Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b

Section 750.227b requires a felony-firearm conviction to rest on an eligible predicate felony and requires its sentence to run consecutively with, and before, only the sentence for that predicate felony.

People of Michigan v. Ferlando Santino Harris · filed 2015-09-15(1), (3)

A case in point is felony-firearm, a conviction of which must be predicated on an eligible felony, MCL 750.227b(1), and a sentence for which must run consecutively with, and before, any sentence imposed for the predicate felony, MCL 750.227b(3). “[T]he Legislature intended that a felony-firearm sentence be consecutive only to the sentence for a specific underlying felony.” People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463; 619 NW2d 538 (2000). The trial court was thus obliged to impose a sentence for felony-firearm to be followed by a sentence for its predicate felony, with all other sentences then running concurrently with that pair.

Section 750.227b allows a felony-firearm conviction and consecutive sentence based on armed robbery and felon-in-possession predicates, but the felony-firearm sentence must run concurrently with a carrying-concealed-weapon sentence.

People of Michigan v. Rodney Leroy Bristol · filed 2015-11-17(1), (2)

But, as in Cortez, the presence of other underlying felonies—armed robbery and felon in possession of a firearm—allow Bristol’s felony-firearm conviction to stand and the felony-firearm sentence may run consecutive to the sentences for those convictions. Id. Thus, we remand for correction of Bristol’s judgment of sentence to specify that the felony-firearm and CCW sentences are to be served concurrently.

A felony-firearm sentence may run consecutively only to a sentence for its predicate felony, so a sentence for a separate nonpredicate offense must run concurrently.

People of Michigan v. Demarcus Cornellius Finley · filed 2016-01-12(3)

Defendant argues that, because the predicate felonies for the felony-firearm charges were murder and felon in possession of a firearm, the trial court erred when it ordered that his sentence for possession with intent to deliver marijuana be consecutive to his felony-firearm sentences. The prosecution concedes this error, and we agree. See People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463-464; 619 NW2d 538 (2000). We remand so that the judgment of sentence can be corrected to reflect that defendant’s sentence for possession with intent to deliver marijuana be concurrent to his sentences for felony-firearm.

A felony-firearm sentence runs consecutively only to the sentence for the specific predicate felony during which the defendant possessed the firearm, not to sentences for other convictions.

People of Michigan v. Kenya Ali Hyatt · filed 2016-01-19(2)

From the plain language of the felony-firearm statute, it is evident that the Legislature intended that a felony-firearm sentence be consecutive only to the sentence for a specific underlying felony. Subsection 2 clearly states that the felony-firearm sentence “shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony.” It is evident that the emphasized language refers back to the predicate offense discussed in subsection 1, i.e., the offense during which the defendant possessed a firearm. No language in the statute permits consecutive sentencing with convictions other than the predicate offense. [People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463-64; 619 NW2d 538 (2000) (internal footnotes omitted).] Perkins’ judgment of sentence should be amended to reflect that his felony-firearm sentence does not run consecutively to his conspiracy to commit armed robbery sentence.

Section 750.227b(2) requires felony-firearm sentences to run consecutively to sentences for felon in possession and possession with intent to deliver marijuana, but not to a sentence for carrying a concealed weapon.

People of Michigan v. Lionel Wright · filed 2016-08-23(2)

While defendant’s sentences for being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to deliver marijuana must run consecutively to his sentence for felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b(2), his CCW sentence may not run consecutively to his felony-firearm sentence, Cortez, 206 Mich App at 207.

Section 750.227b(1) permits a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to a sentence for a predicate felony, and carrying a concealed weapon is not an eligible predicate felony.

People of Michigan v. Wilburn · filed 2016-10-18(1)

A sentence for felony-firearm is to be served consecutively only to a sentence for a predicate felony of the felony-firearm conviction. People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463-464; 619 NW2d 538 (2000). Carrying a concealed weapon may not serve as a predicate felony of a felony-firearm conviction. MCL 750.227b(1); People v Cortez, 206 Mich App 204, 207; 520 NW2d 693 (1994). Therefore, the trial court plainly erred in ordering Wilburn’s carrying a concealed weapon sentence to run consecutively to his felony-firearm sentences, and the error affected Wilburn’s substantial rights. The prosecutor confesses error on this issue. Accordingly, the trial court on remand shall amend Wilburn’s judgment of sentence to provide that his felony-firearm sentences run concurrently with his carrying a concealed weapon sentence.

Section 750.227b requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to the sentence for its predicate felony, not to a sentence for carrying a concealed weapon, which cannot serve as the predicate felony.

People of Michigan v. Beal III · filed 2016-11-01(1), (3)

“From the plain language of the felony-firearm statute, it is evident that the Legislature intended that a felony-firearm sentence be consecutive only to the sentence for a specific underlying felony.” People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463; 619 NW2d 538 (2000). “No language in the statute permits consecutive sentencing with convictions other than the predicate offense.” Id. at 464. The felony of CCW, codified in MCL 750.227, cannot be the underlying felony for a felony-firearm conviction because it is one of the four offenses specifically exempted from being a predicate felony for a felony-firearm conviction. See People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 696, 698; 575 NW2d 283 (1998).

Section 750.227b requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively to the sentence for its predicate felon-in-possession conviction, not to the sentence for carrying a concealed weapon.

People of Michigan v. Walker · filed 2016-12-01(1), (3)

Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences but remand for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence to reflect that defendant’s felony-firearm conviction is to be served consecutive to his felon-in-possession conviction, not his CCW conviction. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Under subsection (1), two prior felony-firearm convictions count separately even if they arose from the same criminal incident, making a later felony-firearm conviction a third conviction subject to 10 years’ imprisonment.

People of Michigan v. Wilson · filed 2017-07-25(1)

We hold that a defendant’s prior felony-firearm convictions count as convictions under MCL 750.227b(1) even if they did not arise out of separate criminal incidents.

Section 750.227b(1) permits the five-year sentence for a second felony-firearm conviction only when the defendant was previously convicted under that same Michigan subsection; a similar federal conviction does not qualify.

People of Michigan v. Pointer-Bey · filed 2017-10-10(1)

To have a “second conviction under this subsection,” logic dictates that there must have been a prior conviction. See People v Alexander, 422 Mich 932; 369 NW2d 461 (1985). And, the phrase “this subsection” clearly refers to MCL 750.227b(1). Contrary to the prosecutor’s argument on appeal, the statute gives no indication that convictions under statutes from other jurisdictions should be deemed convictions under “this subsection,” and we will not add such a provision to the statute. See People v Carruthers, 301 Mich App 590, 604; 837 NW2d 16 (2013). As written, the plain language of the statute unambiguously requires a defendant to have been previously “convicted” of felony-firearm under MCL 750.227b(1) before the defendant can be subjected to a mandatory five year prison term as a second-offender.

Section 750.227b(1) requires a mandatory two-year sentence for felony-firearm.

People of Michigan v. James Thomas Walton · filed 2017-10-17(1)

Felony-firearm is subject to a mandatory 2-year sentence, which the trial court properly imposed in this case. MCL 750.227b(1).

Section 750.227b(1) requires a two-year sentence for felony-firearm.

People of Michigan v. Donquize Demar Dunbar · filed 2017-11-28(1)

Defendant’s sentence of two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm is immaterial because MCL 750.227b requires a two-year sentence. MCL 750.227b(1).

Section 750.227b(1) requires a ten-year sentence for a third or subsequent felony-firearm conviction even when plea agreements produced first-offense-length sentences for the prior convictions.

People of Michigan v. Arius Pinkston · filed 2017-11-14(1)

Defendant appears to argue that he should only have a five-year sentence as required for a second felony-firearm conviction because his prior felony-firearm convictions were based on plea agreements that reduced the sentences to two-years (or the equivalent of first offense sentences). Defendant’s contention belies the plain reading of MCL 750.227b(1). Defendant has four felony-firearm convictions. Therefore, his appropriate sentence is 10 years. See MCL 750.227b(1).

Sections 750.227b(1) and (3) mandate a five-year consecutive sentence for a second felony-firearm conviction.

People of Michigan v. Beamon · filed 2018-06-26(1), (3)

Defendant’s minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment for the AWIM convictions was within the minimum sentence guidelines range, and the 5-year consecutive sentence for felony-firearm was mandated by MCL 750.227b(1) and (3).

Section 750.227b requires a second-offense felony-firearm conviction to rest on proof that the defendant committed or attempted a felony while possessing a firearm and had a separate felony-firearm conviction.

People of Michigan v. Gates · filed 2018-08-30(1)

The elements of felony-firearm (second offense) are “(1) the defendant attempted to commit a felony or committed a felony (2) while he or she had a firearm in her or her possession, and (3) the defendant had a separate felony-firearm conviction.” People v Bryant, 319 Mich App 207, 212; 900 NW2d 360 (2017).

Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively to multiple underlying felony sentences when the prosecutor designates each underlying offense in the complaint and the defendant commits each while possessing a firearm.

People of Michigan v. Adams · filed 2018-09-13

The prosecuting attorney, however, retains discretion, in appropriate cases, to designate multiple underlying offenses in the complaint to support the felony-firearm conviction. Id. at 464 n 11. In such a case, the felony-firearm conviction may run consecutive to multiple underlying felonies. In the complaint in this case, the prosecutor designated both felon in possession and larceny of a firearm as the felonies underlying defendant’s commission of felony firearm. Defendant was found guilty of both predicate felonies and guilty of felony-firearm, and the trial court held that defendant’s felony-firearm sentence would run consecutive to both predicate felonies. The record supports that defendant committed both underlying felonies while in the possession of a firearm. Thus, the trial court did not err by ordering defendant’s sentence for felony firearm be served consecutive to his sentences for felon in possession and larceny of a firearm.

Section 750.227b(3) does not authorize a term of probation for an underlying felony to run consecutively to the mandatory two-year term of imprisonment for felony-firearm.

People of Michigan v. Higgins · filed 2018-10-18(3)

In denying the request for probation, the trial court correctly explained that it lacked the authority to impose a term of probation for an underlying offense consecutively to the two-year term of imprisonment required in MCL 750.227b. The trial court’s overruling of defendant’s probationary sentencing request conforms to the analysis in Brown, 220 Mich App at 682-683, regarding the impropriety of sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment for two years on a felony-firearm conviction and a consecutive term of probation for the underlying felony.

Section 750.227b(1) requires the ten-year third-offense sentence when a defendant has two prior felony-firearm convictions, even if those convictions arose from the same criminal incident.

20250210_C368843_28_368843.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-02-10(1)

In this case, according to the PSIR, defendant was convicted of two counts of felony-firearm in November 2012. Accordingly, defendant’s new convictions of felony-firearm were subsequent to his first two convictions, thus charged and sentenced consistently with Sawyer. The language of the felony-firearm statute provides, “Upon a third or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for 10 years,” MCL 750.227b(1), and defendant had twice been convicted of felony-firearm. “A defendant with two prior felony-firearm convictions who is again convicted of felony-firearm is a third felony- firearm offender under MCL 750.227b(1), regardless of whether the two prior felony-firearm convictions arose out of the same criminal incident.” People v Wilson, 500 Mich 521, 528; 902 NW2d 378 (2017). On this record, defendant is not entitled to relief.

Section 750.227b requires a five-year sentence for a second felony-firearm conviction and gives the trial judge no discretion to shorten it.

People v. Spearman · filed 1981-02-03(1)

The statute does not allow a trial judge any discretion in determining the length of the sentence; it absolutely requires a five-year sentence upon a defendant’s second felony-firearm conviction.

The five-year term for a second felony-firearm conviction applies only when the second offense occurs after the first conviction.

People v. Spearman · filed 1981-06-24(1)

The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the Legislature must have intended that the five-year term of imprisonment for a second conviction of felony-firearm be imposed only where the second offense is subsequent to the first conviction. In light of the holding and rationale set forth in Sawyer, supra, we, sua sponte, rescind our remand order for resentencing in Spearman, supra. In lieu thereof, we reinstate and affirm the sentencing judge’s sentences.

Section 750.227b(1) does not permit an enhanced felony-firearm sentence without a prior felony-firearm conviction.

People of Michigan v. Rivers · filed 2013-12-23(1)

On order of the Court, the answer having been received, the application for leave to appeal is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for correction of the judgment of sentence. The prosecuting attorney has conceded that the defendant was not previously convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b(1), and that the defendant’s sentence for felony-firearm should not have been enhanced in this case.

Section 750.227b(1) permits a third-offense felony-firearm conviction when two prior felony-firearm convictions from separate criminal incidents precede the third offense, even if the second offense preceded the first conviction.

People v. Stewart · filed 1992-09-29(1)

As in Sawyer and Preuss, we hold that a defendant may be convicted of felony-firearm (third offense) if the third offense is preceded by two convictions of felony-firearm, and both prior felony-firearm convictions have arisen from separate criminal incidents.

Section 750.227b is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a person who possesses a firearm while committing a felony because it gives fair notice of the prohibited conduct and does not grant the factfinder unstructured and unlimited discretion.

People v. Jackson · filed 1979-11-21

The felony-firearm statute proscribes carrying or possessing a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony. The crimes defendants were charged with were felonies. Both were in possession of a firearm at the time of the commission of the offenses. Under the facts of these cases the statute certainly provides "fair notice of the conduct proscribed” and it does not confer on the trier of fact "unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed”.

Section 750.227b is not unconstitutionally vague as applied when a defendant possesses a firearm while committing a felony because it gives fair notice and does not confer unlimited discretion on the factfinder.

People v. Khoury · filed 1989-12-04

A vagueness challenge must be examined in light of the facts at hand. People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 714; 432 NW2d 409 (1988). Here, defendant was in possession of a firearm at the time he committed the felony of manslaughter. Had he refrained from pointing his gun at Hester's head, defendant could have avoided violating the manslaughter statute. Once having done that act, however, and the trial judge having found that Hester's resulting death was neither justified nor excusable, the judge was required to consider whether defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony. This requirement does not confer unlimited discretion. Under the facts of this case, the felony-firearm statute provides fair notice of proscribed conduct and does not confer unfettered and unlimited discretion on the trial judge to decide whether defendant committed an offense.

Section 750.227b’s mandatory felony-firearm sentence does not prevent credit for presentence jail time, which should be applied to the first of consecutive sentences.

People v. Cantu · filed 1982-06-22

We find unpersuasive the prosecution’s argument that credit for time served is not available for a mandatory felony-firearm sentence. ... We perceive no conflict between the mandatory felony-firearm sentence and the credit for time served statute as we construe them.

Section 750.227b(2) requires a felony-firearm sentence to be served before the sentence for the underlying felony, so jail credit must be applied to the felony-firearm conviction.

People of Michigan v. Jacques Earl Carpenter · filed 2015-10-15(2)

Defendant lastly argues that he was entitled to an additional day of jail credit, and his time served should have been credited to his felony-firearm conviction rather than his manslaughter conviction. The prosecution agrees with these claims, noting that defendant is correct that his felony-firearm sentence is to be served first. See MCL 750.227b(2). On remand, defendant’s judgment of sentence should be corrected, even if resentencing is not ordered.

Section 750.227b(1) mandates a two-year felony-firearm sentence that a court cannot shorten or offset with discretionary credit for time served on an unrelated offense.

People of Michigan v. Rickey Brown Jr · filed 2026-05-14(1)

Although defendant argues that extraordinary circumstances warrant additional credit, it was not within the trial court’s authority to grant him credit beyond what is permissible under MCL 769.11b and what is required by the mandatory sentencing scheme under MCL 750.227b(1). Accordingly, the trial court could not have given defendant a lesser sentence or discretionary credit for time served even if it believed that doing so would be a fairer result under the circumstances of this case.

Section 750.227b(1) does not exempt off-duty police officers, even when departmental regulations require them to carry firearms while off duty.

People v. LeClaire · filed 1984-09-18(1)

Contrary to the defendant’s arguments on appeal, there is no evidence to suggest that the Legislature intended to exempt off-duty police officers from the felony-firearm statute. In fact, as recently as 1981, the Legislature was presented with the opportunity to exempt police officers from the provisions of § 227b when it amended MCL 750.231; MSA 28.428. Prior to its amendment, §231 specifically excluded police officers from the provisions of MCL 750.224; MSA 28.421 (manufacture, sale or possession of a weapon) and MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424 (carrying a concealed weapon). The 1981 amendment further excepted police officers from the provisions of MCL 750.227c; MSA 28.424(3) and MCL 750.227d; MSA 28.424(4), which were added to our criminal code by the same public act, 1981 PA 103. Had the Legislature intended to exempt off-duty police officers from the felony-firearm statute, it could easily have done so under § 231.

A felony-firearm charge is supported at the probable-cause stage when the evidence shows that the underlying felony was committed with a firearm and that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense.

People v. Burdin · filed 1988-07-08

Our review and disposition in this matter also leads us to conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the probate court to dismiss the felony-firearm charge. Clearly, the evidence presented supported a finding that the underlying felony, assault with intent to commit murder, was committed with a firearm and that there was probable cause to believe that defendant committed the offense.

Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm charge to proceed when probable cause exists for the associated felony.

People v. Harlan · filed 2003-10-16

Thus, probable cause also existed for the associated claim of felony-firearm.

An acquittal of felony-firearm does not require reversal of a felonious-assault conviction as inconsistent when the trial court found that the defendant used a gun and the acquittal resulted from a legal misapplication rather than factual doubt.

People v. Smith · filed 1998-10-23

Defendant argues that his felonious assault convictions must be set aside because the trial court rendered inconsistent verdicts in finding him guilty of felonious assault and not guilty of the felony-firearm charge. We disagree. ... In any event, it is clear that the court had no doubt that a weapon was used in the assault, and the dismissal of the felony-firearm count was not based on a reasonable doubt whether a gun had been used, but on some misapplication of the law. Under these circumstances, where there is no factual inconsistency, we will not set aside defendant’s conviction of an offense of which he was clearly found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 750.227b allows a felony-firearm conviction to stand even when the jury acquits the defendant of the underlying felony charge.

People of Michigan v. Daniel James Delamielleure · filed 2018-01-16(1)

Defendant also points to the fact that he was convicted of felony-firearm but not an underlying felony. However, appellate relief is not available where a jury acquits a defendant of an underlying felony charge, but convicts the defendant of felony-firearm. People v Lewis, 415 Mich 443, 448-453; 330 NW2d 16 (1982); People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463, 464-465; 295 NW2d 354 (1980).

A felony-firearm conviction is valid even when the jury acquits the defendant of the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Archie-Morris Jr · filed 2024-08-01(1)

Here, the jury convicted defendant of felony-firearm, but acquitted him of the underlying felony. While defendant believes such an inconsistent verdict should not be permitted, our jurisprudence has made clear that inconsistent verdicts in the context of felony-firearm convictions do not invalidate those convictions. Lewis, 415 Mich at 446.

A felony-firearm conviction requires commission or attempted commission of an underlying felony, but does not require a conviction for that felony.

People of Michigan v. Scott · filed 2024-09-19(1)

In People v Lewis, 415 Mich 443, 446; 330 NW2d 16 (1982), our Supreme Court specifically concluded that a felony-firearm conviction does not require a conviction of the underlying felony. The Court stated that “[a]lthough the Legislature no doubt contemplated that a person convicted of felony-firearm would also have been convicted of an underlying felony, it made commission or the attempt to commit a felony and not conviction of a felony an element of felony-firearm.” Id. at 453.

Section 750.227b constitutionally requires a determinate sentence for felony-firearm because neither the Michigan Constitution nor federal law prohibits determinate criminal sentences.

People v. Cooper · filed 1999-10-22

In sum, because nothing in the Michigan Constitution or federal law prohibits the imposition of a determinate sentence as a punishment for a crime, the requirement of MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2) that felony-firearm be punished by imposition of a determinate sentence is constitutional.

A mandatory two-year sentence for felony-firearm does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.

People of Michigan v. Marwin Terrelle McHenry · filed 2016-01-26

Further, defendant’s two-year sentence for his felony-firearm conviction does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. See Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge (People v Meeks), 92 Mich App 433, 438-441; 285 NW2d 318 (1979) (holding that the mandatory two-year minimum term of imprisonment for felony-firearm does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment).

For a § 750.227b charge, failing to instruct the jury on any element of felony-firearm is structural error requiring automatic reversal.

People v. Duncan · filed 2000-05-23

We reverse the felony-firearm convictions because the jury was not instructed on any of the elements of that offense. We issue this opinion to iterate a bright line rule: It is structural error requiring automatic reversal to allow a jury to deliberate a criminal charge where there is a complete failure to instruct the jury regarding any of the elements necessary to determine if the prosecution has proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

A felony-firearm charge does not require a separate self-defense instruction when the instructions as a whole make self-defense applicable to the predicate felony and make that felony an element of felony-firearm.

People of Michigan v. Noland Brown · filed 2016-09-22

The instructions as a whole could reasonably be understood to require the jury to consider self-defense for second-degree murder as the substantive offense and second-degree murder as an element of the felony-firearm charge. Because the instructions as a whole fairly presented the issue of self-defense for felony-firearm to the jury, People v Piper, 223 Mich App 642, 648; 567 NW2d 483 (1997), defendant has not proven that defense counsel’s failure to request a separate self-defense felony-firearm instruction fell below an objective standard or reasonableness, Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51.

A defendant who presents evidence of self-defense may be entitled to a self-defense jury instruction on a felony-firearm charge, and counsel’s failure to request it can warrant reversal.

People of Michigan v. Josey · filed 2025-04-21

In the instant case, it does not appear that trial counsel’s failure to request a self-defense jury instruction with respect to felony-firearm constituted sound trial strategy. In fact, we cannot envision a strategic reason for failing to request the instruction. Similar to Kilgore, defense counsel’s failure to request the instruction was objectively unreasonable given that Josey asserted a defense of self-defense at trial.

For a felony-firearm charge under § 750.227b, the trial judge may give the aiding-and-abetting elements once after reading the charges without repeating them after each offense instruction.

People v. Purofoy · filed 1982-05-20

We do not find that Johnson requires a specific instruction on aiding and abetting for a felony-firearm charge. The trial judge’s giving of the elements of aiding and abetting after a reading of the charges satisfied the principle set forth in Johnson. A trial judge is not required to reiterate the elements of aiding and abetting after each of the instructions on the charged offenses and lesser included offenses.

A jury considering a felony-firearm charge must be instructed on both elements of the offense.

People of Michigan v. Traver · filed 2016-08-02

The jury was not instructed as to either of the two elements of this offense. ... By failing to provide the jury with the model instruction, the trial court violated MCR 2.512(D)(2), as the instruction requested by the prosecutor was applicable and accurate.

A jury instruction that makes consideration of a felony-firearm charge depend on conviction of an underlying felony is erroneous, but the error is harmless when the verdict shows no compromise.

People v. Mayes · filed 1983-06-22

A fundamental goal of the Lewis instruction is to prevent compromise verdicts. The defendant here was convicted of seven underlying felonies; this is wholly inconsistent with a claim that the jury reached a compromise verdict so it could convict on the felony-firearm charge. Thus, while the jury instruction was technically erroneous under Lewis, no prejudice resulted to the defendant.

Section 750.227b does not permit a momentary innocent possession defense to felony-firearm.

Grays v. Lafler · filed 2008-11-25

Petitioner cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the momentary innocent possession instruction as a defense at his trial. A request for a momentary innocent possession instruction by trial counsel would have been both frivolous and futile. Momentary innocent possession is simply not a defense in this case.

Section 750.227b does not make the legality of police conduct an element of felony-firearm, so reasonable resistance to unlawful police conduct is not a defense to that offense.

People of Michigan v. Maryanne Godboldo · filed 2016-01-21

Therefore, and logically, the fact that a defendant resisted unlawful police conduct with reasonable force is irrelevant as a defense to felonious assault, discharge of a firearm, or felony-firearm because the legality of police conduct is not an element to these offenses. See id.

Section 750.227b does not recognize a defense of momentary innocent possession, and felony-firearm is a general-intent crime.

People of Michigan v. Jeffrey Ricardo Wimberly · filed 2015-06-23

However, nothing in the plain language of the felony-firearm statute or the felon in possession statute supports a defense of momentary innocent possession. See MCL 750.224f; MCL 750.227b. Nor has defendant highlighted any language in these statutes that would suggest a different interpretation from carrying a concealed weapon should prevail. See also People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 711; 788 NW2d 399 (2010) (in a case involving felon in possession, our Supreme Court referred to this doctrine as the “now defunct momentary innocent possession defense.”). See also Grays v Lafler, 618 F Supp 2d 736, 743 (WD Mich, 2008) (recognizing that under Michigan law, momentary innocent possession is not a defense to felon in possession or felony-firearm). All three crimes also are general intent crimes. People v Dupree, 284 Mich App 89, 120; 771 NW2d 470 (2009).

Section 750.227b does not authorize a trial court to order a defendant to pay court costs.

People v. Lloyd · filed 2009-07-09

The felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b, does not authorize a trial court to order a defendant to pay court costs.

Section 750.227b does not authorize the imposition of court costs.

People of Michigan v. D'Sean Hatten · filed 2015-03-05

In this case, defendant was convicted of five counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, five counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, domestic violence, MCL 750.81, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. None of these statutes authorizes the imposition of court costs.

Section 750.227b does not separately authorize the imposition of court costs.

People of Michigan v. Kenneth Lamar Williams · filed 2015-05-12

Accordingly, under the amended version of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), the trial court did not err when it imposed court costs in defendant’s case even though the statutes underlying defendant’s convictions, i.e., MCL 750.529, MCL 750.224f, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v), MCL 257.602a(3)(a), and MCL 750.227b, do not separately authorize the imposition of court costs. Konopka, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7.

Section 750.227b does not independently authorize an award of court costs upon conviction.

People of Michigan v. Andre Rayshawn Thomas · filed 2015-07-28

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of three counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, intentional discharge of a firearm at a dwelling or occupied structure, MCL 750.234b, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f. ... None of the statutes defendant was convicted of independently authorizes an award of costs upon conviction.

MCL 750.227b does not authorize a trial court to impose fees or costs.

People of Michigan v. Keith Dejuan Jackson · filed 2015-07-30

In this case, defendant was convicted of felon-in-possession, MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, and possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d). None of these statutes authorizes a trial court to impose fees or costs.

A defendant may assert self-defense to a felony-firearm charge when the firearm possession occurred as part of conduct allegedly justified by self-defense.

People v. Goree · filed 2012-04-19(1)

The trial court erred by instructing the jury that self-defense is not applicable to a felony-firearm charge.

A defendant may invoke self-defense against a felony-firearm charge, but the defense fails when the defendant did not honestly and reasonably believe that deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.

People of Michigan v. Saif Ahmed Alghathie · filed 2015-03-12

When an individual’s actions are justified as self-defense, the individual cannot be found guilty of any crime associated with his acts “made in proper self-defense.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 708; 788 NW2d 399 (2010) (citations and quotation omitted). This includes the crimes defendant was convicted of: felony-firearm, People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 302; 819 NW2d 82 (2012), felon in possession of a firearm, Dupree, 486 Mich at 707, and discharging a firearm in or at a building, see id. at 707-708, quoting 2 LaFave, § 10.4(a), pp 143-144 (A defendant’s “intentional infliction of (or, if he misses, his attempt to inflict) physical harm upon [another] . . . is said to be justified when he acts in proper self-defense, so that he is not guilty of any crime.”) However, once a threat has ended, a defendant is no longer acting in self-defense, but as an aggressor. ... Defendant plainly did not have an honest, or reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm where there was no evidence that the men threatened him, and defendant was safely shielded within a bulletproof glass booth. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and without disturbing the credibility findings of the fact finder, the evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that defendant did not act in self-defense when he discharged a firearm in a building, possessed a firearm as a felon, and used a firearm during the commission of a felony.

A felony-firearm conviction is supported when evidence that the defendant shot at victims out of anger disproves his claim that he fired in self-defense.

People of Michigan v. Kurqe E Love · filed 2016-12-20

Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the offenses of felon-in-possession and felony-firearm because the prosecutor failed to disprove defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. ... To disprove defendant’s claim of self-defense, the prosecutor presented the testimony of Yancy and Evans, indicating that defendant shot at the victims out of anger while arguing with Wilford and Evans. In addition, Evans testified that he was not carrying a gun on the day of the shooting and denied making any gestures indicating that he had a weapon. While defendant testified that Evans had his hand in his pocket, he acknowledged that he never saw a gun in Evans’s hand on the day of the shooting. Defendant acknowledged that he was a convicted felon and was prohibited from possessing a firearm. ... The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that defendant shot the gun out of anger rather than in self-defense. The felon-in-possession and felony-firearm convictions were adequately supported.

Self-defense is available as a defense to felony-firearm through the predicate felony.

People of Michigan v. Van Buren · filed 2019-01-17(1)

The instructions were sufficient to inform the jury that the defense of self-defense applied to the felony-firearm charge through the predicate felony.

A defendant charged with felony-firearm is entitled to a self-defense instruction when the evidence supports that defense, and counsel’s failure to request the instruction may prejudice the defendant.

People of Michigan v. Biles · filed 2021-01-28(1)

As a result, there was a reasonable probability that, had trial counsel requested and obtained self-defense instructions for voluntary manslaughter and felony-firearm, the result of defendant’s trial would have been different. Thus, defendant both received ineffective assistance of counsel and was prejudiced as a result, and therefore is entitled to have his convictions set aside, and the case remanded for a new trial.

A self-defense theory for felony-firearm presupposes that the defendant committed the charged criminal acts and seeks to justify those acts rather than deny them.

People of Michigan v. Draughn · filed 2021-04-15

Therefore, it is actually necessary that defendant committed the criminal acts of felon-in-possession and felony-firearm for the self-defense theory to be applicable at all.

Section 750.227b allows self-defense as a defense to felony-firearm and does not require conviction of the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Starke · filed 2022-04-14

A trial court errs by instructing a jury that self-defense does not apply to a felony-firearm charge. Goree, 296 Mich App at 302. We also note that a jury need not convict a defendant of the charged underlying felony in order to convict the defendant of the crime of felony-firearm. Id. at 304.

A felony-firearm conviction tied to an assault with intent to do great bodily harm requires the jury to reject self-defense as to that underlying assault.

People of Michigan v. Boswell · filed 2023-01-26

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of ... three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. ... Thus, in order to find defendant guilty of the two felony-firearm counts related to defendant’s two AWIGBH convictions, the jury had to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not acting in self-defense when he committed AWIGBH.

Common-law self-defense and defense of others may apply to a felony-firearm charge, and a defendant is entitled to corresponding jury instructions when supported by the evidence.

People of Michigan v. Kilgore Jr · filed 2024-10-16

We further observe that, if the prosecutor retries defendant on the felony-firearm charge, defendant would be entitled to, at least, common-law self-defense and defense-of-others instructions.

Self-defense may justify a felony-firearm offense, but an instruction requires evidence that the defendant reasonably believed imminent serious harm made the firearm offense necessary.

People of Michigan v. De Aundray Cartess Shaw · filed 2025-07-25

Michigan recognizes self-defense as a justification for nonassaultive crimes, including felon-in- possession, CCW, and felony-firearm.

Self-defense may be raised as a defense to a felony-firearm charge.

People of Michigan v. Robinson · filed 2025-09-09(1)

Self-defense can be raised as a defense to assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, People v Stevens, 306 Mich App 620, 628, 630; 858 NW2d 98 (2014), and as a defense to felony-firearm, People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 302; 819 NW2d 82 (2012).

A defendant charged with felony-firearm is entitled to a self-defense instruction when the evidence supports that defense; omitting it can require a new trial.

People of Michigan v. Arnold · filed 2026-05-11

The same is true here. Defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that, had the jury been properly instructed on self-defense as to felony-firearm, it would have reached a different result. Accordingly, defendant’s conviction for the felony-firearm charge predicated on second-degree murder must be vacated.

A felony-firearm conviction under § 750.227b qualifies as a prior low severity felony conviction for PRV 2 when it is unclassified and punishable by less than 10 years’ imprisonment.

People of Michigan v. Kenneth Anthony Taylor · filed 2015-02-19

Felony-firearm is not listed in any of the classes M2-H, but is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less than 10 years. Therefore, defendant’s felony-firearm conviction constitutes a low severity felony conviction.

A first felony-firearm conviction carries a maximum sentence of two years and therefore is not a prior high-severity felony conviction for purposes of scoring prior record variable 1.

People of Michigan v. Dover · filed 2018-04-17(1)

Felony-firearm is not assigned an offense class, but the maximum term for a first-offense conviction is only two years. MCL 750.227b. Therefore, it is also not a “prior high severity felony conviction.” MCL 777.51(2)(c).

A felony-firearm conviction for possessing a firearm during a felony does not violate the Second Amendment.

People of Michigan v. Feiler · filed 2024-08-22

The right to bear arms also “does not encompass the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.” People v Powell, 303 Mich App 271, 273; 842 NW2d 538 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant thus has not established that the Second Amendment somehow prohibited his convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b(1) is a general-intent offense requiring an intent to possess the firearm while committing or attempting to commit the predicate felony.

People of Michigan v. Kyle Bryan Toger · filed 2018-02-20(1)

Notably, the crime of felony-firearm is a general intent crime. People v Burgess, 419 Mich 305, 308; 353 NW2d 444 (1984). Thus, all that the prosecution was required to prove for a mens rea element for this crime was that defendant had “the intent to perform the physical act itself,” People v Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 266; 677 NW2d 66 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted), i.e., had the intent to possess the firearm at the time he resisted the police officers. Here, there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant intended to possess the firearm at the time he resisted the police officers. The firearm was seen tucked in defendant’s waistband, and he was seen trying to conceal it. These circumstances are sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that defendant intentionally possessed the firearm. See Kanaan, 278 Mich App at 622 (“[B]ecause it can be difficult to prove a defendant’s state of mind on issues such as knowledge and intent, minimal circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish the defendant’s state of mind . . . .”). Thus, defendant’s argument that he “did not intend” to commit a felony fails. Furthermore, defendant provides no legal authority to support the notion that a previous version of the resisting or obstructing statute should have any bearing on how the existing version applies to the facts at hand.

Section 750.227b does not require the firearm to be discharged, so careless or reckless discharge of a firearm causing death or injury is not a necessarily included lesser offense of felony-firearm.

People of Michigan v. Juan Enrique Reyes · filed 2018-03-13

Because the discharge of a firearm is not necessary to commit second-degree murder, see People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 70; 731 NW2d 411 (2007), assault with intent to commit murder, see People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 195-196; 793 NW2d 120 (2010), or felony-firearm, see People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999), careless or reckless discharge of a firearm causing death or injury is not a necessarily included lesser offense of any charged crime, and defendant was not entitled to an instruction on it.

Section 750.227b(1) requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or attempt to commit, a felony.

People of Michigan v. Woods · filed 2022-12-22(1)

To convict a defendant of felony-firearm under MCL 750.227b(1), the prosecution must prove “that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 268-269; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 750.227b requires the defendant to possess a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

White v. Morrison · filed 2023-05-02

The elements of felony firearm are: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, a felony offense. People v. Akins, 259 Mich. App. 545, 554, 675 N.W.2d 863 (2003) (quoting People v. Avant, 235 Mich. App. 499, 505, 597 N.W.2d 864 (1999)); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b.

Section 750.227b(1) requires the defendant to possess a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and a victim’s testimony that the defendant assaulted her with a firearm can by itself support the firearm conviction.

Timmer v. Campbell · filed 2022-08-02(1)

The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing, or while attempting to commit, a felony offense. See Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2007). ... The victim’s testimony that Petitioner assaulted her with a firearm is sufficient by itself to support Petitioner’s assault and firearms convictions. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lafler, 421 F. App’x 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2011).

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting a felony, and felon-in-possession may serve as the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Mims · filed 2020-07-02(1)

The felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b(1), provides that a “person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a felony . . . is guilty of a felony . . . . “ Thus, the crime of felony-firearm has two elements: a defendant must possess the firearm and he must do so during the commission of or attempted commission of a felony. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011); MCL 750.227b. Possession can be proved by circumstantial or direct evidence and is a question for the trier of fact to resolve. Id. at 83. The underlying felony establishing the elements of felony-firearm was defendant’s status as a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 750.227b requires only that the jury find the felonious assault was committed with a firearm to convict a defendant of felony-firearm.

People of Michigan v. Boerjan · filed 2018-12-18

The jury need only find that the felonious assault was committed with a firearm to convict of felony-firearm. MCL 750.227b.

Section 750.227b applies when a defendant possesses a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

People of Michigan v. Watson · filed 2018-12-20

A defendant is guilty of felony-firearm when he possesses a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. ... There was sufficient evidence to establish that a weapon was used in the perpetration of these crimes, and to convict defendant of armed robbery and felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and self-defense may apply to the charge.

People of Michigan v. Gladney · filed 2019-02-19

The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. People v Goree, 296 Mich App 293, 302; 819 NW2d 82 (2012). ... Self-defense may apply to the possessory offenses of felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm. Goree, 296 Mich App at 303-305. ... Our review of the record evidence leads us to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s first-degree murder and firearm convictions, and to rebut defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 750.227b(1) applies when a defendant carries or possesses a firearm during the commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Ezell · filed 2019-02-28(1)

This testimony was—standing alone—sufficient to permit a reasonable finder of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ezell participated in the robbery and that he carried or possessed a firearm during the commission of the robbery. See MCL 750.227b(1); Gibbs, 299 Mich App at 490-491.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Wilburn · filed 2019-04-18(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... Defendant’s convictions of felonious assault and felony-firearm were well supported by the record evidence.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that a person carried or possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Jones · filed 2019-05-14(1)

Because there was sufficient evidence that defendant committed AWIGBH, there was also sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felony-firearm. Felony-firearm requires carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission or attempt to commit a felony. MCL 750.227b(1). AWIGBH is a felony. MCL 750.84. Defendant admitted that he possessed a gun and shot the gun at Wilkins’s vehicle. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and felon-in-possession may serve as the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Sango · filed 2020-08-20

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). “Felon-in-possession may constitute the underlying felony for felony-firearm.” People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163, 168; 631 NW2d 755 (2001). ... Similarly, because there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant had constructive possession of the gun to support his felony conviction for felon-in-possession, it follows that sufficient evidence was provided to convict defendant of felony-firearm. See Id.; see Dillard, 246 Mich App at 168.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Johnson III · filed 2020-12-10

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). ... Therefore, the district court properly bound defendant over on the open murder and related felony-firearm charges and the circuit court erred by quashing those charges.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Duffin · filed 2021-01-21

The elements of felony-firearm under MCL 750.227b are “that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... The fact that the victim was shot to death also established that the murderer possessed a firearm. ... We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that defendant was the person who committed the charged crimes.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Randle-El · filed 2021-04-15

The elements of felony-firearm are that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a felony. See MCL 750.227b; People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW21d 864 (1999).

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Gregory · filed 2021-08-05(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s conduct satisfied the elements of armed robbery and felony-firearm.

MCL 750.227b requires that the defendant carry or possess a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and felon-in-possession may serve as the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Ford · filed 2023-01-19

The elements of felony-firearm are that the (1) defendant carried or possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission, or attempted commission, of a felony. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). The crime of felon-in-possession may constitute the underlying felony for felony-firearm. See People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163, 168-169; 631 NW2d 755 (2001).

Felony-firearm requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. McLean · filed 2023-05-18

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 268-269; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant committed the felony of involuntary manslaughter. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that it was defendant who possessed the firearm during the felony. Therefore, the trial court did not err by convicting defendant on the charge of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Dunn · filed 2026-04-09(1)

To be convicted of felony-firearm, one must (1) possess a firearm and (2) possess the firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony or attempted felony.

People v. MacMillan · filed 1980-02-05

In order to convict defendant of felony-firearm, the prosecution was legally required to prove that defendant carried or possessed a firearm and that the firearm was carried or possessed during the commission of any felony or attempted felony.

A second felony-firearm offense carries a five-year sentence only if it occurred after conviction for the first offense; otherwise the sentence is two years.

People v. Kimble · filed 1981-09-21

On remand, unless the trial court ascertains that, in fact, the second felony-firearm offense occurred after conviction on the first offense, it shall modify the sentence imposed for violation of MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2) from five years to two years.

Section 750.227b requires proof that a defendant possessed a firearm while attempting or committing a felony.

People of Michigan v. Howell · filed 2017-12-14

The elements of felony-firearm are: (1) attempt or commission of a felony; (2) while in the possession of a firearm.

A felony-firearm conviction must be set aside when the trial court fails to establish a proper factual basis for it.

People v. Young · filed 1982-03-04

All parties agree, as does this Court, that the felony-firearm conviction must be set aside because the trial court did not establish a proper factual basis in accordance with People v Johnson, 411 Mich 50; 303 NW2d 442 (1981).

A felony-firearm conviction requires proof of the underlying felony; it has a different element from a felon-in-possession conviction.

Mattox v. Davis · filed 2008-03-17(1)

Petitioner’s conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony required proof that petitioner had committed assault with intent to murder.

Section 750.227b permits a separate felony-firearm conviction for each separate felony committed with a firearm, even when the felonies arise from a single transaction.

People of Michigan v. Royderrick Levan Collier · filed 2019-01-17

In People v Morton, 423 Mich 650, 651; 377 NW2d 798 (1985), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a defendant could be convicted of multiple counts of felony-firearm arising out of separate felonies during a single transaction. Therefore, in this case, given that Collier was convicted of three separate felonies—first-degree murder and two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm—it was permissible for him to also be convicted of three separate counts of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b permits only one felony-firearm conviction when a defendant committed a single murder supported by two theories.

People of Michigan v. Lewin · filed 2019-04-16

Additionally, because Lewin could only be convicted of one count of felony-firearm, the judgment of sentence should be amended to reflect that fact.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

Cannon v. Skipper · filed 2021-12-07

The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing, or while attempting to commit, a felony offense. See Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2007). ... The two witnesses’ testimony that petitioner was armed with a firearm is sufficient by itself to support petitioner’s firearm convictions. See e.g. Hudson v. Lafler, 421 F. App’x 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2011).

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Brewton · filed 2023-08-17

Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed felony-firearm. We disagree. “The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” Bass, 317 Mich App at 268-269 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, as we concluded above, there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant committed the felony of assault with intent to murder, which was the underlying offense for the felony-firearm charge. Further, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of these felonies.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

In Re Russell Tyshaun Briggs Jr · filed 2024-09-19

To prove the offense of felony-firearm, petitioner was required to prove that respondent possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.

Section 750.227b allows a felony-firearm conviction alongside a concealed-weapon conviction arising from the same criminal episode.

People v. Bradshaw · filed 1987-10-06

Defendant also claims that his convictions for both felony-firearm and carrying a concealed weapon are precluded by the federal and state prohibitions against double jeopardy. This argument has recently been rejected in ... where the Court held that the Legislature intended that both a concealed weapon conviction and a felony-firearm conviction could arise out of the same criminal episode.

Section 750.227b covers carrying or possessing a firearm during an attempted felony, but creates no offense of attempted felony-firearm.

People v. Etchison · filed 1983-02-24

The felony-firearm statute proscribes the carrying or possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of any felony. Moreover, since the Legislature clearly intended to punish possession of a firearm during an abortive felony, it could have additionally made attempted possession of a firearm a crime. It did not do so. Hence, we hold there is no such offense as attempted felony-firearm.

The possession element of felony-firearm may be satisfied by actual or constructive possession, and the charge must be considered separately from carrying a concealed weapon and felon-in-possession charges.

People of Michigan v. Savage · filed 2020-05-14(1)

The record shows the trial court’s oral instructions for CCW, felon-in-possession, and felony-firearm comported with the written instructions provided to the jury, as well as the applicable statutes, and caselaw interpreting those statutes. Likewise, the trial court’s oral instructions for regarding possession as an element of the felony-firearm charge comported with the trial court’s written instructions, M Crim JI 11.34b, and caselaw explaining possession can be actual or constructive. Most importantly, however, the trial court explained that the CCW charge, the felon-in-possession charge, and the felony-firearm charge were separate and distinct charges, that each crime must be considered “separately in light of all the evidence in the case.” A separate verdict form was prepared for each charge. Thus, we find no error.

Section 750.227b(1) makes possession of a firearm an element of felony-firearm, and possession may be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive, and proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.

People of Michigan v. Newman · filed 2020-07-02(1)

“Possession” of a gun is an element of felon-in-possession, MCL 750.224f; People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 268; 893 NW2d 140 (2016), and of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; People v Peals, 476 Mich 636, 640; 720 NW2d 196 (2006). Possession of a firearm can be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive, and proven with direct or circumstantial evidence. ... The combination of a reliable tip, the observations of defendant the day before the search warrant was executed, and defendant’s sole presence inside the home where the contraband was located established probable cause for the district court to conclude that defendant had possession of the cocaine, heroin, and firearms.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and constructive possession of the firearm can satisfy that requirement.

People of Michigan v. White · filed 2019-02-14

The elements of felony-firearm under MCL 750.227b “are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 82-83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). As already explained, the evidence established that defendant possessed marijuana with intent to distribute it under MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii), which is a felony. The evidence also established that defendant constructively possessed a firearm, for the reasons explained. Thus, there was probable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of felony-firearm, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. The circuit court’s ruling otherwise was in error.

Section 750.227b(1) permits a felony-firearm conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knows the firearm's location and it is reasonably accessible to him.

People of Michigan v. Whitmore · filed 2019-04-11(1)

To convict a defendant of felony-firearm, the prosecution must prove that “the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... A defendant has constructive possession of a firearm “if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” ... Given that the firearm was found in the vehicle’s glovebox, there was also sufficient evidence showing that the firearm was reasonably accessible to defendant. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find constructive possession.

Felony-firearm requires possession of a weapon, and constructive possession is sufficient when the weapon is known and reasonably accessible to the defendant.

People of Michigan v. Ashmon II · filed 2019-02-26

Convictions for felony-firearm and for felon-in-possession require that the defendant possess a weapon. ... To be convicted of a possessory crime in Michigan, “actual possession is not required; constructive possession is sufficient.” ... Here, the prosecution presented direct evidence linking defendant to the handguns on the dining room table. Officer Bray testified that he observed defendant sitting at the dining room table with handguns and marijuana. Although Officer Bray did not see defendant physically touch any of the handguns, all of the handguns were within defendant’s immediate reach. If believed by the jury, Officer Bray’s testimony is sufficient to establish the element of possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and constructive possession is sufficient.

People of Michigan v. Marquis Devon Moore · filed 2019-06-18

“The elements of felony- firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... On appeal in this case, defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the element of possession for each of his convictions. ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence that defendant actually possessed the gun because it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the black object that Yesrael saw defendant pull from his pocket and drop on the floor was the gun that Yesrael then recovered from the floor.

Section 750.227b(1)’s firearm-possession element may be established by constructive possession when the defendant knows the weapon’s location and it is reasonably accessible.

People of Michigan v. Bailey · filed 2019-06-20(1)

Bailey’s three convictions include a common element—possession of a firearm—and this is the only element that he claims lacks sufficient evidence. See People v Butler, 413 Mich 377, 390 n 11; 319 NW2d 540 (1982) (equating the “carrying” element of CCW to possession); People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 267-268; 893 NW2d 140 (2016) (stating that possession of a firearm is an element of felon-in-possession); People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999) (stating that possession of a firearm is an element of felony-firearm). Actual physical possession of a firearm is not required to sustain a conviction; “[p]ossession of a firearm need only be constructive to establish the element of possession.” ... “Put another way, a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” ... The officers’ testimony provided sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that Bailey had actual possession, or at the very least, “the location of the weapon [was] known and it [was] reasonably accessible to the defendant.”

Section 750.227b(1)'s possession element may be proved by actual or constructive possession, including evidence that the defendant knowingly had the power and intent to exercise dominion or control over the firearm.

People of Michigan v. Kincade · filed 2020-01-30(1)

“Possession” of a firearm is an element of felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm. People v Barbee, 325 Mich App 1, 12 n 4; 923 NW2d 601 (2018). ... In order to prove possession of a firearm, the prosecution can prove either actual possession or constructive possession. People v Minch, 493 Mich 87, 91; 825 MW2d 560 (2012). “[A] person has constructive possession if he knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons . . . .” People v Flick, 487 Mich 1, 14; 790 NW2d 295 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). ... Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Kincade possessed the gun and the ammunition.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.

People of Michigan v. Williams · filed 2020-04-23(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... The element of possession presents a question for the trier of fact and may be proved by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence. ... There was sufficient evidence to support the possession of a weapon element of the convicted offenses.

Section 750.227b’s possession element may be proved by constructive possession when the defendant knows the firearm’s location and can reasonably access it.

People of Michigan v. Currin · filed 2020-04-30

Possession is an element of possession of a firearm by a felon, felony-firearm, and possession of ammunition by a felon. See MCL 750.224f(2); MCL 750.227b; MCL 750.224f(4). “Possession” includes both actual and constructive possession. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). “[A] defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). ... Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew about the gun and ammunition, and that defendant had reasonable access to them. Thus, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant constructively possessed the gun and ammunition. Because possession is the only element that defendant contends was not sufficiently supported, defendant is not entitled to relief on his insufficiency claim.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be constructive when the defendant knows the firearm's location and it is reasonably accessible to him.

People of Michigan v. Sanders Jr · filed 2020-07-30(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” Bass, 317 Mich App at 268-269, citing People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... Possession of a firearm includes actual or constructive possession. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). While the mere presence of a firearm does not suffice for constructive possession, constructive possession may be found when the defendant is in proximity to the firearm with an “indicia of control,” People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989), or when the “location of the weapon is known” to the defendant and “it is reasonably accessible” to him, id. at 471; see also People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 645 (2000). ... Defendant’s own testimony demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that he at least constructively possessed the firearm because he knew the firearm’s location and could access it. A rational jury could find that defendant possessed the firearm recovered from his vehicle, and the evidence therefore was sufficient to sustain his convictions. Hardiman, 466 Mich at 429.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be constructive and joint when a defendant acting with an armed accomplice exercises control over the firearm.

Hopson v. Horton · filed 2020-12-18

Under Michigan law, “[t]he elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v. Avant, 597 N.W.2d 864, 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). ... Thus, there was sufficient evidence to preclude habeas relief on the grounds that Hopson and Beck jointly possessed the shotgun, with Beck retaining actual possession and Hopson retaining constructive possession.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony; possession may be actual or constructive, including when the weapon's location is known and it is reasonably accessible.

People of Michigan v. Garner · filed 2021-01-14(1)

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), second offense, MCL 750.227b(1). ... “The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... Possession can be actual or constructive. ... “[A] person has constructive possession if there is proximity to the article together with indicia of control. Put another way, a defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” ... Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could reasonably find that defendant had constructive possession of the firearms.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be constructive when the firearm is known and reasonably accessible to the defendant.

People of Michigan v. Young · filed 2021-02-04

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999); see also MCL 750.227b. As with drug offenses, possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App at 83.

Section 750.227b(1) is satisfied when a defendant constructively possesses a firearm while constructively possessing the drugs underlying a felony, including where the defendant knows the firearm's location and it is reasonably accessible to him.

People of Michigan v. Hamelin Jr · filed 2021-07-15(1)

A conviction for felony-firearm requires that the prosecution prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Muhammad, 326 Mich App 40, 61; 931 NW2d 20 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). ... From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find defendant constructively possessed the firearms as the police entered and searched his home because he was in close proximity to them, they were reasonably accessible to him, and he presumably knew they were there. See Johnson, 293 Mich App at 83. Because the evidence supported a finding that defendant constructively possessed the four drugs and the firearms at the same time, the prosecution introduced sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions for four counts of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b requires proof that a defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive.

People of Michigan v. Bankston · filed 2021-07-29(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” Id. at 268-269 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Possession of a firearm can be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive.” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). ... Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver of the minivan had a firearm in his possession during the robbery. ... On the basis of the foregoing, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a firearm and was guilty of both felon-in-possession and felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b(1) permits a felony-firearm conviction when the defendant constructively possesses a firearm during a felony, including when the circumstances show that the defendant knew the firearm was present and had the right to control it.

People of Michigan v. Saarela · filed 2022-10-13(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... Possession of a firearm can be actual or constructive. People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). “Constructive possession exists if the defendant knew that [the contraband] was present and had the right to exercise control over it. Put differently, constructive possession exists if the totality of the circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband.” People v Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 421; 707 NW2d 624 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). ... Taken together, and viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a jury to reasonably infer that defendant was in constructive possession of the gun.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and proximity without indicia of control does not establish constructive possession.

People of Michigan v. Stansberry · filed 2022-12-15

The elements of felony-firearm are that (1) the defendant carried or possessed a firearm (2) during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... The evidence presented at the preliminary examination did not establish probable cause to believe that Stansberry constructively possessed the gun. ... While the evidence showed that Stansberry was in proximity to the gun, the evidence failed to reveal any indicia of control on Stansberry’s part. Under the totality of the circumstances, Stansberry did not constructively possess the gun. ... Absent sufficient evidence to supporting the charge of CCW, there was no ground to bind Stansberry over on the charges of felon in possession and felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b permits the firearm-possession element to be established through constructive possession when the evidence links the defendant to the firearm.

20241217_C367634_38_367634.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-12-17

Intertwined with identity is the possession element of the convictions at issue. See MCL 750.224f; MCL 750.227b. Possession can be either actual or constructive. People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). ... The evidence at trial sufficiently established that defendant constructively possessed the firearm and ammunition.

Felony-firearm requires proof that the defendant possessed the firearm; proximity to a concealed gun, without evidence of knowledge or control, does not establish constructive possession.

People of Michigan v. Davis · filed 2025-04-22

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” Id. at 268-269 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, both crimes require the prosecution to prove that the defendant “possessed a firearm.” Id. ... Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant had constructive possession of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

A defendant possesses a firearm under § 750.227b(1) when he knows it is on his body and can access it, even if someone else placed it there and he never handled it.

People of Michigan v. Wallace · filed 2025-07-15(1)

Defendant argues that the DNA evidence would be favorable to his defense because it would support his defense theory that he did not “actually possess” the gun. This argument is premised on his legal theory that if the firearm was placed on him without him handling the firearm, it was impossible for him to possess the weapon in order to be guilty of the firearm offenses. This argument ignores that possession “can be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive.” People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). A defendant “has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant.” Id. Defendant did not need to place the firearm on his own body to have possession of it. Its placement against his side with his knowledge and within his ability to access it established that he possessed the firearm. See id. Consequently, the possible existence of negative DNA results would not be exculpatory.

A defendant can constructively possess a firearm under § 750.227b when the circumstances support an inference that the defendant knew of and exercised control over firearms at a residence.

People of Michigan v. Lopez · filed 2026-01-13(1)

Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that defendant exercised dominion and control over the controlled substances and firearms found at the subject house.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony; proximity to the gun together with DNA linking the defendant to it can support a finding of constructive possession.

People of Michigan v. Burkett · filed 2026-06-16(1)

Felony-firearm requires that a defendant possess a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. ... Through the lens of these standards, we conclude a rational juror could find defendant possessed the handgun found under the mattress in John’s bedroom. ... For these reasons, there was sufficient evidence demonstrating firearm possession supporting defendant’s felon-in-possession and felony-firearm convictions.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and possession may be proved without admitting the weapon into evidence.

People of Michigan v. Visner · filed 2020-07-16(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Muhammad, 326 Mich App 40, 61; 931 NW2d 20 (2018) (citation omitted); see MCL 750.227b(1). ... The fact that the firearm was not recovered says little, if anything, about whether defendant possessed a firearm when he delivered marijuana. Where the conviction of an offense requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant possessed a firearm, this element may be proven without the actual admission into evidence of the weapon. People v Hayden, 132 Mich App 273, 296; 348 NW2d 672 (1984). In this case, the two undercover officers each testified to observing defendant carrying a semiautomatic handgun on his person during each of the controlled drug purchases. In addition, Detective Hughes wore a recording device during the September 6, 2017 transaction. The prosecution admitted photos obtained from the recording device, and Detective Hughes identified a photograph of the weapon carried on defendant’s hip during the controlled buy on September 6, 2017. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that defendant possessed a firearm during each of the crimes.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant attempted or committed a felony while possessing a firearm.

People of Michigan v. Brown · filed 2019-02-21

Finally, both defendants argue that, because there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions for assault with intent to murder and conspiracy to commit assault with the intent to do great bodily harm, their convictions for felony-firearm are likewise supported by insufficient evidence. The elements of felony-firearm are “(1) the defendant attempted to commit a felony or committed a felony (2) while he or she had a firearm in her or her possession . . . .” See People v Bryant, 319 Mich App 207, 212; 900 NW2d 360 (2017). Given that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that each defendant committed two felonies while possessing a firearm, there is also sufficient evidence to support their convictions of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b applies when a defendant possesses a firearm while committing first-degree murder.

People of Michigan v. Grove · filed 2019-04-09(1)

Similarly, the evidence that defendant shot Randy with a firearm in the course of committing a first-degree murder supported defendant’s felony-firearm conviction. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed or carried a firearm, and a victim’s testimony describing the defendant waving and pointing a pistol can establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt.

People of Michigan v. Mosher · filed 2019-05-21(1)

Defendant’s additional convictions for felon-in-possession, carrying a concealed weapon, and felony-firearm also required proof that he possessed or carried a firearm as an element to support these convictions. ... See MCL 750.224f(1) 4 (felon-in-possession); MCL 750.227(2)5 (carrying a concealed weapon); MCL 750.227b(1) (felony-firearm). ... On the record evidence presented in this case, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that defendant possessed and used a gun during the incident that led to his convictions.

MCL 750.227b makes possession of a firearm an element of felony-firearm, and possession may be actual or constructive and proved by circumstantial evidence.

People of Michigan v. Jeter · filed 2019-05-21

“Possession” of a gun is an element of felon-in-possession, MCL 750.224f; People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 268; 893 NW2d 140 (2016), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; People v Peals, 476 Mich 636, 640; 720 NW2d 196 (2006). ... Possession of a firearm can be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive, and proven with direct or circumstantial evidence. ... In sum, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, appreciating that circumstantial evidence can establish the elements of a crime and that the jury decides issues of credibility and weight, and resolving all conflicts in favor of the prosecution, we hold that a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant’s possession of the firearm was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 750.227b requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Rice · filed 2019-06-27

To convict a defendant of felony-firearm, the prosecutor must prove that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. ... This evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm, which he used to assault McCray with the intent to kill him.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Baldwin · filed 2019-08-20

The jury convicted defendant of three counts of felony-firearm. “The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” Bass, 317 Mich App at 268-269 (cleaned up). The predicate felonies in this case were the possession with intent to deliver 50 to 449 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of heroin, and felon-in-possession. As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that defendant possessed the cocaine, heroin, and firearms found in the home. Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to support the three predicate felonies for the three felony firearm convictions.

A defendant commits felony-firearm by possessing a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Knox · filed 2019-08-20

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... Lowe also testified that defendant pointed a gun at him in a threatening manner and directed Lowe to surrender his property and Malibu which contained the gun in the glovebox. ... This evidence sufficed to establish the elements of the carjacking, armed robbery, UDAA, receiving or concealing a stolen motor vehicle, carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, and felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and the firearm need not be recovered when witness accounts and other evidence establish possession.

People of Michigan v. McCoy · filed 2019-10-01(1)

A conviction of felony-firearm requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. ... Although a firearm was never recovered, given the witness accounts of the shooting, the evidence that Bucy suffered two gunshot wounds, and the witnesses’ identification of defendant as the shooter, as well as the testimony of multiple other witnesses who said they saw defendant possess a handgun that night at Kozar’s house, the evidence was also sufficient to enable the jury to convict defendant of both counts of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and one witness’s testimony can supply sufficient evidence of possession.

Campbell v. Jackson · filed 2020-08-10(1)

In Michigan, “[t]he elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v. Avant, 235 Mich. App. 499, 505 (1999). ... The victim, moreover, testified that Petitioner fired a thick, black handgun near her and her sister’s faces and then demanded that she give him her money and her motorbike. ... Therefore, a rational trier of fact could have concluded from the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution that Petitioner was guilty of both felony firearm and felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony, and victim testimony may be sufficient to prove that conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ezell 73933 v. Skipper · filed 2021-01-07(1)

This testimony [of the victims] was—standing alone—sufficient to permit a reasonable finder of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ezell participated in the robbery and that he carried or possessed a firearm during the commission of the robbery. See MCL 750.227b(1); Gibbs, 299 Mich App at 490-491.

Subsection (1) requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and eyewitness testimony, the defendant’s admissions, and tracking evidence can establish possession during a carjacking.

People of Michigan v. Lee · filed 2021-03-11(1)

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... Considering all of that, there was sufficient—even overwhelming—evidence that defendant possessed a firearm when he committed the crime of carjacking. ... Consequently, there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b requires that the defendant possess a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Powell · filed 2021-03-11

“The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). Here, the three counts of felony-firearm were tied to the one count of possession with intent to deliver and two counts of felon-in-possession. As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence for a rational fact-finder to infer that defendant committed all three of these crimes, all of which are felonies. And the evidence was clear that defendant’s DNA matched the major contributor of the DNA found on the gun. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for a rational fact-finder to find defendant guilty of the three counts of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony, and eyewitness testimony alone can establish that possession.

Redding v. Horton · filed 2021-04-30(1)

The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing, or while attempting to commit, a felony offense. ... TJ’s testimony that petitioner was armed with a firearm during the commission of the other felony offenses is sufficient by itself to support petitioner’s firearm convictions.

Section 750.227b requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm; a vague inquiry about buying guns and an undescribed empty plastic box did not suffice.

People of Michigan v. Goodman · filed 2021-08-12

From the evidence one could conclude that defendant possibly or, at best, probably, possessed a firearm at some time or that he planned to obtain one. Certainly such evidence would be sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a search for a firearm in a location over which defendant had control. However, it does not establish possession beyond a reasonable doubt and proofs that do not rise to that standard are by definition insufficient. See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 196; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (“Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences it permits are sufficient to support a conviction, provided the prosecution meets its constitutionally based burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). See also People v Xun Wang, 505 Mich 239, 251; 952 NW2d 334 (2020) (“[C]ircumstantial proof must facilitate reasonable inferences . . . , not mere speculation.”). While the prosecution need not affirmatively disprove alternative inferences that could have been drawn, the proofs to support a necessary element of the offenses must be sufficient to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Here, they did not.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

Maxwell v. Winn · filed 2022-05-03

The elements of felony firearm are: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, a felony offense. People v. Akins, 259 Mich. App. 545, 554, 675 N.W.2d 863 (2003) (quoting People v. Avant, 235 Mich. App. 499, 505, 597 N.W.2d 864 (1999)); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. ... The evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light favorable to the prosecution, established Petitioner’s guilt of first-degree premeditated murder and felony firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 750.227b(2) requires possession of a pneumatic firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and evidence that a juvenile knowingly carried a BB gun under his seat while possessing a stolen vehicle was sufficient to support the charge.

In Re Aceion Corday Conway · filed 2023-01-19(2)

Further, “the elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant [(1)] possessed a [pneumatic] firearm [(2)] during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Muhammad, 326 Mich App 40, 61; 931 NW2d 20 (2018). ... He was stopped while driving the stolen vehicle, knowingly carrying a BB gun under his seat, close in time to when the vehicle was reported stolen. ... Although there may be alternative inferences that the court could reasonably draw, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence4 was sufficient for the trial court to find the elements of the receiving and concealing charge—and thus also the felony-firearm charge—satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

Subsection (1)'s firearm-possession requirement may be proved by eyewitness testimony corroborated by DNA evidence.

People of Michigan v. Tauheed Salik Wilder · filed 2023-09-28(1)

Because defendant’s convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, felonious assault, felony-firearm, and carrying a concealed weapon each required the jury to find defendant in possession of a firearm during the altercation, those convictions are directly at issue by this argument. ... Considering the testimony as well as the corroborating DNA evidence, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the Taurus.

A felony-firearm conviction has sufficient evidence when eyewitness testimony shows the defendant used a gun to commit the charged murder.

People of Michigan v. McNeir · filed 2023-12-21(1)

In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could find that the elements of first-degree premeditated murder, felon-in-possession, and felony-firearm were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ... And the elements of felony-firearm are that a person carried or possessed a firearm when he committed or attempted to commit a felony. MCL 750.227b(1). ... Dajon testified he saw defendant walk up to him and Lee and use a gun to repeatedly shoot Lee from just steps away. Lee died from his injuries. ... Even this limited testimony and evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm while committing or attempting a felony; evidence that he fired a gun during the charged offenses was sufficient to submit the felony-firearm charges to the jury.

People of Michigan v. Bosworth · filed 2024-07-18(1)

Finally, to prove the crime of felony-firearm, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant carried or possessed a firearm when he committed or attempted to commit a felony. MCL 750.227b(1). ... Notwithstanding that Keyes’s testimony was inconsistent, when viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Bosworth intentionally killed Robinson with premeditation and deliberation, that he assaulted Robinson’s brother with the intent to kill him, and that he used or possessed a firearm when committing both offenses.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony; evidence of the felony and firearm possession during the attack supports a conviction.

People of Michigan v. Shaw · filed 2024-08-01

As discussed, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and, therefore, the present argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for felony-firearm should also fail. To the extent defendant believes there was insufficient evidence that he possessed a firearm, defendant admits on appeal he possessed a firearm because he says he shot Glasper. This fact was also drawn out at trial with testimony that defendant possessed a firearm at the time of the attack.

Possession for felony-firearm may be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by circumstantial evidence even without an eyewitness who saw the defendant holding the gun.

People of Michigan v. Turner · filed 2024-08-15(1)

As indicated earlier, there was evidence that defendant fled the upper-floor apartment by climbing down the balcony railing, but he was intercepted by the officer who directed defendant to climb back up and into the apartment. That officer then discovered a handgun on the ground, directly below where defendant had been dangling. And the handgun was found to be warmer than the ambient air, indicating that it had just been handled and inside on that December day. Additionally, fresh grass and dirt were discovered on the muzzle and barrel of the handgun. Furthermore, defendant’s DNA was found on the firearm. We hold that when this evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had possessed the handgun even though there was no eyewitness testimony placing the firearm in defendant’s possession.

Section 750.227b(1) requires carrying or possessing a firearm while committing or attempting a felony; evidence identifying the defendant as the shooter during an attempted murder can support a felony-firearm conviction.

20241218_C358231_110_358231.Opn.Pdf · filed 2024-12-18(1)

The elements of felony-firearm are carrying or having possession of a firearm when one commits or attempts to commit a felony. MCL 750.227b(1). ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to determine that defendant was the shooter. ... This same evidence was also sufficient to support defendant’s AWIM and felony-firearm convictions and he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Section 750.227b’s felony-firearm offense is supported by evidence that the defendant pointed a pistol at the victim while committing an armed robbery.

Gregory v. Nagy · filed 2025-02-06

During trial, the victim testified that defendant entered the victim’s home and pushed the victim to the ground. Defendant then asked the victim where the victim’s wallet was while pointing a pistol at him; the victim complied and defendant took $300 or $400 from the victim’s wallet. Further, defendant admitted during his trial testimony that he removed $260 from the victim’s wallet. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s conduct satisfied the elements of armed robbery and felony-firearm. ... For all the reasons listed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, there was ample evidence to establish Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during a felony, and a gun within the defendant’s reach bearing his DNA can support a finding of possession.

People of Michigan v. Hernandez · filed 2025-04-16

The elements of felony firearm are possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. MCL 750.227b; People v Avant, 235 Mich App 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). The orange bag of guns was recovered within reach of Hernandez. Hernandez’s DNA was on the Beretta and the evidence lent itself to the prosecutor’s theory that all four passengers in the car each had his own gun.

Section 750.227b(1) requires possession of a firearm during a felony; eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence can establish that possession.

20250219_C369601_40_369601.Opn.Pdf · filed 2025-02-19(1)

Lastly, “[t]he elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” Bass, 317 Mich App at 268-269 (quotation marks and citation omitted). ... But, defendant ignores the fact that the victim testified that he possessed a firearm during the offense and that she did not own a firearm herself, nor did she keep one in her home. Additionally, the police found the firearm and ammunition in a closet in the victim’s home after defendant had been alone in the home before surrendering—strong circumstantial evidence that defendant possessed the gun found in the victim’s house. Parkinson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. Thus, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support defendant’s convictions of felon-in-possession and felony-firearm.

Felony-firearm possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant carried a firearm and discarded it while fleeing police.

People of Michigan v. Rondeau · filed 2025-06-12(1)

Taken together, the most logical explanation is that defendant had a firearm when he was first observed by the police but deposited the firearm under the car when he was attempting to flee the police. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant was guilty of felon-in-possession and felony-firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

A felony-firearm conviction is supported when the underlying felony is supported by the great weight of the evidence and the record shows that the defendant possessed a gun during the incident.

People of Michigan v. Savage · filed 2025-09-15

Because defendant’s conviction of felonious assault was supported by the great weight of the evidence, and record evidence supports that defendant possessed a gun at the time of the incident, defendant’s conviction of felony-firearm was also supported by the great weight of the evidence.

Section 750.227b(1)’s firearm-possession element may be proved through circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish actual possession.

People of Michigan v. Jackson · filed 2025-12-09(1)

“A person is guilty of felony-firearm if the person possesses a firearm during the commission of a felony.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 588; 808 NW2d 541 (2011), citing MCL 750.227b. ... We conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence at trial to permit a rational jury to determine that defendant had actual possession of a firearm.

Section 750.227b(1) allows a felony-firearm conviction based on circumstantial evidence of possession even when no witness saw the defendant holding a firearm.

People of Michigan v. Nowling · filed 2025-09-15(1)

Although no witness testimony or video evidence showed defendant holding a firearm, that does not preclude a finding that he possessed a firearm.