Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49

Section 15-1-49, as amended, shortens the limitations period for general tort actions to three years, but the three-year period applies only to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1989.

Coleman v. Slade Towing Co. · filed 1991-03-27

During the 1989 general session of the Mississippi Legislature, the statute of limitations governing general tort actions was shortened from six years to three years. ... However, the three year limitations period applies only to causes of action that accrue on or after July 1, 1989. Thus, the six year statute of limitations remains applicable to this case.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period for the contribution claim runs from the April 17, 1993 judgment in favor of Trustmark, rather than from the 1988 note or refinancing.

Alleyne v. Jones · filed 1993-04-17

Testimony at trial showed that Dr. Jones defaulted on the Trustmark loan on July 19, 1991. On January 31, 1992, Drs. Alleyne and Baines brought suit challenging, inter alia, the validity of the refinancing arrangement with Trustmark. Trustmark asserted a cross-claim against Dr. Jones and prevailed. In the judgment, the Chancellor specifically found that the judgment in favor of Trustmark would constitute another corporate contribution by Dr. Jones and therefore ordered payment by Drs. Alleyne and Baines. Therefore, the judgment in favor of Trustmark entered on April 17, 1993, controls the relevant time period for the purposes of the statute of limitations and the contribution of Drs. Alleyne and Baines to that judgment.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for the negligence and emotional-distress claims at issue, and filing the federal action while invoking pendent jurisdiction tolled that period.

Norman v. Bucklew · filed 1994-05-03

The Court sides with Norman on this issue. Accordingly, the determinative question is in the application of the relevant statutes of limitation. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 and § 15-1-49. ... Acting in his official capacity on January 10, 1990, Bucklew filed the criminal affidavit against Norman giving rise to this entire lawsuit. Thus, any claim for negligence or emotional distress damages should have run as of January 11, 1993. Norman filed his suit in federal court on January 8, 1993. Accordingly, the three-year statute of limitations was tolled when the federal court's pendent jurisdiction was sought to be invoked by Norman. Therefore, the trial court was in error.

Section 15-1-49 provides Mississippi's three-year general personal-injury limitations period, which federal courts borrow for § 1983 actions.

Metcalf v. Robertson · filed 1995-07-11

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, and the federal courts borrow the forum state's general personal injury limitations period. ... The forum state of Mississippi has a limitations period of three years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Supp. 1994).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for actions accruing after July 1, 1989.

Marascalco v. Birdsong · filed 1995-08-28

As a result, the three-year statute of limitations in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Supp. 1994), which applies to actions accruing after July 1, 1989, is applicable to Marascalco's action.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for actions with no other prescribed limitation, including § 1983 claims in Mississippi.

A-1 Ex Rel. D-2 v. Molpus · filed 1995-03-30

Therefore, the statute of limitations on § 1983 causes of action in Mississippi is now three (3) years.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period only when no other period of limitation is prescribed; here, the court held that a federal six-year period controlled instead.

Durr v. American National Property and Casualty Company · filed 1998-12-21(1)

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995) (1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "(1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after." ... Accordingly, the action sub judice is controlled by the federal six-year limitations period and not Mississippi's three-year proscriptive period.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including borrowed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Knight v. Calhoun County, MS · filed 2001-08-23

The limitations period in Mississippi is three years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Knight’s complaint, filed on August 31, 2000, at the earliest, asserted claims which arose on August 1, 1997, and was therefore time-barred. See id.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions without another prescribed limitation period to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, subject to the court's service-of-process tolling rule.

Triple "C" Transport, Inc. v. Dickens · filed 2002-06-24(1)

Mississippi law provides that “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1) (Rev. 2003). ... In the event process is not served during the 120 day service period, the statute begins to run again. ... Here, the accident occurred on October 6, 1994. Dickens filed suit on July 14, 1997, 84 days before the expiration of the three years. Dickens did not attempt process on Henry during the 120 days, which ended November 11, 1997. Since process was not served on Henry as of that date, the statute of limitations began to run again, and it expired 84 days later, on February 3, 1998.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions without another prescribed limitation period to be commenced within three years after accrual, and it barred these fraud claims filed more than three years after accrual.

Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Ballard · filed 2002-11-22(1)

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1) provides: “(1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” ... Therefore, we find that Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 operates here to bar the Plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for actions lacking another prescribed period, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Carter v. CITIGROUP INC. · filed 2006-07-20

We find that the Plaintiffs' claims were governed by three-year statute of limitations and the claims accrued at the time the loan documents were executed. ... Therefore, all suits were filed after the running of the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year catchall limitations period for a bad-faith claim involving the mishandling of workers’ compensation benefits when no more specific limitations period applies.

Harper v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. · filed 2008-02-28

Because Mississippi has no statute of limitations specific to bad-faith mishandling of a worker’s compensation claim, our three-year catchall statute of limitations applies. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2003).

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period and bars claims when the claimant knew or, with reasonable diligence, should have discovered them before the period expired.

Pope v. Sorrentino · filed 2008-04-15

Pope filed suit on November 26, 2001; therefore, the relevant date for statute of limitations purposes is three years prior to that date, on November 26, 1998. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). Pope's claims, including fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and/or omission, are covered under section 15-1-49. Rankin v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 912 So.2d 725, 726(¶ 2) (Miss.2005). If Pope knew about his claims or with reasonable diligence could have discovered his claims prior to that date, then those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Subsection (1) requires actions with no other prescribed limitation period to be filed within three years after accrual; the period generally runs from the injury rather than its discovery.

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Willie Harried, e · filed 2012-05-29(1)

The applicable statute of limitations is the three-year period provided by § 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code. ... The relevant part of § 15-1-49 provides that: ... (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... Illinois Central’s claims thus accrued on February 13, 2004, the date when Peters and Garrett testified that they learned of Turner’s and Harried’s participation in Cosey.

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed, running from accrual of the cause of action.

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Willie Harried, e · filed 2012-06-13(1)

The applicable statute of limitations is the three-year period provided by § 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code. ... The statute of limitations normally runs from the time of the injury, not from its discovery.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, beginning when the plaintiff becomes aware of the injury or has enough information to know they were injured.

Jobe v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2021-11-09

In Mississippi, that statute is Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, which allows a litigant only three years to file such an action, and the statute begins to run “at the moment the plaintiff becomes aware he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know he has been injured.” ... Hence, his claims in the instant case regarding Harvoni treatment are barred by Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year Mississippi limitations period for § 1983 and Bivens claims.

Magee v. White · filed 2022-01-27

Claims brought under § 1983 or Bivens, are controlled by the applicable state statute of limitations. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) (§ 1983 claims); Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 590 (5th Cir. 1999) (Bivens action). The applicable Mississippi statute of limitations period is three years. See Rankin v. United States, 556 F. App’x 305, 310 (5th Cir. 2014) (Bivens action); James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (§ 1983 claims); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972), as amended.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions in Mississippi.

McGaughy v. Fordice · filed 2024-03-20

In Mississippi, that period is three years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49; Norwood v. City of Mendenhall, Miss., 630 F. App’x 245, 249 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012)). ... Based on the allegations in his complaint, McGaughy was aware of the alleged deficiencies at the time he was a pretrial detainee between the years of 1996 and 1998. As such, the three-year limitations period began to run at the latest, on December 31, 1998, and expired on December 31, 2001.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for claims governed by its general limitations period.

Harris v. Aurora Loan Services, a Wholly Owned Subsidiary of Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, Nationstar Mortgage, LL · filed 2026-06-23

However, these claims accrued no later than 2013 when Harris made these same allegations and stopped paying his mortgage. Harris did not file suit until 2022. Therefore, these claims are all barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2019); Anderson v. LaVere, 136 So. 3d 404, 411 (¶32) (Miss. 2014) (stating that section 15-1-49 applies to claims for breach of contract, conversion, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment); White v. White, 355 So. 3d 233, 240 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (stating that section 15-1-49 applies to claims for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment); McDonnel v. Miller, 655 F. App’x 229, 232 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that section 15-1-49 applies to an equitable estoppel claim to the extent “equitable estoppel is a separate cause of action under Mississippi law”).

Section 15-1-49's shortened three-year limitations period applies only to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1989, and does not apply retroactively to claims that accrued earlier.

First Bank v. Eastern Livestock Co. · filed 1995-05-17

Tort actions for conversion are governed by § 15-1-49, Mississippi’s residual statute of limitations. At the time plaintiffs claim accrued in May 1989, that statute provided a six-year limitations period. However, the Mississippi legislature amended the statute in 1989, reducing the limitations period from six to three years. The amended statute had an effective date of July 1, 1989, and included a “savings clause,” providing that the new three-year period was to apply “only to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1989.” ... The court recognizes that the legislature may effect retroactive application of a shortened limitations period by so providing in the statute itself, or otherwise clearly expressing its intent that the new period apply to causes of action that have already accrued. Here, however, upon amending the statute to shorten the limitations period to three years, the legislature expressed a contrary intent, and one which this court views as consistent with Mississippi case law on the point: the shorter period would apply “only to causes of action accruing” on or after the effective date of the statute. Eastern maintains that by omitting the savings language in the 1990 amendment, the legislature thereby “clearly expressed an intent” that the shorter limitations period apply to already-accrued actions, and “clearly intended” to make the three-year period retroactive. This court infers no such intent from the mere failure of the legislature to retain the savings language, and therefore, rejects Eastern’s position. Accordingly, the court concludes that First Bank’s conversion claim was timely commenced.

Section 15-1-49 was the general six-year limitations period for medical-malpractice actions before July 1, 1976, but was superseded by § 15-1-36 on that date.

Goleman v. Orgler · filed 2000-05-30

Prior to July 1, 1976, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.1995), a six year general statute of limitations governed medical malpractice actions. Id. On July 1, 1976, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.1995) was superseded by the enactment of a two year medical malpractice statute under Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (Supp.1999). Id. at 53-54. Therefore, Goleman's argument for the application of the general six year statute of limitations fails.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for claims of intentional interference with contract and wrongful discharge.

Wertz v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. · filed 2000-11-28

Pursuant to section 15-1-49, the statute of limitation for claims of intentional interference with contract and wrongful discharge, Wertz had three years within which to file his claims. ... Wertz's intentional interference with contract claim was filed within the three year period of limitation in section 15-1-49. Even after refiling the intentional interference with contract claim in the circuit court, it was within the three year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for actions with no other prescribed period, including fraud claims, but the predecessor six-year statute governs claims that accrued in 1972.

Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of US · filed 2003-03-20

In 1989, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49, derived from Miss.Code Ann. § 722 (1972), reduced the six-year statute of limitations to a three-year period. ... Now, in Mississippi a claim of fraud has a three-year statute of limitations in accordance with Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 concerning actions without a prescribed period of limitation. ... However, the trial court incorrectly applied a three-year statute of limitation pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 and found that the claim ran in 1975. In 1972 Miss.Code Ann. § 722 then provided for a six-year catch all statute of limitations for actions without a prescribed period of limitations. Consequently, the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs' claims ran in 1978, not 1975 as the trial court determined in its findings.

Section 15-1-49's six-year limitations period barred the owners' and payees' claims to insurance funds that had become due more than six years earlier.

Cole v. National Life Ins. Co. · filed 1989-09-13

Applying Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations found in § 15-1-49, Miss. Code Ann., the claims and remedies of the owners and payees to these funds became time-barred on or before June 30, 1982, which is one day prior to the effective date of Mississippi's Act.

At the time of this litigation, Section 15-1-49 supplied a six-year limitations period for the tort-based breach-of-loyalty claim and the written noncompetition claim.

Hill v. Southeastern Floor Covering · filed 1992-03-25

This portion of the action is not covered by § 15-1-29, but by § 15-1-49, which at the time of this litigation provided that the statute of limitations applicable was six (6) years. [2] The action accrued in 1983, the suit was filed in 1986, and this was well within the then six year period provided by the statute. Additionally, the alleged breach of the contract took place after a written contract was signed. Hill began to compete with Southeastern in violation of the written contract in 1985. The six (6) year period of § 15-1-49 applied to this claim. The action was filed in 1986 well within that period.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, and a timely filed complaint can prevent the claim from being time barred when a proper-party amendment relates back under Rule 15(c).

Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. · filed 1996-02-22

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 provides for a three-year period of limitations in personal injury claims. It states, in part: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitations is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... We therefore reverse and remand this case for a trial on the merits, finding that the amended complaint was not time barred and that the amended complaint did relate back to the date of the originally filed complaint.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for claims arising from contracts for professional services, barring recovery for services and expenses from a prior representation outside that period.

Logan and Bise v. Stewart · filed 1997-02-28

It is true that § 15-1-49, rather than § 15-1-29, applies to contracts for professional services. See Michael S. Fawer v. Evans, 627 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss. 1993). ... The prior representation ended March 10, 1989, and the three (3) years statute of limitations precludes a claim for any services or expenses for that period of representation. ... The chancellor was correct in concluding that the three (3) year statute of limitations applied to Logan & Bise's proof of claim filed against Stewart's estate with regard to services and expenses concluded in 1989.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for claims of legal malpractice.

Champluvier v. Sidney F. Beck, Jr. · filed 2003-05-09

The statute of limitations period for claims of legal malpractice is three years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (2004). Champluvier terminated Beck on August 16, 1999, and filed a bar complaint on September 1, 1999. Champluvier either knew or should have known of her lawyer’s deficient performance by this time.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for legal-malpractice claims.

Champluvier v. Beck · filed 2004-12-09

The statute of limitations period for claims of legal malpractice is three years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (2004). ... The circuit court was correct in holding that the three-year statute of limitations barred Champluvier's complaint and action.

The general statute of limitations for an heirship-determination action begins to run only after the putative intestate's death; the current limitations period is three years.

Mitchell v. Moore · filed 2017-11-30

Again, no cause of action for an heirship determination existed until after Travis's death, at which point Mississippi's general statute of limitations period (which is now three years instead of six) began to accrue.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims and related bad-faith-performance claims.

Woolfolk v. Rhoda · filed 2019-09-20

Under Mississippi law,4 breach of contract actions and actions asserting the related tort of bad faith performance are governed by the three-year limitations period set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions in Mississippi.

Staton v. Boggs · filed 2021-04-05

In Mississippi, that period is three years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49; Norwood v. City of Mendenhall, Miss., 630 F. App’x 245, 249 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Section 15-1-49 supplies Mississippi’s three-year general personal-injury limitations period, which federal courts borrow for § 1983 claims.

Mann v. Hall · filed 2021-09-17

Since there is no federal statute of limitations for civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal court must borrow the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period. ... The applicable Mississippi statute of limitations period is three years. See James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding Mississippi’s three-year general personal injury limitations period applicable to § 1983 cases); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972), as amended.

Section 15-1-49 supplies Mississippi’s three-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims.

Turnage v. Britton · filed 2022-03-21

In Mississippi, the limitations period for section 1983 claims is three years. Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2007) (incorporating Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, Mississippi’s general personal injury limitations period).

Section 15-1-49 provides the general limitations period for fraud and misrepresentation claims: six years for causes of action accruing before July 1, 1989, and three years for those accruing after that date.

Phillips v. New England Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1998-11-03

It should first be noted that Mississippi’s general statute of limitations applies to claims of fraud and misrepresentation. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972). Prior to July 1, 1989, all actions governed by the general statute were required to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued. After July 1, 1989, such actions were required to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.

Section 15-1-49 provides a six-year limitations period for fraud committed before July 1989 and a three-year period for fraud committed after July 1989.

Rainwater v. Lamar Life Insurance · filed 2002-06-27

It is likewise clear that the Mississippi statute of limitation which was six years for fraud committed prior to July 1989, and three years for fraud committed after July 1989 ran long before these suits were filed. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period does not begin until a contractual cause of action accrues; when a contract remains partly unperformed because a required property sale has not occurred, the period has not begun to run.

Bailey v. Estate of Kemp · filed 2007-03-22

Because Moses and Kemp wish to now gain the benefit of the remainder contract, the Baileys urge that we apply Section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code, which applies to contracts for professional services, and requires that actions based upon them commence within three years after the accrual of the cause of action. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003); In re Estate of Stewart, 732 So.2d 255, 258 (Miss.1999). ... All of these conditions occurred save one: the Florida property was never sold. Because a component of the contract remains to be fulfilled, the statute of limitations has not begun to run. ... Because Bailey has not yet sold the property, the statute of limitations has not run. See Old Ladies Home, supra (limitations period does not begin to run upon nonperformance of contractual duty until the cause of action accrues).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Mississippi.

Ricks v. City of Winona · filed 2012-03-12

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in Mississippi is three years. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. ... The Court finds that the claim is time-barred under both federal and state law. The destruction of the fuel containment area occurred in 2006. As previously stated, the statute of limitations imposed by Section 1983 is three years; the statute of limitations imposed by state law is one year. Because the incident at issue occurred in 2006 and this claim was brought in 2011, the claim is time-barred under both Section 1983 and state law.

Section 15-1-49’s three-year period for these wrongful-death claims began when the fatal injury occurred.

Marshall v. Kansas City Southern Railways Company · filed 2006-01-10

The statute of limitations for all claims began to run July 10, ... 1998, when Shepard was fatally injured in the train collision.

Section 15-1-49 gives these wrongful-death claims three years from the date of the fatal injury to be filed, subject to the savings statute.

Marshall v. Kansas City Southern Railways Co. · filed 2009-03-05

The statute of limitations for all claims began to run July 10, 1998, when Shepard was fatally injured in the train collision. The Beneficiaries filed their complaint on July 20, 1998, well within the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 supplied the six-year limitations period applicable at the time to heirship proceedings, beginning when an heir knows their status has been questioned.

Matter of Heirship of McLeod · filed 1987-04-22

As there is no specific statute of limitation applicable to heirship proceedings, our general statute, Mississippi Code Annotated, § 15-1-49 (1972), providing for a six year limitation applies. However, as an heir is not required to bring a suit to establish his rights unless and until there is a question concerning his status as an heir, this statute does not begin to run until that heir knows his status has been questioned.

Under the version applied here, § 15-1-49 provides a six-year limit for heirship proceedings that begins when the heir knows their status has been questioned.

Craft v. Price · filed 1987-04-22

As there is no specific statute of limitation applicable to heirship proceedings, our general statute, Mississippi Code Annotated, § 15-1-49 (1972), providing for a six year limitation applies. However, as an heir is not required to bring a suit to establish his rights unless and until there is a question concerning his status as an heir, this statute does not begin to run until that heir knows his status has been questioned.

Section 15-1-49’s six-year catch-all limitations period applies to Mississippi common-law fraud claims arising before 1989 when no other limitations period is prescribed.

Fortenberry v. Foxworth Corp. · filed 1993-06-09

The statute of limitations period applicable for common law fraud arising prior to 1989 in Mississippi is six years pursuant to Mississippi’s “catch-all” statute of limitations, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, as below reproduced: ... All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed, shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.

The pre-1990 version of § 15-1-49 imposed a six-year limitations period for actions without another prescribed period, so claims arising from the 1986 policy sale accrued then and expired in 1992.

Lady v. Jefferson Pilot Life Insurance · filed 2001-03-28

Therefore, this court agrees with the defendants that the true terms of the policy were not inherently undetectable. Consequently, the plaintiff may not assert that the statute of limitations was tolled until he later discovered the terms of the policy to be something other than what he initially believed. ... Therefore, based on the foregoing authority, this court concludes that the plaintiffs claims contained in his complaint against Billy Joe Ladd relate to an alleged one-time act or omission relating to the sale of the policy in question and do not assert that the defendant was involved in continual unlawful acts. Under these circumstances, the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs claims against Billy Joe Ladd expired in 1992, about eight years before the instant complaint was filed.

Section 15-1-49 gives a three-year limitations period for contract actions, including contracts for professional services, and the period does not begin until the cause of action accrues; an unfulfilled contractual condition means the period has not yet run.

Bailey v. Andrew T. Moses, Jr. · filed 2005-07-15

The contract detailed how the Bailey family would retain and pay for the professional services of Kemp and Moses in their quest to sell property. Because Moses and Kemp wish to now gain the benefit of the remainder contract, the Baileys urge that we apply Section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code, which applies to contracts for professional services, and requires that actions based upon them commence within three years after the accrual of the cause of action. ... Because a component of the contract remains to be fulfilled, the statute of limitations has not begun to run. ... Because Bailey has not yet sold the property, the statute of limitations has not run.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period does not bar claims as a matter of law when the plaintiff lacked notice that the increased insurance charge resulted from the lender's receipt of fees and commissions.

Gipson v. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. · filed 2002-11-07

The court rejects Fleet’s statute of limitations argument. The court does recognize that plaintiff was sent notice more than three years prior to the date on which he filed suit advising that insurance was being placed on his property, that the insurance cost more and that it provided less coverage than he might otherwise pay. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (establishing three-year statute of limitations). However, plaintiff argues that the letters did not. give him notice of, and he could not otherwise have known that the reason the insurance charge had increased was Fleet’s receipt of fees and commissions. In the court’s opinion, this circumstance precludes an adjudication as a matter of law that plaintiffs claims against Fleet are time-barred.

Section 15-1-49’s three-year limitations period applies to breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims; repeated independent breaches of a continuing duty can keep a claim timely.

Cascade Capital Group, LLC v. Livingston Holdings, LLC · filed 2020-03-06

Section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code – Mississippi’s catch-all three-year statute of limitations – applies to the counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty against Cascade. ... The breaches of fiduciary duty may have originated from the formation of the Note (i.e., they might not have occurred but for the formation of the Note), but they are subsequent independent breaches of a continuing duty, not merely additional harm caused by the formation of the Note. Accordingly, Livingston, Chestnut, and Sharpe’s counterclaims are not time-barred.

At the time relevant here, Section 15-1-49's general limitations period governed an independent bad-faith tort claim rather than the three-year limitations period for actions on unwritten contracts.

Hurst v. Southwest Miss. Legal Services Corp. · filed 1992-12-10

The Hursts alleged the independent tort of bad faith, a matter covered by the six-year general limitation found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 supplies Mississippi's residual limitations period for § 1983 personal-property deprivation claims; the six-year version applies to claims arising before the 1990 amendment, while the amended version provides three years.

Bankston v. Pass Road Tire Center, Inc. · filed 1992-12-31

In Mississippi, the applicable statute is Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Prior to March 12, 1990, this statute provided for a six year limitation period. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972). After that date, the Legislature amended the statute to provide for a three year limitation. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1991 Supp.). In the case sub judice, the six-year limitation period would apply as the claim arose under the six-year statute, and begin to run sometime in 1984 when Bankston was either deprived of his tires or arrested. The action would not be barred until six years later in 1990. As Bankston filed suit on August 2, 1985, his § 1983 claim was obviously timely commenced.

Section 15-1-49's general three-year limitations period does not govern a claim against a political subdivision arising after the Sovereign Immunity Act took effect; the Act's limitations provisions govern instead.

Chamberlin v. City of Hernando · filed 1998-06-18

The appellants argue that Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, the general three-year statute of limitations, applies to the case at bar. For the reasons before stated, this Court holds that § 11-46-3 sets forth the intent of the Legislature that the State and its political subdivisions be immune from liability beginning April 1, 1993. Therefore, since the event giving rise to this cause of action occurred April 25, 1993, clearly after the Act went into effect, § 11-46-3 and not § 15-1-49 governs the case now before this Court.

For injuries not otherwise provided for, the earlier six-year version of § 15-1-49 applies to causes of action accruing before July 1, 1989; the amended version reduced the period to three years and applies only to later-accruing causes.

Sims v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1999-03-31

. Mississippi's general personal injury statute for injuries not otherwise provided for, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, once provided for a six-year limitation period. The six-year period was reduced to three years effective March 12, 1990. However, it is the earlier version of the statute that applies in the instant case, because the amended version applies only to causes of action accruing after July 1, 1989.

Section 15-1-49 applies when no other limitations period is prescribed and generally requires an action to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

USF&G CO. v. Conservatorship of Melson · filed 2002-03-07

The applicable statute of limitation to the case at hand is Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 is Mississippi's general "catch all" statute of limitations. ... Since there is no specific statute of limitations for claims on written contracts, § 15-1-49 therefore applies. ... Thus, the claims of O'Quinn as Melson's conservator, or of Melson herself, are subject to the three year limitations pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 is the general three-year catch-all limitations period, but it does not govern a wrongful-death claim predicated on an intentional tort when a specific one-year period applies.

Lee v. Thompson · filed 2003-09-11

We note that the parties in this case have concluded that the applicable statute of limitation is that found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995), the general three-year statute of limitation applied to "all claims for which no other period of limitations is prescribed." However, a wrongful death action, since it is predicated on an underlying tort, is limited by the statute of limitation applicable to the tort resulting in the wrongful death. In this case, the underlying tort is one of assault and battery (murder), which cause is limited to a one-year period. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (1995); see Veselits ex rel. Cruthirds v. Veselits, 653 F.Supp. 1570, 1575 (S.D.Miss.), aff'd on other grounds, 824 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1987). 749 So.2d at 1042. There can thus be no doubt that Lee's wrongful death action based on the alleged intentional criminal acts committed upon the person of Lawson by the Coahoma County defendants, inasmuch as it is predicated on an intentional tort, is governed by the one-year statute of limitation.

Section 15-1-49 generally imposes a three-year limitations period on actions lacking another prescribed period, but claims accruing in 1972 were governed by the then-applicable six-year catch-all statute.

Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United · filed 2002-03-05

However, the trial court incorrectly applied a three-year statute of limitation pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 and found that the claim ran in 1975. In 1972 Miss. Code Ann. § 722 then provided for a six-year catch all statute of limitations for actions without a prescribed period of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 is a three-year catchall limitations period that applies only when no other statute prescribes a limitations period.

Hubbard v. BancorpSouth Bank · filed 2013-05-14

It is clear from the plain language of Section 15-1-49 that it does not apply in this case. Section 15-1-49 states in relevant part: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... In this case, other statutes of limitations are prescribed for unpaid promissory notes, specifically Sections 15-1-23 and 75-3-118, and these are the controlling statutes.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims, and a contract cannot shorten that period into a private one-year statute of limitations.

Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown · filed 2005-10-24

Accordingly, this Court has refused to enforce an admissions contract, such as in this case, which attempts to modify the statute of limitations. In Pitts, the admissions agreement limited the legal action to within one year, in contradiction to the three-year statute of limitations, and we held that the attempt to create a private statute of limitations was oppressive and unconscionable. Id. at 558. Consistent with Pitts, this section was properly struck as unconscionable by the trial court.

Section 15-1-49 provides a general three-year limitations period that bars a claim filed more than three years after the claim accrues.

Transfer of Structured Settlement Payment Rights Ex Rel. Saucier v. Saucier · filed 2016-12-13

The parties agree that RSL’s claim for damages is subject to the general three-year statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2012). In 2009, RSL purportedly advanced Saucier $6,500, purchased him a television, and paid a Mississippi state tax Hen on Saucier’s behalf. RSL’s damages accrued in 2009, and the statute of limitations on the claim ran in 2012. Thus, RSL’s “Motion for Leave to Amend to Assert a Complaint for Damages,” filed on February 24, 2015, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, section 15-1-49, and the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a general three-year limitations period on actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed.

The Door Shop, Inc. v. Alcorn County Electric Power Association · filed 2018-11-08

Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 provides a general three-year statute of limitations to "all actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed."

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period that may operate as only a partial defense when a claim includes damages accruing within the limitations period.

West v. City of Holly Springs, Mississippi · filed 2019-05-28

In its reply brief, defendant argues, for the first time, that Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 bars Perkins’ breach of contract claim. [Reply brief at 11]. In the court’s view, defendant should have raised his argument in its initial summary judgment brief so that Perkins would have had an opportunity to address it in his response. This court will address this issue, if necessary, at the directed verdict and/or jury instruction phase of trial, but it appears at this juncture that the three-year statute of limitations would constitute, at most, a partial defense.2 In its reply brief, defendant notes that Perkins received his promotion in February 2013 and that it was not until December 5, 2017 that he amended his original complaint to include his promotion pay claim. [Reply brief at 11]. While these facts may well require that the jury be instructed to only consider Perkins’ claim for lost promotion pay which accrued after December 5, 2014, the fact remains that he has continued to work for the city as a police sergeant after that day. This court is therefore unable to conclude, at least at this juncture, that the three-year statute of limitations provides a complete defense to Perkins’ promotion claim.

Section 15-1-49 supplies Mississippi’s three-year general statute of limitations, which the court applied to bar Hampton’s federal claims as untimely.

Hampton v. Tunica County Mississippi, Municipal Corporation, Collectivley Individually · filed 2020-03-10

See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, which sets forth Mississippi’s general statute of limitations. ... He filed the present case on May 16, 2019, over eleven years after that deadline expired.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period, and a claim accrues when the enforceable right to sue arises.

MIC Life Insurance Company v. Bettye Hicks · filed 1998-06-19

The appropriate period of limitations arises from the general three year statute. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 1995). The supreme court has held that a cause of action accrues "only when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim; that is, when the right to sue becomes vested." Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So. 2d 1117, 1121 (Miss. 1992). A cause of action for breach of a life insurance contract accrues on the date of the breach, for example, on the date that the insurance company refused to pay, and not on the date of the decedent's death. Young v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 103, 107 (Miss. 1991).

Section 15-1-49 supplied a six-year limitations period for this action when the cause of action arose in 1987; the Legislature later reduced the period to three years effective July 1, 1989.

EB, Inc. v. Smith · filed 2000-02-29

At the time EB’s cause of action arose, the applicable statute' of limitations was six years. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972) (controlling all actions for which no limitations period is prescribed). Effective July 1,1989, the Mississippi Legislature amended § 15-1-49 so that the period of limitations was reduced to three years.

Section 15-1-49 provides a general three-year limitations period for claims when no more specific limitations period applies.

Alexander v. Taylor · filed 2006-05-09

Consistent with these precedents, we hold that the general limitations statute applies that requires suit to be brought within three-years of the claim. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for claims with no specifically prescribed limitations period.

Hancock v. Watson · filed 2007-01-09

Alienation of affection is an intentional tort with no specifically prescribed statute of limitations; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations applies to alienation of affection claims.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for all causes of action unless a more specific statute applies; for these insurance-contract claims, the period runs after the insurer specifically refuses to pay.

Hood v. Central United Life Insurance · filed 2009-09-30

Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49, which the court originally relied upon, creates a three years statute of limitations applicable to all causes of action unless a more specific statute applies. There is no specific statute relating to insurance contracts. ... As there is no specific statute of limitations for these types of claims, a party would have three years to file suit after an insurer had denied their claim.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on fraud claims.

Sullivan v. Tullos · filed 2007-02-08

In Mississippi, a claim of fraud has a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for antitrust claims, and the court declined to toll that period under the continuing-violation doctrine.

In re Opana ER Antritrust Litigation · filed 2016-02-10

Kansas and Mississippi provide that antitrust claims are subject to a three-year limitations period. ... In light of the unsettled nature of this doctrine, and the absence of guidance from the states in question, the Court declines to toll the statute of limitations for EPPs’ antitrust claims under Kansas and Mississippi law. These claims are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

Section 15-1-49 gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period, with accrual tied to when the claim becomes enforceable and discovery of injury potentially presenting a fact issue for the jury.

Covington County Bank v. Magee · filed 2015-10-15

Mississippi Code Section 15 — 1— 49’s three-year statute of limitations applies to conversion claims.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims, subject to tolling rules governing filing and service.

McNair v. J.F.M., Inc. · filed 2021-07-27

The statute of limitations for a negligence claim in Mississippi is three years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2019). “The filing of an action tolls the statute of limitations until the expiration of the 120-day service period.” Triple C Transport Inc. v. Dickens, 870 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (¶32) (Miss. 2004) (quoting Watters v. Stripling, 675 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 1996)). However, if “the plaintiff fails to serve process on the defendant within that 120-day period, the statute of limitations automatically begins to run again when that period expires.” Id. at 1200 (¶34) (quoting Holmes v. Coast Transit Auth., 815 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (¶7) (Miss. 2002)). “In order to further toll the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must . . . refile the complaint before the statute of limitations ends, or show good cause for failing to serve process on the defendant within that 120-day period; otherwise, dismissal is proper.”

Section 15-1-49(1) generally gives negligence claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Unruh v. Johnson · filed 2025-03-13(1)

Under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49, negligence claims generally are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on negligence claims.

Spencer · filed 2026-01-30

In this case, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. A negligence claim accrues when “all elements of the tort are present.” Mac Long Homes, LLC v. Olvera Constr., LLC, 385 So. 3d 835, 840 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citation modified). The elements of negligence under Mississippi are duty, breach, causation, and damages. Id. Looking at the [42] Second Amended Complaint’s facts, the latest potential negligence claim occurred when Shellpoint allegedly damaged Plaintiff through its filing of the APOC in October 2021. Thus, the latest date the negligence claim could accrue occurred in October 2021. Three years after October 2021 is October 2024. Plaintiff filed the [42] Second Amended Complaint in June 2025. Therefore, the statute of limitations has run for the negligence claim, absent relation back or other doctrines tolling the statute.

Section 15-1-49 provides Mississippi’s six-year limitations period for § 1981 employment-discrimination claims arising before July 1, 1976.

Jones v. Birdsong · filed 1980-06-02

In Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1145 (N.D.Miss.1976), we held that Mississippi’s general six-year limitation period contained in § 15-1-49 ... applies to actions brought under § 1981, although claims for backpay would be barred by the then three-year statute of limitations of § 15-1-29. ... As to those claims arising before July 1, 1976, however, Walton applies and the six-year statute governs.

Before Gates, Mississippi’s residual six-year limitations period applied to § 1983 actions against Mississippi law-enforcement officers.

Stewart v. Russell · filed 1986-02-05

The decision is premised upon application of the Chevron factors and the finding that there was clear past precedent in this circuit for the application of Mississippi’s residual six-year statute of limitations in § 1983 actions against law enforcement officers.

Section 15-1-49 gives fraud claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues; a fraudulent-inducement claim accrues when the fraud-induced sale is completed.

Warren v. HORACE MANN LIFE INSURANCE CO. · filed 2006-05-30

A cause of action for fraud is subject to the three-year statute of limitations set out in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 850 So.2d 78, 82(¶ 12) (Miss.2003). This three year period begins to run once the cause of action accrues. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). A claim for fraudulent inducement accrues upon the completion of the sale induced by the fraud. Stephens, 850 So.2d at 82(¶ 13). ... Warren agreed to purchase the first policy on March 24, 1993. It was not delivered to her until two weeks later. The policy did not go into effect until May 1. Thus, the sale was complete on May 1, 1993. Warren had until May 1, 1996 to file her fraud claim. Warren filed the lawsuit in December of 2003. Unless Warren can establish that the limitations period was tolled, the circuit judge was correct to find her claim time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for Mississippi § 1983 claims, while federal law governs when those claims accrue.

Walker v. Epps · filed 2008-07-15

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is determined by the forum state’s statute for personal injury actions. ... In Mississippi, § 1983 suits are governed by the general statute of limitations, which requires the commencement of an action within three years of the action’s accrual. ... While the State statute of limitations is borrowed for purposes of a § 1983 action, federal law governs when a cause of action accrues. ... In the absence of circuit precedent that would prohibit its application, the Court determines that it must find that Mississippi’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs this § 1983 suit.

Before its July 1, 1989 amendment, § 15-1-49 supplied a six-year residual limitations period for § 1983 actions.

Hill v. Bank of Falkner (In re Hill) · filed 1990-03-16

For purposes of this proceeding, causes of action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be governed by Mississippi’s six year residual statute of limitations, i.e., § 15-1-49, Miss.Code Ann. (1972).

Section 15-1-49 supplied a six-year limitations period for strict-liability tort actions at the relevant time, and Mississippi's limitations period governed the action.

Patton v. MacK Trucks, Inc. · filed 1989-12-13

Shewbrooks and Williams make clear that this action is subject only to this state's limitations statutes. [1] At the time strict liability tort actions were subject to a six-year limitations period. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972) [2] see Ford Motor Company v. Broadway, 374 So.2d 207, 209 (Miss. 1979).

Section 15-1-49 supplied a six-year limitations period for tort actions filed in Mississippi when the claim accrued before the statute was amended to three years.

Ford v. State Farm Ins. Co. · filed 1993-10-07

Thus, Mississippi's six (6) year statute of limitations for tort actions, Miss. Code § 15-1-49 (1972) [3] , applies to a Mississippi lawsuit even though the tort occurred in Louisiana.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for general personal-injury claims.

Busick v. McGinty · filed 1995-11-07

The Mississippi statute for general personal injury is three years.

Section 15-1-49 requires negligence actions to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Mildred Ware and Jimmy Ware v. Brown · filed 2024-06-11

Negligence actions must be commenced within three years of the accrual of the cause of action. Blanchard v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 375 So. 3d 723, 731 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2019)). Because our State allows three years to file a complaint for a negligence action, the Wares filed their action well within the statute of limitations.

Under its former six-year version, § 15-1-49 does not govern construction claims covered by § 15-1-41’s ten-year limitation.

Deville Furniture Co. v. Jesco, Inc. · filed 1983-02-07

... sustained a motion for summary judgment by the defendants, dismissing the action as barred by the six-year statute of limitation, § 15-1-49, Miss.Code Ann. (1972). The answer of the Mississippi Supreme Court makes this ruling incorrect.

Section 15-1-49's then-six-year limitation applies to strict products liability claims for personal injury and begins when the injury is sustained.

Ford Motor Co. v. Broadway · filed 1979-02-14

While there is some doubt that our catch-all six-year statute meets these tests, since Mississippi has no special statute of limitations in strict products liability in tort actions, we hold that the six-year statute applies and, in personal injury actions, the statute begins to run from the time that injuries are sustained.

For claims with no other limitations period involving latent injury or disease, subsection (2) delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards · filed 1990-12-12(2)

We affirm the Circuit Court's finding that a discovery rule exists in conjunction with § 15-1-49 (1972) in the case of a negligence or products liability cause of action involving latent disease. To alleviate any possible confusion, we find that the discovery rule adopted is identical to the rule provided in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Supp. 1990). The cause of action accrues and the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff can reasonably be held to have knowledge of the injury or disease.

Section 15-1-49 suspends the limitations period for latent injury or disease only when no other limitations period is prescribed.

Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese · filed 1993-08-04

The plaintiff points out that under Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 statutes of limitations are suspended where the injury or disease is latent. However, § 15-1 — 49 applies only “in actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed.” In this case these torts are covered by, § 15-1-35, the statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts. Moreover, aside from counsel’s argument that the plaintiff was unaware of his trauma until visiting a psychologist, the Court has absolutely no evidence to substantiate a claim of latent injury. Consequently, even if § 15-1-35 did not apply, this Court could not find that the statute of limitations was tolled under § 15-1 — 49. There is simply no evidence of latency on this record.

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual of the limitations period for latent injury until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the injury, and the court applied that exception to inherently undiscoverable property contamination.

Donald v. Amoco Production Company · filed 1997-09-09(2)

Section 15-1-49 states: ... (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. ... Therefore, we conclude that the lower court erred in failing to apply the discovery exception.

Section 15-1-49's limitations period for asbestos-related injury begins when each separate disease is discovered and diagnosed; an asbestosis claim filed within three years of diagnosis is timely despite an earlier lung-cancer diagnosis.

In Re Asbestos Products Liability Litig.(no. Vi) · filed 2011-05-06

In summary, under Mississippi law, because the pathology and manifestation of asbestosis and cancer are distinct and separate, a plaintiff's claim for injuries due to asbestos exposure accrues upon the discovery and diagnosis of each separate and distinct disease. ... Regardless, Plaintiff's lung cancer and asbestosis are "separate and distinct diseases." Gentry, 606 So.2d at 1122. A diagnosis of lung cancer followed by a diagnosis of asbestosis is clearly not a "seamless progression of a single pathology," but rather two separate diseases, manifested at two separate times, giving rise to two separate causes of action. Therefore, the principles of fairness and judicial economy espoused by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Id. at 1123, are best served by the application of the two-disease rule to this case, regardless of the order of diagnoses.

For actions with no other limitation period involving latent injury or disease, the three-year limitations period does not begin until the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury; the discovery rule does not displace the statute of repose for an improvement to real property.

Wayne E. Ferrell, Jr. v. River City Roofing, Inc. · filed 2003-08-11(2)

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2003) states: ... (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. ... In Moore v. Jesco, Inc., 531 So. 2d 815, 817 (Miss. 1988), this Court held that an “improvement to real property” is not a “product,” and therefore, “an action based on strict products liability will not lie.” ... This issue is without merit.

Subsection (2) delays accrual of an action involving latent injury or disease until the plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury; latent injury is undiscoverable by reasonable methods, and accrual does not require absolute certainty or an expert opinion.

PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery · filed 2004-05-20(2)

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) states “[i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involved latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ... The term “latent injury” while seemingly vague does have definitive boundaries. For an injury to be latent it must be undiscoverable by reasonable methods. ... Because there is no bright line rule, the specific facts of the case will determine whether the plaintiff knew or reasonable should have known that an injury existed. ... Considering Lowery’s actions through the lense of this Court’s recent rulings we hold that Lowery “knew” of her injury on October 1, 1999. Moreover, using the standards outlined in Hayes, Quensel and Sanders, Lowery did not require absolute certainty nor an expert opinion to vest the right to a cause of action under this state’s products liability statute.

For latent injury or disease, subsection (2) delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or should reasonably have discovered, the injury, without requiring knowledge of its cause.

Rebekah Angle v. Koppers, Inc. · filed 2008-08-28(2)

We find that the plain language of the statute supports Defendants’ argument that the cause of action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause. ... No provision of Section 15-1-49 provides that a plaintiff must have knowledge of the cause of the injury before the cause of action accrues, initiating the running of the statute of limitations. Therefore, we find that Angle’s claims are time-barred under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2), as she filed her complaint in 2006, approximately five years after her discovery of the last injury.

For latent injury or disease, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should discover, the injury, without needing to know its cause.

The Lincoln Electric Company v. McLemore · filed 2008-11-26(2)

As clarified in Angle, Section 15-1-49 does not require a plaintiff to know the cause of the injury before accrual of the cause of action. ... Under Angle, knowledge of the cause of an injury is irrelevant to the analysis. ... The inquiry is when the party knew or should have known of an injury. Id.

For a latent injury or disease, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury or disease—not when the plaintiff discovers its cause.

Hewitt v. WYETH, INC. · filed 2011-07-07(2)

Likewise in this case, the proper inquiry is the date of Hewitt’s discovery that she had breast cancer, i.e., her injury or disease, not the date on which she purportedly discovered a causative relationship between hormone replacement drugs and the cancer.

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual of a claim involving latent injury until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury, even if the claimant has not yet discovered its cause.

Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Willie Harried, e · filed 2012-05-29(2)

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual until a party discovers its injury, regardless of whether he has also discovered the cause.

For latent injury or disease, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury—not its cause.

Angle v. Koppers, Inc. · filed 2010-05-27(2)

Section 15-1-49(2) provides a discovery rule that delays the accrual of the cause of action until the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered a latent injury or disease.

Subsection (2) delays accrual of an action involving latent injury or disease until the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury.

Reeg v. Murray Bert Keel, Jr. · filed 2015-08-18(2)

The discovery rule is set out in section 15-1-49(2). It states, “In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” ... We find the circuit judge was correct that there was nothing “secretive or inherently undiscoverable” about the alleged acts or wrongdoing. ... Because the alleged wrongful acts were physical and Reeg was aware of the wrongdoing when it happened, her claimed injury is not “latent.” So the discovery rule does not apply.

For claims involving latent injury or disease, the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury.

Williams v. Clark Sand Company, Inc. · filed 2015-10-01(2)

The latent-injury discovery rule of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2) should be applied to the statute of repose extending corporate life beyond dissolution.

For a latent injury or disease claim, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury; when that occurred may be a jury question if disputed.

Ridgway Lane & Associates, Inc. v. Marcus J. and Patricia Byrd Family Trust · filed 2016-03-03(1)

Mississippi law tolls the general three-year statute of limitations for actions involving “latent injury or disease” until such time as “the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1)-(2) (Rev. 2012). This Court has held that causes of action accrue “upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.”

For latent injury or disease, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or, with reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury.

F & S Abrasive Company, Inc. v. Stringfellow · filed 2019-02-28(2)

Under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49, a plaintiff’s cause of action for a latent injury or disease accrues at the point at which he discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury.

Subsection (2) delays accrual of a cause of action involving latent injury until the plaintiff has discovered, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

Lewis v. Loftin · filed 2019-04-25(2)

Mississippi’s discovery rule provides that in cases “which involve latent injury . . . the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.”

For latent injury or disease, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

American Optical Corporation v. Robert Lee Rankin, Jr. · filed 2017-05-18(2)

Under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49, a plaintiffs cause of action for a latent injury or disease accrues at the point at which he discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury.

For latent-injury or disease actions, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers the injury; subsection (2) does not apply when the injury was immediately known.

Robert Hammons, Jr. v. C. Wade Navarre, II · filed 2018-06-07(2)

The cause of action accrues upon the discovery of the injury. This is not a case that would implicate subsection two of Section 15-1-49. Hammons's injury was known to him immediately.

For latent injuries, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should discover, the injury; a genuine dispute about that discovery date is for the jury.

Gloria Baker, Connie Cornwall, Carolyn Greer, Daniel Morris, and Judy Travis v. Raymond James & Associates Inc., Logan B · filed 2020-04-07(2)

Section 15-1-49(2) sets forth a latent-injury discovery-rule exception to the three-year limitations period, as follows: “In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). “Under Section 15-1-49(2), “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run once plaintiffs are on inquiry that a potential claim exists.” ... “discovery is an issue of fact to be decided by a jury when there is a genuine dispute.” ... we find that Savell’s wrongdoing was “inherently undiscoverable” and that there exists a genuine issue of material fact whether the plaintiffs knew, or should have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence, that they had an “actionable injury” before 2016 when the plaintiffs assert that they first learned “Savell and Morgan Keegan might have violated the law and industry rules.” ... Based upon the foregoing, we find that the circuit court erred in awarding summary judgment in the defendants’ favor based upon statute-of-limitations grounds with respect to the plaintiffs’ common-law claims.

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual of a claim involving latent injury until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury.

Mac Long Homes, LLC and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company a/s/o Mac Long Homes, LLC v. Olvera Construction, LLC · filed 2024-05-07(2)

“[I]f the claim is one that ‘involves latent injury,’ then ‘the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.’” Id. (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2)). We define a latent injury “as one where the plaintiff will be precluded from discovering harm or injury because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable nature of the wrongdoing in question or when it is unrealistic to expect a layman to perceive the injury at the time of the wrongful act.” W. World Ins. Grp., 372 So. 3d at 468 (¶18) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ... And through reasonable diligence in its supervisory capacity, Mac Long should have been able to discover any faulty masonry work that Olvera performed on the exterior patio fireplace at issue. We therefore can discern no latent injury implicated by Mac Long’s breach-of-contract claim against Olvera.

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual of an action involving latent injury or disease until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury; absolute certainty or an expert opinion is not required.

PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery · filed 2005-08-18(2)

Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) states "[i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed *51 and which involved latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury." Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ... Considering Lowery's actions through the lense of this Court's recent rulings we hold that Lowery "knew" of her injury on October 1, 1999. Moreover, using the standards outlined in Hayes, Quesnel and Sanders, Lowery did not require absolute certainty nor an expert opinion to vest the right to a cause of action under this state's products liability statute.

For a latent injury or disease, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury or disease, not when the causal relationship is discovered.

Wells Ex Rel. Wells v. Radiator Specialty Co. · filed 2006-02-09(2)

Subsection 2 of § 15-1-49 codifies the common law “discovery rule” in latent injury claims. Under this subsection, the limitations period does not begin to run until an injured party has discovered, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the latent injury, or in this case, the disease.

For latent injury or disease, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, not when the plaintiff discovers the injury's cause.

Lincoln Electric Co. v. McLemore · filed 2010-12-09(2)

¶ 15. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2), a plaintiffs cause of action accrues at the point at which he discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. ... ¶ 16. While McLemore’s November 2008 trial preceded this Court’s most recent application of Section 15-1-49(2), and the litigants and trial court did not have the benefit of this Court’s decision in Angle v. Koppers, Inc., 42 So.3d 1 (Miss.2010), the case nonetheless is applicable to this appeal. In Angle, this Court determined that the plain language of Section 15-1-49 supports an interpretation “that the cause of action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.” Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).

For latent injury or disease claims with no other limitations period, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the injury, not when the plaintiff discovers its cause.

Phillips 66 Co. v. Lofton · filed 2012-06-07(2)

In cases of latent injury, such as the instant case, Section 15-1-49(2) provides: In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev.2003). ... This Court has determined that the plain language of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2) supports an interpretation “that the cause of action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.” Lincoln Elec. Co., 54 So.3d at 836 (citing Angle v. Koppers, Inc., 42 So.3d 1, 5 (Miss.2010)). ... Discovery of an injury “is an issue of fact to be decided by a jury when there is a genuine dispute.” Weathers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 So.3d 688, 692 (Miss.2009) (quoting Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 167 (Miss.1999)).

Section 15-1-49(2) provides that a latent-injury claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury itself, not when the plaintiff discovers its cause.

Alexander v. Wyeth · filed 2012-10-11(2)

However, as hers was a latent injury, her cause of action was subject to the latent injury discovery rule of § 15-1-49(2), pursuant to which her cause of action did not accrue until she discovered the injury, i.e., upon her breast cancer diagnosis.

For actions involving latent injury or disease where no other limitations period applies, § 15-1-49(2) delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers or, with reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury.

Borne v. Estate of Carraway · filed 2013-07-18(2)

The chancellor applied the discovery rule, which provides that “[i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev.2003). ... Because the chancellor found that Sylvia first had learned of the sinkhole in April 2004, the chancellor did not manifestly err in finding that the complaint was timely filed under the discovery rule. Furthermore, the chancellor did not apply the incorrect legal standard because she found, based on the facts presented, that the injury was discovered in 2004. Such a factual determination by a chancellor is reviewed for manifest error, and we find none here. The chancellor applied the correct legal standard for determining when the clock started running on the Carraway’s claims, and we cannot say the chancellor abused her discretion or that her determination was manifestly erroneous.

Subsection (2) delays accrual of a claim involving latent injury until the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

Aldridge v. Aldridge · filed 2014-03-18(2)

¶28. We affirm the chancellor’s decision, although based on different reasoning. We conclude that the statute of limitations began to run at the earliest on July 21, 2008. Brian and TBAAM are correct that the earliest date that Florence’s claims could have accrued is September 26, 2006. However, the statute makes a specific exception for latent injuries. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ... “In actions ... which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ... ¶ 30. Thus, we conclude that this is a latent-injury case. As a result, “the focus is on the time that the [plaintiff] discovers, or should have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that he [or she] probably has an actionable injury.” Ill. Cent., 682 F.3d at 393 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Florence discovered that she “probably” had a claim on July 21, 2008, when Tetter expressed concern. The initial complaint and two amended complaints were filed and served within three years of July 21, 2008, and, thus, were timely. As a result, we find no merit to this issue.

For a latent injury, a genuine factual dispute over when the plaintiff discovered the injury and the limitations period began must be decided by a jury.

Cannon v. Mid-South X-Ray Co. · filed 1999-02-23(2)

Since a genuine issue of material facts exists surrounding the date of accrual in this cause of action, the grant of summary judgment was improper. It is within the province of the jury to decide the time that Cannon's cause of action accrued since that fact is in dispute.

Section 15-1-49 requires actions with no other limitations period to be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues; claims accrued when the plaintiffs received and executed loan agreements containing disclosures, so later-filed claims were barred.

Andrus v. Ellis · filed 2003-08-18

It is undisputed that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2003) is controlling in the instant case. ... Section 15-1-49 provides in part: ... (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... Applying Wells, the claims in the instant case are barred. ... Accordingly, the Plaintiffs are charged with notice and therefore all claims accrued at the time the loan agreements were executed.

For actions without another limitations period, § 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period beginning when the cause of action accrues.

Bullard v. Guardian Life Insurance Company · filed 2005-04-01(1)

This Court finds that in 1990 Bullard was without a cause of action, if as he claims he had no knowledge of being involved in an alleged fraudulent scheme, but more importantly, because he had suffered no damage. In the absence of damage, no litigable event arose. Bullard’s cause of action against Guardian did not accrue or occur pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. Section 15-1-49(1) until the Prathers filed suit against him in 2000. As Bullard’s claim against Guardian did not accrue until 2000, Bullard timely filed a cross-claim in 2002, within the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 requires a three-year limitations period to run from accrual, and when injury discovery is disputed, accrual cannot be resolved as a matter of law before the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury.

Fletcher v. Lyles · filed 2007-04-16(1)

In analyzing a statute-of-limitations issue under Section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code, this Court has held that “the statute of limitations commences upon discovery of an injury, and discovery is an issue of fact to be decided by a jury when there is a genuine dispute.” Donald v. AMOCO Prod. Co., 735 So. 2d 161, 167 (Miss. 1999) (citation omitted). Whether the Fletchers knew or should have known of the alleged defects or misrepresentations prior to closing is a disputed question of fact. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Fletchers, as we must for summary judgment purposes, we find the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that the statute of limitations accrued prior to the date of closing.

Subsection (1) requires an action to be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues, which for this bad-faith claim occurred when administrative exhaustion was achieved and the claim became enforceable.

Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Incorporated · filed 2012-05-17(1)

Patrick needed to bring her claim within three years of the date the “action accrued.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. “Accrual” simply means that a cause of action has become an enforceable claim. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990) (interpreting accrual under this same statute). ... Once administrative exhaustion was achieved by a final award of benefits (and, possibly, by the passage of the time for reconsideration), all elements for a bad-faith claim arising from the denial of those benefits existed.

Section 15-1-49 requires actions with no other limitations period to be filed within three years after accrual, and the period begins when an insured or uninsured person learns of a problem with the policy or that no coverage or policy is in effect.

McMorris v. Tally · filed 2015-05-14(1)

Under Section 15-1-49, “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” ... Under our precedent, the statute of limitations on an insured’s or uninsured’s claims against an insurance agent or company begin to run when the insured or uninsured learns there is a problem with the policy, or no coverage or policy at all.

The three-year catch-all limitations period begins when an inverse-condemnation cause of action becomes enforceable, when the property is actually taken.

State of Mississippi v. Murphy · filed 2016-10-27(1)

The Murphys did not have an enforceable cause of action for inverse condemnation until their property was actually taken by the State and the City for the purpose of constructing the municipal harbor.

The three-year limitations period begins when a breach-of-contract claim accrues, meaning when it becomes an enforceable claim and the right to sue is vested; here, the period began when the estate attempted to transfer the shares without first offering them to the corporations.

In The Matter of The Estate of Frankie Don Ware, Deceased: Carolyn Ware, As of The Estate of Don Ware, Deceased; Carolyn · filed 2022-05-26(1)

Carolyn also relies on Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49, which provides that breach of contract actions “shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2019). ... “Under Section 15-1-49, the three-year statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues, and we have held that the ‘cause of action accrues when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue becomes vested.’” ... The logical point of any alleged breach was when Carolyn attempted to transfer the shares to the trusts without having first offered them to the corporations by attempting to close the estate. This alleged breach occurred in 2014, and the corporations did not object until 2018. The three-year statute of limitations bars the corporations’ contractual claims against the estate.

Section 15-1-49 generally begins running for a negligence claim on the date of the wrongful act, while discovery starts accrual only in exceptional cases such as fraudulent concealment.

Vidrine v. Daniel Enger, M.D. · filed 1984-08-02

We turn first to the basic negligence claim. In most cases, the Mississippi statute commences to run on the date of the wrongful act; the date injury was or should have been discovered is the date the cause of action “accrues” only in exceptional cases, such as those in which the plaintiff establishes fraudulent concealment.

Section 15-1-49 requires actions with no other limitations period to be filed within three years after accrual, while the discovery rule delays accrual for latent injuries until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury.

First Trust National Association, as Indenture Trustee v. First National Bank of Commerce · filed 2000-05-31(1), (2)

In Mississippi, a breach of contract claim accrues at the time of the breach regardless of when damages resulting from the breach occur. ... First Trust’s cause of action therefore emerged at the earliest on the first of those dates and, most generously, on the last. ... In short, First Trust’s claim that its cause of action did not materialize until BCI and BCBI declared bankruptcy cannot stand; it accrued on disbursement of the funds. ... The district court was fully justified in concluding that First Trust knew or should have known that breach probably had occurred before June 10, 1994. Applying the discovery rule, then, cannot save First Trust’s cause of action.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period for an uninsured-motorist contract claim begins when the insured knows or reasonably should know that the tortfeasor's available insurance is insufficient to cover the claimed damages.

Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2003-02-11

For statute of limitations purposes, a cause of action "accrues" once it exists as a legally enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue has become vested in the plaintiff. ... Once someone who possesses uninsured motorist coverage knows, or reasonably should know, that the damages he or she claims to have suffered exceed the limits of insurance available to the alleged tortfeasor, the cause of action against the uninsured motorist carrier has accrued. It is at this point in time the potential plaintiff has a legally enforceable claim against the uninsured motorist carrier. ... One of the Jacksons' arguments on this point is that no cause of action accrues until there is an actual denial of a claim by State Farm. That creates the argument for a breach of contract, which then permits suit. The difficulty with finding that no cause of action accrues until there is a denial of the claim, is to leave in the hands of the claimant an unlimited period of time to wait, intentionally or inadvertently, before making a claim. Only thereafter would the statute of limitations commence. We do not accede to that one-sided interpretation. Instead, the limitations period is judged by the considerations that we have set out above.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions without another limitations period to be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues, and accrual requires an injury or other litigable event.

Bullard v. Guardian Life Ins. of America · filed 2006-11-02(1)

Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-49 states, in part: "(1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after." ... This Court finds that in 1990 Bullard was without a cause of action, if as he claims he had no knowledge of being involved in an alleged fraudulent scheme, but more importantly, because he had suffered no damage. In the absence of damage, no litigable event arose. Bullard's cause of action against Guardian did not accrue or occur pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-49(1) until the Prathers filed suit against him in 2000. As Bullard's claim against Guardian did not accrue until 2000, Bullard timely filed a cross-claim in 2002, within the applicable statute of limitations.