Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11

Section 11-46-11(3) applies a one-year limitations period to a UM carrier’s derivative subrogation claim against a municipality under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Coleman v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-06-11(3)

In any event, American’s derivative subrogation claim against Greenville would be bound by a one year statute of limitations, in light of the fact that the claim is encompassed under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3). ... Insofar as the defendant American has stated a claim against the third-party defendant City of Greenville under its rights of subrogation pursuant to the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Act, that claim is untimely and shall be dismissed.

Section 11-46-11(3) imposes a one-year limitations period on Tort Claims Act actions that is not tolled by the minor savings clause in § 15-1-59.

Marcum v. Hancock County School District · filed 1997-07-11(3)

We hold that § 11-46-11's one (1) year statute of limitations is not tolled by § 15-1-59's minor savings clause.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires actions under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, including medical malpractice claims against covered state employees, to be brought within one year.

Pickens v. Donaldson · filed 1998-01-07(3)

Because Pickens failed to bring her claim within the MTCA's one-year limitations period, the cause of action is time-barred, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment on independent grounds that Pickens failed to satisfy the statute of limitations of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) is affirmed, but only as to Dr. Vig.

Section 11-46-11 tolls its one-year filing period only when the claimant gives the notice of claim required by the statute; notice to a city's insurer that lacks required information does not qualify.

Coy C Carpenter v. Dawson · filed 1996-04-05(3)

Absent the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations by the providing of statutorily valid notice, Carpenter's suit is thus barred by the one-year statute of limitations. It is clear that the notice provided by Carpenter in the present case did not comply with the requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11, and the trial court thus correctly ruled that Carpenter's claim was not timely filed.

Section 11-46-11 requires actions against political subdivisions to be filed within one year of accrual and allows an extension through the required notice of claim.

Chamberlin v. City of Hernando · filed 1996-05-10(3)

The Legislature intended for § 11-46-11 to take effect from and after April 1, 1993, its date of passage. The Act directs that all actions against political subdivisions shall be filed within one year of accrual. The only way the statute allows the extension of the one-year statute is to file the required notice of claim.

Section 11-46-11(3) allows one year to file a tort claim against a Mississippi governmental agency and tolls that period for ninety-five days when the required notice of claim is filed.

State of Mississippi v. Dampeer · filed 1996-12-31(3)

Therefore, when the proper requirements of bringing a claim for injury against a governmental agency in the State of Mississippi are met, including the giving of the proper notice, the statute of limitations allows one year, plus ninety-five days in which to bring the claim.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires Tort Claims Act suits to be filed within one year and allows a ninety-five-day extension if the claimant files a notice of claim during that year.

Public Safety, Mississippi Department of v. Olur v. Stringer · filed 1997-01-08(3)

The one year limitations period allowed by the statute may be extended for a period of ninety-five days provided a pre-suit notice of claim is filed by the claimant at any point during the one year period.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice of a claim to the governmental entity’s chief executive officer with the required claim information; deficient notice does not toll the one-year filing period.

Carpenter v. Dawson · filed 1997-11-13(1)-(3)

Absent the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations by the providing of statutorily valid notice, Carpenter's suit is thus barred by the one-year statute of limitations. It is clear that the notice provided by Carpenter in the present case did not comply with the requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11, and the trial court thus correctly ruled that Carpenter's claim was not timely filed.

Section 11-46-11 requires actions against political subdivisions to be filed within one year of accrual and permits an extension only through the required notice of claim.

Chamberlin v. City of Hernando · filed 1998-06-18(3)

The Legislature intended for § 11-46-11 to take effect from and after April 1, 1993, its date of passage. The Act directs that all actions against political subdivisions shall be filed within one year of accrual. The only way the statute allows the extension of the one-year statute is to file the required notice of claim.

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year limitations period governs claims against governmental entities under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, even when another limitations statute would otherwise apply.

Henderson v. Un-Named Emergency Room · filed 1998-07-23(3)

In determining the time frame in which actions alleging tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct against MCMC must be brought, Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-11(3), which states that it applies to all actions against governmental entities under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, regardless of any other statutes of limitations that would otherwise apply, is the correct statute to apply.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires MTCA actions to be brought within one year, and the minor savings clause in § 15-1-59 does not toll that period.

Marcum v. Hancock County School Dist. · filed 1999-06-03(3)

We hold that § 11-46-11's one (1) year statute of limitations is not tolled by § 15-1-59's minor savings clause. The MTCA clearly mandates that a one (1) year statute of limitations be applied to any actions brought under the Act.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires a Tort Claims Act action to be filed within one year, allows a ninety-five-day extension for timely notice of claim, and is not waived by good faith settlement negotiations alone.

Miss. Dept. of Public Safety v. Stringer · filed 1999-06-03(3)

The one year limitations period allowed by the statute may be extended for a period of ninety-five days provided a pre-suit notice of claim is filed by the claimant at any point during the one year period. ... We agree with the Nebraska Supreme Court that good faith settlement negotiations alone are not sufficient to waive the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3) allows one year to file a tort claim against a governmental agency, plus ninety-five days when the required notice of claim is filed.

State v. Dampeer · filed 1999-06-24(3)

Therefore, when the proper requirements of bringing a claim for injury against a governmental agency in the State of Mississippi are met, including the giving of the proper notice, the statute of limitations allows one year, plus ninety-five days in which to bring the claim. ... In the instant case the accident occurred on June 12, 1994. The complaint was filed November 5, 1996, nearly two years and five months after the accident. This claim is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitation.

Section 11-46-11(3) sets a one-year limitations period for MTCA claims, including medical malpractice claims against covered state employees.

Pickens v. Donaldson · filed 1999-09-23(3)

Because Pickens failed to bring her claim within the MTCA's one-year limitations period, the cause of action is time-barred, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment on independent grounds that Pickens failed to satisfy the statute of limitations of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) is affirmed, but only as to Dr. Vig.

Section 11-46-11(3) sets the controlling one-year limitations period for tort claims against governmental entities, regardless of another statute of limitations.

Henderson v. UN-NAMED EMERGENCY ROOM, MADISON COUNTY MED. CENTER · filed 2000-04-06(3)

In determining the time frame in which actions alleging tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct against MCMC must be brought, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3), which states that it applies to all actions against governmental entities under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, regardless of any other statutes of limitations that would otherwise apply, is the correct statute to apply. ... The lawsuit was not filed until April 21, 1997, well past the one year statute of limitations requirement.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires an action under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act to begin within one year of the actionable conduct.

Conrod v. Ned Holder · filed 2000-10-04(3)

In this case, Deputy Stevie Little was not named in the action filed in federal district court within the statute of limitations. Further, no notice of an action was given to Stevie Little until a full two years after the alleged conduct. Therefore, the action in this case was not only barred by the plaintiffs failing to meet the requirements of naming a governmental entity as a defendant; as to Stevie Little, the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year deadline for Tort Claims Act actions is not tolled by the minor savings clause in § 15-1-59.

Hays v. Lafayette County School Dist. · filed 1999-12-09(3)

The one (1) year statute of limitations of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Supp.1999) is not tolled by the minors' savings clause in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995).

Section 11-46-11(3)’s extended limitations period applies to claims that accrued before the amendment if they were not already barred under the prior period.

Hollingsworth v. City of Laurel, Mississippi · filed 2000-08-15(3)

We hold the amendment lengthening the statute of limitations for claims brought under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act applies to causes of action accruing before the amendment was enacted which were not barred by the prior statute of limitations.

Subsection (3)'s filing deadline is not relaxed to a substantial compliance standard.

Burge v. Richton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. · filed 2001-10-16(3)

Because of the notable purposes served by our statutes of limitation, we decline to relax those limitations into a standard of substantial compliance simply because the Burges ask us to do so.

Section 11-46-11’s one-year limitations period is not tolled by a claimant’s ignorance of a tortfeasor’s government employment when the government did not mislead the claimant and the claimant failed to investigate.

Ray v. Keith · filed 2002-02-01

Because there is no evidence that Lee County misled Ray, we affirm the trial judge's grant of summary judgment on the grounds that Ray failed to substantially comply with the notice requirements of the MTCA, and therefore, the statute of limitations had expired.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires an action under the Tort Claims Act to be filed within one year of the actionable conduct; an untimely notice of claim does not toll that period.

Gilchrist v. Veach · filed 2002-02-12(3)

Unfortunately, according to the aforementioned statute, this letter was untimely and would not serve to toll the statute of limitations. Therefore, the amended complaint which was filed by Gilchrist on February 6, 1998, which named Dr. Veach as a defendant was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(4) protects a minor from the limitations period until a suit is filed on the minor's behalf; that filing starts the period for later suits arising from the same cause of action.

Lee v. Thompson · filed 2003-09-11(4)

No doubt, Emily, because of her disability of minority, was protected under both Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-11(4) & 15-1-59 until the suit was initially filed in her behalf. That action, however, commenced the running of the applicable statute(s) of limitations concerning subsequently filed suits arising from the same cause of action.

The amendment extending § 11-46-11(3)'s tolling period applies to claims that accrued before its enactment if they were not already time-barred.

HOLLINGSWORTH v. City of Laurel · filed 2002-02-28(3)

We hold the amendment lengthening the statute of limitations for claims brought under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act applies to causes of action accruing before the amendment was enacted which were not barred by the prior statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year limitations period for MTCA claims is not extended by the general savings statute, § 15-1-69.

Stockstill v. State of Mississippi · filed 2002-06-18(3)

While § 11-46-11 makes no mention of a savings clause, other than for minors, § 15-1-1 specifically states § 15-1-69 will not apply if there is a shorter statute specified elsewhere.

Section 11-46-11 requires a notice of claim and generally limits suits against governmental entities to one year after the actionable conduct.

Willie B. Southern, Jr. v. Mississippi State Hospital · filed 2002-08-02(3)

The record does not reflect that Southern complied with the notice of claim requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (3).

Section 11-46-11(3) tolls the one-year filing period when the government receives a claim notice and gives the claimant an additional 90 days to sue; a denial ends the tolling period early.

Page v. University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2004-07-29(3)

However, pursuant to Section 11-46-11, a claimant will always have one year plus an additional 90 days to file suit. The filing of the notice and the receipt of that notice by the agency serves to toll the statute for an additional 95 or 120 days unless the claim is denied prior to the expiration of the tolling period.

A claimant who gives timely notice has at least ninety days after the one-year limitations period runs to file suit under Section 11-46-11.

Marshall v. WARREN CTY. BD. OF SUPR. · filed 2002-12-03

Keeping in mind that in amending Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-11 (Supp.1998), the Legislature did not shorten the one year statute of limitations, we hold that the amended statute, 2002 Miss. Laws Chapter 380 (Senate Bill 3052), requires that a plaintiff receive, at a minimum, ninety days to file his action following the running of the one year statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3) tolls the one-year filing period when the agency receives notice of a claim and gives the claimant an additional 90 days to sue.

Page v. The University of Southern Mississippi · filed 2003-04-11(3)

However, pursuant to Section 11-46-11, a claimant will always have one year plus an additional 90 days to file suit. The filing of the notice and the receipt of that notice by the agency serves to toll the statute for an additional 95 or 120 days unless the claim is denied prior to the expiration of the tolling period.

Section 11-46-11’s one-year limitations period is not tolled by a claimant’s failure to discover a defendant’s government employment when the government did not mislead the claimant or intentionally delay disclosure.

Ray v. Keith · filed 2003-09-11(3)

There is also no evidence of intentional delay by Lee County which would toll the statute. Because there is no evidence that Lee County misled Ray, we affirm the trial judge's grant of summary judgment on the grounds that Ray failed to substantially comply with the notice requirements of the MTCA, and therefore, the statute of limitations had expired.

Section 11-46-11(3) gives a claimant one year from actionable conduct to sue, with a ninety-five-day tolling period after notice of claim and an additional ninety days to file if the governmental entity does not deny the claim.

Gray v. UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE · filed 2008-12-04(3)

Subtracting 550 days from the date the complaint was filed, the trial court correctly determined that any claims for actionable conduct that occurred prior to July 5, 2004, were time-barred.

Section 11-46-11(3) tolls the limitations period, but its language barring an action during that period is unenforceable; a claimant may file suit after satisfying subsection (1)’s ninety-day notice requirement.

Delta Regional Medical Center v. Green · filed 2009-02-10(3)

In light of the these reasons, we are left with no choice but to find the phrase “during which time no action may be maintained by the claimant unless the claimant has received a notice of denial of claim” found in Section 11-46-11(3) unenforceable. ... From this day forward, Section 11-46-11(3) serves only to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3)'s one-year limitations period applies to actions subject to the Tort Claims Act, even if a claimant gives a tort claim another label.

Alexander v. Taylor · filed 2006-05-09(3)

It is self-evident that only those suits “subject to” the Tort Claims Act are controlled by that Act’s statute of limitations. Efforts to re-label tort suits as something else in order to avoid some part of the Act are ineffective, as this quoted language indicates.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires actions under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act to be filed within one year of the actionable conduct.

Burris v. Davis · filed 2009-06-03(3)

See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (“All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after....”). ... The date of the alleged actionable conduct occurred on December 23, 2004, and Plaintiff did not file suit until October 16, 2006. Based on the record, the court agrees that any state law claims would be barred by the applicable statutes of limitation set forth above.

Section 11-46-11(3) imposes a one-year period for claims against governmental employees; failing to investigate an employee’s status does not prevent that period from applying when there is no evidence of concealment.

Stark v. Greenwood Leflore Hospital · filed 2009-06-23(3)

The Starks have shown no evidence that they exercised any due diligence to discover the employment status of Dr. Newell, nor have they presented any evidence that Dr. Newell, GLH, or the clinics misrepresented or attempted to conceal Dr. Newell’s employment status. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court was correct in ruling that the MTCA’s one-year statute of repose applied and that the Starks did not timely file their claim against the Appellees prior to the expiration of the one-year period.

Section 11-46-11(3) does not toll the one-year limitations period when the claimant gives no notice of claim to the governmental employer being sued.

Gorton v. Rance · filed 2011-01-27(3)

Although the statute provides for tolling during the notice period, because Ranee provided no notice to Dr. Gorton’s employer, Greenwood Leflore Hospital, the tolling provision is inapplicable in this case. Therefore, Ranee’s claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations under the MTCA.

Section 11-46-11(3) does not toll the separate limitations period for a defamation claim outside the MTCA.

Williams v. City of Belzoni · filed 2017-03-07(3)

The tolling provision of the MTCA’s statute of limitations, section 11-46-11(3), does not toll the separate statute of limitations applicable to non-MTCA defamation claims, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35.

Section 11-46-11(3) does not toll the limitations period for defamation claims outside the MTCA.

Williams v. City of Belzoni · filed 2017-08-07(3)

The tolling provision of the MTCA's statute of limitations, section 11-46-11(3), does not toll the separate statute of limitations applicable to non-MTCA defamation claims, Miss. Code )Vnn. ..§ 15-1-35.

Section 11-46-11(3) tolls the limitations period for 95 days after the agency receives a notice of claim and for an additional 90 days after that initial period.

Holland v. Mississippi Department of Rehabilitation Services · filed 2019-07-23(3)

However, since a notice of claim was sent to and received by MDRS, the statute of limitations was tolled for 95 days. Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-11(3)(a) (Rev. 2002). After the initial 95 day tolling period, in which a would-be plaintiff cannot file suit unless it receives a notice of denial, the statute of limitations was tolled an additional 90 days. Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-11(3)(b) (Rev. 2002).

Section 11-46-11(3)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for a state-law negligent misrepresentation claim.

Bernegger v. Dept of Revenue State of MS, et · filed 2019-08-30(3)(a)

His § 1986 claim is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 1986, as is his state-law claim for negligent misrepresentation, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a).

Section 11-46-11(3) tolls the limitations period, but its clause barring suit during the tolling period is unenforceable.

Delta Regional Medical Center v. Green · filed 2010-07-22(3)

Today, we clarify Subsection (3) and hold the phrase “during which time no action may be maintained by the claimant unless the claimant has received a notice of denial of claim” to be unenforceable.

Section 11-46-11 requires at least ninety days’ presuit notice and tolls the filing deadline; it did not require Davis to file a separate wrongful-death suit as soon as the notice period ended.

Y. Davis v. Darrell N. Blaylock, MD · filed 2017-01-05

Neither did Section 11-46-11 compel Davis to file Lawsuit 3 on November 19, 2014, the same day she filed Lawsuit 2. Like Section 15-1-36, notice under Section 11-46-11 must be given “at least ninety (90) days before initiating suit.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (emphasis added). But Davis’s notice served to toll the statute of limitations ninety-five days—or until December 25, 2014. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a). And then, by operation of Section 11-46-11(3)(b), she had an additional ninety days—or until March 25, 2015—to file suit. See Buckner, 61 So. 3d at 169. So Davis could have waited to file all her claims on December 10, 2014, and fully complied with both statutes.

Section 11-46-11(3) sets a one-year limitations period for MTCA actions; defendants who reasonably pursue that defense do not waive it, and a third party’s alleged misrepresentation does not estop them from asserting it.

Kimball Glassco Residential Center, Inc. v. Shanks · filed 2011-06-09(3)

We hold that the trial court erred by finding that waiver and estoppel barred Kimball Glassco and Richardson from asserting the statute of limitations under the MTCA. Shanks filed the complaint after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, we reverse the denial of the motion to dismiss, and render a judgment in favor of Kimball Glassco and Richardson.

Section 11-46-11(3) requires actions under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act to be filed within one year of the actionable conduct.

Davis v. Biloxi Public School District · filed 2011-07-19(3)

These claims are controlled by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), which provides that “all actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after....” See Black v. Ansah, 876 So.2d 395, 397 (¶¶7-10) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (applying section 11-46-11(3) (Rev.2002) in a wrongful-termination action). ... The record reflects that Gilda filed her complaint over two years after the MTCA statute of limitations had expired; therefore, we find no error in the circuit court’s dismissal of Gilda’s state-law tort claims.

Claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act are subject to a one-year filing deadline, and an untimely complaint may be dismissed on summary judgment.

Woodall v. AAA Ambulance Service · filed 2015-04-23(3)(a)

And because Woodall did not file her complaint within the one-year statute of limitations, the circuit judge properly granted summary judgment, so we affirm.

Section 11-46-11(3) sets a one-year limitations period for state tort claims against UMMC.

He Shao v. University of Mississippi Medical Center · filed 2019-05-21(3)

As such, any state tort claims against UMMC would be subject a one-year statute of limitations. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Rev. 2012).

Section 11-46-11(3)(a) requires actions under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act to be commenced within one year after the tortious conduct.

Benitez v. Wallace · filed 2019-06-04(3)(a)

In this case, we must determine whether the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-11(3)(a) (Rev. 2012) applies to bar a claim against a government employee. Finding the one-year limitation applicable, we affirm.

Section 11-46-11 establishes a one-year limitations period for claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Hinson v. Rankin County · filed 2012-05-11

Plaintiffs have likewise failed to respond to Rankin County’s motion for dismissal of their state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the bases that it is untimely under the one-year statute of limitations established in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), see Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11, and that plaintiffs’ claim falls under the law enforcement and discretionary function exemptions from the MTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, see Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c) & (d). As the claim is clearly untimely and subject to dismissal on that basis, the court need not address the additional bases urged by the County for dismissal of this claim.

Section 11-46-11 imposes a one-year limitations period for suits against governmental entities under the MTCA.

Ricks v. City of Winona · filed 2012-03-12

The MTCA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for suits filed against a governmental entity. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11. ... Because the incident at issue occurred in 2006 and this claim was brought in 2011, the claim is time-barred under both Section 1983 and state law.

A complaint filed before the one-year deadline tolls the limitation period until the trial court rules, even if the plaintiff failed to give proper presuit notice.

Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe · filed 2015-01-08(3)(a)

As in Price, Howe filed a complaint before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. So the statute of limitations was tolled until the trial court dismissed her case without prejudice for her failure to provide TGH with proper presuit notice.

Section 11-46-11(3) sets the limitations period for Tort Claims Act suits, tolls it upon notice of claim, and bars proceedings after the filing deadline.

University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Jensen · filed 2022-02-24(3)

As a result, giving credit to all tolling periods, the statute of limitations for Jensen’s claim against UMMC under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(3) expired on December 22, 2019—long before Jensen served the attorney general on July 31, 2020.

Section 11-46-11(3)(a) provides a one-year limitations period for claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Miller v. City of Leland · filed 2020-03-31(3)(a)

Further, the Court does not find the suit untimely under the MTCA as the plaintiffs filed suit within the one-year statute of limitations (the event from which the claims arise occurred on or about February 22, 2018, and the plaintiffs’ initial complaint was filed on August 28, 2018). See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a).

Section 11-46-11(3)(a) imposes a one-year limitations period on claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Wilkins v. Henry · filed 2020-06-26(3)(a)

His Complaint [1], however, was filed on September 28, 2017, 26 days outside the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, Wilkins claims are barred for failure to file within the one-year statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice to the governmental entity at least ninety days before suit and imposes a one-year filing deadline; failure to comply bars the claim.

Sharkey v. Humphreys County, Mississippi · filed 2020-07-13(1)-(2), (3)(a)-(b)

Further, plaintiff neither gave appropriate notice nor filed suit within the authorized period. Therefore, plaintiff’s MTCA claims must also be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11.

Section 11-46-11 requires a claimant suing a county to serve notice on its chancery clerk; notice sent only to a separate state agency does not toll the one-year limitations period for claims against the county.

Joiner v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 2020-08-07

To properly file a notice of claim upon Greene County, Mississippi Code § 11-46-11 requires the Chancery Clerk of Greene County to be served, not MDOC. ... Plaintiffs did not file a notice of claim with Greene County, so no tolling occured.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice to the governmental entity’s chief executive office at least 90 days before suit and imposes a one-year limitations period on MTCA tort claims.

Owens v. Pearl River Community College · filed 2022-05-05

Thus, the MTCA governs, and one of the requirements of the MTCA is to file a notice of claim with the chief executive office of the governmental entity at least 90 days before filing suit. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1). ... Without the required notice, these state law claims cannot survive. ... Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s state law tort claims are governed by the MTCA, such claims are also subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a). ... Because Plaintiff did not file his lawsuit until October 2021, his state law tort claims are time barred, and the Court dismisses them with prejudice.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice of an MTCA claim at least ninety days before suit and bars a claim when notice is given more than one year after the claimant learns of the injury and its cause.

Shad White, in his Official Capacity as Auditor for the State of Mississippi v. Jernigan Copeland Attorneys, PLLC · filed 2022-09-01(1), (3)(a)

Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(1) mandates that, if a person has a MTCA claim, ... “at least ninety (90) days before instituting suit, the person must file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Rev. 2019). JCA sent a notice of claim to Auditor Pickering on May 18, 2018. JCA filed its complaint on October 17, 2018. Therefore, JCA complied with the notice provision under Section 11-46-11(1). ... We find that JCA had knowledge of both the damage and the act which proximately caused it when Xenophon filed its lawsuit against JCA for breach of contract. The record indicates this occurred around September 2015. It additionally indicates that JCA notified Auditor Pickering that Xenophon had instituted an action against it at that time. Therefore, JCA had a year from that date to notify the OSA of its claims under the MTCA. Because JCA did not file its notice of claim until May 2018, its implied contract claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The Tort Claims Act’s one-year filing period is not tolled when a plaintiff gives no notice of claim.

Moton v. City of Clarksdale, Mississippi, Hon. Robert M. Tyner as the of the Estate of William O. Luckett, Jr · filed 2023-07-06(3)(a)

In the matter sub judice, it is undisputed that Moton failed to provide any such Notice of Claim to Defendants. Accordingly, the one year statute of limitations could not be tolled beyond one year from the date the allegedly tortious acts were committed upon him, the dates of his arrests on December 23, 2013, and May 26, 2015.

Section 11-46-11(3)(a) requires an action under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act to be commenced within one year of the actionable conduct.

Jackson v. City of Leland · filed 2020-07-27(3)(a)

All actions brought under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act must “be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a). Here, the subject incident occurred on August 2, 2016. However, Jackson did not send a Notice of Claim Letter notifying the City of Leland of the potential claim until September 13, 2017. [56-7]. Thus, Jackson did not act within the time limitation set forth in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Section 11-46-11(3) gives a claimant one year to bring claims subject to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Moore v. The City of Clarksdale, MS · filed 2022-11-02(3)

As such, all claims against Williams involve activities within the course and scope of her employment, making them subject to the MTCA and untimely under the one-year statute of limitations.

For an MTCA claim seeking unpaid construction costs, the one-year filing period began when payment became past due, forty-five days after substantial completion.

E. Cornell Malone Corporation v. Marshall County School District · filed 2025-04-15(3)(a)

Under the facts of this case, the one-year statute of limitations began to run forty-five days after September 23, 2020.

Section 11-46-11’s one-year limitations period applies to claims against a community hospital, and equitable estoppel does not prevent its application when the claimant’s reliance on a representation was unreasonable.

Barbara Slaughter Jones, Individually and as Heir at Law of Thelma Slaughter Jackson, and on Behalf of The Estate of The · filed 2025-11-04(3)(a)

Jones’ change in position was not reasonable. The circuit court correctly found Jones’ action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11(3)(a) sets a one-year limitations period for MTCA claims, including negligence, breach of good faith and fair dealing, detrimental reliance, and unjust enrichment claims against a governmental entity.

Delia Turner and Amy Mood, Co-Executrixes of the Estate of Tommy Turner, Individually, Delia Turner and Amy Mood, Co-Exe · filed 2026-03-17(3)(a)

Upon review, we find that some of the plaintiffs’ claims are governed by the MTCA’s one-year statute of limitations.

Section 11-46-11 does not require a second notice of claim when a suit is refiled after dismissal, and an early filed complaint preserves the remaining tolling period and additional time to file.

Greenwood Leflore Hospital and John F. Lucas, III, In His Representative Capacity v. Watson · filed 2021-09-09

Nowhere does the MTCA (strictly construed or not) require Watson to send a second notice of claim; the statute requires a notice of a claim, not a notice of a complaint. ... We agree with the trial court’s analysis: despite Watson’s early filing of the initial lawsuit, she remained entitled to benefit from the tolling provisions. Importantly, the second lawsuit was identical to the first in all respects. Watson filed her second complaint within the additional time allotted to her by Section 11-46-11(3)(b).

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to file a notice of claim with the governmental entity’s chief executive officer at least 90 days before filing suit; submitting medical invoices to the city’s claims department does not satisfy that requirement.

City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Dell M. Lumpkin · filed 1995-05-10(1)

Given the specific requirements set forth by the Legislature for the granting of notice, it is clear that Lumpkin's actions in merely submitting invoices to the City's claims department did not suffice for the purposes of granting notice under § 11-46-11(1).

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to give the governmental entity’s chief executive officer a notice of claim at least 90 days before filing suit; submitting medical invoices to a city claims department does not satisfy that requirement.

City of Jackson v. Lumpkin · filed 1997-07-31(1)

MCA § 11-46-11 thus requires that the "chief executive officer" of a governmental entity be granted notice of a pending suit at least ninety (90) days prior to filing the suit through the filing of a "notice of claim." ... Given the specific requirements set forth by the Legislature for the granting of notice, it is clear that Lumpkin's actions in merely submitting invoices to the City's claims department did not suffice for the purposes of granting notice under § 11-46-11.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires strict compliance with the notice-of-claim requirement; notice to a school district’s insurer does not satisfy the requirement to notify the district’s chief executive officer.

Watts v. LAFAYETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. · filed 1998-12-08(1)

He did not file a notice of claim with the superintendent of the school district which is required under the strict compliance standard of § 11-46-11. Andrew Watts's letter to the insurance carrier did not constitute strict compliance with the Act, and therefore it did not satisfy the notice requirements of § 11-46-11.

Section 11-46-11 requires notice to a governmental entity’s chief executive officer at least ninety days before suit; its 1999 amendment allowing notice to additional officials does not apply to earlier claims.

Housing Authority of the City of Jackson v. Lampley · filed 1997-02-18(1)

Section 11-46-11(i) expressly requires that the "chief executive officer" of a governmental entity be granted notice of a pending suit at least ninety days before a suit for damages is filed. Although not applicable here, the 1999 amendment to section 11-46-11(i) adds additional officials to whom notice may be given for governmental entities.

A claimant suing a state entity must serve notice of claim on its chief executive officer; serving the Attorney General does not satisfy that requirement.

Little v. DHS · filed 2002-11-07(1)

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1)(2002) provides that "[i]f the governmental entity to be sued is a state entity as defined in Section 11-46-1(j), service of notice of claim shall be had only upon that entity's chief executive officer." As DHS is a state "department" under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1(j), proper service would be had on the chief executive officer of DHS. Little served the Attorney General's office. Nothing in the record shows there was even an attempt to serve DHS's chief executive officer, or anyone at DHS.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to file notice with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity being sued; notice sent to a different entity does not satisfy that requirement.

Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe · filed 2009-03-05(1)

Edwards failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 11-46-11(1) by failing to file a notice of claim with TGH’s CEO, Brunson. If notice is not given to the proper entity, the entire purpose of the ninety-day period is thwarted.

Section 11-46-11 requires presuit notice to a state hospital’s own chief executive officer, even when a state department supervises the hospital.

Spencer Ivy v. East Mississippi State Hospital · filed 2016-05-12(2)(a)(ii)

And if the “governmental entity” to be sued is a “state entity” as defined in Section 11-46-1(j), service of notice of claim shall be had only upon that entity’s . . . chief executive officer.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2012) (emphasis added). ... Thus, based on the plain language of the MTCA statutes and the Title 41 ... statutes discussed above, we find that the “state entity” here is EMSH, and that its CEO is Charles Carlisle.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to file notice with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity being sued; failure to do so requires dismissal.

Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe · filed 2010-12-09(1)

Edwards failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 11-46-11(1) by failing to file a notice of claim with TGH's CEO, Brunson.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to give notice to the chief executive officer of the proper governmental entity at least ninety days before filing suit; defective notice requires dismissal.

Debra Ann Hunter Lowe v. Wall Doxey State Park · filed 2024-10-01(1)

And prior to filing a lawsuit against the State, the Legislature has mandated “that at least ninety (90) days before instituting suit, the person must file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Rev. 2019). ... Lowe’s presuit notice did not strictly follow the statutory requirements of the MTCA. Specifically, Lowe failed to send presuit notice of her claim to the chief executive officer of the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Lowe’s complaint.

Section 11-46-11 requires presuit notice to the governmental entity’s chief executive officer; notice to its insurer or a hospital division’s administrator does not suffice.

April Holifield and Jeffery Holifield v. Highland Community Hospital · filed 2025-04-15(2)(a)

Their argument is unpersuasive here, as there is no evidence that the chief executive officer of FGH was ever served presuit notice as required by statute.

Section 11-46-11 allows substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirements; a claim form describing the accident and injuries can suffice without a liquidated damages amount.

Carr v. Town of Shubuta · filed 1996-08-28

The notice of claim form signed by Ms. Carr a few days after her fall was a sufficient notice of claim under the substantial compliance standard now adopted by this Court. Thus, statute of limitations would have been tolled for the additional ninety-five days to allow the filing of her complaint. Therefore, Carr's lawsuit was timely filed.

Section 11-46-11(1)'s notice requirement can be satisfied through substantial compliance when the claimant furnishes the required claim information to the county.

Albert N. Ferrer, Jr. v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors · filed 1997-08-07(1)

Thus, this Court holds that Ferrer's communication with the Board and its agents substantially complied with the notice requirement in § 11-46-11.

Section 11-46-11(2) permits substantial compliance with its notice requirements when the notice sufficiently alerts the county to a claim despite misidentifying a constable's county.

Williams v. Toliver · filed 1997-11-06(2)

After careful review, this Court finds that the Bolivar County Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment to Toliver by finding that Williams did not comply with the notice requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Williams did, in fact, substantially comply with the notice requirements set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2) (Supp. 1999).

Section 11-46-11's notice requirements are subject to substantial compliance, assessed on the facts of each case.

Lattimore v. City of Laurel, Mississippi · filed 1998-02-02(1), (2)

Under substantial compliance, a genuine issue of material fact is in dispute which justifies a reversal and a remand. That issue is whether Laurel actually received the letter Lattimore claims was mailed to the city. If so, Lattimore has possibly substantially complied with the MTCA.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirement, determined from the facts of the case.

Douglas v. Blackmon · filed 1998-02-02(1)

Although the trial court correctly applied the strict compliance standard when it granted Blackmon's motion to dismiss, the law has since changed and is now substantial compliance. Since the standard in effect was strict compliance at the time the motion to dismiss granted, this Court finds the parties had no reason to include in the record evidence of correspondence between the attorneys and Coregis. Accordingly, this Court reverses and remands this case to the Hinds County Circuit Court for a determination of whether Douglas substantially complied with the notice requirement of the Act.

Section 11-46-11 requires substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirements.

Smith County School District v. McNeil · filed 1998-02-20

Contrary to the school district's position, the law no longer requires strict compliance with the notice requirements under Section 11-46-11 of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Section 11-46-11(2) permits substantial compliance with the notice requirements when a claimant provides an attorney's address instead of the claimant's address and the city suffers no prejudice.

Powell v. City of Pascagoula, Mississippi · filed 1998-03-30(2)

Her notice letter included five of the six specific facts that are to be included in the notice of claim pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2). The City suffered no actual prejudice as a result of Powell's failure to include her own address, where she was represented by an attorney at the time and his address was included. ... Because Powell's Notice bore the address of her attorney, we find this to be substantial compliance with the statute.

Section 11-46-11 allows substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirement.

Trosclair v. Mississippi Department of Transportation · filed 1998-12-04

This Court now recognizes substantial compliance with the notice statute.

Section 11-46-11 allows substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirements.

Reaves Ex Rel. Rouse v. Randall · filed 1998-12-31

In order to carry out the legislative purpose of providing relief to injured citizens, we hold that substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the Act is sufficient.

Section 11-46-11 permits substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirements; a factual dispute over whether the city received a claimant’s letter can preclude summary judgment.

Lattimore v. City of Laurel · filed 1999-04-22(1), (2)

Under substantial compliance, a genuine issue of material fact is in dispute which justifies a reversal and a remand. That issue is whether Laurel actually received the letter Lattimore claims was mailed to the city. If so, Lattimore has possibly substantially complied with the MTCA.

Section 11-46-11’s notice requirement is satisfied by substantial compliance when communications furnish the county with the information required in a notice of claim.

Ferrer v. Jackson County Bd. of Sup'rs · filed 1999-04-29(1)

The information to be supplied by a notice of claim under § 11-46-11 was furnished to the county. Thus, this Court holds that Ferrer's communication with the Board and its agents substantially complied with the notice requirement in § 11-46-11.

Section 11-46-11(2)'s delivery requirement is substantially satisfied when the governmental entity receives notice and suffers no actual prejudice from the method of delivery.

McNair v. UNIVERSITY OF MS. MEDICAL CTR. · filed 1999-06-03(2)

While McNair admits this notice of claim letter was sent via U.S. mail instead of by certified mail or hand delivery, as required by § 11-46-11(2), we find such a failure to comply with the statute is not fatal to her lawsuit.

A notice of claim can substantially comply with section 11-46-11 despite omitting an exact damages amount when treatment is ongoing and the letter identifies the accident and claim.

Overstreet v. George County School Dist. · filed 1999-06-22

Next, the school district's assertion that the letter submitted by Overstreet failed to provide all of the information as required by section 11-46-11 fails under a substantial compliance review. The letter provided the identities of the parties, the date of the accident, a short statement upon which the claim is based, and a description of the circumstances which brought about the injury. At the time the letter was written, Overstreet was continuing to receive medical care for her injuries and an exact amount of her claims for medical expenses could not be calculated.

Section 11-46-11 requires substantial compliance with its notice requirements, with compliance determined from the facts.

Smith County School Dist. v. McNeil · filed 1999-08-26

Contrary to the school district's position, the law no longer requires strict compliance with the notice requirements under Section 11-46-11 of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Whether substantial compliance exists in this case remains to be seen, and it can better be determined by trial on the merits than by summary judgment.

Section 11-46-11(2) permits substantial compliance when a claimant omits her own address but includes her attorney's address in the notice of claim.

Powell v. City of Pascagoula · filed 1999-12-16(2)

Her notice letter included five of the six specific facts that are to be included in the notice of claim pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2). ... Because Powell's Notice bore the address of her attorney, we find this to be substantial compliance with the statute.

Section 11-46-11(2)'s notice requirements can be satisfied by substantial compliance even when the notice incorrectly identifies a constable's county.

Williams v. Toliver · filed 2000-05-11(2)

The question before this Court, then, is whether the notice delivered to the Bolivar County Administrator was sufficient notice as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2). ... The notice sent to Bolivar County Administrator Ray was sufficient to put Bolivar County on notice.

Section 11-46-11(1)'s notice requirement permits substantial compliance, determined from the facts of the claim.

Douglas v. Blackmon · filed 2000-05-18(1)

Although the trial court correctly applied the strict compliance standard when it granted Blackmon's motion to dismiss, the law has since changed and is now substantial compliance. ... Accordingly, this Court reverses and remands this case to the Hinds County Circuit Court for a determination of whether Douglas substantially complied with the notice requirement of the Act.

Section 11-46-11 permits substantial compliance with its notice requirement, and equitable estoppel may apply to its notice and limitations provisions when the facts support it.

Trosclair v. Mississippi Dept. of Transp. · filed 2000-02-24

Given this line of precedent, the facts of a case may permit the application of equitable estoppel to the notice of claim provision as well as the statute of limitations of the Tort Claims Act. ... This Court now recognizes substantial compliance with the notice statute. Further, there is a material issue of fact as to whether Trosclair and Bailes reasonably relied upon the misrepresentations of Cindy Irby.

Section 11-46-11 permits substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirements, and sufficient notice tolls the limitations period.

Carr v. Town of Shubuta · filed 1999-02-11

The notice of claim form signed by Ms. Carr a few days after her fall was a sufficient notice of claim under the substantial compliance standard now adopted by this Court. Thus, statute of limitations would have been tolled for the additional ninety-five days to allow the filing of her complaint. Therefore, Carr's lawsuit was timely filed.

Section 11-46-11(2)'s notice requirement can be substantially satisfied by written notice supplemented by conversations that inform county officials of the injury.

Williams v. Clay County, Mississippi · filed 2002-01-07(2)

We find that the written notice, along with conversations with the Board members and the Chancery Clerk, was sufficient to put Clay County on notice of the injury since it assumes the recipient, the chancery clerk, had knowledge of the incident.

A notice of claim must substantially comply with Section 11-46-11(2), including disclosure of the extent of injuries known when the notice is sent.

Fairley v. George County, Mississippi · filed 2003-02-10(2)

Fairley made no attempt to comply with at least six statutorily required factors. We recognize “regarding extent of injuries” requirements that on occasion the full extent of such injuries may only become known at a later date. However, a plaintiff is required to reveal the extent of injuries known at the time the notice letter is sent. We hold, as in Gale and Little, that Fairley did not substantially comply with the statute.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to give notice before suing a governmental entity; sending no notice does not substantially comply and bars the suit.

Black v. City of Tupelo · filed 2003-09-11(1)

However, Black has not substantially complied with the statutory requirements. Black failed to send any notice of claim letter at all. ... Black did not file a notice of claim; thus, his suit is barred by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.

Section 11-46-11’s notice requirement may be substantially satisfied by written notice supplemented by conversations with county officials who know of the injury.

Williams v. Clay County · filed 2003-11-13(2)

We find that the written notice, along with conversations with the Board members and the Chancery Clerk, was sufficient to put Clay County on notice of the injury since it assumes the recipient, the chancery clerk, had knowledge of the incident.

Section 11-46-11 requires substantial compliance with its notice requirements, including disclosure of the injuries known when notice is sent.

Fairley v. George County · filed 2004-04-22(2)

However, a plaintiff is required to reveal the extent of injuries known at the time the notice letter is sent. We hold, as in Gale and Little, that Fairley did not substantially comply with the statute.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a notice of claim with specified information; a grievance and letter that omit required details do not substantially comply.

Suddith v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISS. · filed 2007-07-31(2)

As to the content of the notice, Suddith's grievance and "letter of representation" do not substantially comply with the notice requirements of section 11-46-11(2) (Rev.2002).

Section 11-46-11(2) permits substantial compliance with the notice requirements when the notice provides enough information to identify and investigate the claim, even if it omits the claimant’s residence.

Lee v. Memorial Hosp. at Gulfport · filed 2008-12-11(2)

After reviewing the notice of claim, this Court finds that Lee substantially complied with the notice requirements of Section 11-46-11(2). ... While Lee did not provide her residence at the time of the injury or at the time of the notice, we find the information provided to be in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirements.

Price v. Clark · filed 2009-07-23(2)

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that substantial compliance with Section 11-46-11(2) was the proper standard, and in finding that the August 30, 2004, notice-of-claim letters did not substantially comply with Section 11-46-11(2).

A notice of claim substantially complies with subsection (2) when it gives the governmental entity enough information to identify the claimant and promptly investigate the claim.

Bounds v. PINE BELT MENTAL HEALTH CARE RESOURCES · filed 2010-01-27(2)

Although the letter dated November 20, 2006, from Bounds’ attorney to Pine Belt recited that it was sent in compliance with Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-36(15), which requires a claimant to provide notice before maintaining a malpractice action against any provider of medical care, it also was substantially compliant with the notice requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2).

Section 11-46-11(2) requires substantial compliance with its notice requirements; a claimant can satisfy the injury description requirement by stating the injuries and medical expenses known when notice is sent.

Marbly v. Manuel · filed 2015-08-11(2)

We agree and find that in this case, Marbly did substantially comply with the MTCA requirements. Marbly’s notice was in writing, delivered via certified mail, and contained a short and plain statement of the facts upon which his claim was based. In addition, Marbly included the time and place that his injury occurred, the name of the person known to be involved, the amount of damages he sought to recover, and his address. Although Marbly maintains that he did not know the extent of his injuries at the time of the notice, his letter did state that he had suffered personal injuries and property damage, and that he had incurred medical bills in the amount of $3,500 as of that date.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a notice of claim to provide information about the extent of the injury and the claimant’s residence at the time of injury and filing; omitting those categories can defeat substantial compliance.

Lane v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, Southern District · filed 2017-05-23(2)

However, Lane’s notice provided no information to satisfy the other three requirements of section 11-46-11(2): the extent of the injury, his residence at the time of the injury, and his residence at the time of the claim.

A notice of claim substantially complies with the section’s content requirements when it provides the required categories of information without attaching proof of its allegations.

J.W. v. The City of Jackson, Mississippi · filed 2023-03-23(1)(b)(iii)

Regardless of which definition the Mississippi Supreme Court considers controlling, the notices of claim at issue here substantially comply with the MTCA’s procedural mandates.

Section 11-46-11 permits a notice of claim that gives substantial information about the circumstances of the injury, even if it does not state every detail.

The Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport v. Yilport Holding A.S., Yilport Mississippi Container Terminal Managem · filed 2025-08-14(2)(b)(iii)

Therefore, the information provided in the notice of claim was substantial enough to be in compliance with the requirements under Section 11-46-11(2), and we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on this issue.

A notice of claim must contain some information in each required category to substantially comply with subsection (2)(b)(iii).

Anderson v. Hinds County · filed 2025-09-04(2)(b)(iii)

As the district court pointed out, her notice of claim adhered to none of the requirements of section 11-46-11(2)(b)(iii). It was therefore not substantially compliant with Mississippi law.

Section 11-46-11(1)'s notice requirement does not apply to claims against government employees individually for acts outside the scope of employment or to § 1983 claims brought in state court.

McGehee v. DePoyster · filed 1996-09-04(1)

We therefore do not construe § 11-46-11(1) as requiring notice to DePoyster or other government authorities of suit brought against him individually for acts outside of the scope of his employment. ... Therefore, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) cannot be used to bar McGehee's § 1983 claims against DePoyster merely because they were brought in state court rather in federal court.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a notice of claim to name persons known to be involved in the incident, but does not require it to designate them as defendants.

Moore v. Carroll County, Miss. · filed 1997-03-24(2)

The court is of the opinion that the notice of claim filed on January 9, 1996 is valid as to the individual defendants and the plaintiffs state tort claims against them shall not be dismissed on this basis.

Section 11-46-11 requires written notice of a claim to the governmental entity’s chief executive officer before suit; the sheriff’s actual knowledge does not satisfy that requirement.

Holmes v. Defer · filed 1997-06-25

Section 11-46-11, supra, requires written notice to the chief executive officer of the governmental entity against which a claim is being brought. In this case, no written notice was provided prior to the bringing of this claim. Additionally, as this complaint involved Yalobusha County, its chief executive officer is the Board of Supervisors, not the Sheriff.

Section 11-46-11’s notice requirements are satisfied by substantial compliance.

Reaves v. Randall · filed 1997-07-17

In order to carry out the legislative purpose of providing relief to injured citizens, we hold that substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the Act is sufficient.

Section 11-46-11 requires dismissal of claims against covered public employees when the claimant fails to comply with its notice and limitations requirements.

Owens v. Thomae · filed 1997-12-11

We hold that the trial court was correct in determining that Drs. Kim and Dixon were employees of the hospital and that Owens's failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act should result in their dismissal.

Section 11-46-11(2) does not require dismissal for delivery by ordinary mail when the governmental entity receives sufficient notice to investigate and suffers no actual prejudice.

McNair v. The University of Mississippi Medical Center · filed 1998-02-06(2)

While McNair admits this notice of claim letter was sent via U.S. mail instead of by certified mail or hand delivery, as required by § 11-46-11(2), we find such a failure to comply with the statute is not fatal to her lawsuit. ... Based on these facts, we find UMC received sufficient notice of McNair's claim to permit the hospital to investigate her claim, and UMC suffered no actual prejudice as a result of McNair's failure to strictly comply with § 11-46-11(2).

Section 11-46-11(2) does not permit dismissal solely because a notice of claim was sent by first class mail; the governmental entity must show actual prejudice from that method of delivery.

Thornburg v. Magnolia Regional Health Center · filed 1998-07-23(2)

We hold that, in cases in which notice is sent by first class mail, a governmental entity must demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the failure to comply with the "registered or certified mail" requirement in order to be entitled to a dismissal on this basis.

Section 11-46-11 requires written notice of a claim; a sheriff's actual knowledge of the circumstances does not satisfy that requirement.

Holmes v. Defer · filed 1998-10-22(1)

Further, the Sheriff's actual notice of the circumstances surrounding the suit is irrelevant. There is no provision in the statute for actual or constructive notice, but a requirement of written notice is expressly stated.

Section 11-46-11 requires the claimant to send the notice of claim; an incident report prepared by the governmental entity does not satisfy that requirement.

Soileau v. Mississippi Coast Coliseum Com'n · filed 1998-12-18(1)

Finally as to form, we hold that the notice by a claimant must in fact be sent by the claimant. The incident report prepared by the Coliseum itself, even if based on an interview with the claimants, is not the notice which the Act contemplates.

Section 11-46-11(1)'s notice requirement does not apply to claims against government employees individually for acts outside the scope of employment or to § 1983 claims brought in state court.

McGehee v. DePoyster · filed 1998-03-12(1)

We therefore do not construe § 11-46-11(1) as requiring notice to DePoyster or other government authorities of suit brought against him individually for acts outside of the scope of his employment. ... Therefore, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) cannot be used to bar McGehee's § 1983 claims against DePoyster merely because they were brought in state court rather in federal court.

Section 11-46-11 requires dismissal of claims against covered state employees when the claimant fails to comply with its notice and limitations requirements.

Owens v. Thomae · filed 1999-09-02

We hold that the lower court was correct in determining that the two residents, Drs. Kim and Dixon, were employees of the hospital and that Owens's failure to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act should result in their dismissal.

Section 11-46-11(2) permits dismissal for notice sent by first class mail instead of registered or certified mail only if the governmental entity shows actual prejudice.

Thornburg v. MAGNOLIA REG. HEALTH CENTER · filed 1999-05-13(2)

We hold that, in cases in which notice is sent by first class mail, a governmental entity must demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the failure to comply with the "registered or certified mail" requirement in order to be entitled to a dismissal on this basis.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires substantial compliance with its notice-of-claim requirement before a tort suit against a governmental entity; giving no notice bars the suit.

Eddie Black v. City of Tupelo, Mississippi · filed 2002-09-27(1)

A party must substantially comply with the notice requirements of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Black did not provide the notice required.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to wait ninety days after filing a notice of claim before suing; filing suit after eleven days is not substantial compliance.

Wright v. Quesnel · filed 2004-07-01(1)

Wright filed a notice of claim but did not wait the statutorily-prescribed ninety day period before filing suit. Allowing a plaintiff to file suit before ninety days have passed since noticing the claim is tantamount to reading out the notice provisions of the MTCA. Gross disregard for the notice provisions is not considered substantial compliance.

Section 11-46-11 requires a claimant to deliver notice to the governmental entity’s chief executive officer ninety days before filing suit.

Estate of Spiegel v. Western Surety Co. · filed 2005-08-09

Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-46-11 requires that the notice of claim be delivered to the chief executive officer of the governmental entity against whom a claim is being made ninety days prior to the filing of a suit against the governmental entity. Spiegel clearly failed to comply with this requirement.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies and then give notice of an impending lawsuit; an internal grievance does not serve as that notice.

Harris v. Mississippi Valley State University · filed 2002-05-23(1)

Thus, the statute clearly contemplates two steps: first, an aggrieved person must exhaust agency remedies, and, second, notice of an impending lawsuit shall be given before filing suit. Under a plain meaning interpretation of this statute, the grievance at issue here is part of the internal appeals process or agency procedures and, therefore, cannot be considered a notice of claim.

Section 11-46-11(1) requires a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies and then give notice of an impending lawsuit before filing suit; a grievance filed during the internal appeal does not serve as that notice.

Harris v. Mississippi Valley State Univ. · filed 2004-05-13(1)

Thus, the statute clearly *990 contemplates two steps: first, an aggrieved person must exhaust agency remedies, and, second, notice of an impending lawsuit shall be given before filing suit. Under a plain meaning interpretation of this statute, the grievance at issue here is part of the internal appeals process or agency procedures and, therefore, cannot be considered a notice of claim.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires written notice containing information in all seven statutory categories; the information in each category must be substantial enough to comply.

South Cent. Regional Med. Center v. Guffy · filed 2006-06-01(2)

But, the failure to provide any of the seven statutorily required categories of information falls short of the statutory requirement and amounts to non-compliance with Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(2). However, where some information in each of the seven required categories is provided, this Court must determine whether the information is "substantial" enough to be in compliance with the statute.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a written notice of claim to address all seven statutory categories of information.

Parker v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors · filed 2007-02-26(2)

Furthermore, the August 2003 letter and the January 2004 letter clearly do not comply with the requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-11(2).

Section 11-46-11(2) requires a notice of claim to address every required category, including the damages sought and the claimant’s residence at the time of injury and filing; omitting a category requires dismissal.

Harden v. Field Memorial Community Hospital · filed 2007-04-17(2)

It is undisputed in this case that Harden’s MTCA notice contained no information regarding the amount of damages sought or her residence at the time of injury or filing. ... As such, Field Memorial was improperly joined and must be dismissed.

A timely notice of claim tolls the one-year limitations period for ninety-five days, after which the claimant has ninety days to sue.

University of Mississippi Medical Center v. McGee · filed 2007-05-24(3)

Since notice of that claim was received on November 28, 2005, which was within one year of Williams’s death and therefore, the one-year statute of limitations for the claim, the statute of limitations was tolled for ninety-five days from the date of the notice, and the claimant had ninety days thereafter to bring suit.

Section 11-46-11(2) requires substantial compliance with the notice-of-claim content requirements.

Price v. Clark · filed 2007-08-17(2)

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that substantial compliance with Section 11-46-11(2) was the proper standard, and in finding that the August 30, 2004, notice- of-claim letters did not substantially comply with Section 11-46-11(2).

Section 11-46-11 requires substantial compliance with the notice-of-claim requirements and permits a claimant to sue before ninety days have passed if the governmental entity denies the claim.

Ruby Lee v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport · filed 2007-09-17

However, we continue to apply a substantial compliance standard to the notice requirements under Section 11-46-11(2). ... This Court finds that a plaintiff may file a complaint without waiting the full ninety days under Section 11-46-11(1) if the plaintiff receives a denial of notice of claim pursuant to Section 11-46-11(3).

Section 11-46-11(2) does not require a notice of claim to identify claims discovered later if the notice describes the claims known when it was sent.

Briere v. South Central Regional Medical Center · filed 2007-11-08(2)

Thus, we hold that the first notice letter was not statutorily insufficient simply because it did not specifically mention all of the claims ultimately raised in the complaint.