Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63

Section 11-1-63(e) requires a failure-to-warn instruction to account for whether the product’s danger was known or open and obvious to the user.

Hageney v. Jackson Furniture of Danville · filed 1999-03-09(e)

Omitted from instruction P-12 was the "if the danger posed by the product is known or is open and obvious to the user" language required by § 11-1-63(e). When a plaintiff is relying on § 11-1-63(a)(i)(2) in a products liability action, the known or open and obvious danger defense is a factor to be considered by the jury in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.

Section 11-1-63 limits the open and obvious defense to product liability claims based on inadequate warnings or instructions.

Seymour v. Brunswick Corp. · filed 1995-05-11

Since the events of this case took place, the legislature has enacted § 11-1-63 Miss. Code Ann. (1994 Supp.). The defense of open and obvious was reenacted but is only applicable to product liability cases based upon theories for inadequate warnings or instructions where it is inherently applicable.

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires a defective warning to proximately cause the claimed damages; the contents of an unread owner’s manual cannot do so.

Palmer v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. · filed 2001-03-28(a)(iii)

The presence or absence of anything in an unread owner’s manual simply cannot proximately cause a plaintiff’s damages.

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires a defective warning to proximately cause the plaintiff's damages; the contents of an owner's manual the plaintiff never read cannot satisfy that requirement.

Palmer v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. · filed 2005-04-07(a)(iii)

The presence or absence of anything in an unread owner's manual simply cannot proximately cause a plaintiff's damages.

Section 11-1-63 limits liability for inadequate warnings to warnings that were inadequate when the product left the manufacturer’s or seller’s control; it imposes no post-sale duty to warn.

Palmer v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. · filed 2003-08-26(a)(i)

The plain meaning of the MPLA's language is that the statute imposes liability on the manufacturer or seller for warnings that were inadequate at the time of sale, not for warnings that became inadequate at some later time. Therefore, it appears that there is no post-sale duty to warn under the statute. ... This Court is not prepared to recognize a post-sale warning duty at this time and in the absence of legislative action.

Section 11-1-63(a) limits the duty to warn to dangers known when the product leaves the manufacturer’s or seller’s control; it does not impose a post-sale duty to warn.

Noah v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2004-03-09(a)

The Mississippi Product Liability Act speaks only of dangers known as of the time the product leaves the control of the manufacturer or seller. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a) (Rev.2002). Creating a post-sale duty to warn appears to conflict with the language of this statute. The legislature has not revised the statute in question and in the absence of such revision, we will not now create a post-sale duty to warn. Even were the defendants aware of allegations of brake failure, they were under no duty to disclose them.

Section 11-1-63(d) bars a product defect claim when the claimant knows and appreciates a danger and deliberately and voluntarily chooses to encounter it.

Green v. Allendale Planting Co. · filed 2007-04-26(d)

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(d) (Rev.2002) precludes liability for defective design when the plaintiff assumes the risk of his injuries. ... Here, the record reveals from Green's deposition that he understood and appreciated the danger. Further, the moving chains were open and obvious to Green. Green proceeded to approach the mule boy without first turning off the machine, even though he appreciated that it was a dangerous situation. The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of KBH.

Section 11-1-63(c)(i) requires a failure-to-warn plaintiff to prove that an ordinary user or consumer was unaware of the product’s danger.

Elliott v. El Paso Corporation · filed 2015-09-03(c)(i)

However, both CPChem and Tri-State are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims because the Elliotts have provided no evidence that the Holly Springs Utility Department—or any other “ordinary users or consumers” of natural gas odorant—was unaware of the potential for odorant fade. Under the MPLA, a manufacturer or seller is not liable for failure to warn unless the plaintiff can prove that the “ordinary user or consumer” of the allegedly defective product did not know of the danger it posed.

Section 11-1-63(c)(ii) does not categorically bar failure-to-warn claims based on a failure to disclose that a product is more dangerous than comparable products.

Munson v. C.R. Bard, Inc. · filed 2021-09-20(c)(ii)

At this juncture, however, this court does not believe that there should be a hard-and-fast rule barring claims based on a failure to warn of the relative risk of a particular product, particularly since the MPLA specifically requires manufacturers to disclose the “dangers” of their products.

Section 11-1-63 excludes commercial damage to the product itself, leaving the product owner to seek a remedy under warranty or contract law.

STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1999-03-09

Although the act does not define "commercial damage to the product itself," presumably the language means that damages caused by the product that adversely affect the product's monetary value are not within the scope of the act's coverage, and thus, the product owner would have to seek a remedy in the law of warranty or contract.

Section 11-1-63 applies to products, and a hangar door that is a fixture is not a product under the section.

Bragg v. United States · filed 1999-04-02

Mississippi’s Products Liability Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63, operates only to impose liability against manufacturers or sellers of “products,” and the hangar door at issue in this case cannot appropriately be characterized as a “product.”

Section 11-1-63 does not support a products liability claim for an improvement to real property because the improvement is not a product.

Wayne E. Ferrell, Jr. v. River City Roofing, Inc. · filed 2003-08-11

In Moore v. Jesco, Inc., 531 So. 2d 815, 817 (Miss. 1988), this Court held that an “improvement to real property” is not a “product,” and therefore, “an action based on strict products liability will not lie.” ... This issue is without merit.

Section 11-1-63 does not support a strict products liability claim for an improvement to real property, such as a newly installed roof.

Ferrell v. River City Roofing, Inc. · filed 2005-08-18

¶ 26. Ferrell asserts that the products liability statute in effect as to this case, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Rev.2002), applies instead of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-41, and consequently renders the "discovery rule" as stated in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003) applicable for the purposes of computing the correct statute of limitations.[3] ... ¶ 28. In Moore v. Jesco, Inc., 531 So.2d 815, 817 (Miss.1988), this Court held that an "improvement to real property" is not a "product," and therefore, "an action based on strict products liability will not lie." ... ¶ 29. This issue is without merit.

Section 11-1-63 limits product liability recovery under the economic loss rule to physical injury to persons or property.

In Re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation · filed 2009-12-01

The economic loss rule limits liability under the PLA to physical injury to persons or property.

Section 11-1-63 does not treat human tissue supplied for medical procedures as a product.

Palermo v. LifeLink Foundation, Inc. · filed 2014-01-14

In accordance with our finding today that human tissue is not a product under the MPLA, the Palermos products-liability negligence claim fails.

Section 11-1-63 does not impose strict products liability on mere service providers, including those deemed to provide a service by distributing human tissue.

Richard (Rickey) Palermo v. LifeLink Foundation, Inc. · filed 2014-11-20

Moreover, even absent the historical context regarding the interplay of Section 41-41-1 and strict liability law, the plain language of the MPLA makes clear that it does not apply to mere service providers.

Section 11-1-63 does not limit product liability claims to users or consumers; a bystander injured by a defective product may sue.

Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Barnett · filed 2016-08-23

However, we read the statute’s references to users and consumers as relevant to the question whether the product is defective—e.g., the knowledge of the product’s ordinary users and consumers must be taken into account, see id. § 11-1-63(c)(i), (c)(ii), & (e)—not as a limitation on the parties who may sue for injuries caused by defective products.

Section 11-1-63 does not apply to products liability suits against lessors of goods.

Funches v. Progressive Tractor & Implement Co. · filed 2018-09-28(a)

Based on the data discussed above, we conclude that the MPLA does not apply to products liability suits against a lessor of goods.

Section 11-1-63(a) does not apply to products liability suits against a lessor of goods.

Funches v. Noland · filed 2018-10-08(a)

Based on the data discussed above, we conclude that the MPLA does not apply to products liability suits against a lessor of goods.

Section 11-1-63 provides the exclusive remedy for product liability claims, including manufacturing defect claims.

Knoth v. Keith · filed 2019-11-08

Knoth’s manufacturing claim must proceed under the MPLA, as it is the exclusive remedy for products liability actions.

Section 11-1-63 provides the exclusive remedy for claims alleging damages caused by a product and subsumes duplicative non-MPLA claims.

Tran v. Knauf Gips KG · filed 2024-04-16

Thus, Plaintiffs’ non-MPLA claims are subsumed by, and will be dismissed as duplicative of, their MPLA claim in Count IX.

Section 11-1-63 provides the exclusive remedy for claims alleging damages caused by a product, so duplicative claims outside the MPLA are dismissed.

Fozard v. Knauf Gips KG · filed 2024-05-13

Thus, Plaintiffs’ non-MPLA claims are subsumed by, and will be dismissed as duplicative of, their MPLA claim in Count IX.

Section 11-1-63 governs claims for damages caused by defective products; it does not subsume a breach of contract claim based on delivery of the wrong product.

Sunshine Mills, Inc. v. Nutra-Blend, LLC · filed 2025-09-04

We clarify today that the Products Liability Act governs claims for damages caused by defective products.

Section 11-1-63 governs product injury claims against manufacturers, including failure to warn, design defect, and manufacturing defect claims.

Nolazco · filed 2026-03-24

Though neither party specified the claims to which the MPLA applies in this case nor conducted any real analysis concerning those claims, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ failure to warn, design defect, and manufacturing defect claims are all subsumed by the MPLA, and the Court will therefore analyze each of those claims under the MPLA’s framework.

Section 11-1-63’s products liability provisions apply to actions filed on or after July 1, 1994.

Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. · filed 1994-06-21

The entire products liability section, § 11-1-63, and the substantive portions of the punitive damages section, § 11-1-65, do not go into effect until July 1, 1994.

Section 11-1-63’s substantive design defect rule does not apply to an action filed before July 1, 1994, even when an amended complaint adds the design defect claim on that date.

Smith v. Mack Trucks, Inc. · filed 1998-03-17(1)(b)

We find that only the Products Liability Act' s procedural provisions were applicable to the case sub judice, according to the express terms of the Act.

Section 11-1-63(c)(i) applies to actions filed on or after July 1, 1994.

O'FLYNN v. Fiberglas · filed 2000-05-02(c)(i)

In 1993, the Mississippi Legislature enacted Mississippi's Products Liability Act with section 11-1-63(c)(i) applicable to actions filed on or after July 1, 1994. Since O'Flynn and Hatten filed their complaints before this effective date, the Mississippi Products Liability Act is inapplicable.

Section 11-1-63’s substantive provisions do not apply to an action filed before July 1, 1994, even when an amended complaint is filed on that date.

Smith v. MacK Trucks, Inc. · filed 2002-06-20

This case is subject only to the procedural provisions of the Act as plaintiffs filed suit on March 2, 1993, clearly before the Act was enacted on July 1, 1993.

The 2004 version of § 11-1-63(h) took effect September 1, 2004, and did not apply to a suit filed before that date.

Henderson v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2004-10-04(h)

Plaintiff cites the 2004 version of Miss. Code Ann. § 11—1—63(h) as his sole authority in support of the proposition that knowledge of a defect on the part of a retailer might give rise to liability on its part, ... but this provision only became effective on September 1, 2004 and is inapplicable to this case.

Section 11-1-63(a) judges personal injury product liability claims against a manufacturer at the time the product left its control.

Dorsey v. Blue Bird Corp. · filed 2014-10-06(a)

The MPLA is clear that all personal injury product liability claims against a manufacturer are judged "at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer.” Miss.Code Ann. § 1 l-l-63(a).

Section 11-1-63(f)(ii) requires a feasible alternative design to probably prevent the harm without impairing the product’s utility, usefulness, practicality, or desirability.

Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc. · filed 1997-09-16(f)(ii)

Telsmith clearly did not stipulate that the alternative designs do not impair the "utility, usefulness, practicability or desirability of the product to users or consumers." Miss.Code. Ann. § 11-1-63(f)(ii).

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a feasible alternative design that would probably prevent the harm without impairing the product’s utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability.

Wolf v. Stanley Works · filed 2000-03-28(f)

However, her own expert witness testified that the mats had a short life expectancy, were likely to fail and result in accidents, and were very costly. These characteristics impair the "utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability of the product to users or consumers." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(f).

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a design-defect claimant to prove that a feasible alternative design was available when the product left the manufacturer’s control and would have prevented the harm without impairing the product’s usefulness.

3M Company v. Johnson · filed 2002-01-30(f)

The plaintiffs here were thus required to prove that at the time the 8500 dust mask and the 8710 disposable respirator left 3M’s control, there was a feasible alternative design available that would have prevented the harm without impairing the usefulness of the product.

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a design defect claimant to show that a feasible design alternative would probably have prevented the harm.

Austin v. Will-Burt Co. · filed 2002-11-25(f)

In order to prevail on this claim the plaintiff must prove that a feasible design alternative would have, to a reasonable probability, prevented the harm. ... The court finds that mast design choice in 1982 did not include proximity warning safety devices that were available and within the state of the art of mast safety design.

Section 11-1-63(f)(ii) requires a claimant alleging defective design to show a feasible alternative design that would likely have prevented the harm without impairing the product's usefulness.

Hobson v. Waggoner Engineering, Inc. · filed 2003-08-05(f)(ii)

To recover under this statute, Ms. Hobson must demonstrate that a dispute of a material fact existed that at the time the product left National Seal's hands, there was a feasible alternative design available that would have prevented the harm without impairing the usefulness of the product.

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a design defect plaintiff to prove that a feasible alternative design was available when the product left the manufacturer's control and would have prevented the harm without impairing the product's usefulness.

3M Co. v. Johnson · filed 2005-01-20(f)

The plaintiffs here were thus required to prove that at the time the 8500 dust mask and the 8710 disposable respirator left 3M's control, there was a feasible alternative design available that would have prevented the harm without impairing the usefulness of the product.

Section 11-1-63 requires a claimant alleging defective design to prove a defect and a feasible alternative design that probably would have prevented the injury.

Clark v. Brass Eagle, Inc. · filed 2002-12-16(a)(i)(3)

The Mississippi Legislature passed the Products Liability Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63, codifying strict liability law. ... Clark offered no proof that the paintball gun used in the incident failed to function as expected and offered no feasible design alternative which, to a reasonable probability, would have prevented what happened to him.

Section 11-1-63(f)(ii) bars design defect recovery unless the claimant proves the product failed to function as expected when it left the manufacturer's control.

Austin v. Will-Burt Co. · filed 2004-03-01(f)(ii)

We conclude that the MPLA, in section 11-1-63(f), unambiguously precludes recovery against the manufacturer on the basis of design defect unless the product "failed to function as expected," and that this preclusion of recovery is applicable even though the facts are such that design defect recovery against the manufacturer would have been available under the Prestage risk-utility test notwithstanding that the product functioned as expected.

Section 11-1-63(f)(ii) bars design defect recovery unless the product failed to function as expected, even if a risk-utility test would permit recovery.

Austin v. Will-Burt Company · filed 2004-03-16(f)(ii)

We conclude that the MPLA, in section 11-1-63(f), unambiguously precludes recovery against the manufacturer on the basis of design defect unless the product “failed to function as expected,” and that this preclusion of recovery is applicable even though the facts are such that design defect recovery against the manufacturer would have been available under the Prestage risk-utility test notwithstanding that the product functioned as expected.

Section 11-1-63 requires a design defect claimant to prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger when the product left its control.

McAfee v. Murray OH Mfg Co OH · filed 2003-04-07

Dixon apparently would have testified that Murray was aware of arcing problems. Such testimony would certainly have been probative. But it also was a necessary element of the McAfees’ prima facie case under Mississippi product liability law.

Section 11-1-63(f)(ii) requires a design defect claimant to show that the product failed to function as expected and that an alternative design would not impair its utility, usefulness, practicality, or desirability.

Glenn v. Overhead Door Corp. · filed 2006-01-17(f)(ii)

In an action alleging that a product is defective because of a design defect, the claimant must show that the product failed to function as expected, and that the alternative design would not impair the utility, usefulness, practicality, or desirability of the product to users or consumers. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(f)(ii) (Supp.2005). Dr. Forbes does not give an opinion as to whether his alternative design would impair the utility, usefulness, practicality, or desirability of the garage door opener.

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a design defect claimant to prove that the seller knew or should have known of the danger and that a feasible alternative design would probably have prevented the harm.

Williams v. Bennett · filed 2006-01-19(f)

Moreover, in explicit terms, our statute requires that when a claimant asserts a design defect theory of liability, the claimant not only must provide proof that the seller knew, or in light of reasonably available knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the danger causing injury, but also, the claimant must provide evidence that the product failed to function as expected by way of producing evidence of a feasible design alternative that could have reasonably prevented the claimant's injury.

Section 11-1-63 requires a products liability plaintiff to identify an unreasonably dangerous design defect.

Graves v. Mazda Motor Corporation · filed 2010-12-15

That’s because, as the district court noted, the plaintiffs’ case founders on an element common to both Oklahoma and Mississippi law — one requiring any products liability plaintiff to identify an unreasonably dangerous design defect. See Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1363; Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63.

Section 11-1-63 requires a plaintiff alleging a design defect to identify the defect and plead a viable alternative design.

Chatman v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2013-03-28(f)(ii)

To start, for this theory to be successful, Chatman must not only identify the defect in the design but also allege that a viable alternative design exists. See Miss.Code Ann. § ll-l-63(f)(n). Regardless of how liberally her Amended Complaint is construed, Chatman has done neither and, for this reason alone, she has not properly pleaded a true design-defect claim.

Section 11-1-63 requires an asbestos design defect claim submitted to a jury to be assessed under the statutory elements, including proximate causation.

Smith v. Union Carbide Corp. · filed 2013-12-12

At the jury consideration stage, the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test falls away, and a plaintiff must demonstrate the elements of a design defect product liability claim as delineated in Mississippi Code Section 11-1-63, including proximate causation.

Section 11-1-63(f) requires evidence that a proposed alternative design probably would have prevented the harm without impairing the product’s utility, usefulness, practicality, or desirability.

Vandiver v. Ohio River Company · filed 2006-03-30(f)

Dr. Sparks, however, had not tested his proposed alternative design in order to determine whether, to a reasonable probability, it “would have . . . prevented the harm without impairing the utility, usefulness, practicality or desirability of the product to users or consumers,” as is required under Mississippi law. 3M Co. v. Johnson, 895 So.2d 151, 165 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(f)).

A feasible design alternative must be assessed for its effect on users or consumers generally; the particular plaintiff’s idiosyncrasies do not determine whether it satisfies that requirement.

Graves v. Mazda Motor Corp. · filed 2009-12-17(f)(ii)

In short, the idiosyncrasies of any particular plaintiff are not determinative of whether the proposed design alternative satisfies the second prong of the statutory test.

Section 11-1-63(f)(ii) allows evidence that competitors use a proposed alternative design to establish its feasibility.

A.K.W. v. Easton-Bell Sports, Inc. · filed 2011-10-18(f)(ii)

The fact that the alternative design offered by Appellant’s expert was in use by Riddell’s competitors is proof of its feasibility and that Riddell should have known about the dangerous condition.

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a defective-design plaintiff to show that the danger was reasonably foreseeable and that a feasible alternative design existed.

Hyundai Motor America v. Applewhite · filed 2008-05-21(f)(i)-(ii)

In other words, the danger presented by the defect must be reasonably foreseeable, and a feasible design alternative must have existed.

A defective-design claim requires proof that the product failed to function as expected; a user who appreciated the danger cannot recover under that requirement.

McSwain v. Sunrise Medical, Inc. · filed 2010-02-08(f)(ii)

Regardless of whether McSwain has proven a feasible alternative design, the Court finds that McSwain has not met the other requirement — to show that the wheelchair failed to function as expected. This provision codifies the consumer expectation test, which provides that a plaintiff cannot recover for injury caused by a product when, “applying the knowledge of an ordinary consumer [he] saw a danger and could have appreciated that danger.”

Section 11-1-63 permits a design defect claim to proceed when allegations about the defect, the manufacturer’s knowledge, and an alternative design make the claim plausible.

Franklin v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc. · filed 2025-03-13(a)(i)(3)

Taken together, these factual assertions state a plausible claim for defective design under the MPLA.

Section 11-1-63(f)(ii) requires evidence of a feasible alternative design that would have had a reasonable probability of preventing the harm.

Maxwell v. FCA US, LLC · filed 2023-01-18(f)(ii)

The district court likewise correctly concluded that Maxwell failed to present evidence of a “feasible design alternative” that would have had a reasonable probability of preventing the alleged harm. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(f)(ii); accord Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(2).

Section 11-1-63(f)(ii) requires a feasible alternative design for a design defect claim; the plaintiff must show that omitting it made the product not reasonably safe.

Smith v. Hyundai Motor America · filed 2024-05-24(f)(ii)

The reasonable alternative design must have been available at the time of sale, and it must be shown that the “omission of such an alternative design rendered the product not reasonably safe.” ... Smith presents no evidence of an alternative design.

Section 11-1-63 does not displace implied-warranty claims under the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code.

Bennett v. Sudhakar Madakasira, M.D. · filed 1998-12-21

In other words, the MPLA does not abrogate a statutory cause of action for breach of implied warranty as grounds for recovery.

Section 11-1-63 governs strict liability claims without abolishing negligence or implied warranty claims.

Childs v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1999-09-27

This Court agrees with Judge Biggers’ holding in Taylor; that is, the MPLA established the procedures to be followed for a strict liability claim and did not abolish claims brought under negligence and breach of implied warranty.

Section 11-1-63 provides a tort claim for breach of express warranty without precluding implied warranty claims under the Mississippi UCC.

In Re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation · filed 2001-03-01

The Mississippi Products Liability Act ("MPLA”) created an additional cause of action in tort for a breach of express warranty, see miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63, but it did not preclude breach of implied warranty claims under the Mississippi UCC in products liability actions.

Section 11-1-63 does not bar a product liability claim for breach of an implied warranty under the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code.

Bennett v. Madakasira · filed 2002-03-21

In other words, the MPLA does not abrogate a statutory cause of action for breach of implied warranty as grounds for recovery.

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(4) allows an express warranty claim when a product fails to perform as warranted, without proof that the product itself was defective.

Forbes v. General Motors Corporation · filed 2003-05-29(a)(i)(4)

As discussed above, the Forbeses sued under subsection (a)(i)(4), which does not require that the product be defective, but simply requires a failure of the product to perform as warranted.

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(4) requires a claimant to have justifiably relied on an express warranty or factual representation when electing to use the product.

Forbes v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2005-10-04(a)(i)(4)

The problem with this argument is the absence of evidence that Mr. or Mrs. Forbes "justifiably relied [on this] in electing to use the product." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(4)(Supp.2004).

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(4) allows an express warranty claim when the manufacturer promised a functional safety feature and the buyer relied on that promise in choosing the product.

Forbes v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2006-05-25(a)(i)(4)

In this case, there is both an express warranty, the promise of a functional driver's side air bag, and justifiable reliance, the fact that, but for the promise of the air bag, Forbes would not have purchased the vehicle. The statutory requirements are thus met.

Section 11-1-63 governs product defect claims; an implied warranty claim based on the same theory is dismissed when it duplicates an MPLA claim.

Patten v. Matco Tools Corporation · filed 2024-06-26

Where, as here, a common law claim is subsumed by the MPLA and is brought alongside a products liability claim based on the same theory of recovery, the proper course is to dismiss the common law claim to the extent it is duplicative of the parallel products liability count.

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(4) requires proof that a product breached an express warranty or failed to conform to an express factual representation on which the claimant justifiably relied when choosing to use it.

Knoth v. Keith · filed 2020-12-09(a)(i)(4)

To prevail on a claim for breach of express warranty, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer “[t]he product breached an express warranty or failed to conform to other express factual representations upon which the claimant justifiably relied in electing to use the product.” ... This dispute creates a triable issue of material fact.

An express warranty claim under Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(4) does not require expert testimony; the plaintiff’s testimony can create a fact issue.

Knoth v. Keith · filed 2021-08-03(a)(i)(4)

Expert testimony is not required to establish a breach of warranty. ... Plaintiff’s testimony is relevant and sufficient to create a fact issue as to a breach of warranty.

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(4) permits a failure-to-conform claim based on express factual representations as a separate theory from breach of express warranty.

Killen v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2022-02-03(a)(i)(4)

The Defendants’ reading strains the statute’s text. Incorporating the “failure to conform” language into the express warranty’s would disregard legislatively adopted language and function to strike it from the Mississippi Code.

Section 11-1-63 requires a claimant alleging a manufacturing defect to produce credible evidence of the defect to avoid summary judgment.

Hammond v. Coleman Co., Inc. · filed 1999-07-22(a)(i)(1)

Plaintiff acknowledged at oral argument that the only theory upon which Plaintiff is proceeding is the theory of a manufacturing defect. In order to prevail, and avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must produce some credible evidence that there was a manufacturing defect.

Section 11-1-63 requires proof of a manufacturing defect and a causal link between that defect and the resulting harm.

Farris v. Coleman Co., Inc. · filed 2000-10-11

Plaintiffs must show that the defect was a manufacturing defect, and further must show a causation link between the manufacturing defect and the resulting fire.

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(1) allows a claimant to prove a manufacturing defect through evidence that bad stock caused the product to fail, without separately proving negligence.

Cooper Tire and Rubber Company v. Tuckier · filed 1999-11-17(a)(i)(1)

The Tuckiers did make a prima facie case under the MPLA by asserting that Cooper did in fact use bad stock in the manufacturing of its tires and that under the MPLA, a products liability act, proof of a negligence case is not necessary.

A claimant can establish a manufacturing defect with expert testimony that bad stock caused a tire to fail; separate proof of negligence is unnecessary.

Cooper Tire and Rubber Co. v. Tuckier · filed 2002-01-10(a)(i)(1)

The Tuckiers did make a prima facie case under the MPLA by asserting that Cooper did in fact use bad stock in the manufacturing of its tires and that under the MPLA, a products liability act, proof of a negligence case is not necessary. ... The Tuckiers did meet their burden of proof when they put on expert testimony that the subject tire did in fact fail due to the use of bad stock, which in turn failed to create a chemical bond in the tire.

Section 11-1-63 requires a claimant to prove that a product defect made the product unreasonably dangerous and caused the claimed injury.

Clark v. Brass Eagle, Inc. · filed 2004-02-26(a)

In Wolf v. Stanley Works, 757 So.2d 316, 319 (Miss.Ct.App.2000), the Court of Appeals correctly recognized Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 as the "starting point" for a products liability claim: A plaintiff has the burden of showing that the defect that allegedly was the proximate cause of injury existed at the time that the product left the hands of the manufacturer, and that the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. ... Clark offered no proof that the paintball gun used in the incident failed to function as expected and offered no feasible design alternative which, to a reasonable probability, would have prevented what happened to him.

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a design defect claimant to prove that the seller knew or should have known of the danger, the product failed to function as expected, and a feasible alternative design probably would have prevented the harm.

Floyd Williams, Jr. v. Bennett · filed 2004-09-27(f)

Fundamental to proving his prima facie case is Williams’s burden of proving that the Lorcin handgun was unreasonably dangerous by showing that the product seller, Bennett, knew or should have known about the unreasonably dangerous condition of the handgun; that the handgun failed to function as expected; and, that there existed a feasible design alternative that would have, to a reasonable probability, prevented the harm complained of by the plaintiff.

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)1 requires proof that a product materially deviated from the manufacturer’s specifications or otherwise identical units; evidence that it malfunctioned alone does not establish that element.

Shelter Insurance Co v. Daimler Chrysler, e · filed 2007-06-05(a)(i)1

Appellants were required to prove that the battery deviated. See id. at § 11-1-63(a)(i)1. They failed to even attempt to do so. Rather, they attempted to prove only that the battery malfunctioned. As a result, they necessarily failed to prove an essential element of their claim.

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(1) requires evidence that a product materially deviated from the manufacturer’s specifications or otherwise identical units to establish a manufacturing defect.

Walker v. George Koch Sons, Inc. · filed 2009-03-27(a)(i)(1)

To establish a manufacturing defect, the Plaintiffs must produce evidence that the ladder “deviated in a material way from [Koch’s] specifications or from otherwise identical units.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(1).

Section 11-1-63 requires a manufacturing defect claimant to prove that the product materially deviated from the manufacturer’s specifications or from a properly constructed product.

Harris v. Spine · filed 2014-06-23(a)(i)(1)

As the statute makes plain, to succeed on a claim based on a manufacturing defect, the plaintiff has the burden to *850plead and prove that the product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer’s specifications for the product or from a properly constructed product.

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(1) requires proof that a product materially deviated from the manufacturer’s specifications or otherwise identical units.

Dykes v. Husqvarna Outdoor Products, N.A., Inc. · filed 2012-04-19(a)(i)(1)

Because the Dykes have not offered proof on essential elements of their case— namely, that the used 2004 Craftsman riding tractor “deviated in a material way from the manufacturer’s specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications,” or that it was defective “at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer,” their case must fail and. summary judgment for Husqvarna shall be granted on the manufacturing defect claim.

A manufacturing-defect claim must allege a material deviation from the manufacturer’s or designer’s specifications or from otherwise identical units.

Taylor v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. · filed 2019-12-05(a)(i)(1)

Taylor likewise fails to allege that the defect was due to a material deviation “from the manufacturer’s or designer’s specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(1). That is, the Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint does not even allege the elements of a manufacturing-defect claim, much less facts to plausibly support those elements.

A manufacturing defect claim requires proof that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s control.

Pettway v. Circle S. Irrigation, Inc. · filed 2021-06-29(a)(i)(1)

Read together, plaintiffs’ evidence does not prove that there was a defect at the time of manufacture. Therefore, since plaintiffs offer no proof that the tire was defective at manufacture, they fail to fulfill their statutory obligation under the MPLA.

Section 11-1-63 requires a manufacturing defect plaintiff to show that the product materially deviated from its intended design and that the deviation caused the injury.

Pippin v. Endologix, Inc. · filed 2025-03-30(a)(1)

Under Mississippi law, a plaintiff must show that the product deviated in a material way from its intended design and that the deviation caused the plaintiff’s injuries. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(1)8.

Section 11-1-63(a) requires proof that a manufacturing defect existed in the product and proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages.

Scirocco v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2016-03-08(a)

As with their design defect claims, the Sciroccos failed to create a factual dispute as to whether their vehicle had the alleged defect or whether the asserted defect was the proximate cause of their damages.

Section 11-1-63 supplies the elements of a products liability action while retaining the concept of strict liability.

Eunice Patricia Nichols Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc. · filed 1999-10-14

With the adoption of § 11-1-63, common law strict liability, as laid out in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), is no longer the authority on the necessary elements of a products liability action. However, the concept of strict liability is still quite alive within the statute, and the principles in State Stove are a driving force in products liability actions even after adoption of the statute.

Section 11-1-63 supplies the elements of a products liability action while retaining the concept of strict liability.

Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc. · filed 2001-05-31

With the adoption of § 11-1-63, common law strict liability, as laid out in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss.1966), is no longer the authority on the necessary elements of a products liability action. However, the concept of strict liability is still quite alive within the statute, and the principles in State Stove are a driving force in products liability actions even after adoption of the statute.

Section 11-1-63 requires a products liability plaintiff to prove that a defect made the product unreasonably dangerous and that the defective condition proximately caused the claimed damages.

Moss v. Batesville Casket Company, Inc. · filed 2004-12-28(a)(ii) & (iii)

Regardless of which subsection of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(i) a plaintiff sues under, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer unreasonably dangerous and (2) the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages.

Section 11-1-63 requires a product liability claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the product was defective, that the defect made it unreasonably dangerous, and that the defect proximately caused the claimed damages.

Lift-All Company, Inc. v. Warner · filed 2005-01-06

By statute, a manufacturer shall not be liable for damages in a product action unless the complainant proves by a preponderance of the evidence the following: (1) the product is defective; (2) the defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; and (3) the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought.

Section 11-1-63 requires a product liability plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defect made the product unreasonably dangerous and proximately caused the claimed damages.

Lift-All Co., Inc. v. Warner · filed 2006-10-12

¶ 12. By statute, a manufacturer shall not be liable for damages in a product action unless the complainant proves by a preponderance of the evidence the following: (1) the product is defective; (2) the defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; and (3) the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Rev.2002).

Section 11-1-63(a) requires a strict liability plaintiff to present evidence creating a genuine dispute on every element of the claim, including causation.

King v. Synthes (U.S.A.) · filed 2006-03-31(a)

To survive a summary-judgment motion in a strict liability cause of action, the Kings must show a genuine issue of material fact as to all the elements of this claim. ... Without medical expert testimony, the Kings cannot meet their burden.

Section 11-1-63 requires proof that a product defect made the product unreasonably dangerous and proximately caused the claimed damages.

Moss v. Batesville Casket Co., Inc. · filed 2006-07-27(a)(ii)-(iii)

Even considering Dr. Kim's affidavit, which was not presented until the Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the alleged defective condition of the casket resulted in an unreasonably dangerous condition to the user or consumer and that the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the casket proximately resulted in any damage as required under the Products Liability Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(ii) (iii).

Section 11-1-63 requires expert testimony to support design and manufacturing defect claims involving a highly technical medical device.

Cothren v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 2011-05-31

Although she is required to provide the Court with expert testimony in support of her claims of design and manufacturing defects under the MPLA, ... Cothren has declined to do so.

Section 11-1-63(a) requires a plaintiff to show that a product was not substantially changed after it left the manufacturer’s control; failing to replace a respirator filter can defeat that showing.

Mine Safety Appliance Co. v. Holmes · filed 2015-04-23(a)

The MPLA places the burden on the plaintiff to show that the product has not been substantially changed after it left the manufacture’s control. Miss.Code Ann. § ll-l-63(a) (Rev.2014); Johnson, 895 So.2d at 165. But here, Holmes clearly failed to make this showing.

Section 11-1-63(a) requires a products liability claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the product was defective.

Johnson v. T & T Farms, Inc. · filed 2019-04-09(a)

Additionally, as stated, in order to succeed on a products-liability claim, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the product was defective. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a). ... Johnson failed to provide any evidence in support of his claim that the meat grinder was defective.

Section 11-1-63 requires proof of causation for a products liability claim.

Edwards v. Campbell Clinic, Inc. · filed 2000-03-15

For each of the claims listed, excepting only the plaintiffs’ claims under res ipsa loqui-tur, causation is an essential element. ... As the plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence of causation, the court finds that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims in this action, except for the plaintiffs’ claims brought under the theory of res ipsa loquitur.

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires a products liability plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s product caused the claimed injury.

Moore v. Mississippi Valley Gas Company · filed 2002-03-11(a)(iii)

Thus, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff in any products liability action to show that the defendant’s product was the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 11-1-63 requires a products liability plaintiff to prove that the defendant's product caused the injury.

Moore v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co. · filed 2003-11-06(a)(iii)

Thus, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff in any products liability action to show that the defendant's product was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires a products liability plaintiff to prove that the defective product proximately caused the injuries; speculation that someone followed allegedly defective instructions is insufficient.

Harris v. International Truck and Engine Corp. · filed 2005-10-18(a)(iii)

Under Mississippi products liability law, in order to obtain relief for a defective product, a plaintiff must prove that the product was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(iii) (Rev.2002). ... As such, we find no genuine issues of material fact sufficient to escape summary judgment on the issue of causation.

Section 11-1-63(a) requires proof that a product defect proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages.

Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2007-08-02(a)

Under the Mississippi Products Liability Act, applicable because this is a diversity action, Smith must show that, (1) the tire was defective at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller; (2) the defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the consumer; and (3) the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought. ... Smith has not shown that, seven years after the tire left Goodyear’s control, the failure of his tire resulted from a manufacturing and/or design defect.

Section 11-1-63 requires a prescription drug plaintiff to show that the injury would not have occurred had the drug not been administered.

Brown v. Eli Lilly and Co. · filed 2011-08-18(a)(iii)

For a plaintiff in a prescription drug case, the statute requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the injury would not have occurred had the drug not been administered.

Section 11-1-63 requires proof that an allegedly inadequate warning proximately caused the claimant’s injury.

Previto v. Ryobi North America, Inc. · filed 2010-12-16(a)(iii)

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff has not established that the failure to include a graphic adjacent to the written warning on the saw proximately caused his injury. Any testimony presented by Le Cocq that the absence of a graphic adjacent to the written warning on the table saw rendered the warning inadequate is therefore irrelevant and should be excluded.

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires the alleged product defect to proximately cause the claimant’s damages.

Berry v. E-Z Trench Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 2011-02-16(a)(iii)

Applied to the facts at hand, neither E-Z Trench’s failure to warn nor its alleged design defect proximately caused Berry’s injuries because neither act satisfies the “but-for” test.

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires a plaintiff to plausibly connect an allegedly inadequate drug warning to the injury, including its effect on the prescribing physician.

Gardley-Starks v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2013-01-10(a)(iii)

Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that the failure of PLIVA to update its label to match that of the Brand Defendants was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries, these claims are due to be dismissed.

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires a plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the product’s defective and unreasonably dangerous condition proximately caused the claimed damages.

Elsie Smith v. Union Carbide Corporation · filed 2016-09-22(a)(iii)

Regarding causation, the Mississippi Products Liability Act requires a plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(iii) (Rev. 2014) (emphasis added).

Section 11-1-63(c)(i) bars recovery on a failure-to-warn claim without proof that the alleged warning defect caused the claimant’s injury, even if the warning was inadequate.

Dependable Abrasives, Inc. v. Pierce · filed 2015-01-29(c)(i)

Even accepting as true Pierce’s allegation that the warnings on the Diamond Blast sand were “grossly inadequate,” as posited by Dr. Karnes, there can be no recovery if Pierce failed to prove that the danger of inadequate warnings on Diamond Blast sand “caused the damage for which recovery is sought.”

Section 11-1-63(a)(i)(2) limits a prescription drug failure-to-warn claim to the adequacy of the drug’s warnings or instructions; marketing materials and internal documents do not establish that the label was inadequate.

Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Fortenberry · filed 2017-10-19(a)(i)(2)

The Court does not consider Janssen’s marketing materials or internal documents as support of Taylor’s failure to warn claim under the Products Liability Act in determining the adequacy of the Risperdal label. Taylor’s attempt to support her failure to warn claim with Janssen’s marketing materials and internal documents improperly expands the statutory scope of her claim.

Section 11-1-63 requires evidence of design defect and causation; a design defect claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence of causation.

Logan v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2019-09-17

Although we affirm the circuit court’s decision based on Rainey’s qualifications, we note that Rainey’s testimony itself spoke neither to causation nor design defect as required under the MPLA. ... William did not fulfill his statutory obligation under the MPLA, and, therefore, we find that summary judgment was proper.

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a design defect claimant to show that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger, the product failed to function as expected, and a feasible alternative design probably would have prevented the harm.

Barnett v. Boston Scientific Corporation · filed 2021-05-13(f)

To assert a design defect claim under the MPLA the Plaintiffs must show that at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control: (1) the manufacturer knew or should have known about the danger that caused the damage for which recovery is sought; and (2) the product failed to function as expected and there existed a feasible design alternative that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm. ... The facts contained in these paragraphs, along with all reasonable inferences therefrom, properly plead a design defect claim.

Section 11-1-63(f) requires a feasible alternative design for a design defect claim; an allegation identifying a backup operating system can satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Gulfstream Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Alarm.com, Inc. · filed 2022-05-16(f)

Although not specifically designated in the Amended Complaint as a “feasible design alternative” in satisfaction of Section 11–1–63(f) of the MPLA, the allegation regarding a backup operating system suggests an alternative design that is sufficient to survive the Motion.

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires proof that the defendant’s defective, unreasonably dangerous product proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Bedford v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. · filed 2020-02-18(a)(iii)

Accordingly, in short, in order to establish liability in this case, the Plaintiffs must show, based on expert testimony, that a product manufactured, designed, or sold by the Defendant was defective and unreasonably dangerous and proximately caused the Decedent’s death. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(jii).

Section 11-1-63(a)(iii) requires plaintiffs to prove proximate causation to recover under the Mississippi Products Liability Act.

Jackson v. Parker-Hannifin Corporation · filed 2022-12-12(a)(iii)

The Mississippi Products Liability Act provides that Plaintiffs must prove proximate causation to recover. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a)(iii).

Section 11-1-63(b) bars product liability claims for harm caused by tobacco use under its inherent characteristics rule.

Lane v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company · filed 2000-12-18(b)

Strictly interpreted, § 11-1-63 precludes all product liability actions against tobacco companies.

Section 11-1-63(b) bars product liability claims based on the inherent, commonly known harms of tobacco use.

Lane v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2003-05-08(b)

Strictly interpreted, § 11-1-63 precludes all product liability actions against tobacco companies. The harm from tobacco use has been well documented, and elimination of the sources of the harm would greatly reduce the desirability of cigarettes.

Section 11-1-63(b)'s inherent characteristic defense applies only to products liability actions and does not bar every damages action involving cigarettes.

Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Ursula R. King · filed 2004-03-02(b)

The inherent characteristic defense in subsection (b) of § 11-1-63 does not bar “any action for damages caused by” cigarettes.

Section 11-1-63(b)'s inherent characteristic defense applies only to certain products liability claims involving defective design or formulation; it does not bar every claim involving cigarettes.

RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. King · filed 2006-03-02(b)

Subsection (b) of § 11-1-63 precludes certain, but not all, products liability claims of defective design or formulation.

Before the 2003 amendments, § 11-1-63 allowed product liability actions against sellers as well as manufacturers.

In Re bridgestone/firestone, Inc · filed 2003-04-21

However, the defendants neglect to acknowledge the Mississippi Products Liability Act of 1993, enacted several years after the Reeves decision, which provides for product liability actions against both manufacturers and sellers. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (1999); ... It is clear that, under the applicable Mississippi law, those plaintiffs whose car and/or tire dealers have been named as defendants do assert viable claims under Mississippi law.

Section 11-1-63 permits product liability actions against sellers as well as manufacturers under the version applicable to these cases.

Turnage v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2003-04-21

However, the defendants neglect to acknowledge the Mississippi Products Liability Act of 1993, enacted several years after the Reeves decision, which provides for product liability actions against both manufacturers and sellers.

Section 11-1-63(g) permits sellers to be sued for product defects without proof of their fault and gives faultless sellers a right to indemnity from manufacturers.

Duffin v. Honeywell International, Inc. · filed 2004-04-05(g)

See Miss.Code Ann. § ll-l-63(g) (providing “sellers” with a right of indemnity against manufacturers where the sellers are not at fault in causing product defects, but permitting such sellers to be sued for such defects regardless).

Section 11-1-63(a) confines product liability claims to manufacturers or sellers; licensing a trademark alone does not make the licensor either one.

Harrison v. BF Goodrich Co. · filed 2004-03-09(a)

The present statute, Section 11-1-63, by its explicit terms, confines product liability claims to manufacturers or sellers of products.

Section 11-1-63 does not provide a defective design claim against an employer that merely purchased the product.

Green v. Allendale Planting Company · filed 2005-11-29

The Mississippi Products Liability Act (M.P.L.A.) does not provide a cause of action for defective design against an employer who merely purchased a product.

Section 11-1-63(h) limits a product seller’s liability when the seller did not substantially control or alter the product and had no actual or constructive knowledge of its defect.

McKee v. Bowers Window & Door Company, Inc. · filed 2009-07-01(h)

Applying the analysis in supra ¶¶ 34-36, as to Bowers Window, and adding that no proof was adduced that Bowers Window “exercised substantial control over . . . the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that caused the harm[,] . . . altered or modified the product,” or “had actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition of the product at the time [it] supplied the product[,]” this Court concludes that summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Bowers Window on the McKees’ product-liability claims. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(h) (Rev. 2002).

Section 11-1-63(h) requires proof that a seller substantially controlled, altered, or modified the product, or knew of its defective condition, to hold the seller liable on a product-liability claim.

McKee v. Bowers Window & Door Co. · filed 2011-04-21(h)

¶ 38. Applying the analysis in supra ¶¶ 34-36, as to Bowers Window, and adding that no proof was adduced that Bowers Window “exercised substantial control over ... the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that caused the harm[,] ... altered or modified the product,” or “had actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition of the product at the time [it] supplied the product[,]” this Court concludes that summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Bowers Window on the McKees’ product-liability claims. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(h) (Rev.2002).

Section 11-1-63(c)(i) requires a party asserting the innocent-seller defense to a failure-to-warn claim to show that the seller could not have known of the danger and that an ordinary consumer would have known of it.

Various v. Various · filed 2009-12-10(c)(i)

Succinctly put, the statute requires the party asserting the defense to show that the manufacturer or seller did not know, and could not have known, about the danger that these asbestos products posed to the consumer. Furthermore, the party asserting the defense must also show that the ordinary consumer or user of these asbestos products would have known that the products contained asbestos, and that the asbestos could have harmful health effects.

Section 11-1-63(h)’s innocent seller exemption applies to an implied warranty claim seeking personal injury damages from an allegedly defective product.

Murray v. General Motors, L.L.C., e · filed 2012-06-05(h)

In sum, we agree with the district court—and with four other federal district courts in Mississippi—that if the plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury as a result of an allegedly defective product, the innocent seller exemption applies to a breach of implied warranty claim.

Section 11-1-63(h)’s innocent seller provision is an affirmative defense that supports dismissal only when the defense is apparent from the face of the complaint.

Thomas v. Firerock Products, LLC · filed 2014-08-22(h)

For these reasons, the Court concludes that, given the opportunity, the Mississippi Supreme Court would hold that the innocent seller provision is an affirmative defense under the MPLA. Accordingly, dismissal based on the innocent seller provision is only appropriate if it is apparent from the face of the complaint.

Section 11-1-63 does not treat a mere product designer as a manufacturer or bar a common-law negligence claim against a designer who neither manufactures nor sells the product.

Lawson v. Honeywell International, Inc. · filed 2010-11-16

A mere designer of a product does not fall under the definition of a “manufacturer,” as that term is used in the MPLA. ... We hold that the MPLA does not preclude common-law negligence claims against nonmanufacturing designers who do not fall under the purview of the statute.

Section 11-1-63 does not preclude common-law negligence claims against product designers who do not manufacture or sell the product.

Lawson v. Honeywell International, Inc. · filed 2011-10-20

We hold that the MPLA does not preclude common-law negligence claims against nonmanufacturing designers who do not fall under the purview of the statute.

Section 11-1-63 requires evidence linking the defendant’s product to the injury; claims against a brand-name drug manufacturer fail when the plaintiff cannot show he took its drug.

Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2012-06-27(a)

Here, the record evidence in this case is insufficient to support any claims by Plaintiffs that Mr. Lashley ingested brand-name Reglan®. In this respect, Plaintiffs have not carried their summary judgment burden, and based on the foregoing persuasive authorities, the Court is of the view that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to warn, negligence, strict liability, and misrepresentation.

Section 11-1-63 requires a products liability plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s product caused the injury.

Lashley v. Pfizer, Incorporated · filed 2014-02-21

The Mississippi Products Liability Act (“MPLA”) applies “in any action for damages caused by a product” and requires a plaintiff to prove that it was the defendant’s product that caused the injury.

Section 11-1-63 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s product caused the injury.

Del Valle v. Pliva, Inc. · filed 2014-04-16

The Mississippi Products Liability Act (“MPLA”) applies “in any action for damages caused by a product” and requires a plaintiff to prove that it was the defendant’s product that caused the injury.

Section 11-1-63 covers product liability claims framed as misrepresentation claims and requires identification of the defendant’s product as the cause of injury.

Germain v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc · filed 2014-06-27

Guided by our sister circuit’s decision, we predict that the Mississippi Supreme Court would construe Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims as a product liability claim under the MPLA that fails for lack of product identification.

Section 11-1-63(a) requires a product liability plaintiff to prove that the injury-causing product originated with the defendant manufacturer or seller.

Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Gwendolyn M. Reeves · filed 2012-07-03(a)

The plaintiff bears the burden of proof, in a product liability suit, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the product which caused the alleged injuries suffered from a defect “at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a) (Rev. 2002). This language clearly indicates that the product must have originated from the manufacturer or seller, and if it did not, then no claim in tort may be sustained.

Section 11-1-63 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s own product caused the injury.

Del Valle v. Pliva, Inc. · filed 2014-02-21

The Mississippi Products Liability Act (“MPLA”) applies “in any action for damages caused by a product” and requires a plaintiff to prove that it was the defendant’s product that caused the injury.

Section 11-1-63 requires a products liability plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s own product caused the injury.

Lashley v. Pfizer, Incorporated · filed 2014-04-16

The Mississippi Products Liability Act (“MPLA”) applies “in any action for damages caused by a product” and requires a plaintiff to prove that it was the defendant’s product that caused the injury.

Section 11-1-63(h)'s innocent seller protection applies to implied warranty claims for damages caused by a product.

Holifield v. City Salvage, Inc. · filed 2017-02-28(h)

But even then, the provisions of the MPLA—including the innocent seller provision—broadly applied “in any action for damages caused by a product except for commercial damage to the product itself.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 2013). Thus, an implied warranty claim such as the Holifields’ is subject to the innocent seller provision.

Section 11-1-63(h) bars breach of express and implied warranty claims against a seller that qualifies as an innocent seller.

Prisock v. Tempur-Sealy International, Inc. · filed 2020-05-12(h)

Thus, finding these opinions overwhelmingly persuasive, the Court finds that JAM’s status as an innocent seller per Section 11-1-63(h), bars the Plaintiffs’ breach of express and implied warranties claims.

Section 11-1-63(h)’s innocent seller protection may not bar a claim when the seller’s repairs could have altered or modified the product in a way that caused the harm.

Goodwin v. Premier Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. · filed 2020-07-02(h)

It is thus too early to determine if Premier Ford can successfully rely on the innocent seller defense. Given the nature of the repairs, it is possible that Premier Ford exercised substantial control over and altered and/or modified the Ford Escape in a way that could have affected the engine, steering mechanism and/or control system.

Section 11-1-63(h) protects a nonmanufacturing seller from product defect liability when allegations of its actual or constructive knowledge of the defect are vague and unsupported by specific facts.

Simpson v. Barretts Minerals · filed 2023-03-13(h)

Even under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the Court finds that these allegations are too “vague and conclusory” to support joinder of the in-state Defendants, who otherwise appear to be mere “conduit[s]” of the disputed products, protected by the innocent seller provision.

Section 11-1-63(h)’s innocent-seller immunity is an affirmative defense; the seller must establish that it lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the defect when it supplied the product.

Webb v. Baldor Electric Company · filed 2024-08-21(h)

That affidavit does not establish beyond peradventure that Walmart lacked “actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition of the product at the time [it] supplied the product.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63(h).

Section 11-1-63(h) shields a seller from liability when it merely sells a product and did not substantially control or alter the aspect that caused the harm or know of the defect.

McFerren · filed 2026-03-09(h)

The Court finds Hattiesburg Cycles is an innocent seller. There is no reasonable basis that Plaintiffs could recover against Hattiesburg Cycles.

Section 11-1-63 preserves common-law defenses to product liability actions, including the sophisticated-user defense.

Mississippi Valley Silica Co. v. Eastman · filed 2012-07-19(h)

While statutes often supersede the common law, the products-liability statute does not.

Section 11-1-63(e)’s sophisticated-user defense does not entitle a manufacturer to judgment when the evidence conflicts over whether its customers were adequately warned of the product’s dangers.

Union Carbide Corporation v. Russell E. Nix, Jr. · filed 2012-07-26(e)

This Court does not need to determine how to define “user” in this case. Regardless of how it is defined, Union Carbide presented evidence that it informed some of its purchasers of some of the dangers of asbestos (although it presented nothing specific to WellTech), and Nix presented evidence showing that Union Carbide often downplayed the dangers of asbestos to its purchasers. Given the conflicting evidence, reasonable jurors could differ regarding whether the information Union Carbide gave to its customers, as a whole, adequately warned of the dangers of asbestos. Thus, the trial court’s denial of the motion for JNOV on this issue was not error.

Subsection (e)'s sophisticated-user defense does not warrant judgment notwithstanding the verdict when evidence conflicts over whether the manufacturer's warnings adequately conveyed the product's dangers.

Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix · filed 2014-06-05(e)

This Court does not need to determine how to define “user” in this case. Regardless of how it is defined, Union *387Carbide presented evidence that it informed some of its purchasers of some of the dangers of asbestos (although it presented nothing specific to WellTech), and Nix presented evidence showing that Union Carbide often downplayed the dangers of asbestos to its purchasers. Given the conflicting evidence, reasonable jurors could differ regarding whether the information Union Carbide gave to its customers, as a whole, adequately warned of the dangers of asbestos. Thus, the trial court’s denial of the motion for JNOV on this issue was not error.

Section 11-1-63 covers negligence actions for damages caused by a product but sets no filing deadline.

Tucker v. The Hershey Company · filed 2021-03-18

The MPLA2 applies “in any action for damages caused by a product, including … any action based on a theory of … negligence” but does not provide a deadline for bringing claims.