Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b

Section 750.227b permits conviction of a person who aids and abets another’s possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, even if the aider and abettor never actually possessed the firearm.

People v. Tavolacci · filed 1979-02-06

Nor do we see anything in the language of MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2) that indicates a legislative intent to exclude the possibility of an aider and abettor to the crime described therein. ... In light of the considerations noted above, we hold that one may be convicted as an aider and abettor to the felony-firearm offense.

Section 750.227b permits a person who does not actually possess a firearm to be charged with aiding and abetting another person who does possess one.

People v. Perry · filed 1979-10-02

It is our opinion that the proper application of the aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979, to the felony-firearm statute requires us to hold that one not in actual possession of a firearm may be charged with aiding and abetting one who does possess a firearm.

Section 750.227b permits conviction as an aider and abettor without personal possession when the defendant knowingly acts or encourages, intending to aid the possessor in obtaining, retaining, or using the firearm during a felony.

People v. Atkins · filed 1979-11-06(1)

Careful reading of People v Tavolacci, supra , and the relevant portions of Judge KAUFMAN'S dissenting opinion in People v Walter Johnson, supra , persuades us that MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2) does not require proof of personal possession of the firearm when used in the commission of a felony. ... However, in order that an accused may be convicted as an aider and abettor of a possessory crime such as felony-firearm, it must be shown that he knowingly acted or encouraged, with the intent to aid, the possessor to obtain or retain possession of or to use the firearm during the course of a felony.

Section 750.227b(1) does not require personal possession for accomplice liability, but the defendant must knowingly act or encourage with intent to aid the possessor in obtaining, retaining, or using the firearm during a felony.

People v. Bynum · filed 1979-11-07(1)

However, careful reading of People v Tavolacci, supra , and the relevant portions of Judge KAUFMAN'S dissenting opinion in People v Walter Johnson, supra , persuades us that MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2) does not require proof of personal possession of the firearm when used in the commission of a felony. See United States v James, 528 F2d 999, 1015 (CA 5, 1976), reh den, 532 F2d 1054 (1976), People v James Napoleon Taylor (Docket No. 77-1734, decided February 10, 1978 [unreported]), cf. United States v Brant, 448 F Supp 781 (WD Pa, 1978), United States v Giannoni, 472 F2d 136 (CA 9, 1973), cert den, 411 US 935; 93 S Ct 1911; 36 L Ed 2d 396 (1973). However, in order that an accused may be convicted as an aider and abettor of a possessory crime such as felony-firearm, it must be shown that he knowingly acted or encouraged, with the intent to aid, the possessor to obtain or retain possession of, or to use the firearm during the course of a felony.

Section 750.227b permits liability through aiding and abetting even when the defendant did not personally possess the firearm, and the prosecution need not prove that the firearm was operable.

People v. Gibson · filed 1979-12-05(1)

It is our opinion that the proper application of the aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979, to the felony-firearm statute requires us to hold that one not in actual possession of a firearm may be charged with aiding and abetting one who does possess a firearm. ... It is our opinion that the prosecutor need not present proof of operability as an element of a prima facie case in a felony-firearm prosecution. A contrary requirement would be inconsistent with the legislative intent of discouraging the practice of carrying guns in circumstances where harm is apt to occur.

Section 750.227b requires the defendant to personally possess the firearm; a codefendant's possession alone does not support a felony-firearm conviction.

People v. Powell · filed 1979-05-21

The testimony elicited in support of the defendant's plea indicates that he was sentenced under MCL 750.227b as a result of his codefendant's possession of a firearm. We agree with the holding of People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich App 654; 272 NW2d 605 (1978), that the language of the felony-firearm statute clearly contemplates "personal" possession of a firearm by the defendant.

A person who does not actually possess a firearm may be charged with aiding and abetting felony-firearm when another person possesses the firearm.

People v. Wimbush · filed 1979-12-05

It is our opinion that the proper application of the aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39; MSA ... 28.979, to the felony-firearm statute requires us to hold that one not in actual possession of a firearm may be charged with aiding and abetting one who does possess a firearm.

The felony-firearm statute permits accessory liability for a defendant who aids and abets the felony even when the defendant does not personally possess the firearm.

People v. Duckett · filed 1980-01-09

We perceive no legal impropriety in the application to defendant of accessory liability under the felony-firearm statute.

Section 750.227b does not require a defendant to personally possess the firearm and permits conviction on an aiding-and-abetting theory.

People v. Sullivan · filed 1980-05-19

Defendant Sullivan next contends that a conviction under the felony-firearm statute requires personal possession of a firearm. That contention is refuted by People v Tavolacci, 88 Mich App 470; 276 NW2d 919 (1979), lv gtd 407 Mich 882 (1979), People v Atkins, 93 Mich App 524; 286 NW2d 901 (1979).

Section 750.227b requires the defendant personally to possess a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People v. Bridges · filed 1980-07-01

The statute clearly speaks in terms of personal possession. It is possession during the course of a felony, or attempted felony, that is required for conviction.

Section 750.227b permits an aider and abettor to be convicted of felony-firearm even if the aider and abettor did not possess the firearm.

People v. Bailey · filed 1981-03-03

An aider and abettor need not have possession of the firearm to be convicted under MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).

Section 750.227b requires a defendant to personally possess the firearm during the commission of a felony and does not permit a felony-firearm charge based solely on aiding and abetting another person's possession.

People v. Majors · filed 1981-03-17

We are of the belief that the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), requires that the defendant personally possess the firearm during the commission of a felony to enable the prosecution to charge that offense.

A defendant may be convicted as an aider and abettor of felony-firearm only if the defendant assisted the principal in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm.

People v. Johnson · filed 1981-03-30

To convict one of aiding and abetting the commission of a separately charged crime of carrying or having a firearm in one’s possession during the commission of a felony, it must be established that the defendant procured, counselled, aided, or abetted and so assisted in obtaining the proscribed possession, or in retaining such possession otherwise obtained. ... In neither of the instant cases does the record show that the defendant assisted the accomplice to obtain or retain possession of the firearm which the accomplice possessed during the commission of the felony.

Section 750.227b permits conviction as an aider and abettor even when the defendant did not personally carry the firearm.

People v. Berberich · filed 1981-04-10

A majority of this panel having decided that one may be convicted under the statute as an aider and abettor even if he did not carry the firearm, defendant's plea conviction for both armed robbery and felony-firearm is affirmed.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm only if the defendant assists an accomplice in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm; knowledge that the accomplice possesses and intends to use it is insufficient.

People v. Bynum · filed 1981-09-08

The Supreme Court has declared that evidence of knowledge of an accomplice’s possession and intent to use a weapon is insufficient for conviction of aiding and abetting felony-firearm. ... Rather, it must be shown that the defendant assisted his accomplice in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm.

A felony-firearm plea lacks a sufficient factual basis when the record does not establish that the defendant possessed a firearm or aided and abetted another person’s possession of one.

People v. Fairfax · filed 1981-10-21

However, we agree with defendant’s assertion that the factual basis in support of the felony-firearm plea was deficient. The defendant stated that there were two shotguns used by the three robbers, but it is not clear whether the defendant possessed or aided and abetted in the possession of one of the shotguns.

Section 750.227b does not impose aider-and-abettor liability without evidence that the defendant assisted in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm.

People v. Caldwell · filed 1981-10-26

Under this rule, defendant’s conviction under the felony-firearm statute would be reversed because there was no evidence produced at trial that defendant had assisted in obtaining possession or had assisted in the retaining of possession of the paratrooper-type carbine held by a codefendant during the drug transaction.

Section 750.227b requires an aider and abettor to have actually possessed the firearm or aided in its possession.

People v. Willis · filed 1982-08-25

We hold that the defendant’s conviction for a violation of the felony-firearm statute is vacated as it is not clear that the jury found that the defendant actually possessed or aided in the possession of the firearm.

A person aids and abets felony-firearm only by knowingly acting or encouraging with the intent to help an accomplice retain the firearm.

People v. Morneweck · filed 1982-04-08

Proof that defendant knowingly assisted in a felony involving a firearm is not sufficient evidence upon which to convict her of aiding and abetting possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. To convict this defendant of so aiding and abetting, it must have been shown that she knowingly performed some act or encouragement with the intent to assist her accomplices in keeping possession of the firearm.

A person does not aid and abet felony-firearm through mere presence; a direct or indirect act or encouragement, coupled with criminal intent, is required to aid another's firearm possession.

People v. Slate · filed 1982-06-23

Mere presence is not enough to constitute aiding and abetting illegal possession; some direct or indirect act or encouragement coupled with criminal intent is necessary.

Section 750.227b does not permit a felony-firearm conviction based merely on knowledge that the principal possessed a firearm.

People v. Jones · filed 1982-07-14

Defendant could not be found guilty of felony-firearm if she merely knew that the principal had a firearm in his possession at the time of the crime.

A felony-firearm conviction based on aiding and abetting requires proof that the defendant aided and abetted the firearm-possession offense, separately from the underlying felony.

People v. Reed · filed 1982-09-29

In a felony-firearm prosecution, the possession of a firearm is a crime distinct from the underlying ... felony. The aiding and abetting charge must, therefore, be established in each to support the conviction for each.

Section 750.227b permits conviction on an aiding-and-abetting theory when the defendant assists in obtaining or retaining another person’s firearm possession during a felony.

People v. Mitchell · filed 1983-05-04

"To convict one of aiding and abetting the commission of a separately charged crime of carrying or having a firearm in one’s possession during the commission of a felony, it must be established that the defendant procured, counselled, aided, or abetted and so assisted in obtaining the proscribed possession, or in retaining such possession otherwise obtained. ... From these facts a reasonable juror could infer that the defendant aided and counselled in the procurement of the gun. We conclude a factual basis was established for defendant’s felony-firearm conviction.

Section 750.227b requires the jury to be instructed on the elements of aiding and abetting felony-firearm even when the defendant does not request the instruction.

People v. Espinosa · filed 1985-04-16

We trust that, at retrial, the court will instruct the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting the commission of felony-firearm, whether requested by defendant or not.

A felony-firearm conviction requires proof that the defendant personally possessed a firearm during the felony or aided and abetted another in obtaining or retaining possession of it.

People v. Witt · filed 1985-01-07

In order to support a felony-firearm conviction under People v Johnson, 411 Mich 50, 54; 303 NW2d 442 (1981), it must be shown that defendant either personally possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony or that defendant procured, counselled, aided, or abetted and so assisted another in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm.

Section 750.227b does not require an aider and abettor to intend or participate in the underlying felony; it is enough that the defendant intentionally assisted the principal's firearm possession under circumstances constituting felony-firearm for the principal.

People v. Nix · filed 1987-10-15

Since the felony-firearm offense does not contain a scienter requirement, it is not necessary for the prosecutor to show that the defendant, acting as an aider and abettor, did intend or otherwise participate in the commission of the underlying felony. It is sufficient that the defendant intentionally assisted or aided the principal’s possession of a firearm under circumstances that constituted a felony-firearm offense with respect to the principal.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant committed the charged felony and did so knowing that he possessed a firearm.

People v. Oliver · filed 1988-07-18

The elements of a felony-firearm charge are (1) that defendant committed the charged felony and (2) that defendant committed the felony knowing that he possessed a firearm. Keeping in mind that the level of proof at the preliminary examination stage does not require positive proof of guilt, but only some evidence of each element, we find sufficient evidence was established to support the bindover on the felony-firearm charge.

Section 750.227b permits conviction of an aider and abettor who did not actually possess the firearm only if the person aided and abetted its acquisition or retention.

People v. Eloby · filed 1996-02-16

One who does not actually possess a firearm may validly be convicted of felony-firearm as an aider and abettor. ... However, the person must aid and abet either the acquisition or the retention of the gun.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and felony-firearm liability may rest on aiding and abetting when a defendant knowingly supplies the gun used in the felony.

People v. Akins · filed 2004-02-19

The prosecution also charged Mitchell with felony-firearm as an aider and abettor. “The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... The evidence shows that Mitchell gave his gun to Akins, knowing that it would be used to commit the robbery. ... Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that sufficient evidence existed to support Mitchell’s convictions of felony murder, assault with intent to rob while armed, and felony-firearm as an aider and abettor.

A defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting felony-firearm when the defendant intentionally assists or encourages another’s carrying or possession of a firearm during a felony; the defendant need not assist in obtaining or retaining the firearm.

People v. Moore · filed 2004-05-12(1)

There is no foundation in the language of either the aiding and abetting statute or the felony-firearm statute to support this Court’s narrow ruling in Johnson. To the extent that Johnson required a defendant to assist in either obtaining or retaining possession in order to be convicted of felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory, that decision is overruled. Following MCL 767.39, the appropriate test for aiding and abetting felony-firearm in Michigan is whether the defendant “procures, counsels, aids, or abets in [the commission of a felony-firearm offense].” Applying this standard, we hold that there was sufficient evidence in each case to support the felony-firearm convictions, and we affirm both defendants’ convictions.

Felony-firearm liability under an aiding-and-abetting theory requires proof that the defendant assisted in obtaining the prohibited possession or retaining possession otherwise obtained.

People v. McGuffey · filed 2002-08-08

The prosecution is required to demonstrate that “the defendant procured, counseled, aided, or abetted and so assisted in obtaining the proscribed possession, or in retaining such possession otherwise obtained.”

Section 750.227b(1) permits accomplice liability when a defendant intentionally assists or encourages another's carrying or possession of a firearm during a felony.

People of Michigan v. Erwin Harris · filed 2004-05-12(1)

Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended ... the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement.

Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction under an aiding-and-abetting theory when the defendant procures, counsels, aids, or abets another person in carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

People v. Bulls · filed 2004-09-15(1)

A defendant may be convicted of felony-firearm on the basis of an aiding and abetting theory when the prosecution establishes that the defendant has procured, counseled, aided, or abetted another person in the carrying or possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm when the principal violates the statute, the defendant assists or encourages that violation, and the defendant intends the violation or knows of the principal’s intent when providing the assistance or encouragement.

People of Michigan v. Jaron Howard Morgan · filed 2014-11-04

In order to establish that a defendant aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense, the prosecution must prove: (1) a person violated the felony-firearm statute; (2) defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation; and (3) “defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement.” ... In furnishing his brother with information about the location of a gun, defendant provided the means by which his brother murdered the victim. Defendant also encouraged his brother to confront the victim regarding the victim’s alleged theft of defendant’s property. From such facts, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant aided and intended the commission of the felony-firearm, as he directed his felon brother to obtain the gun while driving around Lansing to confront the victim.

A felony-firearm conviction may rest on aiding and abetting when the defendant assists another in carrying or possessing a firearm during a felony and intends the felony-firearm violation or knows the principal intends it.

People of Michigan v. Deangelo Al Jenkins · filed 2014-12-04

The elements of felony-firearm “are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. One must carry or possess the firearm when committing or attempting to commit a felony. Possession of a firearm can be actual or constructive, joint or exclusive.” ... “All that is required to prove aiding and abetting felony-firearm is that the defendant aided and abetted another in carrying or having in his possession a firearm while that other commits or attempts to commit a felony.” ... As such, sufficient evidence was presented to support Jenkins’s conviction of felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory based on the assistance Jenkins rendered to Sims and the second gunman by transporting them to the scene to use the weapons in their possession and awaiting their attempt to complete the crimes before facilitating their removal from the scene.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm by performing an act that assists an accomplice's carrying or possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

People of Michigan v. Deborah Ann Lilliard · filed 2015-03-12

By cutting the victim off, defendant engaged in specific acts that aided her accomplice ... in the carrying or possession of a firearm during the accomplice’s commission of a felonious assault.

Section 750.227b applies when a person carries or possesses a firearm while committing or attempting a felony, and accomplice liability requires assistance plus intent or contemporaneous knowledge of the principal’s intent.

People of Michigan v. Shaunanna Lakeisha Gibson · filed 2015-06-16

“The felony-firearm statute applies whenever a person carries or has a firearm in his possession when committing or attempting to commit a felony.” People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 62; 679 NW2d 41 (2004) (discussing MCL 750.227b). A person aids or abets felony-firearm if that person “procures, counsels, aids, or abets in [the commission of a felony-firearm offense].” Id. at 74 (alteration in original). To prove a defendant aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense, the prosecution must establish “that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement.” [Id. at 70-71.] It is determined on a case-by-case basis whether a defendant performed such acts or gave such encouragement to assist “in the carrying or possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.” Id. at 71, quoting Carines, 460 Mich at 768. “Implicit in the use of a firearm is the possession of that firearm.” Moore, 470 Mich at 71. As discussed above, this Court will not disturb the factfinder’s determination regarding what inferences may be fairly drawn from circumstantial evidence. Kosik, 303 Mich App at 150-151. The trial court reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence in this case that defendant intentionally lured Hood outside, with knowledge that defendant’s passenger had a high-powered firearm that he intended to use to assault Hood. By doing so, defendant aided and abetted a felony-firearm violation: (1) it is undisputed that defendant’s passenger committed a felonious assault against Hood using a firearm, (2) defendant performed acts that assisted the felony-firearm violation by driving her passenger to Hood’s home and luring Hood outside, and (3) the trial court inferred from the circumstantial evidence that defendant either intended for her passenger to commit the felony-firearm violation or knew that the passenger intended to commit that violation at the time defendant gave such aid.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm only if the defendant specifically assists or encourages another person’s carrying or possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony; merely aiding the underlying felony or knowing that the principal is armed is insufficient.

People of Michigan v. John Wesley Poblette · filed 2015-09-17

The correct test for aiding and abetting felony-firearm in Michigan is whether the defendant ‘procures, counsels, aids, or abets in [another carrying or having possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony]’.” See Moore, 470 Mich at 70. For aiding and abetting felony-firearm, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the defendant specifically aided the commission of the felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b may be applied through an aiding-and-abetting theory when the evidence permits an inference that the defendant knew of and assisted the accomplice’s intended crimes.

People of Michigan v. Josephus Anderson · filed 2015-12-08

Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his home invasion, assault, and felony-firearm convictions under an aiding and abetting theory because there was no evidence that he intended his accomplice to commit a crime. We disagree. ... While any single fact taken alone might not support a finding regarding defendant’s intent, when taken together, a reasonable person could infer that defendant knew that his accomplice intended to commit the crime. We conclude that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s convictions under an aiding and abetting theory.

Section 750.227b supports aiding-and-abetting liability when another person commits felony-firearm, the defendant assists that violation, and the defendant intends the violation or knows of the principal's intent when providing the assistance.

People of Michigan v. Covington · filed 2016-04-12

To convict a defendant of felony-firearm, the prosecution is required to prove “that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. ... In sum, defendant’s felony-firearm conviction was sufficiently supported by the evidence.

Section 750.227b(1) supports an aiding-and-abetting conviction when a person encourages the principal’s firearm-assisted felony and knows that the principal intends the crime.

People of Michigan v. McCoy · filed 2016-06-30(1)

The evidence established that the man with the gun committed a felony, namely assault with intent to commit murder, while in possession of a pistol. Thus, there is evidence that felony-firearm was committed. Second, defendant told the man with the gun to shoot Martin, which is sufficient to establish that defendant gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation. That same evidence also supports that he had knowledge that the man with the gun intended to commit the crime. As such, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s felony-firearm conviction.

Section 750.227b permits an aiding-and-abetting conviction when a defendant encourages another person who possesses a firearm during a felony to use that firearm.

People of Michigan v. White · filed 2016-11-29(1)

A defendant may be convicted of felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory. ... “All that is required to prove aiding and abetting felony-firearm is that the defendant aided and abetted another in carrying or having in his possession a firearm while that other commits or attempts to commit a felony.” ... Thus, MEW aided and abetted REW’s possession of the firearm by specifically encouraging him to use the gun in his possession.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and liability may rest on aiding and abetting the armed principal.

People of Michigan v. Jackson · filed 2016-10-18

“ ‘The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.’ ” ... Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that defendant Hearn aided and abetted Jackson’s commission of the crimes.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm when another person commits the offense, the defendant assists that violation, and the defendant intends the violation or knows the principal intends it when providing assistance.

People of Michigan v. Hill · filed 2017-02-09

Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. [Id. at 70-71.] “In determining whether a defendant assisted in the commission of the crime, the amount of advice, aid, or encouragement is not material if it had the effect of inducing the commission of the crime.” Id. at 70. Here, viewing the record evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Robinson was guilty of aiding and abetting felony-firearm. It is undisputed that Diaz-Gaskin and Grayson committed felony-firearm by possessing firearms during the commission of the armed robbery.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm when a felony-firearm violation occurs, the defendant assists it, and the defendant either intends the violation or knows when providing aid that the principal intends it.

People of Michigan v. Diaz-Gaskin · filed 2017-02-09(1)

Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. [Id. at 70-71.] ... Both of these were acts that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violations committed by Robinson’s codefendants. Based on the circumstances, a rational trier of fact could infer that Robinson either intended the commission of the felony-firearm violations committed by Diaz-Gaskin and Grayson or knew, when he aided them, that they intended to commit such violations.

Aiding and abetting felony-firearm requires a felony-firearm violation, assistance or encouragement, and either intent that the violation occur or knowledge of the principal’s intent when the aid was given.

People of Michigan v. Robinson · filed 2017-02-09

Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. [Id. at 70-71.] “In determining whether a defendant assisted in the commission of the crime, the amount of advice, aid, or encouragement is not material if it had the effect of inducing the commission of the crime.” Id. at 70.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm when, with the required intent or knowledge, he assists another's carrying or possession of a firearm during a felony; driving known armed codefendants to the planned crime and helping them conceal the gun sufficed.

People of Michigan v. Terrance Jerod Hare · filed 2017-03-16(1)

“Under the aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39, the correct test for aiding and abetting felony-firearm in Michigan is whether the defendant procures, counsels, aids, or abets in another carrying or having possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.”...Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, defendant’s actions and words demonstrated an intent to counsel, aid, or abet the possession of a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery and home invasion....Defendant assisted his codefendants in the possession of a firearm by specifically driving his armed codefendants to the crime scene to carry out the planned robbery. Defendant further assisted his codefendants in the offenses of felony-firearm when he admittedly took steps to prevent the police from locating the gun....Accordingly, defendant’s convictions for felony-firearm based on an aiding and abetting theory are supported by sufficient evidence.

A person aids and abets felony-firearm by relying on another's possession of a gun to intimidate or immobilize the victim during the underlying felony; the prosecution need not prove that the person asked or encouraged the principal to bring the gun.

People of Michigan v. Dupree · filed 2017-07-25(1)

Here, the evidence revealed that defendant actively encouraged Johnson in the commission of felony-firearm by relying on his possession of the gun in order to intimidate or immobilize the complainant while she robbed her. Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the prosecution was not required to show that she had asked Johnson to bring a gun to the church parking lot or that she had somehow encouraged him to bring a gun.

Felony-firearm requires possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and a defendant may be convicted of the offense as an aider and abettor.

People of Michigan v. Adams Jr · filed 2018-04-10(1)

Finally, “[t]he elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” People v Taylor, 275 Mich. App. 177, 179; 737 NW2d 790 (2007) (citation omitted). ... Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Adams was guilty of aiding and abetting Fountain. Adams not only knew of Fountain’s intent to rob Thomas of his glasses, but also commented on how nice the vehicle was. Both Adams and Fountain exited the Sebring at the same time, with Adams proceeding to the driver’s seat of the SUV while Fountain drew a gun on Thomas and ordered Thomas to turn over his glasses. Adams’s participation clearly aided and encouraged Fountain in word and deed.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing or attempting a felony; aiding-and-abetting liability cannot rest on speculation that firearm possession was a natural and probable consequence of a home invasion.

Matthews v. Jackson · filed 2018-04-30(1)

The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing, or while attempting to commit, a felony offense. ... In view of these elements, the Michigan Court of Appeals' conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant aided and abetted first degree home invasion and felony firearm was unreasonable. In this case, "the natural and probable consequences" of the home invasion did not necessarily involve any firearm possession. The evidence did not show that Petitioner and his co-defendant knew that a firearm would be found in the victim's house nor did it show that they had any plan or intention to steal firearms when they broke into the house. The prosecution did not even present evidence that finding a firearm inside of a house is a natural or probable consequence of the typical home invasion.

Felony-firearm liability may be established under an aiding-and-abetting theory when the evidence supports that the defendants participated in the shooting that constituted the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Moore · filed 2018-08-28

Contrary to defendants’ arguments, sufficient evidence was presented to convict both defendants of second degree murder and felony firearm under an aiding and abetting theory. ... When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support that all of the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm when he assists another in carrying or possessing a firearm during a felony and intends that offense or knows the principal intends it.

People of Michigan v. Wilson · filed 2018-09-13(1)

“Under the aiding and abetting statute, MCL 767.39, the correct test for aiding and abetting felony-firearm in Michigan is whether the defendant procures, counsels, aids, or abets in another carrying or having possession of a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.” ... “A jury could infer from this evidence that defendant Wilson, if not armed and using a firearm himself, knew that defendant Stafford intended to use a firearm to carry out the crime. Thus, defendant Wilson assisted the others in the possession of a firearm. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports defendant Wilson’s conviction for felony-firearm as either a principal or under an aiding-and-abetting theory.”

Section 750.227b supports an aiding-and-abetting conviction when the defendant assists another person’s possession of a firearm during a felony and intends that violation or knows of the principal’s intent when providing assistance.

People of Michigan v. Hughes · filed 2019-07-23(1)

However, the jury could have convicted Hughes of felony-firearm related to his interaction with Sergeant Bush under a theory that he aided and abetted Culpepper’s possession of a firearm while the two committed felonious assault on Sergeant Bush. In order to convict Hughes of aiding or abetting felony-firearm, the prosecutor had to prove that “a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement.” People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 70–71; 679 NW2d 41 (2004). Here, the evidence supported the conclusion that Hughes coordinated his activities with Culpepper in order to facilitate the felonious assault on Sergeant Bush. To accomplish this assault, it was necessary that Culpepper possess a firearm during the assault. Hughes’s participation demonstrated his knowledge that Culpepper would use a firearm to accomplish the assault. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to convict Hughes of felony-firearm.

A defendant may be convicted of felony-firearm as an aider and abettor when someone commits felony-firearm, the defendant assists or encourages that violation, and the defendant intends the violation or knows the principal intends it when providing the assistance or encouragement.

People of Michigan v. Alonzo · filed 2019-08-06

Additionally, there was sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to convict defendant of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, under a theory of aiding and abetting. ... To prove aiding and abetting of felony-firearm, the prosecution must establish that the felony- firearm statute was violated by someone, that the defendant acted or encouraged, and thereby assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the felony-firearm violation or knew that that principal intended to commit the felony-firearm violation at the time the defendant gave aid or encouragement. Id. at 70-71. ... Everson used a gun to murder Perry, thereby violating the felony-firearm statute. Defendant helped him; defendant knew Everson had the gun and was planning to attack Perry, so he beat Perry to the ground, enabling Everson to kill him with the gun. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict defendant of felony-firearm under a theory of aiding and abetting.

Section 750.227b supports aiding-and-abetting liability when a defendant assists a principal's firearm possession during the commission of a felony, including by relying on the firearm to restrain a victim while carrying out the felony.

People of Michigan v. Bell · filed 2020-02-20

Defendant relied on the gunman’s detainment of Saad with the weapon in order to have the opportunity to steal narcotics from the safe and shelves. Thus, the evidence established that defendant performed acts that assisted his partner in the possession of a firearm during the commission of armed robbery, unlawful imprisonment, and felonious assault.

A conviction under § 750.227b for aiding and abetting felony-firearm is supported when the evidence permits rational inferences that the defendant knew the principal had a firearm and intended to assist the armed robbery by serving as a lookout.

Rice 490612 v. Rewerts · filed 2020-12-03

Certainly, the inferences identified by the court of appeals—that Petitioner knew Moore had a firearm and intended to assist Moore by serving as a lookout while Moore robbed the couple—could rationally flow from the totality of the underlying facts. ... Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims.

A defendant aids and abets felony-firearm when the offense is committed, the defendant assists or encourages it, and the defendant intends the offense or knows the principal intends it when providing aid.

People of Michigan v. Brown · filed 2021-03-25

Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. In determining whether a defendant assisted in the commission of the crime, the amount of advice, aid, or encouragement is not material if it had the effect of inducing the commission of the crime. [Citation omitted.] Brown once more contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his felony-firearm conviction because he and West testified that he did not know West had a gun. Again, Brown asks this Court to reject the fact-finder’s credibility assessment and reasonable inferences from the evidence and again, we decline to do so. See Nowack, 462 Mich at 400. In addition, Detective Tyler Sutherland described mannerisms a person would adopt if they were concealing a gun, and the jury viewed video of Brown and West from the fast-food restaurant that showed West holding something under his shirt. The jury could infer from the video whether West had a gun and whether Brown would have observed West’s having a gun. Further, the same evidence that supports the reasonable inference that Brown performed acts assisting West’s shooting a firearm from the vehicle also support the jury’s finding that Brown “performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in [West’s] commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that [Brown] intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that [West] intended its commission at the time that [Brown] gave aid and encouragement.” Moore, 470 Mich at 70-71.

A defendant may be convicted of felony-firearm as an aider and abettor without personally possessing the gun when she encourages the principal to use or possess it.

White v. Brewer · filed 2021-06-11

But the prosecution was not required to show that Petitioner possessed the gun because she was charged and convicted as an aider and abettor. Testimony that Petitioner urged her brother to shoot or kill Rooker was sufficient for a finding that she encouraged the use or possession of a firearm by her brother.

Evidence supporting an armed-robbery conviction can also support a finding that the defendant aided and abetted felony-firearm when both offenses require possession of a firearm.

People of Michigan v. Yusef Ford · filed 2021-04-29(1)

Because both armed robbery and felony-firearm require the possession of a firearm, the reasons supporting Neal’s conviction for armed robbery, as addressed previously, also support the finding that Neal aided and abetted the felony-firearm offense. Thus, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to find Neal guilty of felony-firearm under a theory of aiding and abetting.

Aiding and abetting felony-firearm is governed by the same general aiding-and-abetting principles as any other felony.

People of Michigan v. Davis · filed 2023-05-18

This case, however, is rooted in Michigan’s felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b, and our Supreme Court has held “aiding and abetting the commission of a felony-firearm is no different from aiding and abetting the commission of any other felony.” People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 69; 679 NW2d 41 (2004). Accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a futile objection when instructing the jury on aiding and abetting principles as to the felony-firearm charges in general.

A defendant may be convicted of felony-firearm as an aider and abettor when someone committed felony-firearm, the defendant assisted or encouraged that violation, and the defendant intended the violation or knew the principal intended it when providing assistance or encouragement.

People of Michigan v. Dodson · filed 2023-05-25

To convict a defendant of felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor must prove: [A] violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. [People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 70-71; 679 NW2d 41 (2004).] Here, as concluded above, there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant, as an aider and abettor, was guilty of first-degree murder. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to also convict defendant on the charge of felony-firearm under an aiding and abetting theory.

Section 750.227b(1) supports aiding-and-abetting liability when a defendant encourages another person's use of a firearm during a felony, including by taking advantage of the firearm to intimidate the victim, even if the defendant did not know about the firearm before the criminal enterprise began.

People of Michigan v. Ashley · filed 2023-08-17(1)

With regard to felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b(1) provides that “[a] person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a felony . . . is guilty of a felony.” The elements of felony-firearm are (1) the defendant possessed a firearm (2) while committing or attempting to commit a felony. People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 268- 269; 893 NW2d 140 (2016). ... The same evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant supported, encouraged, or incited Eckhart’s violation of the felony-firearm statute. When Eckhart pointed the gun at Hatcher, defendant did not protest or attempt to dissuade Eckhart. Rather, defendant took advantage of the firearm to intimidate Hatcher to return the van keys. Regardless of whether defendant knew about the gun before embarking on the criminal enterprise, defendant’s actions after Eckhart retrieved the gun from the van supports the jury’s finding that defendant aided and abetted Eckhart in using the gun to assault Hatcher.

Section 750.227b supports felony firearm liability for an aider and abettor who assists another person’s firearm possession during a felony.

Bell v. Carl · filed 2024-08-12

While there is no evidence that Petitioner was personally armed with a gun during the crime, there was evidence that he aided and abetted his co-defendant’s possession of a firearm during the commission of the three felonies.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm during a felony, and a driver who assists another person’s shooting can be convicted as an aider and abettor when the evidence shows more than mere presence.

Brown v. Tanner · filed 2025-02-07

The elements of felony firearm are: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, a felony offense. ... In the present case, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Petitioner aided and abetted West during the shooting and was not merely present.

Section 750.227b supports aiding-and-abetting liability when someone commits felony-firearm, the defendant assists that violation, and the defendant intends the violation or knows the principal intends it when giving aid.

Alonzo v. Morrison · filed 2025-09-23

To prove that a defendant aided and abetted the crime of felony-firearm, the prosecution must show that the felony- firearm statute was violated by someone, that the defendant acted or encouraged, and thereby assisted in, the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the felony-firearm violation or knew that that principal intended to commit the felony-firearm violation at the time the defendant gave aid or encouragement.

A person may be convicted of felony-firearm as an aider and abettor without personally possessing a firearm when the person assists another in possessing or carrying a firearm during a felony.

People of Michigan v. Perkins · filed 2026-03-16(1)

However, as discussed above, a defendant can be convicted of felony-firearm under an aiding-and-abetting theory, which does not require the prosecution to show that a defendant had actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

A participant aids and abets a felony-firearm violation when the participant assists an armed accomplice during a felony and intends the violation or knows the accomplice intends it when giving aid.

People of Michigan v. Kenneth Dawayne Hill · filed 2017-02-09

Both of these were acts that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violations committed by Robinson’s codefendants. Based on the circumstances, a rational trier of fact could infer that Robinson either intended the commission of the felony-firearm violations committed by Diaz-Gaskin and Grayson or knew, when he aided them, that they intended to commit such violations.

Section 750.227b supports liability for aiding and abetting felony-firearm when a person assists armed accomplices during a felony and intends their firearm violations or knows the accomplices intend them.

People of Michigan v. Jomar Davell Robinson · filed 2017-02-09

Both of these were acts that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violations committed by Robinson’s codefendants. Based on the circumstances, a rational trier of fact could infer that Robinson either intended the commission of the felony-firearm violations committed by Diaz-Gaskin and Grayson or knew, when he aided them, that they intended to commit such violations.

Aiding and abetting felony-firearm requires assistance to a firearm violation and intent to further that violation or knowledge of the principal’s intent when giving aid.

People of Michigan v. Darius Aramond Diaz-Gaskin · filed 2017-02-09(1)

Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense requires proof that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation, and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the defendant gave aid and encouragement. [Id. at 70-71.] ... Here, viewing the record evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Robinson was guilty of aiding and abetting felony-firearm. ... Based on the circumstances, a rational trier of fact could infer that Robinson either intended the commission of the felony-firearm violations committed by Diaz-Gaskin and Grayson or knew, when he aided them, that they intended to commit such violations.

Section 750.227b permits conviction as an aider and abettor without personal possession of a firearm when the defendant intentionally helps others obtain the weapons.

People v. Turner · filed 1980-09-02

However, a majority of the decisions from this Court have followed the lead of People v Tavolacci, 88 Mich App 470; 276 NW2d 919 (1979), in holding that actual personal possession of a firearm is ... unnecessary. Here, there was ample evidence to show that Turner acted to encourage, with an intent to aid his codefendants in obtaining the weapons utilized.

Aiding and abetting a felony-firearm offense requires assisting another person in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm.

People v. Burns · filed 1981-10-21

... it must be established that the defendant procured, counselled, aided, or abetted and so assisted in obtaining the proscribed possession, or in retaining such possession otherwise obtained. ... The facts in the present case do not appear to be distinguishable from those presented in Johnson. Accordingly, the matter is remanded for further proceedings on the felony-firearm charge.

A felony-firearm conviction based on an accomplice’s firearm requires proof that the defendant possessed it or helped the accomplice obtain or retain it.

People v. Cohens · filed 1981-12-15

The record in this case does not establish that defendant had actual possession of the firearm or assisted the accomplice in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm which the accomplice used in commission of the murder in file number 79-04902.

Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction for aiding and abetting when the defendant’s conduct supports an inference that he assisted another person in retaining the firearm.

People v. Baker · filed 1982-04-14

We believe that the defendant’s statements were sufficient to allow an inculpatory inference...to the effect that he assisted in his codefendant’s retention of the firearm.

A felony-firearm conviction on an aiding and abetting theory requires assistance in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm; awareness of its use and participation in the felony are insufficient.

People v. Bruno · filed 1982-04-23

Under Johnson, in order to convict defendant of felony-firearm, defendant must have assisted in obtaining or retaining possession of the firearm. That he was aware that a firearm would be used, intended that it be used, and actively participated in the crime involving its use is not sufficient.

Section 750.227b requires possession of a firearm at the time of the felony, but does not require possession before the felony begins.

People v. Mahone · filed 1980-03-19(1)

The statute does not state, and we do not interpret it to state, that a defendant must possess a firearm prior to the commission of a felony.

Using a firearm during a felony satisfies § 750.227b(1)’s knowing-possession element.

People v. Yarbrough · filed 1981-06-17(1)

"Use” of a firearm implies knowing possession.

A felony-firearm conviction based on aiding and abetting requires evidence that a defendant who did not personally possess the firearm helped obtain or retain it.

People v. Sanders · filed 1983-11-07

As in Johnson and Slate, defendant here did not personally possess the firearm, nor was there evidence introduced to establish that he assisted in obtaining or retaining it. Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s conviction on the felony-firearm count only.

Section 750.227b requires the defendant to personally carry or possess a firearm; aiding an armed robbery while knowing an accomplice is armed is insufficient.

People v. Johnson · filed 1978-09-20(1)

Being an aider and abetter in an armed robbery is not enough to subject a defendant to the enhanced sentence of the felony-firearm statute.

A charge of aiding and abetting felony-firearm requires preliminary-examination evidence that the defendant helped another person obtain or retain possession of a firearm.

People v. Usher · filed 1982-11-17

Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support binding him over on the charge of felony-firearm. We agree. ... While evidence was produced at the trial that tended to show that defendant gave his gun to one of the participants, no such evidence was introduced at the preliminary examination. The prosecutor conceded this point during oral argument. Defendant’s felony-firearm conviction must be reversed.

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, but does not require proof that the firearm was operable or readily operable.

People of Michigan v. Calvin Lamont Gloster · filed 2014-12-30(1)

The elements of felony-firearm are: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, (2) during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony. MCL 750.227b; and People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). ... The crime of felony-firearm does “not require proof that the firearm was ‘operable’ or ‘reasonably or readily operable.’ Rather, the statute requires only that the weapon be of a type that is designed or intended to propel a dangerous projectile.” People v Peals, 476 Mich 636, 642; 720 NW2d 196 (2006).

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed an actual firearm; merely feigning the use of a weapon is insufficient.

People v. Hill · filed 2009-03-03

Whereas the weapons offenses required proof of an actual firearm, defendant properly could be convicted of armed robbery even if he only feigned the use of a weapon.

Section 750.227b treats a handgun used as a gun as a firearm, including when the gun is unloaded, but this decision did not determine whether an inoperable gun qualifies.

People v. Vaughn · filed 1979-10-02

We find the definitions to be one and the same and thus find the verdicts to be inconsistent, requiring reversal. ... A gun being a firearm, it seems clear from the above definition that an unloaded gun is a weapon "from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled * * *”. ... The handgun with which defendant allegedly assaulted the complainant herein was clearly both a dangerous weapon under the felonious assault statute and a firearm under the felony-firearm statute. We need not reach the issue of whether an inoperable gun would be a firearm, for defendant did not make any such claim but rather denied the existence of any gun.

Section 750.227b includes firearms that are operable as well as firearms that are inoperable.

People v. Stephenson · filed 1979-11-26

Therefore, we find that the felony-firearm statute includes any firearm, operable or inoperable.

Section 750.227b does not require the prosecution to prove that the firearm was operable as an element of a prima facie felony-firearm case.

People v. Jackson · filed 1981-07-09

The general rule is that the prosecutor need not present proof of operability as an element of a prima facie case in a felony-firearm prosecution. ... Accordingly, we find defendant’s argument to be without merit.

Section 750.227b does not treat a starter pistol as a firearm, and the prosecution need not prove that a .38 caliber handgun was operable.

People v. Ray · filed 1982-09-22

We agree with defendant that a starter pistol is not a firearm within the meaning of MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). ... The prosecutor was not required to additionally prove that the .38 caliber handgun was operable.

Section 750.227b does not require the prosecution to prove that the firearm was operable, and an inoperable gun can support a felony-firearm conviction.

People v. Pierce · filed 1982-09-23

Policy considerations bid us to continue stating that operability need not be proved, however. We believe that the Legislature clearly intended the statute to discourage carrying guns whether operable or not. ... In the meantime, we will continue following the policy reasons underlying our past decisions on this issue.

A toy gun that discharges no projectiles is not a firearm under the felony-firearm statute.

People v. Schofield · filed 1983-03-10

We conclude that a toy gun is not a "firearm” as that term is used in MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).

Section 750.227b(1) does not require the prosecution to prove that the firearm was operable.

People v. Broach · filed 1983-06-22(1)

Based on established precedent, proof of operability of the weapon is not needed to include it within the prohibitions of the felony-firearm statute.

Section 750.227b does not require the prosecutor to prove that the firearm was operable.

People v. Prather · filed 1982-10-15

The general rule is that the prosecutor need not present proof of operability as an element of a prima facie case in a felony-firearm prosecution.

Section 750.227b does not require proof that the firearm was operable.

People v. Rogers · filed 1985-04-16

Proof of the operability of the weapon is not an essential element required for conviction of felony-firearm.

A firearm need not be operable to support a felony-firearm conviction.

People v. Garrett · filed 1987-07-20

We choose to follow the majority of panels of this Court and hold that the firearm need not be operable in order to convict.

Section 750.227b does not require the firearm possessed during the felony to be operable.

People v. Thompson · filed 1991-05-06

In his first argument on appeal, defendant contends that because the handgun he used was inoperable in that it had a broken hammer, his conviction of felony-firearm cannot stand. We disagree. Operability is not and has never been an element of felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b uses the firearm definition in MCL 750.222, has no operability requirement, and permits proof that an object was a firearm through eyewitness descriptions and accompanying threats even when the weapon was not recovered.

People of Michigan v. Simon Antonio Starks · filed 2015-09-22

We first note that the applicable definition of “firearm” for purposes of MCL 750.227b (felony-firearm) is found in MCL 750.222, not MCL 8.3t, although the definitions are quite similar. ... Under the caselaw, this evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the object possessed by defendant was a “firearm” for purposes of MCL 750.227b.

Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction when the defendant constructively possesses a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the firearm need not be operable.

People of Michigan v. Charles Terrell Estes · filed 2015-12-17(1)

With regard to defendant’s felony-firearm conviction, the same rationale applies. MCL 750.227b states that “[a] person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a felony . . . is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for 2 years.” “The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony.” ... “[A] defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to the defendant. Physical possession is not necessary as long as the defendant has constructive possession.” ... Given that defendant had already been convicted of a previous felony, he possessed and used a key to enter the home, and the testimony that the rifle was readily accessible to him, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions of violations of MCL 750.224f and MCL 750.227b. ... In People v Brown, 249 Mich App 382, 387; 642 NW2d 382, 385 (2002), this Court found “the operability of a gun to be irrelevant for a conviction.” Therefore, the fact that the rifle may have been defective is not grounds for reversal of defendant’s convictions.

Section 750.227b(1) requires a real firearm, although it need not be operable, and its firearm element may be proved through victim testimony and circumstantial evidence.

People of Michigan v. Johnson · filed 2017-08-22(1)

Felony-firearm and felon-in-possession both require a real firearm, defined as “any weapon which will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by action of an explosive.” MCL 750.222(e). The firearm need not be operable, but it must, in relevant part, have been intended or capable of expelling a projectile by action of an explosive. ... Accordingly, there was testimony and circumstantial evidence that would permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson possessed a firearm during the commission of the robbery, see Roper, 286 Mich App at 83, which satisfied the firearm element of both felony-firearm and felon-in-possession. See MCL 750.227b(1); MCL 750.224f(1).

Section 750.227b requires proof that the defendant possessed a real firearm.

20231109_C362919_66_362919C.Opn.Pdf · filed 2023-11-09

Unlike armed robbery, both felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, and felon-in-possession, MCL 750.224(f), require proof that the defendant possessed a real firearm.

Section 750.227b does not require proof that the firearm was operable to establish a prima facie felony-firearm case.

People v. Mason · filed 1980-03-05

We agree with the position taken in People v Gibson, 94 Mich App 172; 288 NW2d 366 (1979), that the prosecutor need not present proof of operability as an element of the prima facie case in a felony-firearm prosecution.

A weapon that can propel a dangerous projectile is a firearm under § 750.227b even if disrepair temporarily prevents it from firing.

People v. Brooks · filed 1984-06-05

Nonetheless, for reasons stated in People v Pierce, supra, we conclude that the term "firearm” as used in the felony-firearm statute includes a weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled even though the weapon may be in a state of disrepair and therefore be incapable temporarily of firing.

Section 750.227b(2) requires a mandatory five-year sentence for a second felony-firearm offense.

People of Michigan v. Alexander · filed 2021-08-12(2)

The three felony-firearm, second offense, convictions carry a mandatory five-year sentence. MCL 750.227b(2).

Section 750.227b(1) does not require the prosecution to separately charge a defendant as a third-time felony-firearm offender.

People of Michigan v. Jackson · filed 2017-06-22(1)

Here, the prosecution was not required to separately charge defendant as a third-time offender of the felony-firearm statute.

Section 750.227b(1)’s second-offense enhancement applies when the defendant has a prior felony-firearm conviction under the same statute.

People of Michigan v. Tyson · filed 2022-08-11(1)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the prosecution to amend the felony information to provide defendant a felony-firearm second offense notice because MCL 767.76 and MCR 6.112(H) authorize trial courts to do so before, during, or after trial, and defendant does not nor can he dispute that he had a prior felony-firearm conviction making him subject to an enhanced sentence under MCL 750.227b for his felony-firearm conviction in this case. ... In People v Eason, 435 Mich 228, 232; 458 NW2d 17 (1990), our Supreme Court clarified that the “sentence enhancement provision is a legislative authorization for judges to tailor punishment to the criminal on the basis of an objective factor, i.e., a prior conviction under the same statute.” In People v Williams, 215 Mich App 234, 234-236; 544 NW2d 480 (1996), this Court held that the defendant was not denied due process when charged and convicted of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, but sentenced as a second-time felony-firearm offender, MCL 750.227b(1). The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in this case by permitting the prosecution to amend the information to include the felony-firearm second offense notice. Defendant’s claim of error fails as a matter of law.

Section 750.227b(b) imposes a five-year determinate sentence on a second-time felony-firearm offender without requiring habitual-offender notice under § 769.13 or a jury finding of the prior conviction.

Williams v. McCullick · filed 2020-02-13(b)

Section 769.13 notice does not apply to the criminal statute for felony-firearm and its heightened sentences for repeat offenders. Accordingly, the lack of such notice does not undermine the proper application of the five-year determinate sentence of § 750.227b(b) to Petitioner. ... The five-year mandatory determinate sentence was properly imposed on Petitioner as a second-time offender.

Subsection (1) imposes a mandatory two-year prison term for felony-firearm, so the conviction is not subject to the sentencing guidelines.

People of Michigan v. Johnson · filed 2019-11-26(1)

Defendant’s conviction of felony-firearm is not subject to the sentencing guidelines because it carries a mandatory sentence of two years’ imprisonment. See MCL 750.227b(1); MCL 777.16m.

MCL 750.227b requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony, but not to a sentence for carrying a concealed weapon when that offense is not the predicate felony.

People v. Riggins · filed 2016-06-28(2)

The trial court improperly ordered both the defendant’s sentences for assault with intent to commit great bodily harm, MCL 750.84, and carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, to be consecutive to his sentence for felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. On remand, the trial court shall impose only the sentence for assault with intent to commit great bodily harm to be consecutive to the felony-firearm sentence, and shall order concurrent sentences for the defendant’s convictions of carrying a concealed weapon and felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b(3) does not authorize a probationary sentence to run consecutively to the mandatory term of imprisonment for felony-firearm.

People of Michigan v. James Jr · filed 2016-06-14(3)

In Brown, a case directly analogous to the instant case, this Court, recognizing that “[a] consecutive sentence may be imposed only if specifically authorized by statute,” held that the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b, “does not provide statutory authority for the imposition of a consecutive sentence of probation” for the predicate felony.3 Id. at 683-685. Thus, where the sentence for the predicate felony is a term of probation, ... that probationary term must run concurrent with the mandatory sentence of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Id. at 684-685.

Section 750.227b(3) does not permit carrying a concealed weapon to support a felony-firearm conviction or its sentence to run consecutively to the felony-firearm sentence.

People of Michigan v. Davis · filed 2016-03-22(3)

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it ordered that his sentence for carrying a concealed weapon run consecutively to his sentence for felony-firearm. The prosecutor concedes error, and we agree: A conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, will not support a felony-firearm conviction, and thus cannot be ordered served consecutively to a felony-firearm sentence. See MCL 750.227b(3); People v Bonham, 182 Mich App 130, 137; 451 NW2d 530 (1989). We remand for correction of the judgment of sentence.

Section 750.227b(3) requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to the sentence for the predicate felony, not to a sentence for a different felony.

People of Michigan v. Yelder · filed 2016-04-12(3)

Last, defendant argues that, because the predicate felony for his felony-firearm charge was assault with intent to murder, the trial court erred when it ordered that his sentence for carrying a weapon with unlawful intent be consecutive to his felony-firearm sentence. The prosecution concedes this error, and we agree. See People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 463-464; 619 NW2d 538 (2000). We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but remand so that the judgment of sentence can be amended to reflect that defendant’s sentence for carrying a weapon with unlawful intent run concurrent to his sentence for felony-firearm. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Section 750.227b(1) excludes carrying a concealed weapon as a predicate felony, so a felony-firearm sentence may not run consecutively to a sentence for that offense.

People of Michigan v. Brandon · filed 2016-04-21(1)

MCL 750.227b, the felony-firearm statute, permits consecutive sentencing as long as the offense to be served consecutive to a defendant’s felony-firearm sentence is a predicate felony of a felony-firearm conviction. People v Clark, 463 Mich 459, 464; 619 NW2d 538 (2000). CCW cannot serve as a predicate or underlying felony of felony-firearm. MCL 750.227b(1); People v Cortez, 206 Mich App 204, 207; 520 NW2d 693 (1994). Therefore, it was plain error for defendant’s CCW sentence to run consecutively to his felony-firearm sentence.

Section 750.227b(2) permits a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to the sentence for the felony charged as its predicate offense.

People of Michigan v. Alexander Isaiah Ansari · filed 2015-02-12(2)

In this case, the amended information indicates that defendant’s first-degree murder charge was the only predicate felony for his felony-firearm charge. The prosecutor did not file separate felony-firearm charges for either count of assault with intent to commit murder. Accordingly, the trial court erred in imposing defendant’s felony-firearm sentence consecutive with the sentences for his assault with intent to commit murder convictions. Both parties agree that this matter should be remanded to correct the judgment of sentence, so it is unnecessary to determine whether defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s error.

Section 750.227b(1) mandates a two-year sentence for a first felony-firearm offense and a five-year sentence for a second felony-firearm offense.

People of Michigan v. Darryl Jay Lofton · filed 2010-11-03(1)

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 27, 2010 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the sentence of the Genesee Circuit Court and we REMAND this case to that court and DIRECT that court either to grant the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea or to resentence the defendant to two years on the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, first offense, MCL 750.227b(1), for the reason that the defendant was misinformed at his plea hearing that he would serve a consecutive sentence of two years for his felony-firearm conviction, rather than the mandatory sentence of five years for felony-firearm, second offense.

Section 750.227b requires multiple felony-firearm sentences to run concurrently with each other absent other authority for consecutive sentencing, and permits the five-year sentence for a second conviction only when the second offense occurred after the first conviction.

People v. Sawyer · filed 1981-03-10(1), (2)

A careful reading of subdivision (2) reveals that the Legislature has only directed that the sentence for felony-firearm be served prior to and consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the felony. The statute neither compels nor authorizes a trial judge to impose consecutive multiple sentences for felony-firearm. ... These purposes are not served by imposing a more severe sentence on the day when a defendant first pleads guilty, and we accordingly believe that the Legislature intended that a five-year term of imprisonment for a second conviction should only be imposed where the second offense is subsequent to the first conviction.

Section 750.227b’s mandatory term of imprisonment applies to defendants found guilty but mentally ill.

People v. Korona · filed 1982-09-09

Neither the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), nor the guilty but mentally ill statute, MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059, provides the exception claimed by defendant. Instead, MCL 768.36(3); MSA 28.1059(3) states that "[i]f a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill * * * the court shall impose any sentence which could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense”. ... Thus, the mandatory term . of imprisonment for violating the felony-firearm statute applies to defendants found guilty but mentally ill.

Section 750.227b(1)'s five-year sentence for a second felony-firearm conviction cannot be imposed unless the defendant was charged and pleaded guilty as a second offender.

People v. Richardson · filed 1984-02-08(1)

We find that, regardless of whether the instant conviction of felony-firearm represented defendant’s second such conviction, defendant was neither charged with being a second-time felony-firearm offender nor did he plead guilty as a second offender. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred requiring reversal in imposing a five-year second-time felony-firearm sentence.

Section 750.227b(1) permits the five-year sentence for a second felony-firearm offense only when that offense was committed after the first felony-firearm conviction.

People v. Foy · filed 1983-03-10(1)

A five-year term for a second offense of felony-firearm cannot be imposed unless the second offense is committed subsequent to the first conviction.

Section 750.227b(2) requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to the sentence for the felony underlying the felony-firearm conviction, not to sentences for offenses during which the defendant did not use a firearm.

People v. Hunter · filed 1985-03-04(2)

The trial judge specifically found that defendant had not been armed when he committed the offenses of assualt with intent to murder and larceny from a person. Under MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), the Legislature ordered that the mandatory two-year prison term for felony-firearm be served prior to and consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the felony. In this case, the mandatory two-year term was ordered to run prior to all other sentences, including those sentences given for offenses during which defendant did not use a firearm. Under a clear reading of the statute, it was an error to order that the sentences not underlying the possession of a firearm conviction run consecutively.

Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction and cumulative punishment alongside a concealed-weapon conviction arising from the same criminal episode when carrying a concealed weapon is not the predicate felony for the felony-firearm charge.

People v. Sturgis · filed 1986-12-30(1), (2)

We conclude that the history, language, and structure of the statutes indicate that felony-firearm and concealed weapon offenses are distinct offenses which may be separately punished in a single trial when the concealed weapon offense is not the predicate of the felony-firearm offense.

Section 750.227b permits a separate felony-firearm conviction for each felony committed while possessing a firearm, even when the underlying offenses occur during a single criminal transaction, subject to statutory exceptions.

People v. Oscar Moore · filed 1987-11-16

Defendant next contends that he was improperly convicted of multiple counts of felony firearm. Neither his statutory argument nor his constitutional double jeopardy claim have merit. In People v Morton, 423 Mich 650, 655-656; 377 NW2d 798 (1985), our Supreme Court construed the legislative intent of the felony-firearm statute and concluded that, but for a few exceptions not applicable here, every felony committed by a person possessing a firearm may result in a felony-firearm conviction. Significantly, the multiple underlying offenses in Morton occurred within the continuum of a single criminal transaction. A defendant's right to be free of double jeopardy is not impinged upon by this result. 423 Mich 655. There is no basis here to reverse defendant's convictions.

Section 750.227b permits two felony-firearm convictions when the firearm-related felonies were committed on two separate occasions.

People v. Muhammad · filed 1988-08-17

Also, defendant Muhammad claims the trial court committed error by allowing him to be charged and convicted of two counts under the felony-firearm statute, because he claims the charges against him arose out of a single transaction. The trial judge ruled that in the instant case there were two sets of felonies committed on two separate occasions. One felony was at the bank and the other on the highway. We agree that there was no error in charging the defendants with two separate felonies.

Section 750.227b requires felony-firearm sentences to run consecutively to an habitual-offender-enhanced sentence for the underlying felonies in which a gun was used.

People v. Sanders · filed 1987-06-24(2)

Defendant’s felony-firearm sentences remained related to his convictions for the underlying crimes in which a gun was used, regardless of the fact that defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender. The trial judge correctly ordered that the felony-firearm sentences be served consecutively to defendant’s enhanced sentence as an habitual offender.

Section 750.227b mandates a fixed sentence for felony-firearm that may not be enhanced under the habitual-offender statute and must be served consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony.

People v. Honeycutt · filed 1987-10-19(1), (2)

For the above reasons, we conclude that the felony-firearm statute may not be supplemented by the habitual offender statute. Accordingly, the trial court erred not only in imposing concurrent sentences, but also by allowing the supplementation of the felony-firearm charge. Rather, the trial court should have imposed the mandatory two-year sentence on the felony-firearm conviction and then imposed sentence on the assault charge, as supplemented under the habitual offender statute, with that second sentence running consecutively to the felony-firearm sentence.

Section 750.227b permits a felony-firearm conviction and punishment alongside a conviction for possessing a short-barreled shotgun when a separate offense serves as the underlying felony.

People v. Walker · filed 1988-03-22

However, the language of the statutes does not suggest that possession of a firearm and felony-firearm convictions cannot occur simultaneously so long as a different offense is used as the underlying felony for felony-firearm. Therefore, the language of the statutes suggests a legislative intent to authorize multiple punishments.

Section 750.227b requires a felony-firearm sentence to precede and run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony, but carrying a concealed weapon cannot be that underlying felony and its sentence therefore runs concurrently with the felony-firearm sentence.

People v. Underwood · filed 1988-04-05(1), (2)

By statute, a sentence for felony-firearm is to be served consecutively to the sentence for the underlying felony. ... In fact, MCL 750.227b(1); MSA 28.424(2)(1) states specifically that ccw may not be the underlying felony for a felony-firearm conviction. Therefore, defendant’s ccw sentence should run concurrently with his felony-firearm sentence.

Section 750.227b permits no more felony-firearm convictions than the defendant has underlying felony convictions.

People v. Passeno · filed 1992-07-20

Accordingly, defendants properly can be convicted of only as many counts of felony-firearm as they have underlying felony convictions.

Section 750.227b(2) requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to the sentence for the underlying felony or attempted felony, not to sentences for carrying a concealed weapon or a misdemeanor.

People v. Bonham · filed 1989-10-20(2)

Since a ccw conviction may not be the underlying felony for a felony-firearm conviction, MCL 750.227b(l); MSA 28.424(2X1), there is no statutory authority for imposing a ccw sentence to be served consecutive to a felony-firearm sentence. ... Therefore, defendant’s felony-firearm sentence should run concurrently with the ccw sentence. ... There is no statutory authority to impose a consecutive sentence for felony-firearm and a misdemeanor. ... Therefore, defendant’s felony-firearm sentence should run concurrently with the misdemeanor sentence.

Section 750.227b does not require the prosecution to charge more than one felony-firearm count when a defendant possesses a firearm while committing separate felonies in a single criminal transaction.

People v. Syakovich · filed 1989-05-23

We do not believe that the converse is necessarily true: a defendant need not be charged with more than one count of felony-firearm where séparate felonies are committed while the defendant is in possession of a firearm during a single criminal transaction.

Section 750.227b(2)'s mandatory consecutive felony-firearm term may be considered when fashioning a proportionate sentence for the underlying felony.

People v. Jeff Davis · filed 1992-11-02(2)

We also find that the trial court did not err in taking into consideration the effect of the mandatory consecutive two-year sentence defendant would necessarily serve as a result of the felony-firearm conviction. A felony-firearm conviction may not be had unless the defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony, although it is not necessary that the defendant be convicted of the underlying felony. People v Burgess, 419 Mich 305, 310; 353 NW2d 444 (1984). When a defendant has been convicted of both felony-firearm and the underlying felony, we believe it would defeat the principle of proportionality to require the sentencing court to disregard the mandatory prison term for the felony-firearm conviction when fashioning an appropriate sentence for the underlying felony.

A sentence for carrying a concealed weapon runs concurrently with a felony-firearm sentence because no statute mandates consecutive service of those sentences.

People v. McCrady · filed 1995-09-19(2)

Defendant further argues that his sentence for the ccw conviction was improperly made consecutive to the sentence for the felony-firearm conviction. We agree. Because there is no statute mandating that a sentence for a ccw conviction run consecutively to a sentence for a felony-firearm conviction, the sentence should run concurrently.

Section 750.227b(2) does not authorize a felony-firearm prison term to run consecutively to a probation sentence for the underlying felony.

People v. Brown · filed 1997-03-18(2)

Clearly, the second phrase of MCL 750.227b(2); MSA 28.424(2)(2) does not provide statutory authority for the imposition of a consecutive sentence of probation.

Section 750.227b(1) permits a second-offense felony-firearm sentence enhancement without a separate second-offender charge or adversarial hearing over the prior conviction.

People v. Williams · filed 1996-01-19(1)

Whenever sentence enhancement is authorized, due process does not require that the prosecution separately charge the defendant as a second offender, nor is the defendant entitled to an adversarial hearing before the prior convictions are used for sentencing purposes.

Section 750.227b(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant carried a firearm while committing or attempting a felony; repeat-offender status affects only the sentence's duration and is not a separate element requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Miles · filed 1997-03-06(1)

This statute requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant carried a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a felony and nothing more. Similar to the enhancement provision of the controlled substances act, whether a defendant was a first-, second-, or third-time offender under the felony-firearm act affects only the duration of the defendant's sentence. Due process protections afforded defendants subject to such sentence enhancement provisions are less than those afforded defendants for the substantive offense, because the enhancement is not a separate element that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Subsection (2) requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to the sentence for the specific predicate felony during which the defendant possessed the firearm.

People of Michigan v. Rajahaan Faruq Clark · filed 2000-12-18(2)

Subsection 2 clearly states that the felony-firearm sentence “shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony.” It is evident that the emphasized language refers back to the predicate offense discussed in subsection 1, i.e., the offense during which the defendant possessed a firearm.

A felony-firearm sentence must run consecutively only to the sentence for the specific predicate felony during which the defendant possessed the firearm, not to sentences for other convictions.

People v. Clark · filed 2000-12-12(2)

No language in the statute permits consecutive sentencing with convictions other than the predicate offense.

The unit of prosecution for felony-firearm is each underlying felony, not each firearm carried or possessed during that felony.

People v. Uphaus · filed 2007-08-29(1), (2)

By emphasizing that the punishment for a violation of MCL 750.227b is in addition to the punishment for the underlying felony and requiring that the sentence for the felony-firearm conviction be served consecutively to and preceding the sentence for the underlying felony, the Legislature indicated that it was more concerned with the underlying felonious conduct, which was rendered more dangerous by the presence of a firearm, than with the number of firearms involved. ... Therefore, we conclude that the appropriate “unit of prosecution” is the felonious conduct rather than the number of firearms carried or possessed.

A felony-firearm sentence must run consecutively only to the sentence for the predicate felony, not to sentences for other convictions.

People v. Roland · filed 2007-09-12(3)

The trial court improperly imposed the defendant’s sentence for felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, consecutively to his sentences for carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. On remand, the trial court shall impose the felony-firearm sentence to be served consecutively only to the sentence for felon in possession of a firearm and shall order concurrent sentences for the defendant’s convictions of carrying a concealed weapon and felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 750.227b permits felon-in-possession to serve as the predicate felony and requires the felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to the sentence for that predicate, not to a sentence for carrying a concealed weapon.

People of Michigan v. Damon Washington · filed 2015-03-24(1), (2)

Felon-in-possession is not one of the exceptions listed in the felony-firearm statute. See MCL 750.227b(1). ... Therefore, defendant’s claim that he could not have been convicted of both crimes fails. ... The felony-firearm statute does not permit the trial court to sentence a defendant to consecutive sentences for felony-firearm and another offense that is not the underlying offense for the felony-firearm conviction. ... The offense of carrying a concealed weapon is specifically excluded as a potential underlying offense for a felony-firearm conviction. See MCL 750.227b. Therefore, the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences for carrying a concealed weapon and felony-firearm.

Section 750.227b(2) requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to the sentence for the specific predicate felony during which the defendant possessed a firearm.

People of Michigan v. Lance Smalley Rogers · filed 2015-05-19(2)

“From the plain language of the felony-firearm statute, it is evident that the Legislature intended that a felony-firearm sentence be consecutive only to the sentence for a specific underlying felony.” Clark, 463 Mich at 463. MCL 750.227b(2) provides that a term of imprisonment for felony-firearm “shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony.” (Emphasis added.) This emphasized language refers back to the predicate offense discussed in MCL 750.227b(1)—“the offense during which the defendant possessed a firearm.” Clark, 463 Mich at 464.

A felony-firearm sentence may run consecutively only to the sentence for a felony identified by the prosecution as a predicate offense.

People of Michigan v. Woodie Carl Lewis Jr · filed 2015-09-10(3)

Defendant was charged with felony-firearm in connection with the unlawful imprisonment, kidnapping, and assault with intent to commit sexual conduct offenses, the latter two of which he was acquitted. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence for felonious assault to be served consecutive to his felony-firearm sentence, and erred in ordering his home invasion sentence to be served consecutive to his other three sentences. ... However, with respect to defendant’s sentence for felonious assault, unlike home invasion, the felonious assault statute does not grant discretion to impose a consecutive sentence and felonious assault was not one of the predicate offenses that the prosecution listed on the amended information. Accordingly, remand for amendment of the judgment of sentence to reflect that the felony-firearm sentence runs concurrent to the felonious assault sentence is appropriate.

Section 750.227b excludes carrying a concealed weapon as a predicate felony for felony-firearm, so a carrying-a-concealed-weapon sentence cannot run consecutively to a felony-firearm sentence.

People of Michigan v. Melvin Lee Redmond · filed 2015-06-11(1), (2)

It is well settled that under ... the plain language of MCL 750.227b, CCW cannot be a predicate felony to a felony-firearm conviction, and therefore a CCW sentence cannot be served consecutively to a felony-firearm sentence.

Section 750.227b requires a felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively only to sentences for predicate felonies and does not authorize consecutive sentencing with carrying a concealed weapon, which cannot serve as a predicate felony.

People of Michigan v. Anthony Maurice Wallace · filed 2015-08-25(1), (2)

The predicate offenses for defendant’s felony-firearm conviction were armed robbery and felon in possession of a firearm. The felony-firearm statute authorizes consecutive sentencing for those two predicate offenses. MCL 750.227b(2). Therefore, it was proper to make the sentences for those two predicate offenses consecutive to the felony-firearm sentence. However, the trial court lacked statutory authority, the prosecutor concedes this as error, to make the felony-firearm sentence consecutive to the carrying a concealed weapon sentence because carrying a concealed weapon may not serve as the predicate ... offense for felony-firearm as there is no statute authorizing consecutive sentencing for those two offenses. McCrady, 213 Mich App at 486; Cortez, 206 Mich App at 207; Bonham, 182 Mich App at 137.

Section 750.227b(3) requires a felony-firearm sentence to be served consecutively with and before the sentence for the underlying felony.

People of Michigan v. Renard Lynum · filed 2015-09-22(3)

In this case, the trial judge erred in imposing concurrent sentences because MCL 750.227b(3) expressly provides that a sentence for felony-firearm must be served “consecutively with and preceding” any term of imprisonment for the underlying felony.