Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9

Section 9’s damages and fee provisions do not make an available insurance administrative remedy inadequate; a plaintiff must exhaust that remedy before suing.

Gordon v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. · filed 1972-04-12(3), (4)

The provisions of G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (3) and (4), for minimum damages, multiple damages, attorney’s fees and costs do not confer upon the plaintiff rights of the type which must be vindicated by an administrative remedy in order for it to be adequate.

Section 9(6) lets a person entitled to bring a consumer action sue without exhausting administrative remedies, subject to the paragraph seven procedure.

Shipps v. Compass Group USA, Inc. · filed 2002-01-11(6)

Paragraph seven of 93A, §9 refers to the court acting upon a motion brought by the respondent to bring the petitioner before a regulatory board. Because no such motion is before the court and, given the rationale outlined in the c. 127, §§38E-38H exhaustion inquiry, paragraph seven is inapplicable in this case. As Shipps is a person entitled to bring an action under §9, there is no exhaustion requirement.

Section 9(6) allows eligible consumers to sue without first pursuing or exhausting administrative remedies.

Silva v. Todisco Services, Inc. · filed 2017-01-24(6)

By statute, individuals who are “entitled to bring an action” under G.L.c. 93A, §9, “shall not be required to initiate, pursue or exhaust” any administrative remedies before filing suit or obtaining relief under c. 93A in court.

Section 9 generally requires a consumer to send a demand letter at least thirty days before filing suit.

Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc. · filed 1975-01-30(3)

At least thirty days before commencing suit, the plaintiff, with an exception not applicable to this case, must send a demand letter to the prospective defendant.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter identifying the specific deceptive practices claimed; the plaintiff must allege and prove this prerequisite to suit.

Entrialgo v. Twin City Dodge, Inc. · filed 1975-08-20(3)

A demand letter listing the specific deceptive practices claimed is a prerequisite to suit and as a special element must be alleged and proved.

Section 9 requires a consumer to mail a written demand for relief before bringing an action.

Nader v. Citron · filed 1977-03-08(3)

The statutory scheme provides different procedures for consumers seeking relief under § 9 and businessmen seeking relief under § 11. Before an action may be initiated under § 9, the consumer must mail a written demand letter to a prospective defendant.

Section 9 limits a Chapter 93A claim to the unfair or deceptive acts described in the written demand for relief.

Kaminski v. Shawmut Credit Union · filed 1980-06-30

In 1975 Mr. Kaminski did indeed send a demand letter to CCU, MCUSIC and the Shawmut. However the violations of the TILA which have been discussed herein were not mentioned in that letter. ... I rule that the claim under Chapter 93A is limited to the claim outlined in that letter and does not extend to the TILA violations discussed above.

Section 9’s demand letter requirement is satisfied when the letter gives the defendant notice of the claim and requested relief so it can investigate and negotiate settlement, despite an incorrect mileage figure or an omitted damages amount.

Franklin Street Auto Sales & Service, Inc. v. Patrick Motors, Inc. · filed 1981-01-23

The primary purpose of the demand letter required by M.G.L. c. 93A, § 9 is to promote negotiation and settlement. It is to put defendant on notice so the defendant can investigate the claim. With such notice, the defendant can investigate the claim and initiate settlement or negotiation. The plaintiffs letter notified the defendant that the odometer reading was altered and further claims treble damages, attorney’s fees and costs. The Judge’s findings that the demand letter was sufficient is based on substantial evidence and the defendant’s first and second requests for rulings were properly denied.

A § 9 demand letter must identify the grievance clearly enough to give the defendant a fair opportunity to tender, but need not state a legal theory.

Swanson v. Bankers Life · filed 1982-06-11

We hold that the letter expressed the plaintiffs’ grievance with sufficient clarity to put the defendant on notice and fairly gave the defendant an opportunity to tender. We reject the implication that the letter had to set forth the legal theory or rationale for the plaintiffs’ demand for relief.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to wait thirty days after making a demand before suing under § 9, but does not prevent the consumer from pursuing other remedies during that period.

York v. Sullivan · filed 1975-12-03(3)

Second, the thirty-day requirement is a prerequisite to an action under § 9, but nothing in the statute makes it a prerequisite to any other remedy available to aggrieved consumers.

Section 9's thirty-day demand letter requirement does not apply to a claim brought under Section 11.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. State Park Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 1981-12-08

Because count four of the plaintiff’s complaint was brought pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 11, there was no requirement of a thirty-day demand letter as required by G. L. c. 93A, § 9, Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 99-101 (1977), and the judge committed error in dismissing count four.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant seeking treble damages to send a written demand describing the unfair act and injury at least thirty days before filing suit.

Carter v. Empire Mutual Insurance · filed 1978-03-23(3)

While it is true that violations of G.L.c. 140C also constitute violations of G.L.c. 93A (see G.L.c. 140C, § 12), the plaintiff cannot succeed in her effort to recover treble damages pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, § 9(3). The record appendix reveals no evidence that the plaintiff at least thirty days before the commencement of her suit sent any of the defendants a written demand for relief "reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered."

Section 9 does not automatically treat a failure to offer a settlement in response to a demand letter as bad faith.

Russell v. Denton · filed 1982-07-12

Upon the evidence including exhibits, the trial judge was well justified in refusing to give various of the Russells’ requests for rulings, for example (1) that there was a knowing and wilful violation of G. L. c. 93A, § 2, and (2) that Denton’s refusal to offer any settlement in his response to the demand letter was in bad faith.

Section 9’s demand letter requirement is satisfied when the letter reasonably describes the deceptive acts and gives the defendant an opportunity to evaluate and settle the claim, even if it does not specify a money or property loss.

Brandt v. Olympic Construction, Inc. · filed 1983-06-03(3)

The demand letter reasonably described the deceptive acts relied on and “was sufficient to give the defendant]]] ‘an opportunity to review the facts and the law involved to see if the requested relief should be granted or denied’ and to enable [it] to make ‘a reasonable tender of settlement’ in order to limit the recoverable damages.”

A demand letter under § 9(3) remains adequate for a claim it describes even if it raises other matters.

Doucette v. Kwiat · filed 1984-08-28(3)

The fact that other matters were raised in the demand letter does not invalidate that portion of the letter that related to the fee taken for discharging the liens. The demand letter was adequate as to the claims on which Doucette recovered in this action.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter that reasonably describes the unfair practice and the injury suffered; an inadequate letter does not satisfy the prerequisite to suit.

Spring v. Geriatric Authority of Holyoke · filed 1985-03-14(3)

General Laws c. 93A, § 9, provides that a written demand for relief must "reasonably" describe the unfair practice complained of and the "injury suffered." ... We therefore hold that the plaintiff's demand letter, even if we treat it as introduced in evidence, does not satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under G.L.c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter that reasonably describes the unfair practice and injury; relief is unavailable for practices omitted from the letter.

Thomas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1985-04-23(3)

Under G.L. c. 93A, § 9, para. (3), it is required that the claimant must file a demand letter “reasonably describing the unfair act or practice relied upon and the iryury suffered.” In the present case, the insured alleges unfair and deceptive practices which occurred subsequent to the filing of the demand letter. Since Aetna effectively was not informed of the damage inflicted during storage until the aforementioned demand letter was filed, in our view, it was not properly notified under G.L.c. 93A, § 9. Relief is unavailable for practices which are unmentioned in the demand letter.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to allege and prove compliance with the demand letter requirement to recover.

Rita v. Carella · filed 1985-05-16(3)

In order to recover under c. 93A, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the “demand letter” requirement was satisfied. G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3).

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to describe the injury and relief sought and give the recipient a signal that the claimant intends to invoke Chapter 93A.

Cassano v. Gogos · filed 1985-07-11(3)

We are of opinion that, in order to qualify as a written deman under c. 93A, a letter must, in addition to defining the injury suffered and the relief sought, mention at ... least one of the six factors we have enumerated (or contain some other signal which will alert a reasonably perceptive recipient).

Section 9 requires a good-faith settlement offer after a consumer’s demand letter; an offer based on terms concealed from the consumer can be unreasonable and in bad faith.

Lodie v. Anton's Cleaners · filed 1993-02-04

This finding is well within the proscription of M.G.L.c. 93A §9 which states once a demand is made, based on a Chapter 93Acomplaint, the settlement offer must not be made “in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice complained of violated said section two.” M.G.L.C. 93A §9. Defendant’s settlement offer was unreasonable and in bad faith because it was based on terms not made known to plaintiff.

Section 9 requires a consumer to send a demand letter before suing a defendant for a Chapter 93A violation.

Kilgore v. R. J. Grosso Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1987-03-26(3)

Clearly, in the instant case, plaintiffs, the Kilgores, having never given a §9 demand letter to Season-All Industries, Inc., could not maintain an action directly against Season-All Industries, Inc. for c. 93A violations.

Section 9 requires a claimant to allege that a demand letter was sent.

City of Boston v. Aetna Life Insurance · filed 1987-04-09

The failure of the City to allege the sending of a demand letter is fatal to its § 9 claim.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant to send a demand letter to a prospective respondent at least thirty days before suing that respondent; an amended complaint cannot relate back to a date before the claimant could have sued.

Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc. · filed 1987-09-24(3)

Because the letter and intent of c. 93A, §9(3) requires that mailing or delivery of a claimant’s letter precede by at least thirty days the commencement of any action against the prospective respondent identified in that letter, and since the plaintiff failed to serve a demand letter upon Ford, naming Ford as a prospective respondent to a possible c. 93A action until January 26,1984, the earliest date as of which an action could be commenced against Ford would have been on or about February 25,1984, a date well beyond the time when the four year statute of limitations specified in c. 260, §5A elapsed. The so-called “relation back” doctrine would allow the amendment adding Ford to relate back to February 25, 1984, but in our opinion it could not “relate back” to a point before which the plaintiff could have brought his action against Ford.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand at least thirty days before suit that identifies the claimant and reasonably describes the unfair or deceptive practice and the injury suffered.

MacKenzie v. Auto Supermart, Inc. · filed 1988-01-11(3)

The statute requires, as a condition precedent to bringing an action, that “At least thirty days prior to the filing of .any such action, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be mailed or delivered to any prospective respondent.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is apparent that the plaintiffs letter neither describes “the unfair or deceptive act” relied on nor the injury suffered.

A consumer seeking double or triple damages after a manufacturer fails to timely comply with or appeal a state-certified Lemon Law arbitration award need not send a separate demand letter under § 9(3).

Latino v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1988-08-17(3)

We hold that no demand letter is necessary for a consumer to collect double or triple damages upon the manufacturer’s failure to either timely abide by the arbitration order or file a timely appeal.

Section 9’s demand-letter requirement does not prevent a later-added consumer claim from relating back to the original complaint when the demand letter was sent after that complaint was filed.

Stark v. Patalano Ford Sales, Inc. · filed 1991-03-07

We see nothing in the legislative objectives of the § 9 demand letter or the circumstances of the instant case which precludes application of relation back principles to Stark’s motion to amend his original complaint by adding a claim under c. 93A against Ford. The claim should not have been dismissed.

Section 9 requires a demand letter to reasonably describe the injury claimed; an omitted injury cannot support relief, even nominal damages.

Mitchell v. Norman B. Watt Associates, Inc. · filed 1996-02-08(3)

The failure of the demand letter to describe any injury for loss of enjoyment bars any G.L.c. 93A relief for such a claim, including nominal damages of $25.00.

Section 9(3)’s 30-day period gives a defendant an opportunity to obtain Chapter 93A protection; it does not set the deadline for a reasonably prompt response under Chapter 176D.

Carmen Forcucci and Theresa Forcucci v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company · filed 1993-11-01(3)

Thirty days is a statutory period relating to a defendant’s opportunity to receive Ch. 93A protection, Mass.G.L. e. 93A, § 9(3), not to the statutory requirement of a reasonably prompt response. Mass.G.L. c. 176D, § 3(9).

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter identifying the alleged unfair or deceptive practices thirty days before suit, and the plaintiff must plead and prove that requirement was met.

Bean v. Cy Realty Corp · filed 1994-03-10(3)

A demand letter, listing the alleged specific unfair or deceptive practices of defendant, is a prerequisite to a G.L.c. 93A suit and, as a special element, must be charged and proved.

Section 9's demand letter requirement is satisfied when a plaintiff sends the demand to out-of-state defendants in care of their Massachusetts attorney, who has actively represented them for months.

Whelihan v. Markowski · filed 1994-08-25(3)

Neither of the well-established purposes of a demand letter (see Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 704 [1975]; York v. Sullivan, 369 Mass. 157, 162 [1975]; Spring v. Geriatric Authy. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 288 [1985]) were frustrated or compromised by the fact that the plaintiff sent her demand to the defendants, who resided in Connecticut, in care of their Massachusetts attorney, who had been active counsel of record for over ten months. We, therefore, conclude that the prerequisite to suit under c. 93A, § 9, was met.

Section 9’s demand letter requirement is satisfied by a plain and straightforward description of the basis for liability and the claimed injury.

Alfaro v. Capone · filed 1994-09-19

Finally, I conclude that plaintiffs demand letter sent before the action commenced fully complied with the requirements of G.L.c. 93A, §9 and described with adequate precision both the basis for Brenda’s liability claim against the Capones and the alleged injury she suffered. ... An effective and proper demand letter need not contain an encyclopedic description of the basis for liability or damages. A plain and straightforward description of both is perfectly adequate.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to specifically describe the alleged unfair or deceptive acts; a letter that fails to do so bars the action.

Simpson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1994-09-28(3)

Specifically, G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) requires “a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered . . .” As a matter of law, the required demand letter must contain a specific description of the defendants’ alleged deceptive acts.

Section 9(3) requires a pre-suit demand letter that specifically describes the alleged unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

McDermott v. Estate of Buchman · filed 1994-12-12(3)

Plaintiffs c. 93A demand letter fails to meet the criteria set out in §9(3). It does not list with specificity the alleged unfair or deceptive acts or practices of Dr. Buchman.

Section 9(3) requires a reasonable settlement offer within thirty days of a demand when liability is reasonably clear.

Clegg v. Butler · filed 1995-01-24(3)

Utica was required to make a reasonable offer of settlement within thirty days of the demand made upon it, G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). Utica’s failure to make an offer of settlement until July 3, 1992, violated the statute.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to allege and prove that a compliant demand letter was sent at least thirty days before filing suit.

Spilios v. Cohen · filed 1995-04-05(3)

The plaintiff has the burden of alleging and proving the timely sending of a letter complying with the statutory specifications, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, alleging omission to send such a letter, put on the plaintiff the obligation of showing that she would be able to sustain her burden of proof.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand at least thirty days before filing a consumer action and bars a claim against Massachusetts defendants when that requirement is not met.

Hadar v. Concordia Yacht Builders, Inc. · filed 1995-04-13(3)

At least thirty days before filing for relief under the Massachusetts C.P.A. plaintiffs must send a written demand to all proposed respondents. ... Therefore, the plaintiff’s proposed amendments under the C.P.A. are procedurally barred as concern Concordia Yacht and Concordia Custom.

Section 9(3) does not require a demand when the defendant has no place of business or assets in Massachusetts.

Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. · filed 1995-05-11(3)

Against Yamaha, which had no place of business or assets in the Commonwealth, no demand was necessary under G. L. c. 93A.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to give reasonable notice of each unfair practice for which the consumer seeks recovery.

Loftis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1995-08-11(3)

The Court finds that the 93A demand letter did give reasonable notice of a demand arising from Liberty’s failure to make a reasonable offer of settlement and its refusal to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation. It did not give reasonable notice to Liberty that one of the unfair acts or practices alleged by Loftis was Liberty’s failure to investigate the claim promptly. Therefore, Loftis may not recover for Liberty’s lack of promptness under G.L.c. 93A.

A consumer bringing a private claim for unfair insurance settlement practices under Chapter 176D through § 9 must first send a Chapter 93A demand letter.

Yood v. Dadasis · filed 1995-09-22(3)

This understanding, along with the fact that private enforcement of Chapter 176D only exists through the mechanism of chapter 93A, leads this court to conclude that such a cause of action by a consumer must be preceded by a Chapter 93A demand letter.

Section 9(3) requires 30 days’ written notice before suit; a letter that does not reasonably alert the recipient to a Chapter 93A claim is insufficient.

Eisenberg v. Gouthro · filed 1995-11-16(3)

The claimant must provide 30 days written notice prior to filing a 93A claim. ... The purported notice in the instant case contains none of the specific references enumerated in Cassano, nor does it contain any signal which could reasonably alert the defendants that a c. 93A claim is being contemplated. The letter is insufficient notice as a matter of law and defendants Neill and Flym’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED as to Count VI of the complaint.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to send a written demand at least 30 days before filing suit that identifies the claimant and reasonably describes the unfair or deceptive act and the injury suffered.

Contescu v. Colarusso · filed 1994-10-05(3)

As a prerequisite, the plaintiff must send a written demand at least 30 days prior to filing suit. The letter must identify the claimant, reasonably describe the unfair or deceptive act, and the injury suffered. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9(3) exempts an intervenor’s counterclaim from the demand requirement.

Crosby Yacht Yard, Inc. v. Yacht "Chardonnay" · filed 1994-11-14(3)

The bottom line is that because his claim is made by way of a counterclaim, Bomstein falls squarely within the exception found in M.G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3) which provides that the demand requirements do not apply to a “claim asserted by way of counterclaim ... ”.

A § 9 demand letter addressed to an individual under the trade name he used with consumers can support recovery against him personally.

Strong v. Hegarty · filed 1997-06-05

Defendant first contends that there can be no recovery under G.L.c. 93A, §9 because the demand letters were directed only to the corporation (which subsequently went bankrupt) rather than against Brendan Hegarty individually. This overlooks, however, the demand letter dated March 13, 1989, which was addressed to “Mr. Brendan Hegarty, Hegarty Construction, 21 Houghton Street, Dorchester, MA 02122."

A § 9(3) demand letter remains effective during ongoing settlement negotiations when later unfair conduct arises from those negotiations and is of the same character as the conduct identified in the letter.

Griffin v. Commercial Union Insurance · filed 1998-07-21(3)

As long as the alleged unfairness arises out of the negotiations that prompted the demand and as long as the alleged unfairness is of the same character as that specified in the demand, I am of the opinion that a letter of the type §9(3) requires has a continuing vitality for the litigation’s life.

A judge may not raise the sufficiency of a § 9(3) demand letter on the judge’s own initiative when the defendants have failed to object.

Fredericks v. Rosenblatt · filed 1996-07-11(3)

It was error for the judge to raise the issue of the sufficiency of the demand letter where the defendants expressly failed to do so.

Section 9 requires a 30-day demand letter before suit.

McMahon v. Digital Equipment Corp. · filed 1996-10-29

The plaintiff has not alleged that she sent a 30-day demand letter to CORE, a prerequisite to bringing a suit under Mass.Gen.Laws eh. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 requires a demand letter that reasonably describes the alleged deceptive act and injury; a deficient letter does not require a response.

Kramer-Rutter v. Cinella · filed 1997-05-27

The Court finds that the 1991 letter did not constitute a valid 93A demand letter, and that defendant’s failure to respond to it is not actionable. An adequate demand letter which reasonably describes the allegedly deceptive act and injury suffered is a prerequisite for a Chapter 93A action.

Section 9 requires a demand letter to be delivered to the prospective defendant at least thirty days before an action is filed.

Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-04-24

An action may not be brought under §9 of the statute unless a demand letter has been delivered to the prospective defendant at least thirty days prior to the tiling of any action. In the instant case, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, or even allege, that they fulfilled this requirement. As such, defendant’s motion is allowed concerning plaintiffs’ claim under this section of the statute, and plaintiffs’ cross-motion is denied.

Section 9 requires a demand letter to give enough facts about liability and injury for the recipient to evaluate the claim and make a reasonable settlement offer.

Logan v. Arbella Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-06-15(3)

Viewing the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that the first three letters individually and collectively fail to satisfy the requirements of G.L.c. 93A, as outlined by the above cases. While, in the first correspondence forwarded to Arbella, upon which the original complaint was premised, the plaintiff asserts “[T]he facts of this case present a clear case of liability on the part of your insured," the plaintiffs letter fails to elaborate or to set forth any facts upon which the allegation of “clear liability” is based. As for the alleged amount of damages, other than copies of plaintiffs medical bills, no facts as to plaintiffs medical condition which would warrant payment of the demanded policy limits ($1,250,000) were provided. Nor were other sufficient facts provided as to plaintiffs medical condition so as to enable the defendant to intelligently evaluate the case to be able to make a reasonable settlement offer.

Omitting one claimant from a Section 9 demand letter causes no prejudice when all attorney’s fees and costs are attributable to another claimant’s Section 9 claim.

Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 1998-07-16(3)

The fact that Mr. Vassallo was not included in the demand letter sent under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, caused the defendants no prejudice because the award of attorney’s fees and costs would, in any event, be attributable in its entirety to" Mrs. Vassallo’s G. L. c. 93A claim.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant to send each prospective defendant a separate demand letter at least thirty days before filing suit.

Zoppo v. John Hancock Insurance · filed 1998-06-03(3)

Because §9 requires that a separate demand letter be sent to each defendant, see Rita, 394 Mass. at 824 n.3, and because the Zoppos failed to send a demand letter to the GIC within the time set forth in §9(3), the GIC’s motion as to plaintiffs’ c. 93A claim will be allowed.

Section 9 requires a written demand before a consumer may pursue a c. 93A claim.

Labovitz v. Feinberg · filed 1999-07-16

The c. 93A count fails for the additional reason that there is no dispute that the plaintiff omitted making the written demand required by G. L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9 requires a consumer to send a 30-day demand letter before bringing an action and to allege that the letter was sent.

Ball v. Wal-Mart, Inc. · filed 2000-06-23(3)

Such a letter is a absolute prerequisite to an action asserted under G.L. c. 93A, § 9.

Section 9(3) does not require a demand letter to state a dollar amount when it otherwise describes the claim in detail.

Tarpey v. Crescent Ridge Dairy, Inc. · filed 1999-07-22(3)

Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, the fact that the demand letter did not specify the dollar amount demanded is not decisive since, as noted above, the letter was otherwise comprehensive and detailed.

Section 9(3) permits a plaintiff to use the demand letter and the defendant’s response to support a claim of unfair or deceptive practices.

Calianos v. Mutual Builders, Inc. · filed 1999-10-19(3)

In the Court’s view, both of the exhibits are necessary to establish a claim of unfair and deceptive practices pursuant to M.G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9 does not permit conduct that occurred after a demand letter to be treated as a separate basis for liability under that letter.

Davis v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2001-05-18(3)

This event occurred two months after the original letter, and, consequently, cannot be considered a separate item for purposes of G. L. c. 93A liability.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to be mailed at least 30 days before an action begins.

Dean v. Compass Receivables Management Corp. · filed 2001-06-27(3)

Moreover, M.G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3) requires that a demand letter be mailed at least 30 days prior to commencing an action thereunder.

A section 9 demand letter served thirty days before a motion to add a consumer claim can satisfy the demand requirement even if it was not served before the original complaint.

Medeiros v. Woburn Nursing Center, Inc. · filed 2001-07-31

Although the plaintiffs did not file their G.L.c. 93A claim within four years of the alleged violations, and did not serve a demand letter upon the defendants thirty days prior to the original filing, both as prescribed by the statute, they did file their Complaint within four years of the alleged G.L.c. 93A violations, and they,did serve a demand letter upon the defendants thirty days prior to filing this Motion to Amend Complaint to add the G.L.c. 93A claim. ... Thus, the Court will allow the amendment of the Complaint.

Section 9(3) does not require a demand letter to state a dollar amount when it describes the injury in enough detail for the recipient to reasonably estimate its exposure.

Simas v. House of Cabinets, Inc. · filed 2001-10-30(3)

Here, although the October 14, 1993, letter did not specify a dollar amount of damages, it described Simas’s injuries in sufficient detail to permit the contractor reasonably to ascertain its exposure.

Section 9(3) requires a defendant seeking to limit damages and attorney’s fees to respond in writing within thirty days of receiving the consumer’s demand letter.

Mackesy v. Fotopoulos · filed 2002-05-07(3)

An exception to the general rule arises under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). There, in order for a defendant to limit his liability for damages and attorney’s fees in a 93A action, he must respond in writing within thirty days of the mailing or delivery to him of the 93A letter. This exception has a specific purpose and is not admissible on the general question of liability.

Section 9(3) exempts a counterclaimant from the demand letter requirement and permits the respondent to offer relief after receiving notice of the claim.

Jablonski v. Clemons · filed 2002-06-07(3)

G.L.c. 93A §9(3) exempts one seeking relief (i.e. the defendants as plaintiffs in counterclaim) from the requirement of a demand letter. The statute goes on to provide that the respondent (i.e. the party from whom relief is sought) may make a written offer of relief and paying the rejected tender into cour t as soon as practicable after receiving notice of the claim for relief, the counterclaim in this case.

Section 9(3) permits a demand letter after arbitration resolves the underlying injury claim if the letter specifically identifies the unfair practice and gives the insurer an opportunity to limit its exposure to multiple damages.

Bickford v. Premier Insurance · filed 2002-05-17(3)

Premier contends that this letter is barred as well because it was written after confirmation of the arbitration award. Since the bodily injury claim was resolved, Premier argues that the January 25 th demand did not take place at a time that allowed Premier to limit its damage. While undoubtedly true for the underlying claim, the Court is not persuaded that this is the only type of damages appropriately addressed by a 93A demand. G.L.c. 93A allows for the award of double or triple damage awards. Such multiple damage awards are given not to compensate claimants for their injuries, but to deter the willful and malicious use of unfair and deceptive trade practices for the benefit of the public. The January 25, 2001 demand letter spoke with particularity directly to this theory of damages and gave Premier the opportunity to limit its possible exposure along these lines. As such, it is both sufficiently specific and timely to serve the procedural functions of a 93A demand letter.

Section 9(3)'s demand-letter requirement can be satisfied by a letter and pre-suit correspondence that adequately describe the alleged unfair practice and injury in light of what the defendant already knows.

Tallent v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-04-25(3)

Given the specific language of the original and supplemental demand letters, and the depth of Liberty Mutual’s knowledge of the underlying claim, this Court concludes that the c. 93A demand letter and the supplemental correspondence in 1996 meet the statutory requirements.

Section 9(3) requires neither a demand letter nor a settlement offer when a 93A claim is brought as a counterclaim.

Zimbovsky v. Tokar · filed 2005-09-07(3)

As the Tenant’s G.L.c. 93A claims were asserted by way of counterclaim, neither a thirty-day demand letter by the Tenant, nor a tender of settlement by the Landlord, was required by §9(3). ... While that statute permitted the Landlord to tender a written settlement offer to limit the Tenant’s potential recovery to single damages, it did not obligate him to do so.

Section 9(3) requires specificity in the demand letter, but not necessarily in the pleadings.

Lawson v. Affirmative Equities Co., LP · filed 2004-10-27(3)

While G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3), requires specificity, it does so in the demand letter and not (necessarily) in the pleadings.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to send a written demand at least thirty days before suit and allege that notice in the complaint; the court may allow amendment to cure an omitted allegation.

Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law · filed 2004-11-10(3)

Before bringing suit under that statute, a plaintiff must mail to the defendant a "written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3).

Section 9(3) requires consumer plaintiffs to deliver a written demand for relief before suing and to allege that they did so.

In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation · filed 2004-12-08(3)

The motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ chapter 93A claim is therefore Granted without prejudioe because the plaintiffs have not alleged that they delivered the required demand letter to the defendants.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to identify the alleged unfair practice so the recipient can assess a reasonable settlement offer.

Evangelista v. Hingham Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2005-02-14(3)

The letter made no reference to disparate treatment. Thus, Hingham was unable to consider this claim when assessing a reasonable settlement offer, as required by the statute.

Section 9 requires a claimant to send a written demand reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive practice and the injury suffered.

Bushay v. McDonnell (Bushay) · filed 2005-07-27(3)

Chapter 93A, § 9, which protects consumers from the unfair or deceptive practices of a person in any trade or commerce, requires the claimant to send a written demand letter reasonably describing the unfair and deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered.

Section 9 requires a demand letter before a consumer can recover for unfair or deceptive acts.

Parks v. Ricciardi · filed 2005-09-08

A G.L.c. 93A, §9 demand letter was a prerequisite to any recovery by the plaintiffs for Ricciardi’s unfair and deceptive acts.

A consumer claim under § 9 requires a demand letter; failure to send one defeats the claim.

Ron Bouchard's Auto Service, Inc. v. Donna M. Godfrey Trust · filed 2005-10-24(3)

The Trust’s failure to send a §9(3) demand letter to Chrysler was, however, fatal to any G.L.c. 93A, §9 claim.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant to send a demand letter directly to the prospective defendant; sending it to the defendant’s insurance adjuster does not satisfy the notice requirement.

Bassi v. Julian Crane & Equipment Corp. · filed 2005-10-26(3)

Bassi was required to serve a G.L.c. 93A demand letter directly to Crane as a separate, independent defendant. It was not reasonable for Bassi to believe that service on Morr was a service on Crane.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant to allege and prove an adequate demand letter before maintaining a consumer protection claim.

Reichenbach v. Financial Freedom Centers, Inc. · filed 2006-01-23(3)

A prerequisite to maintaining a c. 93A claim is the alleging and proving of a demand letter fulfilling the requirements of G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to send a written demand for relief at least thirty days before filing suit, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive practice and injury.

Linton v. New York Life Insurance & Annuity Corp. · filed 2005-03-01(3)

In order to file suit on such a claim, however, plaintiff must mail or deliver to defendant “[a]t least thirty days prior to the filing of any such action, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered.”

Section 9(3) exempts cross claims from the demand letter requirement, including cross claims filed by interveners.

Siegel v. Berkshire Life Insurance · filed 2005-10-06(3)

The judge correctly ruled that Carole was not required to send Berkshire a demand letter before filing her cross claim, because G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3), explicitly exempts cross claims from the demand letter requirement. ... Even if Carole voluntarily intervened in the creditors’ lawsuit, she was not required to precede her cross claim with a demand letter. The cross claim exception contains no limitation pertaining to interveners, and we see no reason to depart from the plain language of the statute.

Section 9 requires a plaintiff to send a demand letter before bringing a claim.

West Waters v. Earthlink, Inc. · filed 2006-06-19

The plaintiffs 93A claim fails because he has not sent the requisite demand letter pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9.

Section 9(3) does not require a new demand letter for a federal action alleging the same violations as an earlier state action for which a demand letter was sent.

Southern States Police Benevolent Ass'n v. First Choice Armor & Equipment, Inc. · filed 2007-03-09(3)

With respect to the first argument, the Court finds no case law directly on the issue but concludes that in this case where the violations alleged in the state class action complaint are identical to those in the federal class action complaint there is no reason to hold that the plaintiffs have failed to meet their demand requirement because they failed to refile their demand letter.

Section 9 requires a proper demand letter for a private consumer action.

Gray v. Kayafas · filed 2007-11-13

From these, I find that the plaintiffs sent a proper demand letter under G.L.c. 93A, §9 (Ex. D to Ethne Gray’s affidavit submitted in support of plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment).

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to serve a demand letter before bringing a consumer protection action and recovering under it.

Baillargeon v. Kazanjians Garage, Inc. · filed 2008-02-15(3)

The reason is that the plaintiff failed to serve G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) demand letters on the defendants in satisfaction of that statutory prerequisite to a G.L.c. 93A action and recovery.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to send a written demand letter before filing suit; failure to do so is fatal to the claim.

Roberts v. Crowley · filed 2008-03-06(3)

A failure to send the required demand letter is thus fatal to a claim brought under § 9.

Before class certification, § 9(3) requires a demand letter to describe the individual claimant’s own injury.

Richards v. Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. · filed 2006-07-14(3)

Accordingly, in judging the sufficiency of such a precertification demand letter, we look solely to the description of the individual claimant’s own injury, and the central issue in this case becomes whether the demand letter sufficiently described the injury suffered by the plaintiff herself.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand for relief before a consumer may sue under Chapter 93A.

In RE McMILLEN · filed 2008-05-07(3)

In order to prosecute his claim under that statute, McMillen was obligated first to make a written demand for relief upon Kadis in accordance with § 9(3) of the Act. G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3). The demand letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the Consumer Protection Act. Bushay v. McDonnell (In re Bushay), 327 B.R. 695, 702 (1st Cir. BAP 2005), aff'd 187 Fed.Appx. 17 (1st Cir.2006). McMillen has neither alleged nor shown evidence of compliance with this requirement. Accordingly, his count under G.L. c. 93A is dismissed.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand for relief before a consumer may sue under Chapter 93A; failure to allege or show compliance warrants dismissal.

McMillen v. Kadis (In re McMillen) · filed 2008-05-07(3)

In order to prosecute his claim under that statute, McMillen was obligated first to make a written demand for relief upon Kadis in accordance with § 9(3) of the Act. ... McMillen has neither alleged nor shown evidence of compliance with this requirement. Accordingly, his count under G.L. c. 93A is dismissed.

Section 9(3) does not require a demand letter when a claim is asserted by counterclaim.

DeBettencourt v. Aronson · filed 2009-09-28(3)

The contractor also claims that the homeowners cannot be awarded their attorney’s fees because they did not send a formal demand letter pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). This argument ignores the specific language of this subsection that states: “The demand requirements of this paragraph shall not apply if the claim is asserted by way of counterclaim. ...”

Section 9(3) requires a written demand for reasonable relief thirty days before a suit for treble damages.

Kanamaru v. Holyoke Mutual Insurance · filed 2008-08-21(3)

Chapter 93A, the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, requires a plaintiff to make a written demand letter asking for reasonable relief thirty days prior to filing a lawsuit for treble damages.

Section 9(3) excuses a claimant from sending a demand letter when the claim is asserted as a counterclaim.

NRT New England, Inc. v. Moncure · filed 2008-10-23(3)

However, §9 relieves a parly of the responsibility to send a demand letter when, as here, a c. 93 claim first arises in responsive pleadings. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). There is thus no jurisdictional defect barring the Court from hearing Moncure’s §93A claim.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter for a chapter 93A claim, and failure to send one can warrant summary judgment.

Brooks v. Manzaro · filed 2008-12-01(3)

Brooks does not dispute Manzaro’s fatal claim that Brooks failed to send a demand letter. Because Brooks has not responded with facts that would establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial on his chapter 93A claim, Manzaro is entitled to summary judgment on this count.

Section 9’s demand requirement applies to persons seeking relief for unfair or deceptive business practices, not businesses bringing claims under § 11.

Crisp Human Capital Ltd. v. Authoria Inc. · filed 2009-04-28

Authoria correctly points out that the demand requirement applies only to persons, not businesses, who seek a remedy for unfair and deceptive business practices under Chapter 93A, § 9.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to serve a demand letter identifying the alleged unfair or deceptive practices before filing suit.

Bevilacqua v. Eisen · filed 2009-05-27(3)

The Defendants are correct that serving a demand letter, which lists among other things the alleged unfair and deceptive practices, is a jurisdictional pre-requisite under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).

Section 9(3) requires a consumer plaintiff to send a written demand for relief before filing suit.

Paoluccio v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. · filed 2009-06-26(3)

Both plaintiff and defendant stipulate that no demand letter was sent prior to suit. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact in connection with the requirement of a demand letter, and thus the plaintiff has failed to satisfy this jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to prove that a written demand for relief was sent at least thirty days before filing suit.

Lingis v. Waisbren · filed 2009-10-19(3)

In sum, Lingis’s G. L. c. 93A claim fails because there is no evidence that she complied with G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3).

A consumer demand letter need not list every defect arising from conduct it has already reasonably described, and new defects from that conduct do not require additional demand letters.

Driscoll v. Toll MA Ltd. Partnership · filed 2009-12-28(3)

Although the plaintiffs did not make special reference in their initial demand letter to each particular structural defect that they now allege, the case law does not require such specificity with respect to claims of additional defects arising out of a cause of action that has already been reasonably described. Cf. Bressel v. Jolicoeur, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 205, 211 (1993) (plaintiffs Chapter 93A claim based on defendants’ alleged misrepresentation foreclosed where demand letter made “no reference to this particular act”). Here, the demand letter reasonably described the alleged unfair and deceptive acts, and the court finds no basis for requiring serial demand letters to account for each new defect that arises from the same conduct.

Section 9 requires a demand letter before suit and an allegation of that demand in the complaint; a letter sent after filing does not cure the omission.

In Re Flonase Antitrust Litigation · filed 2010-01-21

In this case, named plaintiff failed to send a demand letter to the Defendant before filing the SAC, nor was any demand alleged in the SAC. The fact that plaintiff did thereafter send a letter to Defendant on July 20, 2009, nearly two months after filing the SAC, cannot save plaintiffs claim. The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the claim under 93A is thus granted without prejudice.

Section 9 does not allow a plaintiff to recover damages for conduct omitted from the demand letter.

Lanton v. Lin · filed 2010-06-30

Quite apart from plaintiffs lack of a showing of any reasonable expectation of proving any measurable damages from this failure to admit an issue which was not contested at trial, M.G.L.c. 93A, §9 does not allow a plaintiff to recover damages for an activity not specified in the plaintiffs demand letter.

Section 9(3)’s demand letter requirement is satisfied when a respondent thoroughly answers a letter addressed to another entity, showing that it received notice of the claim and an opportunity to settle.

Fernandes v. Havkin · filed 2010-08-10(3)

Defendant’s argument fails because defendant’s thorough response to the letter, which was in compliance with section nine of chapter 93A, constructively satisfied the purpose of the demand letter requirement, which is making the respondent aware of claimant’s grievance and providing an opportunity to settle the claim prior to litigation.

Section 9(3) requires a pre-suit demand letter only when the respondent maintains a place of business or assets in Massachusetts.

In Re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation · filed 2010-09-21(3)

After examining the pleadings and motion to dismiss papers, however, the court is unable to ascertain whether the § 9 notification exemption applies to any defendants. In other words, it is unclear whether any defendant maintains a place of business or keeps assets within the state of Massachusetts. Resolution of this inquiry must simply await further development of the factual record and, consequently, defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim will be denied.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to plead service of a demand letter for a Chapter 93A claim.

Fernandes v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In Re Fernandes) · filed 2011-01-31(3)

As claims under c. 93A, they must be dismissed for failure of the Debtor to plead that she has served the demand letter required by G.L. c. 93A, § 9(3).

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter at least 30 days before suit that reasonably describes the unfair or deceptive practice and the injury.

Musi v. Blair · filed 2011-02-18(3)

At least 30 days before filing his complaint, Musi was required to mail or deliver to Blair “a written demand for relief, identifying [himself] and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive practice relied upon and the injury suffered.” G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). ... The letter was timely, and reasonably described the practices at issue.

A Massachusetts trial court read § 9(3) to excuse a demand letter if the respondent lacked either a Massachusetts place of business or assets.

Paisley v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC · filed 2011-02-25(3)

Under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), the demand letter requirements “shall not apply ... if the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth ...” This means that a demand letter is not required if GMAC either does not maintain a place of business in the Commonwealth “or” does not keep assets within the Commonwealth.

Section 9 requires a written demand for relief at least thirty days before suit; failure to prove service of the demand requires dismissal.

Patrocinio v. A.M.R. Realty, LLC · filed 2011-03-23(3)

There being no proof of the service of a written claim for relief pursuant to §9, received at least thirty days prior to filing of the law suit, the count for relief under G.L.c. 93A, §9 as set forth in Count II is dismissed.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to be delivered to the prospective respondent or a person authorized to negotiate or settle the claim for it.

Smith v. Jenkins · filed 2011-04-11(3)

Because Smith’s demand letter was neither addressed to George Fabrizio nor delivered to a person with authority to negotiate or settle the claim, the Chapter 93A delivery requirement was not satisfied, and Union’s motion for judgment as a matter of law will be allowed.

Section 9 requires a demand letter before an action may be brought.

President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Michaud · filed 2011-06-20

The act alleged to violate G.L.c. 93A (Harvard’s failure to pay the defendants’ prejudgment attachment) is between two businesses (Harvard and defendants) and, among other things, no G.L.c. 93A, §9 demand letter was ... alleged to have been sent—a prerequisite to bringing a §9 action.

Section 9(3) excuses a demand letter when the respondent has no place of business or keeps no assets in Massachusetts.

Williams v. Perrault · filed 2011-07-19(3)

Regarding the absence of a demand letter, Perrault’s argument ignores that part of §9(3) that states, “The demand requirements of this paragraph shall not apply ... if the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth....” In this case, Perrault admitted in his answer that, at all relevant times, he neither maintained a place of business, nor kept assets, in Massachusetts.

Section 9 requires a consumer bringing an unfair or deceptive practices claim to send a demand letter to the defendant.

Washington v. Clinton Savings Bank (In Re Washington) · filed 2011-08-29(3)

Mr. Washington alleges in his affidavit that the bank’s conduct was unfair and deceptive, the terminology of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, although his complaint lacks any reference to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and fails to state whether a demand letter was sent to the bank as required by the statute. Thus he has not stated a claim under the statute.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to describe the challenged conduct and resulting injury, but does not require the claimant to identify every statutory or regulatory violation.

Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. · filed 2011-09-01(3)

The demand letter required under G. L. c. 93A does not require claimants to set forth every specific statutory or regulatory violation alleged, so long as it fairly notifies the prospective respondent of the actions or practices of the respondent and the injury suffered.

Section 9’s demand-letter prerequisite is satisfied at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges a demand under the section.

Lingis v. Waisbren · filed 2011-10-05(3)

The italicized language used by plaintiff references her demand letter that she claims met the requirements of Section 9 of 93A. She has satisfied the demand letter pre-requisite to suit.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer plaintiff to send a Chapter 93A demand letter and plead compliance before suing.

Loltek-Jick v. O'Toole · filed 2011-12-15(3)

However, the complaint does not allege that a Chapter 93A demand letter was sent to O’Toole before this claim was asserted, and it is undisputed that no demand letter was sent. Under §9(3), “(n]ot only must such a letter be sent, but plaintiff must also plead that he has complied with this requirement as a prerequisite to suit.”

Section 9(3) does not require a thirty-day demand when the prospective defendant lacks a Massachusetts place of business or assets; dismissal for lack of notice is premature without facts showing the requirement applies.

Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc. · filed 2010-11-17(3)

However, that requirement “shall not apply if ... the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth.” § 9(3). If, on summary judgment, the Defendant can show facts supporting the applicability of the notice requirement under Massachusetts law, the question of whether the requirement was met will be ripe for decision. ... Likewise, Plaintiffs are not in breach of the notice requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 9, and the Massachusetts claims may proceed.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to be mailed or delivered to the prospective respondent; it need not comply with service of process rules.

Smith v. Dorchester Real Estate, Inc. · filed 2013-10-15(3)

No authority has been cited for the proposition that a Chapter 93A demand letter must be served on a defendant in compliance with the Massachusetts service of process rules, and we have found none. ... All that the statute requires is that a demand letter be "mailed or delivered" to a prospective respondent.

Section 9(3) excuses a consumer from sending a demand letter when the defendant has no place of business in Massachusetts.

Powell v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2012-01-04(3)

The Powells’ un-rebutted response to Deutsche Bank’s challenge is that the notice requirement does not apply because Deutsche Bank did not maintain a place of business in Massachusetts. See G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). Thus, the challenge fails on this ground.

Section 9 requires a demand letter, and failure to allege that one was sent is fatal to the claim.

Askenazy v. Tremont Group Holdings, Inc. · filed 2012-01-26

The second set encompasses the claims brought under section 9 by the six plaintiffs who, the Complaint fails to allege sent the statutorily-required demand letter.... That pleading omission is “fatal” to their claims.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to serve a demand letter at least 30 days before filing suit; a letter sent after filing does not cure that failure.

Conrad v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. · filed 2012-04-24(3)

Plaintiff cannot advance her c. 93A claim because she failed to serve a demand letter at least 30 days prior to initiating this action, as required under the statute.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to prove the demand letter at trial; attaching it to the complaint does not establish that element.

Hugenberger v. Alpha Management Corp. · filed 2012-05-22(3)

While the Court in Lingis was not concerned with the notice aspect of c. 93A, §9(3), it is well established through that case and others (citations omitted) that the demand letter is an element that must be proven at trial. In this matter, the plaintiffs made no efforts to admit the demand letter into evidence, and their reliance on the fact that they appended a copy of the demand letter to the complaint is misplaced.

Section 9(3) requires a presuit demand letter that describes the specific alleged unfair or deceptive conduct; a claim based on conduct absent from the letter cannot proceed.

Da Silva v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-08-08(3)

Without a demand letter stating the specific alleged violations, Plaintiff cannot proceed with a claim of violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter sent 30 days before suit that describes the challenged acts and injury with reasonable specificity; the claimant must allege that it sent the letter.

Russo's Marine Mart, Inc. v. Harris · filed 2012-10-25(3)

A prerequisite to bringing an action under section 9 is a demand letter sent 30 days before suit that, at a minimum, describes with reasonable specificity the acts complained of and the injury suffered. G.L.c. 93A, §9(3). While not raised by the parties, this Court rules that the Harrises’ failure to allege in their counterclaim that they sent Russo’s such a demand letter defeats their action.

A defendant’s admission that a Section 9 demand letter was sent and received establishes those facts, but the court determines whether the letter’s content is legally sufficient.

Piscatelli v. Fitzgerald · filed 2013-04-03

Fitzgerald’s admission that a demand letter pursuant to G.L.c. 93A, §9 was sent and received was not binding on the court in its determination of the legal sufficiency of the letter. We conclude that Fitzgerald has not established error in the trial judge’s obvious conclusion that the demand letter was sent and received and that the content satisfied G.L.c. 93A, §9.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer plaintiff to prove a timely demand letter that meets the statute’s requirements; the letter itself is the best evidence of its contents.

Hugenberger v. Alpha Management Corp. · filed 2013-06-28(3)

Of particular import here, the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving “the timely sending of a letter complying with the statutory specifications.” Ibid., quoting from Spilios, supra. ... It also bears stating that the demand letter itself (and any written tender of settlement in response thereto) would be the best evidence of their contents.

Section 9(3) permits, but does not require, a recipient of a written demand to make a settlement offer in response.

Henning v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB · filed 2013-09-17(3)

Henning's claim is dismissed insofar as it is based on this assertion because the response to a potential plaintiff’s written demand is permissive under the statute.

Section 9(3) does not require a plaintiff to plead a presuit demand when the prospective respondents have no alleged place of business or assets in Massachusetts.

In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation · filed 2012-03-20(3)

Indeed, no such dispute would be sensible, given that the IPSAC plainly does not recite any factual allegations that the Defendants’ places of business or assets are located in Massachusetts. Accordingly, pleading pre-suit notification is not required here.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to plead facts showing a timely written demand for relief; a bare assertion of compliance is insufficient.

Calautti v. American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. · filed 2012-08-07(3)

Without further specificity as to sending of a demand letter, including its timing and contents, and the identity of the entity to which the plaintiff directed it, the complaint does not set forth allegations sufficient to show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Section 9(3) requires a pre-suit demand for relief; holding a Massachusetts mortgage and note supplies an asset that defeats the no-assets exemption.

Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-10-09(3)

As such, that Wells Fargo maintained at least one asset in Massachusetts is clear. This is enough to establish the need for pre-suit notice. Because Woods's pleadings admit she filed no notice, her 93A claim was properly dismissed.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand that identifies the specific unfair or deceptive practices; a general reference to Chapter 93A in a bankruptcy plan is inadequate.

Sheedy v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (In re Sheedy) · filed 2012-09-27(3)

The reference to Chapter 93A in the Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan is inadequate to constitute a written demand. The plan contains no reference to any specific deceptive practices.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand to the defendants before filing a Chapter 93A claim.

Lopez v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (In re Lopez) · filed 2013-01-03(3)

Furthermore, no claim is possible under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (“Chapter 93A”), which provides that “[u]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful”— since the Debtors did not send a written demand to any of the Defendants as required by Chapter 93A, § 9 before filing the Complaint.

Section 9(3) allows pleadings filed in an earlier case to serve as a written demand for relief when they give fair notice of the consumer claim and enable a reasonable settlement offer.

Farmer v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 2013-05-09(3)

After consideration, this court concludes that the pleadings filed by Farmer in Housing Court satisfied the requirements of G.L.c. 93A, §9(3), where they constituted fair notice of Farmer’s 93A claim and enabled Defendants to make a reasonable tender of settlement.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand for relief before suit, and the complaint must allege that the plaintiff sent it to the defendant.

O'Connor v. Nantucket Bank · filed 2014-01-16(3)

Given that the O’Connors failed to allege that they provided Nantucket Bank with the required demand letter, the Chapter 93A claim against Nantucket Bank is dismissed.

Section 9(3) does not require certified mail to prove that a consumer’s demand letter was delivered.

Leck v. Pope's Landing Marine, Inc. · filed 2014-10-23(3)

The statute does not demand proof of service through certified mail; nor is certified mail required by the terms of the statute to prove delivery.

Section 9 requires a plaintiff to send a demand letter thirty days before bringing an action.

Pare ex rel. Springer Farm Trust v. Northborough Capital Partners, LLC · filed 2015-02-27(3)

Plaintiffs under § 9 must send a demand letter thirty days prior to bringing an action, a requirement not contained in § 11.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to send a demand letter identifying the Chapter 93A claim and wait 30 days before filing suit.

Lassman v. Robinson (In re Toli) · filed 2015-08-14(3)

Under Chapter 93A, however, a plaintiff cannot file suit under that statute until 30 days have elapsed after a demand letter of the type set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3) has been sent. ... In the present case, the Trustee sent a demand letter, but the letter did not make any reference to Chapter 93A or “its vocabulary, — unfair or deceptive, multiple damages, recovery of legal fees.” ... Therefore, the Defendants are entitled to judgment on Count IX.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand at least thirty days before a consumer files suit.

Chery v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 2014-03-17(3)

The cases are utterly irrelevant to the issue before us — whether a party can, in the circumstances here, maintain an action under G.L.c. 93A, §9(3) in the absence of a demand under the statute, made thirty days prior to suit. The answer to that question is “no.”

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to send a demand before filing suit.

Haskins v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. · filed 2014-11-10(3)

The plaintiff's claim under G. L. c. 93A was properly dismissed because he did not send the requisite demand prior to commencement of suit.

Section 9(3) requires a plaintiff to plead that a written demand for relief was sent before filing suit.

Bou-Nassif v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2015-04-16(3)

This claim is DISMISSED against both defendants for failure to plead compliance with section 9(3) of chapter 93A requiring the sending of a written demand ... for relief in advance of filing suit.

An excessive request for relief does not invalidate a § 9(3) demand letter that adequately describes the injury and allows damages to be reasonably calculated.

Denapoli v. Hart · filed 2018-04-23(3)

The question before us then is whether a demand letter with an "excessive" request for relief violates the reasonableness requirement of G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3). ... While we agree with the judge that a demand for a full refund was excessive, we conclude that such demand was not fatal to the G. L. c. 93A award.

Section 9(3) excuses a written demand when the prospective respondent lacks a place of business in Massachusetts, even if it has assets there.

Moronta v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC · filed 2015-11-05(3)

We reject Nationstar's argument that the borrower cannot proceed on his G. L. c. 93A claim because he failed to serve a demand letter pursuant to c. 93A, § 9, on Nationstar. A written demand is required pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3), as appearing in St. 1979, c. 406, § 2, unless "the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth." The borrower alleged in his complaint that no c. 93A letter was required because the defendants do not maintain places of business in the Commonwealth. Nationstar's argument that its mortgages in the Commonwealth constitute assets, and therefore the notice requirement does apply even if it does not have a place of business in the Commonwealth, ignores that the statute is written in the disjunctive.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant to mail the defendant a written demand for relief that identifies the claimant and reasonably describes the unfair or deceptive practice.

Lannan v. Levy & White · filed 2016-05-11(3)

Under Chapter 93A, a plaintiff must mail to the defendant a “written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3).

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter to give a defendant notice of the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct; a letter that neither identifies the defendant nor describes its conduct is insufficient.

Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-07-05(3)

Even if we were to accept that an agency relationship may permit a Chapter 93A plaintiff to send a demand letter to only one defendant in a multi-defendant action, Young's demand letter does not mention Wells Fargo, nor does it describe any unfair or deceptive conduct committed by Wells Fargo. Accordingly, the demand letter was insufficient to put Wells Fargo on notice of Young's allegations, and summary judgment is warranted as to the Chapter 93A claim against Wells Fargo.

Section 9(3) excuses a consumer from sending a demand letter if the prospective respondent either lacks a place of business in Massachusetts or keeps no assets there.

Moronta v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC · filed 2016-12-22(3)

So rephrased, the provision clearly excuses the plaintiff from serving a demand letter if the prospective respondent either lacks a place of business in Massachusetts or does not keep assets in Massachusetts.

Section 9 requires a demand letter before a private consumer action may proceed.

Wildlands Trust of Southeastern Massachusetts, Inc. v. Cedar Hill Retreat Center, Inc. · filed 2016-12-30

The defendants makes several arguments as to why this Count should be dismissed, all of which are meritorious. ... Second, the defendants note that the plaintiffs failed to send a demand letter to defendants which is a prerequisite to an action under G.L.c. 93A, §9.

Section 9(3) does not require a demand letter to state a dollar amount if it describes the injury well enough for the recipient to estimate its exposure and offer a settlement.

In re Myford Touch Consumer Litig. · filed 2018-02-14(3)

That was enough for Ford to determine a ballpark figure of what was at stake and to make a settlement offer to Creed, satisfying the purposes of the requirement for a prelitigation demand letter under Massachusetts law.

Section 9(3) requires a presuit demand letter that reasonably describes the unfair practice and injury and gives the defendant a meaningful basis to assess damages.

Traut v. Quantum Servicing Corp. · filed 2018-03-07(3)

The demand letter here was sufficient to achieve the dual purposes of the notice requirement, encouraging negotiation through notification to prospective defendants and limiting the amount of damages in a meaningful way.

Section 9(3) requires a demand letter that gives the defendant notice of the alleged injury and potential damages so the parties can negotiate a settlement.

Traut v. Homeward Residential, Inc. · filed 2018-03-07(3)

The demand letter here was sufficient to achieve the dual purposes of the notice requirement, encouraging negotiation through notification to prospective defendants and limiting the amount of damages in a meaningful way.

Section 9(3) requires a consumer to send a demand letter before suit when the respondent maintains a place of business in Massachusetts at the relevant time.

Rodrigues v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC · filed 2018-09-24(3)

Because the undisputed facts show that Ocwen did maintain a place of business in Massachusetts at the necessary time, the plaintiffs were required to first send a Chapter 93A demand letter as a precondition to suit. Ocwen is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A claim.

Section 9(3)’s exception to pre-suit notice requires facts showing that the defendant has no place of business or assets in Massachusetts.

In re Rust-Oleum Restore Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation · filed 2016-01-07(3)

Plaintiffs’ allegation that Rust-Oleum is an Illinois corporation and silence as to a place of business or assets in Massachusetts does not suffice, however, as they “must allege facts” supporting the exception’s application.

A defendant who fails to raise a § 9(3) demand-letter objection before or during trial cannot pursue it after trial, even if it pleaded the objection as an affirmative defense.

Silva v. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2017-04-26(3)

Norfolk & Dedham also argues that the c. 93A claim was barred because Silva failed to make a specific demand for postjudgment interest in his demand letter. See G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3). While Norfolk & Dedham asserted § 9(3) as an affirmative defense in its answer, it did not raise this issue in its opposition to Silva's motion for summary judgment "or otherwise flag it prior to (or even after) trial." Diamond v. Pappathanasi, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 89 (2010). "Having proceeded through a full trial to determine the truth of the allegations set forth in the plaintiff's complaint, we believe that it is too late for the defendant[] to argue the point." Ibid.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand that identifies the claimant, describes the unfair or deceptive practice, and signals an intent to invoke Chapter 93A.

Adams v. Wells Fargo Bank · filed 2018-11-20(3)

When bringing a claim for a violation of Chapter 93A, the party seeking relief must present the other party with a “written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3). ... The proposed amended complaint does not attach or refer to a Chapter 93A demand letter. Nor does it provide any evidence that her communications to Wells Fargo contained any signal that she intended to invoke Chapter 93A.

Section 9(3) requires a written demand at least thirty days before suit, unless the prospective defendant has no place of business or no assets in Massachusetts.

Casey, Jr. v. 3M Company · filed 2019-02-12(3)

Although the notice requirement does not apply where the defendant does not maintain a place of business or keep any assets in Massachusetts pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A, § 9(3) (providing in relevant part that subsection 3 does not apply “if the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth”), Casey has not alleged facts indicating that Alligator does not maintain a place of business or keep assets in Massachusetts.

Section 9(3) requires a claimant to mail a written demand describing the unfair practice and injury at least thirty days before filing suit.

Culley v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2019-03-29(3)

First, chapter 93A § 9(3) directs a complainant to mail “a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered” at least thirty days prior to the filing of any action for relief under chapter 93A.

Section 9(3) excuses a consumer from sending a demand letter if the prospective respondent either lacks a place of business in Massachusetts or does not keep assets there.

Lyons v. Federal National Mortgage Asscociation · filed 2019-05-01(3)

The SJC concluded that a demand letter would not be required and reasoned that the statute “clearly excuses the plaintiff from serving a demand letter if the prospective respondent either lacks a place of business in Massachusetts or does not keep assets in Massachusetts.” Id. at 1014–15. The SJC’s interpretation of the Chapter 93A demand requirement should have controlled, see Needleman v. Bohlen, 602 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1979) (“We, of course, are bound by the SJC’s rulings on Massachusetts law.”), and this Court’s reliance on federal case law that was effectively overruled by Moronta’s holding was in error.

Section 9(3)'s pre-suit demand requirement is satisfied when demand letters are properly mailed and delivered, even if the recipients refuse to accept them.

Wade v. Touchdown Realty Grp., LLC · filed 2019-06-07(3)

Plaintiffs have put evidence into the record showing that they sent pre-suit demands by either certified or first-class mail to the two most recent addresses for both Touchdown and Clayton. Defendants evidently refused to accept service of the demand letters, but they were properly mailed and delivered.