30A Mass. Gen. Laws § 14

Section 14(8) does not apply to agency decisions made before the State administrative procedure act took effect on July 1, 1955.

Connolly v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1956-11-06(8)

The provisions of the State administrative procedure act found in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 30A, § 14 (8), inserted by St. 1954, c. 681, § 1, are not here applicable, for that act did not become effective by its terms (see St. 1954, c. 681, § 22) until July 1, 1955, three months after the decision of the commission here involved.

Section 14 allows an aggrieved person to seek Superior Court review of an agency decision within 30 days and permits relief for constitutional violations or unlawful procedure.

RAGNAR v. Morrissey · filed 2009-03-23(7)

Under Massachusetts law, any person aggrieved by an administrative decision is entitled to bring an action in Superior Court within 30 days of that decision. M.G.L. c. 30A, § 14. The Superior Court is empowered to set aside or modify the decision if it is deemed to be a “violation of constitutional provisions” or “[m]ade upon unlawful procedure.” See id. § 14(7). Ragnar does not allege that such post-deprivation procedures are inadequate, nor (apparently) did he pursue those remedies before bringing this action pursuant to § 1983.

Section 14 permits judicial review of a welfare department decision despite a provision making that decision final and binding on the local board.

Town of Natick v. Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare · filed 1961-01-06

The principle is not made inapplicable by the provision of G. L. c. 118A, § 3: “Every decision of the department shall be final and binding upon the local board or bureau involved and shall be complied with by such local board or bureau.” This is not a statute which “expressly precludes judicial review” within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(1) provides for review of a board’s permit decision on the agency record for legal error and substantial evidence.

Board of Selectmen v. Outdoor Advertising Board · filed 1964-02-04(1)

The selectmen have not pursued their administrative remedies before the board, nor have they sought review under Gr. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1), from the board’s action granting the permit. Such a proceeding would have brought before us the evidence- and record before the board, and would have permitted review of whether the board’s decision involved error of law and whether it was supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14 provides the exclusive method of judicial review for an Outdoor Advertising Board permit decision.

Building Inspector of Northampton v. Springfield Advertising Co. · filed 1968-01-03

That the exclusive method of review was under c. 30A is established by Selectmen of Truro v. Outdoor Advertising Bd. 346 Mass. 754.

Section 14 makes judicial review available only for adjudicatory proceedings and only to an aggrieved party.

Berman v. Board of Registration in Medicine · filed 1969-02-06

Relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is available only as to adjudicatory proceedings and then only as to an aggrieved party.

Section 14 provides judicial review of decisions of the Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission.

Boston Licensing Board v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1975-05-21

The decision of the commission was subject to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 does not foreclose equitable relief for a person who was a stranger to the agency proceedings, even if that person could seek judicial review as an aggrieved person.

General Electric Co. v. Maurice Callahan & Sons, Inc. · filed 1974-04-05

We find nothing in the cases cited by Callahan which would foreclose the plaintiff, perforce a stranger to the board’s proceedings, from equitable relief even if it were conceded that the plaintiff had standing as an “aggrieved” person to challenge its proceedings under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 provides judicial review of board of appeal decisions in driver’s license revocation matters.

Boyle v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 1975-06-12

The board’s decisions are subject to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 judicial review does not preclude a separate declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a statute when the issue requires no agency fact-finding.

Samel v. City of Pittsfield Licensing Board · filed 1978-01-12

While review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, may have been available to the plaintiffs, their subsequent bill for declaratory relief is not precluded.

Section 14 does not authorize judicial review of a county retirement board’s decision because the board is not a state agency and its proceeding is not an adjudicatory proceeding.

Buteau v. NORFOLK COUNTY RETIREMENT BOARD · filed 1979-09-28

The obvious difficulty with this action is that the defendant is not an "agency” as defined in G. L. c. 30A, § 1(2); and therefore the proceeding sought to be reviewed is not an "adjudicatory proceeding” (as defined in § 1[1]) subject to review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 gives an aggrieved party judicial review of an agency’s final decision in an adjudicatory proceeding, including one in which the party was entitled to a hearing.

Taunton Greyhound Ass'n v. State Racing Commission · filed 1980-07-18

Accordingly, we hold that Rehoboth was entitled to a hearing under § 3. Consequently, the proceedings on its application were adjudicatory under c. 30A, § 1(1), and Rehoboth was entitled to findings and reasons under § 11(8) and judicial review under § 14.

When the Determination of Need law incorporates § 14, it adopts only § 14’s procedures and standards of review, allowing judicial review even without a fact-finding hearing before the board.

Shoolman v. Health Facilities Appeals Board · filed 1980-12-11

We conclude that the reference in G. L. c. 111, § 25E, to the provisions of G. L. c. 30A, § 14, “to the extent they are not inconsistent with” those of section 25E, must be read as adopting only the procedure and standards of review provisions of § 14,... and therefore that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Section 14(2) permits a Superior Court judge to allow an interested person who was not a party to the agency proceeding to intervene in judicial review.

Sargeant v. Commissioner of Public Welfare · filed 1981-06-30(2)

Finally, under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (2), the reviewing judge in the Superior Court may in his or her discretion permit the intervention of “interested” persons not party to the administrative action. It is clear that the intervener is a real party in interest in this case. There was no error.

Section 14(6) generally confines Superior Court review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

Methuen Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1981-07-28(6)

The scope of a Superior Court judge’s review is generally confined to the administrative record. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6).

Section 14 leaves fact finding to the agency and limits the court’s review of the agency’s decision.

Catrone v. State Racing Commission · filed 1984-02-08(7)

Under § 14, “[it] is . . . the function of the [agency] and not a judge to make findings of fact.”

Section 14(7) requires judicial review of the agency’s decision; a reviewing judge’s independent findings do not bind the appellate court.

Kowalski v. Director of the Division of Employment Security · filed 1984-02-23(7)

While it appears that the judge misconstrued his role under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), in making these findings, see Keough v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 370 Mass. 1, 3 (1976), we are not bound by his findings and rulings. Our function is to review the decision of the board.

Section 14(7) allows courts to review agency decisions for legal error, lack of substantial evidence, and other departures from law.

Costello v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1984-03-27(7)

These subsidiary findings are sufficient for us to determine whether the department’s decision was “[b]ased upon an error of law,” or “[u]nsupported by substantial evidence” or in some respect “not in accordance with law.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), as amended through St. 1976, c. 411, §§ 1, 2.

Section 14 permits review of utility rate orders for errors beyond whether the return meets comparable earnings and capital attraction standards.

Attorney General v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1984-06-20(7)

... our review of an order of the department may include a consideration of other errors specified in G. L. c. 30A, § 14, as well.

Judicial review under § 14 is an appellate function and does not require the reviewing court to adopt the trial court’s rationale.

Colby v. Commissioner · filed 1984-11-15

Review of the legal soundness of the agency decision under c. 30A, § 14, is, however, an appellate court function and does not require adherence to the rationale used by the trial court.

Section 14 permits Superior Court review of a final agency decision when due process requires an adjudicatory hearing.

General Chemical v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality · filed 1985-01-31

Consequently, the nature of the proceeding before the department was adjudicatory, and General Chemical is entitled to judicial review of the department's decision under G.L.c. 30A, § 14, which gives subject matter jurisdiction to the Superior Court.

Section 14 gives the Superior Court jurisdiction to review a final agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding, and a complaint filed within thirty days states a claim for relief.

General Chemical Corp. v. Department of Environmental Quality Engineering · filed 1985-01-31(1)

Consequently, the nature of the proceeding before the department was adjudicatory, and General Chemical is entitled to judicial review of the department’s decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, which gives subject matter jurisdiction to the Superior Court. A complaint seeking such review, filed (as this complaint was) within the thirty-day period specified in § 14(1), states a claim upon which relief can be granted, and it was error to dismiss the complaint as against the department under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974).

Section 14(7)'s substantial evidence test does not apply to judicial review of determination of need decisions under § 25E because it is inconsistent with that provision; section 14's rules on service of process, intervention, and stays remain applicable.

Howe v. Health Facilities Appeals Board · filed 1985-08-08(7)

We rule that application of the substantial evidence test at the Superior Court level would be so unworkable as to be inconsistent with the provisions of § 25E. The reference in § 25E to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is not thereby robbed of all meaning. The provisions of that section relating, among other things, to service of process, intervention, and stays, remain applicable.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision for an error of law or lack of substantial evidence.

Robinson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1985-08-22(7)

A decision of CRAB may be set aside only if based upon an error of law or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) provides no basis to set aside an agency decision that is supported by substantial evidence, rests on no error of law, and is otherwise proper.

Ruggiero v. State Lottery Commission · filed 1986-03-11(7)

Since the decision of the commission was supported by substantial evidence, was not based upon an error of law, and was otherwise proper (G. L. c. 30A, § 14[7]), there was no basis for setting it aside.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision only on the grounds it lists.

Howard Johnson Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1987-07-17(7)

Under the statute, the judge may set aside a commission’s decision only on those grounds set out in § 14 (7) (a)-(g).

A licensee may waive judicial review under § 14 by voluntarily entering into an offer in compromise with the ABCC.

Restaurant Consultants, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1987-11-16

The plaintiff’s contention that the requirement of a waiver of judicial review violates his rights under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is unpersuasive. The regulatory offer in compromise scheme permits a licensee to enter into an agreement forgoing the expense of judicial redress and of business closure, in return for the ABCC’s willingness to allow the licensee to remain open while accepting a lesser penalty. The process is eminently fair to the licensee, saving him much time and expense and leaving to his discretion the choice whether or not to utilize the agreement procedures. If he so chooses, the licensee may not then have a second bite at the apple and pursue an action for judicial review.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority.

Seagram Distillers Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1988-02-18(7)

We accord “due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14 provides judicial review of adjudicatory agency proceedings; it does not apply when the proceeding is not adjudicatory.

Forsyth School for Dental Hygienists v. Board of Registration in Dentistry · filed 1989-03-02

Further, such a proceeding would be reviewable under § 14. ... We conclude, therefore, that the proceeding was not "adjudicatory" and the rules set out in c. 30A both for the proceeding itself and for judicial review of the proceeding do not apply.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the administrative record unless a procedural irregularity before the agency is alleged.

LeMaine v. City of Boston · filed 1989-07-17(5)

In view of that, the judge correctly denied a request by LeMaine to call witnesses in the Superior Court proceeding. Judicial review of administrative proceedings is confined to the record, unless procedural irregularity before the agency is alleged. G. L. c. 30A, § 14(5).

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of a county retirement board decision because a county retirement board is not an agency under chapter 30A.

Georgetown v. ESSEX COUNTY RETIREMENT BOARD · filed 1990-09-24

No right of judicial review lay under G.L.c. 30A, § 14, because a county retirement board is not an "agency" as defined in G.L.c. 30A, § 1(2).

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of a county retirement board’s decision because the board is not an agency under chapter 30A.

Town of Georgetown v. Essex County Retirement Board · filed 1990-09-24

No right of judicial review lay under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, because a county retirement board is not an “agency” as defined in G. L. c. 30A, § 1(2).

Section 14 does not provide an appeal when another statute governs judicial review of the agency’s decisions.

Robinson v. Department of Public Utilities · filed 1992-04-14

Robinson also sought review under the State Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1990 ed.), which provides for appeals to the Superior Court from final decisions of agencies in adjudicatory proceedings, except where a statutory form of judicial review or appeal is otherwise provided. In the case of the department, G. L. c. 25, § 5 (1990 ed.), governs review of its decisions. Therefore Robinson could not bring an appeal under c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(7) allows a court to set aside or modify an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or violates the law or the agency’s authority or jurisdiction.

Crane v. Commissioner of Department of Employment & Training · filed 1993-03-23(7)

Section 14 (7) also allows us to set aside or modify the board’s decision if it was not based on substantial evidence, or if it otherwise violated the law or the board’s statutory authority or jurisdiction.

Section 14 does not permit review of a police chief’s decision not to reinstate a retired officer.

Leach v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1993-07-08

However, that issue does not fall within the purview of G.L.c. 30A, §14 and therefore will not be considered by this Court.

Section 14(7) limits when a court may set aside or modify an agency decision.

Robinson's Case · filed 1993-11-23(7)

General Laws c. 30A, § 14 (1992 ed.), limits the instances where a court may set aside or modify an agency’s decision.

Section 14 is not the procedure for challenging an agency regulation; that challenge must be brought directly to court by declaratory judgment under § 7.

Nuclear Metals, Inc. v. Mayer · filed 1993-07-13

In addition, NMI’s challenge to the Board’s regulation excluding federal and state entities from the assessment scheme as brought pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14is not properly before the court for a second reason. An action for judicial review of an agency regulation must be brought in accord with G.L.c. 30A, §7 which requires such a challenge be brought directly to the court by declaratory judgment action, and not to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals.

Section 14(7) allows a court to affirm, remand, set aside, or modify an agency decision when specified defects prejudice a party’s substantial rights.

Central Water District Associates v. Department of Environmental Protection · filed 1994-03-29(7)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14(7), this court may affirm, remand, set aside or modify the respondent’s decision if it is determined that a party’s substantial rights were prejudiced because the decision was: (1) in violation of constitutional provisions: (2) in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency: (3) based on an erroneous interpretation of the law; (4) made upon unlawful procedure: (5) unsupported by substantial evidence or (6) arbitrary or capricious.

Section 14(7) allows a court to disturb an agency decision when a listed ground has prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Plymouth Police Brotherhood v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1994-04-08(7)

“We may not disturb the commission’s decision unless.‘the substantial rights of any party have been prejudiced’ for one of the reasons set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7)..We generally accord considerable deference to the commission’s disposition of a charge.”

Section 14 does not provide judicial review when an agency hearing was not an adjudicatory proceeding required by constitutional or statutory law.

Padilla v. Padula · filed 1994-04-29

Since Padilla’s due process claim fails and she cites no other statutory or constitutional authority requiring the EOCD to conduct pretermination hearings, the EOCD hearing was not an “adjudicatory proceeding” within the meaning of G.L.c. 30A, §1(1). ... Padilla is, therefore, not entitled to judicial review pursuant to G.L.c. 30A.

Section 14 provides judicial review of a commissioner’s denial of extra time to appeal an administrative decision, subject to a thirty-day deadline.

Burzynska v. Campbell · filed 1994-08-30

Thus, the plaintiff should have appealed the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14 within thirty days of his December 31, 1993 decision. Having failed to pursue her statutory remedy the plaintiff is barred from bringing an action in the nature of certiorari.

Section 14 limits judicial review of an agency decision to the record and does not permit the court to consider alleged misrepresentations in separate plea negotiations.

Morris v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 1994-09-12

This Court reviews the decision of the Board pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14 and is limited to a review of the record in order to determine if the Board’s decision should be affirmed or remanded. In this judicial review of an agency decision, the Court will not consider whether certain misrepresentations were made to Morris during plea negotiations at Somerville District Court.

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision when an error of law, lack of substantial evidence, or abuse of discretion may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Webster v. Department of Social Services · filed 1995-02-16(7)

The court may reverse, remand or modify an administrative agency’s decision if “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced” because the agency decision is, among other things, based on an error of law, or unsupported by substantial evidence, or an abuse of discretion. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14 requires a court reviewing an agency decision to examine whether substantial evidence supports it without substituting its judgment on facts or discretion.

McIsaac v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1995-05-02(7)

The judge had the limited task of examining whether there was substantial evidence in support of the commission’s decision. It was not for the court to substitute its judgment on questions of fact or exercise of discretion.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision for a defect prejudicing substantial rights; disagreement with the weight of the evidence alone is insufficient.

Murphy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1996-01-31(7)

A reviewing court may set aside an administrative decision if it finds that the substantial rights of a party may have been prejudiced because the decision is defective. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7). ... It is not for this Court to reverse a decision of CRAB which may be “against the weight of the evidence.”

Section 14 does not automatically stay enforcement of an agency decision when a judicial review action is filed.

Aubuchon v. MASS. BUILD. CODE APPELS BD. · filed 1996-08-09

Moreover, as noted supra, note 5, the prosecution of an action pursuant to M.G.L. c. 30A, § 14 does not, absent circumstances not applicable here, serve to stay enforcement of the agency decision.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the record.

Jaffe v. State Building Code Appeals Board · filed 1996-08-09(5)

Judicial review of an agency decision is confined to the record. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5).

Section 14(7) requires courts reviewing a CRAB decision to defer to the agency’s expertise and apply the substantial evidence standard rather than reweigh the evidence.

Lisbon v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1996-09-04(7)

Judicial review of a CRAB decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is narrower than that. On appeal, courts are not called upon to determine whether the CRAB decision was based on “the weight of the evidence,” nor may they substitute their judgment for that of CRAB.

Section 14(7) provides the route for judicial review of matters within an agency’s jurisdiction that the agency has resolved; those matters are not subject to direct judicial determination as separate claims.

Bretton v. State Lottery Commission · filed 1996-11-26(7)

Thus, there was no issue presented to the Superior Court that is appropriate for direct judicial determination outside of review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), and the judge therefore did not err in allowing the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

City of Boston v. Outdoor Advertising Board · filed 1996-12-11(5)

As required by G. L. c. 30A, § 14(5), our review is confined to the administrative record.

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of redevelopment authority decisions because those authorities are not MAPA agencies and urban renewal plan approval hearings are not adjudicatory proceedings.

Raso v. Lago · filed 1997-01-06

However, MAPA review is unavailable for the decisions of a redevelopment authority because an authority is not an “agency” for the purposes of the MAPA, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 65 v. Planning Bd. of Lawrence (“Elks Lodge”), 403 Mass. 531, 538, 531 N.E.2d 1233 (1988), and the hearings conducted for the approval of an urban renewal plan are not “adjudicatory proceedings” within the meaning of the statute, Reid v. Acting Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs, 362 Mass. 136, 142-144, 284 N.E.2d 245 (1972).

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of Civil Service Commission decisions because the commission is excluded from the Administrative Procedure Act’s definition of an agency.

Bielawski v. Personnel Administrator of the Division of Personnel Administration · filed 1996-04-17

Nor could the commission’s decisions be reviewed pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A, § 14, since the definition of “ ‘Agency’ . . . does not include . . . the civil service commission.”

Chapter 152 uses § 14(7)(a)–(d), (f), and (g) standards to review Department of Industrial Accidents reviewing board decisions.

Coggin v. Massachusetts Parole Board · filed 1997-05-07(7)

Under G. L. c. 152, § 12(2), a decision of the DIA reviewing board is scrutinized in accordance with the standards expressed in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(a)-(d), (f), and (g).

Section 14 confines judicial review of agency decisions to a narrow scope.

Salaam v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance · filed 1997-06-24

While the judge appropriately observed the narrow scope of judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, the department’s stated reasons for denying benefits place an unreasonable burden of proof on the applicant in a setting where the department is supposed to be helpful, albeit with watchful eye for overreaching or fraud to its constituents.

Section 14(7) permits a reviewing court to set aside an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

Barnstable County Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1997-08-12(7)

Under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7), a reviewing court may set aside the agency’s decision if the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious, or “not in accordance with law.”

Section 14 provides judicial review for applicants challenging the denial of a landfill site assignment.

Cohasset Heights, Ltd. v. Board of Health · filed 1997-04-09

General Laws c. 30A, §14 affords a site applicant a path for review to contest the denial of Site Application for dumping grounds under G.L.c. Ill, §150A. ... The better vehicle for this Court would be to decide the matter as a 30A appeal. Therefore, the Board’s Motion to Dismiss Count IV should be allowed.

Section 14 requires a reviewing court to accept an agency’s factual determinations when substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports them, rather than independently reassessing the evidence.

Hotchkiss v. State Racing Commission · filed 1998-11-09(7)

It was not the function of a reviewing court under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, to displace the factual determinations of the agency experienced in the unique features and requirements of the racing industry or to exercise an independent assessment of the evidence. It was, rather, the court’s obligation to accept them when, as here, they were supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole and reflected a reasoned choice between conflicting views of that evidence.

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of Civil Service Commission decisions because the commission is excluded from Chapter 30A’s definition of an agency.

Orne v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1999-03-01

Section 14 of G.L.c. 30A, provides for judicial review of final decisions of administrative agencies in adjudicatory proceedings. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the definition of "Agency" contained in c. 30A specifically excludes the CSC. G.L.c. 30A, §1(2). Accordingly, Ome is not entitled to c. 30A review.

Section 14(7)’s grounds for error guide judicial review of a county retirement board’s decision even when the action proceeds by certiorari.

Fire Chief of East Bridgewater v. Plymouth County Retirement Board · filed 1999-06-03(7)

The Superior Court’s review of the board’s decision entails a review for error that the board may have committed under one of the sections of G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to affirm or remand an agency decision, or to set it aside or modify it when the specified grounds for judicial review are met.

Morelli v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1999-06-04(7)

Judicial review of this matter is provided under G.L.c. 30A, §14 and G.L.c. 175, §113P, which authorize the Court to affirm the decision of the agency, remand the matter for further proceedings, or set aside or modify the decision if the Court determines that the substantial rights of a party may have been prejudiced because of an error of law, or that the Board’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is unwarranted by the facts found in the record, or is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. G.L. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14(7) permits a court to reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision when specified defects may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Iodice v. City of Newton · filed 1999-10-01(7)

The applicable standard under G.L.c. 30A, §14 (7), is similar. Under that statute, a reviewing court may reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision if “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced” because the agency decision is based on an error of law or on unlawful procedure, is arbitrary and capricious, or is unwarranted by facts found by the agency supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14 permits judicial review of ABCC decisions but does not provide the same scope of review over local licensing board decisions.

Shamar, Ltd. v. Licensing Board of Boston · filed 2000-04-15

Although the court has judicial review of a decision of the ABCC under G.L.c. 30A, §14, it does not have the same scope of judicial review over the Board.

Section 14 permits limited judicial review of the University of Massachusetts’s administrative decisions.

Vembu v. University of Massachusetts · filed 1998-10-23(4)

The question is, then, whether the Superior Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the Board under G.L.c. 30A, §14(4) in order to review the University’s decision to suspend the plaintiff, in light of the broad grant of authority given to the Board by the legislature. ... While the Court is of the opinion that the University’s administrative actions are subject to the limited judicial review provided by c. 30A, the question is not clear from doubt.

Section 14 defers to a specific statutory form of judicial review when one exists, except as to standards of review.

Hilse v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy · filed 2000-08-15

However, prior to the reference to the superior court, that statute also provides that “(w]here a statutory form of judicial review or appeal is provided, such statutory form shall govern in all respects except as to standards of review.” G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14 generally permits judicial review of a labor representation decision only after the commission has decided a prohibited practice claim.

Collective Bargaining Reform Ass'n v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 2002-03-05

That the commission dismissed COBRA’S petition without directing that an election be held does not render COBRA’S situation more “final” than that of employee organizations in prior cases denying judicial review.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the agency hearing record, limiting an appeal to issues raised before the hearing officer even when that excludes constitutional claims.

Tyler v. Sudders · filed 2002-04-29(5)

A court’s review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative record of the Hearing Officer’s proceedings. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5). As a result, Tyler must confine his appeal to the issues raised before the Hearing Officer, even if such a limitation operates to exclude consideration of constitutionally based claims.

Section 14 provides for judicial review of agency action when a hearing was required, even if no hearing occurred.

Baker v. Gray · filed 2003-03-24

Hence, the act provides for judicial review of an agency action regardless of whether a hearing was provided, so long as such a hearing was required.

Section 14(7) limits when a court may set aside a reviewing board decision to the specified grounds for error.

Conroy's Case · filed 2004-06-07(7)

We agree with the decision of the reviewing board, bearing in mind that “[w]e may set aside the [reviewing] board’s decision only if it is infected with error under G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(a)-(d), (f)-(g),” Murphy’s Case, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 708, 711 (2002), and that “[o]rdinarily an agency’s interpretation of its own rule is entitled to great weight.” Gonzalez’s Case, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 39, 41 (1996), quoting from Finkelstein v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 370 Mass. 476, 478 (1976).

Section 14 permits judicial review of a final agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding; an appeal the agency had no authority to hear provides no proceeding to review.

Edward P. Clark Post, 107, American Legion, Inc. v. Town of Natick Board of Selectmen · filed 2004-10-22

Any person or appointing authority aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding may seek judicial review of that decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. G.L.c. 30A, §14. ... Because the ABCC had no statutory authority to hear the appeal, there was no adjudicatory proceeding from which the American Legion could seekjudicial review.

Judicial review under § 14(5) is confined to the record before the agency.

Heineken U.S.A., Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 2004-11-29(5)

Our review is necessarily confined to that which was before the commission.

Section 14 limits judicial review of agency decisions and permits affirmance when substantial evidence in the record supports the decision.

Perry v. Town of Barnstable Building Commissioner · filed 2006-07-11

Moreover, there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision that the pier was unsafe. ... Recognizing the limited scope of review permissible under G.L.c. 30A, this court concludes that the Board’s decision was reasonable based on the facts in the record.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to assess whether the agency applied correct legal principles, made sufficient findings, and supported its findings with substantial evidence.

Norfolk County Retirement System v. Director of the Department of Labor & Workforce Development · filed 2006-07-19(7)

Our limited function is to determine whether the board of review applied correct legal principles in reaching its decision, whether the decision contains sufficient findings to demonstrate that the correct legal principles were applied, and whether those findings were supported by substantial evidence within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(e).

Section 14 permits judicial review only after an adjudicatory proceeding.

Town of Bellingham v. Local 2071, International Ass'n of Firefighters · filed 2005-09-06

The text of c. 30A, § 14, makes clear, however, that review under that section is only appropriate following an adjudicatory proceeding.

Section 14(7)(d) provides an avenue to seek relief from an agency decision allegedly based on improper procedures.

Town of Marion v. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency · filed 2005-10-24(7)(d)

An administrative appeal pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14(7) (d) is the Town’s appropriate avenue to seek relief from an agency decision which it claims was based on improper procedures.

Section 14 provides for judicial review of a Housing Appeals Committee decision, including whether the committee acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

Taylor v. Board of Appeals · filed 2005-12-02

Rather, plaintiffs currently may only challenge the HAC’s decision with a 30A appeal whereby the court will determine whether the HAC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the comprehensive permit for the construction of the 36-unit Project in Lexington.

Section 14 limits judicial discretion when reviewing agency decisions: a court must uphold a decision supported by substantial evidence and presume the agency acted validly.

Town of Middleborough v. Housing Appeals Committee · filed 2007-07-20

Second, as we discussed earlier, the scope of review of an administrative decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, leaves little room for appellate discretion. As we noted, the agency’s decision must be upheld if supported by “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 376 (1973), and we must indulge all rational presumptions in favor of the validity of the agency’s determinations.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

Salem Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2007-08-27(5)

A court’s review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative record. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5).

Section 14 provides for review of a board classification decision confined to the administrative record.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2007-09-28

An appeal from a classification decision by the board is pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and is confined to the administrative record.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside an agency decision on specified grounds when a party’s substantial rights may have been prejudiced.

eVineyard Retail Sales-Massachusetts, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 2008-03-18(7)

A decision may be set aside if “the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced” because it is based on an error of law or on an unlawful procedure, is arbitrary or capricious, is unwarranted by the facts found by the agency, is unconstitutional, is in excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction, or is not supported by substantial evidence. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 permits judicial review of a final agency decision only if it was made in an adjudicatory proceeding.

School Committee v. Board of Education · filed 2007-03-22

The decision to grant AMSA a charter was not made in an adjudicatory proceeding and, therefore, is not subject to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A. As noted by the judge, G. L. c. 30A, § 14, provides to an aggrieved party judicial review of a “final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding.” If the decision is not made in an adjudicatory proceeding, a court will lack jurisdiction to review the decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 does not govern judicial review of a local housing authority’s termination decision because a local housing authority is not an agency under chapter 30A.

Costa v. Fall River Housing Authority · filed 2008-02-27

The housing authority argues that the only appropriate process for judicial review of its termination decision should be an action instituted in the Superior Court under the Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A, § 14(l)-(7), limited to the restraining standards of § 14(7)(a) through (g). The argument fails because the housing authority is not an “agency” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 14(7) permits a court to review an agency decision for abuse of discretion, errors of law, and lack of substantial evidence.

Kaplan v. Board of Public Accountancy · filed 2008-11-26(7)

We review the board’s decision in accordance with the standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7). ... Nor was the board’s decision unsupported by substantial evidence: neither the petitioner’s felony conviction nor his false denial of the conviction was disputed.

Section 14 leaves findings of fact and assessments of witness credibility to the agency during judicial review.

O'Connor v. Office of Medicaid · filed 2009-01-23

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14, it is the function of the agency rather than the Court to make findings of fact, and it is the duty of the agency rather than the Court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.

A person allowed to participate fully as an intervener in an administrative proceeding is aggrieved by an adverse decision and may seek judicial review.

Sturbridge Board of Health v. O'Leary · filed 2009-02-04

The above cases indicate that once a person is permitted to fully participate in the administrative proceeding as an inter-vener, he is aggrieved by an adverse decision and entitled to seek judicial review of the decision.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside a CRAB decision for legal error or lack of substantial evidence.

Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2009-02-24(7)

A court may not set aside a CRAB decision unless the decision is legally erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence.

Judicial review under § 14(5) is confined to the administrative record.

Lincoln Pharmacy of Milford, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Division of Unemployment Assistance · filed 2009-06-18(5)

Review is confined to the administrative record. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14(5).

Section 14(7) permits review for legal error, arbitrary or capricious action, or abuse of discretion when an incomplete transcript prevents review of a substantial evidence claim.

United Steelworkers of America v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board · filed 2009-07-20(7)

Our review, therefore, is limited to determining whether the board’s decision is marred by legal error or is otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14 does not provide judicial review when another statute supplies a procedure for reviewing the agency decision.

Flaherty v. Delaney · filed 2008-07-18

Because Flaherty must bring an action for judicial review of the Board’s decision pursuant to G.L.c. 22C, §43, this court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction under G.L.c. 30A, §14 to hear the case.

Section 14 provides judicial review of a final state agency decision within thirty days after notice and does not provide relief in the nature of mandamus.

Manchester Housing Authority v. State Board of Retirement · filed 2009-03-05

Because no statutoiy form of judicial review or appeal is provided in G.L.c. 118C, the appeal is controlled by G.L.c. 30A, §14, which sets out a specific method of judicial review for an appeal from a decision by a state administrative organization. It does not provide for relief in the nature of mandamus and this review must “be commenced in the court within thirty days after receipt of notice of the final decision of the agency.” G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14(7)(e)’s substantial evidence standard does not apply to review of a workers’ compensation reviewing board decision under G. L. c. 152, § 12(2).

Drumm's Case · filed 2009-04-10(7)(e)

We note that we may not review the board’s decision under the “substantial evidence” standard of G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(e), as the employer urges us to do.

Section 14(7) permits a court to affirm, remand, set aside, or modify an agency decision when specified errors may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Callahan v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 2009-10-07(7)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14, the court may affirm, remand, set aside or modify an agency’s decision if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency’s decision is: (1) based upon an error of law; (2) unsupported by substantial evidence; (3) unwarranted by facts found by the court on the record submitted; or (4) arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record and bars the court from substituting its judgment for the agency’s.

Rosenthal v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles · filed 2009-11-19(5)

Judicial review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative record and a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.

Section 14 limits judicial review to the agency’s decision and does not permit a collateral challenge to the legal composition of the agency board.

Town of Sturbridge Board of Health v. O'Leary · filed 2009-12-08(7)

Review under G.L.c. 30A, §14, “is limited to determining whether the agency’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise based on an error of law.” ... The court therefore declines to consider whether the Board was legally constituted and proceeds with this review under the presumption that the Board’s decision was duly authorized.

Section 14 permits judicial review of a final agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding, including a reclassification decision when the offender has a constitutional right to an agency hearing.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2011-03-22

The Superior Court has jurisdiction to review the “final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding . . .” G.L.c. 30A, §14. ... The complaint shows enough to establish jurisdiction for judicial review under G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14 (5) confines judicial review to the administrative record, so a constitutional challenge to a general regulation requires a separate action for declaratory relief.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2011-05-03(5)

A challenge to the constitutionality of a general regulation cannot be resolved by requesting declaratory relief in an appeal from an administrative agency decision because judicial review is confined to the administrative record, see G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (5), which has been made based on the presumption that the classification scheme is constitutional.

Section 14 permits judicial review of a Housing Appeals Committee decision and requires courts to uphold a decision supported by substantial evidence, giving due weight to the committee’s expertise.

Zoning Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Committee · filed 2011-09-16

Parties aggrieved by the HAC’s decision may appeal to the Superior or Land Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. ... The HAC’s decision must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, and we must indulge all rational presumptions in favor of the validity of the HAC’s determinations, including its choice between two fairly conflicting views, giving due weight to its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.

Section 14(7) permits a court to affirm, remand, set aside, or modify an agency decision when specified defects may have prejudiced a party’s substantial rights.

Brady v. State Board of Retirement · filed 2011-11-23(7)

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14, the court may affirm, remand, set aside or modify an agency’s decision if it determines that the substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced because the agency’s decision is: (1) based upon an error of law; (2) unsupported by substantial evidence; (3) unwarranted by facts found by the court on the record submitted; or (4) arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. G.L.c. 30A, §14(7).

Section 14 permits a court to reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision when it prejudices substantial rights through legal or procedural error, arbitrary action, or a lack of substantial evidence.

Ramzi, Inc. v. Department of Public Health-WIC Program · filed 2012-07-26

Pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, §14, this court may reverse, remand, or modify an agency decision if the “substantial rights of any party may have been prejudiced” because the agency decision is based on an error of law or on unlawful procedure, is arbitrary and capricious or unwarranted by facts found by the agency, or is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) permits a court to modify or set aside an agency decision if the petitioner shows a constitutional violation, legal error, insufficient evidence, arbitrary or capricious action, or abuse of discretion.

Schoeller v. Board of Registration of Funeral Directors & Embalmers · filed 2012-10-26(7)

Accordingly, we will modify or set aside the board’s decision only if Schoeller demonstrates that the decision was in violation of a constitutional provision; legally erroneous; unsupported by substantial evidence; arbitrary or capricious; or an abuse of discretion. G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7).

Section 14 allows a person aggrieved by a final agency decision to seek judicial review within thirty days after receiving notice; failure to perfect that appeal leaves the decision final.

McLaughlin v. City of Lowell · filed 2013-07-25

Although G. L. c. 30A, § 14, affords any person aggrieved by a final decision of an agency in an adjudicatory proceeding a judicial review thereof, McLaughlin did not seek judicial review within thirty days after his receipt of notice of CRAB’s March 31, 2004, decision.

Section 14 limits judicial review of an agency decision: the court does not reweigh the evidence unless there is no basis in fact for the decision.

Scheffler v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 2013-09-16

Our review does not “extend to examining the weight of the evidence to determine whether the Superior Court’s decision — either upon its own findings of fact or those of the board adopted by the Superior Court — was justified, unless there is absolutely ‘no basis in fact’ to support that decision.” ... See G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 does not provide a way to seek an injunction against an alleged ongoing prison practice through review of an inmate grievance.

Shea v. Spencer · filed 2013-11-29

Insofar as Shea is challenging the DOC’s alleged practice of contracting with private companies for inmate labor, and is seeking an injunction to prohibit the practice, such a claim is not appropriately brought pursuant to G.L.c. 127, §38H and G.L.c. 30A, §14.

Section 14 limits judicial review to the administrative record and permits a court to vacate an agency decision when an essential finding lacks substantial evidence.

Paulding v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds · filed 2013-12-13

Pursuant to the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, judicial review of an agency’s decision under M.G.L.c. 30A is limited to the administrative record. ... However, this court must conclude that the Board’s second finding of fact (quoted above, with italics added) regarding the 1983 Cambridge offense is not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 14’s default judicial review procedure does not govern final orders of the Department of Telecommunications and Cable because chapter 25, section 5 provides the review procedure.

Olmstead v. Department of Telecommunications & Cable · filed 2013-12-04

We first address whether G. L. c. 25, § 5, or G. L. c. 30A, § 14, applies. ... We affirm the ruling of the single justice that G. L. c. 25, § 5, governs appeals from final orders issued by the Department of Telecommunications and Cable.

Section 14(7) limits when a court may disturb an agency decision, including decisions that exceed statutory authority, lack substantial evidence, or are arbitrary or contrary to law.

J.M. Hollister, LLC v. Architectural Access Board · filed 2014-07-10(7)

Like the courts below, we review the board's decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), and will not disturb the decision unless it was made in excess of the board's statutory authority; is unsupported by substantial evidence; 18 or is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.

Section 14(7) requires a court reviewing an agency decision to assess whether it rests on substantial evidence or is abusive, arbitrary, or capricious; that review requires ascertainable standards for the agency’s decision.

Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2015-04-29(7)

If unable to understand the basis for determining a high risk of recidivism from a moderate risk of recidivism, the judge cannot ensure that an accurate classification decision has occurred. Thus, a court cannot perform its duty to determine whether the decision rested on substantial evidence or constituted an abuse or amounted to a arbitrary or capricious decision. G.L.c. 30k, §14(7).

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 3839 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2015-08-21(5)

Review of a hearing examiner's decision, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is "confined to the record."

Section 14 requires a court reviewing an agency decision to consider whether substantial evidence supports it and whether it involves an abuse of discretion or an error of law.

Malloch v. Town of Hanover · filed 2015-09-24(7)

Because the Superior Court judge, having concluded that delegation was impermissible, had ordered the matter remanded to HRD for a "substantive review," he did not conduct a substantive review, pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, of the commission's decision, and had no opportunity to consider whether the commission's determination that Malloch's gender was not a factor in her bypass was supported by substantial evidence and not an abuse of discretion or an error of law.

Section 14 permits judicial review of agency action except where another law expressly precludes it.

City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission · filed 2015-12-03

As to Count I, G.L.c. 30A, §14 provides a right to judicial review of an agency action “[e]xcept so far as any provision of law expressly precludes judicial review.” That is precisely what the Gaming Act does.

Section 14 review of an agency decision does not permit the court to revisit another Superior Court judge’s earlier remand decision.

Estate of Robertson v. Tsai · filed 2016-01-16

Though the plaintiff makes an extensive argument in its memorandum about the unfairness of the request for remand and the Court’s decision to remand the matter, this Court declines to revisit that decision as it is not appropriate to review another Superior Court Justice’s decision via the current 30A complaint.

Section 14 provides the avenue for challenging a final agency decision and bars a separate declaratory relief action asserting errors in that decision.

Murby v. Children's Hospital Corp. · filed 2016-12-05

A group of individuals that includes most of the Plaintiffs in this case recently filed a new lawsuit challenging DPH’s approval of the Hospital’s DoN application under G.L.c. 30A, §14. ... Now that DPH has taken final action, its decision may only be challenged under c. 30A in the other pending action, not through a claim for declaratory relief under G.L.c. 231A in this case.

Section 14 permits judicial review of agency decisions in adjudicatory proceedings unless another law expressly precludes it; the gaming statute precludes that review for commission licensing decisions.

City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission · filed 2017-03-10

More importantly, we consider the language of § 17 (g) to reflect a broader legislative intention to curtail judicial review, barring anyone, not just failed applicants, from obtaining review of commission licensing decisions through the ordinary channels of judicial review that the Legislature has otherwise provided, including review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review to the administrative record.

C.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families · filed 2017-12-28(5)

Our review is confined to the administrative record.

Section 14 limits judicial review of an agency decision to whether it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious, or rests on an error of law.

Sea View Retreat, Inc. v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Health & Human Servs. · filed 2018-07-06

"Appellate review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is limited to determining whether the agency's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise based on an error of law."

Section 14(7) limits judicial review of agency decisions to specified errors and calls for deference to agency discretion when none is found.

M & I Realty, Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Safety · filed 2018-10-05(7)

We do, however, review the decision to ensure it is supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary and capricious, based upon an error of law, or in violation of constitutional provisions. G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). Absent one of the errors enumerated in § 14, we defer to the discretionary authority conferred upon the agency.

Section 14 permits judicial review of a SORB classification and limits when a court may disturb the hearing examiner's decision.

Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd. · filed 2019-03-28(7)

A sex offender may seek judicial review of a SORB classification pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14. On review the court examines the administrative record for substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's classification, and may disturb the decision only where it is unsupported, arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law.

Section 14(5) confines judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

RK&E Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 2020-04-21(5)

Pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (5), our review is confined to the administrative record.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to determine whether an agency decision prejudiced a party's substantial rights through a constitutional violation, legal error, unlawful procedure, or lack of substantial evidence.

15 LaGrange Street Corp. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2021-05-13(7)

Our review of the commission's decision is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), which requires us to determine whether a party's substantial rights were prejudiced because the decision was in violation of constitutional provisions, based on an error of law or unlawful procedure, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

Section 14(7) requires a reviewing court to give due weight to an agency’s expertise and permits relief when an agency decision prejudices substantial rights for reasons such as legal error or lack of substantial evidence.

RICK GRIFFIN v. MASSACHUSETTS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & Others · filed 2022-08-12(7)

This court may reverse, remand, or modify a Commission decision if the substantial rights of any party have been prejudiced because such decision was arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, based upon an error of law, in violation of constitutional provisions, or otherwise not in accordance with law, among other reasons.

Section 14 provides a route for appealing a Department of Unemployment Assistance decision on benefit eligibility.

Toby v. Department of Unemployment Assistance. · filed 2024-03-29

Finally, regardless of the success of his challenge to the department's decision in his case, we conclude that Toby chose the proper route for appeal in G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 permits judicial review of a final agency decision only when it was made in an adjudicatory proceeding; notice, comment, and a public hearing alone do not qualify.

266 Border LLC v. Office of Coastal Zone Management Within the Executive Office of Energy and Environmentalaffairs · filed 2024-04-23

In the case at bar, the record is plain that, while OCZM's review of the East Boston DPA entailed notice and comment and a public hearing, see 301 Code Mass. Regs. § 25.03(5), it did not include an adjudicatory proceeding within the meaning of G.L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 limits judicial review of an agency decision to whether it lacks substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious, or rests on an error of law.

PERRY v. REGISTRY OF MOTOR VEHICLES & Another. · filed 2024-06-14

"Our review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, 'is limited to determining whether the agency's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise based on an error of law.'" Sullivan v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 818, 821 (2020), quoting Haverhill Retirement Sys. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 131 (2012).

Section 14(7) directs courts reviewing agency decisions to give weight to the agency's expertise and discretion and to assess whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7971 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-06-18(7)

After careful review of the hearing examiner's decision, we discern no abuse of discretion and conclude that the level three classification was supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or modify an agency decision for legal error, a constitutional violation, action beyond the agency's authority, or lack of substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527359 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-09-26(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify SORB's classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence."

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or modify a SORB classification that exceeds the board’s authority, violates constitutional provisions, rests on an error of law, or lacks substantial evidence.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 29265 v. Sex Offender Registry Board. · filed 2024-10-01(7)

"A reviewing court may set aside or modify SORB's classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is not supported by substantial evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 649 (2019) (Doe No. 496501), citing G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). ... Where the classification is supported by "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6), and "the examiner's detailed written decision was balanced and fair," see Smith v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 813 (2006), we do not disturb the board's decision.

Section 14 provides judicial review of a medical license suspension resulting from an adjudicatory proceeding.

Padmanabhan v. Board of Registration in Medicine. · filed 2024-11-22

Here, by contrast, the board's indefinite suspension of the plaintiff's license was the result of an adjudicatory proceeding. The plaintiff had available to him the ordinary avenues of review of his indefinite suspension under G. L. c. 112, § 64, and G. L. c. 30A, § 14, but did not avail himself of them.

Section 14 provides narrow judicial review of CRAB decisions, allowing reversal for legal error or lack of substantial evidence.

SIBLEY v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & Another. · filed 2025-05-05(7)

"It is well established that judicial review of a CRAB decision under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is narrow." ... Accordingly, given the narrow scope of judicial review, we cannot conclude that the CRAB decision was unsupported by substantial evidence or legally erroneous.

Section 14(7) permits a court to set aside or modify an agency decision that exceeds the agency’s authority, rests on legal error, lacks substantial evidence, or is arbitrary and capricious.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 527962 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2025-09-11(7)

In reviewing SORB classification determinations, a court "may set aside or modify the board's classification decision where it determines that the decision is in excess of the board's statutory authority . . . , is based on an error of law, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion."[3] ... See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 confines judicial review to the agency record and does not permit a facial challenge to the governing statute.

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 524174 v. Sex Offender Registry Board · filed 2025-12-09

The claim is therefore improper in this action brought solely under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, in which review is confined to the record of board proceedings, and the facial constitutionality of the classification scheme is presumed.

Section 14 permits a person aggrieved by a board decision to seek judicial review; a tenant cannot challenge rent increases at parks where she has shown no injury.

Ducharme v. Mobile Home Rent Control Board of Chicopee · filed 2026-05-22

General Laws c. 30A, § 14, permits a "person . . . aggrieved" by a final decision of the board to obtain judicial review. ... By contrast, where the plaintiff is not a tenant of Holiday II or Kontiki and has neither alleged nor offered proof that raising rents at Holiday II or Kontiki caused her injury, she is not a person "aggrieved" as to Jean's actions related to those two parks.

Section 14(7) calls for direct review of the board’s decision when an appeal comes from a single justice’s judgment.

Thomann v. Board of Registration of Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen · filed 2018-12-10(7)

We agree with the single justice that there was no error in the board's decision. See Weinberg v. Board of Registration in Med., 443 Mass. 679, 685 (2005) (under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 [7], court "reviews the decision of the board directly, despite this matter being brought as an appeal of a decision of the single justice").

Section 14 permits judicial review after an agency issues a final order following an adjudicatory hearing and administrative remedies are exhausted.

Wilczewski v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering · filed 1989-05-02

Once DEQE has issued its final order following an adjudicatory hearing, the administrative process is exhausted and any person still aggrieved by the agency’s final order is then entitled to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14’s limits on judicial review apply only when the employer is an agency under c. 30A and its determination is made in an adjudicatory proceeding.

Pinshaw v. Metropolitan District Commission · filed 1988-06-30

Unless the employer is an “agency” within the meaning of the State Administrative Procedure Act, see G. L. c. 30A, § 1, and its determination is made in an “adjudicatory proceeding,” id., the limits on judicial review in G. L. c. 30A, § 14, do not apply.

Section 14(7) supplies the grounds for reviewing a prehearing dismissal of an agency fee challenge that is a final order under chapter 150E, § 11.

Lyons v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1986-05-08(7)

The commission’s protestations notwithstanding, we do not think that subjecting prehearing dismissals of constitutionally based agency fee challenges to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, involves any significant encroachment on the commission’s discretionary authority. ... Such decisions, however, may be overturned on review if, inter alla, they are in violation of constitutional provisions, in excess of the statutory authority or the jurisdiction of the commission, or made on unlawful procedure, or are arbitrary, capricious, or constitute an abuse of discretion. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Section 14 permits review of Commission decisions resolving agency fee challenges as adjudicatory proceedings that begin when the employee files a prohibited practice complaint.

Lyons v. Labor Relations Commission · filed 1985-04-01

We also hold, for purposes of review, that such decisions are adjudicatory proceedings which commence on the filing by the employee of his or her prohibited practices complaint. See G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 requires judicial review of the appeal board’s decision, rather than the initial retirement board’s decision.

Namay v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board · filed 1985-03-08

The decision which must withstand judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is that of the appeal board, not that of the State, county, or local retirement board.

Section 14 judicial review of an agency decision is subject to the mootness doctrine.

International Marathons, Inc. v. Attorney General · filed 1984-07-03

The mootness doctrine applies to judicial review of administrative decisions as well as to appellate review of lower court decisions.

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of Department of Correction decisions.

Hill v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution · filed 1984-06-19

There is no statutory right of review. Decisions of the Department of Correction are not reviewable under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 does not permit judicial review of an agency decision affecting only a town’s public, political, or legislative functions because the decision is not made in an adjudicatory proceeding.

Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council · filed 1984-05-30

Therefore, the council’s determinations, as they affected the town, were not made in an adjudicatory proceeding, and they are not subject to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14(1) requires a final agency decision and exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review; an agency remand for further hearings is not final.

Town of East Longmeadow v. State Advisory Commission · filed 1983-12-08(1)

An administrative order requiring a subordinate administrative body to reconsider its order is neither final nor appealable. ... Thus the case is one for application of usual principles requiring judicial review only of final administrative decisions, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and deference to primary administrative jurisdiction. G. L. c. 30A, § 14(1).

Section 14 allows judicial review of an agency decision only when it arises from an adjudicatory proceeding.

School Committee of Hatfield v. Board of Education · filed 1977-05-06

Since there is neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a hearing in the context of this case, the proceedings before the board were not adjudicatory proceedings within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (1), and, therefore, this court has no power to review the board’s decision trader G. L. c. 30A, §14.

Section 14 allows judicial review of a final agency decision only when the proceeding required an agency hearing.

Springfield Hotel Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1959-03-16

Since no hearing was required by any provision of law, the petitioners were not entitled to a judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of a preliminary agency inquiry that is not an adjudicatory proceeding.

Miller v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1959-12-08

The second ground of demurrer by the interveners is, “The petition will not lie because the proceedings of which review is sought were not 'adjudicatory proceedings’ within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, §§ 1 (1), 14.” The commission’s demurrer states this ground in slightly different language: “That the proceeding sought to be reviewed is not an adjudicatory proceeding within the meaning of c. 30A.” However expressed, this ground is good.

Section 14 permits judicial review of a final agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding, including a drug store permit denial when a hearing is constitutionally required.

Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy · filed 1965-02-08

Chapter 30A, § 14, provides for “judicial review,” in accordance with that section, of “a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding” (emphasis supplied). ... The Superior Court had jurisdiction of the petition for review in the Milligan case and has jurisdiction of the petition which was before us in the earlier Cohen case and is still pending before the Superior Court.

Section 14 does not provide judicial review when the agency proceeding was not an adjudicatory proceeding.

Westland Housing Corp. v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1967-04-13

In conclusion we are of opinion that neither § 52D nor § 65K required the “hearing” which was held. ... Thus there was no adjudicatory proceeding and so no right to review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 permits judicial review only if there was an adjudicatory proceeding.

Westland Housing Corp. v. Commissioner of Insurance · filed 1963-12-06

There can be no review under c. 30A, § 14, unless there was an adjudicatory proceeding.

Section 14 does not provide judicial review of an agency decision made outside an adjudicatory proceeding.

Moskow v. Boston Redevelopment Authority · filed 1965-08-17

Case No. 6623 is a petition by State Street, purportedly under G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (the State Administrative Procedure Act), against the Division to obtain a review of its decision approving the Project. ... There was no error. The decision was not "in an adjudicatory proceeding," which, as defined in c. 30A, § 1 (1), "means a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named persons are required by constitutional right or by any provision of the General Laws to be determined after opportunity for an agency hearing."

Section 14 permits a person aggrieved by a final agency decision in an adjudicatory proceeding to seek judicial review; a regulatory price decision does not qualify.

Atlas Distributing Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission · filed 1968-06-03

A petition for review may be brought only by one “aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding.” G. L. c. 30A, § 14. ... The instant petition thus appears to be directed at a nonadjudicatory procedure of the commission. The demurrer to the petition for review should have been sustained.

Section 14 permits judicial review of an adjudication setting an individual nursing home's payment rate.

Palm Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Commission · filed 1971-06-14

Second, an individual nursing home may appeal for a determination of an individual rate for that home, claiming that the rate established generally is inadequate or unreasonable “as to such home.” Such a determination is an adjudication rather than a regulation, and is reviewable under G. L. c. 30A, § 14.

Section 14 permits an appeal only from an adjudicatory proceeding that determines the rights of specifically named persons.

School Committee of Springfield v. Board of Education · filed 1974-05-01

Even if QIEC could show itself to be a person aggrieved by the board’s decision to implement the Task Force plan, it nevertheless could not maintain an appeal under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, because that section permits appeals only from “adjudicatory proceedings[s].” The proceedings before the hearing examiner and the board did not involve the determination of the rights of “specifically named persons” and thus were not “adjudicatory” within the statutory definition.