Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13

Section 11-7-13 allows wrongful death damages for the present net cash value of the decedent’s life expectancy, loss of companionship and society, pain and suffering before death, and punitive damages.

McGowan v. Estate of Wright · filed 1988-04-20

Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1984), provides that in a wrongful death action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all the damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit. This statutory language has been held to include (1) the present net cash value of the life expectancy of the deceased, (2) the loss of the companionship and society of the decedent, (3) the pain and suffering of the decedent between the time of injury and death, and (4) punitive damages.

Section 11-7-13 allows a widow and child to recover the decedent’s pain and suffering, punitive damages, and their loss of companionship and support free from the decedent’s debts.

Thornton v. Insurance Company of North America · filed 1973-12-17

We therefore hold that the items of damages recoverable by Mrs. Thornton and her daughter under their declaration were pain and suffering of decedent, punitive damages and loss of companionship and support, and were not subject to any debts or liabilities of the deceased.

Section 11-7-13 allows the estate to recover damage to property, funeral expenses, and medical expenses.

Chapman v. Thrasher Trucking Co. · filed 1990-01-05

The estate may recover damage to real or personal property, funeral expenses and medical expenses.

Section 11-7-13 requires wrongful death awards based on lost future earnings to be reduced by the income taxes the decedent would have paid.

Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc. · filed 1986-03-03

Thus, we are convinced that if presented the question before us, the Mississippi Supreme Court would apply its reasoning in Garnett and hold that wrongful death awards based on future earnings of the deceased should be reduced by the amount of income tax the deceased would have paid on those earnings.

Section 11-7-13 requires equal distribution of wrongful death proceeds among surviving parents and siblings, including half-siblings, when the deceased leaves no spouse or children.

Pannell v. Guess · filed 1991-09-17

Therefore, under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1991), the chancellor had no choice but to distribute the insurance settlement proceeds to Shelly's father, mother, half-sisters and half-brother, equally.

Section 11-7-13 gives survivors a separate wrongful death claim that arises when the injured person dies.

Gentry v. Wallace · filed 1992-08-19

Wrongful death is a separate and distinct cause of action, which can be brought only by the survivors of the deceased. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972 and Supp. 1991). Without and until the death of Mary Gentry, there was no cause of action under the wrongful death statute to trigger the two year statute of limitations.

A wrongful death cause of action under § 11-7-13 does not arise until the decedent dies.

McMillan v. Puckett · filed 1993-08-16

In this, as in any other wrongful death action brought pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972), there is no injury, and hence, no cause of action until a death occurs.

Section 11-7-13 includes a child who was viable when a relative died and was later born alive among the living wrongful death beneficiaries.

John, Jr. Fizer v. Davis · filed 1994-10-18

We hold that a preborn child who is viable at the time of a relative's death and is ultimately born alive, is "living" such that he or she can be a wrongful death beneficiary under the law.

Section 11-7-13 does not allow a wrongful death beneficiary to assign the cause of action to one tortfeasor for use against another.

Coleman Powermate, Inc. v. Rheem Manufacturing Company · filed 2002-11-06

Additionally, Mississippi’s wrongful death statute does not confer upon a tortfeasor the right of assignment of a plaintiff’s wrongful death cause of action.

Section 11-7-13 permits recovery of a decedent’s lifetime damages only if the claimant proves that the defendant’s wrongful act caused the death.

Wilks v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 1996-09-12

Although the wrongful death statute provides for recovery of "all the damages of every kind," which would certainly include lifetime damages, the entire claim under this statute must fail where the heirs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Smith's death was caused by ATC's product.

Section 11-7-13 allows recovery for loss of enjoyment of life in a wrongful death action, even when death was instantaneous.

Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey · filed 1998-05-04

The right to recover for loss of enjoyment of life is included in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2001) which states that in a wrongful death case, the person bringing suit is entitled to recover all damages of every kind and nature which might have been awarded to the decedent had he lived, and any damages for which the decedent's wrongful death beneficiaries sustained by reason of his death.

Section 11-7-13 allows recovery for loss of enjoyment of life in a wrongful death action, even when death was instantaneous.

Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey · filed 2002-05-30

The statute plainly states "the fact that death was instantaneous shall in no case affect the right of recovery." Id. ... Nothing in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 says or should be construed otherwise. We find, as per the trial court's ruling, that Hailey was properly allowed to recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life.

Section 11-7-13’s provision making funeral expenses subject to estate debts does not displace the collateral source rule in wrongful death actions.

Gatlin v. Central Mississippi Medical Center · filed 1998-08-26

The aforementioned provision in § 11-7-13 is entirely unrelated to the collateral source rule, and there is no indication that the Legislature intended to limit the collateral source rule's application in wrongful death cases. By requiring that funeral expenses be subject to the debts of the estate, this provision in § 11-7-13 helps to insure that these funeral expenses are paid from any recovery, but the provision in no way serves to overrule the collateral source rule.

Section 11-7-13 lets a wrongful death beneficiary recover funeral and medical expenses, but that recovery is subject to payment of liabilities for those expenses.

MISSISSIPPI FOOD AND FUEL v. Tackett · filed 2000-03-28

However, under the terms of the statute in effect when Tackett commenced her wrongful death action, she could pursue recovery for funeral and medical expenses as a part of her cause of action. Therefore, although Tackett did not directly receive any compensation benefits because of her father's death, she did receive a real benefit based on the amount the Trust paid in satisfaction of her father's medical bills and funeral expenses, since otherwise, these obligations would have been a charge against her wrongful death recovery.

Section 11-7-13’s provision making funeral expenses subject to estate debts does not override the collateral source rule in wrongful death actions.

Gatlin v. Methodist Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2000-12-14

The aforementioned provision in § 11-7-13 is entirely unrelated to the collateral source rule, and there is no indication that the Legislature intended to limit the collateral source rule's application in wrongful death cases. By requiring that funeral expenses be subject to the debts of the estate, this provision in § 11-7-13 helps to insure that these funeral expenses are paid from any recovery, but the provision in no way serves to overrule the collateral source rule.

A deceased child’s natural parents are wrongful death beneficiaries entitled to bring an action under Section 11-7-13.

Smith v. Holmes · filed 2005-12-15

Both are Tevon's natural parents and are therefore wrongful death beneficiaries who are entitled to bring a wrongful death lawsuit under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev. 2004).

Section 11-7-13 does not give a great-nephew standing as a wrongful-death beneficiary.

Delta Health Group, Inc. v. Payne · filed 2006-11-30

The Legislature failed to confer standing on a great-nephew. See Nat’l Heritage Realty, Inc. v. Boles, 947 So. 2d 238, 245 (holding a cousin is not a wrongful-death beneficiary pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13). Since Payne did not qualify as a wrongful-death beneficiary or as an officer of an estate, he unequivocally lacked standing to commence an action.

When the deceased leaves no spouse or children, § 11-7-13 distributes wrongful death damages equally among surviving parents and siblings, including half-siblings.

Ray v. Ray · filed 2007-08-07

Our wrongful death statute, embodied in Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-7-13, specifically provides that “there shall not be, in any case, a distinction between the kindred of the whole and half-blood of equal degree” and that “if the deceased has no husband, nor wife, nor children, the damages shall be distributed equally to the father, mother, brothers and sisters, or such of them as the deceased may have living at his or her death.” A reading of the controlling statute makes clear that application of the wrongful death statute in this case provides that Jennifer’s wrongful death beneficiaries include all five of her half-siblings, as well as her mother.

Section 11-7-13 does not require dismissal of a second wrongful-death suit solely because it was once pending alongside an earlier suit that was later dismissed.

Briere v. South Central Regional Medical Center · filed 2009-02-26

We clarify Long and hold that the wrongful-death statute does not require that a second suit be dismissed solely because it was, at some point, pending at the same time as a previously-filed suit.

Section 11-7-13 permits wrongful death damages for economic loss, funeral expenses, loss of society and companionship, and the decedent’s pain and suffering before death when supported by evidence.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kirby · filed 2009-04-21

In a wrongful death action, a party “shall recover such damages allowed by law as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004). ... Considering the actual damages and the testimony of Kirby’s mother as to the family’s loss of society and companionship of a young son and brother on the verge of manhood, and the pain and suffering he must have experienced between the time of the tire’s rupture when he was alive and when the rolling automobile stopped against a tree and he was dead, we find that the jury’s award was proper.

Section 11-7-13 requires the court to grant a wrongful-death beneficiary’s motion to join the suit.

Dooley v. Byrd · filed 2009-06-22

Here, the trial court properly granted Dewey’s joinder motion. Not only was the trial court’s decision correct, but Long and the wrongful-death statute also mandated that outcome.

Section 11-7-13 requires a court to grant a wrongful-death beneficiary’s motion to join an existing wrongful-death action.

Dooley v. Byrd · filed 2011-06-16

Here, the trial court properly granted Dewey’s joinder motion. Not only was the trial court’s decision correct, but Long and the wrongful-death statute also mandated that outcome.

If a deceased child leaves no spouse or children, the natural father is entitled to his statutory share of any wrongful-death recovery obtained through the estate.

Chickaway v. United States · filed 2011-07-08

But this decision is somewhat tempered as Phillips correctly argues that Mississippi law necessarily includes him within the membership of Brandon’s estate. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13. In that sense, he maintains an interest in the case at bar, albeit as a member of the estate rather than as an independent plaintiff. Although his failure to exhaust administrative remedies prevents him from directing the course of this litigation, when and if the case ends in favor of Chickaway (in her capacity as administrator of Brandon’s estate), then Phillips will be entitled to the portion of the recovery set out by law for a natural parent.

Section 11-7-13 lets a wrongful-death beneficiary share in damages the decedent could have recovered, but a beneficiary must prove an individual claim for loss of society and companionship.

River Region Medical Corporation v. Patterson · filed 2005-12-19

Patterson is correct in that his relationship to the decedent is all that is required for him to recover a share of the damages which the decedent could have recovered “if death had not ensued.” Such damages could include, among others, the decedent’s lost wages and pain and suffering. However, no such claims were presented at trial. And because at trial the jury considered only the individual claims of each Plaintiff, Patterson bore the burden of proving his own claim of loss of society and companionship.

A wrongful-death beneficiary must prove an individual loss of society and companionship to recover for that loss, while damages the decedent could have recovered are shared equally among beneficiaries.

River Region Medical Corp. v. Patterson · filed 2008-02-21

Assuming Thomas Patterson was a legitimate wrongful-death beneficiary, as we must do in giving him all reasonable inferences, he would then be entitled to recover for himself any loss of society and companionship he might prove, and to share equally in the damages which might have been recovered by Ms. Nettles, "had death not ensued." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004).

Section 11-7-13 does not permit recovery of emotional distress damages.

Bridges v. ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS CO., INC. · filed 2008-03-14

Recovery of emotional distress damages, however, is not permitted under the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute, codified at Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-7-13.

Section 11-7-13 permits a jury to award just damages for losses suffered by the decedent and interested parties in a wrongful-death suit.

Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. v. Kelly · filed 2011-12-13

Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute allows recovery of damages in the amount the jury determines to be just, taking into consideration all damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all interested parties in the suit. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004).

Section 11-7-13 does not allow Supplemental Security Income benefits to be recovered as the decedent’s present net cash value because those benefits are not based on the decedent’s earnings.

Illinois Central Railroad v. Young · filed 2012-12-11

We find that Young’s SSI benefits are not the type of benefits “rooted in the earnings of the decedent” as outlined in New Deemer, and may not be awarded as the present net cash value of the decedent.

Section 11-7-13 requires equal division of damages the decedent could have recovered, while allowing a beneficiary to recover individual damages for loss of society and companionship if claimed before settlement.

Kathy May Huber v. Eubanks · filed 2015-02-12

But we did interpret the statute to mean that the wrongful-death damages must be divided equally among the ... wrongful-death beneficiaries, and that individual damages due to a particular party may be recovered by that party.

Section 11-7-13 does not allow a former spouse to recover as a wrongful-death beneficiary when the divorce preceded the death.

Graham Read Irby v. Sudhakar Madakasira, M.D. · filed 2017-03-28

Collins is not qualified to recover under the wrongful-death statute, since she and Irby were divorced at the time of his death.

Section 11-7-13 gives a decedent’s spouse and children equal shares of wrongful-death proceeds under Mississippi law.

Shortie v. George · filed 2017-05-23

Under Mississippi law, Charles and Oner’s children would receive equal shares. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev. 2004).

Section 11-7-13 does not allow a divorced former spouse to recover wrongful-death damages.

Graham Read Irby v. Sudhakar Madakasira, M.D. · filed 2018-05-29

Collins is not qualified to recover under the wrongful-death statute, since she and Irby were divorced at the time of his death.

Section 11-7-13 excludes a natural father who fails to meet the statutory requirements from wrongful death beneficiary status.

Estate of Nelson v. Nelson (In Re Perkins) · filed 2018-07-26

Roshida and Perkins were never married, Perkins consistently denied paternity, and Perkins failed to meet the statutory requirements to constitute a wrongful death beneficiary of Delvyn.

Wrongful death beneficiaries may pursue a claim based on an assault the decedent could have pursued if he had survived.

Hill v. Madison County · filed 2020-09-02

Based on these allegations, if Mr. Hill had survived, he would have been able to maintain an assault claim. Thus, Plaintiff has pleaded a plausible wrongful-death claim that would evade MTCA immunity.

Section 11-7-13 makes wrongful-death damages the property of statutory beneficiaries rather than assets of the decedent’s estate.

In the Matter of the Estate of Lester Randle, Deceased: Tumika Randle Webber and Sylvester Randle v. Randl · filed 2022-08-18

Damages recovered in a wrongful-death action are the property of the statutory wrongful-death beneficiaries. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13.

Section 11-7-13 permits recovery for the decedent's lost net cash value and pain and suffering, and for survivors' loss of society and companionship.

Jones v. Shaffer · filed 1990-12-19

This statutory language has been held to include: the present net cash value of the life expectancy of the decedent; the loss of society and companionship of the decedent; the pain and suffering experienced by the deceased between the time of the injury and the subsequent demise and punitive damages.

Section 11-7-13 places a decedent’s spouse and children ahead of parents and siblings as wrongful death beneficiaries.

Briney v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance · filed 1996-07-16

In addition, in contrast to the facts of the Moreland case, Briney and Joy's other heirs, with the exception of the adopted child, were not in the top echelon of beneficiaries under Mississippi's wrongful death statute.

Section 11-7-13 places a decedent’s spouse and children ahead of parents and siblings as wrongful death beneficiaries.

Briney v. US Fidelity & Guar. Co. · filed 1998-06-04

In addition, in contrast to the facts of the Moreland case, Briney and Joy's other heirs, with the exception of the adopted child, were not in the top echelon of beneficiaries under Mississippi's wrongful death statute. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1997).

When none of the relatives listed in § 11-7-13 survives, wrongful death damages become an estate asset, subject to debts, with the remainder distributed under the decedent’s will or, if there is no will, the laws of descent and distribution.

Smith v. Garrett · filed 1973-12-17

It appears to us that the intent of the Legislature was that, if there were no surviving heirs as specifically named and listed in the wrongful death statute, the damages recovered in a wrongful death action would become an asset of the estate to be used as any other asset in the payment of the just debts of the estate and then any residue to be distributed according to the last will and testament of the deceased, if there were a will, or under the statute of descent and distribution if there were no will.

Section 11-7-13 determines wrongful death beneficiaries at the victim’s death; a spouse who survives even briefly takes the claim, which passes to the spouse’s estate if the spouse later dies.

Partyka v. Yazoo Development Corp. · filed 1979-09-12

Nor does the statute even imply that the beneficiary must survive for a prescribed minimum length of time in order to be classified as left. Mr. Hall had a wife when he died, and left a wife, even though her survivorship was for only a matter of minutes. At his death before her decease she, at once, had a cause of action for his wrongful death. This cause of action was an item of property, an asset, in her estate, on which she could sue.

Section 11-7-13 permits an illegitimate child to recover for the natural father’s wrongful death if the child has or establishes the right to inherit from him under Section 91-1-15.

Ivy v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co. · filed 1987-07-22

In that same enactment, Section 6, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 was amended so as to authorize illegitimates to participate in a wrongful death claim.

Section 11-7-13 allows an illegitimate child to share in wrongful death proceeds from a natural father's death if the child has or establishes the right to inherit from him under § 91-1-15.

Leflore by Primer v. Coleman · filed 1988-02-24

It is now clear that the Legislature has declared as the public policy of this state that an illegitimate child can inherit from his natural father's estate, and share in the proceeds of a wrongful death action the same as a natural legitimate child. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-7-13, 91-1-15.

Section 11-7-13 gives a decedent’s surviving children priority as wrongful-death beneficiaries over the decedent’s parents and siblings, even if the children were adopted before the decedent’s death.

Fillingame v. Patterson · filed 1988-09-08

This being the rubric of Mississippi jurisprudence, decedent’s children, by their prior adoption, are not dispossessed of their statutory cause of action. ... Finding that decedent is survived by his two natural children and persuaded by the clear reading of the statute, as well as by case authorities, this court holds that only the two children, Shirley Mae and Judy Fillingame, are the proper statutory beneficiaries who may bring this action pursuant to Mississippi’s Wrongful Death Statute.

Section 11-7-13 does not require the jury to know the identity of the wrongful death beneficiaries.

Munn v. Algee · filed 1991-02-28

The Mississippi wrongful death statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.1990), does not require that the jury know the identity of the beneficiaries.

Section 11-7-13 allows an adopted child to bring a wrongful death action for a natural parent's death.

Penalver v. Howell · filed 1993-05-06

Moreover, Section 11-7-13 does not distinguish between the types of children entitled to bring a wrongful death action for the death of a parent, i.e., natural or adoptive.

Section 11-7-13 allows an adopted child to bring a wrongful death action for the death of a natural parent.

Estate of Jones v. Howell · filed 1996-08-08

We also note that none of the statutes in question, i.e., Section 11-7-13 or Section 93-17-13, specifically prohibits an adopted child from bringing a wrongful death action for his natural parent's death.

Section 11-7-13 requires wrongful death settlement proceeds to be distributed equally among surviving parents and siblings, including half-siblings, when the deceased leaves no spouse or children.

Pannell v. Guess · filed 1996-03-28

Therefore, under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1991), the chancellor had no choice but to distribute the insurance settlement proceeds to Shelly's father, mother, half-sisters and half-brother, equally.

When a decedent leaves children but no surviving spouse, § 11-7-13 makes the children, rather than the decedent’s siblings, beneficiaries of wrongful death damages.

Gonzales v. Nellie Gray · filed 2001-01-10

Because Mississippi substantive law applies, and pursuant to Mississippi's wrongful death statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2001), only the children and not the siblings are contemplated beneficiaries, we reverse the chancery court's judgment and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

A natural father's right to benefits for an illegitimate child's wrongful death depends on his right to inherit from the child under § 91-1-15.

Estate of Patterson v. Patterson · filed 2001-01-25

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2000) clearly provides for inheritance from illegitimates, but the right is tied to Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(i) (1994).

Section 11-7-13 makes children, rather than siblings, the wrongful death beneficiaries when the decedent has children and no surviving spouse.

In Re Estate of Blanton · filed 2002-06-13

Because Mississippi substantive law applies, and pursuant to Mississippi's wrongful death statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.2001), only the children and not the siblings are contemplated beneficiaries, we reverse the chancery court's judgment and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Section 11-7-13 allows wrongful death beneficiaries to recover only if the deceased person could have maintained an action had death not occurred.

Ruby Carter v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2002-10-03

Contrary to Carter's position that the wrongful death survivors have a separate tort from that of the deceased inmate, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2003) clearly states that wrongful death beneficiaries are entitled to maintain an action and recover damages as would the decedent if death had not ensued: ... Likewise, Stacie's wrongful death survivors are not entitled to maintain an action against the MDOC and Childs.

Section 11-7-13 allows a father to receive wrongful death proceeds for an illegitimate child only if he establishes a right to inherit from the child under Section 91-1-15.

Williams v. Farmer · filed 2002-11-25

It is clear from Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 that in order for a father to be entitled to proceeds from a wrongful death action for an illegitimate child, he must establish his right to inherit from the child under Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-15, which includes the § 91-1-15(3)(d)(i) requirements.

Section 11-7-13 limits recovery for loss of a deceased child’s society and companionship to statutory beneficiaries.

Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton · filed 1997-04-18

The only statutory beneficiary in this case is Gerald Sutton, Nicholas and Sumone's father. He and he alone can recover damages for the loss of society and companionship and for only the loss of society and companionship of Nicholas and Sumone.

Section 11-7-13 treats a child who was viable when a relative died and was later born alive as a living wrongful death beneficiary.

In Re Estate of Davis · filed 1998-02-05

We hold that a preborn child who is viable at the time of a relative's death and is ultimately born alive, is "living" such that he or she can be a wrongful death beneficiary under the law.

A child who was in utero but not viable when a parent died may recover as a wrongful death beneficiary if later born alive.

Childs v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1999-09-27

After reviewing Mississippi’s wrongful death statute, this Court holds that Phillip Jason Childs, Jr., is entitled to recovery under the statute. ... The Court does not agree with defendant’s argument that Phillip Jason Childs was not “living” at the time of his father’s death because he was not viable.

Section 11-7-13 gives a natural father wrongful death benefits for an illegitimate child's death only if he has or establishes the right to inherit from the child under § 91-1-15.

Stanton v. John W. Patterson, Jr. · filed 1999-01-27

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2000) clearly provides for inheritance from illegitimates, but the right is tied to Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(i) (1994).

Section 11-7-13 treats relatives of the whole and half blood equally when they are of equal degree, allowing a natural half-sibling to qualify as a wrongful death beneficiary.

In Re Estate of Yount · filed 2003-05-13

They have a parent in common, their father, and pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13, "there shall not be, in any case, a distinction between the kindred of the whole and half blood of equal degree." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.2002). Therefore, Emmitt McKnight, as the natural half-brother, is a statutory heir-at-law and wrongful death beneficiary of Dale Clayton Yount, deceased, and is entitled to a one-third portion of his half-brother's estate.

Section 11-7-13 permits a wrongful death action for a fetus that was quick in the womb, even if it was not viable; the claim arises at death, and the jury decides whether the fetus was quick.

66 Federal Credit Union v. Tucker · filed 2003-08-21

Following the holding of the Georgia Supreme Court and applying the reasoning aforementioned as it relates to our criminal statute concerning quick in the womb, we hold that our wrongful death statute includes a fetus who is "quick" in the womb as a "person" within the language of that statute, that the cause of action dates from the death of the child and the determination of whether a child is "quick" in the womb is assigned to the jury as the finder of fact.

Section 11-7-13 allows a father to receive wrongful death proceeds for an illegitimate child only if he can inherit from the child under § 91-1-15.

Williams v. Farmer · filed 2004-07-01

It is clear from Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 that in order for a father to be entitled to proceeds from a wrongful death action for an illegitimate child, he must establish his right to inherit from the child under Miss.Code Ann. § 91-1-15, which includes the § 91-1-15(3)(d)(i) requirements.

Section 11-7-13 excludes in loco parentis children from the children eligible to recover wrongful-death damages.

Halley Smith v. Smith · filed 2012-06-04

The statute is silent as to in loco children. Since this Court must strictly construe the statute, we find that in loco children do not fall within the definition of children in Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute.

Section 11-7-13 does not make an in loco parentis child a wrongful-death beneficiary.

Estate of Justin v. Smith · filed 2014-01-23

Since this Court must strictly construe the statute, we find that in loco children do not fall within the definition of children in Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute.

A natural father of an illegitimate child must show that he qualifies to inherit under section 91-1-15 to benefit from a wrongful-death action; termination of his parental rights is not required.

Lepori v. Welch · filed 2012-06-26

The Wrongful Death Act, by incorporating section 91-1-15, addresses the inequity of a natural father of an illegitimate child benefitting from a wrongful-death action when he has failed to acknowledge and support his child. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13. But it does not require the father’s rights be terminated under section 93-15-103. Instead, it imposes the duty on the father to show he meets the requirements of section 91-1-15 and is, thus, one of his child’s heirs-at-law. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13.

When the deceased leaves no spouse or children, § 11-7-13 divides wrongful-death proceeds equally among the surviving parents and siblings, including half-siblings.

Estate of Eubanks v. Eubanks · filed 2014-01-21

If the deceased has no spouse or children, then the wrongful-death statute makes clear that damages will be equally divided between the deceased’s father, mother, sisters, and brothers living at the time of his death.

Section 11-7-13 allows a wrongful-death claim for an unborn quick child without requiring fetal viability.

Tarinika Smith v. Church Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2018-08-02

Under Mississippi law, a wrongful-death claim may be brought on behalf of a “quick” fetus, while Tennessee law permits a wrongful-death claim only for fetuses deemed “viable” at the time of injury. Compare Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev. 2004), with Tenn. Code § 20-5-106(d) (2009 & Supp. 2017).

Section 11-7-13 allows children to bring wrongful-death actions directly for their own benefit.

Denison v. Mississippi Organ Recovery Agency, Inc., Shirley Schlessinger, M.D., and Dustin Shea Allen, · filed 2026-04-16

Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute authorizes children to bring direct lawsuits for their own benefit. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev. 2019). A portion of Brooke’s complaint would ordinarily be brought under the wrongful- death statute. But, as her counsel conceded, Brooke did not bring a wrongful-death action. Thus, Brooke has no separate claim.

Section 11-7-13 allows an administrator to sue for all damages arising from a wrongful death, even when statutory heirs rather than the estate would receive the recovery.

McAlpin v. James McKoane Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1975-05-29

Although it is true that the estate would have no beneficial interest in any damages recovered under the wrongful death act, should proper statutory heirs exist, the legislature has, through the wrongful death act, designated the administrator as the proper plaintiff to recover all damages flowing from the wrongful death of his decedent.

Section 11-7-13 allows a parent to bring a wrongful death action for a child without the additional qualifications Aetna sought.

Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Williams · filed 1993-09-02

We note that Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 provides that an action for wrongful death may be brought "by the parent for the death of a child" without any qualifications such as those sought by Aetna.

Section 11-7-13 creates a wrongful death cause of action when the death occurs.

McMillan v. Puckett · filed 1996-05-16

In this, as in any other wrongful death action brought pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972), there is no injury, and hence, no cause of action until a death occurs.

Section 11-7-13 lets a husband or child bring a wrongful death action based on their relationship to the deceased, without appointment as the estate’s personal representative.

Webb v. Banquer · filed 1998-09-02

This Court is of the opinion that the “personal representative” referred to in the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13, is synonymous with “the legal representative of the estate” referenced in § 1332(c)(2). However, the court is also of the opinion that the reference in the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute to specific beneficiaries (i.e., husband and/or children) is not synonymous with the “legal representative of the estate.” These specific beneficiaries are not court appointed, and in the opinion of this Court, are not “the legal representative of the estate” contemplated in § 1332(c)(2). In sum, since the specific beneficiaries derive their right to bring the wrongful death action from their relationship to the decedent rather than from court appointment, their case is not covered by section 1332(c)(2).

Section 11-7-13 gives no priority among the persons authorized to bring a wrongful death action.

In Re Estate of Brewer · filed 1999-05-04

The wrongful death statute recites a list of those persons who may act as the named plaintiff in such an action but it does not purport to give preference to one potential plaintiff over another.

Section 11-7-13 authorizes a decedent’s personal representative to bring a wrongful death action for eligible heirs and gives the representative standing to determine whether reputed illegitimate children qualify as heirs.

Jones v. Estate Richardson · filed 1997-06-05

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 provides that an illegitimate child may recover damages for the death of his natural father “if the survivor has or established the right to inherit from the deceased under Section 91-1-15.” Since the personal representative of the decedent is expressly authorized by statute to commence a wrongful death action for *589the benefit of all heirs entitled to recover, the personal representative has sufficient standing to determine heirship. Once he became aware of their existence, the administrator was certainly authorized to determine the heirship of reputed illegitimate children for purposes of the wrongful death statute.

Section 11-7-13 allows a wrongful death suit to be brought by the personal representative, one wrongful death beneficiary on behalf of all entitled persons, or all interested parties together.

Long v. McKinney · filed 2002-12-19

Under this statute, and its predecessor, there are three alternatives for bringing a wrongful death suit: (1) by the personal representative on behalf of the estate and all other persons entitled to recover; (2) by one of the wrongful death beneficiaries on behalf of all persons entitled to recover; or (3) by “all interested parties. . . .”

Section 11-7-13 permits a wrongful death suit to be brought by the personal representative, by one beneficiary on behalf of all persons entitled to recover, or by all interested parties.

Long v. McKinney · filed 2004-12-02

Under this statute, and its predecessor, there are three alternatives for bringing a wrongful death suit: (1) by the personal representative on behalf of the estate and all other persons entitled to recover; (2) by one of the wrongful death beneficiaries on behalf of all persons entitled to recover; or (3) by "all interested parties...."

Section 11-7-13 permits a wrongful death suit by the decedent’s estate representative for the heirs or by a surviving spouse, child, parent or sibling.

Austin v. Mariner Health Care, Inc. · filed 2005-03-08

Mississippi’s Wrongful Death Statute is contained in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13, which provides that suit may be brought by a personal representative of the decedent’s estate for the benefit of his heirs or by the decedent’s surviving spouse, child, parent or sibling.

Section 11-7-13 permits a personal representative to bring a wrongful death action for the benefit of all persons entitled to recover.

Estate of Perry v. MARINER HEALTH CARE · filed 2006-01-10

This contention is true as the wrongful death statute specifically states that the action may be brought in the name of the personal representative "for the benefit of all persons entitled under the law to recover." See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004).

Section 11-7-13 provides for a single wrongful death action encompassing damages to the estate and all wrongful death beneficiaries.

HARPSTER EX REL. SALEZ v. Thomas · filed 2006-07-03

Because Mississippi law provides for a single wrongful death action that encompasses the claims for all damages of every kind to the estate and all wrongful death beneficiaries, it follows that Mrs. Salez and her children have a direct interest in this litigation.

Section 11-7-13 bars a decedent’s sibling from bringing a wrongful death action when the decedent leaves a surviving spouse or children.

Tolliver Ex Rel. Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Green v. Mladineo · filed 2007-07-17

Our review of Mississippi case law makes clear that a decedent's sibling is barred from bringing suit under the wrongful death statute when the decedent has left a surviving spouse or children.

Section 11-7-13 does not give a great-nephew standing to bring a wrongful-death action.

Delta Health Group, Inc. v. Estate of Pope Ex Rel. Payne · filed 2008-10-02

This Court is without authority to expand the enunciated beneficiaries by granting standing to a great-nephew and empowering him with a legal right to commence suit.

An inheriting heir qualifies as an interested party who may bring a wrongful-death action, even if the heir is not a listed relative.

Burley v. Douglas · filed 2007-11-07

Although Burley did not qualify as a “personal representative” or a “listed relative” of Joshua and Jakura Hill, he was an “interested party” because of his relationship as an inheriting heir of the deceased children, a status which later was confirmed by the chancery court’s heirship determination.

Section 11-7-13 permits an interested party to bring a wrongful-death action when a legally recognized relationship with the decedent gives that person a right to recover for an injury caused by the death.

Clark Sand Company, Inc. v. Ruby C. Kelley · filed 2008-08-11

Put simply, an interested party is a person who has a relationship to the decedent that is recognized by law, and who therefore has suffered a remediable injury (i.e., the invasion of a legally protected interest) by the wrongful deprivation of the decedent’s life at the defendant’s hands.

An inheriting heir qualifies as an interested party who may initiate a wrongful-death action under § 11-7-13.

Burley Ex Rel. Hill v. Douglas · filed 2009-11-05

We hold that Burley qualifies as an interested party under the wrongful-death statute, and therefore, he had standing to bring this action.

Section 11-7-13 permits an interested party to bring a wrongful-death action when the person has a legally recognized relationship with the decedent and a right to seek recovery for the death.

Clark Sand Co., Inc. v. Kelly · filed 2011-04-28

Put simply, an interested party is a person who has a relationship to the decedent that is recognized by law, and who therefore has suffered a remediable injury (i.e., the invasion of a legally protected interest) by the wrongful deprivation of the decedent’s life at the defendant’s hands. Such a person thus may claim a genuine right of recovery from the decedent’s wrongful-death action by seeking damages for his or her injury, and that right gives the claimant a legally sufficient interest in the action to make him or her an “interested party” under the wrongful-death statute.

Section 11-7-13 gives a decedent’s spouse and children priority over parents and siblings to bring the single wrongful death action.

Johnson v. Med Express Ambulance Service, Inc. · filed 2008-07-09

The foregoing cases illustrate the following rule of standing in Mississippi wrongful death actions: When one or more members of the preferred class of wrongful death beneficiaries survives the decedent, all members of the deferred class lack standing to maintain the one wrongful death action.

Section 11-7-13 gives a decedent’s widow standing to sue without being appointed executrix of the estate.

Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC v. Pittman · filed 2008-08-29

Consequently, the wrongful-death statue conferred on Mary standing to bring the 2005 amended complaint regardless of whether she had been formally appointed as executrix of Lonnie’s estate when the 2005 amended complaint was filed.

Section 11-7-13 allows a personal representative to bring a wrongful death action, and the representative’s later removal does not require dismissal of the estate’s action.

Wallace v. Mohamed · filed 2008-12-15

Also, Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13 states that an action for damages in a wrongful death suit may be brought “in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev. 2004). ... Consistent with our prior holdings, Wallace was the administrator of the estate at its commencement. ... Our decision in Wallace I dictates the case shall proceed, albeit without Mr. Wallace.

Section 11-7-13 requires claims resulting from a tort that caused death, including the decedent’s survival claims, to be brought in one suit.

Kinsey v. Pangborn Corp. · filed 2011-11-03

This Court has stated that Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13, Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute, “encompasses all claims — including survival claims which could have been brought by the decedent,[ 12] wrongful-death claims, estate *306claims, and other claims — resulting from a tort which proximately caused a death.” ... Section 11-7-13 “requires that all such claims be brought in one suit....” ... A review of Kinsey’s April 2007 Complaint reflects that only “survival-type” claims are presented.

Section 11-7-13 allows a deceased person’s personal representative to bring a wrongful death action for the beneficiaries and a widow to bring one for her husband.

Linares v. City of Southaven · filed 2020-09-30

Unless ordered otherwise by the state court having jurisdiction over the administration of the Estate, Autry is the duly appointed Administrator and, by the authority vested in him pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13, Autry, as Administrator, is authorized to bring a claim for the wrongful death of Lopez on behalf of the Estate and its beneficiaries. ... This section likewise authorizes plaintiff Linares, as Lopez’s widow, to bring this action.

A wrongful death beneficiary may pursue the beneficiaries’ claims under § 11-7-13 without being the estate administrator.

Ivy v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2022-02-24

Indeed, Alvita Barnes as Young’s beneficiary pursuant to § 11-7-13, standing alone was a proper party to pursue the wrongful death beneficiaries’ claims pursuant to § 11-7-3 irrespective of her role as administrator of Young’s estate.

Section 11-7-13 allows a wrongful death beneficiary to sue without opening an estate and recover applicable damages for all entitled persons if the wrongful conduct caused the death.

Jones v. Jones County, MS · filed 2023-09-22

As discussed above, the Court has found that there need not have been any estate opened to bring a wrongful death action. Plaintiff is free to pursue his claims solely as a wrongful death action, and, if causation is proven, he can recover all applicable damages on behalf of all those entitled to recover under the Statute.

Section 11-7-13 permits a personal representative to bring a wrongful death action; removing that representative later does not require dismissal of the estate’s action.

Estate of Wallace v. Mohamed · filed 2011-08-25

Also, Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13 states that an action for damages in a wrongful death suit may be brought “in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person.... ” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004). ... The circuit court correctly dismissed Wallace from the circuit court action, for he was neither a personal representative of the estate nor a wrongful death beneficiary. ... However, the trial court erred in dismissing the wrongful death action brought by the estate and on behalf of the wrongful death claimants who were seeking a trial date at the same hearing.

An heir-at-law is an interested party who may bring a wrongful death action on behalf of all beneficiaries regardless of whether the heir can personally recover damages.

Jaquith Nursing Home v. Yarbrough · filed 2012-10-25

As an heir-at-law, Andrews was an “interested party” and could initiate a wrongful-death lawsuit on behalf of all beneficiaries, regardless of her personal ability to recover.

A wrongful death claimant cannot sue as an estate’s personal representative without an opened estate and an appointment as personal representative.

Gagliardi v. Lakeland Surgical Clinic, PLLC · filed 2020-09-28

Accordingly, Mr. Gagliardi could not have brought this action as personal representative of the estate of Ms. Gagliardi within the meaning of the wrongful death statute.

Section 11-7-13 must be strictly construed because it changes the common law; its warranty provision did not require submitting an aircraft implied-warranty claim to the jury.

McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corporation · filed 1979-01-12

Because this statute changed the common law, it must be strictly construed and has not been held to authorize claims like that of appellants. ... The questions whether privity is required in this warranty action and whether recovery is allowed in this situation under the Mississippi wrongful death act are not unambiguously answered in Mississippi law. We conclude, nonetheless, that the warranty theory was correctly withdrawn from the jury’s consideration.

Section 11-7-13 does not reduce wrongful-death damages because a statutory beneficiary was contributorily negligent.

Hood v. Dealers Transport Co. · filed 1979-04-19

The wrongful death statute, Section 11— 7-13, supra, makes no provision for diminution of damages because of a beneficiary’s contributory negligence.

Section 11-7-13 limits a wrongful death plaintiff to actions the decedent could have brought had he survived.

Cosper v. Allred · filed 1984-07-26

Under the Mississippi wrongful death statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.1983), a plaintiff can bring only those actions which could have been brought by the decedent had he survived, see, e.g., Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 462, 17 So.2d 791, 793 (1944); thus, the residence of the decedent appears to be controlling under the former Mississippi long-arm statute.

Section 11-7-13 allows a wrongful death plaintiff to proceed only if the decedent could have maintained the action.

Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp. · filed 1985-03-25

Under Mississippi law, the plaintiff in a wrongful death action is permitted to proceed ”[o]nly if the decedent ‘could maintain an action and recover damages,’ or 'might have commenced and prosecuted’ the suit____ The plaintiff, then, stands in the shoes of his decedent." Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 730 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir.1984) (construing Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-7-13, 91-7-233); see Thornton v. Insurance Co. of North America, 287 So.2d 262 (Miss.1973). Thus, despite the fact that none of the plaintiffs is a resident of Mississippi, the long-arm statute is available to the plaintiffs in the instant action because the Heaths were residents of Mississippi.

Section 11-7-13 gives wrongful death beneficiaries a derivative action in which they stand in the decedent's position.

Wickline v. US Fidelity & Guar. Co. · filed 1988-08-31

The plaintiffs' status as insureds is because of their status as wrongful death beneficiaries of Stacy Wickline under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1987). The wrongful death statute provides a derivative action by the beneficiaries, and those beneficiaries stand in the position of their decedent.

Section 11-7-13 allows wrongful death beneficiaries to bring only claims the decedent could have brought if they had survived.

Cleveland v. Mann · filed 2005-02-23

Based on the clear language of the statute, a wrongful death beneficiary is only allowed to bring claims that the decedent could have brought if the decedent had survived.

Section 11-7-13 includes the decedent’s personal injury damages in the wrongful death action when the same wrongful conduct caused both the injury and the death.

In Re Estate of England · filed 2003-05-27

When the same wrongful conduct causes both personal injury and death, at the instant of death, the recovery for the personal injury is embraced by the "one suit" for wrongful death and is not actionable by the estate under the survival statute.

Section 11-7-13 allows wrongful death beneficiaries to recover only if the deceased person could have maintained an action had death not occurred.

Carter v. MISSISSIPPI DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS · filed 2003-11-13

Contrary to Carter's position that the wrongful death survivors have a separate tort from that of the deceased inmate, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.2003) clearly states that wrongful death beneficiaries are entitled to maintain an action *1192 and recover damages as would the decedent if death had not ensued: ... Likewise, Stacie's wrongful death survivors are not entitled to maintain an action against the MDOC and Childs.

Section 11-7-13 does not recognize a contingent wrongful death claim while the injured person is alive.

Butler v. Brantley · filed 2004-02-12

Mississippi’s wrongful death statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.2003), does not recognize “contingent” wrongful death claims.

Section 11-7-13 does not allow a tortfeasor to take assignment of a plaintiff's wrongful death cause of action.

Coleman Powermate, Inc. v. Rheem Mfg. Co. · filed 2004-08-19

Additionally, Mississippi's wrongful death statute does not confer upon a tortfeasor the right of assignment of a plaintiff's wrongful death cause of action.

Section 11-7-13 allows wrongful death beneficiaries to bring only claims the decedent could have brought if the decedent had survived.

Cleveland v. Mann · filed 2006-08-31

Based on the clear language of the statute, a wrongful death beneficiary is only allowed to bring claims that the decedent could have brought if the decedent had survived.

Wrongful death beneficiaries stand in the decedent’s position, so a prior judgment against the decedent can preclude their claims.

Harris v. Moldex-Metric Inc · filed 2022-06-21

In Mississippi, “a wrongful death suit is a derivative action by the beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries, therefore, stand in the position of their decedent.” Carter v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 860 So. 2d 1187, 1192 (Miss. 2003); see Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13. ... The undisputed record evidence shows that the plaintiffs are the wrongful death beneficiaries of Mr. Harris, which means that they are in Mr. Harris’ position for the purposes of this action. The Court finds that identity of the parties is satisfied.

Section 11-7-13 permits recovery for a decedent’s personal injuries only when the defendant caused the death; otherwise, recovery for those injuries belongs to the estate under the survival statute.

Barbara Crawford and Gertrude White For and On Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Luvenia Hodge v. East Missi · filed 2024-04-30

Recovery under the wrongful death statute requires a finding that the defendant’s actions caused the death of a decedent. ... The estate is not a party to the action; thus, Crawford cannot recover for survival statute damages in a wrongful death lawsuit where the death was found not to be proximately caused by the alleged tortfeasor.

Section 11-7-13 allows wrongful death beneficiaries to bring only claims the decedent could have brought if the decedent had survived.

Cody Patterson and Corey Patterson, Individually and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Johnny Patterson v · filed 2025-09-11

Simply, in order to bring a claim against MDOT, the sons must “stand in the position of their decedent[,]” which is Patterson.

Section 11-7-13 requires survival, wrongful-death, estate, and other claims arising from a tort that caused death to be brought in one suit.

Kinsey v. Pangborn Corporation · filed 2010-05-17

Section 11-7-13 “requires that all such claims be brought in one suit . . . .” Caves, 991 So. 2d at 149 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev. 2004)) (emphasis added).

Section 11-7-13 allows only one pending suit for a wrongful death, and other claimants must join that suit for the benefit of all beneficiaries.

Woodfork v. Gavin · filed 1985-03-04

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.1984) provides that there shall be only one pending suit for the same wrongful death, which suit shall ensue for the benefit of all beneficiaries. Thus, upon the filing of a wrongful death suit, other claimants must join in that suit rather than filing a separate action.

Section 11-7-13 allows interested parties to join a wrongful death suit and does not bar another action unless the prior suit was decided on its merits.

Brown v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 1989-03-29

Clearly, § 11-7-13, the wrongful death statute, states that it does not operate to bar another action unless the matter is decided on its merits and, even so, any interested party may join in the suit.

Section 11-7-13 permits only one suit for a wrongful death; when a qualified personal representative sues for all beneficiaries, the limitations period runs against the deceased's minor children too.

Curry v. Trent Turner · filed 2000-08-10

A common sense reading of the wrongful death statute indicates the statute of limitations runs against both the personal representative of the deceased and the deceased's children.

Section 11-7-13 allows wrongful death heirs to choose separate counsel while pursuing one suit for the same death.

Franklin v. Phillips · filed 2001-06-05

The wrongful death statute does not by its express terms limit the case to one lawyer or otherwise limit each heir’s choice of her own counsel.

Section 11-7-13 allows only one wrongful death action, so filing that action on behalf of a minor beneficiary ends the minor’s savings protection for a later suit.

Lee v. Thompson · filed 2001-12-13

Certainly, under the minors savings statute, Emily was protected; however, once the first wrongful death suit was commenced by the filing of the state court complaint on June 16, 1999, Emily no longer enjoyed the protection of the minors savings statute since there could be but one cause of action under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13.

Section 11-7-13 requires one suit for a wrongful death, and the limitations period runs against minor beneficiaries when a qualified personal representative brings that suit for them.

Curry v. Turner · filed 2002-12-12

This conclusion is reinforced by the wrongful death statute's requirement that one suit be brought for damages from wrongful death. A common sense reading of the wrongful death statute indicates the statute of limitations runs against both the personal representative of the deceased and the deceased's children.

Section 11-7-13 does not bar another wrongful death suit when the earlier suit was settled without a decision on the merits.

Burr v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center · filed 2002-12-23

The trial court properly dismissed the Hospital’s motion because the prior suit was settled out of court with no jury determination of the merits.

Section 11-7-13 allows only one wrongful death action; filing that action on behalf of a minor beneficiary ends the minor’s savings protection for a later suit.

Lee v. Thompson · filed 2003-09-11

Certainly, under the minors savings statute, Emily was protected; however, once the first wrongful death suit was commenced by the filing of the state court complaint on June 16, 1999, Emily no longer enjoyed the protection of the minors savings statute since there could be but one cause of action under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13.

Only one wrongful death action may proceed for a death; when beneficiaries file separate actions, the first filed action controls.

Smith v. Holmes · filed 2004-07-28

Both are Tevon’s natural parents and are therefore wrongful death beneficiaries who are entitled to bring a wrongful death lawsuit under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7- 13 (Rev. 2004). ... It is clear under our jurisprudence that only one of the wrongful death beneficiaries may bring a wrongful death lawsuit. ... Because Carl’s wrongful death complaint was filed after Cassandra’s, we find that the circuit court’s dismissal of Carl’s complaint was eminently correct.

Section 11-7-13 permits another wrongful death action when the earlier suit was settled without a decision on its merits.

Burr v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center · filed 2005-06-16

The trial court properly dismissed the Hospital's motion because the prior suit was settled out of court with no jury determination of the merits. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 ("there shall be but one (1) suit for the same death which shall ensue for the benefit of all parties concerned, but the determination of such suit shall not bar another action unless it be decided on its merits.") (emphasis added).

Section 11-7-13 does not require dismissal of a second wrongful-death suit merely because it once overlapped with a first suit that was later dismissed.

Briere v. South Central Regional Medical Center · filed 2007-11-08

We clarify Long and hold that the wrongful-death statute does not require that a second suit be dismissed solely because it was, at some point, pending at the same time as a previously-filed suit.

Section 11-7-13 permits only one suit for the same death, so a Mississippi wrongful-death suit is subject to dismissal while an earlier suit for that death is pending in another state.

Sauvage v. Meadowcrest Living Center, LLC. · filed 2008-11-21

Under Section 11-7-13, there shall be one suit for the same death; under Long, all claims must be joined in that single action. ... We hold that a wrongful-death suit filed in Mississippi is subject to dismissal during the pendency of a suit for the same wrongful death in a sister state.

Section 11-7-13’s one-suit provision does not preserve wrongful-death claims barred by the applicable limitations period.

Gray v. UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE · filed 2008-12-04

Gray further argues that the wrongful death statute's provision of "but one (1) suit for the same death" enables a wrongful death claimant to pursue claims for all of a defendant's wrongful, lethal conduct in a single action. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Rev.2004). For that reason, Gray argues, he should be allowed to litigate acts of negligence that occurred before July 5, 2004. While Gray appropriately instigated a single suit for all his claims of wrongful, lethal conduct, for a certain claim to survive summary judgment, that claim had to be timely.

Section 11-7-13 makes a Mississippi wrongful-death suit subject to dismissal while an earlier suit for the same death is pending in another state.

Sauvage v. Meadowcrest Living Center, LLC · filed 2010-02-25

Under Section 11-7-13, there shall be one suit for the same death; under Long, all claims must be joined in that single action. ... We hold that a wrongful-death suit filed in Mississippi is subject to dismissal during the pendency of a suit for the same wrongful death in a sister state.

Section 11-7-13 allows wrongful death heirs to join in one suit while retaining counsel of their choice.

Franklin v. Franklin Ex Rel. Phillips · filed 2003-02-13

Judge Kitchens's joinder of Jonathan and Heather Franklin's lawsuits was within his authority and was proper under the wrongful death statute's mandate that there can be only one lawsuit based upon a wrongful death. Allowing Heather (and the estate) to retain the attorneys she chose was not at odds with the statute's mandate. There was still only one lawsuit. Nothing in the statute prohibits parties in a wrongful death action from being represented by the counsel of their choice.

Section 11-7-13’s one-suit rule does not prevent minor beneficiaries from relying on the minors savings clause merely because an adult could sue; a qualified person must actually file a wrongful-death suit on their behalf.

Pioneer Community Hospital of Newton v. Roberts · filed 2017-03-23

Instead, we hold that only when someone who is qualified to bring a wrongful-death suit actually files a wrongful-death suit on the minor beneficiaries’ behalf will the minors savings clause not apply, because, once the suit is filed, the running of the statute of limitations is immaterial.

Section 11-7-13 has no limitations period; a wrongful death claim based on assault and battery is subject to the one-year period for those torts.

VESELITS BY CRUTHIRDS v. Veselits · filed 1987-02-26

A close reading will reveal that the Wrongful Déath Statute does not specifically provide for a limitation period. ... Since the wrongful death action is predicated upon the defendant’s intentional torts contained in the above section, the one year statute, rather than the six year statute of limitations is applicable to the present action.

Section 11-7-13 has no built-in limitations period; Mississippi’s general limitations period applies to wrongful death actions under it.

Nailen v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1988-07-18

An examination of Mississippi’s wrongful death statute (Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972 & Supp.1987)) reveals that there is no "built-in” limitations period and therefore Mississippi’s general statute of limitations (Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972)) applies.

Section 11-7-13 has no limitations period of its own, so wrongful death actions are subject to Title 15’s limitations provisions.

Thiroux Ex Rel. Cruz v. Austin · filed 1999-11-18

On the contrary, the current wrongful death statute, and the one in effect at the time of Arender, does not contain its own statute of limitation. Therefore that statute is subject to the provisions regarding limitations of actions in Title 15 of the Mississippi Code. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.1999).

Section 11-7-13 contains no limitation period of its own, so wrongful death actions are subject to Title 15’s limitation and minor savings provisions.

Thiroux v. Austin · filed 1997-08-11

On the contrary, the current wrongful death statute, and the one in effect at the time of Arender, does not contain its own statute of limitation. Therefore that statute is subject to the provisions regarding limitations of actions in Title 15 of the Mississippi Code. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1999).

Section 11-7-13 requires claims arising from a death to be brought in one suit, but each claim has its own statute of limitations.

Caves v. Yarbrough · filed 2006-10-13

While it is true that the wrongful-death statute requires that all such claims be brought in one suit, each claim is subject to its own statute of limitations.

Section 11-7-13 does not revive a survival claim after the decedent’s time to sue has expired.

Caves v. Yarbrough · filed 2008-09-25

Stated another way, if a person who is injured through the negligence of a tortfeasor fails to file suit within the three-year statute of limitations, the right to bring the claim expires; and it does not quicken simply because the injured person later dies.

Wrongful-death claims accrue at death, and the limitations period is determined by the underlying tort.

Nelson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-North Mississippi, Inc. · filed 2010-09-21

The statute of limitations for the wrongful-death action is limited by the statute of limitations for the underlying tort. ... Thus, we find that the statute of limitations for the Nelsons’ wrongful-death claims began to run on the day Bobby died, which was July 14, 2001.

Section 11-7-13 wrongful-death claims are subject to the limitations period for the underlying wrongful act.

Johnson v. Madison County · filed 2022-06-16

As noted, Count VI asserts a claim for wrongful death under Mississippi’s Wrongful Death Statute. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13. That statute is “subject to, and limited by, the statute of limitations associated with the claims of specific wrongful acts which allegedly led to the wrongful death.”

Section 11-7-13 does not allow a wrongful death action against an employer when workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy, even if death benefits are not paid.

Morris v. WE Blain & Sons, Inc. · filed 1987-08-19

Ms. Morris initially argues that this statutorily authorized wrongful death action, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972 & Supp. 1986), is not subject to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. ... We find both claims meritless.

Section 11-7-13 does not require uninsured motorist coverage for damages arising from the death of a third person who was not insured under the policy.

Delancey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 1990-12-03

We conclude that neither Mississippi’s uninsured motorist statute nor its wrongful death statute mandates that policyholders be able to recover under their uninsured motorist policies for their damages resulting from the death of a third person.

Section 11-7-13 contains no specific venue rule for wrongful death actions, so the general venue statute governs.

Burgess v. Wisey Lucky · filed 1992-02-21

Mississippi's wrongful death statute does not contain a specific provision regarding venue; therefore, Miss. Code Ann. §11-11-3 (Supp. 1995), the state's general venue statute, must be relied upon in wrongful death cases.

Section 11-7-13 contains no venue provision, so venue for wrongful death actions is governed by Mississippi’s general venue statute.

Burgess v. Lucky · filed 1996-05-23

Mississippi's wrongful death statute does not contain a specific provision regarding venue; therefore, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Supp. 1995), the state's general venue statute, must be relied upon in wrongful death cases.

Section 11-7-13 does not give relatives wrongful death damages when the injured person survives, regardless of the injury’s severity.

Moore v. Kroger Co. · filed 1992-06-29

This court is of the opinion that because Moore’s personal injury claim survives through his conservator, it must remain a personal injury claim despite the severity of the injury. To allow aggrieved plaintiffs to borrow from wrongful death and personal injury claims depending on the severity of the case would foster a cumbersome system, difficult to apply in later cases and as yet unrecognized by Mississippi law.

Section 11-7-13 permits a wrongful death action for an infant who dies at birth or after living less than forty-eight hours.

Sweeney v. Preston · filed 1994-04-07

It is well established that an action may be maintained under our wrongful death statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13, for infants who die at birth. ... Thus an action can be maintained for the death of an infant who lived less than forty-eight hours.

Section 11-7-13 permits a wrongful death action for an unborn child who was quick in the womb, even if the child was not viable.

66 Federal Credit Union v. Tucker · filed 2001-02-15

Consistent with the language found in Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-37 (Rev. 2000), we hold that the wrongful death statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2002), includes an unborn child that is “quick” in the womb as a “person.”

Section 11-7-13 requires proof that the defendant’s wrongful conduct caused the death; without that proof, heirs cannot recover wrongful death or lifetime damages under the section.

Wilks v. American Tobacco Co · filed 1993-06-23

Although the wrongful death statute provides for recovery of "all the damages of every kind," which would certainly include lifetime damages, the entire claim under this statute must fail where the heirs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Smith's death was caused by ATC's product.

A wrongful death claim under § 11-7-13 requires proof that the defendant caused the death; circumstantial evidence and potential adverse inferences can create a triable issue on causation.

Trevor Lee Watts, Individually and as Representative of the Heir at Law of Kimberly Watts v. Watts · filed 2022-11-15

The Mississippi Legislature created a legal right for its citizens to bring civil lawsuits on behalf of their family members when another person or entity wrongfully or negligently causes the death of that family member. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2013). ... In this case, the combination of circumstantial evidence presented plus the potential for any adverse inference, which could be considered by a trier of fact, created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Thomas was responsible for the wrongful death of Kimberly.

Section 11-7-13 permits recovery by wrongful death heirs when the defendant’s wrongful conduct proximately caused the death.

Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Barnett · filed 2016-08-23

Moreover, the jury’s answer to Question 4 indicates that Dorothy is entitled to recover damages under the wrongful death statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 2015).

Section 11-7-13 requires proof that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the death for a wrongful death claim.

Torrie Campbell Knight, Administratrix of The Estate of Linda Campbell, On Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of · filed 2026-04-07

Knight has no viable claim against Glover under the wrongful death statute because, as Knight concedes, there is no evidence that any act or omission by Glover proximately caused Campbell’s death.

Section 11-7-13 requires proof that the defendant caused death by a wrongful or negligent act or omission; a manslaughter conviction precludes relitigation of the same facts in the wrongful death suit.

Gollott v. State · filed 1994-12-01

Looking at the manslaughter statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47 (1972), and the wrongful death statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1993), it is apparent that a conviction of manslaughter will collaterally estop litigation of the same facts in the wrongful death suit.