30A Mass. Gen. Laws § 14

Section 14(7) sets the standards for judicial review of agency decisions.

Cape Cod Collaborative v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance · filed 2017-05-04(7)

Our review of the board's decision is governed by the standards set out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a court to uphold an agency decision unless a ground for reversal, such as legal error, lack of substantial evidence, or abuse of discretion, is present.

Energy Express, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 2017-08-03(7)

Accordingly, we uphold the department's decision "unless it is based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, unwarranted by facts found on the record as submitted, arbitrary [or] capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Bay State Gas Co., supra at 814, quoting DSCI Corp. supra, and citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to determine whether an agency decision is factually warranted and not arbitrary or capricious.

In re Karen J. Connors's Case · filed 2017-09-05(7)

"We review a board's decision regarding workers' compensation benefits under the usual standard for appeal from a final decision of an administrative agency set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)." ... The administrative judge's decision that Connors is permanently and totally disabled is amply supported by the evidence and one that "reasonable persons might support" and thus not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Chase v. Commonwealth Emp't Relations Bd. · filed 2017-09-25(7)

In so doing, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency." G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14 limits appellate review of an agency decision to whether it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious, or rests on a legal error.

Worcester Regional Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2017-11-29

The standard of review of a CRAB decision in these circumstances is well established. "Appellate review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is limited to determining whether the agency's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise based on an error of law."

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse or modify an agency decision for legal error or for action that is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

In re Cheryl Briere's Case · filed 2017-12-13(7)

"We may reverse or modify the board's decision where, among other reasons, it is based on an error of law, or is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law." ... The board's interpretation of G. L. c. 152, § 1(7A), was reasonable, and when affording the board its due deference, we discern no error in its application of the law to the facts of this case.

Section 14(7) requires judicial review of an agency decision for appropriate legal principles and substantial evidence, with deference to the agency's factual findings.

Berard v. Dep't of Unemployment Assistance & Another · filed 2018-03-27(7)

Our review of the board's decision is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7). ... To be valid, the board's decision must be supported by substantial evidence. ... We discern no grounds for disturbing the board's decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) directs courts reviewing agency decisions to consider whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law.

In re Anahid Yapoudjian's Case · filed 2018-04-17(7)

We thus are unable to say, on this record, that the administrative judge's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision if it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, abuses discretion, or is contrary to law.

Lawless v. Dep't of Unempoyment Assistance & Another · filed 2018-04-18(7)

"The agency's decision may only be set aside if the court determines that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law."

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Ives Camargo's Case. · filed 2018-05-10(7)

When reviewing decisions made by the reviewing board, we are to give "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge" of the agency. McDonough's Case, 448 Mass. 79, 81 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse or modify a final agency decision for legal error or arbitrary or capricious action.

In re George Rivera's Case · filed 2018-05-21(7)

We may reverse or modify this decision only if "it is based on an error of law, or is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law."... See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(c), (g). For the following reasons, we see no error of law and nothing arbitrary or capricious in the board's decision.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision only if the court determines that the decision was unlawful.

Hadge v. Bd. of Registration of Real Estate Appraisers · filed 2018-07-16(7)

Our review of the board's disciplinary decision is circumscribed by statute and case law. We may not set aside an agency decision unless we determine that the board's decision was unlawful. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(a )-(g ).

Section 14(7) permits a reviewing board’s decision to be set aside only if it is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or erroneous as a matter of law.

In re Steven E. Lombardo's Case · filed 2018-07-18(7)

"The [reviewing] board's decision may be set aside only if it is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or erroneous as a matter of law." Bolduc's Case, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 583, 585 (2013), citing G. L. c. 152, § 12 ; G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) provides grounds for relief from an agency decision, including excess of authority, legal error, lack of substantial evidence, and arbitrary or capricious action.

Magazu v. Department of Children and Families · filed 2016-01-04(7)

As such, the department's decision to deny the Magazus' application to become foster parents did not exceed the department's authority, is not arbitrary or capricious, and is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Magazus are not entitled to relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (b), (c), (e), or (g).

Section 14(7) requires a party appealing an agency decision to show that the decision prejudiced substantial rights on a specified ground for relief.

Alicea v. Atkins · filed 2018-06-25(7)

To obtain relief under that statute, the party appealing an agency decision must show that his "substantial rights" have been prejudiced because the decision is in violation of constitutional provisions, legally erroneous, made on unlawful procedure, unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion. G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3. The plaintiff failed to meet this burden.

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse or modify an agency decision for legal error or arbitrary or capricious action.

Wilson's Case · filed 2016-05-16(7)(c),(g)

We may reverse or modify the board's decision where it is based on an error of law, or is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

Section 14(7) limits when a court may set aside or modify a workers' compensation reviewing board decision, including for legal error or arbitrary or capricious action.

In re Gregory B. Jones's Case · filed 2018-05-24(7)

We review a reviewing board's decision in accordance with the standards expressed in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(a )-(d ), (f ), and (g ), as amended by St. 1991, c. 398, § 32A, which provides that a reviewing board's decision may only be set aside or modified if the decision is: ... The administrative law judge's decision, and therefore the board's affirmance, rested upon sufficient evidence, valid findings, and was free of any arbitrariness or capriciousness.

On judicial review under § 14(7)(c) and (e), an agency decision may be reversed for an error of law or lack of substantial evidence.

Retirement Board of Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2016-12-22(7)(c), (e)

"We . . . will reverse only if [CRAB's] decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of law or is unsupported by substantial evidence." Foresta v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 453 Mass. 669, 676 (2009). See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c), (e).

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision when legal error, insufficient evidence, or another violation of law may have prejudiced a party's substantial rights.

Spencer v. Civil Service Commission · filed 2018-03-27(7)

We may set aside the commission's decision only if "'the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced' [because the commission decision] is based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." Police Dep't of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 689 (2012) (Kavaleski), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) allows a reviewing court to set aside or modify an agency decision that exceeds the agency’s authority, violates constitutional provisions, rests on an error of law, or lacks substantial evidence.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2019-02-05(7)

A reviewing court may set aside or modify SORB's classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (listing these and other reasons for vacating decision of agency).

Section 14(7) permits a reviewing court to modify or set aside an agency decision only on the specified grounds, including lack of substantial evidence.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2019-02-28(7)

A reviewing court may modify or set aside an agency's decision only if it was "(a ) [i]n violation of constitutional provisions; or (b ) [i]n excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (c ) [b]ased upon an error of law; or (d ) [m]ade upon unlawful procedure; or (e ) [u]nsupported by substantial evidence; or (f ) [u]nwarranted by facts found by the court on the record ...; or (g ) [a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2018-09-27(7)

"In conducting our review, we 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge' of the board."

On judicial review, a court gives due weight to a hearing examiner's expertise when reviewing how the examiner applied and weighed statutory and regulatory factors.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2018-12-05(7)

The extent to which the plaintiff poses a risk of reoffending is certainly a closer question, but the plaintiff has not shown that in addressing that question, the hearing examiner misapplied the mandatory factors. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549, 470 Mass. at 109-110, quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) ("A hearing examiner has discretion ... to consider which statutory and regulatory factors are applicable and how much weight to ascribe to each factor ... [and] a reviewing court is required to 'give due weight to [the examiner's] experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge' ").

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2018-12-18(7)

"In conducting our review, we 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge' of the board." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 615 (2010), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to a hearing examiner’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge when reviewing the examiner’s assessment of applicable factors.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2019-01-29(7)

The extent to which the plaintiff poses a risk of reoffending is subject to some reasonable debate, but the plaintiff has not shown that in addressing that question, the hearing examiner misapplied the applicable mandatory factors. ... See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549, 470 Mass. at 109-110, quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) ("A hearing examiner has discretion ... to consider which statutory and regulatory factors are applicable and how much weight to ascribe to each factor ... [and] a reviewing court is required to 'give due weight to [the examiner's] experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge' ").

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse or modify a reviewing board decision for legal error or arbitrary or capricious action.

Xudong Yang's Case · filed 2019-08-13(7)

We review decisions of the reviewing board in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), and "may reverse or modify the board's decision where it is based on an error of law, or is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing a sex offender classification to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2019-09-13(7)

In reviewing a SORB classification, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency's experience, expertise, and discretionary authority.

Board of Higher Education v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board · filed 2019-10-07

We "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 directs a court reviewing an agency summary decision to determine whether the record warrants the decision and whether it rests on an error of law.

Martignetti Grocery Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 2019-12-17

Like the Superior Court, we ... review the commission's decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, to determine whether the decision is warranted by the summary decision record and not based on any error of law.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to uphold an agency decision unless it rests on an error of law or is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Jacobs v. Massachusetts Division of Medical Assistance · filed 2020-04-10(7)

An appellate court reviewing the judgment of a Superior Court judge that affirms the conclusion of an administrative agency will uphold the administrative conclusion unless, among other grounds, it is "[b]ased upon an error of law," G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c), or "[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g).

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse or modify an agency decision for legal error or arbitrary action; the court reviews legal questions involving statutes the agency does not administer without deference.

Wright's Case · filed 2020-10-27(7)

We examine the reviewing board's decision pursuant to the standards of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... In the instant case, we conclude that the determinative legal questions involve interpretation of the Commonwealth's medical marijuana law and other Massachusetts and Federal laws not administered by the department. We therefore exercise de novo review without deference to the reviewing board's legal interpretation.

Section 14(7) requires courts to give due weight to an agency's expertise when reviewing its decisions, while reviewing statutory interpretation de novo.

Mendes's Case · filed 2020-10-29(7)

See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (in reviewing board decisions, we give "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency"). ... We review the board's interpretation of the act on a de novo basis.

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to give due weight to agency expertise and discretion and to uphold decisions supported by substantial evidence and consistent with law.

Brookline v. Alston · filed 2021-04-27(7)

Importantly, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support this decision; it is also a correct statement of the law.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to determine whether an agency decision prejudiced a party's substantial rights through constitutional error, legal error, unlawful procedure, or lack of substantial evidence.

SLIVE & HANNA, INC. v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another. · filed 2021-10-19(7)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14 (7), "requires us to determine whether a party's substantial rights were prejudiced because the decision was in violation of constitutional provisions, based on an error of law or unlawful procedure, or unsupported by substantial evidence."

Section 14(7)(g) permits a court to set aside an agency decision that is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law.

CITY OF NEWTON v. COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD & another. · filed 2021-12-30(7)(g)

Although we "accord deference to the [board's] specialized knowledge and expertise, and to its interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions," Worcester v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 438 Mass. 177, 180 (2002), we will nevertheless set aside a decision if it is "[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 568 (2015), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision on specified grounds, including that it is arbitrary or capricious.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2018-11-19(7)

On this record, the examiner's decision not to adopt Dr. Plaud's opinion was not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 14(7) allows a reviewing court to set aside or modify an agency decision that exceeds statutory authority, violates constitutional provisions, rests on an error of law, or lacks substantial evidence.

Doe, SORB No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2019-07-17(7)

A reviewing court may set aside or modify SORB's classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (listing these and other reasons for vacating decision of agency).

Section 14(7)(g) permits a court to set aside an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious when the agency departs from its established practice without adequate explanation.

Town of Milton Zoning Board of Appeals v. the Massachusetts Housing Appeals Committee · filed 2021-07-30(7)(g)

In reviewing HAC's decision under G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(g), the court may set aside or modify the decision if "arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." ... HAC's striking of Conditions 18 and 19 was arbitrary and capricious.

Section 14(5) and (7) limit review to the agency record and restrict the grounds for overturning an agency decision, but those limits do not bind Superior Court review of local election decisions under G. L. c. 56, § 59.

DOMINIK LAY v. CITY OF LOWELL & another. · filed 2022-04-28(5), (7)

Most significantly, the Superior Court is not bound by "those provisions limiting the court to consideration of the record before the administrative agency, G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (5), and the limitations as to grounds for overturning an agency decision, G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7)." McCarthy, supra.

Section 14(7) permits a court to overturn an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious.

John Doe No. 21638 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2022-05-16(7)

That final classification Decision cannot stand, because it suffers at least two of the infirmities mentioned in Doe No. 68549 and G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7). The record before the Hearing Examiner lacked substantial evidence to support the Level 1 classification, and, based on the record as a whole, the Decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Section 14(7) requires a court to uphold an agency decision unless a specified ground for reversal is established.

CROSSING OVER, INC. & Others v. CITY OF FITCHBURG & Others · filed 2019-02-25(7)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14(7), requires that the court "uphold an agency's decision unless it is based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, unwarranted by facts found on the record as submitted, arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse or amend an agency decision for legal error, arbitrary or capricious action, or lack of substantial evidence.

LYDON v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another. · filed 2022-07-08(7)

"We will reverse or amend CRAB's decision only if it is arbitrary or capricious, based upon an error of law or unlawful procedure, unwarranted by the facts found by the agency or the Superior Court, or unsupported by substantial evidence." Id. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a court to uphold an agency decision unless it has a listed legal or evidentiary defect or is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

DAMIAN ANKETELL & another v. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS REGULATION. · filed 2022-09-09(7)

"Under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), [w]e shall uphold an agency's decision unless it is based on an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, unwarranted by facts found on the record as submitted, arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law" (quotation and citation omitted).

Section 14(7) does not permit a court reviewing a SORB classification to substitute its judgment for the examiner's merely because a different conclusion is possible.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 523378 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-03-29(7)

Our review does not turn on whether, faced with the same set of facts, we would have drawn the same conclusion as an examiner, but only whether a contrary conclusion is not merely a possible but a necessary inference.

Section 14(7) requires a court to uphold an agency decision unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law.

LEWANDOWSKI v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & Another. · filed 2023-06-01(7)

Accordingly, the decision "will be upheld unless it is 'unsupported by substantial evidence[,] . . . arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.'"

Section 14 (7) requires deference to an agency’s expertise and permits a court to set aside its decision if it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, abuses discretion, or is contrary to law.

SINAPAH v. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (And a Consolidated Case). · filed 2023-06-21(7)

Our review of the board's decision is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). See G. L. c. 151A, § 42. We accord deference to the expertise of the agency and will set aside DUA's decision only if it is "unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law."

Section 14(7) directs a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency's expertise and discretionary authority.

John Voe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 6615 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-08-02(7)

While we review the board's decision de novo, Brown-Forman Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 498, 504 (2006), we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006) (Doe No. 10216), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to accept factual findings supported by substantial evidence and to check for errors of law.

Tufts Medical Center v. Dalexis · filed 2023-09-21(7)

In our review of the commission's decision, we accept the hearing officer's conclusions and factual findings (and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom) as long as they are supported by substantial evidence and are free from error of law.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency's expertise and discretion.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 1483 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-10-11(7)

While we review a judge's consideration of an agency decision de novo, Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 89 (2019) (Doe No. 523391), we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (Doe No. 10216).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or modify an agency decision for legal error, action beyond the agency’s authority, or lack of substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527440 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-10-20(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify SORB's classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." ... The hearing examiner's findings were supported by the evidence and reflected the examiner's qualitative assessment of the relevant regulatory factors; the "examiner did not merely list these factors," but instead "provided a detailed account of the evidence she considered and an explanation of the relative weight that she assigned each factor."

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 17938 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-11-02(7)

The reviewing court shall "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it."

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 253929 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-12-14(7)

In making this determination, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing a SORB classification to give weight to the board’s expertise and permits the court to set aside a decision for legal error, lack of substantial evidence, or abuse of discretion.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 5976 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-01-05(7)

In sum, the decision to classify the plaintiff as a level three sex offender did not exceed SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, was not based on an error of law, was supported by substantial evidence, and was not an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing an agency decision to consider whether it was arbitrary or capricious or rested on an error of law.

COFFEESHOP, LLC v. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION & Another. · filed 2024-03-04(7)

Accordingly, our "review of the ABCC's decision is limited to determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious or whether the ABCC made an error of law." RK&E Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 340 (2020). See Craft Beer Guild, LLC, 481 Mass. at 511-512. See also G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 524499 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-03-29(7)

The reviewing court shall "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it."

Section 14(7)(c) calls for review of an agency decision with deference to the hearing officer’s role as fact finder.

International Longshoremen Association, Local 1413-1465 v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2024-04-03(7)(c)

On appeal, we review the commission's decision in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c), giving deference to the hearing officer's role as fact finder.

On judicial review, courts give due weight to a hearing examiner's expertise and discretion in weighing classification factors.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7616 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-05-14(7)

"A hearing examiner has discretion . . . to consider which statutory and regulatory factors are applicable and how much weight to ascribe to each factor, and . . . a reviewing court is required to 'give due weight to [the examiner's] experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109–110 (2014), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). We discern no abuse of that discretion.

Section 14 provides narrow judicial review of CRAB decisions.

MOYNIHAN v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & Another. · filed 2024-05-28

"It is well established that judicial review of a CRAB decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is narrow."

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 34413 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-06-10(7)

In reviewing the board's decision, we must "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006) (Doe No. 10216).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

COMMONWEALTH v. COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD & another. · filed 2022-09-02(7)

We review CERB's decision in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and G. L. c. 150E, § 11. ... Substantial evidence supports CERB's determination that MassHealth instituted a new practice by surreptitiously monitoring BERS A/B telephone calls with the public.

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside or modify a SORB classification decision for excess of authority, legal error, lack of substantial evidence, or arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 526500 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-09-28(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify [SORB]'s classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of [SORB]'s statutory authority or jurisdiction, is based on an error of law, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion."

Section 14(7) directs courts reviewing agency decisions to consider whether they lack substantial evidence, are arbitrary or capricious, abuse discretion, or conflict with law.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527204 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-10-18(7)

In conducting a de novo review of the judge's consideration of the classification decision, Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 88-89 (2019), we ask whether the classification is "unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law [quotation omitted]." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356011 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 76 (2015) (Doe No. 356011). See G. L. c. 6, § 178M; G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside or modify a SORB classification decision for excess of authority, a constitutional violation, legal error, or lack of substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 1712 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2023-03-24(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify SORB's classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019) (Doe No. 496501), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside a SORB classification decision for legal error, including a hearing examiner’s failure to adequately explain the rejection of expert evidence.

J. Moe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3548 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-06-14(7)

The hearing examiner's failure to offer an adequate explanation for rejecting the plaintiff's expert opinion and scholarly studies was legal error requiring that the classification decision be set aside.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority when evaluating its decision.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 523735 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-08-23(7)

When evaluating the decision by the board, the court will "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing SORB classification decisions to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 10390 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-09-17(7)

When reviewing a classification decision by SORB, we "must determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence."

Section 14(7) requires an agency decision to stand on judicial review unless it lacks substantial evidence or is based on an error of law.

STEPHEN O'MALLEY & Another v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & Another · filed 2024-10-07(7)

On appeal, CRAB's decision must stand unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an error of law. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7); Murphy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 333, 344 (2012).

Section 14 limits judicial review of an agency decision to whether it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious, or rests on an error of law.

HARLY B. SAVAGE v. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES AND BONDS & Another. · filed 2024-11-25

"Our review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, 'is limited to determining whether the agency's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise based on an error of law.'"

Section 14(7) limits when a court may disturb an agency decision, including for an error of law or lack of substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 95420 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-12-27(7)

On appeal, our review is narrow: We will not disturb the board's classification decision unless "the decision is in excess of [the board's] statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe No. 496501, supra at 649, citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3134 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-01-02(7)

In making this determination, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 524112 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-02-12(7)

In reviewing SORB's decisions, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or modify a board classification that exceeds the board's authority, violates constitutional provisions, rests on legal error, or lacks substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 61214 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-02-20(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify [the board's] classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of [the board's] statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." ... As such, the hearing examiner's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) allows a court to overturn an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.

FAHEY v. DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & Another. · filed 2025-04-15(7)

An administrative agency's decision may only be overturned if it is "unsupported by substantial evidence," or the decision is "arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Commonwealth v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 616, 622 (2022), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.

ESSEX NORTH SHORE AGRICULTURAL AND TECHNICAL SCHOOL DISTRICT v. COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD & Another. · filed 2025-05-02(7)

We review CERB's decision in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). "A final administrative agency decision will be set aside if, among other grounds, it is [u]nsupported by substantial evidence, or [a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" (quotations and citations omitted).

Section 14(7) gives due weight to an agency’s expertise and places a heavy burden on a party challenging its decision.

Roman v. Board of Registration in Veterinary Medicine · filed 2025-05-06(7)

As the party challenging the board's decision, Roman "bears 'a heavy burden,' for we 'give due weight to the [board's] expertise, as required by § 14 (7)." Welter, supra at 724, quoting Massachusetts Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 263-264 (2001). Roman has not carried her heavy burden.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 21986 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-05-12(7)

We "give due weight to [SORB's] experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge . . . as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109 (2014) (Doe No. 68549), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

MOUCHARITE v. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & Another. · filed 2025-05-16(7)

Our review of the board's decision is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... "In reviewing an agency's decision, the court 'shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.'"

Section 14(7) requires a party challenging an agency decision to show that it lacked substantial evidence, was arbitrary or capricious, or was based on an error of law.

BOTELHO v. DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF MARINE FISHERIES & Another. · filed 2025-06-02(7)

To successfully challenge the division's decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), the plaintiff must establish that "it was not supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary or capricious, or was otherwise based on an error of law."

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing a housing appeals committee decision to assess whether it is supported by substantial evidence and is arbitrary or capricious.

ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF BRAINTREE v. 383 WASHINGTON STREET, LLC, & Others (And a Consolidated Case) · filed 2025-06-18(7)

We review the HAC's determination for whether it was supported by substantial evidence, and not arbitrary or capricious. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7); G. L. c. 40B, § 22; Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Milton v. HD/MW Randolph Ave., LLC, 490 Mass. 257, 262 (2022). The HAC's decision here was well supported.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 526680 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-06-25(7)

The reviewing court shall "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006) (Doe No. 10216), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7)(c) permits a reviewing court to reverse or modify an agency decision based on an error of law; questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.

Arrowood Indemnity Company v. Workers' Compensation trust fund · filed 2025-07-01(7)(c)

Among other specified grounds, a reviewing court may reverse or modify the board's decision if it is "[b]ased upon an error of law." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c). The board's interpretation of G. L. c. 152, §§ 37 and 65 (2), presents a question of law and is therefore reviewed de novo.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 176782 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-07-02(7)

In reviewing the board's decision, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 (7) requires deferential review of DEP permitting decisions, with due weight given to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

MICHAEL D'ACCI & Others v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION & Others. · filed 2025-08-07(7)

Our review of the DEP's permitting decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), is highly deferential and requires us to accord "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it" (citation omitted).

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing a Civil Service Commission decision to assess whether it violates the statutory standards of review, including whether substantial evidence supports it.

GRENIER v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & Another. · filed 2024-10-11(7)

"Pursuant to G. L. c. 31, § 44, we review the commission's decision to determine if it violates any of the standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), and cases construing those standards" (quotation and citation omitted). ... Fourth, Grenier contends that the commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. ... As discussed, this determination is fully supported by the record before us.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful.

Martinez v. Parking Clerk of Boston. · filed 2024-12-31(7)

According to those standards, "a final administrative agency decision will be set aside if, among other grounds, it is '[u]nsupported by substantial evidence,' G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e), or '[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g)."

Section 14(7) permits a court to alter an agency decision on specified grounds, including legal error, lack of substantial evidence, and abuse of discretion.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 366266 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-01-31(7)

When reviewing the board's decision, we will not alter the decision unless it was "(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; (b) in excess of [the board's] authority; (c) based upon an error of law; (d) made upon unlawful procedure; (e) unsupported by substantial evidence; (f) unwarranted by facts found by the court, where the court is constitutionally required to make independent findings of fact; or (g) arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 108-109 (2014) (Doe No. 68549), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) allows an agency classification to stand when it is supported by substantial evidence and is neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527087 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-05-23(7)

The hearing examiner's conclusions that, by clear and convincing evidence, Doe posed a moderate risk of reoffence, a moderate degree of dangerousness, and that a public safety interest was served by public Internet access to Doe's registry information was not arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7)(c) permits a court to reverse or modify an agency decision based on an error of law.

Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund · filed 2025-07-01(7)(c)

If the board's decision is "[b]ased upon an error of law," we may reverse or modify it pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c).

Section 14(7) allows a court to review an agency decision for arbitrary or capricious action or legal error.

KATHERINE DANT & Another v. MOBILE HOME RENT CONTROL BOARD OF CHICOPEE & Another · filed 2025-08-15(7)

Our review is for whether the board acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or committed other error of law.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or modify an agency decision that exceeds the agency’s authority, violates constitutional provisions, rests on legal error, or lacks substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528140 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-08-19(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify [the board's] classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of [the board's] statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019) (Doe No. 496501), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) directs courts reviewing an agency decision to consider whether it rests on an error of law, lacks substantial evidence, or is arbitrary or capricious.

MURPHY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & Others. · filed 2025-10-14(7)

Under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, "we review such an agency decision to determine whether it is '[b]ased upon an error of law; . . . [u]nsupported by substantial evidence; or . . . [a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Freiner v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 494 Mass. 198, 204 (2024), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Jane Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527139 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-11-05(7)

The reviewing court shall "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision if it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, abuses discretion, or is contrary to law.

ALVAREZ v. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE & Another. · filed 2025-11-13(7)

"We review the department's decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7)." ... "The agency's decision may only be set aside if the court determines that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law."

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing an agency decision to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528280 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-11-20(7)

In reviewing the board's decision, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to the board's expertise and discretionary authority.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527253 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-12-19(7)

We "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to consider the entire record and give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion when reviewing its decision.

KENNETH MACDONALD & Another v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION & Others. · filed 2025-12-30(7)

As a reviewing court, we consider "the entire record, . . . [and] shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or modify an agency decision for excess of authority, a constitutional violation, legal error, or lack of substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528345 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-01-06(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify [the board's] classification decision where it determines ... that the decision is in excess of [the board's] statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019) (Doe No. 496501), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 18837 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-01-14(7)

In reviewing SORB's decision, "we 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board].'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 602 (2013), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528710 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-01-23(7)

In reviewing a board examiner's decision, "we 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board].'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 602 (2013) (Doe No. 205614), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) directs courts to review agency decisions for substantial evidence and legal error.

Legere v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance. · filed 2026-02-09(7)

We review the DUA's decision based on the standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... Because the examiner's conclusion that the claimant failed to make a good ... faith effort to secure employment was supported by substantial evidence and was free from legal error, we affirm the District Court judgment affirming the DUA's determination that the claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion when reviewing its decision.

Khorzoughi v. Department of Unemployment Assistance. · filed 2026-03-02(7)

We must "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon [the DUA]," G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), and we will not reverse an agency's decision "unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or based on an error of law." O'Malley v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 104 Mass. App. Ct. 778, 780 (2024).

Section 14(7) requires reviewing courts to give weight to an agency examiner's experience and specialized knowledge.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528660 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-03-11(7)

The examiner's experience and specialized knowledge in making such determinations are entitled to weight, G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), and "our review does not turn on whether, faced with the same set of facts, we would have drawn the same conclusion as an [examiner] . . . , but only whether a contrary conclusion is not merely a possible but a necessary inference" (quotation and citation omitted).

Section 14(7) limits review of a board decision to whether it lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law; the court gives due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 528364 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-05-07(7)

The hearing examiner appropriately weighed each factor in crediting the police officer's report that the defendant had committed an act of violence while simultaneously recognizing that Doe's contact with the criminal justice system itself was minimal. See Doe No. 23656, 483 Mass. at 138, quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) ("we 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it'").

Section 14(7) requires a court to uphold an agency decision unless it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, abuses discretion, or is otherwise contrary to law.

DEFARIAS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & Another. · filed 2026-05-26(7)

An appellate court "review[s] the commission's decision under G. L. c. 31, § 44," Boston Police Dep't, 483 Mass. at 469, and it "will be upheld unless it is 'unsupported by substantial evidence[,] . . . arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." Id., quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside or modify a sex offender classification decision that exceeds statutory authority, violates constitutional provisions, rests on legal error, or lacks substantial evidence.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 190908 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2026-06-05(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify [the board]'s classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of [the board]'s statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... As substantial evidence supports the hearing examiner's decision to apply each of the challenged factors, we see no reason to disturb the classification decision.

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside or modify a SORB classification that exceeds the agency’s authority, violates constitutional provisions, rests on an error of law, or lacks substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 523373 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-06-12(7)

We "may set aside or modify SORB's classification decision" if we determine that it exceeds "SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019) (Doe No. 496501), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision when it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious, abuses discretion, or is contrary to law.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527388 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2025-11-26(7)

We may only set aside the board's decision on a finding that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law.

Section 14(7)(g) permits a court to set aside a classification decision as arbitrary when the examiner fails to address relevant evidence of reduced risk, even if a regulatory factor does not formally apply.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527940 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2026-04-30(7)(g)

We conclude that it is arbitrary for a hearing examiner to issue a decision that neglects to mention Doe's offense-free time in the community where the regulations indicate that such time indicates a lower risk of recidivism, even if such time cannot be considered under factor 29.

Section 14(7)(d) permits reversal of agency action for inadequate notice only when the defect may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1987-12-21(7)(d)

Agency action will be reversed only where “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7)(d) (1986 ed.). ... No showing of prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice, has been made.

Section 14(7) permits relief from an agency decision only when the agency’s action prejudices a party’s substantial rights.

Entis v. Rent Control Board · filed 1987-02-05(7)

The tenant is entitled to relief only on a showing that his “substantial rights . . . have been prejudiced” by the board’s action. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... Thus, any irregularities which may have attended the board’s handling of that history were not prejudicial, as the result is the same based on the clear language of the by-law.

Section 14(7)(d) authorizes a substantial rights prejudice inquiry for unlawful procedures affecting a decision only when a state agency is alleged to have used those procedures.

Town of Burlington v. Department of Education · filed 1984-05-29(7)(d)

However prudent this additional inquiry may be, which we, of course, do not presume to decide, that inquiry is authorized by the state statute only where a state agency is alleged to have engaged in unlawful procedures that affected its decision.

Section 14(8) requires possible prejudice to a party’s substantial rights before a court may grant relief for an agency’s procedural error.

Fortier v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1961-06-09(8)

But if there was an omission of the prescribed step of a report, it is plain that no “substantial rights of any party . . . have been prejudiced” (G. L. c. 30A, § 14 [8]).

Section 14(7) requires prejudice to a party’s substantial rights before an agency’s possible misunderstanding of testimony warrants relief.

Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Committee in the Department of Community Affairs · filed 1975-05-30(7)

The committee’s possible misunderstanding of a portion of the Quatrale testimony (which was conclusory at best and which the committee was not obliged to credit) does not appear to have resulted in prejudice to “the substantial rights of any party” within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision for legal error only when the error may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1977-08-25(7)

A decision of an administrative agency based on an error of law is an adequate ground for setting that decision aside only where “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced” by the agency’s action. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). Here the record fails to show any prejudice to the company’s customers.

Section 14(7) permits reversal for unlawful agency procedure only when a party’s substantial rights may have been prejudiced.

Aristocratic Restaurant of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1978-03-03(7)

However, only where "the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced" is a reversal of agency action appropriate. G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (7). Neither appellant has made such a showing here.

Section 14(7)(d) permits reversal for an agency’s procedural error only when the error may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

New Palm Gardens, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1981-05-08(7)(d)

Reversal of agency action is only appropriate under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(d), where “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced.” ... No such showing of prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice, has been made here by reason of the incorrect statutory citation in the notice of hearing.

Section 14(7) permits relief from an agency decision only if the decision prejudiced the challenger's substantial rights.

Isgur v. School Committee of Newton · filed 1980-02-28(7)

This conclusion does not end our inquiry, however, because the plaintiffs are entitled to relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), only if their substantial rights have been prejudiced by the decision of the bureau as incorporated into and affirmed by the decision of the commission.

Section 14 does not permit reversal of agency action for insufficient hearing notice without a showing of prejudice.

James v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1980-09-10(7)

Even if the notice was insufficient, and we in no way intimate that it was, James cannot, in the absence of a showing of prejudice, and none is here claimed, require reversal of agency action.

Section 14(7) places on the appealing party the burden of showing that an agency error may have prejudiced substantial rights.

Catlin v. Board of Registration of Architects · filed 1992-12-23(7)

Moreover, even if the board did fail to review the trial transcript, this error was harmless. The appealing party has the burden of showing that his “substantial rights . . . may have been prejudiced” by the agency’s error.

When § 14 applies, a defect in notice of administrative appeal rights does not warrant relief unless the party shows prejudice to its substantial rights.

Massachusetts Respiratory Hospital v. Department of Public Welfare · filed 1993-02-17(7)

Assuming, as the parties do, that the administrative process before the claims review board is subject to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1990 ed.), the hospital’s argument concerning the defective notice of its appeal rights fails at least because it has not shown that its substantial rights have been prejudiced.

Section 14(7) requires prejudice for relief based on unlawful agency procedure.

Lewis v. Department of Public Welfare · filed 1994-05-31(7)

As the relevant portions of the verification and cooperation sections are substantially similar, the plaintiff has suffered no prejudice as a result of this confusion and the court need not address whether the confusion rose to the level of “unlawful process.” Lack of prejudice to the plaintiff is fatal to a 30A motion based on unlawful process.

Section 14(7) allows a court to reverse an agency decision for error only when the error prejudices a party’s substantial rights.

City of Boston v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1999-09-27(7)

A court should not reverse an agency decision unless the errors alleged have prejudiced the substantial rights of a party. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7); Solimeno v. State Racing Commn., 400 Mass. 397, 406 (1987).

Section 14 requires prejudice to substantial rights before a procedural error warrants reversal of an agency decision.

RicMer Properties, Inc. v. Board of Health of Revere · filed 2003-09-05

Lastly, RicMer has not identified what “substantial rights” may have been prejudiced, see G. L. c. 30A, § 14, by any procedural error.

Section 14(7) requires a party seeking relief from an agency error to show substantial prejudice.

Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Department of Telecommunications & Energy · filed 2004-01-08(7)

Second, we agree with Fitchburg that the department should not have included in its order a review of the practices of other gas companies, which it had not introduced in evidence. However, Fitchburg has failed to show that it was substantially prejudiced by the department’s inclusion of the review.

Section 14(7) requires a party seeking to set aside an agency decision for a regulatory violation to show that the violation prejudiced the party’s substantial rights.

Wilson v. Department of Social Services · filed 2006-03-10(7)

To set aside the department’s decision, the plaintiff must ... show not only that the department violated its own regulations, but also that his substantial rights were prejudiced by its action. G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) requires a party challenging an agency decision to show that an error may have prejudiced its substantial rights.

Cordaville Associates, LLC v. Architectural Access Board · filed 2006-07-26(7)

The appealing party has the burden of showing that its “ ‘substantial rights . .. may have been prejudiced’ by the agency’s error.” Id., quoting G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). After reviewing the pages of the transcript in the administrative record, the court finds that the record does not contain any information which might have produced a different result, and, therefore, Cordaville suffered no harm.

Section 14(7)(d) permits relief for unlawful agency procedure when it may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Rivas v. Chelsea Housing Authority · filed 2011-08-31(7)(d)

We will uphold an agency decision challenged under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, unless, inter alia, “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency decision is . . . [mjade upon unlawful procedure.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(d), as amended by St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.

Section 14(7)(d) requires a party challenging an agency decision for unlawful procedure to show that the error may have prejudiced substantial rights.

M.D. v. Department of Developmental Services · filed 2013-04-01(7)(d)

Even though the notice was defective, in the context of a G. L. c. 30A appeal, the guardians were still required to show that their substantial rights may have been prejudiced.

Section 14(7) allows judicial relief for an agency decision made through unlawful procedure even when the agency had good reason to follow its own invalid regulation.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2012-10-19(7)

The language of §14(7) contains no additional requirement that the Board’s procedural reasoning be erroneous. Even if the Board’s limited inherent authority gave it good reason to follow its invalid regulations, an agency decision may — as here — "violat[e] constitutional provisions" or result from “unlawful procedure.”

Section 14(7)(d) does not require a party challenging unlawful agency procedure to prove that the outcome necessarily would have changed.

Rivas v. Chelsea Housing Authority · filed 2013-02-08(7)(d)

Moreover, although Rivas concededly cannot prove that the outcome necessarily would have changed had she been provided with the conference, the law does not require her to make such a showing. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (d).

Section 14(7)(d) permits judicial relief when an agency decision was made through unlawful procedure that may have prejudiced a party's substantial rights.

JOHN J. SULLIVAN v. SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, SHIRLEY, & others. · filed 2022-09-27(7)(d)

Accordingly, the grievance process followed here did not comply with the regulations and thus was "[m]ade upon unlawful procedure." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (d).

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion; the applicable standard of review depends on the agency action and the record.

Quincy City Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1987-08-17(7)

The scope and standard of review will be determined primarily by the nature of the commission's action, including the nature of the record generated in its proceedings, and the court "shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G.L.c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) requires courts to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion while reviewing its decision for substantial evidence and errors of law.

Dopazo v. Brookline Rent Control Board · filed 1987-05-18(7)

Finally, we note that while due weight must be given to the experience technical competence, and special knowledge of the Board, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it (G.L. c. 30A § 14(7) Kahn v. Brookline Rent Control Board, 394 Mass. 709 (1985), this does not materially alter the requirement that the Board’s decision be supported by substantial evidence and not be based upon any error of law.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, special knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Kinchla v. Brookline Rent Control Board · filed 1986-11-26(7)

It should also be noted that due weight must be accorded to the experience, technical competence, and special knowledge of the Board, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it. [G.L. c. 30A § 14(7), Kahn v. Brookline Rent Control Board, 394 Mass. 709 (1985)].

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Town of Brookline v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering · filed 1986-09-08(7)

We “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing agency decisions to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Brookline v. COMMR. OF DEPT. OF ENVTL. QUALITY ENG'G · filed 1986-09-08(7)

We "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it." G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (7).

On judicial review, § 14 requires courts to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

General Electric Co. v. Board of Assessors · filed 1984-12-31

The Legislature has directed this court to “give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge” of agencies on judicial review of their decisions.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency board’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretion.

O'Brien v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1984-12-11(7)

The Legislature has directed that in our review of decisions adopted by the division’s board of review, we are to “give due weight to the [board’s] experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge ... as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3.

Section 14(8)(g) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion when reviewing its decision.

Almeida Bus Lines, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1965-01-07(8)(g)

In considering this question, “ [t]he court shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8) (g).

Section 14 requires a court reviewing an agency order to give due weight to the agency’s expertise and the discretion conferred on it.

Bournewood Hospital, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1976-11-04(7)

In reviewing an agency order, “due weight [shall be given] to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to defer to agency fact findings supported by substantial evidence when there is no other error of law.

Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1976-09-30(7)

Of course, it was not his function to decide the case anew. ... under the State Administrative Procedure Act the court must defer to the fact-finding function of the commission where there is substantial evidence to support its findings and there is no other error of law. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 requires courts reviewing agency decisions to defer to the agency’s fact-finding and reasonable inferences rather than reweigh the evidence.

College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1978-08-25

Our function is to review the decision of the MCAD in accordance with the standards of review expressed in G. L. c. 30A, § 14. ... Courts must defer to an administrative agency’s fact-finding role, including its right to draw reasonable inferences from the facts found.

Section 14(7) gives an agency’s application of law to fact some weight on review and permits a court to disturb it when it is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Garfield v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1979-01-12(7)

Application of law to fact in the first instance is a function specifically committed to the agency. This function calls on the agency’s “experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge”; the resulting decision is entitled to some weight and should not be disturbed unless unsupported by substantial evidence. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Board of Selectmen of Marion v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1979-04-09

In reviewing the action of an administrative agency we bear in mind our duty to "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as amended by St. 1976, c. 411.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision for an error of law while requiring due weight to the agency’s expertise and discretion.

Whitehall Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1979-05-11(7)

Under the standard set out by G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), for judicial review of an agency decision, the decision of the commission may be set aside if it is "[b]ased upon an error of law.” The reviewing court is to give "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.”

Section 14(7) governs judicial review of a utility rate allocation when no claim of confiscation is raised.

Monsanto Co. v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1979-12-04(7)

No claim of confiscation is before us, and the standard of review is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 calls for substantial evidence review of agency fact finding, with consideration of the agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Town of Burlington v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1981-07-01

As to factual issues, our standard of review is the “substantial evidence test.” See Labor Relations Commn. v. Everett, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 827-829 (1979). In applying that test we consider the “experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency.”

Section 14 directs reviewing courts to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge when assessing whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Brookline v. COMM. OF THE DEPT. OF ENVTL QUALITY ENG'G · filed 1982-09-03

In giving "due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency," G.L.c. 30A, § 14, as amended through St. 1976, c. 411, §§ 1, 2, we hold that the DEQE decision in this respect is supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge when deciding whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Town of Brookline v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering · filed 1982-09-03

In giving “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency,” G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as amended through St. 1976, c. 411, §§ 1, 2, we hold that the DEQE decision in this respect is supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed.

Section 14 requires courts reviewing agency decisions to give due weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Mass. Org., St. Engr. & Scientists v. La. Rel. Comm. · filed 1983-08-15

However, we are constrained by statute to "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency," G.L.c. 30A, § 14, as amended through St. 1976, c. 411.