30A Mass. Gen. Laws § 14

Section 14(7)(e) makes agency fact findings govern judicial review when no party claims they lack substantial evidence.

School Committee v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1997-09-11(7)(e)

In the absence of a contention that facts found by the magistrate and adopted by the commission are unsupported by substantial evidence, see G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(e), the requisite judicial inquiry is governed by those findings.

Section 14 requires a court to uphold an agency decision supported by substantial evidence.

Goldstein v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors · filed 1998-02-04

Under the State Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A, § 14, we uphold the board’s decision if it is supported by “substantial evidence.”

In reviewing an agency decision for substantial evidence, a court must consider record evidence that fairly detracts from the agency’s determination.

City of Salem v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1998-04-29(7)

In evaluating the substantiality of the evidence before the MCAD, we must consider anything in the record that fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence supporting the MCAD determination.

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an MCAD decision to uphold findings supported by substantial evidence when there is no error of law.

Broadway Brake Supply, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1997-06-12(7)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 151B, §6, a court must review the decision of the hearing commissioner in accordance with the standard of review set forth in G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... After careful review of the petition for appeal and the full record in this matter, this court finds that MCAD’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and that there is no error of law.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to uphold an agency decision supported by substantial evidence.

Worcester Redevelopment Authority v. Department of Housing & Community Development · filed 1999-08-04(7)(e)

The reviewing Superior Court judge correctly determined that the bureau’s decision stood on substantial evidence and that relocation payments were to be made in accordance with the agency decision.

Section 14(7)(e) permits a court to vacate an agency decision unsupported by substantial evidence.

Minnehan v. Department of Social Services · filed 1999-08-14(7)(e)

That flexible approach leads me to conclude that, on this record, the DSS decision was not supported by substantial evidence and must be vacated.

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision if it is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Larson v. State Retirement Board & Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1999-11-05(7)

A decision of an administrative agency may be set aside on judicial review only if the reviewing court determines that such a decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(7)(e) limits review of the board’s decision to whether substantial evidence in the record supports it.

In re Segal · filed 1999-11-16(7)(e)

We review the determination of the board only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e).

Section 14(7)(e) requires a court to set aside an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence in the administrative record.

Cobble v. Commissioner of the Department of Social Services · filed 1999-11-17(7)(e)

The department’s decision to support a 51A report of abuse in this case was not supported by substantial evidence on the administrative record, and must be set aside. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires courts to consider the entire record when deciding whether substantial evidence supports an agency decision.

National School Bus Service, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Department of Employment & Training · filed 2000-06-19(7)

A reviewing board’s decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. G. L. c. 30A, §§ 1(6), 14(7). ... Aronson’s statements in his letter to DET, whether standing alone or “upon consideration of the entire record,” see G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), are insufficient to overcome the certification previously made that National had acquired all of the business of ICBM/TJV.

Section 14(7)(e) permits a court to set aside an agency decision when a party’s substantial rights may have been prejudiced because the decision lacks substantial evidence.

Laffan v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2000-09-28(7)(e)

The court may review and either affirm, reverse, remand, compel action, or modify a state administrative decision if the court determines “that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is . . . unsupported by substantial evidence.” G.L.c. 30A Section 14 (7)(e).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to determine whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Town of Hingham v. Department of Telecommunications & Energy · filed 2001-01-16(7)

Our review under the substantial evidence test is limited; we uphold the decision “as long as the findings by the authority are supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.” 1001 Plays, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 387 Mass. 879, 885 (1983). See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (we must determine whether agency decision is supported by substantial evidence “upon consideration of the entire record, or such portions of the record as may be cited by the parties”).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to consider the administrative record, give due weight to agency expertise, and set aside an agency decision unsupported by substantial evidence.

Delillo v. Department of Social Services · filed 2001-02-14(7)

This Court shall make its determination upon consideration of the entire record, or such portions of the record as may be cited by the parties. The court shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge of the Department, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it. G.L.c. 30A, §-14(7). ... I thus find and rule that there is not substantial evidence to support the finding of neglect, because the evidence before me is unreliable in key areas.

Section 14(7) requires deferential review of agency decisions, but a decision cannot stand without substantial evidence in the record.

Kilsdonk v. Department of Social Services · filed 2001-08-02(7)

The point in this case is simply that the record does not contain evidence of a physical injury, and thus even under the deferential standard of judicial review established by G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), the department’s decision does not pass muster.

Section 14(7)(e) requires a court to set aside an agency decision that is not supported by substantial evidence.

Ferreira v. Department of Social Services · filed 2001-09-21(7)(e)

The Court shall set aside the decision of an administrative agency if it is not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14 calls for affirming an agency decision that is supported by substantial evidence and accords with the law.

Sullivan v. Department of the State Police · filed 2001-04-05(7)(g)

The court shall affirm the agency’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and if it is in accordance with the law. G.L.c. 30A, §§1 and 14(7)(g); Seagram Distiller Co., 401 Mass. at 721; Lapointe v. Licensing Bd. of Worcester, 389 Mass. 454, 462 (1983). ... The decision of the Massachusetts State Police, Division of Administrative Services is in accordance with the applicable law and is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) requires a court to uphold an agency determination supported by evidence a reasonable mind could accept as adequate.

David v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 2001-11-07(7)

In any event, the determination must be upheld under c. 30A, § 14(7), because the evidence was such as “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Section 14(7)(e) permits judicial relief when an agency decision prejudices a party’s substantial rights and is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Covell v. Department of Social Services · filed 2002-05-23(7)(e)

Review of department decisions upholding listings in the registry will generally implicate the standard contained in § 14(7)(e), i.e., that the substantial rights of a party may not be prejudiced by an agency decision that is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 14 permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is not supported by substantial evidence.

Wolverton v. Commissioner of the Department of Social Services · filed 2002-05-28

The court on a G.L.c. 30A, §14 complaint “may set aside the decision of an administrative agency if it is not supported by substantial evidence.” ... This Court can see no evidentiary support for the department’s decision to support the report of abuse.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency’s expertise and uphold its decision if substantial evidence supports it, even if the court would have decided differently.

Falkowski v. Safety Insurance · filed 2002-07-15(7)

In reviewing the Board’s determination, I am obliged to give deference to the Board’s experience and expertise in these matters. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7); ... Accordingly, if the Board of Appeal’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, I may not reverse it even if I would have ruled differently from the Board had I heard the case de novo. ... Therefore, even giving due deference to the Board of Appeal, I find that its decision that Falkowski was more than fifty percent at fault in this accident was not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) permits a court to vacate and remand an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence.

Powers Package Store, Inc. v. Natick Board of Selectman · filed 2002-10-01(7)

In consideration of the scope of review imposed by §14, this Court finds there was not substantial evidence to support the NBS or ABCC’s decision that Powers twice violated G.L.c. 138, §69 in selling alcohol to an intoxicated person(s).

Section 14’s substantial evidence standard does not govern review of nonadjudicatory MEPA findings; the standard is whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously.

Sierra Club v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Management · filed 2003-07-14

The commissioner and WMA argue that the judge applied an incorrect standard of review, namely, the “substantial evidence” standard under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, to the commissioner’s § 61 findings. ... We agree. ... The standard of review in such cases is arbitrary or capricious, that is, lacking a rational basis.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to accept agency fact findings supported by substantial evidence and bars the court from making its own credibility determinations.

City of Leominster v. Stratton · filed 2003-08-05

Section 44 provides that the judicial review shall be conducted conformably with judicial review of administrative agency decisions, i.e., as prescribed in G. L. c. 30A, § 14. The reviewing court is, therefore, bound to accept the findings of fact of the commission’s hearing officer, if supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) requires agency findings to be supported by substantial evidence on judicial review.

Silvia v. Securities Division · filed 2004-06-21(7)

The division’s decisions are reviewable in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), see G. L. c. 110A, § 411, and its findings must be supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7)(e) limits review of an agency decision to whether substantial evidence supports it; an agency’s failure to consider evidence rebutting presumed receipt of a hearing notice can warrant remand.

Melican v. Division of Medical Assistance · filed 2004-12-09(7)(e)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(e), the court’s review of the DMA’s “determination is limited to whether it was supported by substantial evidence, which is ‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Faith Assembly of God v. State Building Code Commission, 11 Mass.App.Ct. 333, 334 (1981). ... The Board’s failure to consider Larkowich’s evidence and explanation for non-receipt of its notices does not constitute reasonable grounds to support its conclusion. Therefore, this matter is remanded to the DMA for a further hearing to consider the issue of Melican’s receipt of the Board’s notices.

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision for substantial evidence to defer to the agency’s credibility judgments rather than reweigh conflicting testimony.

Massachusetts General Hospital v. Waldman · filed 2005-08-23(7)

However, in deciding whether an agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it is not the court’s role to decide questions of credibility and weigh conflicting evidence; rather, the court must defer to the agency’s expertise in judging credibility and drawing inferences.

Section 14(7)(e) limits judicial review of an agency decision to whether substantial evidence supports it.

Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 2005-08-26(7)(e)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(e), the Court’s review of the commission’s decision is limited to whether it was supported by substantial evidence, which is “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the agency’s conclusions.”

Section 14(7) requires a court to review the whole administrative record and reverse an agency decision when the cumulative weight of the evidence substantially favors the opposite inference.

Allen of Michigan, Inc. v. Deputy Director of the Division of Employment & Training · filed 2005-08-30(7)

Our review is governed by the standards set out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7). ... If we determine that the cumulative weight of the evidence tends substantially toward an opposite inference, we reverse the agency’s decision.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise when deciding whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2005-09-06(7)

At the same time, this Court must “accord due weight to the ‘experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge’ of the [SORB].” Martorano v. Department of Public Utilities, 401 Mass. 257, 261 (1987); G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... Given that the expert evidence regarding the risk of re-offense was uncontradicted, the decision of the hearing officer is not supported by substantial evidence and cannot stand.

Section 14(7) requires the commission’s factual determinations to be supported by substantial evidence.

Andrews v. Civil Service Commission · filed 2006-04-28(7)

The commission’s factual determinations must be supported by substantial evidence, G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), meaning “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is not supported by substantial evidence.

Perini/Kiewit/Cashman v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2006-07-27(7)

The review of this matter is governed by G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). The court “may set aside the decision of an administrative agency if it is not supported by substantial evidence.”

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency factfinder’s choice between two fairly conflicting views when reviewing the evidence supporting its decision.

Doe No. 16297 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2006-09-27(7)

However, the reviewing judge cannot substitute his determination for the one made by the administrative factfinder between “two fairly conflicting views.” I must, and I do, defer to the judgment of the first-hand trier of fact.

Section 14 permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Jacobs v. Department of Social Services · filed 2006-10-27(7)(e)

The scope of review of an agency’s decision is defined by G.L.c. 30A, § 14. ... For the foregoing reasons; the decision of DSS to support a report of neglect as to the plaintiff, Marilyn Jacobs, was not supported by substantial evidence on the administrative record and must be set aside.

Section 14(7) requires substantial evidence to support an agency decision on judicial review.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2006-12-05(7)

This conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 leaves findings of fact and witness credibility to the agency on judicial review.

Goldman v. Civil Service Commission · filed 2006-07-05

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14, it is the function of the agency rather than the Court to make findings of fact, and it is the duty of the agency rather than the Court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision if the petitioner shows that it lacks substantial evidence.

Birudavol v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 2007-04-13(7)

The court may modify or set aside the board’s final decision only if the petitioner demonstrates that the decision was legally erroneous, procedurally defective, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, or contained one or more of three other enumerated defects not at issue here. ... Those determinations, combined with the findings of fact included in the recommended decision, provide substantial evidence for the board’s decision.

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing an agency decision for substantial evidence to consider the entire record without substituting their own view of the facts for supported agency findings.

Kippenberger v. Board of Registration in Veterinary Medicine · filed 2007-04-23(7)

“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the board’s decision, we apply the ‘substantial evidence’ standard contained in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (1984 ed.). ... Our review under the substantial evidence standard is limited. “ ‘While we must consider the entire record, and must take into account whatever in the record detracts from the weight of the agency’s opinion . . . as long as there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the agency, we will not substitute our views as to the facts’ (citations omitted).”

Section 14 permits a court to vacate an agency decision unsupported by substantial evidence and remand for a new hearing.

Massachusetts Department of Correction v. Mullen · filed 2007-07-12

On appeal to this court, the question becomes whether the Commission’s decision was arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, based upon an error of law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. ... As these findings were significantly relied upon in discrediting Nedley’s testimony, the court finds that the Commissioner’s decision as a whole was not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) requires an agency decision to be supported by substantial evidence.

Rivera v. Department of Transitional Assistance · filed 2007-07-27(7)

The agency’s decision, however, must be supported by substantial evidence. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... Having reviewed the entire record before the hearing officer, it is clear that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s decision.

Section 14(7)(e) requires an agency finding to be supported by substantial evidence to withstand judicial review.

DeLeon v. Department of Social Services · filed 2008-07-02(7)(e)

A finding of an agency must be supported “by substantial evidence” to withstand judicial review. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(e).

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when substantial evidence does not support it.

Huezo v. Chelsea Housing Authority · filed 2008-09-11(7)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), this Court may reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision if that decision is based on an error of law or on unlawful procedure, is arbitrary and capricious, or if there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the decision. ... Thus, the Court concludes that there was not substantial evidence to support either: (1) the CHA’s contention that Huezo lacked the funds to pay the rent in June and July 2006 or (2) the CHA’s claim that Huezo did not comply with the notice requirements of G.L.c. 239, §8A.

Section 14(7) requires substantial evidence review to consider the whole record, including evidence that detracts from an agency’s findings.

Driscoll v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette · filed 2008-09-25(7)

That the record contains some evidence from which a rational mind might draw an inference in support of the agency conclusion does not dispose of the reviewing court’s inquiry.

Section 14(7)(e) permits a court to set aside an agency decision unsupported by substantial evidence, but does not permit the court to reweigh evidence or replace the agency’s credibility findings and inferences.

City of Boston v. Downing · filed 2008-10-31(7)(e)

Our review of the board’s decision is governed by the standards set out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), see G. L. c. 151 A, § 42, pursuant to which the board’s decision will be set aside if it is unsupported by substantial evidence. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(e). ... As previously explained, application of the substantial evidence test does not empower us to make a de novo determination of the facts, to make credibility choices, or to draw inferences different from those drawn by the examiner on the facts found.

Section 14(7)(E) permits a court to set aside an agency decision if it is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Anderson v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board · filed 2009-01-23(7)(E)

Pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(E), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, we may set aside the board’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim only if we find it “[Unsupported by substantial evidence.”

Section 14(7) requires an agency decision to be supported by substantial evidence and directs courts to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

Meade v. State Racing Commission · filed 2010-02-09(7)

The agency’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... The Commission’s remand decision rejecting the plaintiff s evidence without any credible contraiy opinion is not based on substantial evidence and cannot stand.

Section 14(7) limits substantial evidence review: a court may not redetermine facts, reassess credibility, or draw different inferences from the agency’s findings.

Gardner v. Worcester Regional Retirement Board · filed 2010-02-26(7)

After review of the full administrative record in light of the standards applicable under G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), the court concludes that the decision of CRAB must be affirmed. ... “Under the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court is not empowered to make a de novo determination of the facts, to make different credibility choices, or to draw different inferences from the facts found by the [agency].”

Section 14(7)(e) permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is not supported by substantial evidence.

DiPilato v. McClain · filed 2010-05-26(7)(e)

These grounds include such reasons as the agency’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, or is otherwise not in accordance with law. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(e), (g). ... Notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this court concludes that the DCF’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision for substantial evidence to consider the entire record.

Forman v. Director of the Office of Medicaid · filed 2011-04-06(7)

We reach this conclusion based on our review of the contract and the record evidence as a whole. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7) (“The court shall make the foregoing determinations upon consideration of the entire record”).

Section 14(7)(e) subjects agency factual findings to substantial evidence review.

Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 2011-11-02(7)(e)

With respect to the prudence review, the department’s factual findings are governed by the substantial evidence test. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e).

Section 14(7) allows reversal of an agency decision when the appealing party shows that it lacks substantial evidence.

Crossen v. Board of Registration of Home Inspectors · filed 2012-03-27(7)

Here, Crossen has failed to show that the Board’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, as required for a reversal under G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(7) allows reversal of an agency decision for lack of substantial evidence when the appealing party demonstrates that deficiency.

Doe 29701 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2012-05-07(7)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that the Board’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, as required for a reversal under G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14 permits a reviewing judge conducting substantial evidence review to consider whether a hearing officer’s decision became the agency’s final decision by default after a tie vote.

McGuiness v. Department of Correction · filed 2013-07-01

Pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and G. L. c. 31, § 44, “[w]e shall uphold an agency’s decision unless it is based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, unwarranted by facts found on the record as submitted, arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” ... A reviewing judge may, however, take into account the fact that a hearing officer’s initial decision became the final decision of the agency by default as opposed to by majority vote when conducting a substantial evidence analysis.

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

Sutton v. Premier Insurance · filed 2013-11-04(7)

General Laws c. 30A §14(7) governs judicial review of an agency decision and provides in relevant part: “(t]he court may affirm the decision of the agency, or remand the matter for further proceeding before the agency; or the court may set aside or modify the decision, or compel any agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced by the agency decision . . . it is unsupported by substantial evidence; or . . . arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” ... Having determined that the decision made by the Board in this case was unsupported by substantial evidence, this court finds that the decision was arbitrary, capricious and an error of law.

Section 14(7)(e) requires a reviewing court to determine whether an administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence.

G.R. v. Department of Developmental Services · filed 2014-02-18(7)(e)

This is an appeal under G. L. c. 30A, § 14. By statute, therefore, we must review the conclusion of the administrative magistrate to determine whether it is supported by “substantial evidence.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(e).

Section 14(7)(e) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.

M.M. v. Department of Developmental Services · filed 2014-02-18(7)(e)

By statute, therefore, we must review the conclusion of the administrative magistrate to determine whether it is supported by “substantial evidence.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(e).

Section 14(7) does not permit a court reviewing an agency decision for substantial evidence to substitute its view of the facts for the administrative fact finder’s.

E.G. v. Department of Developmental Services · filed 2014-02-18(7)

See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7). In determining whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, the focus of the appeal, we are not permitted to overrule those choices or to substitute our view of the facts for the magistrate’s view.

Section 14(7)(e) requires courts to review an agency’s factual conclusions for substantial evidence without substituting their own view of the facts.

Rouleau v. Department of Developmental Services · filed 2014-08-10(7)(e)

Statutory law requires that the conclusion of an administrative agency be assessed only to see if it is supported by “substantial evidence.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(e). If that requirement is met, no court can “substitute [its] view of the facts.”

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision when a lack of substantial evidence may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Doe v. Department of Children & Families · filed 2014-12-10(7)

A court may set aside an agency decision only if the court determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the decision is in violation of constitutional provisions; in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; based upon an error of law; based on unlawful procedure; unsupported by substantial evidence; unwarranted by facts found by the court on the record as submitted; or arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse an agency decision unsupported by substantial evidence, while giving due weight to the agency’s expertise.

SORB 442364 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2015-03-12(7)

At the same time, this court must “accord due weight to the ‘experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge’ ” of an administrative agency. Martorano v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 401 Mass. 257, 261 (1987); G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... Review of the hearing examiner’s findings demonstrates that her decision was not based on substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) limits review of an agency’s factual findings to whether the decision rests on substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious.

Tarlow v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board of the Commonwealth · filed 2015-01-26(7)

The only factual question for the court to decide is whether the decision rested on substantial evidence or was arbitrary or capricious. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). Mr. Tarlow and the school settled only after learning of the retirement board’s policy on how it credits a member’s time when there was a settlement agreement. The settlement was crafted to bring Mr. Tarlow just past the twenty-year mark. This was sufficient evidence for the CRAB, based on its experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and statutorily conferred discretion, to find collusion.

Section 14(7) requires an agency decision to be supported by substantial evidence to withstand judicial review.

Thompson v. Civil Service Commission · filed 2016-10-07(7)

To withstand review, the decision must be supported by substantial evidence. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14 permits a court to affirm an agency classification decision supported by substantial evidence, giving due weight to the agency’s expertise.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 22288 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-06-30(7)

Reviewing the hearing examiner's analysis of the record before him and giving due weight to the board's expertise and specialized knowledge, we conclude that the classification decision is supported by substantial evidence. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14; Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3177 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 486 Mass. 749, 759 (2021).

Section 14(7) permits a court to uphold an agency decision when substantial evidence supports it.

BONNIE CHHAN v. SECRETARY OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & Another. · filed 2023-12-14(7)

Accordingly, we conclude, as did the Superior Court judge, that the decision was based on substantial evidence.

Section 14(7)(e) requires substantial evidence to support an agency classification decision on judicial review.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 525957 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-12-11(7)(e)

Doe also argues that the hearing examiner's analysis was "sparse" and her classification decision is unsupported by "substantial evidence" as required by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e). ... The evidence here sufficiently supported a level one classification.

Section 14(7) permits a court to vacate an agency decision when substantial evidence does not support it.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527557 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-07-23(7)

Because we conclude that Doe's classification as a level two sex offender is not supported by substantial evidence on this record, we vacate the Superior Court's judgment affirming SORB's level two classification.

Section 14(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside or modify a board classification that lacks substantial evidence; a classification supported by substantial evidence survives that review.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 98921 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-10-23(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify [the board]'s classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of [the board]'s statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 649, citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... The decision was based on substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Section 14(7)(e) allows reliable trial testimony to provide substantial evidence for an agency decision, even when the testimony is presented through a transcript.

Zafar v. State Lottery Commission · filed 2026-05-13(7)(e)

Because the commission is not "bound by the rules of admissibility of evidence observed by courts," Embers of Salisbury, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 401 Mass. 526, 529 (1988), "[s]ubstantial evidence may be based on hearsay alone if that hearsay has indicia of reliability" (quotation and citation omitted), Covell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 786 (2003). Esha's trial testimony bears such indicia of reliability.

Section 14(7)(e) allows a party to challenge agency factual findings as unsupported by substantial evidence.

Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. · filed 2014-10-30(7)(e)

To the contrary, however, FG&E could have challenged the DPU's findings as "[u]nsupported by substantial evidence."

Section 14 does not entitle a party seeking judicial review of a rent control board decision to a trial de novo.

Wood-Dyer v. Brookline Rent Control Board · filed 1983-02-18

Judicial review does not entitle a party to a trial de novo.

Section 14(8) governs review of agency decisions, but a claim of unconstitutional confiscation receives independent judicial review of law and fact.

New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1976-09-14(8)

So far as unconstitutional confiscation is claimed, the Company is entitled to an independent judicial review as to both law and fact; otherwise the standard of review is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8).

Section 14(8)(f) permits a reviewing court to make independent findings of fact only when the Constitution requires it.

McCarthy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1961-02-07(8)(f)

Under Gr. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8), the court on review is not empowered to make independent findings of fact unless “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is . . . (f) Unwarranted by facts found by the court on the record as submitted or as amplified under paragraph (7) of this section, in those instances where the court is constitutionally required to make independent findings of fact” (emphasis supplied). There was no such requirement here. The judge, therefore, had no power to make independent findings.

Section 14(8)(f) provides for independent judicial review of law and fact when a utility claims its rates are confiscatory.

Mystic Valley Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1971-05-03(8)(f)

The petitioners contend that the rates set for each of them are confiscatory. It thus is our duty to afford these utilities “an independent judicial review as to both law and fact.”

Section 14 provides for independent judicial review of an agency’s conclusions of law.

Capezzuto v. State Ballot Law Commission · filed 1990-07-11

However, the conclusions of law to be drawn from those facts are subject to independent judicial review.

Section 14 allows relief from an agency decision if the decision rests on an error of law or lacks substantial evidence in the record.

Medi-Cab of Massachusetts Bay, Inc. v. Rate Setting Commission · filed 1987-12-21(7)(c), (e)

Under the provisions of § 14 relevant to this appeal, a party seeking relief from the division’s decision must show in the Superior Court that the decision either was based on an error of law or was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 14 allows a court to review an agency sanction for arbitrariness, caprice, or abuse of discretion.

Keigan v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 1987-04-23

Consequently, we cannot .conclude that the board’s sanction in this case was arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion in this regard. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1984 ed.).

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing Department of Public Utilities decisions to check for legal error and substantial evidence.

Martorano v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1987-12-14(7)

The appropriate standards of review for the department’s decisions are set out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (1986 ed.). ... Therefore, we review the department’s decision both for errors of law and for the sufficiency of the evidence under the “substantial evidence” test.

Section 14(7) limits review of agency findings and conclusions to substantial evidence and errors of law.

College-Town, Division of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1987-06-03(7)

Our review is limited to determining whether the commissioner's findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, and whether there was an error of law. G.L.c. 151B, § 6. G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) allows a court to disturb an agency decision for legal error, lack of substantial evidence, arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, or other failure to comply with law.

Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1986-03-18(7)

Review under G. L. c. 176A, § 6, is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (1984 ed.). ... Thus we shall not disturb the commissioner’s decision unless it is based upon an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

Section 14(7) supplies the standards of review for this unemployment benefits dispute through G. L. c. 151A, § 42.

Reed National Corp. v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1985-01-22(7)

These standards of review, set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), are applicable to this dispute under G. L. c. 151 A, § 42.

Section 14(7)(c) permits a court to set aside an agency decision for an error of law.

Town of Burlington v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1983-09-16(7)(c)

Under § 14, we may only disturb the decision for one of the causes set forth in subsection (7) (a)-(g). In this case, with due deference to the commission’s expertise, we conclude that the commission committed an error of law. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c).

Section 14(7)(g) allows a court to disturb an agency’s discretionary decision if it is arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Therrien v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1983-12-22(7)(g)

We will not disturb the exercise of such discretion unless it is “arbitrary or capricious,” “an abuse of discretion,” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g), or “a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies” of the statute.

Section 14(7) directs a reviewing court to determine whether an agency decision contains an error of law rather than decide the issues anew.

Attorney General v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1983-09-23(7)

Our task under the State Administrative Procedure Act (G.L.c. 30A, § 14 [7]) is not to decide the issues anew but to determine whether there was any error of law.

An agency decision supported by substantial evidence is not arbitrary or capricious when there is no indication that evidence was arbitrarily discounted.

Board of Selectmen v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1983-08-24(7)(g)

Since the commission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, and there is no indication that any evidence was arbitrarily discounted, the decision cannot be considered arbitrary or capricious.

Section 14(7)(g) provides for judicial review of agency action for abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious decision-making.

Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1985-05-03(7)(g)

Having established that the department had discretion to deny Fitchburg’s interim requests, we conclude that the denials were not an abuse of that discretion.

Under § 14(7), an agency’s statutory interpretation receives some weight, but a court is not bound by an erroneous interpretation.

McDonough v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1982-12-10(7)

The construction of the statute is a matter of law and although the opinion of CRAB is entitled to some weight the courts cannot be bound by an erroneous statutory construction by an administrative body. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7); Russo v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 645, 649 (1979); Johnson v. Martignetti, 374 Mass. 784, 790 (1978).

Section 14 brings the agency record before the reviewing court and limits review to errors of law and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.

School Committee v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1976-04-28

A proceeding under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as amended through St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, brings before this court the evidence and the record before the commission and only permits review of the questions whether the commission’s decision involves an error of law or is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 14 permits a reviewing court to modify an agency order when the finding supporting it is not supported by the evidence.

Bournewood Hosp. v. MASS COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION · filed 1976-11-04(7)

The judge did not exceed the scope of review entrusted to him by modifying the commission's order relating to the length of time Silberberg should have received an increased rate of pay because she performed as head of the occupational therapy department. Moreover, his conclusion was correct, since the more liberal finding of the Commissioner was not supported by the evidence before him.

Section 14 limits judicial review of an agency decision; when the record shows no error, the decree should affirm the decision without adding relief.

Town of Franklin v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1973-02-15

The scope of review is defined by G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as amended, and, no error appearing in the record, the decree should have affirmed the decision of the commission without more.

Section 14(8)(c) and (e) allows an agency decision to be set aside for an error of law or lack of substantial evidence.

Cataldo v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1961-12-08(8)(c), (e)

The only pertinent grounds for setting aside the decision of the appeal board would be that it was based upon an error of law or unsupported by substantial evidence. G-. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8) (c), (e).

Section 14(8) permits judicial correction of agency action that is arbitrary or capricious, lacks substantial evidence, or results in confiscation.

Wannacomet Water Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1963-11-20(8)

Judicial correction of the action, however, would be appropriate, if the department were to disregard these and other relevant criteria unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously, or to take action relating to the reserve not based upon substantial evidence or resulting in confiscation. See G. L. c. 30A, §14(8).

Section 14(8) does not allow a reviewing court to replace the agency’s supported factual findings with its own view of a witness’s credibility.

Martin v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1964-04-06(8)

It is not open to the District Court to accept as credible the testimony of the claimant and thus contravene the finding of the review board.

Section 14(8) governs judicial review of agency findings for substantial evidence and errors of law.

Screnci v. Director of Division of Employment Security · filed 1968-02-29(8)

Our review, like the judge’s, is governed by the standards provided in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8). ... The findings were not unsupported by substantial evidence and were not tainted by error of law.

Section 14(8)(e) and (g) allows a court to set aside an agency decision that lacks evidential support or is arbitrary and capricious.

Massachusetts General Hospital v. Commissioner of Public Welfare · filed 1966-05-04(8)(e), (8)(g)

For the reasons indicated the referee’s decision is without evidential support, and is, in effect, arbitrary and capricious. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8) (e) and (g).

Section 14(8) permits review of agency decisions for its enumerated errors even when a rate is not confiscatory.

Southbridge Water Supply Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1975-07-03(8)

On the contrary, we held then (see 360 Mass. at 449 [1971]) and we reaffirm now, that we shall review the department’s decisions not only for confiscation but for the errors enumerated in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8).

Section 14(8) provides for review of whether an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal or procedural error.

Jordan Marsh Co. v. Board of Assessors of Malden · filed 1971-03-19(8)

We will therefore exercise our reviewing function under the provisions of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8). ... There was substantial evidence to warrant the aggregate cash value of $1,250,000 arrived at by the board. Moreover we conclude that there was no error of law or procedure.

Section 14(8) governs judicial review of agency rulings challenged as legally erroneous, unsupported by substantial evidence, unwarranted by the record, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1971-11-11(8)

It contends, and again properly so, that under these allegations the standard of review is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8).

Section 14(7)(g) allows review of an agency decision for arbitrary or capricious action or abuse of discretion; poor administrative judgment alone does not establish those grounds.

Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1975-10-29(7)(g)

In effect, the company urges that the department’s decision on weather adjustment was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion in violation of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g). ... The department’s laconic, case-by-case treatment of the weather adjustment issue may constitute poor administrative judgment, but we cannot say that it is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or modify an agency decision when prejudicial constitutional error, legal error, or lack of substantial evidence affects a party's substantial rights.

Keough v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1976-03-24(7)

Under G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, the decision of the board may be set aside or modified if the court determines that substantial rights of any party have been prejudiced because, among other reasons, the decision violated constitutional provisions, was based on an error of law, or was unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7)(d) requires a court to set aside an agency decision made without the notice required for an adjudicatory hearing.

Kearney v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy · filed 1976-01-14(7)(d)

There having been no compliance with the notice requirements of either G. L. c. 30A, § 11(1), or G. L. c. 112, § 40, so much of the board’s decision as purports to discipline Epray must be set aside as “[mjade upon unlawful procedure” (G. L. c. 30A, § 14 [7] [d]).

Section 14's limits on the record considered and the grounds for overturning an agency decision do not restrict the Superior Court's review under G.L.c. 56, § 59.

McCarthy v. Secretary of the Commonwealth · filed 1977-01-04(5), (7)

The Superior Court is not limited by the restriction on the scope of judicial review of administrative action contained in the State Administrative Procedure Act, G.L.c. 30A. The broad equity powers given to the court by G.L.c. 56, § 59, override those limitations on the scope of judicial review, and most significantly override those provisions limiting the court to consideration of the record before the administrative agency, G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (5), and the limitations as to grounds for overturning an agency decision, G.L.c. 30A. § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) governs review of agency findings subsidiary to a confiscation claim under its substantial evidence and other review standards.

Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1978-06-30(7)

As we have indicated in prior decisions, we review such Department findings, though subsidiary to a confiscation claim, only to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence and otherwise meet the standards of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) allows review of an agency order for lack of substantial evidence or error of law; the ordinary effects of a consistently applied rate base rule did not establish either ground.

Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1977-02-14(7)

There are no unusual circumstances which show that the application to this case of a normal rate base accounting rule lacks substantial evidentiary support or constitutes error of law within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 provides de novo judicial review of questions of law in agency decisions.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1977-05-11

Review of the deputy commissioner’s findings and order is under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and questions of law involved in his determination are subject to de novo judicial review.

Section 14(7) supplies the standard of judicial review for challenged agency rulings that do not give rise to a claim of confiscation.

Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1978-04-19(7)

In so far as any of the challenged rulings do not independently or in cumulative effect give rise to a claim of confiscation, the standard of review is as set forth in the State Administrative Procedure Act. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.

Section 14(7) provides for judicial review of agency decisions for legal error, lack of substantial evidence, and abuse of discretion.

Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1978-09-07(7)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14 (7), provides for judicial review of the Department’s decision to determine, inter alla, whether it is based on an error of law, whether it is supported by substantial evidence, and whether it constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Section 14 limits judicial review of agency decisions: courts may not conduct a trial de novo or replace the agency’s choice between conflicting views with their own.

S. Worcester Cty. Reg. Voc. Sch. v. Labor Rel. Comm'n · filed 1979-05-03

Both in the Superior Court and in this court the scope of review is defined by G.L.c. 30A, § 14. Franklin v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 363 Mass. 878 (1973). That definition does not call upon either court to decide whether complaints are "trivial" or whether the actions complained of were "childish" or "immature." Whatever the effect the commission might give to such characterizations, we may not treat the proceeding as a trial de novo or displace the commission's choice between two conflicting views, even though we might justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before us in the first instance.

Section 14 bars a reviewing court from retrying an agency case or replacing the agency’s choice between conflicting views with its own.

Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School District v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1979-05-03

Both in the Superior Court and in this court the scope of review is defined by G. L. c. 30A, § 14. ... Whatever the effect the commission might give to such characterizations, we may not treat the proceeding as a trial de nova or displace the commission’s choice between two conflicting views, even though we might justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before us in the first instance.

Section 14 does not permit a party to raise an issue in court for the first time when it was never brought before the agency.

International Brotherhood of Police Officers v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1981-01-29

No charge of prohibited practice, timely or otherwise, had brought this issue before the commission; and the union was not entitled to raise it in court in the first instance.

When the facts are undisputed, an issue on judicial review is treated as a question of law, and the court may set aside the agency’s decision for legal error.

Harvard Student Agencies, Inc. v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1981-06-08(7)(c)

This issue, where the facts are not in dispute, is to be treated as a question of law, ... and we conclude that in this respect the boarderred. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7) (c).

Section 14(7)(g) permits review of an agency decision for arbitrariness; a decision does not become arbitrary merely because it differs from earlier decisions that are distinguishable on their facts.

Boguszewski v. Commissioner of Department of Employment & Training · filed 1991-06-05(7)(g)

The claimants also argue that the board’s decision was arbitrary under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g), because it departs from the board’s approach in other cases. We disagree. The board decisions cited by the claimants may be distinguished on their facts.

Section 14 permits a court to set aside, modify, or remand an agency decision when it prejudices substantial rights because it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law.

Fitzgerald v. Cambridge Rent Control Board · filed 1994-02-01

Section 10(a) of the Ordinance, St. 1976, c. 36, provides that judicial review of Board decisions shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.c. 30A, §14. In pertinent part, §14 permits the court to set aside or modify a decision, or to remand a decision to an administrative body for further proceedings, if the court determines that the “substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is . . . arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” The Board’s decision here was not arbitrary, was not capricious and it was not devoid of support in the administrative record.

Section 14(7)(c) allows a court to set aside an agency decision for an error of law without deferring to the agency’s legal conclusion.

Boston Police Superior Officers Federation v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1991-08-13(7)(c)

We may not disturb the commission’s decision unless “the substantial rights of any party have been prejudiced” for one of the reasons set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... No such deference is appropriate, however, when the commission commits an error of law.

Under § 14, a court may set aside a CRAB decision only for an error of law or lack of substantial evidence.

Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1992-10-29

On judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, “[a] decision of CRAB may be set aside only if based upon an error of law or unsupported by substantial evidence.”

Section 14 (7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Crane v. COMMR. OF THE DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING · filed 1993-03-23(7)

Section 14 (7) mandates that we give "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it."

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to uphold an agency decision supported by substantial evidence unless it rests on an error of law or is otherwise defective under the statute.

Wilson v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1993-12-17

The Court, in reviewing a decision of the Civil Service Commission, applies the same standard of review as that provided pursuant to M.G.L.c. 30A. See, M.G.L.c. 31, §44, as amended. The decision of the Commission must be upheld, if supported by substantial evidence and if it is not based on an error of law, or otherwise defective for the reasons set out in the statute. M.G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14(7)(c) allows a court to disturb an agency decision when it is based on an error of law.

Armstrong's Case · filed 1994-01-20(7)(c)

In the context of the issue in dispute, we should disturb the board’s decision only if it is “[bjased upon an error of law.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c).

Section 14 requires a court reviewing an agency decision to assess substantial evidence, legal correctness, and the proper exercise of discretion.

Sycamore Land Corp. v. Thompson · filed 1994-01-28

Under G.L.c. 30A, §14, the court is required to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision, whether the decision is correct as a matter of law and whether the Board properly exercised its discretionary power.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision only when a listed defect may have prejudiced a party's substantial rights.

McIsaac v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1993-10-29(7)

The court may only set aside an agency's decision “if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision” was: (1) viola-tive of the constitution; (2) in excess of the authority of the agency; (3) based on an error of law; (4) made on unlawful procedure; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence; (6) unwarranted by facts found by the Court on the record, in instances where the court is constitutionally required to make independent findings of fact; (7) arbitrary or capricious, or “otherwise not in accordance with the law.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(a)-(g).

Section 14(7)(d) permits a court to set aside an agency decision when unlawful procedure may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Weiner v. Board of Registration of Psychologists · filed 1993-12-29(7)(d)

We may affirm, remand, set aside, or modify an agency decision, or compel any action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, if we determine that “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is . . . [m]ode upon unlawful procedure.”

Section 14(7)(a) allows a court reviewing an agency decision to address constitutional claims when the decision may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Westvaco Corp. Envelope Division v. Campbell · filed 1994-02-11(7)(a)

Indeed, the Massachusetts courts are specifically directed to entertain appeals addressing constitutional issues such as the present one under Mass. Gen.Laws ch. 30A, § 14(7)(a) (court may act “if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is in violation of constitutional provisions ...”).

Section 14 permits remand when an agency decision rests on an error of law.

Yazbek v. Commerce Insurance · filed 1994-04-21

The Board, in its decision, clearly failed to recognize the fragile nature of a presumption and assumed that the presumption survived the introduction of contrary evidence and, in some manner, was to be weighed against contrary evidence. This clearly was an error of law within the meaning of G.L.c. 30A, §14. The matter is to be remanded to the Board for further consideration in compliance with this decision.

Section 14(7) allows a reviewing court to reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision when unlawful procedure or arbitrary or capricious action prejudices a party’s rights.

Cristofori v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1994-05-24(7)

G.L.c. 30A, §14(7) allows a reviewing court to reverse, remand, or modify the decision of an administrative agency if the plaintiffs rights have been prejudiced because the agency’s decision was made upon unlawful procedure, was arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law.

Section 14 permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an error of law.

Busi v. Malden Retirement Board · filed 1994-05-24

When considering an appeal pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, this court may set aside a CRAB decision that is unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an error of law.

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision when legal error, lack of substantial evidence, or abuse of discretion may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Broszeit v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 1995-02-27(7)

The court may reverse, remand or modify an administrative agency’s decision if “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced” because the agency decision is, among other things, based on an error of law, or unsupported by substantial evidence, or an abuse of discretion. G.L.c 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(g) allows a court to set aside an arbitrary or capricious agency decision that substantially prejudices a party’s rights.

Boyette v. Registry of Motor Vehicles · filed 1995-01-27(g)

The court may set aside or modify a decision, “if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(g). ... Thus, because the Registry’s implementation of the additional requirement that an individual must physically surrender his or her license before a suspension period begins to run is not based on any legal authority, the court concludes that the defendants’ decisions in this matter were arbitrary and capricious and substantially prejudiced Boyette’s rights.

Section 14 permits a court to overturn an agency decision if the agency abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily or capriciously.

1010 Memorial Drive Tenants Corp. v. Fire Chief · filed 1995-04-04

Under G.L.c. 30A, §14, a court may overturn an agency’s decision if the agency has abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily or capriciously.

Section 14(7)(g) permits a court to reverse an agency decision when its arbitrary or capricious action prejudices a party’s substantial rights.

Redmond v. Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance · filed 1995-06-21(7)(g)

The Court can review and either affirm, reverse, remand, compel action, or modify a state administrative agency’s decision if the court determines “that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is . . . arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(g). ... This Court finds that the substantial rights of plaintiff have been prejudiced by an arbitrary and capricious decision of the administrative agency.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or remand an agency action as arbitrary or capricious even when substantial evidence supports it.

Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1995-06-28(7)

Section 14(7) provides alternate bases upon which an agency’s action may be set aside or remanded. Here, the judge, in essence, has impermissibly merged the two subsections, (e) and (g), by determining that, if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot as matter of law be arbitrary and capricious.

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision when a defect may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Donahue v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1995-09-11(7)

A reviewing court may set aside an administrative decision if it finds that the substantial rights of a party may have been prejudiced because the decision is defective under M.G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14 limits judicial review of an agency decision to specified grounds, including legal error, unlawful procedure, lack of substantial evidence, and arbitrary or capricious action.

Sullivan v. Bullen · filed 1994-12-15(7)

The state Administrative Procedure Act limits the court’s review to determining whether the Division’s decision was (1) in excess of the Division’s authority or jurisdiction; (2) based on an error of law; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) unsupported by substantial evidence; (5) unwarranted by facts found by the court on the record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion or “otherwise not in accordance with the law.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(17)(a)-(g).

Section 14 requires a court to uphold an agency decision unless it has one of the legal defects enumerated in the statute.

Hill v. Cote · filed 1995-07-13

In a G.L.c. 30A, §14 review, the agency’s decision must be upheld unless it is flawed by one of the specifically enumerated legal defects set out in the statute.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision only if a listed defect may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Public Employee Retirement Administration v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1995-12-12(7)

The court may only set aside an agency’s decision if “it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision” was (1) violative of the constitution; (2)in excess of the authority of the agency: (3) based on an error of law; (4) made on unlawful procedure; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence; (6) unwarranted by facts found by the Court on the record, in instances where the court is constitutionally required to make independent findings of fact; (7) arbitrary and capricious, or “otherwise not in accordance with the law.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(a)-(g).

Section 14 permits a court to set aside an agency decision only on the grounds it specifies.

Condon v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 1996-12-10

The court may set aside a decision only on the grounds set forth in G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14(7)(e) allows a court to affirm, reverse, or remand an agency decision based on legal error, lack of substantial evidence, or another conflict with law.

Sugrue v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1995-12-22(7)(e)

General Laws c. 30A, §14(7)(e) allows a court to review and either affirm, reverse, or remand an administrative agency’s decision if the court determines that the decision is based upon an error of law, is unsupported by substantial evidence, or is otherwise not in accordance with law.

Section 14(7) allows a court to affirm, set aside, or modify an agency decision when substantial rights may have been prejudiced by legal error, lack of substantial evidence, or arbitrary or capricious action.

Bogus v. Safety Insurance · filed 1996-11-07(7)

The court may affirm, set aside or modify the decision if it is determined that substantial rights of a party may have been prejudiced based on an error of law; the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence; or is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. G.L.c. 30A §14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a court to affirm an agency decision when the challenger fails to establish a ground for reversal, such as lack of substantial evidence, legal error, abuse of discretion, or arbitrary or capricious action.

City of Cambridge v. Hyte · filed 1996-01-17(7)

In sum, plaintiff has failed to prove that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, based on an error of law, an abuse of discretion, or arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court must affirm the decision of the agency.

Section 14(7)(c) permits a court to set aside, modify, or remand an agency decision when an error of law may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Pieloch v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1996-03-01(7)(c)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14(7) (c), provides that a court may set aside, modify or remand to the agency an agency’s decision if it determines “that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is based on an error of law.” ... This court therefore reverses, as a matter of law, CRAB’s construction of the term “personal injury” because it was based on an error of law.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision based on an error of law.

Van Munching Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1996-09-18(7)

However, § 14(7) permits the commission’s decision to be set aside if based upon an error of law, as is the case here.

Section 14 permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence, but otherwise bars the court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s.

Ford v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission · filed 1996-09-09

This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, even if it would have decided otherwise, unless the agency’s decision was contrary to law or not based on substantial evidence. Here, a review of the administrative record indicates, however, that the Commission’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence and were contrary to law.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision when the agency’s violation of constitutional rights may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Stone v. Massachusetts Department of Social Services · filed 1997-02-28(7)

General Laws, c. 30A, §14(7) expressly provides that the reviewing court may take appropriate judicial action “if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision” violated or offended any of the standards of review set forth in G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... The decision to vacate the subpoena of the boy’s mother was in error because it denied Stone the opportunity to present his case effectively, thus violating his rights under both the federal and state constitutions. ... For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the decision of the Fair Hearing Office dated January 13, 1994 be VACATED. It is further ORDERED that the case be REMANDED back to the Department of Social Services for a new Fair Hearing that affords the appellant a full opportunity to present his case.

Section 14 permits a court to set aside an agency decision when an error of law prejudices a party’s substantial rights.

Division of Capital Planning & Operations v. TLT Construction Corp. · filed 1997-08-15(7)

Under G.L.c. 30A, § 14, this Court may affirm, remand, set aside, or modify an agency’s decision if it is determined that a party’s substantial rights were prejudiced because the decision was: (1) in violation of constitutional provisions, (2) in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, (3) based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, (4) made upon unlawful procedure, (5) unsupported by substantial evidence, or (6) arbitrary or capricious.

Section 14(7)(g) permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.

Haverhill Municipal Hospital v. Commissioner of the Division of Medical Assistance · filed 1998-08-27(7)(g)

The result is that the board’s decision was arbitrary and an abuse of the board’s discretion. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(g). We set aside the decision of the board in so far as it denied payment to the hospital for labor and delivery services to its patient.

Section 14(7) governs judicial review of agency decisions and permits a court to grant relief when an agency decision may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Bergan v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1997-03-18(7)

Specifically, the court may review and either affirm, reverse, remand, compel action, or modify a state’s administrative decision if the court determines “that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced . . .” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7) (1994 ed.).

Section 14 is the usual means of reviewing CRAB decisions, but it affords no relief when CRAB lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.

Town of Swansea v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1997-08-21

The town also stated a claim under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 — the usual mode of review of decisions by CRAB. ... But since CRAB had no jurisdiction to hear the town’s appeal, c. 30A review would gain the town nothing.

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse or remand an agency decision when it prejudices substantial rights because it lacks substantial evidence or rests on an error of law.

Echevarria v. McIntire · filed 1997-06-10(7)

A reviewing court may reverse an agency decision or remand the matter if the substantial rights of any parly has been prejudiced because the agency decision was “[unsupported by substantial evidence” or “[biased upon an error of law.” G.L.c. 30A, §§14(7)(c) and (e).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision based on unlawful procedure or an exercise of authority beyond the agency’s limits.

Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary v. Bullen · filed 1997-07-10(7)

The Division’s decisions in these five cases were based on an unlawful procedure and exceeded the Division’s authority because the Division failed to apply the federal Medicaid definition, or some other standard not inconsistent with the federal Medicaid definition.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to overturn a commission decision that conflicts with governing law, while giving weight to the commission’s experience and authority.

Town of Plymouth v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1997-10-20(7)

Under G. L. c. 31, § 44, we review the commission’s decision to determine if it violates any of the standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), and cases construing those standards. While we give weight to the commission’s experience and authority, see ... we are required to overturn commission decisions that are inconsistent with governing law.

Section 14(7) requires a court to uphold an agency decision supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.

Jacobus v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 1997-09-04(7)

The Board’s decision will be upheld if it is not infected by an error of law and is supported by substantial evidence, that is, “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Section 14(7) supplies the standards for judicial review of the commissioner’s decision.

Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1998-03-23(7)

Our review of the commissioner’s actions is governed by G. L. c. 176K, § 7 (z), which provides that we are “limited to the record of proceedings before the commissioner,” and that we shall “uphold the commissioner’s action, order, finding, or decision if it is consistent with the standards set forth in [G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7)].”

Section 14's standards for reviewing an agency decision govern a later environmental injunction petition when no timely appeal of the agency decision was made.

Newman v. City of Malden · filed 1998-06-16

That appeal would be governed by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, and judicial review would, therefore, be confined to a determination of whether the Secretary had abused her discretion and made a decision which was arbitrary and capricious. M.G. L. c. 30A, §14. ... When there has been a plenary administrative proceeding before the Secretary under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, and when no timely appeal of that decision has been made, a later petition pursuant to Section 7A of Chapter 214, even if not barred, must be evaluated under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act.