Statute Annotations › Mississippi › Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65

Punitive damages: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Mississippi
Case notes
119
Cited in passing
56
Citing cases indexed
174
Case dates
1992–2026
Screened through
2026-06-16
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-04
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

175 citing cases reviewed: 119 interpreted the section (annotated below), 56 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-16 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 2003-01-01 House Bill 19 (2002 Third Extraordinary Session) added net-worth-based punitive-damages caps and moved the existing contract-action exemption to subsection (5). Source
  • 2004-09-01 House Bill 13 (2004 First Extraordinary Session) lowered several punitive-damages caps, revised the hearing procedure, and removed former subsection (5)'s contract-action exemption for causes filed from this date. Source

Applicability to contract actions

Law changed since House Bill 13 (effective September 1, 2004) removed § 11-1-65's former contract-action exemption; the section's punitive-damages rules now apply to contract actions filed from that date.

Section 11-1-65 does not apply to contract actions, so its punitive-damages procedures and proof requirements do not govern claims for tortious breach of contract.

Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corporation · filed 1992-08-12(2)(a)

Section 11-1-65(2)(a) states that the provisions of this section shall not apply to contracts. The issue of punitive damages in suits for tortious breach of contract is instead governed by common law.
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Punitive damages

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 11-1-65(1)(a) limits punitive damages to clear and convincing proof of actual malice, gross negligence evidencing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for physical safety, or actual fraud, and § 11-1-65(2)(a)'s contract-action exemption does not cover a tort-based bad-faith claim.

Hurst v. Southwest MS Legal Servs Corp · filed 1993-11-01(1)(a), (2)(a)

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... What the Hursts argue is that the statute is inapplicable because it expressly exempts contract actions from its coverage. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(2)(a) (Supp. 1996). However, what is being alleged as the foundation for punitive damages is not a pure breach of contract, for which punitive damages would be inappropriate. ... The supreme court held that the Hursts’ claims sounded in tort, and in fact if tort and contract counts had been joined, the Hursts would have to elect between them. Id. Thus Section 11-1-65 is applicable. ... We find that the gross negligence section of the punitive damage section is expressly limited to situations in which the defendant’s conduct endangers physical safety. ... Finally, punitive damages can be awarded based on actual fraud. ... Intent is the key. ... Under section 11-1-65, there was no jury question regarding punitive damages.
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Punitive damages require clear and convincing proof of actual fraud, and the fact finder must consider the listed relevant factors when setting the amount.

Robert M. Holland, Jr. v. Mayfield · filed 1996-08-09(1)(a), (1)(e)

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought ... committed actual fraud. ... As discussed previously, the Investors clearly and convincingly proved that Holland acted fraudulently. ... The Chancellor made his ruling from the bench after stating the elements to be considered under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 1998). ... It can not be said that the Chancellor abused his discretion in determining that punitive damages were appropriate in this case.
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Section 11-1-65(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others’ safety, or actual fraud.

Irby v. Travis · filed 2003-10-17(a)

Mississippi’s punitive damages statute, Miss. Code § 11-1-65(a), establishes the proper standard of care: Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... Furthermore, the trial judge did not fail to apply the correct legal standard because she applied the standard of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a); and therefore, her decision was not erroneous.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Franklin Corp. v. Tedford · filed 2009-09-10(1)(a)

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others' safety, or actual fraud.

Illinois Central Railroad v. Young · filed 2012-12-11(1)(a)

However, punitive damages may be awarded when the “plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant ‘acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.’”
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a)'s heightened proof standard applies to proving actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud for punitive damages, not to the threshold question whether an insurer lacked an arguable or legitimate basis.

Faith James v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co. · filed 2013-06-21(1)(a)

Moreover, the plain language of the Mississippi statute limits its heightened standard to proof of “actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or . . . actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a). This plainly addresses the second part of the punitive damages test, not the threshold issue that we consider today. Therefore, as State Farm has presented no contrary authority, we hold that the lack of an arguable or legitimate basis requires only proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud for punitive damages; it does not impose that heightened burden on proving the insurer lacked an arguable or legitimate basis.

James v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2014-01-28(1)(a)

While it is clear that the second part of the punitive damages test under State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 722 So. 2d 637, 641 (Miss. 1998), does require clear and convincing evidence, see Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65, State Farm has identified no Mississippi court that has squarely addressed the question of whether establishing the lack of an arguable basis requires a similarly heightened standard. Moreover, the plain language of the Mississippi statute limits its heightened standard to proof of “actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or . . . actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a). This plainly addresses the second part of the punitive damages test, not the threshold issue that we consider today. Therefore, as State Farm has presented no contrary authority, we hold that the lack of an arguable or legitimate basis requires only proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Section 11-1-65 permits punitive damages only when the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Evans v. Roger Trucking, Inc. · filed 2019-10-18

Punitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. §11-1-65. ... Evans has failed to allege conduct by Roger’s Trucking or Nady that rises to the level of “gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others.”
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Section 11-1-65 does not impose punitive-damages liability on an employer solely through respondeat superior.

Riggio v. Pruneda · filed 2019-11-15(a)(a)

There is no question that an employer cannot be liable for punitive damages under a theory of respondeat superior. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a)(a).
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Section 11-1-65 requires a bifurcated punitive-damages trial; evidence relevant only to punitive damages is excluded from the liability phase, while evidence relevant to both phases may be admitted.

Sun State Oil, Inc. v. Pahwa · filed 2021-07-08

Sun State agrees the Court should bifurcate the punitive damages phase of the trial under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 but argues some evidence related to punitive damages is relevant to liability. [72] at 5. The Court agrees that some evidence may be relevant to both phases of the trial. The Court grants in part and denies in part the motion as to this issue. The trial will be bifurcated, and the Court excludes evidence relevant only to punitive damages from the liability phase of the trial. The Court does not exclude evidence relevant to both liability and punitive damages from the liability phase.
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Section 11-1-65 permits punitive damages upon clear and convincing proof of actual malice, gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others’ safety, or actual fraud, and directs courts to consider listed factors in setting the amount.

Li v. Wooten · filed 2021-12-27(1)(a), (1)(e)

“The purpose of punitive damages “is to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar misconduct in the future[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(e). Defendant committed fraud. Punitive damages are in order for Plaintiff. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (establishing that an award of punitive damages requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with “actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.”). ... “In considering the amount of punitive damages to award, if any, the court must look to the following: [The] defendant’s financial condition and net worth; the nature and reprehensibility of the defendant’s wrongdoing, for example, the impact of the defendant’s conduct on the plaintiff, or the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff; the defendant’s awareness of the amount of harm being caused and the defendant’s motivation in causing such harm; the duration of the defendant’s misconduct and whether the defendant attempted to conceal such misconduct; and any other circumstances shown by the evidence that bear on determining a proper amount of punitive damages.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(e).
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Section 11-1-65(a) requires a plaintiff seeking punitive damages to adequately plead actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

The State of Mississippi, Ex Rel. Lynn Fitch Attorney General v. Eli Lilly and Company · filed 2022-08-09(a)

In Mississippi, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages must adequately plead that the defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a). The State adequately pled actual fraud under the 9(b) standard. ... The motion to dismiss the State’s claim for punitive damages is denied.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud for punitive damages, and subsection (3)(a) caps punitive damages at two percent of a defendant’s net worth when its net worth is $50 million or less.

Affordable Care, LLC v. JNM Office Property LLC · filed 2022-08-10(1)(a), (3)(a)

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) provides that: [p]unitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... As for the merits of Affordable’s entitlement to punitive damages, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that JNM acted with actual malice. ... Mississippi Code 11-1-65(3)(a) directs the reduction of a plaintiff’s punitive damages award based on the net worth of the defendant, and allows an award of no more than two percent of the defendant’s net worth if a defendant has a net worth of fifty million dollars or less. ... Therefore, the credible evidence supports the conclusion that JNM’s net worth is $1,375,929.78. Applying the pertinent statutory cap to the punitive damages award in this case, two percent of JNM’s net worth comes to $27,518.60. The punitive damages award should be reduced accordingly.
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Section 11-1-65(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Jones v. Phycon, Inc. · filed 2022-09-23(a)

Under Mississippi law, “[p]unitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a).
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Section 11-1-65 requires punitive-damages proceedings to be bifurcated, with punitive damages considered only after compensatory damages are awarded and the court permits the jury to decide the issue.

Coleman, M.D. v. Meridian Imaging, P.A. · filed 2025-06-13

That said, the Court will follow Mississippi law and bifurcate punitive damages from liability—as Dr. Coleman argued in her opposition memorandum. See Pl.’s Mem. [126] at 3 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65). Thus, the parties may not mention punitive damages or punishing Meridian Imaging until an award of compensatory damages has occurred and the Court has concluded that the jury should decide the issue.
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Subsection (1)(a) permits punitive damages only when clear and convincing evidence shows actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Evans v. Englund Equipment Company · filed 2025-07-30(1)(a)

Under Mississippi law, punitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only when the insurer acted with actual malice, qualifying gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others’ safety, or actual fraud.

Stokes · filed 2026-02-09(1)(a)

Punitive damages may only be awarded if the insurer “acted with actual malice, gross negligence, which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65. For the reasons explained above, this Court finds the complaint does not adequately plead a bad faith claim. Likewise, there are no alleged facts which, even if taken as true, show that Allstate acted willfully or maliciously. Given this, there is no basis for punitive damages.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others' safety, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded.

Contreras · filed 2026-04-20(1)(a)

To recover punitive damages in Mississippi, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant "acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud".
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Section 11-1-65(a) requires a plaintiff seeking punitive damages to adequately plead actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Mancias · filed 2026-06-16(a)

“In Mississippi, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages must adequately plead that the defendant ‘acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.’” Mississippi ex rel. Fitch v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F. Supp. 3d 532, 543 (S.D. Miss. 2022) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a)). ... But the Complaint [1-1] does not plead that Apex was grossly negligent in its supervision, entrustment, or hiring of Brome, and “punitive damages are not available under the Mississippi law based solely upon vicarious liability.” J.M. v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., No. 3:15CV841-HSO-JCG, 2017 WL 3906774, at *19 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2017) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a claim for punitive damages against Apex, so this argument does not prevent merger of their independent negligence claims against Apex under Mississippi law.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded, while subsection (1)(d) makes the court decide whether the issue goes to the trier of fact.

Smith v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. · filed 2019-01-30(1)(a), (1)(d)

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... The court shall determine whether the issue of punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact; and, if so, the trier of fact shall determine whether to award punitive damages and in what amount.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(e) identifies punishment and deterrence as the primary purpose of punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, which make the plaintiff whole.

Beichler v. Citigroup, Inc. · filed 2003-01-16(1)(e)

Based on the Allen holding, the aggregate amount of the punitive damages claim in this case must be applied against each Plaintiff to determine whether the amount in controversy requirement for each plaintiff is met. ... The following excerpt from § 11 — 1—65(l)(e) distinguishes between the purpose of punitive damages and the purpose of compensatory damages in Mississippi: "[T]he primary purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar misconduct in the future by the defendant and others while the purpose of compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff whole.”
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only when the defendant acted with actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Cook · filed 2002-12-05(1)(a)

Punitive damages may not be assessed against the defendant unless the defendant "acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a)(2002).
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Section 11-1-65(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded, and the court upheld applying that standard when denying a punitive-damages hearing.

Irby v. Travis · filed 2006-05-25(a)

Furthermore, the trial judge did not fail to apply the correct legal standard because she applied the standard of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a); and therefore, her decision was not erroneous.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

BC's Heating & Air & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co. · filed 2012-09-04(1)(a)

Mississippi Code provides: “Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (2012). ... This testimony does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, gross *786negligence evidencing willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others, or actual fraud. Accordingly, the Court grants Vermeer Midsouth, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages.
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Section 11-1-65(2)(a) exempts contract actions from the statute's punitive damages provisions, so tortious breach of contract claims are governed by common law standards.

Hurst v. Southwest MS Legal Servs Corp · filed 1993-11-01(2)(a)

In American Funeral, we held that the issue of punitive damages in suits for tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties and fraud are governed by the common law, not by the provisions of § 11-1-65(1). This is because § 11-1-65(2)(a) specifically exempts contract actions from the provisions of the statute.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless clear and convincing evidence shows actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Great American Life Insurance Company v. Tanner · filed 2020-03-31(1)(a)

“Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” ... “Accordingly, the Court finds punitive damages inappropriate in this case.”
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Section 11-1-65(a) permits punitive damages to reach a jury when evidence could show malice or gross negligence demonstrating willful, wanton, or reckless disregard.

Jones v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2025-07-14(a)

Put differently, there remains a genuine dispute suitable for a jury on the question of whether State Farm “acted with actual malice, [sic] gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a).
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Factors for determining the amount of punitive damages

Section 11-1-65(1)(e) requires the fact-finder to consider specified factors when determining the amount of punitive damages, including the relationship between the award and the harm, the reprehensibility of the conduct, and the defendant’s financial condition.

Dabbs v. Irby · filed 1994-12-22(1)(e)

Thus, it is clear that the jury was given some guidance in its determination of the punitive amount and was not left to arbitrarily and unreasonably arrive at a punitive sum. ... Keeping in mind the factors set forth in Mississippi Code Section 11-1-65(f)(ii), we find that there is a reasonable relationship between the amount of the award and the harm caused. We can also understand how the jury could have found the appellant’s act to be reprehensible both in light of the fact that two pets were shot to death and the apparent concealment by Dabbs of the events that occurred from the moment that shots were fired until the time the dogs were found in a ditch several miles from Dabbs’s house.
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Subsection (1)(e) requires the fact finder to consider specified factors when determining the amount of punitive damages, but the court held that it did not apply because it was not in effect when the action was filed.

Fred's Stores of Miss. v. M & H DRUGS · filed 1998-09-10(1)(e)

Fred's argument must fail. First, this section of the statute was not in effect at the time of the filing of Super D's action. See Editor's Note Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp.1997). Furthermore, the record reveals that Super D put on evidence of each of the factors in Subsection (e) at trial. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.
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Section 11-1-65 supplies factors the court must consider in setting punitive damages, and the record should show how those factors informed the award.

Lamar Bailey, Jr. v. Beard · filed 2000-05-08

This Court has no way of knowing whether the circuit court followed any of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 2001) factors for punitive damages or how the circuit court arrived at this award. Consequently, this matter is reversed and remanded to the circuit court on the issue of damages and to direct the court to conduct a proper damages hearing and to allow the record to reflect how these damages are calculated.
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Subsection (1)(e) requires the fact finder to consider specified punitive-damages factors and to be instructed on the purposes of punitive and compensatory damages, but it was not in effect when this action was filed.

Fred's Stores of MS Inc v. M & H Drugs Inc · filed 1996-05-20(1)(e)

Through P-5, P-7, and P-8, the jurors were fully instructed as to the purpose of punitive damages and as to the proof necessary to award them. Fred's argument must fail. First, this section of the statute was not in effect at the time of the filing of Super D's action. See Editor's Note Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp.1997). Furthermore, the record reveals that Super D put on evidence of each of the factors in Subsection (e) at trial. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(d) makes the court the gatekeeper for punitive damages, requiring it to decide whether the issue may be submitted to the jury after the statutory prerequisites are met.

Alpha Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Jackson · filed 1999-11-18(1)(d)

The statute and case law specifically give the court the authority to initially determine whether the particular facts of a case merit the submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Id. Miss Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (1)(d) (Supp. 2001). ... This Court finds that the trial court, as the gatekeeper of whether the issue of punitive damages is to be submitted to the jury, correctly determined that the facts of the case do not support a hypothetical juror finding malice or reckless disregard for Jackson's rights. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the jury instructions for punitive damages should not have been granted to Jackson.
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Section 11-1-65 requires the court to decide whether punitive damages may be submitted to the jury, after the claimant meets the statute's clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Alpha Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Jackson · filed 2001-12-13(1)(d)

The statute and case law specifically give the court the authority to initially determine whether the particular facts of a case merit the submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Id. Miss Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(d) (Supp. 2001). ... This Court finds that the trial court, as the gatekeeper of whether the issue of punitive damages is to be submitted to the jury, correctly determined that the facts of the case do not support a hypothetical juror finding malice or reckless disregard for Jackson's rights. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the jury instructions for punitive damages should not have been granted to Jackson.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(c) requires the trial judge, after compensatory damages are awarded, to hold an evidentiary hearing and initially decide whether the jury may consider punitive damages.

T.C.B. Construction Company, Inc. v. W. C. Fore Trucking, Inc. · filed 2009-11-03(1)(c)

When punitive damages are sought, and only after compensatory damages have been awarded, the trial judge will hold an evidentiary hearing and make an initial determination whether the jury should pass on the issue. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(c)-(d) (Supp. 2012).
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Section 11-1-65 requires clear and convincing proof of actual fraud for punitive damages and requires the fact finder to consider relevant factors in setting the amount.

Holland v. Mayfield · filed 1999-06-03(1)(a), (1)(e)

The Chancellor made his ruling from the bench after stating the elements *677 to be considered under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp.1998). ... It can not be said that the Chancellor abused his discretion in determining that punitive damages were appropriate in this case.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(f) requires consideration of the defendant's financial condition and net worth when evaluating a punitive-damages award, and excessiveness cannot be decided by a simple mathematical formula alone.

Cooper Tire and Rubber Co. v. Tuckier · filed 2002-01-10(1)(f)

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 2001), the punitive damages statute, sets forth factors to be considered. These factors are: 1) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damage award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred; 2) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; 3) the financial condition and net worth of the defendant; and 4) in mitigation, the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct and the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct. The trial court gave a jury instruction tailored to these factors. ... Although, this punitive damages award was nearly ten times the compensatory damages award against Cooper, this ratio is acceptable under the Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(f) factors, which include the financial condition and net worth of the defendant. ... A simple mathematical formula cannot be used to determine whether this punitive damage award is excessive or constitutional.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(e) calls for consideration of relevant factors, including the defendant’s reprehensibility, awareness, duration of misconduct, and concealment, when determining punitive damages.

Watson Laboratories, Inc. v. State of Mississippi · filed 2018-01-11(1)(e)

The chancery court noted that it had considered the factors set forth in Section 11-1-65 in making its award. ... The chancery court applied the applicable law to the evidence. ... The punitive damages award is affirmed.
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Punitive damages—clear and convincing evidence of malice, gross negligence, or fraud

Section 11-1-65(1) requires clear and convincing evidence of malice or gross negligence before punitive damages may be submitted to the jury.

Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett · filed 1997-11-26(1)

Our review convinces us that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit this issue to the jury in that there was no clear and convincing evidence of malice or gross negligence. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1) (Rev. 2002.)
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Thomas v. Harrah's Vicksburg Corp. · filed 1999-02-23(1)(a)

An award of punitive damages in a case such as this is controlled by § 11-1-65 of the Miss.Code Ann. (Supp.1998), the relevant potion of which follows: ... Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... On remand of this matter, the trial court shall conduct a hearing on the sole issue of whether the issue of punitive damages should be submitted to a jury for Surplus against Harrah's and Yates, utilizing the well-settled standards set forth above.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Malone v. Capital Correctional Resources, Inc. · filed 1999-08-02(1)(a)

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, against whom punitive damages are sought, acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... The alleged wrong must be willful, malicious, or reckless. Punitive damages are only appropriate in the most egregious cases so as to discourage similar conduct and should only be awarded in cases where the actions are extreme. ... Clearly, the negligence involved in Jones's failure to lower the landing gear does not rise to the level required under Mississippi law to justify the imposition of punitive damages. We find that punitive damages are not appropriate under the factual circumstances of this case. Therefore, the issue is without merit.
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Subsection (1)(a) permits punitive damages only when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Clara Wise v. Valley Bank · filed 2000-02-25(1)(a)

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Rev. 2002) will only allow for punitive damages where a plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, gross negligence evidencing a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or the commission of actual fraud.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud to support punitive damages.

Gamble v. Dollar General Corporation · filed 2000-08-14(1)(a)

In the punitive damage context, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (1)(a) indicates a claimant must prove by “clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud." (emphasis added). ... While Dollar General may have been negligent in its training, its actions do no rise to the level of actual malice or gross negligence.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Warren v. Derivaux · filed 2008-12-04(1)(a)

Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-1-65(1)(a) allows for punitive damages where a plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant "acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud."
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, fraud, or gross negligence/reckless disregard for the rights of others.

Pursue Energy Corporation v. Nancy Carol Garrett Abernathy · filed 2009-10-01(1)(a)

Mississippi Code Section 11-1-65(1)(a) provides that punitive damages are awarded only if the Sykes plaintiffs proved by clear and convincing evidence that Pursue acted with actual malice, fraud, or gross negligence/reckless disregard for the rights of others. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Rev. 2002). More specifically, in a breach-of-contract case, a plaintiff must prove that the breach was the result of an intentional wrong or that a defendant acted maliciously or with reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Hamilton v. Hopkins, 834 So. 2d 695, 703 (¶26) (Miss. 2003) (citations omitted).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others' safety, or actual fraud.

Jagneaux v. United Rentals (North America), Inc. · filed 2020-04-10(1)(a)

A Mississippi statute sets out the requirements for an award of punitive damages. “Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” ... The Court finds no evidence that United Rentals acted with actual malice or gross negligence evidencing a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. At most, Plaintiffs allege a claim of simple negligence. For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim against United Rentals will be dismissed.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud to recover punitive damages.

Crechale v. Carroll Fulmer Logistics Corporation · filed 2020-08-21(1)(a)

To recover punitive damages under Mississippi law, the claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. §11-1-65(1)(a). ... As seen, the Complaint does not allege any facts against Brooks, the driver, which, if proven, would amount to more than simple negligence. Plaintiff does not allege any heightened misconduct on Brooks’ part beyond the typical negligence allegations associated with an automobile accident. These allegations cannot support a claim for punitive damages against Brooks.
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Section 11-1-65(a)(1) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, gross negligence evidencing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others' safety, or actual fraud.

Bolden-Gardner v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2021-01-04(a)(1)

Under Mississippi law, “punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a)(1). ... The Plaintiffs have simply not alleged that Liberty Mutual acted with malice or with any willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of other, or with actual fraud. ... The Complaint simply does not present a plausible claim for punitive damages for breach of contract or negligence in this case.
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Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Kee v. Howard L. Nations, P. C. · filed 2022-08-16(1)(a)

Mississippi Code Section 11-1-65 governs punitive damages and, in pertinent part, provides: ... (a) Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidence a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... Here, the Court finds that Kee has not come forward with competent summary judgment type evidence to show actual malice or gross negligence. Rather, this case appears to be one of, at most, negligence. Kee has not provided sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on her punitive damages claim. Therefore, to the extent The Firm’s Motion [177] seeks dismissal of that claim, it is GRANTED. Kee’s claim for punitive damages is dismissed with prejudice.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded.

Robertson v. Murray · filed 2023-01-18(1)(a)

An award of punitive damages requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a). “There must be ruthless disregard for the rights of others, so as to take the case out of the ordinary rule.” Gamble ex rel. Gamble v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 852 So. 2d 5, 15 (Miss. 2003). Murray’s conduct would meet that standard.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Tran v. Knauf Gips KG · filed 2024-04-16(1)(a)

Because Plaintiffs have not presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute that Defendants “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud[,]” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a), Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim should be dismissed, see Wallace, 2013 WL 2630241, at *2-3.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for safety, or actual fraud.

Fozard v. Knauf Gips KG · filed 2024-05-13(1)(a)

Under Mississippi’s punitive damages statute, Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... In sum, whether considered individually or in the aggregate, the evidence relied upon by Plaintiffs is insufficient to support an award of punitive damages, and “no reasonable jury could impose punitive damages” based on this evidence. ... Because Plaintiffs have not presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute that Defendants “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud[,]” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a), Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim should be dismissed, see Wallace, 2013 WL 2630241, at *2-3.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 11-1-65 does not apply to contract causes of action, so punitive damages in such a case are governed by common-law standards instead.

American Funeral Assur. Co. v. Hubbs · filed 1997-06-19(2)(a)

However, § 11-1-65(2) states: The provisions of Section 11-1-65 shall not apply to: (a) Contracts; (b) Libel and slander; or (c) Causes of action for persons and property arising out of asbestos. Because we find that this case is exempted from the provisions of § 11-1-65(1), the question of punitive damages must instead be governed by the common law standards set by this Court.
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Section 11-1-65 requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be submitted to the jury.

Community Bank, Ellisville, Mississippi v. Courtney · filed 2001-05-23(1)(a), (1)(d)

We find that there is insufficient evidence in this case to support a jury charge on the issue of punitive damages. The only evidence that remotely approaches one of the statutory requirements is Davis’s alleged out-of-court statement regarding his intention to put Courtney out of business. We find that this self-serving hearsay statement is in no way clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, gross negligence, or the commission of actual fraud. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred when it denied the Bank’s motion for j.n.o.v. on the issue of punitive damages. Pursuant to the controlling standard of review, we reverse and render that verdict.
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Section 11-1-65(a)(1) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded.

BancorpSouth Bank v. Duckett · filed 2006-08-17(a)(1)

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.
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Section 11-1-65 permits punitive damages when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Magyar v. Emily Shiers and James Shiers, Jr. · filed 2025-05-13

Our punitive damages statute provides that such damages may be awarded if the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Rev. 2019). ... Because this case was tried without a jury, the issue on appeal is not whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue to a jury but only whether the circuit judge’s ultimate finding that punitive damages were warranted was clearly erroneous. ... The same evidence also supports the circuit judge’s finding that punitive damages were warranted. Accordingly, we find no clear error in the circuit judge’s award.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for safety, or actual fraud.

Steadman · filed 2026-05-14(1)(a)

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the plaintiff “does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only upon clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Ball · filed 2026-06-11(1)(a)

In Mississippi, punitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only upon clear and convincing proof that the defendant acted with actual malice, gross negligence, or fraud.

Spann v. Robinson Property Group · filed 1997-07-24(1)(a)

A claim for punitive damages requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, gross negligence, or fraud. ... The plaintiff has failed to respond to the defendant’s motion, and thus has presented no evidence to the court that the defendant’s actions are of the malicious or reckless nature necessary to support a claim for punitive damages. ... From the facts and testimony presented, the court finds absolutely no evidence which could conceivably give rise to a claim for punitive damages. Therefore, the court finds that the defendant’s motion should be granted.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Malone v. Capital Correctional Resources, Inc. · filed 2002-02-28(1)(a)

The standard for punitive damages is set by statute as follows: Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, against whom punitive damages are sought, acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. *969 Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp. 2001). ¶ 23. The alleged wrong must be willful, malicious, or reckless. Punitive damages are only appropriate in the most egregious cases so as to discourage similar conduct and should only be awarded in cases where the actions are extreme. Paracelsus Health Care Corp. v. Willard, 754 So.2d 437, 442 (Miss.1999)(citing Wirtz v. Switzer, 586 So.2d 775, 783 (Miss.1991)). Clearly, the negligence involved in Jones's failure to lower the landing gear does not rise to the level required under Mississippi law to justify the imposition of punitive damages. We find that punitive damages are not appropriate under the factual circumstances of this case. Therefore, the issue is without merit.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded, and subsection (1)(e) identifies punishment and deterrence as their primary purposes.

McCorkle v. McCorkle · filed 2001-01-09(1)(a), (1)(e)

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... We find that the facts of this case support a finding of malice and reckless disregard for Mack's rights by clear and convincing evidence, the standard to which we are bound by statute, consistent with Strong and Rhodes. A jury instruction for punitive damages therefore should have been granted.
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Section 11-1-65(1) requires clear and convincing evidence of malice or gross negligence before punitive damages may be submitted to the jury.

MacK Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett · filed 2003-03-27(1)

Our review convinces us that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit this issue to the jury in that there was no clear and convincing evidence of malice or gross negligence. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1) (Rev.2002.)
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The statute requires a claimant seeking punitive damages to prove by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Gamble v. Dollar General Corp. · filed 2003-08-07(1)(a)

In the punitive damage context, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) indicates a claimant must prove by "clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud." ... The facts of this case do not warrant a punitive damage assessment. While Dollar General may have been negligent in its training, its actions do no rise to the level of actual malice or gross negligence. Accordingly, this Court reverses and renders the $100,000 punitive damages assessed against Dollar General.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only when the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or actual fraud.

Wise v. Valley Bank · filed 2003-12-31(1)(a)

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Rev.2002) will only allow for punitive damages where a plaintiff shows by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, gross negligence evidencing a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or the commission of actual fraud.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded.

Keys v. Safeway Ins. Co. · filed 2008-04-22(1)(a)

The award of punitive damages under Mississippi law requires a plaintiff to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.”
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Section 11-1-65(a)(1) bars punitive damages absent clear and convincing proof of actual malice, gross negligence evidencing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others' safety, or actual fraud; simple negligence is insufficient.

In Re Guardianship of Duckett · filed 2008-06-12(a)(1)

Mississippi Code Section 11-1-65 governs the awarding of punitive damages. It provides that: Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(a)(1) (Rev. 2002). This Court has stated that "[g]ross negligence is that course of conduct which, under the particular circumstances, discloses a reckless indifference to consequences without the exertion of any substantial effort to avoid them." Dame v. Estes, 233 Miss. 315, 318, 101 So.2d 644, 645 (1958). On the other hand, "simple negligence is not of itself evidence sufficient to support punitive damages...." Choctaw Maid Farms v. Hailey, 822 So.2d 911, 924 (Miss.2002) (citation omitted). ... We find, therefore, that BancorpSouth's failure to transfer the special instruction data on the guardianship account at issue in this case was, at most, the result of simple negligence and thus cannot support an award of punitive damages. ... Based on the foregoing, we find that the record does not contain substantial evidence that BancorpSouth acted with gross negligence after the conversion by allowing Walter to withdraw all of the guardianship funds from the savings account. Therefore, the chancery court erred by finding that BancorpSouth's post-conversion conduct warranted the imposition of punitive damages.
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Punitive damages—relationship between wrongful conduct and harm

Section 11-1-65 requires a connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the harm resulting before punitive damages may be submitted.

Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey · filed 1998-05-04(1)(a)

The punitive damages statute requires a relation between the wrongful act and the harm that resulted. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65. For instance, among the factors to be considered in the award of punitive damages is the "impact of the defendant's conduct on the plaintiff." Id. § 11-1-65(e). In addition, once the punitive damage verdict has been awarded, the trial court is required to determine "[w]hether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damage award and the harm likely to have resulted from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred." Id. § 11-1-65(f)(ii)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute is clear that there must be some relation between the wrongful act and the harm that resulted. ... Here, as in Pelican Trucking, the primary cause of the accident was Frazier's negligence. There is no nexus between the alleged gross negligence of CMF and the accident.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded, while subsection (1)(f) requires consideration of statutory factors rather than a simple mathematical ratio in assessing the award.

Cooper Tire and Rubber Company v. Tuckier · filed 1999-11-17(1)(a), (1)(f)

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 2001), the punitive damages statute, sets forth factors to be considered. These factors are: 1) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damage award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred; 2) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; 3) the financial condition and net worth of the defendant; and 4) in mitigation, the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct and the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct. ... Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... Although, this punitive damages award was nearly ten times the compensatory damages award against Cooper, this ratio is acceptable under the Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (1)(f) factors, which include the financial condition and net worth of the defendant. ... A simple mathematical formula cannot be used to determine whether this punitive damage award is excessive or constitutional.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages only on clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud, while subsection (1)(e) requires consideration of specified factors in setting the amount.

Gordon v. Dickerson · filed 2021-09-14(1)(a), (1)(e)

Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-1-65(1)(a) (Rev. 2014) permits punitive damages where it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant “acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” ... Given the documentation and descriptions of the home’s egregious condition—and of the landlord’s continued neglect—we find the record supports an award of punitive damages. ... We have held, “If neither party presented evidence of a defendant’s net worth at trial, ‘neither party may challenge on appeal either the inadequacy or the excessiveness of a punitive damages award.’” ... Therefore, any challenges as to the amount of the award is waived on appeal.
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Bifurcated punitive-damages procedure

Section 11-1-65(1)(b)-(d) requires a bifurcated punitive-damages process: the factfinder must decide compensatory damages first, followed by a separate evidentiary hearing before the same factfinder, with the judge deciding whether punitive damages may be submitted.

Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company v. Williams · filed 2004-06-09(1)(b)-(d)

In clear terms, our punitive damages statute mandates that all evidence regarding the punitive damages issue be tried in a separate evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact, if but only if, the jury has awarded some measure of compensatory damages. As such, the clear intent of the legislature was to prevent issue confusion and to create a barrier between testimony regarding the fundamental issue of liability and the inflammatory issue of egregious conduct. Moreover, a jury is, by express legislative design, insulated from both the issue and the evidence regarding punitive damages until after it has heard evidence concerning the basic issue of the culpability of the defendant, and rendered its verdict on the culpability issue. Then, and only if the jury has determined that compensatory damages are appropriate, may the jury hear the evidence concerning the issue of punitive damages. Of course, at the close of the second phase of the trial, the judge, via a motion for a directed verdict, or sua sponte, will make a determination, as a matter of law, and decide whether the issue of punitive damages should be submitted to the jury for consideration.
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Section 11-1-65 requires a bifurcated punitive-damages procedure: the jury must decide compensatory damages first, and only then may the court conduct a separate hearing on punitive damages before deciding whether to submit that issue to the jury.

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Williams · filed 2006-04-20(1)(b)-(d)

In clear terms, our punitive damages statute mandates that all evidence regarding the punitive damages issue be tried in a separate evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact, if but only if, the jury has awarded some measure of compensatory damages. As such, the clear intent of the legislature was to prevent issue confusion and to create a barrier between testimony regarding the fundamental issue of liability and the inflammatory issue of egregious conduct. Moreover, a jury is, by express legislative design, insulated from both the issue and the evidence regarding punitive damages until after it has heard evidence concerning the basic issue of the culpability of the defendant, and rendered its verdict on the culpability issue. Then, and only if the jury has determined that compensatory damages are appropriate, may the jury hear the evidence concerning the issue of punitive damages. Of course, at the close of the second phase of the trial, the judge, via a motion for a directed verdict, or sua sponte, will make a determination, as a matter of law, and decide whether the issue of punitive damages should be submitted to the jury for consideration.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(c) requires the court to promptly hold a separate evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact after a compensatory-damages award, before deciding whether punitive damages may be submitted.

Bradfield v. Schwartz · filed 2004-12-23(1)(c)

Importantly, our punitive damages statute mandates the bifurcation of the issues of liability/compensatory damages and punitive damages. The statute requires that evidence concerning punitive damages be presented separately at a subsequent evidentiary hearing to take place, if and only if, the jury has awarded some measure of compensatory damages.
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After a jury awards compensatory damages, § 11-1-65(1)(c) requires the trial court to promptly hold an evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact to decide whether punitive damages may be considered.

Bradfield v. Schwartz · filed 2006-08-24(1)(c)

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(c) (Rev.2002) expressly provides that if a properly instructed jury returns a verdict for compensatory damages against a party, the trial court "shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact to determine whether punitive damages may be considered. " (Emphasis added).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(c)-(d) requires a separate punitive-damages evidentiary hearing, but the requirement is satisfied when the parties are offered an opportunity to present evidence and decline to offer anything further.

Lang v. Beasley · filed 2014-09-09(1)(c)-(d)

Next, the Langs contend that the trial court erred by not conducting a separate evidentiary hearing on punitive damages. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(c)-(d) (Supp. 2013). However, the record reflects that the trial court offered both parties the opportunity to present evidence. Beasley rested on the record already established. The Langs also declined to present evidence, after the trial court reiterated its decision to sanction them by limiting what they would be permitted to offer. Thus the record reflects that the Langs had no further evidence to present, not that the trial court denied them the hearing.
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Subsection (c) requires an evidentiary hearing to determine whether punitive damages may be considered.

Roop v. Southern Pharmaceuticals Corporation · filed 2016-04-07(c)

Since we find that the trial judge erred in overturning the jury’s verdict as to the claim for wrongful termination for reporting illegal activity, this case should be remanded to the circuit court for the trial judge to empanel a jury and hold “an evidentiary hearing to determine whether punitive damages may be considered . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (c) (Rev. 2014).
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After actual damages are awarded, subsection (1)(c) requires a prompt hearing before the same factfinder on whether punitive damages may be considered, and subsection (1)(d) assigns the court the threshold decision whether to submit punitive damages to the factfinder.

Brown v. North Jackson Nissan, Inc. · filed 2003-09-30(1)(c), (1)(d)

Section 11-1-65(1)(c) requires that, upon an award of actual damages, "the court shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact to determine whether punitive damages may be considered." ... Subsection (d) goes on to say that "[t]he court shall determine whether the issue of punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact ..." and then charges the trier of fact to decide whether such damages are appropriate and, if so, in what amount. ... That failure to affirmatively raise the issue at this critical juncture constituted, in the view of this Court, a waiver of any right to later complain of the trial court's failure to undertake a punitive damages inquiry.
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Compensatory damages as prerequisite to punitive damages

Subsection (c) permits punitive damages to be considered only after an award of compensatory damages has been made.

Horace Mann Life Insurance Company v. Nunaley · filed 2005-06-29(c)

Since Nunaley has suffered no compensatory damages, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled to an award of punitive damages. Bradfield v. Schwartz, 936 So. 2d 931, 938 (Miss. 2006); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(c) (Supp. 2006). We thus likewise find this issue asserted by Horace Mann to have merit.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(b) permits punitive damages only after a compensatory-damages award has been made against the defendant.

Union Carbide Corporation v. Russell E. Nix, Jr. · filed 2012-07-26(1)(b)

Punitive damages may be awarded only if a compensatory damages award has been made against a party. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(b) & (c) (Rev. 2004).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(b) requires the trier of fact to determine whether and how much compensatory damages to award before addressing punitive damages.

Blue Hill Specialty Insurance Company, Inc. v. Grinston · filed 2024-06-23(1)(b)

Finally, Delta moves for summary judgment as to its punitive-damages claim. [146] at 3. But “compensatory damages are a prerequisite to addressing punitive damages,” and Delta has not established compensatory damages. [147] at 21 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(b)). So the Court denies Delta’s motion for summary judgment on punitive damages.
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For punitive-damages caps, the applicable statutory version is applied using the defendant’s net worth at the time of judgment.

Franklin Corporation v. Tedford · filed 2007-07-26(3)

As such, the circuit court’s application of the pre-September 2004 version of the statute and Franklin Corporation’s net worth at the time of judgment was proper.
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Section 11-1-65(3)(a) caps punitive damages in any civil action, including one brought by the State, and subsection (3)(b) requires net worth to be determined under generally accepted accounting principles as near to the punitive-damages hearing as practicable.

Mississippi Medicaid Pharmaceutical Average Wholesale Price Litigation v. State · filed 2015-10-29(3)(a), (3)(b)

A plain reading of Section 11-1-65(3)(a) indicates that it applies to actions by the State, either “expressly or by necessary implication.” ... Section 11-1-65 states that it applies to “any civil action” where an entitlement to punitive damages is established. ... We hold that, because the plain language of Section 11-1-65(3)(a) includes actions by the State, the trial court properly applied the statutory punitive-damages cap to the State. ... Due to the practical limitations of computing net worth before the hearing date, in addition to the fact that presentation of evidence normally ends at the close of the hearing, we find that net worth should be calculated as near to the time of the hearing as practicality allows. The evidence must be sufficient to enable the trial court to determine the defendant’s current net worth, according to generally accepted accounting principles.
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Section 11-1-65 caps punitive damages by reference to the defendant’s net worth, but a defendant with zero or negative net worth may still be liable for punitive damages.

Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Barnett · filed 2016-08-23(3)(a)(vi), (3)(b)

Valley relies on Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-1-65(3)(a)(vi), which provides that for a defendant with a net worth of less than fifty million dollars, “no award of punitive damages shall exceed . . . [t]wo percent . . . of the defendant’s net worth.” ... However, the defendant’s net worth must “be determined in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles” (GAAP), Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(3)(b), and Dorothy presented no evidence that insurance policies are treated as assets under GAAP. ... Accordingly, we agree with Valley that its net worth is zero for purposes of the statutory cap on punitive damages. ... We do not see how a statutory cap based on net worth suggests that there is a minimum net worth, such as zero, that will “cut off” the award of punitive damages. Hence, [a company] potentially could be liable for punitive damages, even if it were determined that the company presently has a negative net value. ... Accordingly, under Waltman, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Valley’s motion to reduce the punitive award to $0.
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Section 11-1-65(b) requires a bifurcated proceeding in which the trier of fact first decides whether to award compensatory damages and the amount before considering punitive damages.

Harbin v. Jennings · filed 1999-02-09(b)

The statute provides a bifurcated proceeding and specifically states that "the trier of fact shall first determine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded and in what amount, before addressing any issues related to punitive damages." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(b) (Supp.1997). ... The trial court's decision to permit the jury to consider both aspects of damages at the same time at a point when, if the jury had been properly instructed, the issue of "whether compensatory damages are to be awarded" had not been resolved was in direct contravention of the statute, and, therefore, error.
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Section 11-1-65(b) requires the trier of fact to decide whether and how much compensatory damages to award before addressing punitive damages.

Redhead v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc. · filed 2001-10-16(b)

The Code states "[i]n any action in which the claimant seeks an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact shall first determine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded and in what amount, before addressing any issues related to punitive damages." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(b) (Supp.2000). As the jury had neither found Entergy liable, nor had they assessed damages, discussion of punitive damages was premature. Punitive damages cannot be assessed until compensatory damages have been given. Id.
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(1)(b) requires the trier of fact to decide compensatory damages before addressing punitive damages.

Sumler v. East Ford, Inc. · filed 2005-11-29(1)(b)

Further, Sumler presented insufficient evidence of compensatory damages. Pursuant to Section 11-1-65(1)(b), the trier of fact must determine compensatory damages before addressing punitive damages. Because Sumler failed to present evidence of compensatory damages, it is impossible to consider punitive damages.
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Subsection (c) permits punitive damages to be considered only after an award of compensatory damages has been made.

Horace Mann Life Ins. Co. v. Nunaley · filed 2007-07-19(c)

Since Nunaley has suffered no compensatory damages, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled to an award of punitive damages. Bradfield v. Schwartz, 936 So.2d 931, 938 (Miss.2006); Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(c) (Supp.2006). We thus likewise find this issue asserted by Horace Mann to have merit.
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Punitive damages—statutory cap

The punitive-damages cap is not applied when the defendant fails to raise it and provide credible evidence sufficient to determine current net worth under generally accepted accounting principles.

Moore v. McDonald · filed 2017-02-07(3)(a)(vi)

A trial judge is not required to apply the punitive damages cap when, as in this case, the defendant presents absolutely no credible evidence to support its application. ... So if a defendant relies on the cap, it must present “evidence . . . sufficient to enable the trial court to determine [its] current net worth, according to generally accepted accounting principles.”
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Section 11-1-65(1)(b) requires the trier of fact to determine compensatory damages before addressing issues related to punitive damages.

Daniels v. Crocker · filed 2017-06-08(1)(b)

Section 11-1-65(1)(b) provides that “[i]n any action in which the claimant seeks an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact shall first determine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded and in what amount, before addressing any issues related to punitive damages.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (1)(b) (Rev. 2014). As we are remanding several of the Danielses’ claims to be tried, it is appropriate here to reverse the grant of summary judgment on punitive damages. The issue of punitive damages should be addressed by the trial judge in accordance with Section 11-1-65(1)(b) after it is determined whether or not the Danielses are entitled to an award for compensatory damages.
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Punitive damages—Requirements and submission to trier of fact

Section 11-1-65 requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud for punitive damages, and requires the court to decide whether punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact.

Magruder v. Brashier · filed 2019-08-14(1)(a), (1)(d)

Miss. Code Ann. §11-1-65 describes the requirements that must be met in order for punitive damages to be awarded. It provides that the plaintiff must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant acted with “actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann.§ 11-1-65 (1)(a). ... The court must decide in each case whether the issue of punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact for consideration. Miss. Code Ann. §11-1-65 (1)(d).
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Section 11-1-65 requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud, and directs the court to determine whether punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact.

Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Salvation Army · filed 2003-01-23(1)(a), (1)(d)

The statute and case law specifically give the court the authority to initially determine whether the particular facts of a case merit the *79 submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Id. Miss Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(d) (Supp.2001). ... In the punitive damage context, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) requires that a claimant must prove by "clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud." (emphasis added). ... When deciding whether to submit the issue of punitive damages to a trier of fact, the trial court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine if a reasonable, hypothetical trier of fact could find either malice or gross neglect/reckless disregard. Ross-King-Walker, Inc. v. Henson, 672 So.2d 1188, 1191 (Miss.1996).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(d) gives the trial court discretion to decide whether the issue of punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact, and that decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

T.C.B. Construction Co. v. W.C. Fore Trucking, Inc. · filed 2012-06-12(1)(d)

The statute clearly gives the trial court discretion over whether to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury: ... Thus, “[t]he trial court’s determination whether a case warrants the consideration of punitive damages will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.”
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Punitive damages—standard, bifurcation, and employer liability

Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud for punitive damages; subsections (1)(b)–(c) require bifurcated proceedings and a compensatory-damages finding before punitive damages are considered.

Deliefde v. Nixon · filed 2021-09-13(1)(a), (1)(b)–(c)

A claim for punitive damages will lie only where the plaintiff shows, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant acted with “actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a). ... This Court agrees with that assessment; Greyhound cannot avoid punitive damages by admitting only vicarious liability for Nixon’s simple negligence. ... Under section 11-1-65, the liability and punitive-damages phases must be bifurcated: ... Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(b)–(c). ... Here, Plaintiffs’ gross-negligence claims survive Greyhound’s Rule 56 motion when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to them. ... For these reasons, Greyhound’s summary-judgment motion is granted as to the direct, simple-negligence claims against it but is denied as to gross negligence and punitive damages.
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Punitive damages—Financial condition, net worth, and insurance evidence

Section 11-1-65(1)(e) permits the fact-finder assessing punitive damages to consider the defendant’s financial condition, net worth, and other relevant circumstances, including available liability insurance, in determining the amount.

James v. Antarctic Mechanical Services, Inc. · filed 2021-10-27(1)(e)

Mississippi’s punitive damages statute instructs that the “primary purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar misconduct in the future by the defendant and others[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(e). In assessing the amount of punitive damages to award, the fact-finder must consider the “defendant’s financial condition and net worth . . . and any other circumstances shown by the evidence that bear on determining a proper amount of punitive damages.” Id. (Emphasis added.); ... The critical inquiry is whether the amount of insurance coverage available to defendants should be disclosed to the fact-finder as part of defendants’ “financial condition,” “net worth,” or “any other circumstance” of relevance. The Court concludes that it should.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(e) directs the fact finder, when punitive damages are awarded, to consider the defendant’s financial condition and net worth to the extent relevant.

Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA LLC · filed 2024-02-27(1)(e)

If Vanderlan succeeds on his EMTALA-retaliation claim and the Court decides that punitive damages both are available under EMTALA and should be submitted to the jury, then and only then may Jackson HMA’s net worth and financial condition become relevant. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(e) (“In all cases involving an award of punitive damages, the fact finder, in determining the amount of punitive damages, shall consider, to the extent relevant, . . . the defendant’s financial condition and net worth . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Punitive damages—Prerequisites and proof

The statute permits punitive damages only after an award of compensatory damages and requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, gross negligence showing willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or actual fraud.

Breland v. Trustmark Corporation d/b/a Trustmark National Bank, Proctor Financial Inc. a/k/a Proctor Financial Insu · filed 2022-01-04(1)(a), (c)

Under Mississippi law, punitive damages may be considered “[i]f, but only if, an award of compensatory damages has been made against a party . . . .” See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(c) (Rev. 2019). As all the defendants correctly point out, Ms. Breland’s claim for punitive damages fails at the outset because there was no award for compensatory damages. “[W]ithout actual damages, punitive damages are not recoverable.” Boatright v. A & H Techs. Inc., 296 So. 3d 687, 701 (¶63) (Miss. 2020). ... Regardless, under Mississippi law, to obtain punitive damages, Ms. Breland must prove that Trustmark, Ironshore, and Proctor “acted with actual malice [or] gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others . . . .” See Miss. Code Ann. §11-1-65. And as the trial court correctly pointed out in its Order, punitive damages require proof by clear and convincing evidence, and no evidence exists in the record to meet this burden of proof. Id. Therefore, we affirm.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires a punitive-damages claimant to prove by clear and convincing evidence actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Affordable Care v. JNM Office Property · filed 2024-03-22(1)(a)

Under Mississippi law, a claimant seeking punitive damages must “prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a).
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Section 11-1-65(c) requires an award of compensatory damages before punitive damages may be considered, and subsection (a) limits punitive damages to conduct involving actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

Thompson v. Intermodal Cartage Co., LLC. · filed 2025-03-04(c), (a)

The Court also agrees that there is no such thing as a “direct punitive damages” claim because, as IMC points out, before punitive damages can attach, there must be an underlying claim upon which a plaintiff can be awarded compensatory damages. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(c) (“If, but only if, an award of compensatory damages has been made against a party, the court shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing to determine whether punitive damages may be considered by the same trier of fact.”); ... Obviously, such a claim must be properly plead, and ultimately, supported by sufficient evidence to show “actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or [] actual fraud.”
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, qualifying gross negligence showing reckless disregard for others’ safety, or actual fraud.

Alston v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc. · filed 2021-05-21(1)(a)

“Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.”
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Section 11-1-65 requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded.

Bland v. Hill · filed 1997-06-04

Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. ... This is not a case warranting punitive damages. ... There was simply no proof that Bland acted with actual malice.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) bars punitive damages unless the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud.

JESCO Construction Company v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2022-01-12(1)(a)

The Mississippi punitive damages statute provides that [p]unitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.
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Punitive damages require clear and convincing proof of malicious or grossly negligent and willful, wanton, or recklessly indifferent conduct, but their award remains discretionary and is not a right.

Patterson v. Holleman · filed 2005-12-13(1)(a), (e)

The claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the trespasser's actions were actually malicious or grossly negligent and willful, wanton, or evinced a reckless disregard for the landowner's rights. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp.2005). ... The chancellor, as the fact-finder, considered the issue of punitive damages and declined to award such damages. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(e) (Supp.2005). This decision was well within the chancellor's discretion. There is no right to an award of punitive damages. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(e) (Supp.2005).
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Section 11-1-65 requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud to recover punitive damages.

Mitchell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2011-06-29

The award of punitive damages under Mississippi law requires a plaintiff to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (1972).
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Punitive damages based on vicarious liability

Section 11-1-65 does not allow punitive damages against an employer based solely on vicarious liability; punitive damages require culpable conduct attributable to the defendant.

Williams v. Pemberton Truck Lines, Inc. · filed 2022-12-13(1)(a)

The Court agrees with Justice Lee’s and the other district courts’ interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 and predicts that a Mississippi court would conclude that a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages solely on a theory of vicarious liability.
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) does not permit punitive-damages recovery solely on a theory of vicarious liability; the plaintiff must establish culpable conduct by the defendant.

Moysey v. BMR Transport, LLC · filed 2023-03-13(1)(a)

The Court agrees with Justice Lee’s and the other district courts’ interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 and predicts that a Mississippi court would conclude that a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages solely on a theory of vicarious liability.
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Punitive damages in insurance bad-faith claims

Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages in a bad-faith insurance action when clear and convincing evidence shows gross and reckless disregard for the insured’s rights, and subsection (1)(e) requires the fact finder to consider the defendant’s financial net worth in setting the award.

United Services Automobile Association v. Estate of Sylvia F. Minor, Kathryn Minor and Stephen Minor · filed 2024-12-05(1)(a) (1)(e)

We are not persuaded by USAA’s argument. The language at issue in Section 11-1-65 has been in the statute since its codification in 1993. See Miss. Code Ann. 11-1-65 (Supp. 1993). Since then, this Court has consistently interpreted the statute to encompass the gross and reckless disregard for the insured’s rights. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Walker-Hill Envt’l & Zur. Am. Ins. Co. of Ill., 345 So. 3d 1197 (Miss. 2022); Miss. Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 323 So. 3d 1034 (Miss. 2021); McCord v. Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., 960 So. 2d 399 (Miss. 2007); Caldwell v. Alfa Ins. Co., 686 So. 2d 1092 (Miss. 1996). ... The fact finder must consider the defendant’s financial net worth when deciding a punitive damages award. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(e) (Rev. 2019). Here, the jury considered USAA’s reported net worth of $40 billion.
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Punitive damages—evidentiary hearing after compensatory award

After an award of compensatory damages, the court must promptly hold an evidentiary hearing on whether punitive damages may be considered by the same trier of fact.

Mendez v. Summit Housing Transport, LLC · filed 2024-05-28(1)(c)

Having said that, this court notes that Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(c) provides that: (c) If, but only if, an award of compensatory damages has been made against a party, the court shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing to determine whether punitive damages may be considered by the same trier of fact. ... This “shall” language arguably makes a punitive damages hearing mandatory in cases where a jury awards compensatory damages, see Bradfield v. Schwartz, 936 So. 2d 931, 939 (Miss. 2006) and this court may have no choice but to conduct such a hearing if plaintiffs request one after obtaining a jury verdict on compensatory damages.
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Effective date and application to pending actions

The procedural provisions of § 11-1-65 apply only to pending actions in which judgment had not been entered on July 1, 1993, while its other provisions apply only as specified by the statute’s later effective date.

Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. · filed 1994-06-21(1)(a)-(d)

The entire products liability section, § 11-1-63, and the substantive portions of the punitive damages section, § 11-1-65, do not go into effect until July 1, 1994. The procedural provisions of § 11-1-65, subsections (1)(a), (b), (c) and (d), apply only to “pending actions in which judgment has not been entered on the effective date of the act, and all actions filed on or after the effective date of the act,” which was July 1, 1993. ... Therefore, since the procedural provisions of § 11-1-65, subsections (1)(a), (b), (c) and (d), apply only to “pending actions in which judgment .has not been entered on the effective date of the act”, this case was not a “pending” action in which judgment had not been entered for purposes of application of the procedural portions of Section 2 of House Bill 1270. ... The remaining portions of the bill are not effective until July 1, 1994, and have no effect on this action. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are without merit, House Bill 1270 has no application to this case.
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Punitive damages—Contracts excluded from statute

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 11-1-65 does not apply to contract actions, including tortious-breach-of-contract claims, so punitive damages are governed by common-law standards rather than the statute's clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement.

Paracelsus Health Care Corp. v. Willard · filed 1999-11-04(2)(a)

Moreover, as shall be shown below, this is a contract action to which § 11-1-65 does not apply. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(2)(a)(Supp.1999). ... Section 11-1-65(2)(a) states that the provisions of this section shall not apply to contracts. The issue of punitive damages in suits for tortious breach of contract is instead governed by common law. American Funeral Assur. Co. v. Hubbs, 700 So.2d at 286. Although punitive damages are not ordinarily recoverable in cases involving breach of contract, they are recoverable where the breach results from an intentional wrong, insult, or abuse as well as from such gross negligence as constitutes an independent tort. Id. at 286 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss., Inc. v. Maas, 516 So.2d 495, 496-97 (Miss.1987)). Before punitive damages can be recovered, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with (1) malice or (2) gross negligence or reckless disregard for the rights of others. Id. ... The jury in this case was properly instructed on the burden of proof necessary for punitive damages to be awarded based on retaliatory discharge. Instruction 11 correctly stated that the jury must find by a preponderance of the evidence for Willard and Sumner on the issue of retaliatory discharge in order for punitive damages to be awarded. ... We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to give Instruction D-11. As worded, it appears to state that the burden which must be met to recover punitive damages for tortious breach of contract is clear and convincing evidence, which is an incorrect statement of law. This assignment is, thus, without merit.
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Law changed since House Bill 13 (effective September 1, 2004) removed the contract-action exemption; § 11-1-65 now applies to contract actions filed from that date.

Section 11-1-65 excludes contracts from its punitive damages provisions, so common law standards govern punitive damages in contract cases.

American Funeral Assur Co v. Daisy Hubbs · filed 1994-12-19(2)(a)

Because we find that this case is exempted from the provisions of § 11-1-65(1), the question of punitive damages must instead be governed by the common law standards set by this Court.
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Section 11-1-65(2)(a) excludes contract actions from its punitive-damages provisions.

Hurst v. SOUTHWEST MISS. LEGAL SERVICES CORP. · filed 1998-03-19(2)(a)

In American Funeral, we held that the issue of punitive damages in suits for tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties and fraud are governed by the common law, not by the provisions of § 11-1-65(1). This is because § 11-1-65(2)(a) specifically exempts contract actions from the provisions of the statute.
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Punitive damages—proof, hearing, and relevant factors

Section 11-1-65 requires clear and convincing proof for punitive damages, provides for a prompt evidentiary hearing after compensatory damages, and requires consideration of relevant listed factors, including net worth.

Smith v. Orman · filed 2002-03-12(1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(e)

That the conduct complained of warrants punitive damages must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp.2001). ... After an award of compensatory damages has been made by the trier of fact, an evidentiary hearing before the same trier of fact is promptly to be held on the issue of punitive damages. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(c) (Supp.2001). ... The Code also requires the trier of fact to "consider, to the extent relevant," certain factors. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(e) (Supp.2001). Among those factors are financial net worth, the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff, the period over which the conduct occurred, and any attempt at concealment. Id. By its own terms, the statute does not require that all listed factors be considered, and factors not listed in the statute may be considered. Only relevant factors need be considered.
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In a contract action, punitive damages require clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before the court proceeds to a punitive-damages hearing.

Bar-Til, Inc. v. Superior Asphalt, Inc. · filed 2014-08-26(1)(a), (1)(b)-(c)

In contract cases, “[p]unitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton[,] or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” ... As our precedent reflects, some underlying basis, such as actual malice or fraud, must exist for an award of punitive damages before a chancellor will hold a second hearing on the issue of such damages.
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Gross negligence supporting punitive damages

Section 11-1-65(1)(a) permits punitive damages when the defendant's gross negligence clearly and convincingly evidences a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others' safety; substantially impaired intoxicated driving qualifies.

Savage v. LaGrange · filed 2002-04-30(1)(a)

The Mississippi Legislature has, by legislative enactment, placed certain preconditions on the award of punitive damages. There must be, first of all, a determination that the party seeking to impose such damages has shown that the defendant acted "with actual malice, [or] gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Rev.1991). This Court harbors little doubt that the act of operating a motor vehicle on a public street while under the influence of intoxicants to the extent that the operator's physical abilities are substantially impaired demonstrates clearly and convincingly the kind of gross negligence contemplated in the statute. See Planters Wholesale Grocery v. Kincade, 210 Miss. 712, 723, 50 So.2d 578, 584 (1951). Thus, we affirm the trial court's determination that punitive damages against Monti Savage were appropriate.
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When punitive damages may be awarded

Section 11-1-65 requires punitive-damages liability to be tied to the harm resulting from the defendant's wrongful conduct, and gross negligence must evidence a willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for others' safety.

Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey · filed 2002-05-30(1)(a)

The punitive damages statute requires a relation between the wrongful act and the harm that resulted. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65. For instance, among the factors to be considered in the award of punitive damages is the "impact of the defendant's conduct on the plaintiff." Id. § 11-1-65(e). In addition, once the punitive damage verdict has been awarded, the trial court is required to determine "[w]hether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damage award and the harm likely to have resulted from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred." Id. § 11-1-65(f)(ii)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute is clear that there must be some relation between the wrongful act and the harm that resulted. ... Here, as in Pelican Trucking, the primary cause of the accident was Frazier's negligence. There is no nexus between the alleged gross negligence of CMF and the accident. ... Since there was no evidence to support a punitive damage instruction, the trial court is affirmed on this issue.
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Punitive damages—bifurcation and submission to jury

Section 11-1-65 requires the jury to decide compensatory damages before punitive damages, bars introducing punitive damages during that deliberation, requires clear and convincing proof of qualifying misconduct, and leaves submission of punitive damages to the trial court.

AmSouth Bank v. Gupta · filed 2002-11-21(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d)

The spirit, and arguably the plain language, of section 11-1-65 requires that the subject of punitive damages not even be brought into the jury's mind as it deliberates upon compensatory damages. It is premature for the trial court to begin talking about a "bifurcated trial" when the trial ultimately may not be bifurcated. ... The jury may consider punitive damages only where the plaintiff has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant "acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud." ... It is for the trial court to determine whether or not the issue of punitive damages may be submitted to the jury. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(d).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(a) requires clear and convincing proof of actual malice, qualifying gross negligence, or actual fraud before punitive damages may be awarded, with the trial court acting as the initial gatekeeper for submitting the issue to the jury.

Teasley v. Buford · filed 2004-06-29(1)(a)

The statute clearly grants the trial court the authority, as a gate-keeper, to initially determine whether the facts presented merit submitting the issue to the trier of fact. ... The trial court when determining whether the issue of punitive damages should be submitted to the jury should decide if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable hypothetical trier of fact could have found either malice or gross negligence or reckless disregard. ... As the claimant, Teasley was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Buford's actions amounted to "actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or actual fraud." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp.2003).
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Section 11-1-65(1)(d) requires the court to initially decide whether the issue of punitive damages may be submitted to the jury.

COMMUNITY BANK, ELLISVILLE, MS v. Courtney · filed 2004-10-21(1)(d)

Trial judges have the "authority to initially determine whether the particular facts of a case merit the submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury."
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Section 11-1-65(1)(b) places the compensatory-damages decision before consideration of punitive damages; evidence relevant only to punitive damages may be excluded from the initial trial phase.

Wood v. Stuart C Irby Company · filed 2024-09-23(1)(b)

This Court will exclude evidence relevant only to punitive damages from the initial phase of the trial.
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OSHA compliance

OSHA compliance does not bar punitive damages when evidence shows the defendant knew the required warning was inadequate.

Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix · filed 2014-06-05(1)(a)

To receive an award of punitive damages, a claimant must prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant ... acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Rev.2004). ... Nix introduced evidence that Union Carbide knew that what OSHA required was inadequate and did nothing to change or supplement their warning. ... Union Carbide cannot now take refuge in the OSHA standard.
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56 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Dixie Ins Co v. Mooneyhan, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as a later enactment concerning punitive-damages procedures; the court did not construe, apply, or decide any issue under § 11-1-65. opinion →
Ross-King-Walker Inc v. Henson, the court cites § 11-1-65 only as a "see also" authority alongside cases stating the punitive-damages standard. It does not discuss the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, the statute is discussed only in a dissenting opinion on rehearing, which expressly says it is not controlling in this case. The majority did not adopt or apply this statutory interpretation and instead affirmed punitive damages under its existing vicarious-liability analysis. opinion →
State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Grimes, the statute is mentioned only in the dissent as legislative background and as a report of an earlier holding; the majority does not construe or apply § 11-1-65 in deciding this case. opinion →
Dixie Ins. Co. v. Mooneyhan, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as a later enactment concerning punitive-damages procedures. The court neither interprets § 11-1-65 nor applies it to the case. opinion →
Ross-King-Walker, Inc. v. Henson, the court cited § 11-1-65 only as additional authority while stating the general standard for submitting punitive damages to the jury; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Williams v. Dixie Specialty Ins, the statute is discussed as the basis for the district court’s bifurcation ruling, but the Fifth Circuit held that the issue was not properly raised, declined to address it further, and only noted in a footnote that no reversible error occurred to the extent the district court followed the statute’s guidance. It did not construe or decide the statute’s requirements or scope. opinion →
Summers v. St. Andrews Episcopal School, Inc., the statute is cited and described only in Justice McRae's separate concurring and dissenting opinion. The majority did not adopt that statutory analysis or construe § 11-1-65; it affirmed the punitive-damages ruling under the common-law totality-of-the-circumstances standard. opinion →
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Alcus Smith, the statute is mentioned only when describing the trial court's ruling in the procedural history; the Supreme Court does not interpret or apply § 11-1-65. opinion →
Neider v. Franklin, the court cited § 11-1-65 as support for a general punitive-damages standard, but did not interpret or apply any specific requirement of the statute; it resolved the issue under the evidentiary standard for punitive damages. opinion →
Bailey v. Beard, the statute is mentioned only in the dissent's report of the majority's criticism of the trial court; the dissent does not construe or independently apply § 11-1-65. opinion →
Sheila White, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., Defendant-Appellant/cros, the statute is listed in a multi-state survey as requiring clear and convincing evidence for punitive damages; the court does not construe or apply Mississippi Code § 11-1-65. opinion →
Miller v. R. B. Wall Oil Company, Inc., the majority did not construe or apply Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 as the basis of its holding. The statute is cited in a footnote reporting the trial court’s reasoning and in a separate dissent’s discussion of what evidence might support punitive damages; that discussion was not the court’s majority holding. opinion →
The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Patty M. Mace Stewart, the majority resolved the case solely on contract formation and rendered judgment for Prudential. Section 11-1-65 is discussed in a separate concurrence's response to the dissent about the Bradfield bifurcation procedure, and the concurrence expressly acknowledges that the discussion is unnecessary to the disposition; the court therefore made no operative holding about the statute. opinion →
W. W. Warren v. Derivaux, the statute is quoted while recounting Derivaux’s argument. The court did not construe or expressly apply the statute’s clear-and-convincing standard; it resolved the punitive-damages issue under general Mississippi punitive-damages principles and deferential appellate review. opinion →
Washington v. American Heritage Life Insurance, the court cited § 11-1-65 only to recite the heightened clear-and-convincing standard while deciding the insurer’s bad-faith and punitive-damages claims. It did not interpret the statute or decide a statute-specific issue; the ruling rested on the insurance bad-faith authorities and the facts of the investigation. opinion →
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Stewart, the majority decided the case on contract formation and reversed and rendered judgment without deciding the punitive-damages issue. Section 11-1-65 is discussed only in Justice Carlson's special concurrence and Justice Graves's dissent, including their descriptions of the trial court's bifurcation procedure; those separate-opinion discussions are not the court's holding. opinion →
Sauvage v. Meadowcrest Living Center, LLC., section 11-1-65(1)(e) is quoted in a separate concurrence to support a discussion of punitive damages as noncompensatory relief. The court's disposition rests on the wrongful-death statute, § 11-7-13, and does not construe or apply § 11-1-65. opinion →
Perkins v. Star Transportation, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the dissent as a passing premise in an argument about Rule 37(c) sanctions and punitive-damages defenses. The opinion does not decide the meaning or application of § 11-1-65, and the dissent's statement is not the court's holding. opinion →
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Knight, the statute is discussed substantively only in Justice Randolph's separate partial dissent; the majority did not adopt that discussion or decide the statute's applicability. opinion →
Elliott v. El Paso Corporation, the statute appears only in a footnote as a citation to Nix; the court does not interpret or apply § 11-1-65, and its punitive-damages ruling rests on the absence of a valid compensatory-damages claim. opinion →
Robertson v. Catalanotto, the statute is cited only to report the chancellor’s punitive-damages standard in the procedural history; the Court of Appeals did not construe or independently apply § 11-1-65. opinion →
Georgia Pacific Corporation v. Cook Timber Company, Inc., the majority reversed the antitrust verdict and expressly stated that it need not address the punitive-damage claims. The discussion of § 11-1-65 appears only in Justice King's dissent and was not adopted by the court. opinion →
Taylor v. Galloway, section 11-1-65 appears only in Taylor's unsupported argument. The court did not construe or apply that statute; it resolved the issue under the tree-cutting statute, section 95-5-10. opinion →
Georgia Pacific Corporation v. Cook Timber Company, Inc., the statute is discussed and applied only in the dissent's analysis of punitive damages. The majority reversed the antitrust verdict and expressly did not address the punitive-damages claims, so the dissent's discussion is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Cronier v. ALR Partners L.P., the court cited the statute as authority for the general actual-malice standard while deciding whether attorney fees could be awarded. It did not construe or independently apply § 11-1-65; instead, it remanded for clarification of whether the attorney-fee award was intended as punitive damages. opinion →
Boddie v. Walker, the statute appears only in a footnote describing the procedure and threshold for punitive-damages issues in this case. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 11-1-65. opinion →
Dickens v. Autozone, Inc., the court recited the statute's punitive-damages standard in a footnote but did not decide whether the clear-and-convincing-evidence requirements were satisfied. It dismissed the punitive-damages claim only because the underlying substantive claims failed. opinion →
Nuzzo v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the court merely recites the statutory punitive-damages standard in the background of its summary-judgment analysis. It does not interpret § 11-1-65(1)(a) or decide the claims by applying that statute; it grants summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to support their underlying tortious-breach and gross-negligence claims. opinion →
Sanders v. Attala County, Mississippi, section 11-1-65(1)(a) is mentioned only in the dissent, which compares its punitive-damages culpability standard to the MTCA reckless-disregard standard. The majority does not adopt or decide anything about § 11-1-65; its holding concerns immunity under § 11-46-9. opinion →
Asbury Automotive Group, Inc. v. Gooding, the statute is mentioned as an assumed damages cap in the court’s diversity-jurisdiction analysis; the court did not construe or decide a disputed issue about the statute, and its jurisdictional ruling rested on the uncertainty over presumed damages. opinion →
Philip T. Cascio, Jr. v. Cascio Investments, LLC, Jackie Cascio Pearson and Phyllis Cascio, the statute is cited only in reporting the trial court’s reduction of the punitive-damages award under a statutory cap. The appellate opinion does not construe or independently apply Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65. opinion →
Mang v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, the opinion only recounts Mang's argument that the statute limits punitive damages; it does not construe or apply § 11-1-65, and resolves remand based on the amount-in-controversy allegations and the absence of a binding damages stipulation. opinion →
Hodges v. Allstate Insurance Company, the court cited § 11-1-65(1)(a) only to recite the general standard for punitive damages while deciding that punitive damages are not an independent cause of action. It did not construe or apply the statute to determine whether punitive damages were warranted. opinion →
Brown Bottling Group, Inc. v. Imperial Trading Co., L.L.C., the court cited § 11-1-65(1)(a) only while reciting the punitive-damages evidentiary standard in its analysis of a Rule 42(b) motion to bifurcate trial; it did not construe or apply subsection (1)(a) to resolve a punitive-damages issue. opinion →
Silver Dollar Sales, Inc. v. Olson, the opinion merely reports that the Mississippi state court reduced punitive damages under a statutory limitation and cites § 11-1-65 parenthetically; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Silver Dollar Sales, Inc. v. Battah, the statute appears only in a footnote stating that the punitive award may have been reduced under the statutory cap. The court did not decide the issue, and expressly noted that the final judgment containing the award was not part of the appellate record. opinion →
Hardaway v. Howard Industries, Inc., the court cited § 11-1-65(1)(a) only in a parenthetical while quoting the punitive-damages standard from Cook. It did not construe the statute or decide what it requires; the citation was incidental to the court’s bad-faith and summary-judgment analysis. opinion →
Mills v. Butler Snow LLP, the court mentions § 11-1-65 in passing as support for the possibility that punitive damages could be sought as another category of damages. It does not construe the statute, identify its requirements, or decide whether it applies to the claims. opinion →
Leech v. Mississippi College, the court cites § 11-1-65(1)(a) parenthetically as authority for describing reckless disregard as a type of conduct supporting a claim; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
Faloon v. Sunburst Bank, the court merely identifies an unresolved issue concerning whether the statute's punitive-damages standard is procedural or substantive and defers it for possible discussion at trial; it does not decide or interpret the statute. opinion →
Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Company, Farrar Oilfield Service and Equipment Co., and Tri-State Oil Services, Inc., Tri-State Oil Services, Inc., the court cited subsection (l)(e) only to note that it lists factors relevant to punitive-damages awards. The holding concerned whether multiple plaintiffs' punitive-damages claims could be counted in determining federal diversity jurisdiction, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 11-1-65. opinion →
Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., the statute appears only in a footnote listing examples of other jurisdictions' punitive-damages laws. The court did not analyze, interpret, or adopt anything about § 11-1-65; its holding concerns Minnesota law. opinion →
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grimes, Incidental: § 11-1-65 is mentioned only in the dissent as background and in reporting a prior holding about its applicability; this case's majority decision does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Summers v. St. Andrew's Episcopal School, Inc., the statute is cited only in a separate dissent to state the dissent's view of the punitive-damages standard. The majority did not adopt that statutory analysis or construe § 11-1-65, so the citation is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Smith, the majority mentions § 11-1-65 only in describing the trial court's procedural ruling and expressly does not address the punitive-damages issue. The statute is discussed substantively only in separate dissenting opinions, not adopted by the court's holding. opinion →
Neider v. Franklin, the court cited § 11-1-65 in support of an oft-cited general punitive-damages rule, but did not construe the statute or make a statute-specific holding. opinion →
Hurdle v. Holloway, the statute is cited in the dissent only as support for the assertion that punitive damages may be imposed on drunken drivers and that such conduct can be willful or intentional; the court does not interpret or apply § 11-1-65. The majority's holding concerns workers' compensation exclusivity. opinion →
United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Knight, the statute is discussed only in Justice Randolph's partial dissent. The majority did not construe or apply § 11-1-65 and resolved the appeal on other grounds, so the dissent's statutory analysis is not this court's holding. opinion →
Ferrara v. Walters, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the Sellers' post-judgment motions and their allegation that the chancellor misapplied it. The Supreme Court did not decide the statute's meaning or application; it resolved the appeal on contract issues and expressly stated that it need not reach the remaining issues. opinion →
Henson v. Riggenbach, the majority did not decide what § 11-1-65 means or requires; it dismissed the appeal as not ripe under Dedeaux. The substantive discussion of § 11-1-65 appears in a dissent and is therefore noncontrolling. opinion →
McLendon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court merely recites the statute’s punitive-damages standard in its general discussion. It does not construe or independently apply § 11-1-65; the summary-judgment ruling rests on common-law bad-faith and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress analysis. opinion →
Miller v. RB Wall Oil Co., Inc., the statute appears only in the separate dissent, as a citation supporting the punitive-damages standard and the dissent's view that the evidence could present a factual issue. The majority did not construe or apply § 11-1-65; its punitive-damages holding relied on the cited case-law standard. opinion →
Stephens v. RIMKUS CONSULTING GROUP, INC. OF LA, the statute appears only in allegations quoted from Smith v. Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc.; this opinion reports those allegations while discussing whether fraud was pleaded with particularity and makes no ruling about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 11-1-65. opinion →
Barnes v. Stonebridge Life Insurance, the court merely described and quoted § 11-1-65(1)(a)-(d) while summarizing Bradfield; it did not construe or apply the statute in resolving Barnes's motion, which was decided on bad-faith delay principles. opinion →
Rogers v. CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. (In Re B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc.), the opinion merely lists punitive damages under § 11-1-65 among the plaintiffs’ requested relief in the Pre-Trial Order. It does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →

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