Statute Annotations › Mississippi › Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1

Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1

Definitions for Mississippi Tort Claims Act: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Mississippi
Case notes
98
Cited in passing
326
Citing cases indexed
519
Case dates
1990–2025
Screened through
2026-03-17
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

424 citing cases reviewed of 519 in the citation index: 98 interpreted the section (annotated below), 326 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-03-17 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Definitions of state and governmental entity

Section 11-46-1(e) includes the Mississippi Highway Commission in its definition of the State.

McKay v. Boyd Const. Co., Inc. · filed 1990-11-28(e)

"State" means the state of Mississippi and any office, department, agency, division ... whether or not such body or instrumentality thereof has the authority to levy taxes or to sue or be sued in its own name. Therefore, Mississippi Highway Commission is the State. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(e) (Supp. 1990).
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Section 11-46-1(g)'s definition of “State” includes the Mississippi Transportation Commission.

Watkins v. Transportation Comm, MS · filed 1996-07-15(g)

The definition of "State," supra, clearly encompasses the MTC.
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Section 11-46-1’s definition of “state” includes Jackson State University.

Glover v. Jackson State University · filed 1997-08-14

The Tort Claims Act took effect in April of 1993, but immunity was not waived for the state (JSU falls within § 11-46-1's definition of "state") until July 1, 1993.
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Section 11-46-1(d) defines governmental entity to include the state and political subdivisions for purposes of sovereign immunity.

State v. Hinds County Bd. of Sup'rs · filed 1994-03-31(d)

Miss.Code Section 11-46-1(d) states "Governmental entity" means and includes the state and political subdivisions as herein defined. ... A suit is barred, in this instance, under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1 or § 11-46-6.
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Section 11-46-1(j) covers a state university hospital such as UMC.

Pickens v. Donaldson · filed 1998-01-07(j)

Finally, the alleged negligence occurred at a university hospital of the state, UMC. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(j) (Supp. 1999).
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Section 11-46-1's definition of “state” includes Jackson State University.

Glover v. Jackson State University · filed 2000-01-27

The Tort Claims Act took effect in April of 1993, but immunity was not waived for the state (JSU falls within § 11-46-1's definition of "state") until July 1, 1993.
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Section 11-46-1 includes a UMMC practice plan that provides clinical services within the definitions of both “political subdivision” and “state.”

Mozingo v. Scharf · filed 2002-10-24(i), (j)

By providing clinical patient services, UAS is carrying out state governmental activities on behalf of UMMC. Therefore, UAS falls squarely within the definition of a political subdivision. ... UAS falls within the definition of "state" because it is an instrumentality of UMMC.
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes a UMMC medical practice group within the definition of “State” when the group is an instrumentality of the hospital.

Watts v. Tsang · filed 2002-10-17(j)

UAS meets the definition of "State" because it is an instrumentality of UMMC, a state teaching hospital.
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Section 11-46-1(j) classifies the Mississippi Department of Human Services as a state department.

Little v. DHS · filed 2002-11-07(j)

As DHS is a state "department" under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(j), proper service would be had on the chief executive officer of DHS.
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes the Mississippi Department of Transportation in the definition of “state,” making it subject to suit under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Johnson v. James Construction Group, LLC · filed 2004-02-20(j)

Therefore, under a plain reading of this statute, MDOT falls under the definition of the “state” provided in the MTCA.
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Section 11-46-1(j) places state universities within the immunity of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Johnson v. Alcorn State University · filed 2006-05-23(j)

State universities fall within the immunity of the MTCA. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(j) (Rev.2002).
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes a state university within the coverage of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Pritchard v. Von Houten · filed 2007-02-06(j)

USM is a state university that falls within the coverage of the MTCA. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(j) (Rev. 2002); Miss.Code Ann. § 37-119-1 (Rev. 2001).
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes UMMC as a state instrumentality subject to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

University of Mississippi Medical Center v. McGee · filed 2007-05-24(j)

UMMC is an instrument of the State of Mississippi and is subject to the requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”).
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Section 11-46-1(j) treats the University of Mississippi Medical Center as a state instrumentality subject to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. McGee · filed 2008-12-11(j)

UMMC is an instrument of the State of Mississippi and is subject to the requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act ("MTCA").
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Section 11-46-1(j) brings public hospitals within the MTCA’s coverage.

Sidney Carlton Gorton, M.D. v. Rance · filed 2009-06-22(j)

Public hospitals are covered by the MTCA. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(j) (Rev. 2002).
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes public hospitals among the entities covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Gorton v. Rance · filed 2011-01-27(j)

Public hospitals are covered by the MTCA. Miss.Code Ann. § 11 — 46—l(j) (Rev.2002).
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Section 11-46-1 covers a hospital owned and operated by city and county governments, along with its employees, under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Stark v. Greenwood Leflore Hospital · filed 2009-06-23

GLH was owned and operated by the City of Greenwood, Mississippi and Leflore County, Mississippi, which are political subdivisions of the State of Mississippi; therefore, GLH and its employees were entitled to the protections afforded by the MTCA. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 (Supp.2008).
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Section 11-46-1 includes a school district within the MTCA’s definitions of “governmental entity” and “political subdivision.”

Covington County School District v. Magee · filed 2010-01-28

The District constitutes a “governmental entity” and a “political subdivision” pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 (Rev.2002).
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Section 11-46-1 classifies a school district as a governmental entity and political subdivision under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Swindle v. Neshoba County School District · filed 2013-09-10

As stated, the School District “constitutes a ‘governmental entity’ and a ‘political subdivision’ pursuant to the MTCA.” See Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Magee, 29 So.3d 1, 4 (¶ 7) (Miss.2010) (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 (Rev.2012)).
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Whether an entity is an instrumentality of a state commission for MTCA coverage requires a fact-specific determination.

Former Board of Trustees & Members of Mississippi Comp Choice Self-Insurers Fund v. Mississippi Workers' Compensation Gr · filed 2014-11-20(j)

Whether GGA is an instrumentality of the Commission is a fact-driven determination, It cannot be made until all facts are developed and considered, as shown by our caselaw.
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes hospitals in the definition of “State,” so a hospital is a state entity whose own chief executive officer may receive notice of a claim.

Spencer Ivy v. East Mississippi State Hospital · filed 2016-05-12(j)

The same is true here; Section 11-46-1(j)’s definition of “State” includes hospitals, and the DMH is not a substitute for EMSH’s CEO.
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes a state hospital as a state entity even when another state department has authority over it.

Spencer Ivy v. East Mississippi State Hospital · filed 2016-05-12(j)

Charles Carlisle is EMSH’s—the “state entity’s”—CEO under the MTCA.
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes UMMC within the MTCA’s definition of “state.”

Forrest Gen. Hosp., J. Keith Thompson, Hattiesburg Clinic, Grif A. Leek & S. Miss. Emergency Physicians, P.A. v. Steven · filed 2018-04-19(j)

Further, UMMC is within the definition of "[s]tate" under the MTCA. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(j).
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Section 11-46-1’s definition of “State” includes the Mississippi Department of Employment Security as a state agency.

Huddleston v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security · filed 2025-06-10

Under Mississippi law, the term “State” includes “the State of Mississippi and any office, department, agency, division, bureau, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, airport, or other instrumentality thereof.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1. This broad definition encompasses MDES, as it is a state agency whose primary function is to promote employment security and administer unemployment benefits.
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Section 11-46-1 defines “State” for MTCA immunity to include state agencies and divisions, encompassing MDCPS and its local offices.

Taylor v. Preciado · filed 2025-09-30

In defining the “State” for purposes of immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Mississippi law includes any “office, department, agency, division, [and] bureau” in the definition of “State.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1. So, Mississippi law treats MDCPS as an arm of the state and its local offices as non-autonomous divisions within MDCPS, not as a local or county entity.11 This factor favors immunity.
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Section 11-46-1(g) and (j) define governmental entities covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act; Pearl River Community College qualifies.

Owens v. Pearl River Community College · filed 2022-05-05(g), (j)

The Court agrees with the Defendants that there is no dispute that PRCC is a governmental entity as defined by the MTCA. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(g), (j).
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Section 11-46-1 defines a governmental entity to include a political subdivision, including a municipality.

Moore RESTRICTED FILER v. Monroe County Detention Facility · filed 2024-11-12(g), (i)

The Board, as a municipality, is considered a governmental entity under the MTCA. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(g), (i) (“governmental entity” includes “political subdivision” and “political subdivision” includes municipalities).
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Section 11-46-1’s definitions cover a junior college such as Jones College as a governmental entity under the MTCA.

Thompson v. Pass Christian Public School District · filed 2024-11-30(g), (i)

Jones College is a “governmental entity” covered by the MTCA.
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Section 11-46-1(j) includes UMMC as a state entity covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Papin v. University of Mississippi Medical Center · filed 2023-05-18(j)

UMMC is a state entity covered by the MTCA.
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Political subdivisions and school districts

Section 11-46-1(i) defines a school district as a political subdivision of the state.

Gressett v. Newton Sep Mun Sch Dist · filed 1994-09-02(i)

Any doubt that the Newton County School District constitutes a political subdivision of the state is removed by Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i), which specifically provides that a school district constitutes a political subdivision of the state.
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Section 11-46-1(i) defines a school district as both a political subdivision and a governmental entity.

Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland School District · filed 1997-10-21(i)

Section 11-46-1 specifically provides that a school district constitutes a "political subdivision" as well as "governmental entity" of the state.
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Section 11-46-1(i) defines political subdivisions to include a municipality and its instrumentality.

Chamberlin v. City of Hernando · filed 1996-05-10(i)

Section 11-46-1(i)(Supp. 1997) defines political subdivisions as a municipality and its instrumentality. There is no entity entitled "Hernando Ambulance Service," as such service is provided by the municipality of Hernando.
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Section 11-46-1(i) defines a school district as a political subdivision of the state.

Gressett v. Newton Separate Mun. School Dist. · filed 1997-07-17(i)

Any doubt that the Newton County School District constitutes a political subdivision of the state is removed by Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i), which specifically provides that a school district constitutes a political subdivision of the state.
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Section 11-46-1(g)(i) defines a school district as a political subdivision and a governmental entity under the MTCA.

Brewer v. Burdette · filed 1997-08-01(g)(i)

The MTCA defines a "school district" as a "political subdivision" and a "governmental entity."
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Section 11-46-1(i) defines political subdivisions to include municipalities and their instrumentalities; a municipal ambulance service is not a separate entity.

Chamberlin v. City of Hernando · filed 1998-06-18(i)

Section 11-46-1(i)(Supp. 1997) defines political subdivisions as a municipality and its instrumentality. There is no entity entitled "Hernando Ambulance Service," as such service is provided by the municipality of Hernando.
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes Madison County Medical Center within the Act's definition of a political subdivision.

Henderson v. Un-Named Emergency Room · filed 1998-07-23(i)

MCMC is a political subdivision as defined in Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-1(i), and all tort claims against MCMC which arose after 1993 are governed exclusively by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes counties and community hospitals in the definition of “political subdivision.”

Jones v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-GOLDEN · filed 1999-03-18(i)

Both the county and the community hospital are specifically included in the definition of "political subdivision" as set out in § 11-46-1(i).
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Section 11-46-1(i) classifies a school district as a political subdivision and governmental entity.

Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland School District · filed 1999-04-29(i)

Section 11-46-1 specifically provides that a school district constitutes a "political subdivision" as well as "governmental entity" of the state. ... As a political subdivision, the Bay St. Louis/Waveland School District is generally protected from negligence suits by sovereign immunity.
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Section 11-46-1(i) classifies a school district as a political subdivision under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Lawrence County School District v. Clayton Brister, Jr. · filed 1999-05-10(i)

The Mississippi Tort Claims Act classifies the School District as a political subdivision.
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes counties and community hospitals in the definition of political subdivision.

Jones v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, Inc. · filed 1998-03-04(i)

Both the county and the community hospital are specifically included in the definition of "political subdivision" as set out in § 11-46-1(i).
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Section 11-46-1 defines a school district as both a political subdivision and a governmental entity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Duncan v. Chamblee · filed 1998-03-31(g), (i)

The MTCA defines a "school district" as a "political subdivision" and a "governmental entity."
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Section 11-46-1 defines a school district as both a political subdivision and a governmental entity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

LW v. McComb Separate Mun. School Dist. · filed 1999-09-02(g), (i)

The MTCA defines a "school district" as a "political subdivision" and a "governmental entity." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(g), (i) (Supp.1998); see also Gressett v. Newton Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 697 So.2d 444, 446(¶ 4) (Miss.1997).
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Section 11-46-1 defines a school district as both a political subdivision and a governmental entity.

Duncan Ex Rel. Duncan v. Chamblee · filed 1999-06-03(g), (i)

The MTCA defines a "school district" as a "political subdivision" and a "governmental entity."
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes joint airport boards as political subdivisions subject to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, even though it does not specifically list them.

Spencer v. Greenwood/Leflore Airport Authority · filed 2000-11-08(i)

Airport boards, although not specifically listed, are by definition subject to the MTCA.
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes school districts in the definition of political subdivisions.

Harris v. Jefferson County School District · filed 2001-04-09(i)

Working in conjunction with Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3(1), Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i) defines "political subdivisions" to specifically include school districts.
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Section 11-46-1(i) classifies a school district as a political subdivision under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

LAWRENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. v. Brister · filed 2001-10-25(i)

The Mississippi Tort Claims Act classifies the School District as a political subdivision. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i) (Supp.2001).
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Section 11-46-1 includes a UMMC physician practice plan that provides patient services within its definitions of “political subdivision” and “state.”

Mozingo v. Scharf · filed 2000-02-11(i), (j)

By providing clinical patient services, UAS is carrying out state governmental activities on behalf of UMMC. Therefore, UAS falls squarely within the definition of a political subdivision. ... UAS falls within the definition of "state" because it is an instrumentality of UMMC.
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Section 11-46-1(i) defines a governmental community hospital as a political subdivision covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Henderson v. UN-NAMED EMERGENCY ROOM, MADISON COUNTY MED. CENTER · filed 2000-04-06(i)

MCMC is a political subdivision as defined in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i), and all tort claims against MCMC which arose after 1993 are governed exclusively by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes community hospitals among the political subdivisions covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Wayne General Hospital v. Hayes · filed 2001-02-05(i)

Third, Wayne General Hospital is a community hospital for purposes of the MTCA and is therefore entitled to venue in the county in which the principal offices of its governing body are located, i.e., Wayne County.
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Section 11-46-1(g)(i) defines a school district as a political subdivision and a governmental entity.

Brewer v. Burdette · filed 2000-10-12(g)(i)

The MTCA defines a "school district" as a "political subdivision" and a "governmental entity." Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(g)(i) (Supp.1999).
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes school districts in the definition of political subdivisions.

Harris Ex Rel. Harris v. McCray · filed 2003-10-23(i)

Working in conjunction with Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3(1), Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i) defines "political subdivisions" to specifically include school districts.
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes a joint airport board that performs public and governmental functions within the definition of a political subdivision.

Spencer v. GREENWOOD/LEFLORE AIRPORT · filed 2003-01-09(i)

It is clear, therefore, that a joint airport board which exercises powers which are declared to be public and governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public necessity, as does the Airport Authority in this case, is a "political subdivision" under § 11-46-1(i) ("any body politic or body corporate other than the state responsible for governmental activities").
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes community hospitals in the MTCA’s definition of political subdivision.

Wayne General Hosp. v. Hayes · filed 2004-03-25(i)

Third, Wayne General Hospital is a community hospital for purposes of the MTCA and is therefore entitled to venue in the county in which the principal offices of its governing body are located, i.e., Wayne County.
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Section 11-46-1(i) does not define a sheriff’s department as a political subdivision; the county is the proper governmental defendant.

Brown v. Thompson · filed 2004-07-30(i)

In this case of first impression, we hold the Sheriff’s Department is not a political subdivision as defined in Section 11-46-1(i), and thus this suit was not properly filed under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act .
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Section 11-46-1 includes school districts as governmental entities under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Pigford v. Jackson Public School Dist. · filed 2005-02-01(I)

School districts are included as governmental entities. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(I) (Rev.2002).
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Section 11-46-1 defines “governmental entity” to include counties in Mississippi.

Ladner v. Stone County · filed 2006-01-17(g) and (i)

“Governmental entity” includes counties within the State. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(g) and (i) (Supp. 2004).
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Section 11-46-1 treats a municipality such as the City of Jackson as a governmental entity under the MTCA.

Spencer v. CITY OF JACKSON, MISS. · filed 2007-07-31(g), (i)

The City of Jackson is considered a governmental entity for the purposes of the MTCA.
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Section 11-46-1(i) does not define a sheriff's department as a political subdivision; the county is the proper governmental defendant.

Brown v. Thompson · filed 2006-03-02(i)

In this case of first impression, we hold the Sheriff's Department is not a political subdivision as defined in Section 11-46-1(i), and thus this suit was not properly filed under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
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Section 11-46-1(i) treats school districts as political subdivisions covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

A.B. Ex Rel. C.D. v. Stone County School District · filed 2009-07-28(i)

Because the school district is considered a political subdivision, A.B.'s claims were brought under the MTCA. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i) (Supp.2008).
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Section 11-46-1(i) excludes state agencies and their employees from the definition of political subdivisions.

MISSISSIPPI CRIME LABORATORY v. Douglas · filed 2011-09-22(i)

The Mississippi Crime Laboratories and the Mississippi State Medical Examiners Office, along with Dr. Hayne, do not fit the definition of “political subdivisions” set forth under this section.
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Section 11-46-1(i) classifies a community hospital as a political subdivision under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Delta Regional Medical Center v. Green · filed 2009-02-10(i)

The parties do not dispute that DRMC is a “community hospital,”as it falls under the definition of “political subdivision” provided in Mississippi Code Section 11-46-1(i).
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Section 11-46-1(i) treats a community hospital as a political subdivision separate from the county that owns it.

Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe · filed 2009-03-05(i)

As a community hospital located in Tallahatchie County, Mississippi, TGH is a “political subdivision” of the State.
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Section 11-46-1(i)’s definition of political subdivision does not include a private corporation merely because it provides governmental services.

Flye v. Spotts · filed 2012-08-02(i)

So after reviewing the language at issue, we conclude that the term “body corporate,” either in isolation or as part of the phrase “body politic or body corporate” in the MTCA, does not include a private corporation.
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Section 11-46-1(i) defines a political subdivision by its responsibility for governmental activities; an entity meeting that definition remains a political subdivision when it performs proprietary work.

Kelly v. Corinth Public Utilities Commission · filed 2016-01-19(i)

Under the MTCA, once it is established that the Department is “responsible for governmental activities,” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i) (Supp. 2015), allegations that it “engaged in a proprietary activity” or “acted as a private entity” in a particular case are irrelevant.
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An entity controlled by governmental entities can qualify as a political subdivision’s instrumentality under the Tort Claims Act.

Woodall v. AAA Ambulance Service · filed 2015-04-23(i)

We find it clear that governmental entities control AAA. The city, the county, and the hospital select the entire board of directors, and that board makes AAA’s strategic decisions. Forrest County General Hospital controls AAA’s day-to-day managers. So governmental entities entirely control both AAA’s big-picture and day-to-day decisions. ... We agree with the circuit judge that AAA is an instrumentality of governmental entities, and that it is entitled to Tort Claims Act protection.
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Section 11-46-1(i) includes counties and community hospitals within the MTCA’s definition of political subdivision.

Forrest General Hospital v. Upton · filed 2018-04-19(i)

Forrest County, Mississippi, and FGH are “political subdivsion[s]” under the MTCA. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-13-10(c) (Rev. 2013), 11-46-1(i).
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Section 11-46-1 includes school districts among political subdivisions, making their employees employees of governmental entities under the MTCA.

Cody Patterson and Corey Patterson, Individually and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Johnny Patterson v · filed 2025-09-11(i)

Patterson was employed by the Lee County School District, which is a political subdivision. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i) (Rev. 2019) (“‘Political subdivision’ means any body politic or body corporate other than the state responsible for governmental activities only in geographic areas smaller than that of the state, including . . . school district . . . .”). Being an employee of a government entity is the same as being either an employee of a political subdivision or of the state. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(f) (Rev. 2019).
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Section 11-46-1(i) treats a community hospital as a political subdivision separate from the county that owns it.

Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe · filed 2010-12-09(i)

While Tallahatchie County owns TGH, as a "community hospital,” TGH is a "separate statutory entit[y]” from Tallahatchie County. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11 — 46—l(i) (Rev.2002) (a “community hospital" is designated as a "political subdivision" separate and apart from a county or municipality); 41-13-10(c) (Rev.2002) (defining "community hospital”).
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A community hospital’s division is not a separate governmental entity under the MTCA; the community hospital is the entity that can receive notice.

April Holifield and Jeffery Holifield v. Highland Community Hospital · filed 2025-04-15(i)

Here, HCH and FGH are not the same entity, and FGH is the only governmental entity capable of notice under the MTCA; so the Holifields were attempting to add a new party to the complaint—a party that never received presuit notice under the MTCA.
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Section 11-46-1(i) does not expressly recognize individual high schools as political subdivisions.

Mayer · filed 2025-11-04(i)

But high schools are not explicitly recognized as political subdivisions, see Miss. Code Ann. § 37-6-5; Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(i), and Mississippi law is clear on this point.
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Section 11-46-1(i) classifies a community hospital as a political subdivision under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Delta Regional Medical Center v. Green · filed 2010-07-22(i)

Further, DRMC’s status as a political subdivision under Mississippi Code Section 11 — 46—l(i) tolled the statute of limitations for a period of 120 days after DRMC received the Notice of Claim from Green.
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Employees and independent contractors

Under Section 11-46-1(f), courts weigh five factors to determine whether a state physician is an employee or an independent contractor for MTCA liability.

Miller v. Meeks · filed 2000-06-29(f)

Therefore, the test to determine the employment status of doctors like Dr. Meeks for the purposes of liability under the MTCA shall be to weigh the following factors: 1. the nature of the function performed by the employee; 2. the extent of the state's interest and involvement in the function; 3. the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over the employee; 4. whether the act complained of involved the use of judgment and discretion; 5. whether the physician receives compensation, either directly or indirectly, from the patient for professional services rendered.
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Section 11-46-1(f) does not categorically exclude university medical center physicians from its definition of employee; their employment status depends on the facts.

SMITH EX REL. SELMON v. Braden · filed 2000-08-24(f)

Nevertheless, though it cannot be said that the § 11-46-1(f), on its face, excludes Dr. Braden from the protections of the MTCA, it can not be said there is no question of fact as to Dr. Braden's employment status.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the MTCA’s definition of employee; a UMMC faculty physician’s status is determined using the Miller five-part test.

Carter v. Harkey · filed 2000-12-21(f)

The MTCA defines "employee" as "any officer, employee or servant of the State of Mississippi or a political subdivision of the state" but specifically excludes from that definition an individual "acting in the capacity of an independent contractor." Id. § 11-46-1(f). ... The trial court did not have the benefit of this Court's decision in Miller, and, therefore, this Court remands the case so that the trial court may reconsider, based upon the Miller factors, whether Dr. Harkey was acting as an employee or independent contractor at the time of the alleged malpractice.
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A physician’s status as a governmental employee under the MTCA depends on the substance of the physician’s relationship with the state hospital; the hospital’s disclaimer of liability does not change that status when it admits the physician is its employee.

Wright v. Quesnel · filed 2002-02-28

The Miller factors are more than sufficient to determine the status of physicians working for state hospitals, and that SPCH's disclaimer of liability for Dr. Quesnel's acts does not change the legal status of Dr. Quesnel, especially when SPCH has admitted that Dr. Quesnel was its employee.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the definition of state employees; determining a faculty physician’s status under that definition requires enough evidence to apply the Miller factors.

Davis v. Hoss · filed 2002-07-22(f)

The MTCA defines "employee" as "any officer, employee or servant of the State of Mississippi or a political subdivision of the state," but specifically excludes from that definition an individual "acting in the capacity of an independent contractor." Id. § 11-46-1(f). ... Under this precedent, the circuit judge erred in granting summary judgment to Doctors Doherty, Patel, Harrison, Hashimoto, and Kregor. A full and meaningful application of the Miller factors was not possible on the record before the circuit court.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the definition of state employee; determining a UMMC faculty physician’s status requires applying the Miller factors to a sufficiently developed record.

Davis v. Hoss · filed 2004-04-01(f)

The MTCA defines "employee" as "any officer, employee or servant of the State of Mississippi or a political subdivision of the state," but specifically excludes from that definition an individual "acting in the capacity of an independent contractor." ... To determine whether a faculty physician at UMMC is an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of immunity under the MTCA, we consider the factors adopted in Miller v. Meeks, 762 So.2d 302, 310 (Miss.2000):(1) the nature of the function performed by the employee; (2) the extent of the state's interest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over the employee; (4) whether the act complained of involved the use of judgment and discretion; and (5) whether the physician received compensation, either directly or indirectly, from the patient for professional services rendered. ... A full and meaningful application of the Miller factors was not possible on the record before the circuit court.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the definition of employees, so the state cannot be sued for their tortious acts.

Brown v. DELTA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2008-10-09(f)

Thus, while the state may be sued for the tortious acts of its employees, it may not be sued for the tortious acts of its independent contractors.
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Section 11-46-1(f) treats a UMMC physician as a state employee when the Miller factors show that the physician acted as an employee rather than an independent contractor while treating the patient.

Meeks v. Miller · filed 2006-06-27(f)

After having weighed and applied all five Miller factors, we conclude that each factor weighs in favor of Dr. Meeks. Because we find that Dr. Meeks was an employee of UMMC and as a result a state employee, we hold that the trial court erred when it denied Dr. Meeks' summary judgment. As an employee of UMMC, Dr. Meeks is immune from liability.
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A UMMC physician who treats a patient within the course and scope of his UMMC employment qualifies as a state employee for MTCA immunity.

Meeks v. Miller · filed 2007-05-24(f)

¶ 22. Based on the findings discussed above, we hold that Dr. Meeks was acting in the course and scope of his employment at UMMC when he treated Fox.
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Section 11-46-1(f) includes uncompensated state personnel as employees and does not require a UMMC physician to belong to a departmental practice plan to qualify as a state employee.

Barksdale v. Carroll · filed 2006-08-29(f)

Section 11-46-1(f) specifically includes uncompensated officers, employees, or servants of the state in the definition of employee. Therefore, we find that membership in a departmental practice plan is not required for a UMMC physician to have state employee status under section 11-46-1(f).
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the definition of “employee,” so a governmental entity cannot be sued under the MTCA for their torts.

Brown v. Delta Regional Medical Center · filed 2007-04-25(f)

Thus, while the state may be sued for the tortious acts of its employees, it may not be sued for the tortious acts of its independent contractors.
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Section 11-46-1(f)'s definition of employee excludes an Alabama state trooper from Mississippi Tort Claims Act immunity.

Duckworth v. Warren · filed 2007-08-13(f)

The trial court analyzed the facts according to these factors; however, a negligence theory is appropriate in the case sub judice, since Alabama State Trooper Bart Walker has no immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1(f), 11-46-7 (Rev. 2002).
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Section 11-46-1(f) does not include an Alabama state trooper in its definition of employee, so he has no immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Duckworth v. Warren · filed 2009-05-28(f)

The trial court analyzed the facts according to these factors; however, a negligence theory is appropriate in the case sub judi-ce, since Alabama State Trooper Bart Walker has no immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 (f), 11-46-7 (Rev.2002).
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Section 11-46-1(f) treats a city alderman as an employee for purposes of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Williams v. City of Belzoni · filed 2017-03-07(f)

As an alderman, Farmer is an “employee” of the city for purposes of the MTCA.
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Section 11-46-1(f) includes an elected sheriff in the MTCA’s definition of “employee.”

Jenkins v. Rankin County, Mississippi · filed 2024-07-24(f)

Although he is an elected official, Sheriff Bailey is considered an “employee” under the MTCA.
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Definition of claim

Section 11-46-1(a) defines a claim as a demand for damages from a governmental entity for injuries; a request for documents does not qualify.

Tommy L. Ewing, Jr. v. Lisa Younger Neese · filed 2016-08-18(a)

Further, the Tort Claims Act applies to a “claim,” and Tommy’s request for documents does not fit the statutory definition of a claim. Mississippi Code Section 11-46-1 defines a claim as “any demand to recover damages from a governmental entity as compensation for injuries.”15 Tommy seeks documents, not damages.
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Liability for constitutional violations

Section 11-46-1 does not shield the State, its political subdivisions, or their employees from liability for constitutional violations.

McGehee v. DePoyster · filed 1996-09-04

We further note, Felder notwithstanding, that nothing in § 11-46-1 purports to insulate the State, its political subdivisions or any of its employees from liability for constitutional violations.
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Section 11-46-1(f) does not categorically exclude university physicians from the Tort Claims Act’s definition of employee; their status depends on the facts.

Smith v. Braden · filed 1997-08-26(f)

Nevertheless, though it cannot be said that the § 11-46-1(f), on its face, excludes Dr. Braden from the protections of the MTCA, it can not be said there is no question of fact as to Dr. Braden's employment status.
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Section 11-46-1(f) generally excludes independent contractors from the Tort Claims Act’s definition of employee.

Owens v. Thomae · filed 1997-12-11(f)

The Tort Claims Act, with a few enumerated exceptions, explicitly excludes independent contractors from its provisions.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s protections.

Conley v. Warren · filed 1998-02-19(f)

If Warren acted as an independent contractor in the treatment of his patient, Conley, he is not entitled to the protection of the Tort Claims Act inasmuch as Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(f) explicitly excludes independent contractors from its provisions.
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Section 11-46-1(f) does not strip a state-employed faculty physician of employee status merely because a state medical practice group pays part of the physician’s compensation.

Watts v. Tsang · filed 1998-08-04(f)

We find as a matter of law that Dr. Tsang cannot lose his status as a State employee, and the immunity that status affords, merely by receiving a portion of his compensation through UAS.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes physicians acting as independent contractors from the definition of employee for Tort Claims Act immunity.

Bennett v. Sudhakar Madakasira, M.D. · filed 1998-12-21(f)

On the other hand, if the acts complained of were committed while the physician was acting as an independent contractor, no immunity is afforded.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the definition of employee for Mississippi Tort Claims Act protection.

Sheila Fox Miller v. W. Mark Meeks, M. D. · filed 1998-10-22(f)

Under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1(f) (Supp. 1999), if Dr. Meeks is found to be an independent contractor, he is not entitled to the protection of the MTCA.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the Tort Claims Act’s definition of employee, subject to enumerated exceptions.

Owens v. Thomae · filed 1999-09-02(f)

If Dr. Thomae is found to be an independent contractor, he is not entitled to the protections of the Tort Claims Act. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(f). The Tort Claims Act, with a few enumerated exceptions, explicitly excludes independent contractors from its provisions.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from the MTCA definition of employee; a faculty physician’s status is determined using the five-part Miller test.

Carter v. H. Louis Harkey, M.D. · filed 2000-01-12(f)

The MTCA defines "employee" as "any officer, employee or servant of the State of Mississippi or a political subdivision of the state" but specifically excludes from that definition an individual "acting in the capacity of an independent contractor." Id. § 11-46-1(f). ... The trial court did not have the benefit of this Court's decision in Miller, and, therefore, this Court remands the case so that the trial court may reconsider, based upon the Miller factors, whether Dr. Harkey was acting as an employee or independent contractor at the time of the alleged malpractice.
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Section 11-46-1(f) excludes independent contractors from protection under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Conley v. Warren · filed 2001-02-15(f)

If Warren acted as an independent contractor in the treatment of his patient, Conley, he is not entitled to the protection of the Tort Claims Act inasmuch as Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(f) explicitly excludes independent contractors from its provisions.
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Section 11-46-1(1) excludes independent contractors from the definition of employee, so a physician acting in that capacity does not receive MTCA immunity.

Bennett v. Madakasira · filed 2002-03-21(1)

On the other hand, if the acts complained of were committed while the physician was acting as an independent contractor, no immunity is afforded.
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326 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Robinson v. Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section of an et seq. reference to the Immunity Act; it does not decide a rule of § 11-46-1 itself. opinion →
Brady v. Reifenwerke, the court’s waiver decision rests on § 11-46-5(4). It quotes § 11-46-1(g)’s definition but does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
Smith v. City of West Point, the court addresses the sovereign immunity act as a whole through an et seq. citation, but does not decide any rule of § 11-46-1 itself. opinion →
Brooks v. Miller, the court applies sovereign immunity under the Act cited as § 11-46-1 et seq.; it does not decide a rule of § 11-46-1 itself. opinion →
Sorey v. Kellett, the court cites subsection (g) as support for its Eleventh Amendment ruling, but does not decide a rule under § 11-46-1. Its other reference is to the Act generally, using “et seq.” opinion →
Grantham v. Dept. of Corrections, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section of the Act; its decision about when the waiver applies concerns a different provision. opinion →
Region VII, Mental Health-Mental Retardation Center v. Isaac, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. It does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Williams v. Morgan, the court cites § 11-46-1 as the first section of the Act, but its ruling on federal-court immunity concerns § 11-46-5(4). opinion →
Richardson v. Rankin County School Dist., the court decides immunity under other provisions; it does not construe § 11-46-1. The citation identifies the Act. opinion →
Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center v. Lawrence, this sentence reports the Fifth Circuit's ruling; it is not this court's own decision about § 11-46-1. opinion →
Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference and does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Employers Ins. v. STATE HWY. COM'N, the court applies sovereign immunity but cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Starnes v. City of Vardaman, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act; its decisions concern other provisions and preexisting immunity law. opinion →
Mohundro v. Alcorn Cnty MS, the court discusses § 11-46-6; its references to § 11-46-1 et seq. identify the Act and do not decide § 11-46-1’s own rules. opinion →
Turrentine v. Brookhaven, Mississippi School District, the court decides the effect and constitutionality of the school bus statutes. It cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference and does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Presley v. Mississippi State Hwy. Com'n, the court decides the validity and prospective effect of § 11-46-6. Its references to § 11-46-1 identify the Act as a whole; the opening's reference to that section as the codification of Section 3 is contradicted by the opinion's later identification of § 11-46-6. opinion →
Lawrence v. Virginia Ins. Reciprocal, the court decides the case under § 41-13-11 and does not construe § 11-46-1’s own rules. opinion →
Lawrence v. Virginia Insurance Reciprocal, the court decides the case under § 41-13-11 and cites § 11-46-1 only in discussing changes to the Sovereign Immunity Act. opinion →
Morgan v. City of Ruleville, the reference to § 11-46-1(f) reports the trial court's ruling; this court did not decide that section's rules. opinion →
Fortune v. Lee Cnty Bd of Supvrs, the § 11-46-1 et seq. ruling was the circuit court's, not this court's. This court did not decide any rule of § 11-46-1 itself. opinion →
Coplin v. Francis, the court decides Monroe County's immunity but cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. It does not decide this section's own rules. opinion →
Parker v. City of Philadelphia, MS, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act; it decides the applicability of § 11-46-6 and pre-Pruett common law, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Wesley v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, the court decided common law sovereign immunity. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in citations to the Sovereign Immunity Act, and the court did not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
West v. Combs, the court cites § 11-46-1 as the first section of an Act but does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Hardee v. Rankin County School District, the majority decides sovereign immunity through Presley's retroactivity, not a rule of § 11-46-1. Its reference to the section is an 'et seq.' citation to the Act; the direct discussion of § 11-46-1 is in the dissent. opinion →
Quinn v. Mississippi State Univ, the court addresses the Immunity Act as a whole; it does not decide a rule of § 11-46-1 specifically. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Aubuchon, the court cites § 11-46-1 when describing the Act and its definitions, but decides immunity under other enactments rather than a rule of this section. opinion →
Elemetric Brown v. Dist, the court decides sovereign immunity under the Act cited as § 11-46-1 et seq.; it does not decide a rule of § 11-46-1 itself. opinion →
Hord v. Yazoo City, City of, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. Its decision applies § 11-46-6 and pre-Pruett common law, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Robinson v. Stewart, the court decides issues concerning the sovereign immunity statutes as a whole. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in an et seq. reference, and the court does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
COM'N v. Rector, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. It decides the prospective application of Presley, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Jackson v. Jefferson Davis County, Mississippi, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section of the Act; it decides the effect of § 11-46-6 and other law, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
PYCA Industries, Inc v. Waste, the court decides the immunity issue under pre-Pruett law, not a rule in § 11-46-1. The specific reference to § 11-46-1(i) describes the district court’s reasoning. opinion →
PYCA Industries, Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Management District, the court applies pre-Pruett immunity law, not a rule of § 11-46-1. Its citation to subsection (i) describes the district court’s reasoning. opinion →
Mohundro v. Alcorn County, the § 11-46-1 citation refers to the Act as a whole; the opinion does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
SW MISS. REG. MED. CENTER v. Lawrence, the opinion reports earlier decisions; this court does not decide § 11-46-1 in this opinion. opinion →
Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center v. Lawrence, the footnote reports decisions in other cases; this opinion does not decide § 11-46-1. opinion →
State of Mississippi v. Dampeer, the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11(3); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et seq. citation to the Act. opinion →
Public Safety, Mississippi Department of v. Olur v. Stringer, the court decided the limitations rule in § 11-46-11(3); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Housing Authority of the City of Jackson v. Lampley, the court quoted § 11-46-1’s definitions but withheld judgment on whether the Housing Authority was a separate governmental entity; its remand concerned notice under § 11-46-11. opinion →
Wilmer Robinson, Jr. v. Singing River Hospital System, the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Greyhound Welfare Foundation v. Mississippi State University, the court decides the scope of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act as a whole. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a range citation; the court does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Holmes v. Defer, the court decided the notice requirements of § 11-46-11. It cited § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the MTCA. opinion →
Marcum v. Hancock County School District, the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11. It cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act, without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Goldman Ex Rel. Goldman v. Bosco, the cited ruling was Presley's, not this court's. This court did not decide a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Mental Health v. Merrill, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the MTCA; it decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
McCrary v. City of Biloxi, Mississippi, the court quotes a question from an earlier case; its own decision concerns a workers' compensation deadline, not § 11-46-1. opinion →
Hord v. City of Yazoo City, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the Act. Its decision concerns § 11-46-6 and pre-Pruett common law, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Brown v. Houston School District, the court decides immunity under the Act cited as § 11-46-1 et seq., but does not decide any rule of the definitions section itself. opinion →
City of Tupelo v. Martin, the court decided the limitations rule in § 11-46-11(3). Its references to § 11-46-1 identify the Act as a whole; it did not decide this section's definitions. opinion →
Alexander v. Mississippi Gaming Commission, the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Tennessee Valley Regional Housing Authority v. Bailey, the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
McGehee v. DePoyster, the court expressly declined to decide the definition in § 11-46-1(h); its notice rulings concern § 11-46-11(1). opinion →
Fairley v. George County, Mississippi, the court decided an MTCA notice issue. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act, and the court did not decide any rule of that definitions section. opinion →
Parker v. City of Philadelphia, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an Act-wide reference; it decides the effect of § 11-46-6 and pre-Pruett common law, not this definitions section. opinion →
Davis Sullivan, M.D. v. Washington, the discussion of § 11-46-1(f) appears in Justice McRae’s dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Gale v. Thomas, the statement about § 11-46-1(i) reports what the court held in Gressett; this court decides the application of § 11-46-3(3). opinion →
Fortune v. Lee County Bd. of Sup'rs, the § 11-46-1 et seq. ruling is the circuit court's. The Supreme Court does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1 itself. opinion →
Quinn v. Mississippi State University, the court cites § 11-46-1 as the start of a range identifying the Immunity Act, but does not decide any rule in this definitions section. opinion →
Thornburg v. Magnolia Regional Health Center, the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et. seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Jones v. Mississippi School for the Blind, this court decides compliance with § 11-46-11's notice requirement. The reference to § 11-46-1 appears in the trial court's quoted ruling; this court does not decide what § 11-46-1 defines. opinion →
Hays v. Lafayette County School District, the court decided the limitations rule in § 11-46-11. It cited § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an Act-wide reference and did not decide any definition in that section. opinion →
Leslie v. City of Biloxi, Mississippi, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(l). opinion →
Simpson v. City of Pickens, Mississippi, the court cites § 11-46-1 only to identify the Act; its decisions concern §§ 11-46-9(1)(c) and 11-46-13, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Summers v. St. Andrews Episcopal School, Inc., the court decides a private school's duty under common law. Its reference to § 11-46-1 et seq. describes the Tort Claims Act and a prior decision, not a rule of this definitions section. opinion →
Holmes v. Defer, the citation refers to the Act as a whole; the court decides the rules of §§ 11-46-11 and 11-46-5, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Trosclair v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, the reference to § 11-46-1 reports the MDOT's motion; the court does not decide that section's rules. opinion →
Robinson v. Singing River Hosp. System, the court decided the limitations rule in § 11-46-11; it cited § 11-46-1 only as the start of an Act-wide reference. opinion →
Ellisville State School v. Merrill, the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et seq. citation to the Act. opinion →
Cotton v. Paschall, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it decides the employee immunity rule under § 11-46-7(2). opinion →
City of Jackson v. Williamson, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an Act-wide citation; the court does not decide its definitions. opinion →
Alexander v. Mississippi Gaming Com'n, the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Greyhound Welfare Foundation v. Mississippi State University, the court decides the Act’s effect on a replevin action, but does not construe § 11-46-1’s definitions; that section appears only as the first number in an Act-wide citation. opinion →
LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. v. Doe, the court cites § 11-46-1(i) for the waiver date but decides immunity under the Tort Claims Act, without construing this definitions section. opinion →
TENN. VALLEY REGIONAL HOUSING v. Bailey, the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an Act-wide reference. opinion →
Thornburg v. MAGNOLIA REG. HEALTH CENTER, section 11-46-1 appears only in an et seq. reference to the Act; the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11. opinion →
Marcum v. Hancock County School Dist., the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act. opinion →
Jackson v. Daley, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act; it does not decide this definitions section's rules. opinion →
Miss. Dept. of Public Safety v. Stringer, the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11(3); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Jones v. Jackson Public Schools, the court decided summary judgment procedure and whether the evidence showed negligence; it did not decide any rule of § 11-46-1. The section appears only as the starting citation for the Act. opinion →
State v. Dampeer, the court decides the limitations period under § 11-46-11; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Gant v. Maness, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of a reference to the Act and does not decide this section's definitions. opinion →
Stewart v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA; the court does not decide its definitions. opinion →
City of Tupelo v. Martin, the references to § 11-46-1 appear in an issue assigned by the City and in the dissent, not in the court’s own decision. The court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11(3). opinion →
Bailey v. Ossama Al-Mefty, the only reference to § 11-46-1 describes a party’s motion. The court did not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Pickens v. Donaldson, the court cites § 11-46-1(j) as background while deciding immunity and limitations under other provisions; it does not decide this section's definition. opinion →
McGrath v. City of Gautier, Mississippi, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides the police protection exemption in § 11-46-9(1)(c). opinion →
Housing Authority of Jackson v. Lampley, the court quoted § 11-46-1’s definitions but withheld judgment on whether the Housing Authority was a separate governmental entity. opinion →
Gale v. Thomas, the statement about § 11-46-1(i) reports what the court held in Gressett; this court does not decide that subsection’s rule. opinion →
Hays v. Lafayette County School Dist., the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act and does not decide its definitions. opinion →
Knight v. McKee, the court decides immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, but does not decide a rule of § 11-46-1. The section appears only as the first number in an Act-wide citation. opinion →
City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Sutton, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; its decision concerns the Act’s exclusivity and the plaintiffs’ untimely claim, not this definitions section. opinion →
McCrary v. City of Biloxi, No. The court mentions § 11-46-1 only while recounting an earlier case; its decision here concerns a workers' compensation claim. opinion →
Trosclair v. Mississippi Dept. of Transp., the court decided notice and limitations issues under the Tort Claims Act, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. The section appears only as the first number in an et seq. citation. opinion →
Jones v. Mississippi School for the Blind, the only interpretation of § 11-46-1 appears in the trial court’s ruling quoted by this court. This court decided the notice issue under § 11-46-11. opinion →
Leslie v. City of Biloxi, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Roberts v. New Albany Separate School District, the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11(3). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Summers v. St. Andrew's Episcopal School, Inc., the Tort Claims Act proposition reports a prior holding; this court decides the private school's duty under common law. The et seq. citation does not decide § 11-46-1's definitions. opinion →
Williams v. Toliver, the court decided the notice requirements of § 11-46-11(2), not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Jones v. Jackson Public Schools, the court decides negligence and summary judgment issues; it does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1. The section appears only as the starting point of an et seq. citation to the Act. opinion →
Simpson v. City of Pickens, § 11-46-1 identifies the Act in an et seq. citation; the court decides rules under §§ 11-46-9(1)(c) and 11-46-13, not this definitions section. opinion →
Pratt v. City of Greenville, Mississippi, No. The references to § 11-46-1 report the City's immunity defense or appear in the dissent. The majority decides whether Pratt could amend his complaint. opinion →
Thompson v. City of Vicksburg, Mississippi, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides notice requirements and judgment finality, not this definitions section. opinion →
City of Ridgeland, Mississippi v. Fowler, the court decides which court has jurisdiction over a Tort Claims Act case, but does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1, the Act’s definitions section. opinion →
Sullivan v. Washington, the discussion of § 11-46-1(f) appears in Justice McRae’s dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Eatman v. City of Moss Point, the only citation to § 11-46-1 appears in a dissent. The majority decides Rule 11 sanctions and does not construe this section. opinion →
Prentiss County Board of Education v. Beaumont, the section-specific statement reports Beaumont’s admission; the court’s decision concerns the judgment limit under § 11-46-15(3). opinion →
Conrod v. Ned Holder, the court decided a requirement of § 11-46-7(2), while citing § 11-46-1 for definitions without deciding that section's rules. opinion →
Moore v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, the court decides the limitations issue under § 11-46-11, not a definition or rule in § 11-46-1. The § 11-46-1 reference appears in the hospital’s argument as an et seq. citation. opinion →
Wayne General Hospital v. Hayes, the court recites § 11-46-1’s definitions, but WGH’s status as a community hospital is undisputed; the court decides venue under § 11-46-13(2). opinion →
Cotton v. Paschall, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides rules under other sections, not this section’s definitions. opinion →
Knight v. McKee, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court does not decide a rule of this definitions section. opinion →
Lee County, Mississippi v. Davis, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in a reference to the Act. opinion →
Bridges v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., this reference reports a party's defense, not the court's decision about § 11-46-1. The court's own analysis addresses other sections of the Act. opinion →
Pearl Public School Dist. v. Groner, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act. opinion →
Gant v. Maness, the court notes that the accident predated the Act. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in an Act-wide citation; the court does not decide its definitions. opinion →
Milton Titus, Jr. v. Williams, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act. It decides rules under §§ 11-46-7 and 11-46-9, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
McGrath v. City of Gautier, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides the police protection exemption under § 11-46-9(1)(c), not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Lipsey, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9, while its reference to § 11-46-1 supplies background and decides none of that section’s definitions. opinion →
City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Brister, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Donaldson v. Covington County, Mississippi, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of a reference to the Act; it does not decide this section’s definitions. opinion →
Bailey v. Al-Mefty, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in a citation to the Act; the court decides the application of other provisions, not this section’s definitions. opinion →
Mississippi Municipal Liability Plan v. Jordan, the majority decides liability under §§ 11-46-15 and 11-46-17, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. Its reference to § 11-46-1 identifies the Act as a whole. opinion →
Mitchell v. City of Greenville, Mississippi, the court decides the warning-sign immunity rule in § 11-46-9(1)(w); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Pratt v. City of Greenville, the citation reports the City's immunity defense; the court does not decide any rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Sutton, the court decided the Act's exclusive-remedy rule under § 11-46-7; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Wachtler v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, the court decides workers' compensation exclusivity and uninsured motorist benefits. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act; the court does not decide its definitions. opinion →
Fairley v. George County, the court decided the Act’s notice requirement, not a rule in § 11-46-1, which appears only as the first section in a range citing the Act. opinion →
Lee v. Thompson, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Williams v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Doe v. State of Mississippi, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it decides rules under other sections, not this definitions section. opinion →
Williams v. Clay County, Mississippi, the reference identifies the Act generally; the limitations and notice rules discussed are in § 11-46-11, not § 11-46-1. opinion →
Young v. Benson, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it decides the limitations issue under § 11-46-11(3), not any rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Stewart Ex Rel. Womack v. City of Jackson, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a reference to the MTCA; the court does not decide its definitions. opinion →
Ray v. Keith, the court treats Keith’s status under § 11-46-1(f) as undisputed and decides notice and limitations issues under the MTCA, not a rule of this definitions section. opinion →
Prentiss County Bd. of Educ. v. Beaumont, the court accepted Beaumont’s concession that the Board was a governmental entity; it decided the judgment reduction under § 11-46-15(3), not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Roberts v. New Albany Separate School Dist., the court decides the effect of an amendment to § 11-46-11(3). It cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act. opinion →
Thompson v. City of Vicksburg, the court decides notice requirements under the Act and whether the case remained pending. It does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1; that section appears only as the start of an Act-wide citation. opinion →
Elkins v. McKenzie, the court decides whether the complaint adequately pleaded state law claims; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the MTCA and does not decide this section’s definitions. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Durn, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides other provisions, not this section’s definitions. opinion →
Harris v. Mississippi Valley State University, the opinion only reports the trial court's ruling. Its § 11-46-1 citation is an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Stockstill v. State of Mississippi, § 11-46-1 appears only as the starting point of a citation to the Act. The court decides the limitations rules in other sections, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Whiting v. Tunica County, the court decides the Act’s notice requirements, not the definitions in § 11-46-1; the citation identifies the Act. opinion →
University of Southern Mississippi v. Davida Dawn Williams, the citation names § 11-46-1 only as the start of a range identifying the Act. The court does not decide any rule in that section. opinion →
Willie B. Southern, Jr. v. Mississippi State Hospital, the court decides the notice and limitations rules of § 11-46-11, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. Its reference to § 11-46-1(j) appears only in the quoted text of § 11-46-11. opinion →
Conrod v. Holder, the court quotes § 11-46-1’s definitions as context, but its decision rests on the requirement in § 11-46-7(2). opinion →
Moore Ex Rel. Moore v. Memorial Hosp. of Gulfport, the court decides the limitations and tolling rules of § 11-46-11, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. The reference to § 11-46-1 is an et seq. citation in a report of Memorial Hospital's motion. opinion →
Yoshino Love v. Sunflower County Sheriff's Department, the court decides the inmate exemption under § 11-46-9(1)(m); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Bonner v. McCormick, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Moss, the court decides venue under § 11-46-13(2); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Transportation v. Johnson, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. The court did not decide that section’s rules and expressly did not reach the statutory cap issue. opinion →
Marshall v. WARREN CTY. BD. OF SUPR., the court decides the limitations and tolling rules of § 11-46-11. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Blailock v. Hubbs, the court decided notice and limitations issues under § 11-46-11. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Robinson, the court quotes § 11-46-1 as background but decides the constitutionality of the savings clause in § 11-46-11(4), without deciding a rule under § 11-46-1. opinion →
Lee County v. Davis, the court decides the immunity rule in § 11-46-9(1)(c); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Lipsey, the court mentions § 11-46-1 in its procedural history but decides immunity under § 11-46-9, not any rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Corey v. Skelton, the court decides employee immunity under the Act but does not decide any rule of § 11-46-1; that section appears only as the first number in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Wachtler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., the citation to § 11-46-1 appears in a footnote to State Farm's reported determination, not in the court's own decision about that section. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Powell, the court cites § 11-46-1 only to identify the Act; its rulings concern other sections. opinion →
City of Ridgeland v. Fowler, the court decides jurisdiction over a Tort Claims Act suit, not the meaning or application of § 11-46-1. The section appears only as the first number in an Act-wide citation. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Brister, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c). opinion →
Dodson v. Singing River Hosp. System, the court cites the section only as part of an Act reference in the procedural history; it decides judicial recusal, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Donaldson v. Covington County, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it does not decide any rule in this definitions section. opinion →
Malone v. Leake County Board of Supervisors, the court decided the remedy under § 11-51-75, not a rule of § 11-46-1, which appears only in the statement of an issue on appeal. opinion →
City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Womack, the court decides § 11-46-3’s immunity rule, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. It cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference and as a definitions cross-reference. opinion →
Connell v. State ex rel. Mississippi Department of Corrections, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of the Act’s section range and decides rules under other provisions, not this definitions section. opinion →
Allred v. Yarborough, the court decides the liability limit in § 11-46-15(1). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Titus v. Williams, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it decides no rule in that section. opinion →
Estate of Williams v. City of Jackson, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Mitchell v. City of Greenville, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of a range identifying the Act; it decides immunity under § 11-46-9, not any rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Johnson v. City of Cleveland, the only reference to § 11-46-1 is in a dissent. It also cites the Act as a whole rather than deciding this definitions section. opinion →
Mississippi Dept. of Transp. v. Trosclair, the citation appears in a dissent. It also refers to the Act as a whole without deciding a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Southern v. Mississippi State Hospital, the court decided the limitations issue under § 11-46-11, not any rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Lee v. Thompson, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an Act-wide citation; the opinion does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Ray v. Keith, the employee definition was undisputed; the court decided whether the MTCA notice and limitations period was tolled, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Stockstill v. State, the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
City of Greenville, Mississippi v. Jones, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act; its decision concerns immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c). opinion →
Elkins v. McKenzie, the court decides whether the complaint gave adequate notice under the MTCA and Rule 8; it does not decide any rule of § 11-46-1, which appears only as the start of an et seq. reference. opinion →
City of Ellisville v. Richardson, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Tort Claims Act; the provided opinion does not decide this section’s definitions. opinion →
Doe v. State Ex Rel. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it does not decide this section's definitions. opinion →
Williams v. Clay County, the court cites § 11-46-1 to identify the Act but decides notice and timing rules under § 11-46-11, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
City of Jackson, Mississippi v. The Internal Engine Parts Group, Inc., section 11-46-1 appears only as the starting citation for the Act. The court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(v), not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Love v. Sunflower County Sheriff's Dept., the court decides the immunity rules in § 11-46-9; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Punzo v. Jackson County, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; its limitations ruling concerns § 11-46-11(3). opinion →
Herman v. CITY OF SHANNON, MS., the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the MTCA; it does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety v. Durn, the court decides the police exemption under § 11-46-9; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Mississippi Mun. Liability Plan v. Jordan, the majority cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of a reference to the Act; it does not decide this section’s definitions. The subsection citations appear in the dissent, which also fails question 1. opinion →
Cockrell v. Pearl River Valley Water Dist., the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the starting point of an MTCA reference; it decides liability under other sections, without construing § 11-46-1. opinion →
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Moss, the court decides venue under § 11-46-13(2); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
East Mississippi State Hosp. v. Callens, the court decides an award under the MTCA but cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference; it does not decide this definitions section's rules. opinion →
Mississippi Dept. of Transp. v. Johnson, the court cited § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the MTCA and did not decide this definitions section’s rules. opinion →
Harris v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., the opinion reports the trial court's ruling. The citation names § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Mental Health v. Hall, the court treats the hospital’s status as undisputed and cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an Act-wide range; it does not decide this section’s definitions. opinion →
UNIVERSITY OF MISS. MED. CENTER v. Robinson, the court cites § 11-46-1 for background but decides the constitutionality of an amendment to § 11-46-11(4). opinion →
City of Jackson v. Lynda Key Presley, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an Act-wide reference; it does not decide this section’s definitions. opinion →
University of Southern Miss. v. Williams, the majority decides a notice requirement under § 11-46-11, not any definition in § 11-46-1. The express citation to § 11-46-1 appears only in a separate opinion. opinion →
Meeks v. Sheila Fox Miller, the discussion of § 11-46-1(i) and (j) is quoted from Mozingo, and subsection (f) appears only in the dissent. The majority decides whether Dr. Meeks acted within the course and scope of his employment without construing this section. opinion →
Smith v. Brookhaven, Police Department, the reference to § 11-46-1 appears in the defendants’ argument, not in a decision by this court about that section. opinion →
Arceo v. Tolliver, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a reference to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act; the court decides the notice requirement under § 15-1-36(15). opinion →
City of Jackson v. Internal Engine Parts Group, Inc., the reference to § 11-46-1 appears only in the court's account of the case's filing, not in its decision. The court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(v). opinion →
City of Ellisville v. Richardson, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a range identifying the Tort Claims Act; it does not decide this section's definitions. opinion →
Blailock ex rel. Blailock v. Hubbs, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides rules under § 11-46-11, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Estate of Stewart Ex Rel. Womack, the court decides immunity and damages under §§ 11-46-3, 11-46-5, and 11-46-15; it does not decide a definition in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Estate of Spiegel v. Western Surety Co., the court decides whether the Mississippi Tort Claims Act applies, but cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a range covering the Act. It does not decide a rule of § 11-46-1 itself. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Powell, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the starting point of an et seq. reference to the Act; its decisions concern other provisions, not this section’s definitions. opinion →
Sutherland v. Ritter, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act; it decides no rule of that definitions section. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Estate of Stewart ex rel. Womack, the citation describes the trial court’s proceeding; this court’s decision concerns the motion for rehearing, not § 11-46-1. opinion →
University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Pounders, the section appears only in an et seq. citation identifying the Act. The court decides prejudgment interest under § 11-46-15(2), not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
MISSISSIPPI DEPT. OF WILDLIFE v. Brannon, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(v); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
City of Greenville v. Jones, the court decides the police-protection immunity rule in § 11-46-9(1)(c), not a definition or rule in § 11-46-1. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in an et seq. citation to the Act. opinion →
Reynolds v. County of Wilkinson, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an Act-wide range. Its decision applies § 11-46-9(1)(c), not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Knight v. Terrell, the citation to § 11-46-1 appears in Terrell’s argument, not in the court’s own decision about that section. The court decided whether the school peace officer statutes granted immunity. opinion →
South Cent. Regional Med. Center v. Guffy, the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11; § 11-46-1 appears only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Mississippi Dept. of Mental Health v. Hall, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
MacDonald ex rel. MacDonald v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, the reference to § 11-46-1 is in the appellant’s stated issue. The court’s own ruling addresses immunity under § 11-46-9, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Arceo v. Tolliver, the court decides the notice requirement in § 15-1-36(15); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in an et seq. reference to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Presley, the citation identifies the Act under which the suit was filed; the court does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1 itself. opinion →
Franklin County Memorial Hospital v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an ‘et seq.’ reference to the Act; it does not decide that section’s definitions. opinion →
Sutherland v. Estate of Ritter, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Act; it does not decide this section's definitions. opinion →
Creel v. United States, the parties conceded the entity and employee status addressed by § 11-46-1; the court decided whether the alleged negligence occurred within the course and scope of employment under other MTCA provisions. opinion →
Knight v. Terrell, the court decided whether the school peace-officer statutes grant immunity. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the start of an et seq. reference to the MTCA; the court did not decide that section’s definitions. opinion →
Suddith v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISS., the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it decides rules under other sections. opinion →
Bynum v. City of Magee, Miss., the citation identifies the Act; the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9, not any rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Ruby Lee v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11. opinion →
Bessent v. Clark, the court cites § 11-46-1 to identify the Act but decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(m), without deciding a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Briere v. South Central Regional Medical Center, the court decides notice requirements under § 11-46-11, not a rule of § 11-46-1. The parties agree on the hospital’s status. opinion →
Morton v. City of Shelby, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act; it decides the police-duty immunity rule under § 11-46-9(1)(c), not a definition in § 11-46-1. opinion →
U. OF MS. MEDICAL CENTER v. Pounders, the court decides the prejudgment-interest issue under § 11-46-15(2). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the starting citation in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Franklin Mem. Hosp. v. Ms. Farm Bureau Ins., the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Act; it does not decide this section's definitions. opinion →
Mildred Elaine Thompson Rayner v. Pennington, the court decided immunity under Section 11-46-9(1)(c). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Bradley Ex Rel. Bradley v. City of Jackson, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. The court decides the police protection exception under § 11-46-9, not a rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Hill v. Carroll County, Mississippi, the court decides res judicata. It cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a range identifying the Mississippi Tort Claims Act and does not decide this section’s definitions. opinion →
Lee v. Memorial Hosp. at Gulfport, the court decides the notice requirements of § 11-46-11; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Stuart v. University of Mississippi Medical Center, the court decides whether UMMC asserted a defense concerning the MTCA’s notice requirement; it does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1. The section appears only in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Briere v. South Central Regional Medical Center, the court decided the notice requirements of § 11-46-11; § 11-46-1 appears only in a citation to the Act as a whole. The parties agreed that SCRMC met the relevant definition. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Mental Health v. Shaw, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Kimball Glassco Residential Center, Inc. v. Terrance Shanks, the court recites § 11-46-1’s definitions but does not decide how they apply; coverage is undisputed on appeal. opinion →
Hill v. Carroll County, the court decides res judicata, while § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. opinion →
University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Donnie Foster, the court decides evidence and trial procedure; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act, and the court does not decide its definitions. opinion →
Preferred Transport Co. v. Claiborne County Board of Supervisors, the court expressly declined to decide the Tort Claims Act immunity issue and did not decide any rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Gray & Associates, Inc. v. State Board of Education, the court decides the limitations rule in § 11-46-11(3). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA as a whole. opinion →
Honeycutt v. Coleman, the Tort Claims Act ruling was the trial court’s, and this court expressly declined to address it. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Mental Health v. Shaw, the court decides discretionary-function immunity under § 11-46-9. It cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act and does not decide that section’s definitions. opinion →
Herndon v. Mississippi Forestry Commission, the court decided immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the entire Act; the court did not decide any rule of its definitions. opinion →
Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in a citation to the MTCA and its definitions are not construed. opinion →
Jones County School District v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Board, the court cites § 11-46-1(i) as background for treating school districts as political subdivisions, but decides the severance tax laws rather than this section’s rules. opinion →
City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Robert Sandifer, Jr., the court decides immunity under other MTCA provisions. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act as a whole. opinion →
Kimball Glassco Residential Center, Inc. v. Shanks, the court did not decide the meaning or application of § 11-46-1’s definitions; MTCA coverage was undisputed on appeal. opinion →
Smith v. Harrison County, the court decided bystander liability and negligence; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA and its definitions were not decided. opinion →
Johnson v. CITY OF QUITMAN, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA. opinion →
Watts v. City of Jackson, the citation identifies the Act; the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(d), not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Thornton, section 11-46-1 appears only as the start of an Act-wide citation; the court does not decide any rule in its definitions. opinion →
Newton v. Lincoln County, the court decides notice and waiver under § 11-46-11. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in the defendants’ citation to the MTCA. opinion →
Zeigler v. University of Mississippi Medical Center, the court decides the immunity rules in § 11-46-5; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
J.S. v. Lamar County School District, the court decides discretionary-function immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(d). It cites § 11-46-1(g) only as a definition and does not decide that subsection’s rules. opinion →
Jefferson v. State, this statement appears in a special concurrence, not the court's decision. Section 11-46-1 is cited only as the start of an et seq. reference, so question 2 also fails. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality v. Pacific Chlorine, Inc., the court did not decide any rule of § 11-46-1; it resolved the case on other grounds and deemed the remaining issues moot. opinion →
University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Foster, the court decides whether the evidence supports the verdict and whether an evidentiary objection was preserved. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court does not decide its definitions. opinion →
City of Jackson v. Sandifer, the court decides immunity under other MTCA provisions; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act as a whole. opinion →
Jones County School District v. Mississippi Department of Revenue, the court cites § 11-46-1(i) as background for the school district’s status, but decides whether the district owes severance taxes under other statutes. opinion →
Honeycutt v. Coleman, the opinion reports the trial court’s Tort Claims Act ruling but expressly declines to address it. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in an Act-wide citation. opinion →
Eason v. Frye, the court decides the inmate-claim bar in § 11-46-9(1)(m); it cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
C.W.P. v. Brown, the citation uses § 11-46-1 only to identify the MTCA; the court addresses notice under § 11-46-11 and does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Warren v. State of Mississippi, the only reference to § 11-46-1 appears in a dissenting footnote, not the court's decision. opinion →
DeSoto County, Mississippi v. Dennis, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(a). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act, and the court does not decide its definitions. opinion →
Campbell v. City of Indianola, the court cites § 11-46-1 as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act; it does not decide this definitions section’s rules. opinion →
Ebony Crisler v. City of Crystal Springs, Mississippi, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c); § 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Pearl River County, Mississippi v. Bethea, the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c). It cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the MTCA and does not decide any definition in that section. opinion →
Y. Davis v. Darrell N. Blaylock, MD, section 11-46-1 appears only in Davis’s stated appellate issue. The court’s own analysis addresses other sections. opinion →
Fountainbleau Management Services, L.L.C. v. City of Tupelo, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an Act-wide reference; it decides discretionary function immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(d), not a rule of the definitions section. opinion →
H. Lefoldt, Jr. v. Rentfro, the court certified the unresolved MTCA questions and retained the appeal; it did not decide a disputed rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Jones v. Singing River Health Services Foundation, the citation refers to the Tort Claims Act as a whole; the court does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Jones v. Singing River Health Svc Fd, this sentence reports the district court’s observation; the appellate court does not decide a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Mississippi Department of Human Services v. S.W., the court decides whether the damages comply with § 11-46-15’s caps; it does not decide any definition or rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Regan v. South Central Regional Medical Center, the court decides a Rule 41(b) dismissal; its Act-wide citation does not decide a rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Hathorn v. Louisville Utilities Commission, the court decided the effect of the settlement agreement, not a rule of § 11-46-1. It cited the section only as part of a reference to the MTCA. opinion →
Lowe v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi, a Municipal Corporation, the reference to § 11-46-1 appears only in the court’s account of the City’s answer. The court’s own ruling concerns § 11-46-9(1)(d). opinion →
H. Kenneth Lefoldt, Jr v. Rentfro, the opinion text is a dissent, so it is not the court's holding. Its analysis also concerns Section 41-13-11(5), not Section 11-46-1's definitions. opinion →
Atwood v. Tullos, the court cites § 11-46-1 only to identify the Act; it does not decide this definitions section's rules. opinion →
Kenneth L. Ostrowski, Jr. v. City of D'Iberville, Mississippi, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA; the court decides immunity under section 11-46-9(1)(q). opinion →
City of Clinton, Mississippi v. Tornes, the court decides immunity and liability under other MTCA provisions; § 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in an et seq. citation to the Act. opinion →
O'Reilly v. University of Mississippi Medical Center and its School of Dentistry, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in an et seq. citation to the Act. The court decides the application of § 11-46-7(2), not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Joiner v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, the court decides the inmate exception under § 11-46-9; it cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Green v. Singing River Health System, the court decides the limitations issue under § 11-46-11. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA as a whole. opinion →
Davis v. Singing River Health System;, the court decided when the limitations period under § 11-46-11 began. Section 11-46-1 appears only as the first number in a citation to the Act. opinion →
Towns v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the Act; its decision about federal-court immunity rests on § 11-46-5(4). opinion →
Minor v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety, the court cites § 11-46-1 only to identify the MTCA; it does not decide any rule of that definitions section. opinion →
Minor v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety, the court cites § 11-46-1 only to identify the Act; it does not decide any rule in that section. opinion →
L & L Construction Services, L.L.C. v. Falgout, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the MTCA; it decides immunity under § 11-46-5, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Butler v. Jim Ray and East Webster High School, the court decided the MTCA notice requirement under § 11-46-11; it cited § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a reference to the Act. opinion →
Joiner v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, the court does not decide a rule of § 11-46-1. It cites the section only to identify the Act invoked in the complaint; its ruling concerns whether GCSWD can be sued. opinion →
B.G., a minor, by and through his next friend and special guardian Marion E. Grantham Jr. v. Rob Banks, Brad Carver, Jer, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA; the court does not decide that section’s definitions or other rules. opinion →
Joiner v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, the court cites § 11-46-1 only to identify the Act; its state-law rulings concern § 11-46-11, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Sturdivant v. Coahoma County, Mississippi;, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA; the court decides no rule of that definitions section. opinion →
Cook v. Taylor, the court decides waiver of an MTCA immunity defense. It recites § 11-46-1’s definitions but does not decide their meaning or application. opinion →
McKay v. Choctaw County, Mississippi, through the Choctaw County Board of Supervisors, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the Act; the court decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c), not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Minor v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety, the court cites § 11-46-1 as the start of an et seq. reference to the Act; it does not decide a rule of this definitions section. opinion →
Sanders v. Attala County, Mississippi, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA; the court addresses immunity under § 11-46-9, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Gordon v. Holly Springs School District, the court cites § 11-46-1 as the start of an et seq. reference to the MTCA, but decides rules in other sections without construing this section’s definitions. opinion →
Anthony K. Hood and Barbara L. Hood v. City of Pearl, Mississippi, section 11-46-1 appears only as the first section in a citation to the MTCA; the immunity issue concerns section 11-46-9(1)(d). opinion →
Ready v. Heckart, the court cites § 11-46-1 only to identify the Act; it decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(c), not a rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Lionel Robinson and Ferante Sims v. Smith, the court did not decide any rule of § 11-46-1. It cited the section only as the start of a reference to the MTCA and expressly declined to address the MTCA issue. opinion →
Easter v. Itawamba County, Mississippi, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an et seq. reference to the MTCA. Its notice ruling concerns § 11-46-11, not the definitions in § 11-46-1. opinion →
John Tennesen and Sandra Tennesen v. City of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, the citation identifies the Act as a whole; the court addresses immunity under section 11-46-9, not the definitions in section 11-46-1. opinion →
Necaise v. May, section 11-46-1 appears only in defendants’ amended pleading as an “et seq.” reference. The court did not adopt or decide a rule of that definitions section. opinion →
Moton v. City of Clarksdale, Mississippi, Hon. Robert M. Tyner as the of the Estate of William O. Luckett, Jr, the court addresses the Act’s exclusive remedy and filing deadline, but does not decide any definition in § 11-46-1; it cites that section only as the start of a range. opinion →
Beacham v. City of Brookhaven, Mississippi, the court decides whether claims are subject to the Act and the notice requirement in § 11-46-11(1); it does not decide any rule in § 11-46-1. opinion →
Necaise v. May, the citation appears in a defense pleaded by the defendants, not in the court’s own decision about § 11-46-1. opinion →
Necaise v. Mississippi Department of Revenue, this is the defendants’ pleaded defense, not the court’s decision. The court does not decide § 11-46-1’s rules. opinion →
Necaise v. Mississippi Department of Revenue, the citation appears in defendants’ pleaded defense, not in the court’s own decision about § 11-46-1. opinion →
Phillips v. Jackson Public School District, this is JPS’s argument, which the court does not adopt as a ruling on § 11-46-1. The citation also refers to the Act as a whole, not this definitions section. opinion →
Federinko v. Forrest County, Mississippi and Butch Benedict, Jr., Coroner, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a range covering the MTCA; it does not decide any rule in this definitions section. opinion →
Gordon v. A Sheriffs Office Adams County, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation, not a decision adopted by the district judge. The § 11-46-1 citation also appears only in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Riley v. Petal MS City Government, the court adopted a ruling about the Act’s presuit notice requirement under § 11-46-11(2). Section 11-46-1 appears only as the start of an et seq. citation; the court did not decide its definitions. opinion →
Dedeaux v. Hancock County, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation that the district judge has not adopted. The section appears only in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Rogers v. City of Lumberton, the only reference to § 11-46-1 appears in the court’s account of the City’s motion, not in a decision about that section. opinion →
E. Cornell Malone Corporation v. Marshall County School District, the citation uses § 11-46-1 only as the start of an Act-wide range. The court decides a limitations issue under § 11-46-11, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Upton v. Moulds, the court dismissed the MTCA claim for insufficient allegations of personal involvement; it did not decide any rule of § 11-46-1, which appears only in an et seq. reference to the Act. opinion →
Wogan v. City of Ridgeland, Mississippi, the court decides whether the MTCA covers the false-arrest claim and applies § 15-1-35; it does not decide a rule in § 11-46-1, the definitions section. opinion →
Busby Outdoor LLC and Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, The Lamar Comp, the court cites the Act’s definitions to distinguish a state department from a political subdivision, but decides whether the City can enforce its sign ordinance on state property, not a rule of § 11-46-1. opinion →
Whitehead, the court cites § 11-46-1 only as the start of an Act-wide reference; it decides the claim under §§ 11-46-7(2) and 11-46-5(3), not this section’s definitions. opinion →
Delia Turner and Amy Mood, Co-Executrixes of the Estate of Tommy Turner, Individually, Delia Turner and Amy Mood, Co-Exe, the court decides which limitations periods govern the claims. It cites § 11-46-1 only as the first section in a range referring to the MTCA and does not decide that section’s definitions. opinion →
Strait v. Pat Harrison Waterway Dist., the court cites § 11-46-1 as the starting point of a reference to the Sovereign Immunity Act while deciding the effect of other provisions. opinion →
Strait v. Pat Harrison Waterway District, the court cites § 11-46-1 as the starting point of the Sovereign Immunity Act while deciding whether § 51-15-120 waived immunity. opinion →
Webster v. University of Mississippi Medical Center Grenada, Aimee R. Watts, M.D., In Her Representative Capacity, and Kimberley J. Farmer, M.D., In Her Representative Capacity, the court reports the defendants’ citation to the section’s definition of “State” but decides how UMMC-Grenada must be served under Rule 4(d)(5). opinion →
Taylor v. Delta Regional Medical Center, the court cites the definition to identify community hospitals as covered by the MTCA, but decides immunity under § 11-46-9(1)(g). opinion →

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