30A Mass. Gen. Laws § 14

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Massachusetts Organization of State Engineers & Scientists v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1983-08-15

However, we are constrained by statute to “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency,” G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as amended through St. 1976, c. 411.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise, while leaving statutory interpretation to the courts.

United States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1984-04-03(7)

As a general rule, in reviewing the interpretation of a statute by an administrative body, a court shall "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency." G.L.c. 30A, § 14(7). However, in the final analysis, "[t]he duty of statutory interpretation is for the courts." School Comm. of Wellesley v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 376 Mass. 112, 116 (1978), quoting Cleary v. Cardullo's, Inc., 347 Mass. 337, 344 (1964).

On judicial review, courts give deference to an agency director’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Grand v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1984-12-11(7)

With regard to such matters, we give deference to the “experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [director], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon” her. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), as amended through St. 1976, c. 411, §§ 1, 2.

Section 14 requires reviewing courts to give due weight to an agency’s discretion, including its discretion to take new evidence on remand to make required findings.

Kahn v. Brookline Rent Control Board · filed 1985-05-07(7)

To honor the mandate of the Appellate Division, the board had the discretion to take new evidence. This discretion is consistent with the requirement of G. L. c. 30A, § 14, that the reviewing court give due weight to the discretionary authority conferred upon an agency.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, special knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Volloch v. Rent Control Board of Brookline · filed 1986-05-22(7)

Additionally, we are required to give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and special knowledge of the Board, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Commonwealth v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1989-02-13(7)

This court must “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency . . . .” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(8) requires reviewing courts to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and delegated discretion.

Wolf v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1990-05-14(8)

Thus, the decision regarding what standard to apply in that situation is left to the department’s discretion. “In reviewing administrative agency decisions, this and all other courts are required to give ‘due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.’ G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8).”

Section 14 permits a reviewing court to defer to CRAB’s expertise and specialized knowledge when assessing the validity of a retirement option election.

DoCurral v. Milford Retirement Board · filed 1994-01-18

Second, G.L.c. 30A, §14 permits this court to defer to CRAB’s expertise and specialized knowledge in determining the validity of an option. CRAB’s determination with respect to the instant election of option is not suspect and will not be disturbed now.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion when assessing its findings.

Greater Media, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1993-06-07(7)

We accord “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” ... Review of the record indicates that the department’s findings were based on substantial evidence.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and statutory discretion and prohibits substituting its own judgment for the agency’s.

Brennan v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1994-03-31

Such proceedings are governed by the provisions of G.L.c. 30A, §14. ... In reviewing the agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute. ... The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to defer to commission findings supported by substantial evidence and to check for errors of law.

Talbert Trading Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1994-07-22

General Laws c. 151B, § 6, incorporates the standard set forth in G. L. c. 30A as the standard for review of commission decisions. That standard requires that the reviewing court defer to the facts found by the commission where there is substantial evidence to support the findings and where there is no error of law.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Towler v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1994-09-13(7)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14(7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, under which judicial review of CRAB decisions is conducted, directs that a reviewing court “shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.”

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretion.

Estate of Janowicz v. Massachusetts State Lottery Commission · filed 1994-10-12(7)

The court must “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred on it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). Therefore, the court concludes that the administrative decision regarding the enforceability of Perrault’s letter precludes the plaintiff from obtaining a review by trial de novo of the identical issue in this court.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and statutory discretion.

McDonough v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1994-10-28(7)

In reviewing an agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute.

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency findings to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

Massachusetts Oilheat Council v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1994-11-14(7)

We accord ‘due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.’ Flint v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 412 Mass. 416, 420 (1992), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (1990 ed.). ... After a review of the record of the department proceedings, we conclude that its findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) requires courts to defer to an agency’s factual findings and reasonable inferences when reviewing its decision.

Stapleton v. Nyhan · filed 1995-02-03(7)

As noted above, under the standard of review of the Board’s decision under M.G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), a Court is to be highly deferential to an administrative Board on questions of fact and reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom.

Section 14 requires a court reviewing an agency decision to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and statutory discretion.

Foxboro Harness, Inc. v. Massachusetts State Racing Commission · filed 1995-04-07(7)

In reviewing the agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise, technical competence, specialized knowledge and statutory discretion.

Tarin v. Bullen · filed 1995-04-10(7)

In reviewing the agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s expertise, technical competence, specialized knowledge and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and statutory discretion.

Bisceglia v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance · filed 1996-09-18(7)

In reviewing the agency’s decision, the court is required, under G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), to give due weight to the DMA’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred on it by statute.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to agency factfinding supported by substantial evidence when there is no error of law.

Alonzo v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1996-11-22(7)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 15133, §6 the decision of the hearing commissioner must be reviewed in accordance with one standard of review set forth in G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... Accordingly, the court must defer to the fact-finding function of the Commission, “including its right to draw reasonable inferences from the facts found,” where there is substantial evidence to support its findings and there is no error of law.

Section 14(7) calls for considerable weight to be given to agency findings that draw on the agency’s experience and expertise.

Franclemont v. Commissioner of Department of Employment & Training · filed 1997-02-28(7)

Whether businesses engage in commercial competitive conduct brings into play the “experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge” of the department, and its finding on that question is entitled to considerable weight.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and statutory discretion, while allowing it to overrule an arbitrary interpretation of agency regulations.

Goldthwaite v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Health · filed 1998-06-24(7)

In reviewing the agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionaiy authority conferred upon it by statute. ... DPH’s calculation of a per diem rate based upon the inclusion of trust assets is contrary to the plain meaning of the terms “liquid assets” and “financially responsible individuals.” Accordingly, this Court must overrule such an arbitrary interpretation.

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretion.

Iodoce v. Architectural Access Board · filed 1997-03-07(7)

In reviewing the board’s decision, we are required to “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the ...discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to give due weight to agency expertise and discretion and to affirm decisions supported by substantial evidence unless otherwise unlawful.

Beck v. People's Service Insurance Co. · filed 1997-07-22(7)

In reviewing an agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge and statutorily conferred discretion. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7); Flint v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 412 Mass. 416, 420 (1992). This is not a de novo determination by the Superior Court, but a review of an agency decision. If the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not otherwise unlawful, the decision is to be affirmed.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and statutory discretion.

Douglas Environmental Associates, Inc. v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection · filed 1997-07-24(7)

In reviewing an agency decision under this section, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge and statutorily conferred discretion.

Section 14 calls for deference to an agency’s expertise and experience in areas where the Legislature has delegated it decision-making authority.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1997-09-18

Moreover, we give deference to the department’s expertise and experience in areas where the Legislature has delegated to it decision-making authority, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Spadafora v. Department of Fisheries, Wildlife & Environmental Law Enforcement · filed 1998-06-25(7)

In reviewing the agency’s decision, the court is required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7); see also Flint v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 412 Mass. 416, 420 (1992) (recognizing standard of review as highly deferential to agency on questions of fact and reasonable inferences); Seagram Distillers Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n., 401 Mass. 713, 721 (1988) (finding sufficient evidence to support commission’s conclusion).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and statutory discretion.

Hosking v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority Employees' Retirement Board · filed 1998-06-29(7)

In reviewing the agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and statutory discretion.

O'Callahan v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1998-10-27

In reviewing an agency decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute. Iodice v. Architectural Access Bd., 424 Mass. 370, 375-76 (1997), citing G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14(7) directs reviewing courts to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority when interpreting the law it administers.

Evans v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1999-01-26(7)

In such matters of interpretation the court is admonished by G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), as amended by St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.”

Section 14(7) requires courts to give due weight to an agency’s expertise, but does not bind them to the agency’s position when no regulation directly addresses the issue.

Rudow v. Commissioner of the Division of Medical Assistance · filed 1999-03-11(7)

In doing so, we “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” § 14 (7). We are not, however, bound to adhere to a position taken by the agency particularly where, as here, there are neither Federal nor State regulations directly addressing the issue.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority when assessing whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence.

City of Boston v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1999-11-01

In determining whether a decision has such support, we “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency’s discretionary judgment rather than substitute its own.

Thomas v. Civil Service Commission · filed 2000-01-13(7)

In reviewing that action under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), it was not open to the Superior Court judge to substitute his judgment for that of the commission.

Section 14(7) calls for due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion, while legal questions receive de novo review.

Hogan v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2000-01-20(7)

We grant “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). However, where an agency’s decision is based on a question of law, we review the commission’s interpretation de nova.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency’s experience and expertise when reviewing its decision.

Pietrolungo v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 2000-01-24(7)

In reviewing the Board’s determination, I am obliged to give deference to the Board’s experience and expertise in these matters. G.L.c. 30A§14(7); ... Giving due deference to the Board of Appeal, I find that its decision that Mr. Pietrolungo was more than fifty percent at fault in this accident was not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and statutory discretion when reviewing its decision.

O'Rourke v. Worcester Retirement Board · filed 1998-12-21(7)

In reviewing the agency’s decision, the court is required to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Hosking v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2000-07-14(7)

We must also “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

John D. v. Department of Social Services · filed 2001-03-07(7)

“The court shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7). ... Beyond the considerable deference we accord to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, we conclude that the interpretation by DSS of its regulation in this case was rational, reasonable, and consistent with its plain terms.

Section 14(7) requires reviewing courts to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and delegated discretion.

Garofoli v. Worcester Retirement Board · filed 2001-08-06(7)

Reviewing courts shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.

Section 14(7) requires courts to defer to agency fact-finding when substantial evidence supports the findings and there is no error of law.

Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination · filed 2000-06-06(7)

Under the State Administrative Procedure Act, we defer to the fact-finding function of the commission where substantial evidence exists to support its findings and there is no error of law.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give weight to an agency’s experience and authority, but an agency decision that is inconsistent with law cannot be affirmed.

Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2000-06-15(7)(c)

Although we give weight to the commission’s experience and authority, see G. L. c. 30A, § 14, we do not affirm commission decisions that are inconsistent with law. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c); Plymouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 426 Mass. 1, 5 (1997); Boston Police Superior Officers Fed’n v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 410 Mass. 890, 892 (1991) (no deference may be paid to commission’s decisions when we review for error as a matter of law).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority when reviewing its interpretation.

Dube v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2000-08-21(7)

Furthermore, in matters of interpretation, we must “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and review legal issues de novo.

Belhumeur v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2000-09-21(7)

In accordance with the statute, we “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). To the extent the commission’s decision involves issues of law, however, we review the decision de novo.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and statutory discretion.

Mole v. University of Massachusetts · filed 2001-01-11(7)

The court also is required to give due weight to the agency's experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute. G.L.c. 30A §14(7); Jodice v. Architectural Access Bd., 424 Mass. 370, 375-76 (1997).

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

Flanagan v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2001-06-14(7)

In making this determination, the court should “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.”

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to agency expertise and refrain from substituting its judgment on the evidence.

Discipio v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 2001-07-23(7)

Deference is given to the expertise of the agency, G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), and a reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, even if the reviewing court would have taken a different view of the evidence.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Town of Andover v. Energy Facilities Siting Board · filed 2001-11-19(7)

The board could properly rely on this testimony, and we must give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge” of the board. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) calls for deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a law it administers when the reviewing court finds no error of law.

Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Office of the Attorney General · filed 2002-02-25(7)

However, in the absence of a finding of an error of law, this court will defer to the Attorney General’s interpretation of a law it is charged with administering and enforcing. ... Therefore, so long as the Attorney General’s statutory interpretation is reasonable, this court will not supplement its own judgment.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Boston Bicycle Couriers, Inc. v. Deputy Director of the Division of Employment & Training · filed 2002-11-18(7)

A reviewing court will accord “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.”

Section 14 requires a court reviewing an agency decision to give weight to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

City of Worcester v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2001-10-29

In reviewing the commission’s decision, we “give due weight ... to the [commission’s] experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge ... as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Murphy's Case · filed 2001-12-20(7)

We “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [department], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as amended by St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge when assessing the evidence.

Boston Gas Co. v. Department of Telecommunications & Energy · filed 2002-03-07(7)

Although we must carefully consider any evidence in the record that detracts from the agency’s conclusion, we “accord due weight to the ‘experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge’ of the department.” Martorano v. Department of Pub. Utils., 401 Mass. 257, 261 (1987), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 requires courts reviewing Labor Relations Commission decisions to defer to the commission’s specialized knowledge, expertise, and interpretation of applicable statutes.

City of Worcester v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2002-11-27

Judicial review of commission decisions is to be conducted in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14. G. L. c. 150E, § 11. We therefore must accord deference to the commission’s specialized knowledge and expertise, and to its interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions.

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Healey v. Massachusetts Civil Service Commission · filed 2002-12-02(7)

When reviewing the administrative appeal, “the court shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14 requires courts reviewing an agency decision for substantial evidence to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Town of North Attleboro v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2002-12-04

In ascertaining whether a decision has such support we “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) allows a reviewing court to decide pure questions of law despite the deference it gives an agency’s statutory interpretation.

Mackay v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2002-12-30(7)

... and ours is the power to determine pure questions of law. See Raytheon Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 364 Mass. 593, 595 (1974); G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise, but the court may reject an agency interpretation that conflicts with a regulation’s plain terms.

Szenher v. Warring · filed 2003-02-27(7)

In doing so, the Court shall “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... Itis evident that the Board’s interpretation of 130 C.M.R. 516.005 is contrary to the plain terms of the regulation and therefore cannot be upheld.

Section 14(7) directs courts to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion and permits them to disturb an arbitrary or capricious decision.

Hingham Healthcare Ltd. Partnership v. Division of Health Care Finance & Policy · filed 2003-06-26(7)

In addition, the court shall “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” ... Logically, this determination lies in the discretion of the defendant, and unless arbitrary or capricious, we will not disturb it.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Tri-County Youth Programs, Inc. v. Acting Deputy Director of the Division of Employment & Training · filed 2002-04-09(7)

Where our review is governed by the Act, we are required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), as amended by St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion when reviewing its factual findings.

Shoestring Ltd. Partnership v. Barnstable Conservation Commission · filed 2005-06-06(7)

This court gives “due weight to the experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give weight to an agency’s expertise while correcting decisions that conflict with governing law.

Brooks v. Civil Service Commission · filed 2004-04-13(7)

This standard requires the court to give weight to the experience and authority of the Commission and to defer to its application of technical or specialized knowledge, but requires the court to overrule Commission decisions that are inconsistent with governing law.

Section 14 requires a court reviewing an agency decision to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Commonwealth v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2004-04-16

In reviewing the commission’s decision, we “give due weight to the [agency’s] experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge ... as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to agency factfinding and permits reversal when a decision unsupported by substantial evidence prejudices a party’s substantial rights.

Woburn Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Committee · filed 2004-06-10(7)

This Court may reverse or modify the agency decision “if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is unsupported by substantial evidence; or arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... Giving the HAC’s fact-finding the deference to which it is entitled, this Court finds that there was more than substantial evidence to support those findings.

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

City of Boston v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2004-06-28(7)

Therefore, we “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Kozloski v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2004-09-07(7)

As to matters of interpretation of the retirement laws and application of the law, the judge was required, as are we, to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [TRB,] as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give weight to an agency’s expertise, accept findings supported by substantial evidence, and affirm conclusions free of legal error.

Gupta v. Deputy Director of Division of Employment & Training · filed 2004-11-29(7)

Under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, the District Court, as well as this court, is obliged to give due weight to the DET’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in applying the law to the circumstances of the case, must accept findings of the DET review examiner that were supported by substantial evidence, and must affirm conclusions ... not shown to be infected by error of law.

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing conflicting evidence to give deference to an agency’s findings in light of its expertise and discretion.

School Committee v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2005-07-12(7)

We also give deference to the MCAD’s findings where the evidence is conflicting, given the agency’s “experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge . . ., as well as the discretionary authority conferred on it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Vallee v. Director, Massachusetts State Lottery Commission · filed 2005-07-25(7)

The Court must “give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion.

Shaw ex rel. Shaw v. Murphy · filed 2006-06-12(7)

Under G.L.c. 30A, § 14 the Court is required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” Id., §14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2006-11-09(7)

In reviewing CRAB’s decision that the statutory definition of “regular compensation” encompasses neither the housing allowance nor the annuity payments, we are required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

Brown-Forman Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 2006-02-06(7)

We review the commission’s decision in accordance with the standards set out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), and discussed in Athol Daily News v. Board of Review of the Div. of Employment & Training, 439 Mass. 171, 174 (2003). ... That is, we give due weight to the commission’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion while requiring its decision to be supported by substantial evidence.

New Bedford v. Goldblatt · filed 2006-03-02(7)

As such, the Court is required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” Id., §14(7). ... The agency’s decision, however, must be supported by substantial evidence. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14 requires a court reviewing a commission decision to defer to the commission’s specialized knowledge, expertise, and interpretation of applicable statutes.

Town of Hudson v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2007-07-12

In reviewing the commission’s decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, see G. L. c. 150, § 11, we “must accord deference to the commission’s specialized knowledge and expertise, and to its interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions.” Worcester v. Labor Relations Commn., 438 Mass. 177, 180 (2002).

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision for substantial evidence to defer to the agency’s assessment of evidence and give due weight to its expertise.

Zoning Board of Appeals of Groton v. Housing Appeals Committee · filed 2007-02-09(7)

The Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency, instead it is to determine whether or not the decision was based on substantial evidence bearing in mind that the agency, the HAC, alone weighs credibility, accuracy, and the persuasiveness of testimonial and documentary evidence. This Court gives “due weight to .the experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” See G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Attorney General v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 2008-01-03(7)

In reviewing the decision, we are required to “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.”

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion while requiring substantial evidence for its decision.

Commonwealth of Department of State Police v. Commonwealth of Civil Service Commission · filed 2008-03-31(7)

In these circumstances, the Court is required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... The agency’s decision, however, must be supported by substantial evidence. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14 provides narrow judicial review of CRAB decisions; courts may not reweigh the evidence or substitute their judgment for CRAB’s.

Damiano v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2008-07-23

Judicial review of a CRAB decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is narrow. We are not called upon to determine whether the CRAB decision is based on the “weight of the evidence,” nor may we substitute our judgment for that of CRAB.

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to defer to agency expertise and refrain from substituting their own judgment.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2009-03-19(7)

In reviewing an agency decision, the court gives deference to the specialized knowledge and expertise of the agency, see G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.

Section 14 requires courts reviewing agency decisions to defer to agency fact findings and uphold a decision unless it rests on an error of law, lacks substantial evidence, or is arbitrary and capricious.

Metro Equipment Corp. v. Commonwealth · filed 2009-04-14

On appellate review, we defer to the agency’s findings of fact and “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14. In this instance, we will uphold DALA’s decision unless it is based upon an error of law, is unsupported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary and capricious.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion.

Victor v. Dehner · filed 2009-06-01(7)

When reviewing an agency’s decision, “the court shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency’s expertise and discretion when interpreting an ambiguous regulation.

Shelales v. Director of the Office of Medicaid · filed 2009-10-30(7)

Where ambiguities exist, a reviewing court must show deference to the experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority conferred upon the regulatory agency.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and statutory discretion.

Zoning Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Committee · filed 2010-03-18(7)

We are required to “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it” by statute. G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board · filed 2010-06-25

In conducting our review, we nevertheless “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” Quincy City Hosp. v. Labor Relations Commn., supra at 749, quoting from G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) requires courts to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion while retaining authority to decide pure questions of law.

Megiel-Rollo v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2010-04-21(7)

In reviewing the Board’s decision, the court is required to “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [Board], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). However, “(j]udicial deference to an agency’s action is not a principle of abdication, and ours is the power to determine pure questions of law” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

City of Springfield v. DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CABLE · filed 2010-08-16(7)

In reviewing administrative agency decisions, we give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2011-06-14(7)

When reviewing an agency decision, we “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) directs reviewing courts to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2012-04-23(7)

In conducting our review of such decision, we “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” Id. at 632-633, quoting from G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7). ... According the board the substantial deference it is due, we conclude that the hearing examiner’s decision is both reasonable and supported by the evidence.

Section 14(7) requires deference to an agency’s expertise where relevant; expertise in motor vehicles does not warrant deference on a purely legal question of statutory interpretation.

Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 2012-05-17(7)

We also must give deference to the agency’s “experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge,” where relevant. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... Moreover, the board’s specialized knowledge relating to motor vehicles and driving rules does not give it any special competence to determine what the Legislature meant by “convicted,” a term that is unrelated to these subjects.

Section 14(7)(c) removes the deference normally given to an agency decision when the agency commits an error of law.

Ledonne v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 2012-06-08(7)(c)

However, the deference normally accorded to an administrative agency’s decision is no longer appropriate when that agency commits an error of law. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7)(c).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and delegated discretion.

Rotondi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2012-10-29(7)

In reviewing CRAB’s decision that G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (d), applies to any person, including elected officials, who apply for membership in a public retirement system, we are required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7)(g) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and delegated discretion when reviewing its decision.

Doe, SORB No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2015-12-11(7)(g)

In reviewing the hearing examiner's decision, however, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency's expertise and discretionary authority.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2019-01-15(7)

"In reviewing the agency's decision, the court 'shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.' " Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216., 447 Mass. at 787, quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge when reviewing its decision.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 34664 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-03-13(7)

Giving "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [hearing examiner]," G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), we conclude that the classification decision here was "based on a sound exercise of informed discretion rather than the mechanical application of a checklist or some other reflex" (quotation and ... citation omitted).

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

BOUZAN v. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & Another. · filed 2024-05-15

Although no deference shall be given to the judge's decision under these circumstances, see Curtis v. Commissioner of Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 516, 519 (2007), this court "shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to a hearing examiner’s expertise when reviewing an agency decision.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3271 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-11-13(7)

We therefore defer to the hearing examiner's expertise on this factor. See Doe No. 68549, 470 Mass. at 109-110, quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) ("a reviewing court is required to 'give due weight to [the examiner's] experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge'").

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 314343 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-12-13(7)

In making this determination, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) directs courts reviewing agency decisions to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 464933 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-10-03(7)

"When evaluating the board's decision, however, we 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.'"

Section 14(7) calls for deference to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge when reviewing its decision.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 473226 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-03-23(7)

Our standard of review is deferential to the board's "experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge." See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) directs courts to give weight to an agency examiner's experience and specialized knowledge when reviewing the agency's decision.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 526823 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-12-17(7)

The examiner's experience and specialized knowledge in making such determinations are entitled to weight on review. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14’s limits on evidence and standard of review give way when federal special education law requires courts to receive additional evidence and decide by a preponderance of the evidence.

School Committee v. Commissioner of Education · filed 1984-04-05

Under either principle, the Federal standard of review must prevail. By § 1415(e)(2), Congress has unmistakably required that State courts provide de nova review of departmental decisions; and to the extent that State law may provide for review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, a provision precluding the reviewing court from receiving relevant evidence and deciding the case on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard would be in a direct conflict with the requirements of the Federal law.

Section 14 provides substantial-evidence review of agency decisions, but that review does not apply when a party invokes federal review under 20 U.S.C. § 1415.

Town Of Burlington v. Department Of Education Of The Commonwealth Of Massachusetts · filed 1981-06-18

We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants under state law because we conclude that state law cannot be applied when review under federal law is sought. ... Here the arguably applicable state review provision part of the state's general administrative procedure legislation calls for, inter alia, judicial review governed by the substantial evidence standard. Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 30A, § 14. This standard does conflict with the federal standard; we can imagine many judicial reviews that would uphold an agency decision as based on substantial evidence but that would reach a different result were new evidence to be taken and judged under the more rigorous "preponderance of the evidence" standard.

Section 14 does not require a landowner who accepts an agency decision to seek judicial review before suing for damages for an alleged taking caused by that decision.

Hamilton v. Conservation Commission of Orleans · filed 1981-08-21

There is no reason why the plaintiff should not be allowed to proceed by the most thorough and expeditious means available to her, and the trial judge erred in concluding that she was required to seek judicial relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, before she could maintain her action for damages for an alleged taking.

A complaint can seek review under § 14 by challenging an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious, even if it does not cite the section.

DALY v. MICHAEL RODRIGUES & Another. · filed 2026-06-26(7)(g)

Though Daly's complaint did not cite G. L. c. 127, § 38E or G. L. c. 30A, § 14, it can be construed as seeking review of the decision denying his grievance because it challenges the decision as incorrect and arbitrary and capricious.7 See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g) (in judicial review actions, court may set aside agency decision that is "[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").

Section 14(7) lets a reviewing court compel unreasonably delayed agency action but does not set a deadline for completing agency proceedings.

Vitale v. State Racing Commission · filed 1982-04-09(7)

Certainly the power of a reviewing court under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), to “compel any action . . . unreasonably delayed” is not such a statute of limitations.

Section 14(7) requires a showing of prejudice to obtain relief for an agency’s failure to meet its hearing and decision deadlines.

B.K. v. Department of Children & Families · filed 2011-07-13(7)

The father also argues that DCF’s failure to conduct a hearing or issue its decision within the time standards contained in 110 Code of Mass. Regs. §§ 10.10 and 10.29 (1998) resulted in substantial prejudice. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7); Fisch v. Board of Registration in Med., 437 Mass. 128, 133-134 (2002). Although DCF failed in this instance to follow its own time standards, no showing of prejudice to the father has been made.

Section 14(7) requires a showing of prejudice to substantial rights before a court may set aside or modify an agency decision because of delay.

Decoulos v. Board of Registration of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup Professionals. · filed 2024-11-13(7)

Despite this significant delay, we may set aside or modify the board's decision only if "the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced" as a result.

Judicial review under § 14 requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies, including review by CRAB of a magistrate’s decision.

Daniels v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1994-10-06

Instead of filing a written objection to the magistrate’s decision which would have triggered a review by CRAB, the plaintiff filed in the Superior Court this action for review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14. ... The motion was correctly allowed. ... There is no statutory directive which takes this case out of the rule that administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts.

Section 14(7) permits a court reviewing an agency decision to affirm it on an alternative legal basis.

Tsegaye v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 1994-11-08(7)

However, I find that the Board’s decision should be affirmed on an alternative basis. M.G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

On judicial review under § 14, a court may sustain a correct agency decision on any sound basis, even if the agency did not discuss that basis.

Hickey v. Commissioner of Public Welfare · filed 1995-03-16

We think the principle of appellate review, that a correct decision may be sustained on appeal on any sound basis, ... is equally applicable to review of administrative agency action by a judge of the Superior Court.

Section 14 allows a reviewing court to affirm an agency’s disposition on different grounds even when the agency’s decision rests on an error of law.

Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2013-09-16

Under this standard, when an agency’s decision is based on an error of law, a reviewing court may choose to leave in place the overall disposition of a case, but on different grounds than those relied upon by the agency.

Section 14 places the burden on a party appealing an agency decision to show that the decision is invalid.

American Microtel, Inc. v. Secretary of State · filed 1995-01-27

Judicial review of a decision of an administrative agency is governed by G.L.c. 30A, §14. The parly appealing an administrative decision bears the burden of demonstrating the decision’s invalidity.

A party seeking judicial review under § 14 bears the burden of showing that the agency decision is invalid.

Fitzgerald v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1995-03-01

The party appealing an administrative decision bears the burden of demonstrating the decision’s invalidity.

Section 14(7) requires a party seeking judicial review to show that the agency decision is invalid under its listed grounds.

Tesson v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare · filed 1995-04-14(7)(a)-(g)

Having reviewed the administrative record in this case, this Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of showing the decision’s invalidity under G.L.c. 30A, §14(7) (a)-(g).

A party seeking judicial review under § 14 bears the burden of showing that the agency decision is invalid.

Hayes v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1995-11-01

The party appealing the administrative decision bears the burden of demonstrating the decision’s invalidity.

Section 14 governs judicial review of Civil Service Commission decisions, and the appealing party bears the burden of showing the decision is invalid.

Boston Police Department v. Campbell · filed 1997-07-23

The court’s review of the Commission’s decision is governed by G.L.c. 30A, §14. G.L.c. 31, §44. As the party appealing an administrative decision, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the decision’s invalidity.

Section 14 places the burden of establishing an agency decision’s invalidity on the party appealing it to Superior Court.

Lingley v. Executive Office of Environmental Affairs · filed 2001-02-14

A party appealing an administrative decision under G.L.c. 30A, §14 to the Superior Court has the burden of establishing invalidity on appeal.

Section 14(7) requires a party challenging an agency decision to show both a violation of a listed standard of review and prejudice to substantial rights.

Breneman v. Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission · filed 2004-03-15(7)

The plaintiffs must not only show that MAC violated one or more of the standards of review listed in G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), but also that their substantial rights have been prejudiced by the agency’s action.

Section 14 places the burden on a party appealing an agency decision to show that the decision is invalid.

King v. Board of Appeals of Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 2011-08-25

The party appealing an administrative decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the decision is invalid. ... The factors in the plaintiffs favor do not demonstrate that she has satisfied her burden in this appeal.

A party challenging an agency decision under § 14 bears the burden of proving that the decision is invalid.

Burke v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Polices and Bonds · filed 2016-09-12

As the party challenging an agency decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, Burke has the burden of proof to demonstrate the invalidity of the administrative determination.

Section 14(7) requires a person challenging an agency classification decision to show an enumerated ground before a court may vacate it.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2019-02-06(7)

Before we may vacate a classification decision, Doe must carry his "burden of showing that one of [the enumerated] conditions [set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7),] has been met." Id.

Section 14(7) places the burden on a party challenging an agency’s final order to show a ground for setting it aside, such as legal error, lack of substantial evidence, or an abuse of discretion.

Armstrong v. Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth Securities Division · filed 2022-05-16(7)

Mr. Armstrong has the burden of proving that the Division’s final order is invalid because it violates some constitutional provision, exceeds the Division’s authority, or is based on an error of law, not supported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or is otherwise unlawful. See generally Duggan v. Board of Reg. in Nursing, 456 Mass. 666, 673 (2010) (applying G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7)). The Court concludes that Armstrong has not met that burden.

Section 14 review does not permit a party to introduce an issue it failed to raise before the administrative agency.

City of Boston v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1995-09-13

A party may not, in the course of a c. 30A review, introduce an issue not raised before the administrative agency.

Section 14 generally limits judicial review to issues raised before the agency, but a subject matter jurisdiction objection may be raised at any time.

Westinghouse Electric Supply Corp. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1999-03-05

Normally, in an appeal under G.L.c. 30A, §14, a court will not consider issues that have not been raised before the Commission. ... ERISA preemption, however, concerns subject matter jurisdiction, a defense that may be raised at any time.

Section 14(7) permits a court to overturn agency action beyond the agency’s authority or jurisdiction upon consideration of the entire record; a party must raise such a challenge before the agency to create a record for review.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3974 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2010-06-04(7)

This is reflected in the terms of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), which permits the Superior Court to overturn an agency action made “[i]n excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency,” but only “upon consideration of the entire record.” Thus, when a party neglects to raise an issue during agency proceedings, the reviewing court lacks a record on which to evaluate questions of statutory authority or jurisdiction.

Section 14(2) requires service of a judicial review complaint on each party to the agency proceeding; a failure to give notice can be cured if the party later participates without prejudice.

Gordon v. State Building Code Appeals Board · filed 2007-08-30(2)

Notice of the plaintiffs’ complaint for judicial review should have been given to Stavis as an interested party. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(2), inserted by St. 1976, c. 411, § 2 (“Service shall be made upon the agency and each party to the agency proceeding”). However, the defect was cured by virtue of the fact that the Superior Court judgment that entered without Stavis’s knowledge was vacated; Stavis was granted leave to intervene; and she participated fully in the proceeding thereafter. There was no prejudice.

Section 14(7) permits a court to uphold an agency decision despite an invalid ground when the agency clearly would have reached the same result on valid grounds.

Bickford v. Colonel, Department of State Police · filed 2010-01-29(7)

When an agency decision rests on both a legitimate and an illegitimate basis, a court can nevertheless uphold the decision if it is clear that, after excising the illegitimate basis, the agency would have made the same decision.

Section 14(7) requires a showing that agency conduct prejudiced a party’s substantial rights before it can justify relief from a final order.

Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 2011-12-06(7)

Moreover, Kellogg has not shown that the board’s conduct in issuing its temporary suspension order prejudiced his “substantial rights” with regard to the order before us, that is, the final suspension of his medical license. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency error to determine whether the error may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Police Department of Boston v. Kavaleski · filed 2012-11-06(7)

Although we conclude that the commission erred by considering testimony from Roberts without notice to the parties and an opportunity to respond, that does not end our inquiry. Pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), we also determine whether, as a result of that error, “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced.”

Section 14(7) requires a showing of possible prejudice to substantial rights to obtain relief for a claimed notice defect.

P.D. v. Department of Developmental Services · filed 2014-02-18(7)

Even if the content of DOS’s forty-five day notice failed to comply with G. L. c. 123B, § 3, and 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 6.63(2)(c) (2009), the guardians have not demonstrated possible prejudice to their substantial rights.

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision for error only when the error prejudices the plaintiff's substantial rights.

Rothstein v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd. · filed 2018-05-04(7)

Even where CRAB has erred, we will not set aside its decision unless the error has prejudiced the plaintiff's substantial rights. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

A party seeking to set aside an agency decision because of an error must show substantial prejudice.

Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n · filed 2019-02-28(7)

But a party seeking to set aside an agency decision must also establish that it was "substantially prejudiced" by such an error, and Craft has not met that burden.

Section 14(7) permits a new hearing when errors in an agency decision may have prejudiced a person's substantial rights.

Doe, SORB No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2019-12-20(7)

Because Hanson's testimony bore directly on the hearing examiner's decision to give full aggravating weight to the risk factor of repetitive and compulsive behavior, Doe's "substantial rights . . . may have been prejudiced" on that basis as well.

Section 14(7) permits relief for an agency error that prejudices substantial rights, including a notice failure that prevents affected owners from participating meaningfully.

Commercial Wharf East Condominium Ass'n v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2020-07-31(7)

The department suggests that, even if Boston Boat's failure to give notice of its RDA to unit owners within the condominium was deficient, CWECA and the unit owners have failed to demonstrate any prejudice to their substantial rights entitling them to relief. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7); Chiuccariello v. Building Comm'r of Boston, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 482, 486 (1990). ... However, the presiding officer denied CWECA's request to require that the department identify units alleged to have changed in use. Accordingly, individual unit owners were unable to determine whether their particular rights in their unit would be affected by the proceeding.

Section 14(7) requires remand of a sex offender classification when an erroneously applied regulatory factor may have affected the classification.

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 22188 v. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD. · filed 2022-10-04(7)

On balance, we conclude that the proper standard of review when an offender successfully challenges the application of a regulatory factor is to ask whether the error may have affected the classification and, if so, to remand to SORB. This best comports with our statutory mandate to determine whether "the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 requires an appellant to show that the agency’s actions may have prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights.

D.F. v. Department of Developmental Services · filed 2023-04-27

In the context of this G. L. c. 30A, § 14, appeal, D.F. was "required to show that [his] substantial rights may have been prejudiced" by the department's actions.

Section 14 does not require reversal for an error in an agency's grievance procedure when the plaintiff has not shown entitlement to relief through that procedure.

WATSON v. CAROL MICI & Others. · filed 2024-06-05

The error does not require reversal, however, for the reason raised by the judge. The plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that he is legally entitled to relief for negligently lost property through the grievance procedure.

Section 14 calls for remand when an error in applying a regulatory factor may have affected an agency classification and prejudiced a party's substantial rights.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 526715 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-06-05

The proper standard of review when an offender successfully challenges the application of a regulatory factor "is to ask whether the error may have affected the classification and, if so, to remand to [the board]. This best comports with our statutory mandate to determine whether 'the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced' (emphasis added)." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 797, 804 (2022) (Doe No. 22188), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) requires a party challenging an agency decision to show that the decision prejudiced its substantial rights.

The PORT RESTAURANT AND BAR, INC. v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION & Others. · filed 2025-07-31(7)

Moreover, "[o]ur review of the commission's decision is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), which requires us to determine whether a party's substantial rights were prejudiced."

A constitutional claim omitted from a § 14 judicial-review complaint and litigated in a separate § 1983 action is properly resolved in the separate action.

Bulldog Investors General Partnership v. Secretary of the Commonwealth · filed 2010-07-02

The plaintiffs did not raise the First Amendment issue in their complaint for judicial review in the instant case, brought pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. They did plead the issue and litigate it in the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. In these unusual circumstances, the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is the proper forum for resolving the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.

Section 14(1) requires judicial review of decisions by the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Reviewing Board to begin in a Massachusetts superior court.

Sills v. Rex Lumber Company · filed 2021-06-30(1)

The Massachusetts Industrial Accident Reviewing Board is the agency charged with administering the state’s workers’ compensation law, and judicial review of its decisions may only be commenced in a Massachusetts superior court.

For appeals from Commonwealth Employment Relations Board decisions under chapter 150E, section 14 governs the standard of review but does not govern where to file a notice of appeal.

Secretary of Administration & Finance v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board · filed 2012-01-03

Subsequent to the 1981 amendment, the appeals pursuant to § 11 were only governed by § 14 “insofar as applicable.” ... In sum, we conclude that in specifying the Appeals Court as the proper forum for § 11 review, the Legislature intended to leave procedural details, such as filing requirements, to the existing Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Section 14 permits a court reviewing a final agency decision to consider a legal challenge to the validity of an agency regulation.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2012-07-16

Despite the preference for presenting a challenge to a regulation in a declaratory action, we consider the issue raised in this appeal from a final order of classification.

Section 14 does not provide a way to challenge the validity of governing statutes or regulations; those challenges require a declaratory judgment claim.

J.W., Sex Offender Registry Board No. 25324 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-05-04

To the extent that J.W. seeks to invalidate any of the governing statutes or board regulations, such claims cannot be resolved in this case brought solely under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, but must be raised through a claim for declaratory judgment.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the administrative record, so a challenge to a general regulation's validity must be brought in an original declaratory judgment action.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 97000 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2026-05-15(5)

Any argument that the regulations are invalid for failure to account for "emerging adults" must be brought as an original action for declaratory judgment.

Section 14 does not provide for interest when a court reverses an agency decision denying payment of money.

Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Board · filed 2013-07-15(7)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14, which provides for judicial review of the final decisions of agencies in adjudicatory proceedings, is silent as to the question of interest where an agency decision denying the payment of money is reversed.

Section 14(7) does not permit a court to compel an agency to take a discretionary action through mandamus.

Back Beach Neighbors Committee v. Department of Transportation. · filed 2025-12-15(7)

The BBNC argues that its complaint also stated a claim for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), by seeking an order compelling MassDOT to block vehicular access between Beach Street and Granite Street. We agree with the judge that, assuming that MassDOT has authority over Granite Street, an order compelling it to take the discretionary action of blocking that intersection would be an inappropriate exercise of mandamus power.

Section 14(7) does not authorize monetary damages or fees and costs against the Commonwealth on judicial review of an agency decision.

Kao v. Superintendent · filed 2017-12-15(7)

Conspicuously absent from this statutory grant is authority to award monetary damages or fees and costs against the Commonwealth; absent express statutory authority such remedies are unavailable.

Section 14 does not allow injunctive relief in judicial review of an agency decision.

ROWE v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & Another. · filed 2023-11-06

As the judge recognized at the hearing on Rowe's motion for a preliminary injunction, G. L. c. 30A, § 14, does not allow for injunctive relief, and we are reluctant to read that remedy into the statute.

Under § 14(7), an appellate court reviews the same agency record as the Superior Court and gives the Superior Court's view no special weight.

Doe, SORB No. 524553 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2020-09-29(7)

Also, an appellate court reviewing a Superior Court's ruling under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), "is conducting an analysis of the same agency record, and there is no reason why the view of the Superior Court should be given any special weight. Both in the Superior Court and in [the appellate] court the scope of review is defined by . . . § 14" (citation omitted).

Under § 14(7), an appellate court independently reviews the agency record to decide whether the agency decision meets the statute’s standards.

M.N.D. & Another v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES. · filed 2025-05-23(7)

Therefore, the question before us is not whether the judge's characterizations of DCF's record and legal conclusions were incorrect, as the mothers' brief suggests, but instead whether, on our own review of the record, the hearing officer's decision meets the standards of § 14 (7).