30A Mass. Gen. Laws § 14

Section 14 requires a final agency decision before judicial review; labor certification questions ordinarily become reviewable after the commission rules on an unfair labor practice complaint.

Sullivan v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1977-07-22

Judicial review of certification questions should not take place until a complaint is brought charging an employer or an employee organization with an unfair labor practice, and the commission has issued or denied the requested order.

Section 14 does not permit judicial review of a local planning board’s decision because the board is not an agency under chapter 30A.

Chase v. PLANNING BOARD OF WATERTOWN · filed 1976-07-07

We do not find it necessary to decide whether the plaintiffs are aggrieved persons within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 14, because the planning board of Watertown is a local body and is not an “agency” for purposes of the State Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A.

Section 14 does not provide Superior Court review of a commission decision when the commission lacked authority to hear the appeal and no adjudicatory proceeding occurred.

Casa Loma, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1979-02-05

Because the commission had no statutory authority to hear Casa Loma’s appeal, ... there was no adjudicatory proceeding before it (see. G. L. c. 30A, § 1), and thus Casa Loma had no right under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, to appeal the commission’s decision to the Superior Court.

Section 14 does not permit an appeal from a commission decision when there was no adjudicatory proceeding before the commission.

Profile Lounges, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1979-04-23

Thus, the plaintiffs’ appeals to the commission were without statutory authority, there was no adjudicatory proceeding before the commission, and, therefore, the plaintiffs could not appeal from the commission’s decision to the Superior Court under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as they have attempted to do.

Section 14 judicial review proceedings do not apply to the judicial department.

Sampson v. Committee on Probation · filed 1979-12-03

Nor can we regard this as a proceeding under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as such proceedings also do not apply to the judicial department.

Section 14 does not permit judicial review of a Labor Relations Commission certification decision because it is not a final order.

Local 1111, International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1982-07-27

In the Superior Court the defendants argued that judicial review did not lie from a certification decision of the commission, because such a decision is not a final order of the commission. In this regard they are correct.

Section 14 permits judicial review of final decisions in adjudicatory proceedings, including decisions dismissing benefit appeals or denying recalculation requests.

Crane v. Commissioner of Public Welfare · filed 1985-07-22

We conclude that the department’s actions in either dismissing the appeals or denying the requests for a recalculation of EA benefits were final decisions in an adjudicatory proceeding subject to judicial review.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretion, including when the agency interprets a contract it was charged with approving.

Children's Hospital Corp. v. Rate Setting Commission · filed 1991-05-08(7)

Ordinarily, in appeals pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), we give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” ... We therefore must accord the commission’s interpretation of HA-30 deference in reviewing its decision.

An appeal from a DEQE order must be brought under § 14; a District Court appeal from a conservation commission order cannot disturb it.

DeGrace v. Conservation Commission of Harwich · filed 1991-07-29

This was error: the District Court judge had no power to disturb the ruling of the DEQE. Any appeal from the order of the DEQE would have to have been made pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. (None was taken.)

Section 14(7) permits a court to review prospective agency orders when they are part of the final decision under appeal.

Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Council · filed 1991-11-12(7)

Third, we may set aside or modify the council’s decision if it is in excess of statutory authority, based on an error of law, arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (b), (e), and (g), (1990 ed.). Therefore, since the orders are part of the decision from which MMWEC is appealing, it is appropriate that we decide their validity at this time by determining the council’s authority under its enabling legislation.

Section 14 generally permits judicial review of final orders, not interlocutory orders, in workers’ compensation cases.

O'Brien's Case · filed 1996-12-12

The Attorney General argues that G. L. c. 152, § 12 (2), and G. L. c. 30A, § 14, which govern appeals from orders in workers’ compensation cases, only make provision for appeals from final orders, and this is surely not a final order. We agree that interlocutory orders in these cases are not appealable.

Section 14(7) does not require a court to defer to an agency conclusion that is an error of law.

Mayor of Lawrence v. Kennedy · filed 2003-01-09(7)

The commission’s contrary conclusion was an error of law and consequently is not entitled to the substantial deference typically afforded the commission’s resolution of matters properly before it. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7); Boston Police Superior Officers Fedn. v. Labor Relations Commn., 410 Mass. 890, 892 (1991).

Section 14 permits Superior Court review of a lottery prize dispute after a Commission hearing and final decision, within thirty days of that decision.

Daniel v. Massachusetts State Lottery Commission · filed 2003-07-15

Failure to prevail in a hearing before the Commission allows Daniel to seek judicial review of the Superior Court pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14(7) within thirty days of the Commission’s final decision.

Section 14 permits judicial review of a final agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding; a stay pending further agency review is not final.

Capolupo v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2003-12-01

This discouragement is made express in G.L.c. 30A, §14, which permits review only of “a final decision of [an] agency in an adjudicatory proceeding.” ... The DEP’s determination that such review is required is a procedural stepalbeit one having potentially significant consequences for the project’s schedule and budgettoward this determination. It is not a “final order” reviewable under c. 30A, §14.

Section 14 permits a reviewing judge to modify an agency award when the agency denied interest based on an error of law.

DeRoche v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2006-06-12

Modification of the commission’s award to impose the twelve per cent rate was well within the authority of the judge, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, where the commission had denied interest based on an error of law.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Brackett v. Civil Service Commission · filed 2006-07-14(7)

A reviewing court “shall give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 permits review of an agency decision when a complaint challenges the agency’s application of a regulation and seeks to set aside its decision, even if the complaint also challenges the regulation’s validity.

Moot v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2007-02-12

Although the plaintiffs do challenge the validity of the regulation, they also challenge the department’s application of the regulation in this case and seek, among other things, an order setting aside the department’s decision. Their complaint is properly brought under § 14.

Section 14 calls for deference to an administrator’s expertise and experience, but that deference does not require a court to uphold an agency decision contrary to governing law and public policy.

United States Gypsum Co. v. Executive Office of Environmental Affairs · filed 2007-06-04

Although we must give due deference to an administrator’s “expertise and experience,” pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, the principle of deference does not extend to judicial abdication, ... particularly when the exercise of that expertise and experience is fundamentally at odds with overarching public policy, here that of protecting and preserving the Commonwealth’s marine economy and nonrenewable coastal resources to the maximum extent practicable.

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing MCAD decisions to give due weight to the agency’s specialized knowledge when reviewing its housing determinations.

Sy v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2011-07-08(7)

The judge’s reversal of the MCAD decision because the apartment was not available “in March or April” but “was becoming available in the future, . . . [that it] was more of an expectation than a time with any certainty,” failed to accord the deference due the specialized knowledge of the MCAD in its determination of what constituted “available” housing.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and discretionary authority.

Parente v. State Board of Retirement · filed 2011-11-03

Pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, we are required to give “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency [CRAB], as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.”

Section 14 permits review of an agency decision only if it resulted from an adjudicatory proceeding, which requires a statutory or constitutional right to a hearing.

Hoffer v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 2012-02-03

Because Hoffer had neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a hearing on her petition for reinstatement, the board’s order was not the result of an “adjudicatory proceeding.” Therefore, Hoffer may not rely on G. L. c. 30A, § 14, to obtain review of that order.

Section 14 provides judicial review of final agency decisions; an investigating commissioner’s denial of a motion to dismiss before a hearing does not qualify.

Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2012-09-19

A complainant, respondent, or other person aggrieved by a final decision of the commission may obtain judicial review in the Superior Court. G. L. c. 151B, § 6. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14. For the purpose of judicial review, “the Decision of the Full Commission . . . shall constitute the Final Order of the Commission.” 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.24(1) (1999). Here, the Temple’s motion to dismiss the commission complaint was denied during the investigatory stage of the commission proceedings, before any finding had been made as to probable cause, and before any public hearing had been conducted. Therefore, there was no statutory authority for judicial review of the denial of the motion to dismiss by the investigating commissioner.

Section 14 review begins with the text of the agency decision, rather than the agency’s later interpretation of it.

John Doe No. 376575 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2014-02-04

In reviewing a decision of an administrative agency under M.G.L.c. 30A, §14, the starting point is the text of the administrative decision, not the agency’s after-the-fact interpretation of that decision.

Section 14 permits judicial review of a final agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding; dismissal of a complaint for which no hearing is required does not qualify.

Hougie v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 2015-01-29

Under G.L.c. 30A, §14, “any person or appointing authority aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding” may seek judicial review with this court. This court is authorized to reverse, remand or modify an agency decision under an array of various statutory grounds, all of which are irrelevant here because the court is without jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision.

Section 14 allows judicial review of final agency decisions in adjudicatory proceedings; an MCAD investigating commissioner's lack of probable cause determination after a preliminary hearing is not reviewable.

Grandoit v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Grandoit v. Boston Housing Authority · filed 2019-07-12

Judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is available to persons "aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding." ... The investigating commissioner's determination is therefore not a "final" agency decision subject to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A or, by extension, G. L. c. 151B, § 6.

Section 14 permits judicial review of an agency's denial of a motion to reopen a classification proceeding when the denial concerns a claimed right to an agency hearing.

Doe, SORB No. 6969 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2021-05-10

SORB's denial of Doe's motion to vacate his final classification was a decision in an adjudicatory proceeding within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 permits judicial review of an agency decision only when there is a right to an agency hearing.

FORE RIVER RESIDENTS AGAINST COMPRESSOR STATION v. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT & others. · filed 2021-12-16

FRRACS's argument is unavailing; judicial review is not available under § 14 unless there is a right to an agency hearing.

Section 14(7)(g) provides for judicial review of certain State agency decisions but does not authorize review of town board decisions.

CAROLINE YOUNG & Others v. TOWN OF LEE & Others. · filed 2024-02-29(7)(g)

The plaintiffs argue that review for abuse of discretion is authorized by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (g). That statute, however, provides for judicial review of certain decisions of State agencies; it does not authorize review of decisions of town boards.

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of a local board of health decision because the board is not an agency under chapter 30A.

P.J. Keating Company v. Town of Acushnet · filed 2024-04-12

PJK sought review of the board's order in the Superior Court, citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as the basis for such review. ... The board is not an "agency" as that term is defined in G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (2), and thus the board's decision is not reviewable under c. 30A.

Section 14 provides judicial review of a final agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding; it does not apply when no such proceeding occurred and the agency decisions were not final.

ELIZABETH GRADY FACE FIRST, INC. v. DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE & Another. · filed 2024-05-28

Equally inapplicable is G. L. c. 30A, § 14, which applies to "a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding." Here, of course, no such proceeding is alleged to have happened and, under the licensing scheme, neither agency's decision could in any event be deemed "final."

Section 14 governs review of inmate grievance appeals, while prison disciplinary appeals proceed by certiorari under G. L. c. 249, § 4.

GLENN HART v. DENNIS W. BUTLER & Others. · filed 2025-04-16

Because this is a disciplinary appeal, this is an action in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, and not an inmate grievance appeal subject to review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 permits an inmate who has exhausted administrative remedies for a grievance about prison conditions to seek judicial review of the agency's decision.

JOSHUA CARRIER v. JAMES RIOUX & Others. · filed 2025-05-09

Where, as here, an inmate has filed a grievance against prison officials concerning conditions of confinement and has exhausted administrative remedies, the inmate may seek judicial review of the decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 does not permit judicial review of a human rights commission’s preliminary finding of no probable cause because it is not a final agency decision.

CRISWELL v. CARITAS COMMUNITIES INC. & Another. · filed 2025-12-04

The plaintiff sought judicial review of the CHRC's probable cause determination, which is not subject to judicial review.

Section 14 permits judicial review of final agency decisions in adjudicatory proceedings; a commission order directing an election is not final, so the parties must exhaust available remedies before seeking review.

Worcester Industrial Technical Institute Instructors Ass'n v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1970-03-04

General Laws c. 30A, § 14, provides for judicial review of a “final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding.” A commission decision and order for an election has been held not to be a final decision in an adjudicatory proceeding subject to judicial review. ... There appear to be no extraordinary circumstances in the instant case. The parties must first exhaust their other available remedies before they resort to judicial review.

Section 14 allows the State retirement board to seek judicial review as an aggrieved person when it acts to protect the retirement system and the public interest.

State Board of Retirement v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1961-02-10

One ground of Mrs. Fingold’s demurrer is that the State board cannot be a “person . . . aggrieved” within G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and that, accordingly, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction. ... The State board has an obligation to protect the integrity of the State system and the interests with respect to that system of the public and of the State’s taxpayers. ... The rights of review granted by c. 30A are not to be interpreted narrowly where only the petitioner for review seems likely to attempt to protect aspects of the public interest. ... The demurrer was properly overruled.

Section 14 allows a license applicant to seek judicial review of both the denial of its application and a competing grant that prevents it from receiving the license it sought.

Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. State Racing Commission · filed 1961-06-06

We hold that Bay State is an aggrieved person entitled to present for judicial review not only the commission’s denial of its own application but also the commission’s action in granting Eastern a license which would preclude issuing the full license sought by Bay State.

A petitioner is not an “aggrieved” person under § 14 as to an issue whose resolution would not affect its rights and interests.

Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. State Racing Commission · filed 1962-07-03

Its determination would in no way affect the rights and interests of Bay State with respect to the award of the disputed ten days of racing. On this issue Bay State is not an “aggrieved” person within c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 allows an aggrieved commission to seek judicial review of an adjudicatory decision when the governing statute does not bar its review or provide an inconsistent review procedure.

Cliff House Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Commission · filed 1979-06-04

Section 36 authorizes judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, to the extent not inconsistent with its own provisions. Section 14 of G. L. c. 30A, as amended through St. 1976, c. 411, allows an aggrieved person to obtain judicial review of agency action in an adjudicatory proceeding except where "any provision of law expressly precludes judicial review” or where a statutory form of judicial review is provided. Section 36 neither expressly precludes nor provides for judicial review at the request of the commission, nor does it contain any provision inconsistent with the commission’s seeking judicial review. Hence, the commission may appeal a decision of the division.

Section 14 permits judicial review of an agency decision only for a party aggrieved by it; the party must show a legally cognizable injury to its rights or pecuniary interests.

Group Insurance Commission v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1980-07-24

Because the GIG has pointed to no legally cognizable injury, either direct or indirect, to its rights or pecuniary interests, we conclude that it is not a party aggrieved by the decision and order of the Labor Relations Commission and therefore has no standing to challenge the decision and order.

Section 14 permits a State agency to seek judicial review as an aggrieved person when the proceedings require interpretation of its statutory power and authority.

Group Insurance Commission v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1979-11-29

We hold that a State agency is an “aggrieved person” for purposes of judicial review of State administrative proceedings, G. L. c. 30A, § 14, where those proceedings require interpretation of the statutory power and authority of that agency.

An employer may be a person aggrieved under § 14 when a disability retirement award concretely affects its contributions to the retirement system.

Town of Foxboro v. Norfolk County Retirement Board · filed 1999-08-25

For these reasons, Foxboro has proved that it is sufficiently aggrieved by CRAB’s action and therefore has standing under G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14 permits parties to an agency proceeding to intervene in judicial review, but they must be aggrieved to initiate it.

Board of Health of Sturbridge v. Board of Health of Southbridge · filed 2012-02-22(2)

As interveners, the plaintiffs would have the right to intervene in an appeal brought by an aggrieved person whether or not they were aggrieved themselves, G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (2), see note 21, supra, but on the present record they were not entitled directly to initiate an action for judicial review.

Section 14 requires a person seeking judicial review of an agency decision to be aggrieved, but it does not govern a declaratory challenge to an agency official’s authority to issue a decision.

Lighthouse Masonry, Inc. v. Taylor · filed 2012-04-02

DALA and the OAG argue that Lighthouse is without standing to pursue its claims in Counts III and IV, to the extent they relate to the citations that were vacated, because Lighthouse is not a person “aggrieved by a final decision of an agency in an adjudicatory proceeding.” See G.L.c. 30A, §14. True enough for a 30A administrative appeal, but here Lighthouse does not seek review of DALA’s decision under 30A, but challenges Taylor’s authority not to issue Fletcher’s draft as the final decision of DALA.

Section 14 allows a person aggrieved by an agency decision affirming a driver’s license suspension to pursue judicial review.

Scheffler v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 2012-07-18

Even assuming that the Board’s argument is correct, as far as it goes, Scheffler was undeniably aggrieved by the Board’s decision to affirm the suspension of his driver’s license. Therefore, he is a person aggrieved for the purposes of G.L.c. 30A, §14 and is entitled to pursue his appeal.

Section 14(1) requires a complaint for judicial review of a final agency decision within thirty days; filing late deprives the court of jurisdiction.

School Committee of Franklin v. Commissioner of Educ. · filed 1985-09-05(1)

The school committee’s failure to institute the action within the thirty-day limitation period contained in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1), deprived the court of jurisdiction under that chapter.

Section 14(1) requires a request for judicial review of a distinct agency decision to be filed within thirty days; leave to file granted after that period expires does not make it timely.

Wolbach v. Beckett · filed 1985-07-01(1)

Although the plaintiffs label this complaint an “annex” to the earlier and timely filed complaint for review from the decision after the first phase of the hearings, the “annex” is not, in our review, an amendment of the original complaint. It is a request for judicial review of the department’s decision on issues separate and distinct from those earlier adjudicated. As such, it should have been filed within the thirty-day period set out in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1). The fact that the plaintiffs were granted leave of court on November 5, 1982, to file their “annex” does not render it timely, as leave was neither requested nor obtained until after expiration of the thirty-day time period.

Section 14(1) sets a jurisdictional thirty-day deadline for seeking judicial review of a final agency decision, subject only to the extensions it provides.

Flynn v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1984-03-29(1)

It should not have been allowed because the thirty-day limitation upon the filing of actions seeking review of administrative agency action is jurisdictional in nature and, hence, not susceptible to extension except in the limited fashion provided for in § 14(1).

Section 14(1) provides a right to appeal an agency decision; failing to exercise that right forfeits review of the decision.

Town of Burlington v. Colonial Motor Hotel Corp. · filed 1975-06-25(1)

As the defendant (which presented no argument before this court) failed to exercise its right to appeal from the decision of the board pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1), as in effect prior to St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3 ... it thus lost its opportunity for review of the board’s decision.

Section 14 requires a party seeking judicial review of a commission order to appeal it; failure to do so forecloses a substantial evidence challenge in an enforcement proceeding.

Labor Relations Commission v. City of Everett · filed 1979-06-28

The city’s contention that the commission’s order was not supported by substantial evidence is foreclosed by the city’s failure to file an appeal under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, from either the commission’s original or supplemental decisions.

Section 14(1) requires the court clerk to receive a complaint for judicial review within thirty days after notice of the agency decision; mailing it within that period is insufficient.

Harper v. Division of Water Pollution Control · filed 1992-04-15(1)

On its face, § 14 (1) contemplates that the clerk must receive the complaint (or a document called an appeal) within thirty days of the receipt of notice of the agency decision.

Section 14(1) provides a thirty-day period for seeking judicial review of an agency decision, measured from notice of the final decision or, after a timely rehearing petition, notice of its denial.

Amann v. Town of Stow · filed 1993-04-29(1)

M.G.L. c. 30A, § 14(1) starts the limitations clock running upon “receipt of notice of the final decision of the agency or if a petition for rehearing has been timely filed with the agency, within thirty days after receipt of notice of agency denial of such petition for rehearing.” ... The Amanns filed their first IDEA complaint on November 13, 1990, twenty-nine days after the BSEA denied their motion for a rehearing, and therefore within the thirty-day limitations period.

Section 14(1)’s thirty-day deadline bars judicial review of an agency decision, including a challenge to the agency’s jurisdiction, but does not bar a separate declaratory action to determine that jurisdiction.

Board of Appeals of Rockport v. DeCarolis · filed 1992-04-01(1)

We hold that the notice of appeal was sufficient to meet the specificity requirements of rule 3(c) and that the expiration of the appeal period under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1), barred any challenge to the agency’s decision under the State Administrative Procedure Act but did not bar a determination of the agency’s jurisdiction in a proceeding for declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231 A.

Section 14(1) requires a petition for judicial review to be filed within thirty days; filing in the wrong court does not toll that deadline.

Friedman v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 1993-03-31(1)

Filing the petition incorrectly in the Superior Court, instead of the Supreme Judicial Court, will not toll the thirty-day time limit.

Section 14(1) requires an appeal from an agency decision to be filed in Superior Court within thirty days of receipt; an untimely appeal leaves the decision final and binding on the parties.

Fafard Real Estate & Development Corp. v. Karayianes · filed 1993-11-16(1)

The defendants failed to either file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Appeals Board within ten (10) days from the date the copy of the decision was mailed to them, per the requirements of 801 C.M.R. §1.01(10)(p), or to file an appeal of the Appeals Board’s decision with the Superior Court within thirty (30) days of receipt of the decision, per G.L.c. 30A, §14(1). The defendants’ failure to make a timely appeal of the Appeals Board’s decision to the Superior Court makes the Appeals Board’s decision sustaining Fafard’s appeal final and binding on the parties.

Section 14(1) requires filing for judicial review within 30 days, and an agency cannot extend that period by regulation; prejudicially misleading notice voids the purported final order, so the 30 days run from a valid final order.

Wald's Catering, Inc. v. Commonwealth Executive Office of Elder Affairs · filed 1995-07-27(1)

General Laws c. 30A, §14(1) provides for a 30day filing period in which to contest the validity of an administrative decision. The 30day filing requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the state agency. ... Therefore, the EOEA regulation is void because the agency does not have the authority to circumvent the strict dictates of G.L.c. 30A. ... Based on these considerations, this Court holds that the notice provided to plaintiff was misleading and prejudicially defective. Accordingly, the notice is void. ... Once the Secretary provides a valid final order, the case will be subject to judicial review within 30 days pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, § 14(c).

Section 14(1) requires a complaint for judicial review within thirty days of the agency’s final decision; when an agency reopens proceedings on reconsideration, its later denial may be the final decision for that deadline.

285 Lynn Shore Drive Condominium Trust v. Automatic Sprinkler Appeals Board · filed 1999-07-29(1)

According to the complaint, because the board reopened the hearing as a result of the trustees’ petition for reconsideration, the May 24, 1995, denial of the trustee’s petition for reconsideration was the board’s “final” decision. Because G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1), states that the complaint must be filed within thirty days of the final decision of the board, and the trust filed its complaint within that time period, the allegations in the complaint demonstrate that the trustee’s appeal under G. L. c. 30A was timely and should not have been dismissed.

Section 14(1)’s thirty-day filing period does not apply to appeals from local board of health licensing decisions under the Manufactured Housing Act.

Danusis v. Longo · filed 1999-11-23(1)

As to the Act, there is nothing within § 32K or any other provision that subjects any appeal under that section to the thirty-day appeal period set out in c. 30A, § 14(1).

Section 14(1) requires a request for judicial review within thirty days after receipt of notice of an agency decision, unless good cause for an extension is shown.

Hutner v. Cape Codder Condominium Board of Trustees · filed 2001-08-31(1)

We do not reach the merits of his appeal, dated June 16, 1999, because it was filed after the statutory deadline. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1) (requiring requests for review to be filed within thirty days after receipt of notice of agency decisions unless good cause for an extension is shown).

Section 14 gives a party thirty days to appeal an adverse decision; a declaratory judgment action cannot be used to evade that deadline.

Pereira v. Commissioner of Social Services · filed 2000-08-09

Pereira failed to appeal from the decision adverse to her within the statutory period of thirty days. G. L. c. 30A, § 14. ... Pereira cannot circumvent the limitation period by framing her action as one for declaratory judgment.

The thirty-day period to seek judicial review of a Commission decision begins when a represented party’s counsel receives notice of the decision.

Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2002-11-21(7)

Because counsel has this responsibility, the court concludes that the thirty-day time limit within which judicial review must be sought starts when counsel has received notice of the Commission’s decision, not the party itself.

Section 14(1)’s thirty-day filing period begins when the party receives notice of the final agency decision; sending the decision to counsel’s outdated address does not constitute receipt.

Eastern Casualty Insurance v. Roberts · filed 2001-09-25(1)

We are satisfied that, on the facts present here, notice of the final agency decision cannot be deemed to have been received until Eastern’s counsel received actual notice thereof. ... Since Eastern sought review promptly upon learning of the adverse decision, it has complied with the filing requirement of G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1), and the employee’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

Section 14(1) does not give a person who was not a party to an agency proceeding thirty days from learning of the decision to seek judicial review.

Rinaldi v. State Building Code Appeals Board · filed 2002-12-06(1)

Rinaldi admits that he was not a party to the board’s proceedings as he never received notice of Santos’s appeal or of the public hearing and therefore never appeared before the board. Rinaldi’s interpretation of the statute here would leave open decisions of the board for inordinate lengths of time and defeat the principle that there must be finality to proceedings before administrative agencies.

Section 14(1) does not require dismissal of a judicial review action filed while agency reconsideration is pending when reconsideration ends before the action proceeds and the early filing causes no prejudice or disruption.

Paquette v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2002-09-16(1)

We conclude that, on the facts of this case, the prematurity of the plaintiffs’ appeal was not fatal to jurisdiction.

Section 14 requires a petition for judicial review of a final agency decision to be filed within thirty days after the party receives notice.

Ramaseshu v. Board of Registration · filed 2004-03-08

While he could have obtained review of the board’s decision at one time, that time has long since elapsed. Pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 64, and G. L. c. 30A, § 14, “[s]uch a petition [for judicial review] . . . must be filed within thirty days from the time the party receives notice of the final decision of the agency.”

Section 14(1)’s deadline for filing a complaint for judicial review cannot be extended under appellate rule 14(b).

Maitland v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 2007-01-23(1)

Contrary to Maitland’s suggestion, rule 14 (b) does not allow a judge to alter the requirements of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1).

Section 14(1)’s thirty-day filing requirement can be satisfied by a timely complaint that names the wrong defendant but repeatedly identifies the proper agency; the judge may allow an amendment adding that agency.

Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Board · filed 2007-02-07(1)

On the facts and circumstances of this case, we therefore hold that Herrick’s filing of a complaint within the thirty-day time limit set forth by G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1), which contained ample references to CRAB, while imperfect, was adequate compliance with the statute. The judge, in her discretion, could therefore permit Herrick to amend his complaint, and her determination that the court was without such authority was thus error.

Section 14(1) allows a court to extend the time to seek judicial review for good cause if the party applies within the thirty-day period or an existing extension.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2007-08-27(1)

Section 14(1) of chapter 30A provides a party seeking to extend the time to appeal an agency’s decision two options. The party may timely petition for a rehearing (in which case the §14 appeal must be commenced within thirty days after receipt of notice of agency denial of the petition for rehearing); or the party may obtain leave of the court for good cause shown “[u]pon application made within the thirty-day period or any extension thereof.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(1).

A late judicial review filing under Section 14 may be excused when extraordinary medical circumstances prevent timely filing.

Dumas v. Medicaid/MassHealth · filed 2007-10-12

The court finds that Bertha Dumas’s cardiac condition as outlined by Dr. Benotti and testified to by her daughter prevented her from complying with the 30-day time limit to request a fair hearing and to file her 30A appeal.

Section 14(1)'s thirty-day filing deadline applies to judicial review of final inmate grievance decisions under G. L. c. 127, § 38H.

Grady v. Commissioner of Correction · filed 2013-01-18(1)

Nevertheless, the Legislature subsequently decided that the provisions of c. 30A, § 14, including the thirty-day appeal period, should apply in the specific case of an inmate challenging a DOC grievance decision pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 38H.

Section 14(1) allows review of an earlier agency determination despite the thirty-day filing limit when the agency reanalyzes and incorporates that determination in a later decision.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 34186 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2015-02-02(1)

Although judicial review of an agency's action is subject to a thirty-day filing limitation, we consider the merits of the question because the hearing examiner in 2010, on a request for reclassification filed by the board, reanalyzed the issue and incorporated the 2002 decision.

Section 14(1) requires a complaint for judicial review within thirty days of notice of the agency decision; missing that deadline bars review of the decision.

Doe, SORB No. 209081 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2017-12-06(1)

We have no jurisdiction to review the classification decision itself, as the plaintiff failed to file a complaint in the Superior Court within thirty days of receiving notice of the board's decision in December of 2008. See G. L. c. 6, § 178M; G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1).

Section 14(1) requires a complaint for judicial review to be filed within thirty days; an untimely complaint generally cannot be heard.

Plymouth Ret. Bd. v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd. · filed 2018-02-16(1)

The Superior Court properly dismissed Daley's claims as untimely pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1). Where Daley or the Public Employment Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) failed to file complaints within the thirty-day period, the CRAB decision became final against them, and the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to consider judicial review.

Section 14(1) requires an action seeking review of a final prison grievance decision to be filed within thirty days after notice of the decision is received.

Mackie v. Comm'r of Corr. · filed 2017-11-03(1)

An action seeking review of a final decision on a grievance must be commenced within thirty days of receipt of notice of the decision.

Section 14(1) requires a complaint for judicial review within thirty days after receipt of the agency’s final decision; a court may extend that period only on an application made within the filing period or an extension of it.

JOHN EARLEY v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION · filed 2022-01-07(1)

A person aggrieved by an administrative decision may generally secure judicial review by filing a complaint in the Superior Court “within thirty days after receipt of notice of the final decision of the agency.” G.L. c. 30A, § 14(1). ... The filing of a complaint within thirty days is jurisdictional; the timing requirement cannot be waived and may only be excused or extended by the court in limited circumstances that do not apply here.

Section 14(1)'s rehearing tolling rule does not extend the deadline for seeking judicial review of a Civil Service Commission decision under G. L. c. 31, § 44.

Cucchi v. City of Newton · filed 2018-08-16(1)

This reference to § 14 is not naturally read as addressing matters (such as the filing of a motion to reconsider) that arise before any court proceedings are instituted. ... The foregoing considerations, taken together, persuade us that the filing of a motion to reconsider a commission decision does not toll the time for seeking judicial review of that decision.

Section 14 (1) requires a complaint for judicial review within thirty days after notice of a final agency decision; an untimely complaint bars review.

Grandoit v. Mass. Rehab. Comm'n · filed 2019-01-16(1)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14 (1), provides that "any person ... aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding ... shall be entitled to a judicial review thereof ... within thirty days after receipt of notice of the final decision of the agency." Failure to timely file a complaint will bar a plaintiff's ability to obtain judicial review of a final agency action.

Section 14(1)'s filing deadline is satisfied when a pro se inmate verifiably gives a grievance-review complaint to prison authorities for mailing within the thirty-day period.

Fitzpatrick v. Department of Correction · filed 2023-05-18(1)

In the context of this case, an action for judicial review of a grievance under § 14 should be considered "commenced" at the moment the inmate delivers the complaint to the prison authorities. ... The rule applies only in the narrow context of an incarcerated party who proceeds pro se and who verifiably delivers a complaint to prison authorities, for purposes of mailing, within the limitations period.

Section 14’s thirty-day deadline for judicial review does not govern a permissible declaratory judgment action challenging an agency decision.

MADELINE BANKS v. MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION & Another. · filed 2023-11-22

Second, in light of our conclusion that Banks's action for declaratory relief was appropriate, we reject the board's assertion that Banks's complaint was untimely because it was not brought within the thirty-day statute of limitations for actions for judicial review, see G. L. c. 30A, § 14, or the sixty-day ... statute of limitations for petitions for certiorari, see G. L. c. 249, § 4.

Section 14(1) allows thirty days to appeal a board decision after receipt of notice; when the board fails to send notice, an appeal filed within thirty days of actual notice is timely.

Employer's Reinsurance Corporation v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund · filed 2026-01-30(1)

Under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1), an appeal from a decision by the board shall be commenced "within thirty days after receipt of notice of the final decision." ... Similarly, here ERC filed a notice of appeal in a timely manner once it learned of the board's decision and, therefore, the appeal is properly before us.

Section 14(3) provides that seeking judicial review does not stay an agency decision unless the reviewing court orders a stay.

Longo v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 1969-05-06(3)

In similar manner review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 ... does not stay an agency decision until so ordered by the reviewing court.

Filing a complaint for judicial review does not by itself stay the agency’s decision.

Amherst-Pelham Regional School Committee v. Department of Education · filed 1978-09-28(3)

Chapter 30A specifically provides that the filing of a complaint for judicial review by itself does not stay the agency’s decision.

Filing an action under § 14 does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision.

Aubuchon v. Massachusetts ex rel. State Building Code Appeals Board · filed 1996-08-09

Moreover, as noted supra, note 5, the prosecution of an action pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, § 14 does not, absent circumstances not applicable here, serve to stay enforcement of the agency decision.

Section 14 requires a final agency decision for judicial review; a settlement agreement is not a final decision.

Tecce v. Office of the State Fire Marshal · filed 2004-10-18

An examination of the statute shows that the Fire Marshal is correct and a settlement agreement clearly is not a “final decision” as required under G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14 permits judicial review only after an agency issues a final decision in an adjudicatory proceeding.

Town of Wrentham v. Housing Appeals Committee · filed 2007-06-27

Review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is only available after a final decision of an agency in an adjudicatory proceeding.

An appeal under § 14 does not automatically stay enforcement of an agency decision, but the court may order a stay on terms it considers proper.

International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 3188 v. Town of Lakeville · filed 2006-12-21(3)

Although an appeal pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14 “shall not operate as a stay of enforcement of the agency decision,” this court may “order a stay upon such terms as it considers proper.” G.L.c. 30A, §14(3).

Section 14 permits judicial review of an agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding only after the decision is final.

Town of Wrentham v. West Wrentham Village, LLC · filed 2008-05-27

Although G. L. c. 40B, § 22, expressly provides that HAC decisions “may be reviewed in the superior court,” judicial review is only available after a final decision of an agency in an adjudicatory proceeding. G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 permits a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) in an action for judicial review of an agency decision, even before the administrative record is filed.

John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board · filed 1977-05-04(1)

Bearing in mind that the legislative purpose of the amendment to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, was to harmonize the statute with the new rules of civil and appellate procedure ... we do not read the statute in its present form as effecting the drastic change of eliminating such motions in actions brought under G. L. c. 30A, §14.

Section 14(6) allows a motion to expand the administrative record, but the court may deny it when the documents are cumulative and the party gives no reason for failing to submit them in the agency proceeding.

Emerson Hospital v. Rate Setting Commission · filed 1990-12-11(6)

The single justice also reported Emerson’s motion to expand the administrative record, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6) (1988 ed.), to include two documents that the hospital had submitted to the commission at an earlier, separate proceeding. These documents, illustrating the uncontested fact that Emerson realized savings in plant operations independent of the expansion project, are by Emerson’s admission merely cumulative. Emerson has failed to present any reason why it did not resubmit the documents to the commission in this proceeding. Furthermore, we can imagine no justification for imposing on the commission the obligation to review the files from all its prior dealings with Emerson when the hospital files an exception request. Emerson’s motion is denied.

Section 14(5) requires judicial review of an agency decision to proceed without a jury and be confined to the record.

Tele-Communications v. O'BRIEN · filed 1989-01-09(5)

Last, § 14 (5) explicitly states that such “review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.”

Section 14(5) generally confines judicial review to the agency record, making summary judgment appropriate unless a procedural irregularity before the agency is alleged.

Rico's of the Berkshires, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1985-04-23(5)

The case was placed before the court on cross motions for summary judgment, Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974), an appropriate procedure since review is confined to the record, except where procedural irregularity before the agency is alleged.

Section 14(8) requires review of the entire record, including a hearing officer’s report when the officer submitted one to the agency.

Norwood Ice Co. v. Milk Control Commission · filed 1959-01-20(8)

Pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8), also quoted above, one of the duties of judicial review is to determine “upon consideration of the entire record” whether substantial rights have been prejudiced because the agency decision was “Unsupported by substantial evidence.” ... Accordingly, we hold that there was no error in the order making the hearing officer’s report part of the record.

Section 14(4) allows the record on judicial review to consist of the entire agency proceedings, stipulated portions, or a statement of the case agreed to by the agency and parties.

Multi-Line Insurance Rating Bureau v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1970-02-09(4)

Under paragraph (4) of § 14 the record consists of (a) the entire proceedings, or (b) such portions as the agency and the parties may stipulate, or (c) a statement of the case agreed to by the agency and the parties.

Judicial review is confined to the agency record, except for testimony about procedural irregularities not shown in that record; the court may not take new evidence to decide factual issues assigned to the agency.

Duato v. Commissioner of Public Welfare · filed 1971-06-14(6)

It was contrary to the basic rule stated in § 14 (6) that judicial review of administrative proceedings “shall be confined to the record, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, testimony thereon may be taken in the court.” The parties to a proceeding for judicial review may not require the court to receive evidence on, or to decide, factual issues which the law requires the administrative agency to decide.

Section 14(8) requires a court to consider the agency record, or the portions cited by the parties, before remanding a matter to the agency.

City of Lawrence v. State Board of Education · filed 1970-04-07(8)

In considering a petition for review the trial judge is given by statute the power to remand the matter for further proceedings before the agency. The court’s power to remand, however, is predicated on a “consideration of the entire record, or such portions of the record as may be cited by the parties.”

Section 14(8) requires a reviewing court to consider the entire administrative record, including evidence that detracts from the evidence supporting the agency’s decision.

Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm. · filed 1973-03-22(8)

The reviewing court must examine the committee’s decisions “upon consideration of the entire record.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (8). This statutory directive has been construed to require taking into account evidence that detracts from the weight of the supportive evidence.

Section 14(7) allows a court to deny a request to present additional evidence before the agency when there is no good reason the evidence was not presented in the original agency proceeding.

Marmer v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors · filed 1974-04-11(7)

This was treated as a motion pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), for leave to introduce further evidence before the board. The motion was properly denied since there was no “good reason for failure to present it [the evidence] in the proceeding before the agency.”

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an administrative board’s decision to the record and generally precludes additional evidence.

Young's Court, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board · filed 1976-03-10(5)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14(5), requires that review of a decision of an administrative board be confined to the record. In most instances the court is precluded from taking additional evidence.

Section 14(4) requires the agency to provide the Superior Court with a record of the entire proceedings so the court can review whether substantial evidence supports its decision.

Registrar of Motor Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 1981-02-13(4)

In this case we are unable to decide whether there was substantial evidence to support the board’s decision, since the board did not provide the Superior Court with a record of the entire proceedings as required by c. 30A, § 14 (4).

Judicial review under § 14(7) requires a record sufficient for the court to assess the agency decision against its standards.

Registrar of Motor Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 1981-02-13(7)

The further record should be sufficient to allow the court to determine whether the board’s decision meets the standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14(5) limits judicial review to the agency record unless alleged irregularities in the agency hearing warrant further testimony.

Swartz v. Commissioner · filed 1982-04-08(5)

The scope, of review in the present proceeding is limited to the evidence in the record of the proceedings below. G.L.c. 30A, § 14(5). There is no allegation of irregularities in the agency hearing to trigger the exception allowing for further testimony.

Section 14(6) requires a good reason for failing to present additional evidence before the agency; wanting to retry a claim with counsel does not suffice.

Fanion v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1984-05-15(6)

The claimant has not shown that “there was good reason for ... failure to present [the evidence] in the proceeding before the agency.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6). The judge correctly denied the motion for leave to present additional evidence.

Section 14(6) allows a reviewing judge to order the agency to take additional material evidence when there was good reason it was not presented earlier; it does not allow the judge to take that evidence and make findings.

She Enterprises, Inc. v. State Building Code Appeals Board · filed 1985-06-28(6)

Section 14(6) does not authorize a reviewing judge to consider extra-record evidence and make findings. It authorizes a judge, upon a showing that evidence not offered before the agency is material to the issues in the case and that there was good reason for the failure to present it to the agency, to “order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency,” which “may modify its findings and decision by reason of such additional evidence.”

Section 14(6) allows a claimant an opportunity to present potentially crucial medical records during judicial review of an agency decision.

Hunt v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1986-03-06(6)

She was denied this opportunity by the examiner (after he earlier indicated that it would “not be necessary” to procure them) and also by the District Court judge to whom she addressed a motion seeking this relief after the hearing. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6) (1984 ed.). ... The claimant should have been given this opportunity.

Section 14(7) does not permit a reviewing court to hold a new trial or take further evidence when reviewing an agency decision.

Jahn v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1986-03-11(7)

The reviewing court is not empowered to hold a trial de nova, or to engage in further evidentiary hearings.

Section 14(7)(c) permits a reviewing court to modify an agency decision and compel action unlawfully delayed when the decision was based on an error of law.

Bagley v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1986-04-09(7)(c)

The court may modify the agency decision and compel action unlawfully delayed if the agency decision was based on an error of law. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (c).

Section 14(7) does not authorize a reviewing judge to remand an agency decision after finding no error or abuse of discretion.

Hillary's v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1989-04-21(7)

The standards of review provided by G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), are precise. The judge concluded that the commission’s decision was correct, and, contrary to Hillary’s contention, that the commission did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the hearings to receive evidence of interim earnings. He was thus, on the basis of his own conclusions, without authority to take the action he did. General Laws c. 30A, § 14(7), does not vest the reviewing judge with a roving commission to undo that with which he disagrees.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the administrative record, but permits court testimony about alleged agency procedural irregularities that do not appear in that record.

McKenna v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1993-10-29(5)

The evidence in question was offered at the agency hearing and McKenna has made no showing of any procedural irregularities which led to the Administrative Magistrate’s decision not to admit the offered materials into evidence. Additionally, the Magistrate did in fact consider the treatises in reaching her decision and Dr. Borges’s testimony was admitted in the form of the Statement of Applicant’s Physician, as well as medical records and correspondence. Therefore, McKenna’s motion to present additional evidence is denied and this court's review is confined to the existing administrative record.

Section 14(6) gives a Superior Court judge independent discretion to order an agency to take additional evidence when it is material and there was good reason it was not presented earlier.

Northeast Metropolitan Regional Vocational School District School Committee v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimi · filed 1994-01-24(6)

Thus, in the particular situation facing the trial judge in J.C. Hillary’s, and in the situation in this case as well, the judge retained authority to exercise his discretion under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(6).

Section 14 review requires a permit decision to rest on the formal administrative record, with parties given notice and an opportunity to comment on information in that record.

Douglas Environmental Associates, Inc. v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection · filed 1993-12-09

However, it seems clear from the fact that G.L.c. 111, §150A calls for judicial review under G.L.c. 30A, §14, that (1) the Department's decision must be based on the formal administrative record, and (2) as is true of adjudicatory proceeding, parties are entitled to notice and an opportunity to comment on the information constituting that record.

Section 14(7) permits a court to remand an agency decision when an error of law may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Coit v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1996-10-04(7)

The court may affirm the decision of the agency, remand the matter for further proceedings, or set aside or modify the decision, if it determines that the substantial rights of a party may have been prejudiced because of an error of law, or that the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is unwarranted by facts found in the record, or is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14(5) generally confines judicial review to the administrative record but permits additional testimony about procedural irregularities absent from that record.

Morse v. Massachusetts Division of Industrial Accidents · filed 1996-05-08(5)

Under G.L.c. 30A, §14(5) judicial review of an administrative proceeding is confined to the administrative record. In the case of alleged irregularities in procedure, not shown in the record, additional testimony may be taken by the court. ... An appeal allegedly filed by a plaintiff that does not appear in the Commissioner’s records, resulting in the expiration of the limitations period, is an illustration of an irregularity in procedure.

Section 14(4) calls for documents an agency relied on to be included in the administrative record filed for judicial review.

Fullam v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 1996-10-28(4)

If the Board relies for its decision upon any documentary materials from the file of the surcharging insurer or from any other source, it should include them in the administrative record filed in the Superior Court under G.L.c. 175, §113P and G.L.c. 30A, §14(4) so as to enable fully informed judicial review.

Section 14(6) generally confines judicial review to the administrative record, but the court may consider facts agreed by the parties.

Sullivan v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 1996-10-29(6)

Absent narrow circumstances not here present, see G.L.c. 30A, §14(6), review under c. 30A proceeds solely on the administrative record. Nevertheless, the parties agreed on certain facts and submitted their agreed statement to the Court. I therefore consider it.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the administrative hearing record unless procedural irregularities are alleged.

Nguyen v. McIntire · filed 1997-10-22(5)

In determining whether the allegations are legally sufficient, a court, ruling on a complaint for judicial review under G.L.c. 30A, is confined to the record of the administrative hearing unless procedural irregularities are alleged. G.L.c. 30A §14(5); LeMaine v. City of Boston, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 1173, 1174 (1989). At bar, plaintiff does not allege any procedural irregularity and, therefore, this court’s review will be confined to the record of the administrative agency.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the administrative record unless procedural irregularities are alleged.

City of Fitchburg v. Pagan · filed 1997-11-07(5)

In determining whether the allegations are legally sufficient, a court ruling on a complaint for judicial review under G.L.c. 30A is confined to the record of the administrative hearing unless procedural irregularities are alleged.

Section 14(4) requires the agency to file a complete record of the administrative proceedings in Superior Court unless the parties agree otherwise.

Arnone v. Commissioner of the Department of Social Services · filed 1997-06-24(4)

Under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(4), it is the responsibility of the agency to file in the Superior Court, by way of answer, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a complete record of the administrative proceedings.

Section 14(7) allows a reviewing court to remand, modify an agency decision, or compel action unlawfully withheld; the court may compel action when another hearing is unlikely to produce a better record.

Wood Waste of Boston, Inc. v. Board of Health · filed 1998-12-21(7)

Having concluded that the Board committed legal error, exceeded its authority, and made findings that are not supported by substantial evidence, the court may remedy these errors either by remanding the matter for further proceedings before the Board, by modifying the Board’s decision, or by compelling any action unlawfully withheld. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... Where, as here, the Board has missed that opportunity, and where it appears unlikely that giving the Board another opportunity will enable it to build a better record in opposition to this project, it is not appropriate to further interrupt this protracted process to give the Board that second opportunity.

Section 14(4) permits a reviewing judge to make reasonable additions to the administrative record in an appeal from a non-adjudicatory agency decision.

Douglas Environmental Associates, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 1999-03-01(4)

Section 14 (4) of G. L. c. 30A was not written with a focus on the appropriate content of the record on appeal from a non-adjudicatory proceeding of the sort involved in this case. ... The judge’s discretionary assessment of what the record should contain was reasonable.

Section 14(6) requires additional evidence offered during judicial review to be material to the agency decision.

Bailey v. Bullen · filed 1999-06-09(6)

The additional evidence that the plaintiff seeks this court to consider does not satisfy the conditions set forth in G.L.c. 30A, §14(6). Miriam seeks to introduce the Probate Court documents as evidence that Robert’s fiduciary fee of $15,500 was reasonable and therefore did not constitute a disqualifying transfer of assets. However, this evidence is not material to the present case because in determining the plaintiffs eligibility for medical benefits, the Division is not bound by Probate Court rulings.

Section 14(5) limits judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

Jarrett v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 1999-10-20(5)

The court’s review of an agency decision is based on the administrative record alone. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5).

Section 14 confines judicial review to the administrative record and requires the challenger to show that the agency decision lacks substantial evidence.

Goggin v. Commerce Insurance · filed 1998-11-15(4), (5)

Judicial review of the Board:s decision is thus confined to the administrative record. ... Accordingly, this Court must sustain the Board’s decision unless Goggin meets his burden of demonstrating that the Board’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(5) permits a reviewing court to receive additional evidence only in special circumstances.

Tierney v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2000-12-18(5)

The Court may not receive additional evidence, absent the special circumstances set forth in G.L.c. 30A, §14(5), which do not exist here.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the administrative record unless procedural irregularities are alleged.

Bigwood v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2001-01-09(5)

In determining whether the allegations are legally sufficient, a court ruling on a complaint for judicial review under G.L.c. 30A is confined to the record of the administrative hearing unless procedural irregularities are alleged. ... Because Bigwood does not allege any procedural irregularity, this court’s review will perforce be confined to the four corners of the record of the administrative agency.

Section 14(7) permits a reviewing court to compel an agency to act when an unlawful or erroneous decision prejudices a party’s substantial rights.

Wood Waste of Boston, Inc. v. Board of Health of Everett · filed 2001-08-24(7)

That finding must be supported in the record before it, and where such support is lacking, a reviewing court may, as provided in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), as amended by St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, either remand the case for further proceedings before the board, or “compel any action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced” by an unlawful or erroneous board decision. We agree with the judge that the appropriate remedy in this case is to order the issuance of the site assignment.

Section 14(7) limits judicial review to the administrative record, so a hearing transcript absent from that record cannot be considered.

Scigliano v. Harnett · filed 2000-06-15(7)

This court, however, must restrict its review to what is contained in the Record. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). Since the transcript of the hearing is not contained in the Record, it cannot be considered in this review.

Section 14(6) does not permit a party to supplement the administrative record to retry a claim on another theory using evidence that could have been presented to the agency.

Massachusetts Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban · filed 2001-05-29(6)

To permit MAMLEO to supplement the record in the circumstances of this case would be, in essence, permitting it to retry its claim on another theory. This is not a proper use of § 14 (6).

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

BAA Massachusetts, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 2000-08-16(5)

The pleadings included the entire administrative record. Our review is confined to that record. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(5).

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

Ford v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2001-01-11(5)

A court’s review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative record. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5).

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

Healy v. CRAB · filed 2001-02-20(5)

A court’s review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative record. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5).

Section 14(4) permits supplementation of the record with materials the agency referenced in its proceedings.

Eaton v. Board of Selectmen · filed 2004-10-26(4)

This supplemental record principally contains portions of minutes and transcripts of other proceedings (Town Meeting and a Selectmen’s meeting) which are referenced by the Board in its removal proceedings. Such a supplementation is appropriate pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14(4) and Standing Order 1-96.

Section 14(7) limits judicial review to the administrative record and requires courts to give due deference to an agency’s expertise.

Licensing Board v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 2003-10-06(7)

The reviewing court must limit its review to the administrative record and give due deference to the “experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge of the agency,” in considering the merits of the appeal. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2006-03-21(5)

Furthermore, a court’s review of an agency decision is confined to the record. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5).

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the administrative record, so a court cannot consider evidence that was not before the agency.

Cadle Co. v. Massachusetts Division of Banks · filed 2006-11-17(5)

Judicial review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative record, and the substantial evidence standard of review goes to the reasonableness of what the agency decided on the basis of the evidence before it.

Section 14(7) limits judicial review to the administrative record and its specified grounds for setting aside an agency decision; the challenger bears the burden of showing invalidity.

Hurrie v. Kelly · filed 2006-01-09(7)

The plaintiff here bears the burden of demonstrating that the decision of the agency is invalid, and judicial review of the DALA decision under Chapter 30A is not a de novo hearing, but is limited to the standards set forth under Subsection 7 of Section 14, and the Court is confined to the record of the administrative proceedings.

A court may dismiss a moot §14 judicial review claim without reviewing the administrative record.

Healer v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2006-12-22

Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ assertion, because the claim pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14 is moot, this court does not need to review the administrative record before ruling on the motion to dismiss.

Section 14(6) does not permit expansion of the administrative record with evidence immaterial to the issues under review.

Commonwealth v. Roxbury Charter High Public School · filed 2007-05-14(6)

The proposed evidence was immaterial to the issues in the case, so that there was no basis under § 14(6) to expand the record to include it.

Section 14(6) generally confines judicial review to the agency record, but the court may consider new evidence when the opposing party does not object.

Voyiatzis v. Registry of Motor Vehicles · filed 2008-01-25(6)

Generally, this court is not authorized to review the extra record evidence. ... However, in this case the Commonwealth did not object to the introduction of the new information and therefore this court will consider it as part of the record.

Section 14 requires a court reviewing an agency decision to consider the whole record, including evidence that supports and detracts from the claimant’s position, when assessing whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious.

Andrews v. Division of Medical Assistance · filed 2007-02-14

Thus we look at the record to determine if, considering the evidence as a whole, the decision of the hearing officer was arbitrary or capricious and whether the decision took into account all of the facts that fairly supported the plaintiff’s claim as well as those that fairly detracted from them. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(5)-(6) limits review to the agency record unless the party seeking to introduce new evidence shows good reason for not presenting it to the agency.

Oliver v. Commonwealth · filed 2008-09-25(5)-(6)

The court will not review evidence not presented at the agency proceeding and thus not in the record unless the party attempting to introduce the evidence shows good reason for not presenting it at the proceeding. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5)-(6). Oliver failed to show why she did not produce the evidence, namely Barnstable Police Department reports, at the Board hearing that addressed this same issue. As such, this court will not consider Oliver’s additional evidence and will confine review to the administrative record.

Section 14(6) leaves a motion to present supplemental evidence to the reviewing judge’s sound discretion.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2008-12-12(6)

There was no error. “A motion for leave to present supplemental evidence pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14(6), is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge.”

Section 14 judicial review does not allow a party to raise new issues for the first time on appeal, especially statutory interpretation issues that the agency should address first.

Secretary of Administration & Finance v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board · filed 2009-04-16

Review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A is not the time to insert new issues into the case, especially those requiring statutory interpretation best left to the commission’s expertise in the first instance.

Section 14(5) permits evidence outside the agency record of alleged procedural irregularities, including inadequate notice and disclosure of the reasons for agency action, when those irregularities are not apparent from the record.

West Boylston Nursing Home, Inc. v. Dougherty · filed 2011-10-12(5)

Lack of notice as to how to present a claim and lack of adequate disclosure of the real reasons for agency action are both “procedural” errors within the meaning of G.L.c. 30A, §14(5). The Nursing Home’s proposed evidence tends to explain the nature of these alleged failures in a way that is not apparent from the record. In addition, the proposed evidence demonstrates the arguable futility of challenging the overzealous “re-coupment” of properly paid funds through an appeal to the Final Deadline Appeals Board, as opposed to seeking an edit override. Therefore, the evidence meets the test of G.L.c. 30A, §14(5) and should be considered.

Section 14(6) generally limits judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record, excluding new material offered by affidavit or judicial notice.

Tartarini v. Department of Mental Retardation · filed 2012-07-23(6)

A judge conducting a review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, generally does not consider matters outside the administrative record, whether by affidavit or judicial notice.

Judicial review is confined to the agency record, so an agency's failure to address evidence never presented to it is not grounds to disturb its decision.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2014-11-05(5)

Because our review is "confined to the record," the successor examiner's failure to address evidence that was not presented to him would not be grounds for disturbing his decision.

Section 14(6) permits a person seeking judicial review to offer supplemental evidence of rehabilitation.

Doe, SORB No. 203108 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2015-05-05(6)

He did not seek to offer any supplemental evidence of further rehabilitation, as he was permitted to do under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(6).