Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49

Before July 1, 1976, § 15-1-49 supplied a six-year limitations period for medical-malpractice claims, with accrual traditionally measured from the wrongful act rather than its discovery; § 15-1-36 supplanted it for claims accruing on or after that date.

Sweeney v. Preston · filed 1994-04-07

In contrast, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972), the general statute of limitations which governed medical malpractice actions prior to 1976, then provided that "all actions for which no other period of limitations is prescribed shall be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued, and not after." While the statute contained no definition of "accrual," it was interpreted at that time to mean that the cause of action "accrue[d] and the statute be[gan] to run on the day of the wrongful act or omission of the wrongful act or omission which constitutes the malpractice, not from the time of discovery thereof." Smith v. McComb Infirmary Association, 196 So.2d 91 (Miss. 1967), citing Wilder v. St. Joseph Hospital, 225 Miss. 42, 82 So.2d 651 (1955). After July 1, 1976, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 was no longer applicable to medical malpractice actions, having been supplanted by the legislature's enactment of Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1976), which created a two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims which "accrued on or after July 1, 1976."

Section 15-1-49 formerly supplied a six-year general limitations period for medical-malpractice actions, but it was superseded on July 1, 1976, by the two-year medical-malpractice period in § 15-1-36.

Goleman v. R.J. Orgler, M.D. · filed 1999-02-23

Prior to July 1, 1976, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 1995), a six year general statute of limitations governed medical malpractice actions. Id. On July 1, 1976, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 1995) was superseded by the enactment of a two year medical malpractice statute under Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1999). Id. at 53-54. Therefore, Goleman's argument for the application of the general six year statute of limitations fails.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period on legal-malpractice actions and, for latent injury, accrual occurs when the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Spann v. Gerald J. Diaz, Jr. · filed 2006-11-15(1), (2)

Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-49 (Rev. 2003) governs legal malpractice claims. Section 15-1-49 states in pertinent part: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after. (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. Therefore, in order for Spann to pursue her legal malpractice claim against Diaz, Spann must show to this Court that she filed her claim within the applicable three-year statute of limitations, or that Diaz waived his statute-of-limitations defense.

Section 15-1-49 requires a legal-negligence action to be filed within three years after accrual, with accrual occurring when the client learns or through reasonable diligence should learn of the lawyer’s negligence.

Lehman v. Byrd & Wiser · filed 2015-05-18

After a review of the record, we hold that the district court was correct in determining that Lehman’s legal negligence action is barred by the statute of limitations. ... Given Lehman’s appraisal of Wiser’s representation in March 2000, we hold that Lehman, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have learned of Wiser’s alleged negligence far before––and certainly at least three years before––he brought this action. ... Accordingly, we hold that Lehman’s failure to inquire further was a failure to exercise reasonable diligence for purposes of Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49(1) gives legal-malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the client learns or reasonably should learn of the lawyer's negligence; filing a complaint tolls that period for 120 days even without service of process.

Parmley v. Pringle · filed 2008-03-04(1)

The statute of limitations on a legal malpractice action is three years. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1)(Rev.2003). The statute of limitations begins to run on the date the client learns, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned, of the negligence of his lawyer. Smith v. Sneed, 638 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Miss.1994). ... Thus, the statute of limitations expired on May 16, 2005. ... The filing of a complaint even without service of process tolls the three-year statute of limitations for the 120-day period allowed pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). Owens v. Mai, 891 So.2d 220, 223(¶ 16) (Miss.2005). ... Therefore, the filing of the first complaint stopped the statute of limitations from running for 120 days.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Stringer v. Lowe · filed 2006-11-07

The Mississippi Legislature amended section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) on March 12, 1990, and changed the general statute of limitations from six to three years. Stringer terminated Lowe on September 21, 1990. Stringer filed suit against Lowe alleging legal malpractice on September 4, 1996. Furthermore, the statute of limitations was not tolled. This issue is without merit.

Section 15-1-49 governs the limitations period for tort claims arising from contractual obligations.

Trammell v. State · filed 1993-08-19

United Companies and Hutchinson confirm that tort actions arising from contractual obligations should be controlled by and subject to the tort prescriptions of Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period does not apply to the penal tree-destruction claim under § 95-5-10(1).

McCain v. Memphis Hardwood Flooring Company · filed 1995-06-27(1)

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-33 operates as a one-year statute of limitations to the penal part of § 95-5-10(1). The McCains' contention is correct that § 95-5-29 only applies to subsection (2) of § 95-5-10, but, their contention that subsection (1) of § 95-5-10 is subject to the three-year statute of limitations under Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995) is incorrect to the extent that it applies to the destruction of trees.

Section 15-1-49 is Mississippi’s three-year residual statute of limitations, requiring an action to be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Taylor v. County of Copiah · filed 1994-03-30

Because plaintiffs complaint alleges due process taking violations, equal protection violations, and discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and federal statute, the controlling statute of limitations for each of plaintiffs claims is the Mississippi residual statute of limitations found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. The statute of limitations provides that an action must be brought within three years of a cause of action accruing.

Section 15-1-49(1) sets a three-year limitations period for actions lacking another prescribed period, measured from accrual.

Robert M. Holland, Jr. v. Mayfield · filed 1996-08-09(1)

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995) provides, in pertinent part that: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... The other Investors testified that they first discovered that front-end commissions had been paid to Holland, the Evanses, and Gaskin, from a deposition taken from one of the BT principals in the Texas case on January 2, 1992. The Investors' Complaint was filed on April 10, 1993, well within the statute of limitation. The Chancellor did not err in denying Holland's Motion to Dismiss based on Miss. Code Ann. §§ 15-1-49 and 15-1-67.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions with no other prescribed limitation period to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Rockwell v. Preferred Risk Mut Ins Co · filed 1996-10-25(1)

Rockwell's cause of action falls under the three-year general statute of limitations set out in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). "All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after." Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (1995). The four wheeler accident occurred on August 1, 1992, so the deadline for Rockwell to file his personal injury lawsuit was August 1, 1995. Since Rockwell waited until October 23, 1995, to file his complaint, Judge Russell was correct in finding that Rockwell was eighty-three days past the deadline.

Section 15-1-49 gives negligence and emotional-distress claims a three-year limitations period, and filing a federal action invoking pendent jurisdiction tolls that period.

Norman v. Bucklew · filed 1996-12-05

The negligence and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are governed by the three-year statute of limitations. The events giving rise to these claims occurred on January 10, 1990. Thus, the three years would have expired on January 11, 1993. Norman filed his federal court claim on January 8, 1993, which tolled the statute of limitations when pendent jurisdiction was invoked. The fact that these claims were subsequently dismissed without prejudice does not prevent the statute of limitations from having been tolled. Accordingly, the state trial court erred in apparently imposing the affirmative defense of the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period when no other period applies, and the period for this guardian-bond claim began when the guardian accounted rather than on the date of the last disbursement.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Iris Althea Melson · filed 1999-12-29

The applicable statute of limitation to the case at hand is Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 is Mississippi's general "catch all" statute of limitations. ... Since there is no specific statute of limitations for claims on written contracts, § 15-1-49 therefore applies. ... The statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of a surety on a guardian's bond against the ward from the time he is discharged from liability for future acts of the guardian but from the time the guardian accounted to the wards. ... Since Tolliver's first and final accounting was not filed until June 5, 1992, we find that O'Quinn satisfied the statute of limitations by filing suit on May 30, 1995, within the three year statute of limitations. Therefore, this issue is without merit.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period, and the claim accrued when the pressure ulcer was discovered, making the suit filed more than three years later time-barred.

Terry v. Clinton Health & Rehab Center · filed 2000-08-30

The court’s other option is to apply the three-year statute of limitation of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Whether this court applies either the two-year statute, § 15-1-36, or the longer three-year statute of limitations, § 15-1-49, the plaintiffs cause of action is still barred. ... The plaintiffs cause of action thus accrued on February 25, 1996, and was time-barred when filed on March 5, 1999.

Section 15-1-49 bars the claims against the uninsured-motorist insurer when the insureds added the insurer to the suit more than three years after knowing the extent of the injuries and the tortfeasor's insurance coverage.

Jackson v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2001-10-12

It is clear from the record that the Jacksons added State Farm to the suit more than three years after they knew the extent of Rebecca's injuries and knew the amount of Bordelon's insurance coverage. Accordingly, their claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year statute of limitations, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003).

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed to be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Nygaard v. Getty Oil Company · filed 2004-07-30(1)

Since accrued royalties are personal property and not an interest in land, Miss. Code Ann. §15-1-7 is inapplicable. There being no applicable specific statute of limitations for actions seeking recovery of accrued royalties, the general, three-year statute must be applied. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) required Nygaard to bring the action “within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued.”

Section 15-1-49 requires actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed to be filed within three years after accrual; the court held these claims accrued when the loan documents were executed and that fraudulent concealment did not toll the period without proof of concealment.

Carter v. Citigroup Inc. · filed 2004-12-20

Section 15-1-49 provides in part: ... (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... We find that the Plaintiffs’ claims were governed by three-year statute of limitations and the claims accrued at the time the loan documents were executed. ... Therefore, all suits were filed after the running of the three-year statute of limitations. ... Since, there is no proof of fraudulent concealment, the running of the statute of limitations on their causes of action was not tolled.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for the claims at issue, accruing when the plaintiffs had notice of the contract terms giving rise to their claims.

Citifinancial Mortgage Company v. Washington · filed 2005-02-10

The remainder of the claims are governed by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15- 1- 49 (Rev. 2003). Rankin v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 912 So. 2d 725, (Miss. 2005) (breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligence are subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49). ... The statute of limitations for the claims in this case began to run when the plaintiffs had notice of the terms of the contract, which was at the time of the execution of the loan agreement, when the Plaintiff received the terms of the contract. ... Plaintiffs filed their claim six years later in November 2001, well outside the three-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for claims not governed by the six-year negotiable-instrument period.

Whitaker v. Limeco Corporation · filed 2009-01-30

However, having already found no error on the part of the trial court in declining to find that either of the notes met the statutory requirements for negotiable instruments, we find no error on the part of the trial court in applying the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Section 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49(1) provides a three-year limitations period that begins when a cause of action accrues, subject to tolling; continuing effects of an original wrong do not extend the period as a continuing tort.

Thomas v. Cook · filed 2015-07-28(1)

Thomas’s legal-malpractice action fell under the general three-year statute of limitations. Channel v. Loyacono, 954 So. 2d 415, 420 (¶13) (Miss. 2007) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2012)). Under this statute, a plaintiff’s three years to file begins when the cause of action accrues—unless it is tolled for some reason. ... Here, we find any distress Thomas experienced during the three years of litigating against Cook was part of the “continual ill effect” of Cook’s decision to take on the adverse representation in the first place—a continuing wrong, not a continuing tort. Id.; see also Sneed, 638 So. 2d at 1255-56 (finding imprisonment a continual effect of being convicted and sentenced based on alleged malpractice, not a continuing tort tolling the statute of limitations). Thus, the limitations period was not extended until March 2011.

Section 15-1-49(1) supplies the general three-year statute of limitations for actions that do not have a specific limitations period.

Thomas McDonnell, III v. Sandy Miller · filed 2016-07-22(1)

Those actions do not have specific limitations periods and are therefore governed by Mississippi’s general three-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations, and the discovery rule did not toll it beyond 2007 for the Bank’s claims.

The Commercial Bank v. Smith Shellnut Wilson LLC · filed 2018-08-07

Based upon the foregoing, we find no error in the circuit court’s determination that the discovery rule does not toll the limitations period beyond 2007. An application of the law to the facts of this case reflects that in 2007, and numerous times thereafter, the Bank received the offering circulars that contained the notice of purchaser restrictions provided pursuant to federal law. As such, the three-year statute of limitations under section 15-1-49 applicable to the Bank’s misrepresentation/material omission claim and breach of fiduciary duty claim expired in 2010. The Bank’s complaint was not filed until March 2016, and we therefore affirm the circuit court’s findings that these claims are time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on breach-of-contract claims.

He Shao v. University of Mississippi Medical Center · filed 2019-05-21

Further, in Mississippi, a three-year statute of limitations applies to a breach of contract claim. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. ... Because He Shao’s termination dates back to August 2011, any complaint filed after 2014 would be time-barred. He Shao’s second complaint was filed on February 17, 2017, well past the expiration of any applicable statute of limitations for her claims. As such, we find that the complaint was properly dismissed, not based upon res judicata, but due to the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in Mississippi because those claims borrow the state’s personal-injury limitations period.

Bridget v. Green · filed 2019-09-16

In Section 1983 actions, courts look to the law of the state in which the cause of action arose to determine the applicable statute of limitations. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007). Specifically, courts look to a state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury torts. Id.; Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). In Mississippi, the applicable statute of limitations is three years. Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cnty., Miss., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49).

Section 15-1-49(1) provides a three-year limitations period for claims not otherwise governed by a different limitations period, and the period accrued when the plaintiff was injured.

Bracy v. Pfizer, Inc · filed 2018-05-01(1)

The general statute of limitations under Mississippi law,> where not otherwise prescribed by law, is three years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1). ... On balance, the Court finds that the three year statute of limitations for this action began to accrue in November 1994, or shortly thereafter, when Plaintiff was hospitalized for a Dilantin reaction. The limitations period should not be tolled pursuant to either the discovery rule or for fraudulent concealment, and therefore ended in late 1997. Plaintiff filed this action in 2016. Accordingly, his complaint is time-barred.

Section 15-1-49(1) gives breach-of-contract actions a three-year limitations period, running from the alleged breach.

Petro Harvester Operating Comp v. Kei · filed 2020-03-25(1)

Under Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1), breach of contract actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Breach of contract actions accrue at the time of the alleged breach. ... The Keiths allege that Petro Harvester’s breach began when the Surface Lease expired in March 2018. Therefore, Petro Harvester had until March 2021 to file its declaratory judgment action. Petro Harvester filed in March 2018, well within the statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year statute of limitations, making a storage-fee claim untimely when filed almost seven years after the fees accrued.

Robert W. Stratton, Sr. v. McKey · filed 2020-07-30

Stratton’s second argument is that McKey filed his counterclaim for storage fees outside the three-year statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2019). ... But McKey was almost seven years too late in filing a claim for storage fees that had accrued at the latest on or before November 30, 2010.

Section 15-1-49 gives conspiracy claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Skinner v. GPCH-GP, Inc. · filed 2020-08-06

Under Mississippi law, conspiracy claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Am. Bankers’ Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Wells, 819 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (Miss. 2001) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49).

Section 15-1-49’s three-year residual limitations period applies to § 1983 claims and bars claims based on conduct occurring more than three years before filing.

Porter v. Town of Tunica · filed 2023-02-03

Thirdly, in as much as Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges constitutional violations under §1983, and nowhere asserts a claim to which a statute of limitations that exceeds three (3) years applies, any allegations related to conduct prior to August 19, 2018, are now time barred and due to be dismissed. See Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401-02 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding Mississippi’s 3-year residual statute of limitations found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 applicable to claims pursuant to § 1983). This would leave, under the allegations of the amended complaint, only those claims related to the November 21, 2020, and the January 14, 2021, events.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for the claims at issue.

Mann v. Hall · filed 2023-02-16

The applicable statute of limitations for Mann’s claim against Waggoner/Global Tel-Link is three years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49; see also Anderson v. LaVere, 136 So. 3d 404, 411 (Miss. 2014) (holding that § 15-1-49 is the controlling statute of limitations for fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment claims).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period, and a breach-of-contract claim accrues when the breach occurs.

Johnson v. Clarksdale Public Utility Authority · filed 2023-03-22

Under Mississippi’s statute of limitations, the claim must be brought within three years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. ... The statute of limitations in Mississippi for breach of contract is also three years. Miss. Code Ann.§15-1-49. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “in the case of a breach of contract, the cause of action accrues at the time of the breach, regardless of the time when the damages from the breach occurred [.]”

Section 15-1-49(1) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Mississippi.

Holmes v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2023-09-01(1)

The applicable Mississippi statute of limitations period is three years. ... Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1). ... No matter which of these two dates the Court uses, Holmes filed her first complaint on February 1, 2022, well within Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period on breach-of-contract claims, with a separate accrual date for each installment when the debt is payable in installments.

Marion R. Bell and Kenny L. Rivers v. Delta Plaza LLC · filed 2024-06-30

Accordingly, Delta Plaza was barred from suing Riverbelle for any breach of the lease agreement after December 31, 2012. ... Riverbelle owes Delta Plaza rent for the months that it remained on the premises, to the extent that the general three-year statute of limitations, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, had not passed by the time Delta Plaza asserted its claims. ... But as we discussed supra, the parties’ lease agreement expired in 2012, and any claim arising from the parties’ lease agreement is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. ... But Delta Plaza’s claims arising from the lease agreement, including any provision therein for recovery of attorney’s fees, are barred by the statute of limitations, and Delta Plaza offers no other basis to sustain an award of its fees and expenses.

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions, including wrongful or fraudulent foreclosure claims, when no other limitations period applies.

Okorie v. PriorityOne Bank · filed 2025-09-30(1)

Likewise, amendment is futile because Okorie’s proposed amended claims are time-barred under Mississippi law. “In Mississippi, claims brought for wrongful foreclosure of property are subject to the general three-year statute of limitations.” Ford v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, No. 1:14-CV-178-SA-SAA, 2015 WL 5655721, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 24, 2015); see also Buntyn v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 3:13-cv-19-HTW-MTP, 2014 WL 652946, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 20, 2014). (“[T]he Mississippi Supreme Court has held that Mississippi Code § 15–1–49 applies to actions for wrongful or fraudulent foreclosures.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (“All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.”).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations, which the court applied from the decedent’s death and after tolling during the service-of-process period.

Evans v. Oberon Holding Corp. · filed 1998-08-18

In the present case, the applicable three-year statute of limitations began to run on December 23, 1991, the day of Ronnie Sutters’s death. ... The filing of the original complaint on December 21, 1994, just two days before the statute of limitations expired, tolled the statute of limitations until the expiration of the 120-day service of process period. ... Since Oberon was not properly served within the 120-day period following the filing of the amended complaint, the statute of limitations began running again on July 21, 1995 and expired on July 22, 1995, pursuant to the three-year limitation set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 1995).

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions for which no other limitation period is prescribed to be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Holland v. Mayfield · filed 1999-06-03(1)

Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995) provides, in pertinent part that: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... The other Investors testified that they first discovered that front-end commissions had been paid to Holland, the Evanses, and Gaskin, from a deposition taken from one of the BT principals in the Texas case on January 2, 1992. The Investors' Complaint was filed on April 10, 1993, well within the statute of limitation. The Chancellor did not err in denying Holland's Motion to Dismiss based on Miss.Code Ann. §§ 15-1-49 and 15-1-67.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period; the court applied it to bar claims arising from policy sales filed more than three years after the sales.

Skinner v. USAble Life · filed 2001-08-31

Defendant argues that all of plaintiffs’ claims against resident defendants are barred by Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations contained in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1999). On March 29, 2001, plaintiffs Calvert and Washington asserted claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendants Gilliam and Spencer respectively. However, these claims, which arise out of the sale of disability policies, are clearly time barred. Calvert states in the complaint, and Gilliam does not dispute, he purchased his disability policy on February 3, 1993, more than three years before he filed suit. Similarly, Washington states in the complaint, and Spencer does not dispute, that he purchased his disability policy on October 2, 1995, more than three years before he filed suit.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for misrepresentation and negligence claims, and the period began when the alleged misconduct was discoverable through reasonable diligence—here, at loan closing.

Bell v. American General Finance, Inc. · filed 2003-06-19

The Court therefore finds that any misrepresentation McGee may have committed, either intentionally or negligently, was discoverable through reasonable diligence at the time of closing. ... Consequently, the statute was not tolled by the discovery rule or by fraudulent concealment. The statutory period began at the time of the closing of the loans. ... The statutory period in Mississippi for misrepresentation claims is three years. Miss.Code § 15-1-49. Plaintiffs 2000 deadline has passed. Plaintiffs claims against McGee for misrepresentation are therefore time-barred, and must be dismissed. ... Plaintiffs claim of negligence against McGee is similarly time-barred, as Plaintiff through reasonable diligence could have discovered any negligence by McGee at the time of sale.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims, running from the policy-purchase date in this case.

Brumfield v. Pioneer Credit Co. · filed 2003-10-17

The Court finds that even if Plaintiff could establish a claim against Defendants Brown, Hamrich, and Shirley for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, his claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date that Plaintiff purchased his policy. See Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 850 So.2d 78, 82-83 (Miss.2003). Plaintiff purchased his last policy on June 12, 1998. See Brief in Support of Response to Motion to Remand of Voyager Life Insurance Company at 2. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for any fraudulent misrepresentation expired on June 12, 2001. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on December 27, 2002. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations unless the statute is tolled by the discovery rule or by fraudulent concealment.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions without another prescribed limitations period to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Frye v. American General Finance, Inc. · filed 2004-02-09(1)

Each of these causes of action is governed by, at most, a three-year statute of limitations. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) ("All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after."). Here, the plaintiffs obtained their loans between nine (9) and eleven (11) years prior to filing suit, and therefore, their claims are time-barred.

Subsection (1) requires actions for which no other limitation period is prescribed to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Frye v. American General Finance, Inc. · filed 2004-04-06(1)

Each of these causes of action is governed by, at most, a three-year statute of limitations. ... Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (“All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.”). Here, the plaintiffs obtained their loans between nine (9) and eleven (11) years prior to filing suit, and therefore, their claims are time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 requires actions to be commenced within three years after the causes of action accrue.

Bland v. Fleet Finance, Inc. · filed 2004-05-18

Accordingly, the court holds that all of the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the three year statute of limitations set forth in Section 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period, barring claims brought more than three years after the insured knows the extent of the injuries and the tortfeasor's insurance coverage.

Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2004-08-19

It is clear from the record that the Jacksons added State Farm to the suit more than three years after they knew the extent of Rebecca's injuries and knew the amount of Bordelon's insurance coverage. Accordingly, their claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year statute of limitations, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003).

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period, and claims based on the loan transactions accrued on the dates of those transactions.

Donald v. Pioneer Credit Co. · filed 2005-06-21(1)

Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49, any potential cause of action Brumfield may have had against Defendants expired three years subsequent to those loan dates. The statute of limitations on Brumfield’s most recent loan expired on June 12, 2001. However, suit was not filed until December 27, 2002. Thus, all of Brumfield’s claims in- this suit are time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year statute of limitations that barred the proposed negligence claims filed after the limitations period expired.

Russell v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2006-10-17

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in partially denying the motions for leave to amend based on the fact that the statutory period expired the day before the motions were filed. The amended complaints Russell was proposing would have been filed after the statutory period expired and, consequently, would have been time-barred.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on fraud claims.

Sullivan v. Tullos · filed 2009-10-22

In Mississippi, a claim of fraud has a three-year statute of limitations. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2003); ... The plaintiffs allege that their fraud claim could not have accrued prior to April 10, 2002. It is a factual issue as to whether the heirs exercised reasonable diligence and first discovered the alleged fraud on April 10, 2002. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-67 (Rev.2003). Thus, absent proof of any other knowledge the plaintiffs may have had regarding the alleged fraud, the statute of limitations began to run on April 10, 2002, and the plaintiffs’ April 8, 2005, complaint was timely filed within the three-year limitation period.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period that resumes running when the 120-day period for service of process expires without service.

Stutts v. Miller · filed 2010-03-18

Stutts filed her complaint on September 20, 2007, four days before the statute of limitations ran. It is undisputed that the applicable statute of limitations is three years. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). Stutts did not serve the Millers until January 24, 2008, six days after the expiration of the 120-day period, on January 18, 2008. On this date, the statute of limitations resumed running and expired on January 22, 2008, before the Millers were served. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Stutts’s complaint with prejudice.

Section 15-1-49 is Mississippi’s three-year catch-all statute of limitations; the period begins when the cause of action accrues, and recordation of an interest in real property provides constructive notice triggering the period.

Estate of Smith v. Smith (In re Smith) · filed 2013-07-09

Under Mississippi state law, the applicable statute of limitations for this action is three (3) years.7 Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. The statute of limitations begins to run once the cause of action accrues. Id. In Mississippi, recordation of interest in real property provides constructive notice, thereby commencing the running of the statute of limitations. Bedford v. Kravis, 622 So.2d 291, 295 (Miss.1993); Metropolitan Nat’l Bank v. United States, 901 F.2d 1297, 1303-04 (5th Cir.1990).

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions with no other limitations period to be filed within three years after the cause of action accrues, when the right to sue becomes vested.

Anderson v. LaVere · filed 2014-02-20(1)

Section 15-1-49 states that “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” ... Under Section 15-1-49, the three-year statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues,23 and we have held that the “cause of action accrues when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue becomes vested.” ... We find that Anderson’s and Harris’s cause of action accrued, at the latest, in 1991, when LaVere began paying royalties and fees to the Johnson estate. Therefore, Anderson’s and Haris’s claims are time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations in Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year deadline for actions without another prescribed limitation period.

Durr v. American National Property & Casualty Co. · filed 2000-06-15(1)

The Durrs contend that this action, which was filed on September 22, 1995, is time barred because Mississippi prescribes a three-year limitation period. Miss.Code Ann. § 15 — 1—49(1)(1995) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” ... Accordingly, the action sub judice is controlled by the federal six-year limitations period and not Mississippi’s three-year proscriptive period.

Section 15-1-49 is procedural and applies to actions in Mississippi arising under the laws of another jurisdiction.

Bastoe v. Sterling Drug, Inc. · filed 1988-03-30

... this Court is of the opinion that Shewbrooks makes no change in the longstanding proposition that Mississippi’s general statute of limitations is considered procedural and therefore applies to actions in Mississippi arising under the laws of another jurisdiction.

Section 15-1-49 supplied a six-year limitations period for this injury claim, even though it accrued in Kansas, because Kansas treated its limitations period as procedural.

Steele v. G. D. Searle & Co. · filed 1976-11-24

For a similar type injury in Mississippi, the applicable statute is six years (Section 15-1-49, Mississippi Code of 1972). ... The Court finds this argument persuasive, but not enough to ignore the rulings that hold that Mississippi, in this case, would follow its previous conflict of laws decisions, that is, it would apply the Mississippi statute of limitations where the statutes of the state wherein the action accrued are considered procedural rather than substantive.

Section 15-1-49 may apply to a claim filed in Mississippi even if the claim arose elsewhere and is barred by that state's limitations period.

Cowan v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1982-12-20

This purpose is not subverted by Mississippi’s application of its own limitations period to an action filed in its own courts.

Section 15-1-49's limitations period for a legal-malpractice action begins when the client learns, or through reasonable diligence should learn, of the lawyer's negligence.

Smith v. Sneed · filed 1994-06-23

Today, we hold that the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action properly begins to run on the date the client learns or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should learn of the negligence of his lawyer.

Section 15-1-49 gives legal-malpractice claims a three-year limitations period running from accrual, which occurs on the wrongful act or when the injury was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Spann v. Diaz · filed 2008-07-31

A legal malpractice action accrues when the alleged wrongful act or omission occurs or when "the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury." Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). Once a legal malpractice cause of action has accrued, the plaintiff has three years from that date to file his or her lawsuit.

Section 15-1-49 gives legal-malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff learns, or through reasonable diligence should have learned, of the lawyer’s negligence.

Bennett v. Melvin & Melvin · filed 2009-08-06

The three-year statute of limitations applies to actions for legal malpractice. ... Under the discovery rule, as applied in a legal-malpractice action, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the plaintiff learns, or through reasonable diligence, should have learned, of the negligence of the lawyer.

Section 15-1-49 gives legal-malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, and under the discovery rule accrual begins when the client learns or should reasonably learn of the lawyer’s negligence.

Donovan v. Burwell · filed 2016-01-12

Legal malpractice claims must be brought within three years after the claim accrues. ... Mississippi applies the discovery rule for legal malpractice actions. ... Therefore, “the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the client learns or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should learn of his lawyer’s negligence.” ... We cannot accept Burwell’s argument. Instead, we conclude that “it would be impractical to require a layperson to have discovered” from this order alone that malpractice had already been committed.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period on legal-malpractice actions, running when the plaintiff learns or should have learned through reasonable diligence of the lawyer’s negligence.

Nail v. William R. Wright and Wright Law Firm P.A.; · filed 2020-09-08

“The three-year statute of limitations applies to actions for legal malpractice.” ... “Under the discovery rule, as applied in a legal-malpractice action, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the plaintiff learns, or through reasonable diligence, should have learned, of the negligence of the lawyer.”

For a legal-malpractice action, the three-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff learns, or through reasonable diligence should have learned, of the lawyer’s negligence.

Bennett v. Hill-Boren P.C. · filed 2011-01-27

The three-year statute of limitations applies to actions for legal malpractice. ... Under the discovery rule, as applied in a legal-malpractice action, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that the plaintiff learns, or through reasonable diligence, should have learned, of the negligence of the lawyer.

Section 15-1-49's general three-year limitations period does not govern claims subject to the Sovereign Immunity Act.

Chamberlin v. City of Hernando · filed 1996-05-10

For the reasons before stated, this Court holds that § 11-46-3 sets forth the intent of the Legislature that the State and its political subdivisions be immune from liability beginning April 1, 1993. Therefore, since the event giving rise to this cause of action occurred April 25, 1993, clearly after the Act went into effect, § 11-46-3 and not § 15-1-49 governs the case now before this Court.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a general three-year limitations period only when no other limitations period applies; a wrongful-death claim based on assault and battery is governed by the tort's one-year period under § 15-1-35.

Thiroux v. Austin · filed 1997-08-11

We note that the parties in this case have concluded that the applicable statute of limitation is that found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995), the general three-year statute of limitation applied to "all claims for which no other period of limitations is prescribed." However, a wrongful death action, since it is predicated on an underlying tort, is limited by the statute of limitation applicable to the tort resulting in the wrongful death.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period only when no other limitations period applies; an intentional-tort wrongful-death claim is governed by the underlying tort’s one-year period instead.

Lee v. Thompson · filed 2001-12-13

...We note that the parties in this case have concluded that the applicable statute of limitation is that found in Miss. Code Ann. §15-1-49 (1995), the general three-year statute of limitation applied to “all claims for which no other period of limitations is prescribed.” However, a wrongful death action, since it is predicated on an underlying tort, is limited by the statute of limitation applicable to the tort resulting in the wrongful death. In this case, the underlying tort is one of assault and battery (murder), which cause is limited to a one-year period. Miss. Code Ann. §15-1-35 (1995); see Veselits ex rel. Cruthirds v. Veselits, 653 F.Supp. 1570, 1575 (S.D. Miss.), aff’d on other grounds, 824 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1987).

Section 15-1-49 supplies the general limitations period for Mississippi wrongful-death actions when no period is built into the wrongful-death statute, and remains procedural for conflict-of-laws purposes.

Nailen v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1988-07-18

An examination of Mississippi’s wrongful death statute (Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (1972 & Supp.1987)) reveals that there is no "built-in” limitations period and therefore Mississippi’s general statute of limitations (Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972)) applies. However, the application of § 15-1-49 to wrongful death actions does not in any way change the traditional rule that Mississippi’s general limitations period is considered procedural for conflict of laws purpose.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for a wrongful-death action when Mississippi's limitations law applies.

Robinson v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2001-01-26

Accordingly, even assuming for the sake of argument, that Kentucky has a “more significant relationship” to the occurrence and the parties, given that the Kentucky courts appear to no longer construe the one-year limitations period as substantive, this court concludes that Mississippi’s three-year statute of limitations applies and that plaintiffs wrongful death action is thus not time barred.

Section 15-1-49 provides the three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Mississippi.

James, Carrie, a Minor, by Elizabeth James, Next Friend v. T.G. Sadler · filed 1990-08-28

Under Owens, the three year residual period provided by Section 15-1-49, Miss.Code Ann. applies.

Section 15-1-49’s general three-year period does not govern a wrongful death claim when the underlying tort has its own limitations period.

Thiroux Ex Rel. Cruz v. Austin · filed 1999-11-18

We note that the parties in this case have concluded that the applicable statute of limitation is that found in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995), the general three-year statute of limitation applied to "all claims for which no other period of limitations is prescribed." However, a wrongful death action, since it is predicated on an underlying tort, is limited by the statute of limitation applicable to the tort resulting in the wrongful death. In this case, the underlying tort is one of assault and battery (murder), which cause is limited to a one-year period.

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual until discovery of a latent injury, but its discovery rule does not apply to conversion of negotiable instruments unless the limitations defendant fraudulently concealed the claim.

Lucille Smith v. Franklin Custodian Funds, Inc. · filed 1997-09-03(2)

Next, Smith contends that the statute of limitations was tolled by the discovery rule presented in Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-49(2) which states: In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. ... We hold today that the rule adopted by a majority of our sister jurisdictions is sound and should be applied in our jurisprudence. We therefore hold that the discovery rule is inapplicable in actions involving conversion of negotiable instruments unless the defendant asserting the statute of limitations is involved in the fraudulent concealment.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period, and the period does not begin until the plaintiff has reasonable notice of the facts underlying the claim.

American Bankers' Insurance Company of Florida v. Wells · filed 1999-02-10

We therefore find that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss Wells's claim for backdating because she never received reasonable notice of the backdating and the statute of limitations never began to run until, presumably, documents were produced during discovery.

For actions with no other limitations period involving latent injury or disease, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

Benvenutti v. McAdams · filed 2015-05-07(2)

Section 15-1-49(2) reads, “[i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.”

The discovery rule applies only when no other period of limitation is prescribed, and it tolls limitations for latent injuries or for nonlatent injuries where the causative negligence is unknown.

Raddin v. Manchester Educational Foundation, Inc. · filed 2015-10-08(2)

The discovery rule applies only “[i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev. 2012). The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations for (1) latent injuries or (2) nonlatent injuries where the negligence that caused the injury is not known.

The discovery rule delays accrual for latent injury or disease actions until the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, but it applies only when no other limitations period is prescribed.

Sharkey v. Barber · filed 2016-02-16(2)

“The discovery rule applies only ‘in actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed.’” ... But here, Chris’s three causes of action had prescribed limitations periods. So the discovery rule does not apply.

The discovery rule delays accrual of a negligence or gross-negligence claim until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury.

Peoples Bank of Biloxi, Mississippi v. McAdams · filed 2015-08-06(2)

However, negligence/gross negligence claims are subject to the “discovery rule” of Section 15-1-49(2), essentially that “the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.”

Section 15-1-49(2) provides that a claim subject to the residual limitations period accrues, at the latest, when the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should discover, the injury.

Rushing v. Yazoo County · filed 2021-06-10(2)

A claim subject to that period accrues, at the latest, when “the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.”

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual of negligence and gross-negligence claims involving latent injury until the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

Erin Burns and Shaun Burns, Co-Executors of The Estate of Katheryn Suzanne Burns, and Erin Burns, Individually v. Bancor · filed 2023-11-21(2)

[N]egligence/gross negligence claims are subject to the discovery rule of Section 15-1-49(2), essentially that the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.

Section 15-1-49(2)'s discovery rule does not apply to conversion actions involving negotiable instruments unless the defendant asserting the statute of limitations was involved in fraudulent concealment.

Smith v. Franklin Custodian Funds, Inc. · filed 1998-10-22(2)

Next, Smith contends that the statute of limitations was tolled by the discovery rule presented in Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-49(2) which states: *148 In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. ... We therefore hold that the discovery rule is inapplicable in actions involving conversion of negotiable instruments unless the defendant asserting the statute of limitations is involved in the fraudulent concealment.

Section 15-1-49's discovery rule does not save a claim when the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to show a latent discovery.

Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans · filed 1994-09-23

We can leave this question for the Mississippi courts, however: In the present matter, Tichenor's evidence that he experienced a latent discovery is insufficient to invoke the discovery rule.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period, and under the discovery rule it begins when the claimant has reasonable notice of the potential claim.

AMERICAN BANKERS'INS. CO. OF FL. v. Wells · filed 2001-12-06

Wells and Oliver do not dispute that the three-year statute of limitations in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995) is applicable to all of these causes of action. ... We therefore find that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss Wells's claim for backdating because she never received reasonable notice of the backdating and the statute of limitations never began to run until, presumably, documents were produced during discovery. ... We find that the Certificates of Insurance gave adequate notice of the backdating and that a reasonable person would have known of the backdating at the time of the receipt of the Certificates. We find that the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss Oliver's claim for backdating because he received reasonable notice of the backdating and the statute of limitations began to run as early as December, 1993, when he received the Certificate of Insurance for the first force-placement, and as late as February, 1995, when he received the Certificate of Insurance for the second force-placement.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for the tort claims at issue, and the period begins when the plaintiff has reasonable notice of the alleged injury or claim.

60rican Bankers' Insurance Co. of Florida v. Wells · filed 2001-12-06

Wells and Oliver do not dispute that the three-year statute of limitations in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995) is applicable to all of these causes of action. ... We therefore find that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss Wells’s claim for backdating because she never received reasonable notice of the backdating and the statute of limitations never began to run until, presumably, documents were produced during discovery. ... We find that the Certificates of Insurance gave adequate notice of the backdating and that a reasonable person would have known of the backdating at the time of the receipt of the Certificates. We find that the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss Oliver’s claim for backdating because he received reasonable notice of the backdating and the statute of limitations began to run as early as December, 1993, when he received the Certificate of Insurance for the first force-placement, and as late as February, 1995, when he received the Certificate of Insurance for the second force-placement.

Section 15-1-49 generally provides a three-year limitations period, while subsection (2) delays accrual for latent injury or disease until the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Bolden v. KENTUCKY FINANCE CO., INC. · filed 2004-03-25(2)

The parties agree that plaintiffs’ claims, all of which are based on misrepresentations which were allegedly made or omissions of fact relating to their loan transactions, are governed by Mississippi’s general three-year statute of limitations, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. This case was filed on February 20, 2002. Thus, any claims that accrued on or before February 20, 1999 would be time barred, unless the statute of limitations was tolled. ... Mississippi Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) establishes the “discovery rule,” and provides, ... In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. ... Inasmuch as the court concludes that plaintiffs’ claims are time barred, it is ordered that defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted.

Subsection (1) imposes a three-year limitations period for actions without another prescribed period, and subsection (2) delays accrual of claims involving latent injury or disease until the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Pollard v. SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO. · filed 2005-09-06(1) and (2)

We agree that §§ 15-1-49(1) and (2) apply as to these claims.[2] ... Furthermore, § 15-1-49(2) states that "[i]n all actions . . . which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury." ... Applying the objective standard of reasonable knowledge articulated by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Edwards, we conclude that Pollard and Trellvion's claims accrued no later than 1994, and based on § 15-1-49(1), we conclude that the statute of limitations on Pollard and Trellvion's claims expired no later than 1997.

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period for actions without another prescribed period, with accrual governed by Mississippi’s discovery rule when applicable.

Channel v. Loyacono · filed 2007-04-19(1)

It is undisputed that § 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code applies to this action. "All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after." Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2003). What is disputed in this case is when exactly the three-year statute of limitations began to run. In other words, when did the cause of action in this case "accrue?" ... A review of the cases reveals that Mississippi does not follow the "continuous representation rule." While the Court has briefly discussed the rule when the argument has been presented, it is clear that this Court follows the discovery rule. ... In Smith v. Sneed, 638 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Miss.1994), this Court held that "the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action properly begins to run on the date the client learns or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should learn of the negligence of his lawyer." This Court has said that the discovery rule is to be applied when "the plaintiff will be precluded from discovering harm or injury because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable nature of the wrongdoing in question," or it may be applied "when it is unrealistic to expect a layman to perceive the injury at the time of the wrongful act." McCain v. Memphis Hardwood Flooring Co., 725 So.2d 788, 794 (Miss.1998) (citing Sneed, 638 So.2d at 1257; Staheli v. Smith, 548 So.2d 1299, 1303 (Miss.1989)). Given this precedent, it must be determined whether the alleged injury in this case was secretive or inherently undiscoverable, or in the alternative, whether the plaintiffs, as laymen, could not have reasonably been expected to perceive the injury at the time of the alleged wrongful act.

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual of claims involving latent injury or disease until the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, but only when no other limitations period applies.

Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2013-09-11(2)

The discovery, rule delays accrual of actions “which involve latent injury or disease ... until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury.” Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). However, the discovery rule only applies “[i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed.” Id. Because a one-year statute of limitations is prescribed for battery, the discovery rule does not apply to Plaintiffs battery claim.

Section 15-1-49 is a three-year catchall limitations statute whose discovery rule delays accrual only for latent injuries, and accrual turns on discovery of the injury rather than its cause.

In re Fresenius Granuflo/Naturalyte Dialysate Products Liability Litigation · filed 2015-01-02

The catch-all three-year statute of limitations provides, “In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” ... Death and cardiac arrest are the injuries that were suffered by plaintiffs or their decedents in these cases. These injuries were apparent to the plaintiffs at the time they occurred, and therefore cannot be considered latent. Even if, as appears implausible, the increased levels of bicarbonate could fairly be considered an additional injury, this does .not change this conclusion. Discovery of the injuries from health problems such as cardiac arrest, not to mention death, does not depend on whether plaintiffs had discovered what *313caused them. While plaintiffs received information about NaturaLyte and Granu-Flo’s effects at a later date, discovery of that information is irrelevant under § 15-1-49 even if no reasonable person would have thought to bring suit absent that information.

The discovery rule in subsection (2) does not apply when the claim is an intentional tort subject to another prescribed limitations period.

Sharkey v. Barber · filed 2016-02-16(2)

Because all three of Chris’s claims are intentional torts, section 15-1-49(2) does not apply. Id. at 1249 (¶ 14). So Chris cannot appeal to the discovery rule to save his untimely claim.

Under § 15-1-49, the three-year period for a legal malpractice claim begins when the client knew or should have known of the alleged wrongdoing.

Sarenthia Channel v. Loyacono · filed 2005-01-25(1)

It is undisputed that § 15-1-49 of the Mississippi Code applies to this action. ... Because plaintiffs Channel and Robinson believed Loyacono and Verhine were guilty of wrongdoing in December of 2000, the statute of limitations began to run as to their legal malpractice claims at that time, and their claims are barred.

The three-year limitations period is tolled until a plaintiff should reasonably know of the claim, but the plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to discover it.

Serton v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys Co. · filed 2012-02-03

Mississippi’s discovery rule will toll the statute of limitations until the plaintiff should have reasonably known of his cause of action. Blailock ex. rel. Blailock v. Hubbs, 919 So. 2d 126, 130 (Miss. 2005). But plaintiffs “must exercise reasonable diligence in determining whether an injury suffered is actionable,” in order to benefit from the discovery rule. Id.

Section 15-1-49(2)’s discovery rule applies to injury to property and did not toll the three-year limitations period for the asserted lending claims.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2022-10-26(2)

Section 15-1-49(2) sets forth Mississippi’s “discovery rule.” That rule has no application herein, because it applies to injury to property.

Section 15-1-49 applies a discovery rule to latent injuries: the limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury.

Williams v. Kilgore · filed 1992-12-17

In other contexts, particularly asbestosis cases, where it may be decades before symptoms of the disease become apparent, we have read the word "accrue" to import a discovery rule into § 15-1-49. The case sub judice is analogous to those involving latent injuries and diseases, which are governed by Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, the general three year statute of limitations, which now also employs the discovery standard.

The three-year period begins when the plaintiff discovers the injury, even if its cause remains unknown.

Anthony K. Hood and Barbara L. Hood v. A & A Excavating Contractors, Inc., Asbury Lane Village, LLC and ALV Development, · filed 2022-05-17(2)

Under section 15-1-49, a plaintiff has three years from the discovery of his injury to determine the cause(s) of the injury and file suit against the responsible party or parties.

For a latent injury, Section 15-1-49(2) starts the limitations period when the plaintiff discovers the injury, even if the plaintiff does not yet know its cause.

Pryor v. J. B. Hunt Transport, Inc. · filed 2026-05-07(2)

Under Angle, Pryor’s ignorance of the cause of his injuries is not relevant as long as he knew of the injuries themselves, and he admits knowing of them in the above-quoted response.

Section 15-1-49’s discovery rule delays accrual for a latent injury or disease; a loan’s disclosed interest rate is not a latent injury.

Archer v. NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION · filed 2007-09-04(2)

This case does not relate to a latent injury or disease. The injury (having been charged an interest rate that was not the best) occurred on the date Plaintiffs signed the contracts, and the terms of the deal were clearly stated and well known.

Section 15-1-49(2) makes the timeliness of these claims depend on when the claimant knew or should have known about them.

Fitzmaurice v. Vandevort · filed 2017-08-08(2)

Whether those claims were timely depends on when Fitzmaurice knew or should have known about them.

Section 15-1-49(2) applies only to latent injury or disease; an undervalued sale is not a latent injury when the property's true value was reasonably discoverable.

Monty Y. Brown v. McKee · filed 2018-05-10(2)

But this provision applies only to actions "involv[ing] latent injury or disease." ... Here, Brown's alleged injury-underselling his interest in the company-was not latent. The true value of the apartment complex at the time of sale was reasonably discoverable-especially to someone like Brown, who according to his own pleading had experience building apartments in Starkville.

Section 15-1-49(2) applies the discovery rule only to latent injuries and tolls the limitations period until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the injury.

William T. White and William T. White d/b/a White Haul Transport, Inc. v. Patsy B. White · filed 2022-08-16(2)

However, section 15-1-49(2) ... applies only to actions that involve a “latent injury,” and it tolls the statute of limitations only until “the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.”

Section 15-1-49 applies the three-year limitations period for written contracts when an employment writing contains sufficient information to make the agreement definite.

Levens v. Campbell · filed 1997-11-04

On written contracts, however, there is a three year limitations period. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). ... We conclude that while this writing will not disaffirm employment- at-will status, the hiring information section of the application contains sufficient information for the document to constitute a writing for purposes of the statute of limitations. ... We hold that this is a writing which defeats the one year limitations period of § 15-1-29.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for actions on written contracts.

Levens v. Campbell · filed 1999-01-21

On written contracts, however, there is a three year limitations period. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). ... We conclude that while this writing will not disaffirm employment-at-will status, the hiring information section of the application contains sufficient information for the document to constitute a writing for purposes of the statute of limitations. ... We hold that this is a writing which defeats the one year limitations period of § 15-1-29.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for contracts for professional services, barring recovery for services and expenses from a representation that ended more than three years before the claim.

In Re Estate of Stewart · filed 1999-02-18

It is true that § 15-1-49, rather than § 15-1-29, applies to contracts for professional services. See Michael S. Fawer v. Evans, 627 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss. 1993). We must determine whether the chancellor was manifestly erroneous in finding that portions of the claim were barred by the three (3) year statute of limitations. ... The record supports the finding that the chancellor was not manifestly erroneous in holding that a claim will only be recognized from May 21, 1993, which was the start of a "new lawsuit." The prior representation ended March 10, 1989, and the three (3) years statute of limitations precludes a claim for any services or expenses for that period of representation.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for actions on written contracts.

Brewer v. American Power Source, Inc. · filed 2007-10-03

Also without merit are plaintiffs’ arguments, based on an affidavit from plaintiff Annie Williams, that a document signed by the plaintiffs during orientation setting forth their rate of pay and other information, constituted a written employment contract within the meaning of Miss.Code. Ann. § 15 — 1—49. In the court’s view, this evidence does not suffice to establish a written employment contract, and § 15-1-29 sets forth the appropriate statute of limitations in this case.

Section 15-1-49 provides that a claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury; awareness of the full extent of harm is unnecessary.

Wheeler v. Magdovitz · filed 1998-03-30

Further, under Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, a claim accrues when a plaintiff “discover[s], or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” ... In this case, as in Tomaiolo, Wheeler should have discovered any discrepancies between his actual assets and those listed on his bankruptcy petition at the time he signed the petition.

For actions with no other limitations period involving latent injury or disease, subsection (2) delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury, and the court applied that discovery exception to alleged latent property contamination.

Donald v. Amoco Production Co. · filed 1999-03-25(2)

Section 15-1-49 states: ... (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. ... Recognizing Donald's allegations as true and with this logic in mind, it only seems equitable that the discovery exception should apply in the unique facts of the instant case. ... Therefore, we conclude that the lower court erred in failing to apply the discovery exception.

For latent injuries, section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury; discovering the injury's cause is unnecessary.

J.P. Milam v. Kelly · filed 2019-07-30(2)

Section 15-1-49(2) provides a tolling provision for the statute of limitations, known as the discovery rule: “In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” The Mississippi Supreme Court further clarified this rule, stating that “causes of action accrue upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause.”

The discovery rule delays accrual until a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered a latent injury, but it does not apply when the plaintiff's symptoms make the injury readily discoverable.

Hannah v. Piccadilly Holdings, LLC · filed 2019-08-30(2)

Section 15-1-49(2) of the Mississippi Code provides an exception to this general rule. It states that “[i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). This is “the discovery rule.” ... The subsection5 of the Mississippi Code referenced by Hannah applies only to latent injuries or diseases. ... Experiencing nausea, vomiting, chills, and sweats for several days, and then seeking medical treatment for those very symptoms indicates that Hannah “‘knew’ or ‘reasonably should have known’ that [he] suffered an injury.” PPG Architectural Finishes, 909 So. 2d at 51. ... This means that, at least as of June 11, 2015, Hannah’s illness could not be categorized as a latent injury.

Subsection (2) makes a latent-injury claim accrue when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury, rather than when the plaintiff discovers its cause.

City of Tupelo, Mississippi v. John Patterson (Pat) O'Callaghan · filed 2017-01-19(2)

A cause of action concerning a latent injury, therefore, accrues when the right to sue becomes vested: the date the injury is discovered by the plaintiff.

Under subsection (2), the discovery rule delays accrual of an action involving latent injury until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury, and whether that occurred may be a jury question.

McGowen v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Biloxi and Sacred Heart Catholic Church · filed 2021-06-17(2)

Again, Section 15-1-49 states that the “cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” ... The Court need go no further than the language of Section 15-1-49 to resolve the instant appeal. The complaint alleges that the Plaintiff did not know of his injury until late 2018. As the Court must take all allegations of the complaint as true in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to invoke the discovery rule in answer to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The statute’s discovery rule delays accrual of an action involving latent injury or disease until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the injury.

Sandra Davis and Porter Horgan v. Davis · filed 2023-03-16(2)

The discovery rule provides that in actions “which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev. 2019). ... We adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and hold that the discovery rule does not apply to the tort of alienation of affection. The tort requires loss of affection or consortium, an injury that is readily perceivable with reasonable diligence.

Section 15-1-49(2) delays accrual until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered a latent injury; it does not delay accrual until the plaintiff discovers the injury's cause.

Clearman v. Pipestone Property Services, LLC and Mississippi Commercial Landscaping, LLC · filed 2023-11-21(2)

“[s]ection 15-1-49(2) provides a discovery rule that delays the accrual of the cause of action until the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered a latent injury . . . . No provision of [s]ection 15-1-49 provides that a plaintiff must have knowledge of the cause of the injury before the cause of action accrues, initiating the running of the statute of limitations.” ... Stated simply, under section 15-1-49, a plaintiff has three years from the discovery of his injury to determine the cause(s) of the injury and file suit against the responsible party or parties. ... “[I]f there is no latent injury, the discovery rule cannot apply.”

For a latent injury, the discovery rule may be decided without a jury when reasonable minds could not differ about when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.

F & S Sand, Inc. v. Stringfellow · filed 2019-02-28(2)

Based on the facts presented at the motion hearing, this Court holds that the statute-of-limitations issue is not a question of fact for the jury because reasonable minds could not differ about the conclusion.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions for which no other limitations period is prescribed to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Robinson v. Cobb · filed 1999-06-03(1)

It is undisputed that the statute of limitations applicable to this action is the three-year limitations period found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (1995) which states that "[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after."

Subsection (1) provides a three-year limitations period for actions with no other prescribed period, measured from accrual, while applicable disability-tolling rules may suspend that period.

Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams Company · filed 2003-08-08(1)

The applicable statute of limitations is provided by Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1), which states: ... (1) [a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. ... Both statutes refer to the accrual date of the cause of action. ... As Trellvion was a minor at the time his cause of action accrued, as well as at present, his claims are tolled by the “minor saving statute” and not barred by Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in barring Trellvion’s claims.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period on negligence claims, including negligence claims underlying a wrongful-death action.

Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc. · filed 2005-11-30

The three year statute of limitations applicable to negligence actions is codified in Miss. Code Ann. Section 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). We hold that Jenkins may not rely on any act of negligence which allegedly occurred three years before the complaint was filed on December 31, 2002. Claims – whether for negligence or wrongful death – that were not brought within the applicable statute of limitations are barred by that statute.

Section 15-1-49 imposes a three-year limitations period on negligence claims, and a wrongful-death claim based on negligence is barred to the extent the underlying negligent act occurred more than three years before suit was filed.

Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc. · filed 2006-04-27

The three year statute of limitations applicable to negligence actions is codified in Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). We hold that Jenkins may not rely on any act of negligence which allegedly occurred three years before the complaint was filed on December 31, 2002. Claims — whether for negligence or wrongful death — that were not brought within the applicable statute of limitations are barred by that statute.

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action against an insurer for uninsured-motorist benefits when treated as an action on contract.

Mitchell v. Progressive Insurance Company · filed 2006-07-31(1)

A cause of action against an insurer for uninsured motorist benefits is an action on contract. See Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tompkins, 490 So. 2d 897, 906 (Miss. 1986). As such, a three-year statute of limitations period applies. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2003). As both parties submit this cause of action accrued on January 16, 2003, the Court shall accept this date for its analysis. As “a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court[,]” Mitchell was required to file a complaint, in compliance with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, on or before expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Miss. R. Civ. P. 3(a).

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year residual statute of limitations for personal-injury actions, requiring suit within three years after the claim accrues.

Giles v. Stokes · filed 2008-07-22

Mississippi's residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). Thus, under Mississippi law, Giles was required to file his complaint within three years of the date his action accrued in order to be within the statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 supplies a three-year limitations period for actions lacking another prescribed period, including McArn wrongful-discharge tort claims.

Community Care Center of Aberdeen v. Barrentine · filed 2015-03-26

Section 15-1-49 provides that “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” While we have not previously stated that this is the statute of limitations that applies to McArn claims, we do so today. ... McArn wrongful-discharge claims are subject to Section 15-1-49’s three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49(1) supplies a general three-year limitations period for actions with no other prescribed limitations period, including intentional infliction of emotional distress and abuse of process.

GEICO Casualty Company, Geico General Insurance Company, GEICO Indemnity a/k/a GEICO Direct, as Subrogee of Fonda Magee · filed 2021-04-15(1)

We overrule Jones because it judicially expanded the one-year statute of limitations in Section 15-1-35 to include torts beyond the ones chosen by the Legislature and return to the Court’s original interpretation as stated in Norman. As such, Stapleton’s intentional tort claims fall within the general, three-year statute of limitations in Section 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions for which no other limitation period is prescribed to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Kelly v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Jennifer L. Shackelford, Liberty Home Equity Solutions, Inc. and Professiona · filed 2021-12-09(1)

Thus, like the additional claims made by the brother in Lott, Kelly’s claims fall under Section 15-1-49 or Section 15-1-35, respectively. Id. Therefore, this Court concludes that the chancery court did not err by finding that the three-year statute of limitations under Section 15-1-49 applies to Kelly’s negligence claims and that the one-year statute of limitations under 15-1-35 applies to Kelly’s slander-of-title claim.

Section 15-1-49(1) supplies a three-year limitations period for actions when no other limitations period is prescribed.

Johnson v. George Miller, Sr., individual capacity; Donald Mitchell, individual capacity; and Clarksdale Public · filed 2024-11-21(1)

The MWPA does not prescribe a statute of limitations. Thus, consistent with this Court’s opinion in GEICO Casualty Co. v. Stapleton, 315 So. 3d 464, 468 (Miss. 2021), Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(1) applies. “All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced with three (3) years after the cause of action accrued, and not after.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2019).

Section 15-1-49's general three-year limitations period does not govern the penal tree-cutting damages covered by § 95-5-10(1); those damages are subject to the one-year limitations period in § 15-1-33.

McCain v. Memphis Hardwood Flooring Co. · filed 1998-06-04

Miss.Code Ann. § 95-5-10 (1994) makes the wrongdoer pay double the fair market value of any tree destroyed or cut without the owner's permission. Thus, after the wrongdoer pays the fair market value of the trees to the owner, any additional amount paid is not compensatory but a penalty. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-33 operates as a one-year statute of limitations to the penal part of § 95-5-10(1). The McCains' contention is correct that § 95-5-29 only applies to subsection (2) of § 95-5-10, but, their contention that subsection (1) of § 95-5-10 is subject to the three-year statute of limitations under Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995) is incorrect to the extent that it applies to the destruction of trees.

Section 15-1-49(1) gives actions with no other prescribed limitations period three years after accrual to be commenced.

Sheriff v. Morris · filed 2000-09-26(1)

Pursuant to this statute, Sheriff had three years from the time the forfeiture proceedings concluded in which to file his cause of action.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence causes of action.

Owens v. Mai · filed 2005-01-13

Because of this, the statute of limitations ran in March, 2000, some fourteen (14) months prior to Mai's motion to dismiss Crystal Springs I and some nineteen (19) months prior to Owens's filing of Crystal Springs II. Thus, when Owens filed Crystal Springs II, the three (3) year statute of limitation set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003) had run.

Section 15-1-49 gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period running from the date the wrongful-death cause of action accrued.

Anderson v. R & D FOODS, INC. · filed 2005-04-26

Since the Andersons asserted negligence claims, they had three years from the date of Holly's death in which to file suit. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev. 2003). ... The Andersons filed their amended complaint against R & D approximately one year after the expiration of the three year period.

Section 15-1-49(1) requires actions without another prescribed limitations period, including the fraud claims here, to be filed within three years after accrual; the court held that the plaintiffs' claims were barred because they knew of the alleged misrepresentations more than three years before filing suit.

Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Ballard · filed 2005-10-06(1)

"[I]n Mississippi a claim of fraud has a three-year statute of limitations in accordance with Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 concerning actions without a prescribed period of limitation." ... "The Plaintiffs claim that SF fraudulently induced them into the contract containing the arbitration agreement. Based on the record, it is clear that the Plaintiffs were aware of the matters that were allegedly misrepresented to them by SF well in excess of three years before the suits were filed. Therefore, we find that Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 operates here to bar the Plaintiffs' claims."

Section 15-1-49(1) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on an action against an insurer for uninsured-motorist benefits because that claim is an action on contract.

Mitchell v. Progressive Ins. Co. · filed 2007-09-27(1)

A cause of action against an insurer for uninsured motorist benefits is an action on contract. See Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tompkins, 490 So.2d 897, 906 (Miss.1986). As such, a three-year statute of limitations period applies. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev.2003).

Section 15-1-49(1) provides a three-year limitations period for actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed.

Pickett v. Gallagher · filed 2014-08-19(1)

The parties do not dispute that the statute of limitations for the causes of action raised in Pickett’s complaint is three years. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2012) (providing three-year statute of limitations for “actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed”). ... Based on Pickett’s receipt of the settlement check in February 2000, the three-year statute of limitations expired in February 2003. ... We find summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of the defendants/appellees based on the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 begins running on fraud or misrepresentation claims when the plaintiff knows of the alleged fraudulent conduct and the defendant’s denial of it.

Fulgham v. Woodmen of the Wrld · filed 2000-03-27

Thus, by at least May 14, 1989, the plaintiffs were aware of the defendant’s denial of any fraudulent actions in connection with the issuing of the insurance policy. Consequently, any potential cause of action for fraud growing out of this contractual relationship accrued as of that time. Accordingly, because the plaintiffs filed their suit for misrepresentation and bad faith after May 1995, it was untimely.

Section 15-1-49 applies a three-year limitations period to these claims, running when the fraud is discovered or reasonably could have been discovered.

Jabour v. Life Insurance Co. of North America · filed 2005-03-31

Furthermore, Jabour did not file this lawsuit alleging claims arising firom the sale of the 1987 policy until 2004. His claims for misrepresentation and gross negligence against Harvel are governed by the three-year statute of limitations. See Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Therefore, the claims against Harvel are barred by the statute of limitations unless the statute is tolled by the discovery rule or by fraudulent concealment. ... Under Mississippi law, “the statute of limitations commences to run in any event at the time the fraud is discovered, or at such time as the fraudulent concealment ‘with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered.’ ” ... A review of the 1987 policy reveals that it is sufficiently clear as to its exclusion of Jabour’s condition to have placed Jabour on notice, at the time of the signing and the receipt of the policy, of any alleged misrepresentation made by Harvel. Inasmuch as Jabour signed the 1987 policy and received a copy of it, his claim against Harvel for misrepresentation accrued at the time of the signing and receipt of the policy. Jabour’s claim against Harvel as to the 1987 policy is barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 begins running on a subrogated claim when the insured’s claim accrues; a later subrogation agreement does not start a new limitations period.

Ind. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. v. Mathes · filed 1984-09-12

ILM's argument overlooks the fact that it was subrogated only to its insured's right of action which accrued on December 1, 1976. The subrogation agreement did not create a new cause of action, because ILM only succeeded to the rights and remedies of its insureds.

Section 15-1-49’s three-year period for fraud claims begins when the sale is completed if the plaintiff then has contract terms that contradict the alleged earlier misrepresentation.

Bentley v. Mutual Benefits Corp. · filed 2007-11-05

Therefore, in accordance with Carter, Andrus, Stephens, and Dunn, we conclude that Bentley was on notice and that his claims accrued on May 27, 1997, the time he completed the purchase of the viatical settlement. Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly found that Bentley’s April 5, 2002 causes of action, which were filed nearly five years after the purchase of the viatical settlement, are time-barred.

Section 15-1-49's general three-year limitations period does not apply to an action concerning conveyances that are void ab initio.

Seay v. Seay · filed 2002-01-24

An action to set aside the conveyances was therefore unnecessary, and no statutory limitation of action applies hereto.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitation does not apply to an action concerning conveyances that were void ab initio.

Seay v. Seay · filed 2000-07-24

Three sisters, Maynette Seay, Annette Seay Hinds, and Elizabeth Seay Self, seek review of the DeSoto County Chancery Court's finding that their claims were barred under the general three-year statute of limitations found in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). We find that the attempted conveyances of the sisters' interest in certain real property were not valid, and were, in fact, void ab initio. An action to set aside the conveyances was therefore unnecessary, and no statutory limitation of action applies hereto.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period does not apply to an action concerning conveyances that were void ab initio, because no action to set them aside is necessary.

In Re Estate of Hardy · filed 2002-01-24

Three sisters, Maynette Seay, Annette Seay Hinds, and Elizabeth Seay Self, seek review of the DeSoto County Chancery Court's finding that their claims were barred under the general three-year statute of limitations found in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). We find that the attempted conveyances of the sisters' interest in certain real property were not valid, and were, in fact, void ab initio. An action to set aside the conveyances was therefore unnecessary, and no statutory limitation of action applies hereto.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitation does not apply to an action concerning conveyances that are void ab initio.

In Re Estate of Hardy · filed 2005-08-04

The applicable statute of limitations and the proper venue are not issues because the deeds were void ab initio.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period does not bar an action concerning conveyances that are void ab initio.

Seay v. Seay · filed 2005-08-04

Three sisters, Maynette Seay, Annette Seay Hinds, and Elizabeth Seay Self, seek review of the DeSoto County Chancery Court’s finding that their claims were barred under the general three-year statute of limitations found in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). ... An action *1054to set aside the conveyances was therefore unnecessary, and no statutory limitation of action applies hereto. ... The applicable statute of limitations and the proper venue are not issues because the deeds were void ab initio.

Section 15-1-49's three-year limitations period does not govern an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim when the applicable Mississippi law subjects that claim to a one-year limitations period.

Hervey v. Metlife General Insurance Corp. System Agency of Mississippi, Inc. · filed 2001-03-15

With respect to Schmidt’s contention that plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35, plaintiff argues that this tort is not governed by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-35, but rather by the three-year limitations period of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Having considered the parties’ arguments on the subject and having reviewed pertinent authorities, the court concludes that plaintiffs claim is indeed time-barred.

For an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance when no other limitations statute applies, § 15-1-49 requires suit within three years after accrual.

O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Millette · filed 2001-02-08

O'Neal's action to set aside the alleged fraudulent conveyance by Ted Millette is governed by the catch-all statute of limitations set out in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49. O'Neal's claim that this action is governed by the ten year limitations period found in § 15-1-7 is groundless since this suit is not "an action to recover land" as contemplated by that statute. Since O'Neal did not file this action for four years, rather than three years required by statute, after Ted Millette recorded his deed conveying the property, O'Neal's action to set aside the same is time barred.

Section 15-1-49’s catch-all limitations period does not bar a claim when equitable estoppel prevents the period from running.

Public Employees Retirement System v. Langham · filed 2001-07-02

The Patrol contends that in a situation such as this where there is no set statute of limitations, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995) establishes a three-year "catch-all" statute of limitations. ... If it is true that the Patrol has undertaken a duty, equitable estoppel would prevent the running of the statute of limitations from hindering Langham in her attempt to receive the statutory benefits increases. ... The decision of the trial court is affirmed as to the statute of limitations.

Section 15-1-49 is the catch-all statute of limitations governing an action to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance when no other limitations period applies.

O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Millette · filed 1999-06-28

O'Neal's action to set aside the alleged fraudulent conveyance by Ted Millette is governed by the catch-all statute of limitations set out in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.

Section 15-1-49(1)'s three-year limitations period begins to run, at the latest here, when an insured receives written notice that the insurer denied the claim.

Eddie Oaks v. Sellers · filed 2005-12-12(1)

For the above reasons, we find that the three-year statute of limitations, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49, began to run at the latest on August 26, 1997, when Sellers received written notice that American States denied his insurance claim. Therefore, we find that the DeSoto County Circuit Court erred by denying the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We now reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of DeSoto County and render judgment to dismiss Sellers’s claims against the Defendants, Eddie Oaks, Brenda Oaks, Oaks Insurance Agency, Inc., and DeSoto Insurance, Inc., as the claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

Subsection (1) supplies a three-year catch-all statute of limitations for claims not covered by another limitations provision.

Patel v. Hill-Rom Company, Incorporated · filed 2016-06-28(1)

The three-year “catch-all” statute of limitations applied to Patel’s claims. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2012). Patel filed his complaint on February 8, 2013, which was more than five years after his father died. Unless he could establish fraudulent concealment, his wrongful-death claims were two years beyond the statute of limitations.

Subsection 15-1-49(1) is a three-year catch-all limitations period that applies only when no other limitation period is prescribed.

Mid-South Outlet Shops, LLC v. C70 Builders, Inc. · filed 2024-11-13(1)

From the language above, it is clear that the three-year limitation period in §49 is a catch-all limitation that only applies if “no other period of limitation is prescribed.” Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1); White v. White, 325 So.3d 666, 676 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). ... Therefore, §41 applies to Tanger’s breach of contract claim as well, and the three-year limitations period of §49 is not applicable.

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations for the claims at issue.

Pitts v. Watkins · filed 2003-12-11

This is in direct contradiction of Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 which provides for a three-year statute of limitations. This period of limitation cannot be changed by contract, and any such change in the limitations period shall be null and void. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-5 (Rev. 2003).

Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations, and a contract cannot shorten that period.

Pitts v. Watkins · filed 2005-04-14

After reviewing the contract in its entirety, including all terms, the document purports to establish its own one-year statute of limitations, in contradiction to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003). ¶ 18. The document contains the following provision: "Any legal action arising from this Agreement or from the Inspection and Report, including (but not limited to) the arbitration proceeding more specifically described above, must be commenced within one (1) year from the date of the Inspection." This is in direct contradiction of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 which provides for a three-year statute of limitations. This period of limitation cannot be changed by contract, and any such change in the limitations period shall be null and void. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-5 (Rev. 2003). The attempt to create a private statute of limitations is further evidence of overreaching by Watkins, is oppressive, violates statutory law and is likewise unconscionable.