Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10

Section 10(j) bars claims against a school district based on its employees’ negligent failure to prevent or diminish a teacher’s sexual misconduct toward a student.

Canty v. Old Rochester Regional School District · filed 1999-06-21(j)

Canty essentially attempts to hold the School District liable for its agents’ negligent failure to “prevent or diminish” the sexual misconduct of Shockro. ... this Court GRANTS the School District’s motion to dismiss Canty’s Claims Act claims to the extent they are premised on the acts of school employees other than Shockro.

Section 10(j) immunizes a municipality when officers’ conduct during a lawful pursuit was not the original cause of harm inflicted by a fleeing third party.

ANAGNOS v. Hultgren · filed 2006-08-23(j)

This court finds that the City of Lowell is not liable under Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 258, Section 10(j) because the officers’ conduct during the police chase was not the original cause of Decedent’s death.

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer from negligence claims arising from a third party’s harm when the employer did not originally cause the harmful situation.

Coucelos v. City of Woburn · filed 2024-09-26(j)

The alleged “boys-will-be-boys” culture does not meet the standard for “originally causing” plaintiffs’ injuries.

Section 10(j) bars municipal negligence liability for another person’s misconduct when the municipality took no affirmative act that originally caused the alleged harm.

Biscan v. Town of Wilmington · filed 2024-03-04(j)

The complaint does not allege that Wilmington took any affirmative act that was the “original cause” of the alleged torts. ... Accordingly, Count I of plaintiff’s complaint against the Town will be dismissed as barred under Section 10(j) of the MTCA.

Section 10(h) shields a public employer from negligence liability for failing to provide police protection by responding to a reported threat of suicide.

Hayes v. Town of Dalton · filed 2025-03-25(h)

Because Plaintiff’s claim is based on Defendants’ alleged failure to protect Sherilyn by responding to her residence (Dkt. No. 128-1 ¶¶ 32, 33, 34, 50, 52, 63), even if Defendants were negligent, § 10(h) insulates the Town from liability.

Section 10(j) bars claims against a public employer for failing to train or supervise employees to prevent or mitigate harm.

McDowell · filed 2026-01-15(j)

It is well established in Massachusetts that “[c]laims of failure to train or supervise ‘are all claims based on the failure to prevent or mitigate a harm, rather than participation in the initial injury-causing circumstance’ and thus are barred by § 10(j).” Ward, 367 F.Supp.2d at 16 (citation omitted). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ claim against the Town for lack of proper supervision is dismissed.

Section 10(j) bars a claim against a public employer for failing to prevent a third party’s violence when the employer did not originally cause it.

Dupre v. Falcone · filed 1995-03-22(j)

Nor can the Town be sued for any “failure to act to prevent. .. the violent or tortious conduct of a third person.” On the undisputed facts, there is no possible argument that Wagner’s alleged absence from the Navy Yard Room “originally caused” the assault on Dupre.

Section 10(j) excludes claims based on public employees’ failure to prevent or mitigate harm from a situation they did not originally cause.

Blavackas v. Worcester State College · filed 1996-08-02(j)

The “situation” which caused Blavackas to suffer injury was Heffernan’s own self-inflicted intoxication. The claim that the resident assistant’s failure to prevent the unauthorized party or respond adequately after the party occurred is specifically excluded from liability. Likewise, the claim that the college police failed to prevent the accident by allowing Heffernan to drive off the campus is also specifically excluded from liability.

Section 10(j) immunizes a municipality from liability for a harmful situation that the municipality or someone acting on its behalf did not originally cause.

Cossaboom v. Lewis Restaurant & Grill, Inc. · filed 1996-12-24(j)

Therefore, since the softball game and the alcohol consumed at the game were not part of the municipal function, the exclusion under G.L.c. 258, §10(j) applies and immunizes the defendants from liability.

Section 10(j) grants public employers immunity for failing to prevent harm caused by others when the employer did not originally cause the harm, subject to exceptions including explicit assurances and discretionary-function rules.

Foley v. City of Boston · filed 1997-05-30(j), (j)(1), and (b)

A close examination of the language of § 10(j) reveals that public employers are immune from liability only if they or their employees do not originally cause harm to the plaintiff. ... On the other hand, if the public employer or employees originally do cause injury, §10(j) will not permit the governmental entity to escape liability.

Section 10(j) immunizes public employers from claims based on a failure to prevent or diminish harm, including harm caused by a third party.

Brum v. Town of Dartmouth · filed 1999-01-21(j)

In sum, the principal purpose of § 10 (j) is to preclude liability for failures to prevent or diminish harm, including harm brought about by the wrongful act of a third party.

Section 10(j) bars a claim that a school district negligently failed to prevent one student from assaulting another when the assailant was not acting on the school's behalf.

Bayles v. Love · filed 1999-05-20(j)

Count IV, as set forth in the complaint, is indistinguishable from the claim that the Supreme Judicial Court held, in Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. at 691-96, to be barred by G.L.c. 258, §10(j). Nothing in the factual allegations of Count IV contains any hint that Love, in striking Bayles, was acting on behalf of the school. Accordingly, the motion must be granted as to Count IV on the basis of the immunity provided by that statutory provision.

Section 10(j) protects a public employer that fails to prevent harm from a third party, even when it fails to perform a statutory duty, if it did not originally cause the harmful situation.

Costa v. Department of Public Health · filed 2001-06-29(j)

The distinction within §10(j) between creating harm and failing to prevent harm is subtle. ... DPH’s failure to act to prevent harm to the decedent was not the original cause of that harm but rather a failure to prevent or diminish that harm.

Section 10(j) shields a public employer from negligence liability for failing to prevent the consequences of harm it did not originally cause.

Kelly v. City of Cambridge · filed 1999-12-24(j)

As the harm in this case (the cat scratch) was not originally caused by the city, the city is not liable in negligence under the MTCA for its failure to prevent the harmful consequences (the rabies injections).

Section 10(j) exempts a public employer from liability for failing to prevent an injury it did not originally cause.

Sostillio v. City of Newton · filed 2000-02-04(j)

The fact of the matter is that the City did not originally cause the plaintiffs injury; at worst, it simply failed to prevent it. This is precisely the type of situation which the Legislature intended to exempt from liability under the Act when it enacted §10(j).

Section 10(j) bars a claim against a municipality for failing to carry out a dog removal order when the municipality did not originally cause the dog bite.

Coughlin v. Hanson · filed 2000-10-25(j)

North Brookfield might well have prevented the dog bite by removing the dog, but its failing so to prevent cannot, under G.L.c. 258, §10(j), be the underpinnings of suit.

Section 10(j) exempts a municipality from liability for failures to act to prevent or diminish harm when the municipality did not originally cause the harmful situation.

Hayes v. Town of Spencer · filed 2000-11-20(j)

But, failures to act to prevent or diminish harm cannot, after Brum, be the underpinnings of suit against a government entity. See id. at 693. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact that G.L.c. 258, §10(j) exempts the town from liability.

Section 10(j) immunizes public entities from claims based on a school’s failure to prevent harmful conduct by other students.

Martin v. Town of Wilmington · filed 2001-05-23(j)

Rather, the crux of the complaint is that John’s ability to maximize his public education has been injured by the School’s negligent failure to take action to remedy the harmful conduct of third parties. This is precisely the type of claim from which the Legislature intended to immunize public entities pursuant to G.L.c. 258, §10(j).

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer from liability for failing to diminish the harmful consequences of an illness it did not originally cause.

Heaberlin v. Fall River Department of Social Services · filed 2001-06-08(j)

Therefore, even if DSS or Sousa negligently failed to act to diminish the harmful consequences of the meningitis contracted by Robert, Section 10(j) provides immunity because neither DSS nor Sousa “originally caused” Robert’s illness.

Section 10(j) shields a municipality from liability when a teacher fails to prevent harm originally caused by another student, even if leaving the class unsupervised was negligent.

Bilodeau v. City of Leominster · filed 2004-08-06(j)

Accordingly, this court finds that the teacher’s departure, while it may have been negligent, was not the original cause of Bilodeau’s injuries. Instead, the teacher failed to prevent or diminish a harm originally caused by another student. As none of the exceptions to §10(j) apply to the plaintiffs, the City is immune from liability.

Section 10(j) immunity is not limited to claims arising from a third person's violent or tortious conduct.

Jacome v. Commonwealth · filed 2002-11-19(j)

Thus, we hold that immunity under § 10 (j) is not restricted to those claims arising from the violent or tortious behavior of third persons.

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer from claims based on a failure to prevent or diminish harm from a condition it did not originally cause.

Pasquale v. Reading Municipal Light Department · filed 2004-09-27(j)

Because the Pasquales cannot show that the Towns “originally caused” the harmful condition or situation, the Towns are immune from tort liability under G.L.c. 258, §10(j).

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer from a claim based on its failure to prevent harm it did not originally cause.

Jones v. Maloney · filed 2009-08-03(j)

Thus, the claim is based on an alleged failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation. The Commonwealth did not originally cause the harmful conditions or situation, that is his exposure to criminal prosecution and eventual conviction; rather Cyle’s groping of his classmate is the original cause.

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer from claims based on its failure to prevent a third party’s harmful conduct when the employer did not originally cause the harm.

Reguera v. Leduc · filed 2005-08-22(j)

Even if Reguera’s presentment letter under the Act was sufficient, her claim must fail because the Collaborative is immune from liability under § 10(j) of the Act. ... Thus, it cannot be said that Leduc acts resulting in Kristen’s harm were originally caused by the Collaborative.

Section 10(j) preserves public employer immunity for an unsuccessful act intended to reduce harm from a condition the employer did not originally cause.

Anderson v. City of Gloucester · filed 2009-10-15(j)

On this record, Mackey’s identification of Goyette as the survivor was plainly an “act” intended to “diminish the [fire’s] harmful consequences,” namely the uncertainties about the identity of the victims. Because of the error, Mackey’s act did not produce the desired result. But § 10(/) does not provide immunity for success. Indeed, no immunity is needed for acts that succeed, and § 10(/) provides the immunity the Legislature thought necessary for acts that fail. Mackey’s act is, therefore, an act the statute covers.

Section 10(j) preserves public-employer immunity for harm caused by a third person when the alleged failure to intervene did not materially create the dangerous situation.

Parsons v. Town of Tewksbury · filed 2010-01-19(j)

As evidenced by the other allegations in the complaint, this “act” is actually no more than a failure to intervene recast as an affirmative act. This is precisely the type of failure to prevent harm by a third person for which §10(j) provides governmental immunity. Accordingly, the MTCA bars the Parsons’ claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium.

Section 10(f) does not immunize a town when its officers’ continued high-speed pursuit materially contributes to a fleeing driver’s conduct that injures a third party, even if the pursuit ends seconds before the crash.

Harrison v. Town of Mattapoisett · filed 2010-12-01(f)

In these circumstances, *372the affirmative acts of the Mattapoisett and Fairhaven officers in continuing the high-speed chase materially contributed to creating the specific condition or situation (i.e., Lessa’s flight from the police) that resulted in the plaintiff’s harm. The fact that the officers stopped the chase before Lessa drove down the ramp does not change the result.

Section 10(j) bars negligence claims against a public employer for failing to prevent or lessen harm caused by third parties when the employer did not originally cause the harmful situation.

Harrington ex rel. Harrington v. City of Attleboro · filed 2016-03-16(j)

Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, however, are precluded under another subsection of § 10, namely § 10(j).

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer for an employee’s response to an emergent situation when the employer did not materially contribute to creating the condition that caused the harm.

Surgens v. Attleboro Public Schools · filed 2010-03-31(j)

Similarly (and assuming arguendo that the City’s response to Chelsea’s not having been picked up at the designated spot may have been negligent), it is the purpose of § 10(j) to provide immunity for responses by public employees to emergent circumstances of that kind. Thus, all claims against the City must be dismissed.

Section 10(j) bars public employers from liability for harm caused by a third party when the employer merely failed to prevent or mitigate it, but permits liability when an affirmative act originally caused the harmful situation.

Doe1 v. Boston Public Schools · filed 2019-03-01(j)

Section 10(j) bars A.R.’s claim for negligent supervision because it is “based on the failure to prevent or mitigate a harm, rather than participation in the initial injury-causing circumstance.” Pettengill v. Curtis, 584 F. Supp. 2d 348, 366 (D. Mass. 2008) (quoting Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018, 1044 (D. Mass. 1996)). A.R.’s remaining theories, however, allege affirmative acts by school officials. The causal link between those acts and A.R.’s injuries is not so remote that the Court can find as a matter of law that they are not an “original cause” of her injuries within the meaning of Section 10(j).

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer from a claim based on failing to prevent harm unless its affirmative act materially contributed to creating the specific condition that caused the harm.

Vandenberg v. Town of Williamstown · filed 2017-10-05(j)

The essence of the plaintiffs' claim is that the defendants negligently failed to prevent harm, a claim for which the defendants are immune from suit under G. L. c. 258, § 10(j ), as a matter of law.

Section 10(j) immunizes public employers from claims based on a failure to prevent harm caused by a third party unless the public employer originally caused the harmful situation.

Baptiste v. Executive Office of Health & Human Services · filed 2020-02-28(j)

In other words, § 10 (j) provides immunity from tort liability to public employers "for a public employer's act or failure to act to prevent harm from the wrongful conduct of a third party ... unless the condition or situation was 'originally caused' by the public employer." Cormier, supra, citing Brum, supra at 692, 695.

Section 10(j) bars claims against a public employer for failure to supervise a teacher or investigate complaints to prevent harm, but does not bar a negligent-hiring claim based on participation in the injury-causing circumstance.

Doe v. D'AGOSTINO · filed 2005-04-25(j)

Here, Plaintiffs’ negligence claims against the Arlington School. Committee, for the most part, are based on the school officials’, failure to supervise D’Agostino or properly investigate prior complaints. This court holds that these claims are barred by section 10(j) because they are “based on the failure to prevent or mitigate a harm, rather than participation in the initial injury-causing circumstance.” ... Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claim, though, is not barred by section 10(j).

Section 10(j) immunizes a public employer from claims for failing to prevent third-party harm unless its affirmative act originally caused the harmful situation.

Hankey v. Town of Concord-Carlisle · filed 2015-09-30(j)

For a public employer’s conduct to constitute an “original cause” the public employer must have engaged in an “affirmative act (not a failure to act)” that “materially contributed to creating the specific ‘condition or situation’ that resulted in the harm.” ... Here, Plaintiff has not presented evidence of an affirmative act (as opposed to a failure to act) by the Individual Defendants that originally caused Plaintiff to suffer harassment.

Section 10(j) does not immunize a public employer when an employee’s affirmative conduct may have originally caused the situation that injured a third party.

Ward v. City of Boston · filed 2005-03-21(j)

The affirmative conduct on the part of Officer Dambreville is sufficient to satisfy the “original cause” requirement of § 10(j), and, thus, the court cannot find on the record presently before it that the City is immune from liability.

Section 10(j) allows a negligence claim for failure to prevent third-party harm when the public employer affirmatively caused the condition that led to the harm.

Thomas v. Town of Chelmsford · filed 2017-07-25(j)

Once the municipality is shown to be the “original cause” of the injury, then a negligence action can be maintained for a subsequent “act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of ... violent or tortious conduct of a third person.”

Section 10(j) does not immunize a public employer from claims for harm caused by the affirmative conduct of its employees acting within the scope of employment.

Williams v. City of Boston · filed 2011-03-24(j)

Section 10(j) of the MTCA does not render the City immune from suit based on the allegedly negligent acts of its officers. ... In the instant case, Williams is seeking to hold the City liable, not for its employees’ failed efforts to prevent or diminish harm, but for harm allegedly caused by the affirmative conduct of its officers while acting within the scope of their employment.

Section 10(j) does not bar a negligent retention claim at the pleading stage when retaining an employee after notice of misconduct may have originally caused the plaintiff’s harm.

Doe v. Fournier · filed 2012-02-22(j)

Although retention is more passive than hiring and may not be sufficient to constitute an original cause under section 10(j), at this early stage, it would be premature to conclude that the school officials’ negligent retention of Van Am-burgh after learning of his improper relations with students was not an original cause of Plaintiffs harm.

Section 10(j) bars a claim that a parole officer negligently failed to supervise a parolee to prevent an assault, but does not bar a claim that the officer’s recommendation and misleading information exposed someone to risk.

Bonnie W. v. Commonwealth · filed 1994-12-09(j)

It is clear that the plaintiff’s claim based on a theory of Claxton’s negligent failure to supervise Elliott and to thereby prevent Elliott from gaining access to the plaintiff’s mobile home where the alleged assault occurred, is barred by § 10 (j) if St. 1993, c. 495, § 144, making the amendment retroactive to cases such as the present one, is constitutional. ... That claim is barred. The plaintiff’s second theory of negligence liability, that Claxton contributed to the plaintiffs injury by negligently recommending Elliott’s continued employment at the trailer park and misrepresenting Elliott’s criminal history to park management, is a different matter. That claim is not barred by the 1993 amendment to G. L. c. 258, § 10, the only public duty rule we shall now apply.

Section 10(j) permits a negligent hiring claim when a public employer may have helped create the risk of an assault, but bars a negligent supervision claim based on failure to prevent it.

McConnell v. Dooling · filed 1995-06-07(j)

A jury could find that the Authority did not simply fail to prevent the assault, but participated in risk-creating conduct which contributed to the situation which caused the harm. ... McConnell’s second theory of negligence is that the Authority negligently supervised Dooling, and thereby failed to prevent him from assaulting the plaintiff. This claim is barred by §100).

Section 10(h) bars a claim based on an officer’s failure to take a person into protective custody, while §10(j) does not bar a claim based on an officer’s affirmative act of creating the risk of harm.

Enterprise Rent A Car of Boston, Inc. v. Imbrogna · filed 1996-06-15(h), (j)

Imbrogna’s theory that Canton is liable for the officer’s failure to place Venuti into protective custody is a clear example of the type of claim that § 10(h) operates to bar. ... The court is persuaded that this approach represents a sensible reading of the §10(j) exclusion. If Imbrogna’s factual allegations are proven at trial, then Section 10(j) will not apply. The affirmative act of giving the keys to Venuti was sufficient risk-creating intervention or involvement by the officer to give rise to liability.

Section 10(j) does not bar a claim when public employees’ earlier neglect of a statutory duty created the unsafe condition that made a third party’s injury possible.

Brum v. Town of Dartmouth · filed 1998-02-25(j)

The applicability of § 10 (j) here does not, in any event, hinge on the public employees’ passive or active involvement in the ultimate harmful consequences that befell Robinson; rather, under the explicit language of the subsection, the critical inquiry is whether the public employees’ action or lack thereof brought about or contributed to harmful consequences made possible by their own earlier neglectful conduct in mismanaging the school’s security status in the face of a statutory obligation to act.

Section 10(j) does not shield a public employer when its employee affirmatively assigns a third party to supervise children and that person harms them.

Barret v. Wachusett Regional School District · filed 1999-09-29(j)

La Porte’s affirmative act in allowing Cooper to supervise the children, therefore, falls outside of the purview of the immunity provided by M.G.L.c. 258, §10(j).

Section 10(j) requires an affirmative act by a public employer to trigger its original-cause exception; a negligent failure to prevent a third party’s assault does not suffice.

Mills ex rel. Mills v. Ellis ex rel. Ellis · filed 1999-12-15(j)

A failure to prevent, even if negligent, does not cause the “condition or situation” that leads to the harmful consequence. This is particularly true in the case of a fellow student committing a tortious assault upon another.

Section 10(j) bars a claim based on a city's failure to supervise an employee to prevent harm, but does not bar a negligent hiring claim based on the city's affirmative creation of the risk.

Brimage v. City of Boston · filed 2001-01-24(j)

With respect to the negligent supervision allegation, it is clear that §10(j) bars this count. ... This Court’s ruling that §10(j) should not bar a negligent hiring allegation is consistent with the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding in Bonnie W. v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 122 (1994), where the Commonwealth’s action of recommending a sexual assailant for employment was held to be outside the protections of §10(j).

Section 10(j) immunizes public employers from claims for failing to prevent harm unless their affirmative conduct originally caused the harmful condition; whether earlier conduct was too remote to qualify may require a factual record.

Kent v. Commonwealth · filed 2001-07-06(j)

The defendants are correct that G. L. c. 258, § 100), would immunize them from a claim for “failure to act” in 1995 unless the plaintiffs also proved that the defendants’ affirmative behavior “originally caused” the condition or situation which led to the harm. See Brum v. Dartmouth, King v. Commonwealth, 428 Mass. at 692-696, citing Bonnie W. v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 122, 125 (1994). However, whether or not the release of MacNeil in 1987 is too “remote” to constitute such an affirmative act involves the same factual considerations as the issue of *37proximate causation. Again, this is a question inappropriate to decide at this embryonic stage of the case.

Section 10(j) preserves public employer immunity for failure to prevent third-party harm unless the employer’s affirmative act materially contributed to the specific condition or situation that caused the harm.

Kent v. Commonwealth · filed 2002-07-15(j)

In order for a public employer’s affirmative act to be the “original cause” of a “condition or situation” that results in harmful consequences to another from “the violent or tortious conduct of a third person,” we hold that the act must have materially contributed to creating the specific “condition or situation” that resulted in the harm.

Section 10(j)’s final clause applies to negligent conduct by an employee or a person under the public employer’s direction and control.

Boye v. Nashoba Regional School District · filed 2002-10-01(j)

On the basis of Brum and Kent, supra, the court concludes that this last clause of Section 10(j) applies only to negligent conduct by an employee or person under the direction and control of the public employer that “originally caused” the injury.

Section 10(j)'s public duty exception does not apply when a person acting on behalf of a public employer creates the condition that causes the harm.

Ku v. Town of Framingham · filed 2003-02-27(j)

Conversely, in the matter before this court, the wrongdoer was acting as an employee or as an independent contractor “on behalf of the public employer.” When actions by such a person create the condition that causes the harm, the statutory exception is not applicable and the public employer is liable.

Section 10(j) does not immunize a public employer when an employee’s affirmative act originally causes the harmful situation.

Barley v. Town of Auburn · filed 2005-02-16(j)

While the dispatcher did not cause the heart attack, the dispatcher “originally caused” the delay and confusion that resulted in the ambulance to reach Francis Barley in an alleged untimely manner. The dispatcher’s “affirmative act” distinguishes this fact pattern from those in prior cases.6 Since the facts of this case take it out of the scope of the protection of §10(j), immunity does not extend to the Town in this particular situation.

Section 10(b) immunizes discretionary decisions about training and continued use of a police dog, while § 10(j) does not bar a claim arising from an officer’s affirmative act of releasing the dog without restraint.

Audette v. Commonwealth · filed 2005-06-13(b), (j)

The judge ruled, and we agree, that the Commonwealth was immune from liability for any claim based on Tasker’s failure to train or supervise Rocky, or his failure to remove Rocky from service, pursuant to the “discretionary function” exclusion found in G. L. c. 258, § 10(b). ... We conclude that Audette’s claim is not barred by G. L. c. 258, § 10(j).

Section 10(j) bars claims against a public employer for failing to prevent harm caused by a third party unless an employee’s affirmative act materially contributed to creating the harmful situation.

Parker v. Chief Justice for Administration & Management of Trial Court · filed 2006-08-18(j)

Here, the negligence of the probation officers, as a matter of law, cannot be said to be an affirmative act that created a situation resulting in harm. The effect of § 10(f) is a limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity so that the Commonwealth remains immune from tort claims except in those instances where the public employee’s affirmative act “materially contributed to creating the specific ‘condition or situation’ that resulted in the harm.” Kent v. Commonwealth, supra.

Section 10(j) bars claims based only on a public employer’s failure to prevent harm, but negligent hiring or promotion may fall outside that bar when it originally creates the harmful situation.

Pettengill v. Curtis · filed 2008-09-30(j)

A claim merely for negligent supervision would be barred. ... If Pettengill can prove that Haverhill negligently hired Curtis, it may have “originally caused” the situation and, therefore, it would not be immune from suit pursuant to § 10(j). Similarly, if negligent promotion of Curtis by Haverhill created a new risk by giving Curtis more autonomy, that too would make Haverhill the “original cause” of Pet-tengill’s injuries. ... Therefore, Haverhill’s motion to dismiss Count 7 on this basis is being denied.

Section 10(j) does not bar liability when a public employer or its agent causes or materially contributes to the condition that results in harm.

LaMachia v. City of Worcester · filed 2004-03-17(j)

When the act or omission of the public employer or its agent causes or materially contributes to the specific condition or situation that results in harm, there is liability.

Section 10(j) bars a claim based on a public employer’s failure to supervise an independent contractor when the employer did not affirmatively retain control over the contractor’s conduct that caused the injury.

Srebnick v. Rodriguez · filed 2010-03-05(j)

Thus, for the Srebnicks to steer a safe course between sections 10(b) and 10(j), they would have to show more than the mere existence of such standards, and more than MARTs failure to step in when one of its independent contractors did not abide by those standards. They would have to show that MART had “retained control” over Kiessling’s compliance through some affirmative act or acts, and that in doing so MART had failed to act reasonably, thus causing Pamela Srebnick harm. On the record before the court there is no evidence of such retained control, nor of any causal link between the act or acts of control and the harm that befell Ms. Srebnick. Therefore, the Srebnicks’ claim against MART is barred by the “original cause” exemption.

Section 10(j) does not provide immunity when a public employer’s affirmative act materially contributes to the condition that causes an injury, even if another person’s conduct is the immediate cause.

Gennari v. Reading Public Schools · filed 2010-09-22(j)

Because, in either case, the decision to hold recess in the courtyard was an “original cause” of the situation that led to the injury, the motion judge was correct in denying the defendant’s assertion of immunity under § 10(j).

Section 10(j) immunizes a municipality when a student's injury results from its failure to supervise and no affirmative municipal act caused or contributed to the harm.

Ingerson v. City of Worcester · filed 2011-11-18(j)

On the motion record before me, I find that there is nothing upon which an affirmative act of the City of Worcester, causing or contributing to the harm of the plaintiff can be found. ... Pursuant to the holdings in Kent and Gennari the inactions of the City of Worcester result in the City’s immunity from liability under G.L.c. 258, §100).

Section 10(j) immunizes a municipality from a claim arising from a third party’s harmful conduct when its employee did not originally cause the situation leading to the injury.

Dellelo v. Town of Billerica · filed 2014-11-05(j)

Therefore, because Officer Peloquin’s action cannot be found to be an original cause of Mr. Dellelo’s injury, the Town is immune from this claim under G.L.c. 258, §10(j).

Section 10(b) does not immunize a city for failing to implement its sewer upgrade plan, and § 10(j) does not immunize it when its own affirmative act materially contributes to the harmful condition.

Shapiro v. City of Worcester · filed 2013-01-30

Accordingly, we affirm the motion judge’s conclusion that § 10 (b) does not apply and that the city is not immune from suit. ... Here, the action of the city permitting MDC effluent to flow into the city’s sewer system materially contributed to its overloading and exposed homeowners to a known risk. ... Further, the plaintiffs’ suits are not foreclosed by operation of the exemptions to liability under G. L. c. 258, § 10 (b) and (/).

Section 10(j) does not immunize the Commonwealth when its affirmative decision to allow convicted inmates into an area housing civilly committed people originally causes the dangerous condition that leads to injury.

Devlin v. Commonwealth · filed 2013-04-24(j)

Rather, the affirmative decision to allow convicted inmates to work in an area where civilly committed individuals were housed and treated was one of the “original[] cause[s],” G. L. c. 258, § 10(j), of the harmful consequences within the meaning of the statute.

Section 10(j) immunizes public employers from claims based on failing to prevent third-party harm unless the employer’s affirmative act originally caused the harmful condition or situation.

Jane J. v. Commonwealth · filed 2017-04-12(j)

In this context, "originally caused" means an affirmative act that creates the circumstance which results in the harm inflicted by the third party.

Section 10(j) permits a claim when public employees’ affirmative acts originally cause the injury-causing situation, and § 10(j)(2) permits a claim when an intervention places the victim in a worse position.

Doe v. Town of Stoughton · filed 2020-07-31(j), (j)(2)

Since these questions rest on the weighing of evidence and considerations of credibility, summary judgment based on § 10(j) is not warranted.

Section 10(j)(2) removes public-employer immunity for third-party harm when a public employee’s intervention injures the victim or leaves the victim worse off, but the exception requires evidence of that effect.

Doe v. Holly · filed 2023-07-14(j)(2)

For, while the MTCA provides that such immunity does not attach when an "intervention of a public employee . . . causes injury to the victim or places the victim in a worse position than he was in before the intervention," see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(j)(2), we agree with the District Court that the Does have failed to identify evidence from which a rational factfinder could find that such an "intervention" put Doe Child in a worse position.

Section 10(j)(2) preserves liability when a public employee intervenes and leaves the injured person in a worse position than before the intervention.

Salem v. Stoneham Police Department · filed 2024-09-27(j)(2)

The Court finds that that police detectives’ affirmative act of intervening and putting Salem in a worse position than he was in before their arrival triggers the application of § 10(j)(2).

Section 10(j) excludes liability for failing to prevent harm from a condition the public employer did not originally cause; its intervention exception requires the employee to cause injury or worsen the victim’s position.

Hardy v. City of Somerville · filed 1994-12-15(j)

The claim that Officer Monte failed to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of Mr. Hardy’s intoxication, by placing him in a voluntary detoxification facility, is specifically excluded from liability. ... The plaintiffs claim that the intervention of Officer Monte, in bringing Mr. Hardy to a voluntary detoxification facility, placed him in a “worse” position than when Officer Monte initially found him; however, it is the opinion of this Court that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts to support that claim. Accordingly, the exemption to the Section 10(j) exclusion is not applicable to the alleged facts.

Section 10(j)(2) excludes from immunity a claim that a public employee’s intervention injured the victim or made the victim’s position worse.

Serrell v. Franklin County · filed 1999-07-26(j)(2)

The record discloses, however, that the plaintiff did produce evidence which fits the § 10(j)(2) exclusion, i.e., that the officers’ intervention exacerbated the situation to her detriment and, ultimately, her harm.

Section 10(f)(2) does not bar a claim based on a public employee’s intervention that leaves the victim worse off than before.

Williams v. O'Brien · filed 2010-10-25(f)(2)

We do not agree that this statute avails the defendants. The allegations recite deliberate acts, including calling Williams a “snitch” in front of other inmates and purposefully placing him in a cell with Holiet. Section 10(f) does not apply to “any claim based upon intervention of a public employee which . . . places the victim in a worse position than he was in before the intervention.”

Section 10(j) bars claims based on failing to diminish harm from a third party's tortious conduct, and its intervention exception applies only to affirmative acts by public employees.

Stahr v. Lincoln Sudbury Regional High School District · filed 2018-05-18(j)(2)

The term "intervention" is not defined in G. L. c. 258, §§ 1 or 10. ... In this sense, "intervention" refers to an affirmative act on the part of the intervener. ... Here, the intervening "acts" alleged to fall within the scope of § 10(j)(2) are, rather, plainly omissions. ... Thus, the plaintiffs' arguments as to the applicability of § 10(j)(2)'s exception to the exclusion from liability set forth in § 10(j) must also fail.

Section 10(j)(1) permits a claim based on explicit and specific assurances of safety or assistance; a written and verbal promise of constant one-to-one supervision can qualify.

Doe v. Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District · filed 2022-01-04(j)(1)

This assurance was explicit in that staff members verbalized the assurance to Jane’s parents and put it down in writing. It was specific because it clearly defined what actions they would take and for how long – Jane would not be left unsupervised at any point, per her IEP, for the entirety of the school day.

Section 10(j)(1) requires a specific assurance of safety; a general assurance that an officer will direct traffic safely does not qualify.

Mazzola v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. · filed 1994-11-08(j)(1)

A representation that Officer Ambrose will safely direct traffic around the work site is precisely the type of general assurance not within the subsection (j)(l) exception.

Alleged lease promises to provide peaceful enjoyment and promptly repair unsafe conditions can defeat dismissal under § 10(j)'s exception for specific assurances of safety.

Rodriguez v. Cambridge Housing Authority · filed 1996-05-13(j)(1)

It may be that at summary judgment the defendants will prevail in establishing that there are no “explicit and specific assurances of safety or assistance” in the lease agreement with which they did not comply. Cf. Laurence v. Cambridge, 422 Mass. 406, 410 (1996). However, at this point, the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to defeat a motion to dismiss. The claims in paragraph 8 of the complaint that the CHA promised to provide quiet and peaceful enjoyment and to repair unsafe conditions within 24 hours or provide alternative accommodations and reasonable moving expenses make it impossible for me to determine that as a matter of law there is no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.

Section 10(j)(1) requires an assurance of safety or assistance to be spoken or written and definite in its terms; an assurance implied from conduct does not qualify.

Lawrence v. City of Cambridge · filed 1996-04-08(j)(1)

Although the meanings of these terms are similar, we believe that by “explicit” the Legislature meant a spoken or written assurance, not one implied from the conduct of the parties or the situation, and by “specific” the terms of the assurance must be definite, fixed, and free from ambiguity.

Section 10(j)(1) requires an explicit and specific assurance of safety made to the victim or a family member; an assurance merely implied from an inspection does not qualify.

Barnes v. Metropolitan Housing Assistance Program · filed 1997-05-22(j)(1)

The contract with the owner does not meet the requirements of § 10 (j) (1) if for no other reason because such assurances as it may contain are not “made to the direct victim or a member of [her] family.” ... It is not an explicit and specific assurance that the premises are free of lead paint hazards. Rather, it is the sort of assurance “implied from the conduct of the parties or the situation,” that we have held does not meet the requirements of the statute.

Section 10(j)(1) requires specific assurances of safety to be made directly to the injured person or a member of that person's family or household; assurances to an organization do not qualify merely because the injured person volunteers for it.

Melchionno v. Rizzo · filed 1998-01-22(j)(1)

Given the restricted application of G.L.c. 258, §10(j)(1) by the Supreme Judicial Court, this Court concludes that “member of her family or household” is to be strictly construed, and may not be broadly interpreted so as to encompass a person who was a volunteer worker and/or officer of the organization to which the assurances *497were made.

Section 10(j)(1)’s exception requires explicit and specific assurances of safety; a lease restricting pets does not qualify merely because it implies that tenants will comply.

Cooper v. Somerville Housing Authority · filed 1999-08-19(j)(1)

At best, plaintiff could argue that the lease requirements prohibiting tenants from keeping pets on the premises and the landlord’s option to commence termination proceedings against tenants who did keep unauthorized pets gave rise to an implied assurance that plaintiff would not encounter pets in other tenants’ apartments. Assurances that are merely “implied from the conduct of the parties or the situation” are not the kind of “explicit and specific assurances” required to meet the §10(j)(1).

Section 10(j)(1) permits liability when a person relies on explicit and specific assurances of assistance; in an emergency, the circumstances can make an assurance sufficiently specific about when assistance will occur.

Lamare v. Commonwealth · filed 2000-02-18(j)(1)

Under these emergency circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the assurance of assistance, which the jury found was given, would be carried out at once. Therefore, the Town’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as it pertains to specific and explicit assurances is DENIED.

Section 10(j)(1) requires explicit and specific assurances of safety or assistance; general promises to address housing conditions do not qualify.

Campbell v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 2005-03-04(j)(1)

The various responses by BHA inspectors, including that “it would be taken care of,” her apartment would be made “sanitary and clean,” she was entitled to “safe, affordable, and decent housing,” and “they would take care of it,” did not constitute “explicit and specific assurances” that “the premises [were] free of lead paint hazards.”

Section 10(j)(1) permits a claim despite immunity when a public employee makes explicit and specific assurances of safety or assistance and the injury results partly from reliance on them.

McCarthy v. City of Waltham · filed 2010-04-09(j)(1)

The city’s motion for a directed verdict should have been allowed because the evidence that the police made “explicit and specific assurances of safety or assistance” to James’s family members, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon’s Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 7 n.1 (1983), was insufficient, as matter of law, to overcome the immunity afforded the city under G. L. c. 258, § 10(/).

Section 10(j)(1) permits a negligence claim against a public employer when its employees specifically assure someone that they will address reported third-party misconduct.

Doe v. Town of Stoughton · filed 2013-01-22(j)(1)

However, at hearing, Plaintiff represented that she was given specific assurances by public employees that the offensive behavior would be addressed. Under the facts as alleged, the conduct by the Town of Stoughton’s public employees fall into the exception to immunity under M.G.L. ch. 258 § 10Cj)(1).

Section 10(j) permits claims based on negligent maintenance of apartment locks and related alternative accommodations, but bars other negligent security claims absent specific and explicit assurances of safety.

Rodriguez v. Cambridge Housing Authority · filed 1998-04-17(j)

Such allegations of negligent maintenance of the property may proceed under §10(j)(3). ... Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiffs’ claims are based on any theory of negligent security beyond negligence in the maintenance of the physical security of the unit (Le., the locks) and failure to provide alternative accommodations until the locks were fixed, such claims are barred by §10(j).

Section 10(j)(3) permits a negligent-maintenance claim to proceed when a factual dispute exists over whether a town’s failure to light an intersection was negligent maintenance of public property.

Estate of Walenty v. Town of Mendon · filed 1999-12-22(j)(3)

However, the public duty exemption does no apply to “any claim based on negligent maintenance of public property." G.L.c. 258, §10(j)(3). Accordingly, since there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Town’s failure of illuminating the intersection was negligent maintenance, summary judgment must be denied.

Section 10(j) does not immunize a municipality from claims based on negligent maintenance of public property.

McCarthy v. Town of Hamilton · filed 2000-01-07(j)(3)

The third exception to §10(j) is straightforward in stating that harm resulting from poorly maintained public property is not subject to the section’s general liability exclusion. Since Mrs. McCarthy’s claims are based on allegations of negligent maintenance of public property — both the beach, due to lack of appropriate warnings and preventative measures, and the lake, due to the town’s failure effectively to deal with the weeds— the town is not immune from liability under §10(j).

Section 10(j)(3) permits claims based on negligent maintenance of public property despite the sovereign immunity exception in § 10(j).

Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Administration & Management of the Trial Court · filed 2006-12-15(j)(3)

Further, the exception set forth in § 10 (j) does not apply to “any claim based on negligent maintenance of public property.” G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j) (3). While the plaintiffs’ complaint does not specifically include a count for negligence, the thrust of their complaint is negligent maintenance of the Sullivan Courthouse by the CJAM. If proved, such allegations would not be barred by sovereign immunity in accordance with G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j) (3).

Section 10’s negligent maintenance exception covers a housing authority’s failure to change working locks when it knows an unauthorized person may have a key.

Rodriguez v. Cambridge Housing Authority · filed 2003-09-03(j)(3)

We conclude, as did the trial judge, that the failure to change working locks here falls within the maintenance exception to negligent security claims otherwise barred by the statute.

Section 10(j)(3)’s negligent maintenance exception concerns upkeep of playground equipment and grounds, rather than prevention of every risk to visitors.

Moore v. Town of Billerica · filed 2013-06-07(j)(3)

The maintenance of a playground envisions the general upkeep of the playground’s equipment and grounds, not preventing all risks of danger to its visitors.

Section 10(j)(3) does not remove immunity when a public employer did not create the condition and only failed to warn visitors or prevent harm.

Gill v. Armstrong · filed 2023-06-22(j)(3)

Where the complaint does not allege that the town created the condition at issue, and where the complaint alleges only that the town failed to warn visitors and failed to prevent all risks by "permitting" the cable to be maintained on its property, the claims do not fall within the § 10 (j) (3) exception.

Section 10(h) immunizes a municipality from claims that police negligently failed to prevent a third party’s criminal conduct, including by failing to provide adequate police protection or enforce the law.

Carleton v. Town of Framingham · filed 1994-09-12(h)

The plaintiffs’ theories of liability all depend on the alleged failure of the police to prevent Nagle’s criminal conduct. In the words of clause (A), these claims are based on the “failure to provide adequate police protection,” to “prevent the commission of crimes,” and to “enforce [a] law.” Aside from its exceptions (inapplicable here), clause (A) seeks to immunize a municipality when the criminal acts of a third person are a cause of a plaintiff’s harm, and the police were negligent in not preventing that criminal conduct. We conclude that clause (A) purports to immunize the town in the circumstances of this case.

Section 10(A) provides governmental immunity for claims based on a failure to provide adequate police protection or enforce the law.

Makynen v. Mustakangas · filed 1995-10-10(A)

While the appeal in this case was pending, the Supreme Judicial Court decided Carleton v. Framingham, 418 Mass. 623, 629 & n.7 (1994), which holds that G. L. c. 258, § 10(A), provides governmental immunity against the kind of claim asserted by the plaintiff.6 That case is dispositive of the plaintiff’s claims against the Commonwealth.

Section 10(h) immunizes a municipality from claims based on inadequate police protection, even when the activity incidentally generates municipal revenue.

Pallazola v. Town of Foxborough · filed 1994-09-12(h)

The statutory public duty rule set forth in the amendment provides immunity to a municipality from claims based on the “failure to provide adequate police protection, prevent the commission of crimes, ... or enforce any law.” G. L. c. 258, § 10 (h). ... Nothing in the amendment suggests or implies that we should create an exception from immunity for negligent conduct occurring in the course of some activity that incidentally generates revenue for the municipality.

Section 10 exempts claims arising from a public employee’s negligent protection, supervision, or care of people in custody, and the 1993 amendment applies to claims without a final judgment.

Richardson v. Dailey · filed 1994-09-29

Although not raised by their motions, the Court takes note that, in 1993, Mass. G.L.c. 258, §10 was amended by exempting from liability any claim arising out of a public employee’s “negligent protection, supervision or care of persons in custody . . . ,” and by providing that the amendment shall apply retroactively “to all claims upon which a final judgment has not entered ...” The Supreme Judicial Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the amendment. Carleton v. Town of Framingham, 418 Mass. 623 (decided September 12, 1994); Pallazola v. Town of Foxborough, 418 Mass. 639 (decided September 12, 1994). Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider whether the City or the Commonwealth would otherwise be required to defend a negligence claim on the grounds that Richardson’s custodians should have known that he posed a suicide risk (see White v. Seekonk, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 139, 140 (1986)) or negligently failed to provide him adequate supervision (see Sloven v. Salem, 386 Mass. 885 (1982)). Accordingly, summary judgment is allowed on these counts.

Section 10(h) bars claims based on a municipality’s failure to provide adequate police protection, prevent crimes, or arrest suspects.

Ford v. Town of Grafton · filed 1998-05-08(h)

Section 10(A) specifically bars claims based on the “failure to provide adequate police protection, prevent the commission of crimes, investigate, detect or solve crimes, identify or apprehend criminals or suspects, arrest or detain suspects, or enforce any law.”

Section 10(h) and (j) immunize a public employer from liability for claims based on failure to provide adequate police protection.

Fish v. Lyons · filed 1998-09-03(h), (j)

Since the plaintiffs’ claims are based upon failure of a public employer to provide adequate police protection service, the Court rules that clauses (h) and (j) immunize the City of Melrose from liability in the circumstances of this case.

Section 10(h) bars negligence claims against a municipality for inadequate police protection, including an officer’s direction of traffic on a public way.

Fellman v. Khalsa · filed 2004-01-15(h)

A police officer’s directing traffic on a public way is a common form of providing police protection to the public for the risks involved in motor vehicle traffic. Such protection can never be perfect. The Legislature in Section 10(h) has determined that a “failure to provide adequate police protection” cannot be the basis for a negligence suit against a city or town.

Section 10(h) immunizes a municipality from claims that officers negligently directed traffic because traffic direction is police protection, absent an applicable exception for explicit and specific assurances of safety.

Ariel v. Town of Kingston · filed 2007-06-06(h)

We agree that police officers’ direction of traffic on a public way constitutes a form of providing police protection to the public for the risks involved in motor vehicle traffic. ... Police officers directing traffic are generally, and specifically here, not making “explicit and specific assurances” of safety to the operators of individual motor vehicles.

Section 10(h) preserves a town’s immunity from an inadequate police protection claim where the officer’s alleged violence arose from a personal dispute and allegations that supervisors knew of the danger or promised protection are too vague to support relief.

Hogan v. Byrne · filed 2011-08-29(h)

Of necessity, the plaintiff must overcome the Town’s immunity particularly as affirmed in G.L.c. 258, § 10(h) which provides in pertinent part that the MTCA does not apply to: ... The problem between the two men was personal, not official and unrelated to Byrne’s duties as a police officer. The plaintiffs claim against the Town is not saved by a general allegations that Byrne’s supervisors knew or reasonable should have known about the problem between Byrne and the plaintiff or that assurances were made by an unidentified person on an unidentified date that some action would be taken to protect the plaintiff from harm from Byrne. The allegations are so general and vague that the plaintiffs right to relief against the Town is speculative at best.

Section 10(c) excludes public employer liability for claims arising directly from a public employee’s intentional torts.

Farrah Ex Rel. Estate of Santana v. Gondella · filed 2010-07-22(c)

Public employers are not liable for claims arising directly out of an employee’s intentional torts. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) preserves public employers’ immunity from claims arising from intentional torts.

Cass v. Town of Wayland · filed 2019-05-30(c)

Additionally, as public employers, the Town of Wayland, WPS, and WPD are immune from claims arising from intentional torts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) does not waive the Commonwealth’s immunity for intentional torts.

Madison v. Cruz · filed 2019-06-25(c)

The Commonwealth has not waived its immunity for intentional torts.

Section 10(c) preserves the Commonwealth’s immunity from intentional tort claims.

Madison v. Cruz · filed 2019-08-01(c)

The Commonwealth has not waived its immunity for intentional torts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) bars public employer liability for intentional torts.

Holden v. Barry · filed 2020-11-19(c)

This count is dismissed against the town because the MTCA does not allow employer liability for intentional torts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) immunizes public employers from intentional tort claims, and § 10(d) immunizes them from claims arising from tax assessment or collection.

Tomaselli v. Beaulieu · filed 2013-08-30(c), (d)

The Tomasellis’ claims against the Town itself must be dismissed, as the Town is immune from suits alleging intentional torts. ... In addition, to the extent that the Tomasellis are contending that the defendants are seeking to enforce an illegal tax, the Town is immune from “any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax” pursuant to ch. 258, § 10(d).

Section 10(c) preserves public employers’ immunity from claims arising out of intentional torts.

Pollard v. Georgetown School District · filed 2015-09-17(c)

Under Massachusetts law, however, public employers like the District “remain immune from ‘any claim arising out of an intentional tort[.]’ ” Wilmot v. Tracey, 938 F.Supp.2d 116, 143 (D.Mass.2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c)). The Court dismisses this claim against the District with prejudice.

Section 10(c) preserves a public employer’s immunity from claims of intentional torts.

Collins v. Boston Public Health Commission · filed 2022-02-11(c)

BPHC retains its immunity to claims of intentional torts under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c); see id. at § 1 (including public and regional health districts within the definition of public employer).

Section 10(c) preserves the Commonwealth’s immunity from intentional tort claims.

Hartunian v. Sweeney · filed 2022-08-29(c)

Indeed, under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, the Commonwealth expressly retains immunity for intentional torts.

Section 10(c) excludes claims arising from employees’ intentional torts from public employer liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

DiFronzo v. City of Somerville · filed 2023-08-28(c)

A public employer is not liable, however, for the intentional torts of its employees.

Section 10(c) excludes intentional tort claims from the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, leaving public employers immune from those suits.

Spring v. Geriatric Authority of Holyoke · filed 1985-03-14(c)

The plaintiff contends that by virtue of the language in G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c), she is entitled to pursue her intentional tort claims without recourse to c. 258. We disagree. ... Consistent with the common law principles of governmental immunity which preceded the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, we conclude that public employers retain their immunity from suits arising from intentional torts.

Section 10(c) excludes all intentional torts from the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, including those not listed in the section.

Connerty v. Metropolitan District Commission · filed 1986-08-05(c)

We construe the language of § 10 (c) as excluding all intentional torts from the coverage of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. The use of the word “including” in § 10 (c) indicates that the enumeration of intentional torts in the section is not an all-inclusive list.

Section 10(c) excludes intentional torts by State employees from the basic provisions of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act but does not bar common law remedies in areas the Act does not cover.

Lane v. Commonwealth · filed 1988-01-19(c)

Although the basic provisions of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act are not applicable to intentional torts by State employees ... the enactment of G. L. c. 258 did not bar the development and application of common law principles governing the liability of public employers in areas to which G. L. c. 258 does not apply.

Section 10(c) makes the Tort Claims Act’s liability provisions inapplicable to claims arising out of intentional torts.

MacLean v. Delinsky · filed 1990-07-09(c)

In any event, G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c), makes §§ 1-8 of that chapter inapplicable to claims arising out of intentional torts. The complaint alleges only intentional torts and therefore G. L. c. 258 does not help the plaintiffs.

Section 10(c) bars a claim against a public employer based on an employee’s intentional tort.

Tambolleo v. Town of West Boylston · filed 1993-05-25(c)

This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the sole claim made in the plaintiffs’ letters was one barred by G. L. c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) immunizes the Commonwealth from liability for intentional acts of its employees.

Wilson v. Commonwealth · filed 1992-01-09(c)

To the extent that the DEQE’s actions may be construed as “willful and malicious,” the Commonwealth is immune from liability from any such intentional acts of its employees. G. L. c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) bars claims against public employers for intentional torts committed by public employees.

Priestly v. Doucette · filed 1993-12-21(c)

Since G.L.c. 258, § 10(c) prohibits actions against public employers for intentional torts committed by a public employee, Count IV must be dismissed against the State Police.

Section 10(c) makes a public employer immune from liability for its employees’ intentional torts.

Consolo v. George · filed 1993-10-19(c)

It is well settled law that pursuant to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, a public employer is immune from liability for the intentional torts of its public employees.

Section 10(c) excludes intentional tort claims from public employer liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

Tramontozzi v. Watertown School Committee · filed 1994-06-09(c)

Where, as here, the School Committee received notice of a claim explicitly barred under the Torts Claim Act, G.L.c. 258, §10(c), presentment is inadequate.

Section 10(c) immunizes public employers, including the Boston Redevelopment Authority, from suits for intentional torts.

Lafayette Place Associates v. Boston Redevelopment Authority · filed 1998-05-20(c)

We therefore hold that the BRA is immune under G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c), from suit for intentional torts.

Section 10(c) exempts public employers from liability for claims arising out of intentional torts.

Haddad v. Scanlon · filed 1999-07-16(c)

On a final note, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act exempts public employers from liability for any claim arising out of an intentional tort. See G.L.c.258, §10(c). Consequently, Haddad’s claims against the City of Beverly for intentional infliction of emotional distress, (Count II), defamation (Count III), and violations of G.L.c. 12, §111 (Count VI), will be dismissed.

Section 10(c) precludes public employer liability for employees’ intentional torts, including assault and battery.

City of Lynn v. Thompson · filed 2000-10-23(c)

We recognize that G. L. c. 258, § 10(c), precludes liability on the part of public employers for the intentional torts, including assault and battery, of their public employees. Nothing in the findings of the arbitrator or in this record suggests anything other than that E.R.’s injury was caused by conduct unbecoming an officer, that is, his insensitive handling of a person exhibiting signs of mental illness.

Section 10(c) permits a negligence claim against a municipality when the harm directly results from intentional acts.

Barnes v. Town of Webster · filed 2005-10-11(c)

However, a municipality may be liable under a negligence theory in circumstances in which the harm is the direct result of intentional acts.

Section 10(c) preserves the Commonwealth’s immunity from intentional tort claims.

Whalen v. Commonwealth · filed 2006-06-26(c)

Intentional torts are expressly exempted from the waiver of the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L.c. 258 (‘Tort Claims Act”).

Section 10(c) shields a town from liability for employees’ intentional torts, including malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Fiske v. Town of North Attleboro · filed 2007-02-14(c)

Here, Count (6): malicious prosecution; Count (8): abuse of process; and Count (12): intentional infliction of emotional distress are clearly intentional torts and explicitly fall within the scope of G.L.c. 258, § 10(c). Therefore, the Town is immune from liability on these three claims.

Section 10(c) excludes municipal liability for intentional tort claims, but does not bar claims against public officials in their individual capacities.

Cachopa v. Town of Stoughton · filed 2008-09-15(c)

Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, § 10(c), municipalities are not liable for any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including intentional interference with a contractual relationship. However, Cachopa’s claims are against Pascarelli and Goulston in their individual capacity and are thus not barred by governmental immunity.

Section 10(c) bars claims against municipalities for intentional torts, including interference with advantageous or contractual relations.

Blackstone Smithfield Corp. v. Town of Blackstone · filed 2009-05-13(c)

Blackstone Smithfield cannot maintain its claims under Count II against the Town because, under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, municipalities are not liable for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . interference with advantageous relations or interference with contractual relations." G.L.c. 258, § 10(c); see also Swanset Dev. Corp. v. Taunton, 423 Mass. 390, 397 (1996).

Section 10(c) excludes all intentional tort claims against the Commonwealth, including torts not expressly listed.

Lefebvre v. Umass Memorial Health Care, Inc. · filed 2004-05-10(c)

The statute specifies a list of intentional torts,4 but is properly read to exclude all intentional torts.

Section 10(c) precludes intentional tort claims against public employers and public employees sued in their official capacities.

Hutchings v. City of Gardner · filed 2010-01-04(c)

The court also notes the MTCA would preclude the plaintiffs assertion of his intentional tort claims (intentional interference with business relations and abuse of process) against both the City, see G.L.c. 258, §10(c) (precluding public employer liability for employee’s intentional torts), and the individual defendants acting in their official capacities, see Saxonis v. Lynn, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 916, 918 (2004) (stating public employee sued in official capacity for intentional tort immune under G.L.c. 258, §10(c)), rev. denied, 443 Mass. 1104 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 819 (2005); Howcroft v. Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 596 (2001) (affirming dismissal, under G.L.c. 258, § 10(c), of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against public employees sued in official capacity).

Section 10(c) immunizes municipalities from claims arising out of intentional torts, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Willoughby Ex Rel. Doe v. Town of Tisbury · filed 2010-11-10(c)

Pursuant to Massachusetts law, the Town is immune from liability for “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including ... intentional mental distress.”

Section 10(c) bars claims against a public employer for its employees’ intentional torts, including conspiracy to interfere with a contract.

Bingo Innovative Software, LLC v. Cahill · filed 2011-06-09(c)

It is well established that under the MTCA, a public employer cannot be sued for its employees’ intentionally tortious conduct. G.L.c. 258, §10(c); Nelson v. Salem State College, 446 Mass. at 537; Cachopa v. Town of Stoughton, 72 Mass.App.Ct. at 665. Thus, the Lottery is not liable to BIS for Cahill and Cavanagh’s interference with the pilot agreement or conspiracy to commit the tort of contractual interference.

Section 10(c) immunizes public employers from claims arising out of intentional torts, including malicious prosecution.

Damon v. Hukowicz · filed 2013-08-09(c)

The court also agrees that the Hadley Police Department is immune from this claim; under section 10(c) of the Massachusetts Tort Claims ACT (“MTCA”), public employers are immune from “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including ... malicious prosecution.” M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c). As the Hadley Police Department falls within the definition of a “public employer,” see M.G.L. c. 258, § 1, section 10(c) plainly applies.

Section 10(c) preserves public employers’ immunity from claims for intentional torts, including invasion of privacy and malicious prosecution.

Hamani v. Commonwealth of Executive Office of Public Safety & Security · filed 2014-12-11(c)

Section 10(c) lists a number of these intentional torts, including both malicious prosecution and invasion of privacy. G.L.c. 258, §10(c). As a result, the plaintiffs claims of invasion of privacy against DCJIS (Count I) and Probation (Count III), as well as her claim for malicious prosecution against Probation (Count V) fail as matter of law.

Section 10(c) bars intentional tort claims against officials in their official capacity but does not apply when an official is sued individually.

Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water District · filed 2014-12-23(c)

Thus, any official capacity claim against Bernardo for an intentional tort would be barred. See Nelson v. Salem State Coll., 446 Mass. 525, 537 n. 9, 845 N.E.2d 338, 349 n. 9 (2006). Since, however, Bernardo is being sued in his individual capacity, the statute has no application here.

Section 10(c) immunizes public employers from liability for intentional tort claims such as intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Butcher v. University of Massachusetts · filed 2018-09-17(c)

Because UMass is statutorily immune, summary judgment properly entered in favor of UMass as to Butcher's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c); Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 427 Mass. 509, 533-535 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999).

Section 10(c) keeps public employees immune from claims arising from intentional torts, including misrepresentation and deceit.

Doe v. Spears · filed 2019-07-17(c)

Nor has Massachusetts waived its sovereign immunity with respect to intentional tort claims under the MTCA. See Wilmot v. Tracey, 938 F. Supp. 2d 116, 143 (D. Mass. 2013) (explaining that “under Section 10(c) of the MTCA, public employees remain immune from any claim arising out of an intentional tort . . . [and thus plaintiff] cannot maintain a claim against the DCF for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c) (listing misrepresentation and deceit as examples of intentional torts for which public employees remain immune under the MTCA).

Section 10(c) exempts public employers from liability for intentional acts of their employees.

Deady v. Koutoujian · filed 2015-08-05(c)

Section 10(c) of the Act exempts public employers from liability for the intentional acts of their employees. See G.L.c. 258, §10(c). In his opposition memorandum, Mr. Deady argues that his complaint alleges that Mr. Koutoupan demonstrated a deliberate indifference to Mr. Davison’s medical needs and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him, and that Mr. Koutoujian may be held personally liable under the Act for these intentional acts. These allegations are conclusoiy and do not meet the standard required to survive a motion to dismiss. Mr. Deady’s argument is, unfortunately, unavailing.

Section 10 immunizes a municipality from suit under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act for intentional torts committed by its employees acting within the scope of their duties.

Mercurio v. Town of Sherborn · filed 2017-12-19

The claim fails against the Town because a municipality as a public employer is immune from suit under the Massachusetts Torts Claim Act (MTCA) for the intentional torts of its employees acting within the scope of their duties.

Section 10(c) makes a public employer immune from liability for intentional torts.

Puleio v. Timberland Corp. · filed 2019-01-18(c)

The claim does not lie against the DOC, which, as a public employer under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, is immune from liability for such intentional torts. G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c ).

Section 10(c) bars claims arising from intentional torts, including malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Williams v. Lamusta · filed 2022-12-08(c)

First, Mr. Williams solely alleges intentional tort claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress barred by the statute.

Section 10(c) bars intentional tort claims against a public employer.

Richards v. Walter Fernald State School · filed 2000-07-31(c)

Fernald School is a public employer within the meaning of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff concedes that her claims of intentional torts (intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault) are barred by G.L.c. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) bars claims against public employees based on alleged negligent or reckless conduct.

Pace v. Massachusetts Department of Correction · filed 2021-03-24(c)

Claims made against public employees based on alleged negligent or reckless conduct are barred by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c).

Section 10(c) preserves governmental immunity for claims alleging willful, wanton, or reckless conduct because that conduct is treated as intentional for purposes of the Act.

Hurley v. Berkshire Design Group · filed 1993-12-21(c)

The MTCA will be viewed, in its §10, as immunizing Worcester from liability for the willful, wanton and reckless conduct alleged in Count I of the complaint.

Section 10(c)'s intentional tort exception does not apply to a claim for negligent misrepresentation, even if the count is titled “Misrepresentation/Deceit.”

G & B Associates, Inc. v. City of Springfield · filed 1995-08-04(c)

It is obvious, however, that the title to Count IV is a mistake because the contents of that count spell out a claim for negligent misrepresentation. It follows that G. L. c. 258, § 10(c), does not apply to Count IV, and the parties have not argued otherwise.

Section 10(c)'s intentional-tort exception does not cover a claim of reckless conduct.

Jackson v. Town of Milton · filed 1996-08-27(c)

In Forbush, this court held that reckless conduct is not equivalent to intentional conduct for the purposes of G. L. c. 258, § 10(c).5 This principle was later affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Molinaro. Accordingly, since the plaintiffs claim falls outside the scope of § 10(c), there is no basis for ignoring the § 2 exemption.

Section 10(c) does not bar a claim for a municipality’s negligent training or supervision merely because an officer’s intentional tort caused the injury; an arrest is not required.

Chaabouni v. City of Boston · filed 2001-02-27(c)

Similarly, while Chaabouni seeks redress for the intentional torts the'officers allegedly committed, his additional negligence claim against the City rests on the independent theory that the City was negligent in failing to train and supervise Officers Thomas and Buchanan. ... Consequently, the Court applies the state courts’ interpretation of section 10(c) and rejects the City’s motion to dismiss the negligence claim on that basis.

Section 10(c) does not immunize a municipality from a negligent failure-to-train claim merely because the resulting strip search was an intentional act; an intentional tort requires the searching officer to know the search was unlawful.

Ford v. City of Boston · filed 2001-07-31(c)

While I certainly agree that a strip-search is an intentional “act,” it is not an intentional tort unless the officer performing the search acted with “intent to harm (or a state of mind of knowing that the act would result in a violation of a legally protected right).”

Section 10(c) does not bar a negligent defamation claim merely because it lists libel and slander among the intentional torts excluded from the waiver of governmental immunity.

Haney v. City of Boston · filed 2012-07-30(c)

Thus, while §10(c) excludes intentional torts from the waiver of sovereign immunity, it does not bar claims rooted in negligence.

Section 10(c) bars claims against municipalities arising from employees’ intentional torts, even when pleaded as vicarious liability grounded in negligence.

Nault v. Bazarewsky · filed 2018-02-26(c)

Under the MTCA, public employers, including municipalities, are not liable for intentional torts committed by public employees. See Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018, 1044 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 284-85 (1985)); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 10(c) (stating that municipalities may not be sued based on “any claim arising out of an intentional tort, including . . . false imprisonment, false arrest, intentional mental distress, [and] malicious prosecution . . . .”). Plaintiff cannot circumvent the MTCA by pleading a vicarious liability claim as one grounded in negligence.

Section 10(c) bars municipal liability for an employee’s false arrest when a negligence claim rests on an investigation that led to that arrest.

McDonald v. City of Boston · filed 2018-09-20(c)

Since the City cannot be liable for a false arrest by its employee, and the crux of McDonald’s negligence claim is that the defendants’ negligent investigation led to her false arrest, Count III against the City fails to state a claim.

Section 10(c) bars municipal liability for a public employee’s false arrest, including when the claim is framed as negligent investigation leading to that arrest.

McDonald v. City of Bos. · filed 2018-09-20(c)

However, no party in that case seems to have argued that Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 258, § 10(c) expressly provides that a city cannot be liable for a false arrest performed by one of its employees. This court cannot similarly disregard the plain language of § 10(c).

Section 10(c) excludes public-employer liability for employees’ intentional torts, even when the claim labels the conduct negligent.

Hunter v. Chrispin · filed 2023-02-21(c)

A public employer is not liable, however, for the intentional torts of its employees.

Section 10(c) permits negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against a municipality based on physical interactions with responding officers when those interactions may have been negligent.

Galego v. City of Fall River · filed 2023-11-20(c)

The court therefore will not dismiss the negligence count (or the negligent infliction of emotional distress count) under § 10(c), to the extent that plaintiff’s claims are based on physical interactions with the responding officers.

Section 10(c) does not bar a negligence claim based on faulty record keeping merely because the resulting harm was an arrest and imprisonment.

Ortiz v. County of Hampden · filed 1983-05-27(c)

We hold that the plaintiffs claim states a cause of action sounding in negligence which is not barred by G. L. c. 258, § 10(c), and should not have been dismissed either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) ... or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 10’s intentional tort exception does not bar a claim based on a city’s independent negligence, even when that negligence results in an officer’s assault and battery.

Hathaway v. Stone · filed 1988-06-27

This claim is based on the City’s own negligence, rather than Stone’s intentional tort. The negligence claim against the City does not “arise out of” Stone’s intentional torts, but rests on an independent negligent act by the City.