borrows state’s general statute of limitations in § 1983 cases); Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (setting forth Mississippi’s three year general limitations period). ... Thus, the statute of limitations regarding claims arising out of those events expired on July 18, 2017 (July 18, 2014 + 3 years).

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims.

Bradley v. State of Mississippi · filed 2022-08-03

It is further plain that any such § 1983 claims are subject to Mississippi’s general three-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 provides Mississippi’s three-year general personal-injury limitations period, which applies to § 1983 claims that borrow the forum state’s limitations period.

Minor v. Turner · filed 2023-01-12

The instant case is proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which borrows the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period, Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249 (1989), which is three years in Mississippi. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49(1) supplies a three-year limitations period when the MWPA does not provide its own statute of limitations.

Johnson v. Miller · filed 2025-01-22(1)

The MWPA itself does not specify a notice requirement. ... And because the MWPA does not contain its own statute of limitations requirement, the three-year statute of limitations prescribed by Mississippi Code § 15-1-49(1) applies. ... Accordingly, Johnson had three years after the cause of action accrued to bring suit under the MWPA.

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on negligent-misrepresentation claims.

Nolazco · filed 2026-03-24(1)

Negligent misrepresentation claims fall outside the MPLA’s preemptive authority. Elliot, 181 So.3d at 269. What is more, those claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations period. Mac Long Homes, LLC v. Olvera Constr, LLC, 385 So.3d 835, 841-42 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1)).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for Davenport’s negligent-distribution claim.

Davis Davenport v. Hertz Rental Equipment Corporation · filed 2016-03-01

We note that Davenport’s negligent-distribution claim against Hertz was subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012).

For personal-injury claims with no other prescribed period, § 15-1-49 sets a three-year limitations period; a timely complaint tolls that period and a qualifying Rule 15(c) amendment can relate back.

Jewell S. Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery Inc · filed 1993-12-23

¶13. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 provides for a three-year period of limitations in personal injury claims. It states, in part: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitations is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... We therefore reverse and remand this case for a trial on the merits, finding that the amended complaint was not time barred and that the amended complaint did relate back to the date of the originally filed complaint.

For a latent injury or disease, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury; a later-discovered consequence of the same injury does not restart the period.

prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 14,816 Carol Stewart Kemp v. G.D. Searle & Co. · filed 1997-02-05(2)

We simply hold that the district court was correct in concluding that Kemp’s injury was the PID and that the statute of limitations began to run when she knew of her injury and its cause, not when she later discovered all of the consequences and complications of the PID.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year catch-all limitations period for negligent misrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress when no other period applies.

Air Comfort Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. · filed 2000-05-16

We address Air Comfort's tort claims first. Negligent misrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress are governed by the "catch-all" three-years statute. Miss Code Ann. § 15-1-49; see Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So.2d 1246, 1256 (Miss.1996); City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So.2d 1212, 1217 (Miss.1990). If the claim is seen as intentional and not negligent infliction of emotional distress, a one-year statute of limitations applies. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Rev.1995); see Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., Inc., 608 So.2d 324 (Miss. 1992). If Honeywell committed a tort while performing under this construction contract, the time period for bringing a suit to recover damages for that tort expired.

Section 15-1-49 gives an alienation-of-affection claim three years to be filed, measured from accrual when the alienation or loss of affection is finally accomplished.

Carr v. Carr · filed 2000-11-07

However, a claim for alienation of affection must be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.1995). A claim of alienation of affection accrues when the alienation or loss of affection is finally accomplished. ... The claim accrued on November 4, 1994 when Mr. Carr, in open pursuit of a relationship with Charlotte Lannom Carr, moved out of the marital home and abandoned the marital relationship. Mrs. Carr filed her claim on December 2, 1997, approximately one month after the statute of limitations had run on the claim. That claim is therefore barred by the statute of limitations, making summary judgment proper in this case.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Robinson v. Cobb · filed 2000-07-20(1)

It is undisputed that the statute of limitations applicable to this action is the three-year limitations period found in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (1995) which states that "[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation *887 is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after."

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period governs negligent infliction of emotional distress when no more specific limitations statute applies; intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to the one-year statute in § 15-1-35.

Slaydon v. Hansford · filed 2002-08-27

That is the only specific statute of limitation that could apply to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. If it is inapplicable, then the three-year statute governing all actions "not otherwise specifically provided for" is the operative one. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.1995). ... If the tort is alleged to have been committed intentionally, it is subject to the one-year statute. If committed negligently, the three-year statute applies.

Section 15-1-49 generally requires an action to be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues, but fraudulent misrepresentations may toll the limitations period.

Fulop v. Suta · filed 2002-12-10

¶ 7. Mississippi’s general statute of limitations provides for a three-year time period before the action is cut off. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2000). Mississippi also provides for a three-year limitations period for purely oral contracts and implied contracts. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-29 (Rev.2000). Since Fulop’s action is based on contract theory and on a theory of fraud, it is safe to say that the appropriate time for him to act was within three years of accrual of the cause of action. ¶ 8. Thus the real question facing this Court is when Fulop’s cause of action accrued, which draws on the nature of Fulop’s agreement or agreements with Suta. There is no doubt that as far as Suta and Fulop’s original agreement on the digging of the well and septic tank, the statute of limitations has run. There are however a number of other issues involved, including the nature of the agreement between Fulop and Suta for Fulop’s continued use of the well, and whether Fulop detrimentally relied on Suta’s representations, and whether or not Suta made those representations in good faith. It is quite possible that if Suta made fraudulent misrepresentations, that the statute of limitations may be tolled. Consequently, we must remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period on actions without another prescribed period, and claims accrue when plaintiffs are charged with notice of the relevant terms in executed loan documents.

Andrus v. Ellis · filed 2004-11-04

¶ 22. It is undisputed that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003) is controlling in the instant case. See Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 850 So.2d 78 (Miss.2003); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Wells, 819 So.2d 1196 (Miss.2001). Section 15-1-49 provides in part: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. This Court employs de novo review when considering issues of law such as statutes of limitations. Stephens, 850 So.2d at 82. ¶ 23. The trial court provided no reasons as to why it denied summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Seemingly, the application and resulting bar under § 15-1-49 is certain. The most recent loan transaction at issue occurred in 1995. With filing of the complaint occurring on March 22, 2002, the statute would bar all claims that accrued prior to March 22, 1999. Thus, in the absence of an exception, statutory or otherwise, the claims are barred.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions for which no other limitation period is prescribed to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Nygaard v. Getty Oil Co. · filed 2005-06-30(1)

Since accrued royalties are personal property and not an interest in land, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-7 is inapplicable. There being no applicable specific statute of limitations for actions seeking recovery of accrued royalties, the general, three-year statute must be applied. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) required Nygaard to bring the action "within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued."

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period that runs from accrual of the cause of action.

Haycraft v. Mid-State Construction Co. · filed 2005-12-06(1)

We find that the seven year limitations period of Section 15-1-43 was not applicable here. Indeed, the trial court was correct to apply the three year statute of limitations of Section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code Annotated. ... The general three year statute of limitations begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). ... We find the applicable three year limitations period began to run from August 24, 1994. Because the application for arbitration was not filed until August 22, 2001, the Haycrafts’ claims were time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for claims seeking the fair market value of wrongfully cut trees and reforestation costs.

Stockstill v. Gammill · filed 2006-10-26

In sum, McCain is overruled to the extent that it found that the remedies provided in section 95-5-10(1) were subject to the limitations period set out in section 15-1-33, and that section 95-5-29 would apply to a claim for the fair market value of the trees cut and the cost of reforestation. Since the 1999 legislative amendment to Miss.Code Ann. § 95-5-29 does not apply to today's case, the practical effect of today's decision is that Gammill's claims for the fair market value of the trees cut and reforestation costs were governed by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003), which provides for a three-year limitations period. Therefore, in applying section 15-1-49 to Gammill's claims for the fair market value of the trees cut and the cost of reforestation, these claims were not barred. We thus find that the chancellor was not in error in entering a judgment in favor of Gammill and against the Stockstills for the sum of $65,526.50, representing the reasonable value of the timber cut ($50,026.50), and the reasonable cost of reforestation of the subject land ($15,500.00).

Section 15-1-49 supplies a general three-year limitations period when no more specific limitations period applies.

Robertson v. Chateau Legrand Property Owner's Ass'n · filed 2009-10-20

If there is no express statute of limitations for a cause of action, Mississippi applies a general three-year statute of limitations. ... Therefore, by applying the three-year statute of limitations, any claim occurring prior to January 26, 1997, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for actions not governed by a more specific limitations period.

Whitaker v. LIMECO CORP. · filed 2010-04-08

However, having already found no error on the part of the trial court in declining to find that either of the notes met the statutory requirements for negotiable instruments, we find no error on the part of the trial court in applying the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Section 15-1-49. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). Accordingly, there was no error on the part of the trial court in dismissing the breach-of-promissory-notes claim as time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 permits an asbestosis personal-injury claim filed within three years after the plaintiff’s diagnosis of asbestosis.

Wagner v. Various · filed 2011-05-06

Plaintiffs asbestosis claim is not time-barred, as Plaintiff filed a claim within three years of being diagnosed with asbestosis in compliance with Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period for actions lacking another prescribed period, accruing when the injury is discovered rather than when its cause is discovered.

Kinsey v. Pangborn Corp. · filed 2011-11-03(1)

The applicable statute of limitations provides that “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev.2003). ... For instance, Watkins’s “survival-type” claims actually accrued on the date of discovery of the injury. See Lincoln Elec. Co. v. McLemore, 54 So.3d 833, 836 (Miss.2010) (quoting Angle v. Koppers, Inc., 42 So.3d 1, 5 (Miss.2010)) (“the plain language of Section 15-1-49 supports an interpretation ‘that the cause of action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.’ ”) (emphasis in original). ... The “survival-type” claims accrued upon Watkins’s diagnosis with silicosis on October 4, 2002.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a general three-year limitations period for an alienation-of-affection claim when no specific limitations period is prescribed.

Carter v. Reddix · filed 2012-12-11

“Though alienation of affection is an intentional tort, it does not have a specifically prescribed statute of limitations. Therefore, we apply the general three-year statute of limitations found in Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-49 (Rev.2003).”

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for actions based on written contracts, but it does not apply when the employment contract is unwritten.

Vance v. Town of Lula · filed 2013-12-03

For written contracts, the statute of limitations is a three-year period. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2012). ... However, the supreme court has stated “that where the written agreement is so indefinite that parol evidence is necessary to show a contractual relationship, the contract is unwritten and the limitations statute [for] written contracts is not applicable.” Le-vens, 733 So.2d at 758 (¶ 15) (citation omitted).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for intentional infliction of emotional distress and § 1983 claims in Mississippi.

Hubbard v. MISSISSIPPI CONF. OF THE UNITED METHODIST · filed 2001-04-25

Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations for Hubbard's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is three years. ... Accordingly, in Mississippi, the general three year statute of limitations of section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code applies to section 1983 claims.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for state-law claims arising from a mortgage refinancing transaction.

Spence v. Southern Mortgage Co. (In Re Spence) · filed 2001-05-18

Counts one through eleven are state law causes of action which are governed by the three year “general” statute of limitations found in § 15-1-49, Miss.Code Ann. (1972). The pleadings reflect that the debtor refinanced her house on May 5, 1998. Therefore, the three year statute of limitations applicable to the state law causes of action expired on May 5, 2001. Since the statute of limitations for these causes of action had not run before the motion to amend was filed, the debtor’s request to add these counts will be granted.

Section 15-1-49(1) gives the pleaded claims a three-year limitations period; dismissal was unwarranted because the pleadings did not establish that the claims were time-barred.

Norman v. GEICO Insurance · filed 2021-01-13(1)

There is no dispute that each claim falls under the three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 15-1-49(1) of the Mississippi Code. ... As a result, GEICO’s affirmative defense is not “evident from the plaintiff’s pleadings.” Jones, 339 F.3d at 366.

Section 15-1-49’s three-year limitations period applies to claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with business relations.

Smith v. Antler Insanity, LLC · filed 2014-10-27

However, the Mississippi courts have previously held that the three-year “catch all” statute of limitations from MCA Section 15-1-49 applies to claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress. ... Furthermore, the three-year “catch all” statute also applies to claims of tortious interference with business relations. ... The Court finds that the claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and tortious interference with business relations are clearly not time-barred; the facts, however, must be more closely examined to determine whether the claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress are time-barred.

Section 15-1-49(1) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 and fraud claims when no other period is prescribed.

Bernegger v. Dept of Revenue State of MS, et · filed 2019-08-30(1)

Bernegger’s § 1983 claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. James ex rel. James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n states with more than one statute of limitation for personal injury actions, § 1983 actions should be governed by the residual or general personal injury limitations period.”); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (prescribing three-year statute of limitations to “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed”). His fraud claim is also subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1); Sanderson Farms Inc. v. Ballard, 917 So. 2d 783, 789 (Miss. 2005).

Section 15-1-49(1) gives plaintiffs three years from accrual to bring product liability or negligence claims when no specific limitations period applies.

Tucker v. The Hershey Company · filed 2021-03-18(1)

Because there is not a specific limitation period, MPLA claims must be brought within Mississippi’s general three-year statute of limitations. ... Negligence claims are also subject to the general three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period on claims including negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

In the Matter of the Estate of Ray Charles Staten, Sr., Deceased: Ursula C. Staten v. Robert H. Pedersen, Lisa Mishune R · filed 2024-07-23

Therefore, even had the court granted her motion and reopened the estate, any viable claims against the Appellees are now barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2019); Rankin v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 912 So. 2d 725, 726 (¶2) (Miss. 2005) (recognizing that breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligence are subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 15-1-49).

Section 15-1-49 sets a three-year, or 1,095-day, limitations period for claims subject to the general statute of limitations.

Mine Safety Appliance Co. v. Holmes · filed 2015-04-23

Holmes's claim is subject to the general statute of limitations in Section 15-1-49, which is three years, or 1,095 days.

Section 15-1-49 gives a claim for actual damages from timber cutting three years from the cutting to be filed.

Alexander Sr. v. Patsy Phillips Musgrove · filed 2021-01-05

Accordingly, Mississippi’s catch-all limitations provision under Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1- 49 (1972) also applies in this case to Vanderford’s claim for actual damages for the timber cutting. The amended complaint adding Vanderford’s timber-cutting claim was filed on May 16, 1995, well within the applicable three-year limitations period that began running when the timber was cut in mid-May 1994.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions without another limitations period to be commenced within three years after accrual; filing tolls the period during the 120-day service window, but the period resumes if service is not made unless good cause is shown.

Triple" C" Transport, Inc. v. Dickens · filed 2004-04-22(1)

Mississippi law provides that "[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after." ... In order to further toll the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must then refile the complaint before the statute of limitations ends, or show good cause for failing to serve process on the defendant within that 120 day period; otherwise, dismissal is proper.

Section 15-1-49’s three-year limitations period bars a claim filed on the last day of the period when the plaintiff fails to serve the defendant within the allowed time.

Andrews v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. · filed 2016-05-17

This lawsuit was filed exactly three years after the date of the subject accident; however, plaintiff did not serve process on Davidson within the time provided for by the applicable rules of civil procedure and as a result the claims against him are time-barred and he is thus improperly joined.

Section 15-1-49 bars the commencement of an action on a cause of action, but does not apply to delays occurring within litigation that has already been commenced.

Brown v. Thomas · filed 2000-05-09

Quite simply, though, a statute of limitations is a bar to the commencement of proceedings on a cause of action. It has no relevance to the delays that occur within litigation that has already been commenced.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period, which resumes after the 120-day service period ends if the defendant was not served and may then bar the action.

Stutts v. Miller · filed 2008-10-06

It is undisputed that the applicable statue of limitations is three years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2003). ... Stutts did not serve the Millers until January 24, 2008, six days after the expiration of the 120-day period, on January 18, 2008. On this date, the statute of limitations resumed running and expired on January 22, 2008, before the Millers were served. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Stutts’s complaint with prejudice.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period is tolled for 120 days after a complaint is filed while the plaintiff attempts service; if service is not completed in that period, the limitations period resumes and may expire before proper service.

Edney v. Williams · filed 2018-12-13(1)

As this Court has held, “[f]iling a complaint tolls the applicable statute of limitations 120 days, but if the plaintiff fails to serve process on the defendant within that 120-day period, the statute of limitations automatically begins to run again when that period expires.” Brady, 142 So. 3d at 398 (quoting Watters v. Stripling, 675 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 1996)). The incident that Williams complained of occurred on February 8, 2008. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49, Williams was required to file his lawsuit within three years after the cause of action accrued. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012). On March 11, 2010, Williams filed his complaint against Edney. At that point, the statute of limitations was tolled for 120 days pending service of process upon the defendant, leaving 334 days remaining on the statute of limitations. Officer Edney argues that because he was not properly served, the statute of limitations began running again on July 9, 2010, and that it expired on June 8, 2011.

Section 15-1-49’s applicable version imposed a six-year limitations period, and class-action tolling ended when the court excluded the putative class members at class certification, requiring them to protect their claims independently.

Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1999-01-11

This court holds that the claims of those royalty owners who were excluded from the class by Judge Russell’s December 1978 Order now have lapsed and are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ... This court’s 1986 Order was entered almost two years after the claims of the putative class members in the instant case had expired. Once Judge Russell excluded these royalty owners from the class on December 15, 1978, they no longer had the right to rely on the class representatives to protect their interests, and the statute of limitation ran on their claims six years later, in 1984.

The three-year limitations period may be tolled by fraudulent concealment when the time the fraud could reasonably have been discovered remains disputed.

Smith v. Union National Life Insurance · filed 2001-11-07

The defendants point out that the three-year limitation period of Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 applies to the plaintiffs’ claims for fraud, grossly negligent and/or negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and unjust enrichment. ... In the case at bar, there is likewise at least a genuine issue of material fact regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations (i.e. the time at which such fraud should have been, or with reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered). The Court therefore finds there is a possibility that at least some of the plaintiffs’ claims are not barred.

Section 15-1-49 gives breach-of-contract and fraud claims three years from when they become enforceable, and a pending Mississippi Bar complaint does not toll that period.

Archer v. Creel · filed 2016-09-13

Both statutes of limitation arise under section 15-1-49, which holds that these claims arise “when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim[.]” Anderson v. LaVere, 136 So. 3d 404, 411 (¶¶32-33) (Miss. 2014). ... Therefore, Archer knew that each of her claims arose as of August 24, 2010. ... Because the Mississippi Bar proceedings did not toll the statute of limitations, the August 24, 2010 letter sufficiently shows that Archer knew of Creel’s alleged legal malpractice as early as that date. ... Under the applicable statute of limitations, Archer had until August 24, 2013, to file her action.

For a latent disease, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovered or, with reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury; when the evidence is disputed, the triggering date is a fact question for the jury.

Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Barnett · filed 2016-08-23

The applicable statute of limitations is three years, and because this case involves a “latent disease,” the limitations period began to run when Howard “discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, [his] injury.” ... Under Mississippi law, notes in Howard’s medical records suggesting the possibility of silicosis are insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations as a matter of law, and Dr. Julian Rose testified that he was first able to diagnose Howard with silicosis less than three years prior to the commencement of this lawsuit. ... On the record in this case, “the determination of the time at which [Howard] knew or by reasonable diligence should have known of his illness ... [was] a fact question [to] be resolved by [the] jury.”

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period when no other period applies, but for latent injury the claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury; a genuine dispute about discovery timing is for the jury.

T.L. Wallace Construction, Inc. v. McArthur, Thames, Slay, and Dews, PLLC · filed 2017-06-29(1), (2)

Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 provides: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012). When there is a genuine dispute, discovery of an injury is an issue of fact for the jury. Ridgway Lane & Assoc., 189 So. 3d at 629 (citations omitted); see also Smith v. Sneed, 638 So. 2d 1252 (Miss. 1994).

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period when no other period applies, while a latent-injury claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury.

Gloria Baker, Connie Cornwall, Carolyn Greer, Daniel Morris, and Judy Travis v. Raymond James & Associates Inc., Logan B · filed 2021-03-04(1), (2)

Under subsection (1), the “statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues,” Anderson v. LaVere, 136 So. 3d 404, 411 (Miss. 2014) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1)), meaning “when the right to sue becomes vested.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Bullard v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 941 So. 2d 812, 815 (Miss. 2006)). With subsection (2), however, the legislature has carved out an exception for latent injuries. This exception prevents the cause of action from accruing by tolling the clock “until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ... This Court has defined latent injury “as one where the ‘plaintiff will be precluded from discovering harm or injury because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable nature of the wrongdoing in question . . . [or] when it is unrealistic to expect a layman to perceive the injury at the time of the wrongful act.’” PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, 909 So. 2d 47, 50 (Miss. 2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So. 2d 161, 168 (Miss. 1999)). The latent injury “must be undiscoverable by reasonable methods[,]” and plaintiffs “must be reasonably diligent in investigating [their] injuries.” Wright v. Quesnel, 876 So. 2d 362, 366 (Miss. 2004) (citing Wayne Gen. Hosp. v. Hayes, 868 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Miss. 2004)). ... Here, no evidence was presented of any active concealment on the part of the Defendants with regard to the Plaintiffs’ investment portfolios. Rather, the evidence clearly shows that the Plaintiffs should have been (and were) aware as late as December 2008 that they had sustained almost total losses from Savell’s purchases of the penny stocks. ... We agree with Judge McCarty’s dissent and the trial court’s ruling that in order for the Plaintiffs “[t]o discover their injuries, Plaintiffs simply had to glance at their account statements, which would have alerted them to the substantial losses about which they now complain.” Baker, 2020 WL 1685704, at *10 (McCarty, J., concurring in part) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). ... For these reasons, we find that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to when the Plaintiffs learned or through reasonable diligence should have learned of the Defendants’ alleged malfeasance. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision, and we reinstate and affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs’ claims as time barred.

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period after accrual, while subsection (2) delays accrual for latent injuries until the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Western World Insurance Group, as Subrogee of Sunbelt Shavings, LLC, Shuqualak Lumber Company, Inc. and Wood Carriers, I · filed 2023-10-12(1) (2)

Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 states, “All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” ... This statute also provides for latent injuries and the discovery rule: “In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” ... There must be a latent injury for the discovery rule to apply. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ... The July 12, 2018 fire was not a latent injury as this Court defines. ... Rather, Western World’s knowledge of a fire on July 12, 2018, and the facts surrounding KC Welding’s actions on the Sunbelt property earlier that day provide Western World with the requisite knowledge for a cause of action to accrue, causing the statute of limitations to begin running on July 12, 2018. Therefore, this Court finds that the fire was not a latent injury that would require the statute of limitations to be tolled.

Section 15-1-49's limitations period is tolled until the plaintiff reasonably should know of negligent conduct and, in the applicable formulation, the injury, its cause, and the causal relationship to the defendant's conduct.

Boyles v. Schlumberger Technology Corp. · filed 2002-12-12

The discovery rule provides a tolling of the running of a statute of limitations until a plaintiff "should have reasonably known of some negligent conduct, even if the plaintiff does not know with absolute certainty that the conduct was legally negligent." Sarris v. Smith, 782 So.2d 721, 725 (Miss.2001). Expressed another way, "The operative time [for the running of the statute of limitations] is when the [plaintiff] can reasonably be held to have knowledge of the injury itself, the cause of the injury, and the causative relationship between the injury and the conduct of the [defendant]." Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Miss.1986) (quoted with approval in Sarris, 782 So.2d at 723).

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual for actions involving latent injury until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury, while subsection (1) requires suit within three years after accrual.

Fulkerson v. Odom · filed 2011-02-08(2), (1)

Because Fulkerson’s discovery of the affair is irrelevant to the question of when his claim accrued, the “discovery rule” cannot be used in these circumstances to delay the accrual Fulk-erson’s claim until 2006, when Fulkerson learned of the past affair. Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-49(2) (Rev. 2003) codifies the discovery rule, which delays accrual of actions “which involve latent injury or disease ... until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury.” Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ... Odom’s phone call could no more obviate the statutory bar of section 15-1-49 than the phone call in our hypothetical example. Section 15-1-49(1) required Fulkerson to commence his cause of action “within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued and not after.” Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (emphasis added). Thus, section 15-1-49(1) bars his claim.

The three-year limitations period for fraud claims does not begin until the policyholder discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the alleged fraud.

Henderson Ex Rel. Estate of Evans v. Community Bank (In Re Evans) · filed 2011-12-15

The Court agrees with the Fraud-Claim Banks that the statute of limitations in these circumstances did not begin to run until the alleged fraud became known, or should have become known, to the policyholder. See Parker v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 949 So.2d 57, 59 (Miss.Ct.App.2006). Because there are fact issues as to when the Fraud-Claim Banks knew, or should have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence about the alleged misrepresentations, the Court finds that the Title Companies are not entitled to partial summary judgment on the ground that their fraud claims are time-barred under Mississippi law.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period for contracts does not govern enforcement of property-settlement provisions incorporated into a divorce judgment.

Moseley v. Tiffiny Moseley Smith · filed 2014-12-02

Smith based her action on a provision in the property-settlement agreement. Since a property-settlement agreement is a contract, Smith argues the three-year statute of limitations for contracts should apply. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012). But a property-settlement agreement, though “quasi-contractual,” is not simply a contract. ... Thus, we abandon our previous conclusion in D’Avignon, 945 So. 2d at 408 (¶24), and instead hold that the seven-year statute of limitations for actions founded on judgments applies to all provisions in a property-settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce judgment, not just those that pertain to alimony and child support.5 See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-43.

Subsection (1)'s general three-year limitations period applies only when no other limitations period is prescribed; it does not bar a post-conviction-relief motion governed by the UPCCRA.

Fluker v. State of Mississippi · filed 2015-06-11(1)

The Court of Appeals erred by finding that the general, catch-all, three-year statute of limitations for civil claims applies to a motion for PCR. ... The UPCCRA prescribes a three-year statute of limitations for motions for PCR. ... Due to the exclusivity of the UPCCRA, these exceptions cannot be defeated by the general, three-year statute of limitations. ... The Court of Appeals erred by finding that Fluker’s claim was barred by Section 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 gives these insurance-procurement and coverage claims a three-year limitations period that begins, at the latest, when the insured receives notice that the claim is denied.

Stroud Ex Rel. Stroud v. Progressive Gulf Ins. Co. · filed 2017-09-19

“There is no dispute that the Strouds’ claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, and that the Strouds filed suit more than three years after Progressive denied coverage. ... In a case such as this, the law is clear that a claim that an insurance agent failed to procure the coverage requested by the insured accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the very latest, when the insured receives notice of the denial of his claim. ... When the insured is denied the coverage that he allegedly requested, he is “on notice of a possible problem with the procurement and understanding of the terms of his insurance policy,” and the statute of limitations begins to run (if some prior event has not already triggered it). ... Progressive’s denial of David’s claim put the Strouds “on notice of a possible problem,” so the statute of limitations on all their claims began to run on that date, at the very latest.”

Section 15-1-49 gives litigants three years to file an action, with the limitations period beginning when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury or has enough information to know of it.

Moore v. Edwards · filed 2022-03-08

In Mississippi, the applicable statute of limitations is set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, which allows a litigant three years to file such an action. The statute begins to run “the moment the plaintiff becomes aware he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know he has been injured.”

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for the listed claims, beginning when the plaintiff has notice of the contract terms giving rise to the injury.

CITIFINANCIAL MORTG. CO. v. Washington · filed 2007-10-25

The remainder of the claims are governed by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). Rankin v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 912 So.2d 725, (Miss. 2005) (breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligence are subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49). ... The statute of limitations for the claims in this case began to run when the plaintiffs had notice of the terms of the contract, which was at the time of the execution of the loan agreement, when the Plaintiff received the terms of the contract. ... Having signed and received a copy of the loan, which contained all the payment terms, Plaintiffs were on notice of the terms complained of as of November 29, 1995. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs' right to sue began on November 29, 1995, and the statute of limitations began to run on that date also. Plaintiffs filed their claim six years later in November 2001, well outside the three-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-49. Accordingly, this Court finds that the trial court erred by denying CitiFinancial's motion for summary judgment. The statute of limitations bar warrants a grant of summary judgment on all claims raised in this case.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims, beginning when the claim accrues; when accrual depends on discovering an injury, discovery is a jury fact issue if genuinely disputed.

Covington County Bank v. Earnest Ray Magee · filed 2015-10-15

Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49’s three-year statute of limitations applies to conversion claims. That statute “begins to run when the cause of action accrues, and we have held that the ‘cause of action accrues when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue becomes vested.’” And “[u]nder Section 15-1-49, ‘the statute of limitations commences upon discovery of an injury, and discovery is an issue of fact to be decided by a jury when there is a genuine dispute.’”

Section 15-1-49(1) provides a three-year residual limitations period for conversion and replevin claims, beginning when the property is wrongfully taken or withheld.

Estate of Martin Luther King Jr., Inc. v. Ballou · filed 2012-03-23(1)

In Mississippi, claims for conversion and replevin are governed by Mississippi’s residual statute of limitations, which for causes of action accruing after 1989 is three years and for causes of action accruing in or prior to 1989 is six years. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (“All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.”); First Bank v. Eastern Livestock Co., 886 F.Supp. 1328, 1330 (S.D.Miss.1995). ... It is the unauthorized act of dominion or ownership over another’s property that marks the accrual of the limitations period. Likewise, as replevin is an action for recovery of personal property wrongfully taken or withheld, the statute begins to run when the property is wrongfully taken or withheld.

Section 15-1-49(1) supplies a three-year limitations period only when no other statute prescribes a limitations period.

Patsy B. White v. William T. White d/b/a Royers Estates Inc. · filed 2020-02-04(1)

But the three-year statute of limitations explicitly states that it applies to “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed . . . .” § 15-1-49(1) (emphasis added). It provides a limitations period in the absence of an express statute. As set out above, actions to recover land have their own statute of limitations prescribed via section 15-1-7, suits seeking recovery of land in chancery are governed by section 15-1-9, and actions for a constructive trust have their own limitations period in section 15-1-39. The same conclusion in Bryant must be reached here. Because this case is undisputedly an action to recover land and for the imposition of a constructive trust, the proper statutes of limitations to be applied grant ten years of time, not three.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract claims.

Green v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2022-03-08

Accordingly, any breach of contract claim arising from the facts of this case is barred by the statute of limitations. Mississippi’s statute of limitations for breach of contract is three years. Wallace v. Greenville Pub. Sch. Dist., 142 So. 3d 1104, 1106 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49).

Section 15-1-49 supplied the six-year limitations period governing this § 1983 claim after Owens was applied retroactively.

Flowers v. Dickens · filed 1990-05-25

Accordingly, the court finds that Owens should be applied retroactively and, pursuant to the holding in Owens, plaintiff’s claim is controlled by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972).

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year statute of limitations, and claims filed more than three years after the relevant policy was issued are barred when fraudulent concealment does not toll the period.

Cunningham v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1997-08-29(1)

The plaintiffs claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1). ... Therefore, since the amended complaint was filed well over three years from the date Floore’s 1988 policy was issued, the court finds that Floore’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 supplies Mississippi’s catch-all limitations period for wrongful-termination claims.

Burditt v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. · filed 1997-09-12

Therefore, the appropriate statute of limitations for wrongful termination under Mississippi law is the “catch-all” statute of limitations, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. ... Because Burditt filed her complaint within three years of her termination, she is not barred by the statute of limitations and, therefore, the defendants’ motion is denied.

The three-year statute of limitations in § 15-1-49 does not bar an insurer's intervention in an injured worker's timely commenced third-party tort action to assert statutory subrogation rights.

MISSISSIPPI FOOD AND FUEL v. Tackett · filed 2000-03-28

The chancellor held that the Trust's right of recovery was barred by the State's three year statute of limitation. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.1995). ... We, therefore, adopt the general rule that an insurance company's intervention in an injured worker's third-party tort claim to assert the company's right of subrogation is not subject to a statute of limitations bar so long as the original action was commenced by the injured worker (or his personal representative) within the applicable limitation period.

Section 15-1-49's general three-year limitations period does not govern claims against governmental entities subject to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Henderson v. UN-NAMED EMERGENCY ROOM, MADISON COUNTY MED. CENTER · filed 2000-04-06

The appellants argue that Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49, the general three-year statute of limitations, applies to the case at bar. For the reasons before stated, this Court holds that § 11-46-3 sets forth the intent of the Legislature that the State and its political subdivisions be immune from liability beginning April 1, 1993. Therefore, since the event giving rise to this cause of action occurred April 25, 1993, clearly after the Act went into effect, § 11-46-3 and not § 15-1-49 governs the case now before this Court.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitation period on claims arising after March 12, 1990, and a six-year limitation period on claims arising before that date.

Peters v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2001-09-14

The applicable statute of limitations is Mississippi’s general statute of limitations, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49, which imposes a three-year limitation period for claims arising after March 12, 1990, and a six-year limitation period for claims arising prior to that date. ... When he was required to pay premiums after that time, he knew of the fraud, and had three years to bring suit. He did not bring this action until November 28, 2000. Thus, his claim is time-barred.

Section 15-1-49's six-year limitations period, as applicable to the 1987 claim, is tolled while the same claims are pending in federal court and dismissed without prejudice.

Boston v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. · filed 2002-04-04

The general statute of limitations that was in effect as of July 12, 1987, the time the action accrued, was six years. ... Because Boston spent over five years in the federal court system pursuing this action and almost eight years passed from the time this case accrued to when she filed a complaint in state court, this Court must simply determine if Mississippi's six (6) year statute of limitations was tolled while Boston was in federal court. ... In accordance with this Court's determination in Norman, we conclude that the six (6) year statute of limitations was tolled while the case was in federal court and that the trial court erred in determining that Boston's claims were time-barred.

Section 15-1-49(1) supplies a limitations period of no more than three years for the claims at issue, so claims based on loans seven to eleven years old are time-barred.

Queen v. American General Finance, Inc. · filed 2003-09-30(1)

Each of these causes of action is governed by, at most, a three-year statute of limitations. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1). The plaintiffs in this action obtained their loans between seven and eleven years prior to filing suit, and therefore, their claims are time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 provides the limitations period for fraudulent-misrepresentation claims; the opinion applies a three-year period generally, while noting that a six-year period governed in 1986.

Smith v. Union National Life Insurance · filed 2003-10-02

The Court finds that even if Plaintiffs could establish a claim against Defendant Bailey for fraudulent misrepresentation, their claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs’ claims for fraudulent misrepresentation are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period, running when the claim accrues, subject to the discovery rule only when the injured party could not reasonably discover the injury and the conduct causing it.

Department of Human Services v. Ray · filed 2008-12-16

Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-49 (Rev.2003) provides a three-year statute of limitations for claims of fraud. See Warren v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 949 So.2d 770, 772(¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (citing Stephens, 850 So.2d at 82(¶ 12)). The three-year period begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. The discovery rule applies so as to toll the statute of limitations only when the injured party is unaware of his injuries and the conduct that caused the injuries. Davis v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397, 402(¶ 15) (Miss.2004). ... The statute of limitations for fraud is three years. Warren, 949 So.2d at 772(¶ 8). This period begins to run when the action accrues. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Approximately twenty years have passed since Ray, according to his own testimony, had reason to believe that he was not L.J.'s father. See Johnson, 177 Miss. at 643, 171 So. at 14. Clearly, the statute of limitations has run on Ray's claim of fraud. Quite simply, Ray chose to sit on his rights. For the above reasons, Ray's claim of fraud is time-barred under the statute of limitations for fraud.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year catchall limitations period for a bad-faith claim based on mishandling or failure to pay workers’ compensation benefits, beginning when the Commission renders final judgment absent tolling.

Harper v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. · filed 2010-06-17

Because Mississippi has no statute of limitations specific to bad-faith mishandling of a worker’s compensation claim, our three-year catchall statute of limitations applies. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2003). ... Absent some argument for tolling, the statute of limitations for a bad-faith claim against an employer or insurance company for failure to pay benefits begins to run when the Commission renders final judgment.

Section 15-1-49’s three-year limitations period cannot run against a municipal hospital such as NRMC.

Natchez Regional Medical Center v. Quorum Health Resources, LLC · filed 2012-07-18

Therefore, the Court declines the Defendants’ invitation to declare Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 unconstitutional because it deprives them of a vested right without due process of law and elects not to certify this issue to the Fifth Circuit, as the Defendants request in a footnote. The Court finds that Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations cannot run against NRMC and therefore does not limit NRMC’s actions occurring before February 12, 2006.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period only for actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed.

Hubbard v. Bancorpsouth Bank · filed 2014-04-10

The Hubbards and BancorpSouth agree that the circuit court mistakenly held that the three-year statute of limitations defined by Section 15-1^9 controls this case. It is clear from the plain language of Section 15-1^9 that it does not apply in this case. Section 15-1-49 states in relevant part: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2012) (emphasis added). In this case, other statutes of limitations are prescribed for unpaid promissory notes, specifically Sections 15-1-23 and 75-3-118, and these are the controlling statutes. The question of which statute is appropriate for the present case remains.

Section 15-1-49 gives fraud and fraudulent-misrepresentation claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Hopson v. Chase Home Finance LLC · filed 2014-04-11

Assuming that plaintiffs have attempted to assert a claim for fraud based on these allegations, such claim is plainly barred by the statute of limitations. As defendants note in their motion, any fraud claim relating to the origination of plaintiffs’ loan is time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations on claims for fraud. See Citi-Financial Mortgage Co. v. Washington, 967 So.2d 16, 17 (Miss.2007) (ruling that fraudulent misrepresentation claim is subject to three-year statute of limitations in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49).

For latent injuries, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should discover, the injury.

Munson v. C.R. Bard, Inc. · filed 2021-09-20(2)

Product liability actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations in Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1). “In actions . . . which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” § 15-1-49(2). ... Because there is a reasonable dispute as to the material fact of when Ms. Munson did know or should have known that her filter had migrated, perforated, and fractured, summary judgment is inappropriate on the issue of limitations.

For a claim involving latent injury, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury.

William O. Rives, II and Richard T. Rives v. Jason G. Ishee and GB Brookhaven, LLC · filed 2022-03-08(2)

However, if the claim is one that “involve[s] latent injury,” then “the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” ... By the express allegations in their own complaint, the Rives brothers admit there were no latent injuries.

For latent disease claims, the cause of action accrues when the disease is diagnosed by a physician.

Cichirillo v. Avondale Industries, Inc. · filed 2005-11-29(2)

Application of the discovery rule, as provided in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) and as interpreted by the Mississippi courts, convinces us that under Mississippi law, one's cause of action for cancer in a latent disease case does not accrue until that disease has been diagnosed by a physician.

For a strict products liability claim involving latent disease, the limitations period begins when the disease physically manifests.

Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation and Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., Defendants · filed 1984-07-02

The court’s recognition of the plaintiff’s need to have adequate time in which to vindicate his rights commands the view that the Mississippi court would follow the judicial trend in adopting the discovery rule for strict liability latent disease cases, rather than put upon the plaintiff the uneasy burden of instituting a claim for injuries unknown and unknowable as of the time of initial exposure to the potential pathogen. In this context, the “sustained” injury must be equated with the physical manifestation of disease.

Under the former six-year version of § 15-1-49, a latent disease claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the disease; suspicion alone does not start the limitations period.

Schiro v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 1992-12-31

Applying the foregoing principles set forth in Owens, we hold that in the instant case the cause of action accrued on January 26, 1982, when the doctor diagnosed that the mass was cancerous. ... Thus, she properly brought suit within the applicable six year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal-injury action, and a timely filing is not defeated merely because an assignment of medical-payment rights is reassigned after that period.

Taylor v. Walmart Transportation, LLC · filed 2021-10-01

Mississippi’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Taylor filed this lawsuit in Mississippi state court within the three-year statute of limitations. ... Here, Defendants offer no authority to support that the reassignment had to occur before the three-year statute of limitations otherwise Taylor cannot recover. ... Taylor filed her lawsuit within the 3-year statute of limitations. At no point did she relinquish her rights to her negligence claim. The Clinic and Dr. Goel reassigned Taylor the rights to payment for her medical damages during the pendency of the lawsuit. There is therefore no genuine issue of material fact and no legal authority offered to contradict that Taylor’s medical damages from the Clinic and Dr. Goel are legally hers to recover.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions in Mississippi.

Wilburn v. Cain · filed 2022-11-17

In Mississippi, that period is three years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49; Norwood v. City of Mendenhall, Miss., 630 F. App’x 245, 249 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 personal-injury claims in Mississippi, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Green · filed 2026-04-02

In Mississippi, § 1983 actions are governed by Mississippi’s general three-year personal injury limitations period. James by James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S. Ct. 573, 102 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1989)); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. ... Here, Green was required to bring her § 1983 claim within three years after her cause of action accrued. ... So it is obvious from her complaint’s face that she failed to bring her § 1983 claims within the three-year statute of limitations. Therefore, her claims are time barred.

Section 15-1-49 gives an uninsured- or underinsured-motorist claim a three-year limitations period that begins when it can reasonably be known that the claimant’s damages exceed the tortfeasor’s available insurance.

United Services Automobile Association a/k/a USAA v. Moffatt · filed 2022-02-08

“A cause of action against an insurer for uninsured- [or underinsured]-motorist benefits is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.” ... “On this issue, “the Mississippi Supreme Court [has] held that the statute of limitations for an uninsured-motorist claim begins to run when it can be reasonably known that the damages suffered exceed the limits of insurance available to the alleged tortfeasor.””

Section 15-1-49 gives an uninsured-motorist benefits claim a three-year limitations period that begins when it can reasonably be known that the damages exceed the alleged tortfeasor's available insurance.

Madison v. Geico General Insurance Co. · filed 2010-12-14

A cause of action against an insurer for uninsured-motorist benefits is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. See Mitchell v. Progressive Ins. Co., 965 So.2d 679, 683 (¶ 13) (Miss.2007). The issue in this case is when the statute of limitations began to run. ... In Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 880 So.2d 336, 343 (¶ 21) (Miss.2004), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for an uninsured-motorist claim begins to run when it can be reasonably known that the damages suffered exceed the limits of insurance available to the alleged tortfeasor.

The three-year limitations period for an uninsured-motorist claim resumes after the 120-day service period if the plaintiff neither serves process nor obtains more time.

Sandlin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2025-04-22

The circuit court’s order of dismissal was entered on July 6, 2023, nearly four years after the accident, and nearly a year after the three-year limitations period had expired.

Section 15-1-49’s three-year limitations period for uninsured-motorist claims begins when the claimant can reasonably know that the damages exceed the alleged tortfeasor’s available insurance coverage.

Montgomery v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois · filed 2012-03-20

Our review of case law herein establishes that the statute of limitations under section 15-1^49 begins to run “when it can be reasonably known that the damages suffered exceed the limits of insurance available to the alleged tortfeasor.” Madison, 49 So.3d at 1168 (¶ 9).

Section 15-1-49 is the controlling limitations statute for conversion and unjust-enrichment claims, and its period is not extended by continuing tort or equitable estoppel on these facts.

Rhea v. Career General Agency, Inc., GuideOne America Insurance Company and Dennis Basden · filed 2022-12-06(1)

The supreme court has further determined that “[s]ection 15-1-49 is the controlling statute of limitations[, ] which applies to claims of . . . conversion [and] unjust enrichment,” among others.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for an insurance bad-faith claim accruing in Mississippi.

Succession of Paul Blanchard v. GEICO General Insurance Company · filed 2023-12-05

As discussed above, GEICO now concedes that its prior argument that a one-year prescription applied was incorrect. In the alternative, if the claim accrued in Mississippi, it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49; Oaks v. Sellers, 953 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (¶14) (Miss. 2007) (stating that section 15-1-49 governs insurance bad faith claims).

The three-year discovery rule for latent injury applies only when no other limitation period is prescribed, so it does not displace § 15-1-41's repose period for an improvement to real property.

Ferrell v. River City Roofing, Inc. · filed 2005-08-18(2)

Ferrell asserts that the products liability statute in effect as to this case, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Rev.2002), applies instead of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-41, and consequently renders the "discovery rule" as stated in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003) applicable for the purposes of computing the correct statute of limitations. ... Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003) states: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. (3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall apply to all pending and subsequently filed actions. ... In Moore v. Jesco, Inc., 531 So.2d 815, 817 (Miss.1988), this Court held that an "improvement to real property" is not a "product," and therefore, "an action based on strict products liability will not lie." ... This issue is without merit.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions without another limitations period to be filed within three years after accrual, subject to tolling under the minor saving statute for a minor's claim.

Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams Co. · filed 2007-02-15(1)

The applicable statute of limitations is provided by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1), which states: (1) [a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1). ... As the original complaint was not filed until November 28, 2000, the three (3) year statute of limitations applicable to Pollard's claims had already expired. However, because Trellvion was a minor at the time his cause of action accrued,[5] his claims are tolled by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59. ... As Trellvion was a minor at the time his cause of action accrued, as well as at present, his claims are tolled by the "minor saving statute" and not barred by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for actions, including ordinary negligence claims, for which no other period of limitation is prescribed.

Johnson v. Med Express Ambulance Service, Inc. · filed 2008-07-09

Therefore, the three-year limitation period set forth in § 15-1-49 applies to the ordinary negligence claims underlying the plaintiffs’ wrongful death action and serves as the statute of limitations for said action.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for causes of action with no other prescribed period, including federal common law nuisance claims.

Comer v. Murphy Oil Usa, Inc. · filed 2012-03-20

The three-year statute of limitations provided by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 applies to all causes of action for which no other period of limitation has been prescribed. With regard to federal common law claims, federal courts must borrow the applicable statute of limitations from the state in which it sits. McGuire v. Baker, 421 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir.1970). Therefore, Mississippi's three-year statute of limitations also applies to the federal common law nuisance claim.

Section 15-1-49 gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period when no specific period applies.

Hampton v. Gannett Co., Inc. OSA · filed 2003-12-15(1)

As the Mississippi Code includes no specific statute of limitations for claims of negligence, Plaintiffs negligence claims are governed by the three year limitation period set forth in § 15-1-49.

At the time, Section 15-1-49 provided a six-year limitations period for negligence claims resembling common-law case actions, with each claim assessed separately.

King v. Otasco, Incorporated · filed 1988-12-06

Under Mississippi law, “[t]he policy ... has been to provide a short one-year statute of limitations for listed intentional torts and a long six-year statute of limitations for ‘case’ actions.”8 ... King’s remaining causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligently causing the arrest of another fall into a final category. They do not charge intentional torts, and are more analogous to common law “case” actions than to trespass actions. Accordingly, Mississippi’s one-year statute of limitations does not bar them.

Section 15-1-49’s three-year period applies to claims for actual and punitive damages, but not to a claim to clear title based on a possessory interest in land.

Lott v. Saulters · filed 2012-08-14

Because Ralph alleges a possessory interest in land, his claim is not governed by the three-year statute of limitations in Section 15-1-49. However, Ralph’s claims for actual and punitive damages are barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49(1)’s three-year period for a bad-faith workers’ compensation claim runs from the final award of the specific benefits at issue; later proceedings over other benefits do not extend it.

Bridgeman v. SBC Internet Svcs · filed 2024-06-07(1)

No later decision by the Commission or Mississippi Court of Appeals could have affected the elements of Bridgeman’s bad-faith claims against the Defendants for what occurred before March 2014. ... Bridgeman’s 2021 suit was thus filed outside the three-year statute of limita- tions.

Section 15-1-49’s six-year limitations period does not govern an Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act claim when the adjacent state’s limitations period applies as federal law.

Bonner v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. · filed 1981-05-06

Rather, reference is to the Supremacy Clause by virtue of which the now federal one-year limitation period bars maintenance of the present action, notwithstanding the Mississippi six-year limitations period.

Section 15-1-49’s six-year limitations defense must be pleaded; pleading Section 15-1-7 does not invoke it.

Estate of Miller v. Miller · filed 1982-02-10

However, the general limitation statute of six years, Section 15-1-49 (1972), was not pled but appellant argues that the question was sufficiently raised by pleading Section 15-1-7. ... The appellant having relied upon a statute not applicable, cannot invoke the protection of another not pleaded. A party who pleads or replies to a statute of limitations not appropriate to the action must abide the result. ... The above statement of the law is a viable principle today.

Under the version at issue, § 15-1-49’s six-year limitations period applies to an action on a separate guaranty contract.

First National Bank of Columbus v. Drummond · filed 1982-09-27

As reflected in the opinion by the Supreme Court of Mississippi attached as an appendix hereto, the six-year statute of limitations provided in Section 15-1 — 49 applies and the complaint by the bank was initiated timely.

Under the then-applicable six-year period in § 15-1-49, a trustee joined by a triggering creditor could use the unexpired state limitations period consecutively with the period in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a).

Levingston v. Hammett (In Re Hammett) · filed 1984-06-04

The interaction of 11 U.S.C. § 544 and § 546(a) permits the Plaintiff Trustee, when joined by the “triggering creditor”, Lonoke Production Credit Association, to utilize consecutively the time period provided in § 15-1-49, if still effective on the date of the bankruptcy filing, in addition to the time period provided in § 546(a).

Section 15-1-49 does not govern an equitable claim for an implied trust and partnership accounting; the ten-year period in § 15-1-39 applies.

Wholey v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. · filed 1988-07-27

So to, the present complaints were based upon the breach of a fiduciary duty by Cal-Maine giving rise to the imposition of an implied trust, and of necessity a partnership accounting. The lower court erred when it applied the six-year statute of limitations and granted Cal-Maine summary judgments on this point.

Section 15-1-49’s general limitations period yields to § 15-1-25’s specific four-year period for suits against estate administrators.

Townsend v. Estate of Gilbert · filed 1993-04-01

Therefore, we find that the specific statute of § 15-1-25 preempts the general statute of § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in Mississippi.

Hubbard v. Mississippi Conference of United Methodist Church · filed 2001-04-25

In Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So.2d 1246, 1256 (Miss.1996), the Mississippi Supreme Court expressly stated that the statute of limitations applicable to intentional infliction of emotional distress is three years pursuant to the Mississippi general statute of limitations found at section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code. ... Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations for Hubbard’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is three years.

The six-year residual period in the 1972 version of § 15-1-49 does not apply to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims treated as menace-type torts.

Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co. · filed 1986-10-27

Guthrie contends that Mississippi’s residual limitation of six years should apply. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972). ... The district court’s reasoning that intentional infliction of emotional distress is the same type of tort as menace and therefore covered by the one-year statute of limitations is persuasive. We affirm the district court’s determination that Guthrie’s emotional distress claim is time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 gives a breach-of-contract claim three years from accrual before it expires.

Ross v. Gulf Group, Inc. · filed 2002-05-21

... there can be no legitimate dispute that the cause of action accrued on July 31, 1991, and that, under the provisions of Section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code, the cause of action expired three years from that date.