Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4

Section 4(6) reaches leasing of privately financed multiple dwellings when conducted as a business.

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Colangelo · filed 1962-05-16(6)

Section 4, subsection 6, is really aimed at preventing’ discrimination in the business of housing. In its application to privately financed multiple dwelling and contiguously located housing accommodations, the statute seeks to reach leasing and selling when conducted as a business.

Section 4(10) prohibits discrimination solely because a tenant receives housing subsidies; business reasons related to Section 8 requirements do not necessarily establish discrimination on that basis.

Attorney General v. Brown · filed 1987-08-19(10)

That these reasons are related to the requirements of the Section 8 program does not necessarily equate with discrimination “solely” on the basis of the individual’s status as a Section 8 certificate holder. Brown should have an opportunity to litigate the issue whether his reasons are legitimate business reasons which are not satisfied by the protections afforded by the regulations of the Section 8 program.

Section 4(6) prohibits a landlord’s sexual harassment of a tenant even when it does not affect eviction, the ability to rent, or rental cost.

Gnerre v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1988-06-08(6)

Similarly, we conclude that sexual harassment need not affect a tangible condition of tenancy such as eviction, refusal to rent, or rental cost to be a violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (6).

Subsections (6) and (7) prohibit denying public housing benefits to unmarried couples solely because they are unmarried.

Worcester Housing Authority v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1989-12-12(6), (7)

We agree with the commission that G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (6) and (7), are unambiguous and that the plain words of the provisions prohibit the authority from maintaining its policy.

Section 4(6) treats a refusal to rent to an unmarried couple for joint occupancy as marital status discrimination, even when the landlord describes the objection as directed at cohabitation.

Attorney General v. Desilets · filed 1994-07-14(6)

The defendants argue that they are not discriminating on the basis of marital status but rather on the basis of conduct and that consequently they are not discriminating in a way forbidden by G.L.c. 151B, § 4 (6). There is no merit to this argument. This court's opinion in Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 406 Mass. 244 (1989), makes clear that the prohibition in G.L.c. 151B, § 4 (6), against discrimination in leasing because of marital status applies to discrimination against an unmarried woman and an unmarried man seeking to rent an apartment for their joint occupancy.

A familial-status housing discrimination claim under § 4(11) requires a prospective tenant to show that she applied to rent an available unit or was discouraged from applying by the landlord’s conduct.

Commonwealth v. Russell Realty · filed 1995-09-21(11)

Specifically, the second prong of the prima facie element has not been established. Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, Dudley never filed a rental application for the Andersons’ apartment, nor did Dudley ever request a rental application.

A tenant seeking an accommodation to a housing provider’s rules because of a handicap must show that the accommodation is reasonable and necessary.

Nason v. Stone Hill Realty Ass'n · filed 1996-05-06(7A)(2)

Second, with respect to Stone Hill’s failure to allow Nason to keep the cat in her apartment, Nason has not shown a substantial likelihood of proving that maintaining possession of the cat is necessary due to her handicap. In order to succeed in her claim of discrimination under G.L.c. 151B, §4(6)(b) or 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(2)(A), Nason must demonstrate that her request for accommodation in Stone Hill’s rules, policies and practices is both reasonable and necessary.

Section 4(11)(a)'s elderly or infirm tenant exemption does not excuse a refusal to rent based on public assistance or a desire to avoid lead paint abatement.

McFadden v. Moll · filed 2003-05-28(11)(a)

Also, the elderly/infirm exemption only applies to the statutory bar to discrimination against families with children where lead paint is not involved (c. 15 11, §4(11); it does not permit discrimination motivated by a desire not to abate lead paint (c. 111, §199A) or to take tenants on public assistance (c. 151B, §4(10).

Section 4(7A)(1) prohibits refusing reasonable modifications necessary for a person with a disability to fully enjoy a dwelling.

Rodriguez v. Montalvo · filed 2004-01-12(7A)(1)

To hold Defendants liable for discriminating on the basis of Jose’s disability, Rodriguez must therefore show that Defendants refused a modification of the premises that was both reasonable and necessary to afford Jose full enjoyment thereof. See id.; see also M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(7A)(1) (similarly defining discrimination on the basis of handicap). ... Rodriguez, therefore, has a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits of both her federal and state law discrimination claims.

A housing discrimination claim under § 4(7) need not plead a prima facie case when the plaintiff alleges it will produce direct evidence of discrimination.

Commonwealth v. Orian · filed 2005-05-24(7)

Further, as Orian conceded at oral argument, the Commonwealth alleges that it will produce direct evidence of discrimination and, hence, is not required to plead a prima facie case.

Section 4(10) prohibits a landlord from rejecting a housing subsidy recipient because of a required program lease term, even for economic reasons.

DiLiddo v. Oxford Street Realty, Inc. · filed 2007-11-15(10)

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the lease termination provision at issue was a “requirement,” G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (10), of the alternative housing voucher program (AHVP), the program that provided a housing subsidy to DiLiddo. We further conclude that, where the Legislature has exercised its authority to set the balance between the protection of landlords’ interests and the need for affordable housing, the defendants’ refusal to agree to the provision violated the strictures of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (10).

Section 4(10) prohibits discrimination against tenants because they receive housing subsidies or because of the requirements of a housing subsidy program.

Goodman v. First Horizon Home Loans · filed 2012-04-25(10)

The Complaint sufficiently alleges a pattern of conduct suggesting discrimination against plaintiff because she was a Section 8 tenant.

A rental unit may be available under § 4(11) when the owner says it will become vacant soon and accepts an application for it.

Sy v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2011-07-08(11)

Therefore, Sy herself considered the first-floor apartment “available” because she stated it would be vacant shortly and she voluntarily handed out and took back at least one application from a potential tenant for that unit with the obvious intent of renting it.

Section 4(11)(3) excludes the leasing of a unit in a two-family dwelling when the owner occupies the other unit.

W.R.S. v. R.S. · filed 2018-04-04(11)(3)

However, the statute excludes from its reach the leasing of "a single dwelling unit in a two family dwelling, the other occupancy unit of which is occupied by the owner as his residence." G. L. c. 151B, § 4(11)(3), inserted by St. 1983, c. 628, § 3. In addition to having failed to establish the existence of a tenancy, the plaintiff's claim fails because it does not fall within the scope of the statute.

Section 4(7A)(2) and (8)(2) prohibit refusing reasonable housing accommodations and treating people differently because of disability.

Vanderburgh House LLC v. City of Worcester · filed 2021-03-30(7A)(2), (8)(2)

The language of the two discrimination provisions is likewise identical. Compare § 3604(f)(2) with Mass.Gen. L. ch. 151B, § 4 (8)(2). Therefore, just as the Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated an FHAA claim under two theories—reasonable accommodation and discriminatory intent (disparate treatment)—their allegations suffice to state a claim under Chapter 151B.

Section 4(7B) prohibits discriminatory statements about renting multiple-dwelling housing based on public assistance recipiency, and plausible allegations of such statements can withstand a motion to dismiss.

Commonwealth v. Bragel · filed 2013-12-04(7B)

However, at this stage of litigation, it is sufficient that the Commonwealth has made plausible factual allegations that suggest a violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4(7B). The Bragels’ contrary description of the incident cannot form the basis for granting a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Bragels’ motion to dismiss Count I of the complaint must be denied.

Section 4(7A)(2) requires reasonable accommodations needed to give a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; an accommodation must have a causal link to the disability.

Rosa v. Lawrence Housing Authority · filed 2021-07-20(7A)(2)

Even reaching the reasonable accommodation claims on the merits as to the LHA, they fail on this undisputed record. ... The types of discrimination prohibited by the FHA include the “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford [a handicapped] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 ... U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see Mass. Gen. L. c. 151B, § 4(7A)(2). ... Without more, Rosa fails to establish a “causal link” between her disabilities, for which she sought accommodation, and her inability to find an apartment within the time allotted.

Section 4(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; choosing qualified, higher-ranked candidates for promotion does not establish discrimination.

Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety · filed 1968-12-24(1)

The petitioner contends that the failure of the respondent to promote her to the grade of staff sergeant constitutes discrimination against her solely because of her sex and therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Massachusetts Fair Labor Practices Act, G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1), as amended. We disagree. We find nothing in the record to support the trial judge’s findings and rulings in this regard. ... It appears that only two persons were promoted while the petitioner was one of the top three candidates for promotion, both of whom were higher on the list than the petitioner. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the individuals who were promoted to fill the two vacancies were not qualified. There was no discrimination.

Section 4 requires a complainant to show that sex discrimination affected the employment decision; a claim fails if the employer would have made the same decision regardless of sex.

College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1978-08-25

If, however, an employer discriminates on the basis of sex but the complainant would not have been hired even if he or she had been a member of the opposite sex, a complainant has not proved a case of discrimination under G. L. c. 151B, § 4.

Section 4 (1) places the burden of proving employment discrimination on the complainant, who may meet it with an unanswered prima facie case or by showing that the employer’s stated reasons were not the real reasons.

Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1976-09-30(1)

The burden of proof of unlawful discrimination rests at all times with the complainant. He may meet that burden by establishing an unanswered prima facie case of discrimination. He may also meet that burden by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent’s facially proper reasons given for its action against him were not the real reasons for that action.

In a race discrimination claim under § 4, cl. 1, evidence that a promotion practice generally operated without discrimination is relevant to whether an individual was discriminated against.

Springfield Board of Police Commissioners v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1978-05-01cl. 1

Statistical evidence showing that the practice involved was generally carried out in a nondiscriminatory manner is extremely relevant even in a case focusing on discrimination against a single individual since this evidence tends to demonstrate that the action complained of was not the result of discrimination.

Section 4(1) does not establish discriminatory hiring if the applicant would not have been hired even without the discrimination.

Buckley Nursing Home, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1985-06-03(1)

If the complainant would not have been hired even if she had been white, the complainant has not proved a case of discrimination under G. L. c. 151B, § 4.

A racial discrimination claim under § 4(1) requires proof that the employer’s stated reasons for rejecting the applicant were a pretext.

Salem v. MASSACHUSETTS COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION · filed 1989-02-21(1)

Brown's allegations of racial bias required proof that the police department's reasons for not hiring Brown were a pretext.

A racial discrimination claim under § 4(1) requires proof that the employer’s stated reasons for not hiring the applicant were a pretext.

City of Salem v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1989-02-21(1)

Brown’s allegations of racial bias required proof that the police department’s reasons for not hiring Brown were a pretext.

Once an employer supports its action with lawful reasons and evidence, a plaintiff who has made a prima facie discrimination case must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that those reasons were not the real ones.

McKenzie v. Brigham & Women's Hospital · filed 1989-07-20(1)

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, but the defendant answers it by advancing lawful grounds for the action taken and produces evidence of underlying facts in support thereof, the plaintiff, in order to prevail, must persuade the fact finder by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s asserted reasons were not the real reasons for the action.

In a sex discrimination pretext claim under § 4(1), the employee must establish a prima facie case, the employer must produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and the employee must prove that reason was a pretext.

Ne Metro. Reg. Vocational Sch v. Mass. Comm'n · filed 1991-07-18(1)

The plaintiff must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of sex discrimination. If she succeeds, then the defendant has the burden of producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected or someone else selected for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. If the defendant meets its burden of production, then the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons but were pretexts for discrimination.

In a sex discrimination hiring claim under § 4(1), an employer meets its burden of production by presenting evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Northeast Metropolitan Regional Vocational School District School Committee v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimi · filed 1991-07-18(1)

It is sufficient if the defendant presents evidence which articulates a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for its action, which we conclude it did.

When an employer gives nondiscriminatory reasons for unequal pay or a denied promotion, the employee must show those reasons are pretextual.

Ramsdell v. Western Massachusetts Bus Lines, Inc. · filed 1993-06-30(1)

However, once the employer offers nondiscriminatory reasons for the disparate treatment, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reasons are merely pretext.

Section 4 requires an age discrimination plaintiff to show adequate job performance, adverse employment action, and evidence that the employer did not treat age neutrally or retained a younger worker; the plaintiff must produce enough evidence of discriminatory pretext to survive summary judgment.

Tuccelli v. Bull HN Information Systems · filed 1994-01-12(1B)

In the instant action, the above principles are supplemented by the shifting burdens of proof required in proving discrimination under G.L.c. 151B, §4.... The plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that (1) he was at least 40 years of age, (2) he met his employer’s legitimate job performance expectations, (3) he experienced adverse employment action, and (4) the employer did not treat age neutrally or that younger persons were retained in the same position.

A sex-discrimination claim based on termination requires proof that the employee belongs to a protected group, performed acceptably, was terminated, and that the employer sought a similarly qualified replacement.

White v. University of Massachusetts at Boston · filed 1991-07-03(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination resulting in termination of employment, White must establish that (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she performed her job at an acceptable level; (3) she was terminated; and (4) her employer sought a replacement with similar qualifications.

A complaint states an age discrimination claim under § 4 when it alleges that the employer dismissed the plaintiff because of her age.

Alonzi v. HMK Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1993-06-25

Under this liberal standard, the plaintiff has sustained her burden of pleading a cause of action under G.L.c. 151B. At para. 9 of the Amended Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendants engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4 . . and at para. 10 of the Amended Complaint, she alleges that “[defendants’ treatment of Plaintiff . . . was discriminatory in violation of G.L.c. 151B.” Taken together with the defendant’s factual allegations that defendant dismissed her from her job when she was 54 because of her age, these claims are sufficient to state a cause of action.

Section 4(1B) permits an age-discrimination claim to proceed when supervisors’ remarks about age create a genuine issue as to whether the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

Tennaro v. Ryder System, Inc. · filed 1993-09-10(1B)

In the present ease, the Court concludes that Tennaro has presented sufficient evidence, to wit: the remarks by his superiors concerning his age, to raise a genuine issue as to whether defendants’ proffered reason for the termination is merely pretextual. The Court, therefore, will deny the motion of defendants (except Ryder) for summary judgment with respect to Count I and Count III insofar as it alleges age discrimination.

An age discrimination claim under § 4 survives summary judgment when the plaintiff offers sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual.

Stern v. Dynagraf, Inc. · filed 1993-11-12(1B)

On the basis of the affidavits and depositions on the record, Dynagrafs motion for summary judgment on G.L.c. 151B is denied. Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence on the issue of pretext for him to survive summary judgment.

A racial discriminatory discharge claim fails at the prima facie stage when the employee is replaced by someone of the same race and presents no other evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.

Dennis v. Boston Co. · filed 1993-09-22(1)

Ms. Dennis fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because TBC replaced her with a black woman.

In a § 4 discrimination claim, an employer can satisfy its burden of production by providing evidence supporting its stated nondiscriminatory reason for a hiring decision.

Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc. · filed 1994-07-29

All this, however, is academic in the present case because even under the more demanding standard apparently followed in Massachusetts, FMI has done more than merely articulate a reason. It has offered three affidavits in which those concerned set forth their assessment that Woods was not as well qualified as the four men ultimately hired; there is a contemporaneous evaluation of Woods critical of his skills that would presumably be admissible as a business record; and there is an explanation from one of the affiants that colorably explains how Woods could have done an adequate job for a number of years without being especially well qualified for the more demanding tasks contemplated by the new position in the upgraded company.

Under § 4, an employee may establish a prima facie race discrimination claim without applying for a promotion when she was not told the position existed.

Harrison v. Boston Financial Data Services, Inc. · filed 1994-08-15

While it is not clear whether Harrison ever actually applied for a promotion, that is not fatal to the plaintiffs prima facie case. ... Moreover, where, as here, the complainant-employee was not offered the so-called new position or even made aware that the particular job opening existed, a fact finder reasonably could infer that discriminatory practices prevented even awareness of the opportunity.

Section 4 permits an age discrimination claim to proceed to trial when younger employees with worse sales records escaped discipline, creating a factual dispute over the reason for discharge.

Scotti v. Arrow Electronics, Inc. · filed 1994-11-28

Although his sales fell off during the next quarter, two others, who were younger, had worse performance records and were neither warned nor discharged. ... There is enough here, we think, to put Scotti over the rail and enable him to place the conflicting facts before a trier of fact.

Section 4 permits an age discrimination claim when an employee over forty alleges that she was qualified for a position, was denied it, and the employer filled it with a younger person of similar qualifications.

Riebold v. Eastern Casualty Insurance · filed 1997-06-04

To make out a prima facie case the plaintiff must show that (1) she is over forty years of age; (2) she is qualified for the position in question; (3) she was denied the position in question; and (4) that the employer filled that position with a younger individual with qualifications similar to those of the plaintiff.

Section 4(1B) requires an employee alleging age discrimination to show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext or that discrimination actually motivated the decision.

Zisch v. Textron Defense Systems · filed 1996-04-11(1B)

When the defendants in an age discrimination case satisfy the second-stage burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff in the third-stage to show either that the employer’s articulated reasons are a pretext or by direct evidence that the actual motivation was discrimination. ... However, in cases such as this, where the plaintiff has no reasonable likelihood of proving an essential element of his case, namely that, the defendants acted with an discriminatory motive in laying him off, summary judgment is appropriate.

For a discriminatory discharge claim under § 4(1), an employee opposing summary judgment must produce evidence raising a genuine factual dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason was the real reason.

Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. · filed 1996-04-15(1)

In order to survive summary judgment on a chapter 151B claim, the plaintiff must produce enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s articulated reason for the adverse employment decision was the real reason.

A jury instruction on disability discrimination under § 4(16) may permit recovery upon proof that the employer lied about its reason for termination.

Petsch-Schmid v. Boston Edison Company, Alison Alden and James Dillon · filed 1997-02-27(16)

Petsch-Schmid, however, overlooks the fact that by potentially permitting her recovery upon proof of Boston Edison's lies, she enjoyed the benefits of the court's "pretext-only" instruction. Compare Blare, 646 N.E.2d at 117 (entitling a discrimination plaintiff to recovery upon establishing pretext) with LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 843 (1st Cir.1993) (under federal law, permitting, but not compelling, inference of intentional discrimination upon proof of pretext). We find no error and certainly no plain error.

Under § 4(16), evidence that an employer introduced and enforced a performance rule after learning of an employee’s handicap can support a finding that its stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Handrahan v. Red Roof Inns, Inc. · filed 1997-06-23(16)

On the foregoing evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the thirty-minute rule was not a well-established company policy, as the defendant contended, but rather a new rule implemented and enforced only after the defendant learned of the plaintiff’s handicap. Accordingly, the trial judge correctly denied the defendant’s motions for a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v.

To show that an employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination under § 4(1), a plaintiff must identify specific instances in which similarly situated employees were treated differently.

Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. · filed 1997-11-12(1)

We adopt the approach taken by Federal courts under Title VII that in order to establish that the defendant’s stated reasons for terminating him were a pretext, the plaintiff must “identify and relate specific instances where persons similarly situated ‘in all relevant aspects’ were treated differently.”

Section 4(1B) does not require an age-discrimination plaintiff with direct evidence of discrimination to prove replacement by a younger person.

Brownlie v. Kanzaki Specialty Papers, Inc. · filed 1998-03-12(1B)

Kanzaki also argues that Brownlie failed to produce evidence that he was replaced by a younger person — that in fact Brownlie’s position had been eliminated. Given Brownlie’s direct evidence of discrimination (Watanabe’s remarks), no such proof was necessary, but if it were necessary, the evidence was supplied by the testimony of Collina on cross-examination.

An age discrimination claim under section 4 may proceed to a jury when the evidence could support findings of pretext and discriminatory age animus.

Daniel F. BRENNAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. GTE GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1998-07-16

Brennan, who was fifty years old at the time of his termination, brought suit claiming that he was discharged as a result of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (“ADEA”), and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 (“eh,151B”). ... We find therefore that Brennan has demonstrated sufficient evidence of pretext and discriminatory age animus to withstand a directed verdict. His age discrimination claims should proceed before a jury.

Section 4 requires evidence that age played a role in an adverse employment decision; the employee’s age alone does not establish age discrimination.

Bruce v. Town of Wellesley · filed 1999-09-24(1B)

Other than the undisputed fact that the plaintiff was over age forty at the time he was discharged, there was no showing that the town was concerned about the plaintiff’s age.

Section 4 permits an age discrimination plaintiff to avoid summary judgment by showing that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination, without separately proving that age animus was the true reason.

Quercia v. Allmerica Financial · filed 2000-02-24

Under M.G.L. c. 151B, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must “persuade the court by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s proffered reason for its employment decision was not the real reason, but is a pretext for discrimination.” ... Massachusetts law, then, does not include the further requirement of showing that age animus was the true reason for the employer’s action.

Under section 4(1B), a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case and proves pretext conclusively establishes prohibited age discrimination.

Mullin v. Raytheon Co. · filed 1998-04-20(1B)

In Massachusetts, the plaintiff who makes out a prima facie case and then proves pretext conclusively establishes prohibited discrimination.

For a prima facie age discrimination claim arising from a reduction in force, § 4(1B) requires evidence that the employer did not treat age neutrally or that the cuts had a disparate impact on employees over 40.

Plante v. Shawmut Bank, N.A. · filed 1998-07-15(1B)

I find that the modification of the prima facie case for reduction in force situations involves a new fourth element — proof that the employer did not treat age neutrally in the reduction in force or that the reduction in force had a disparate impact on employees over 40.

A disability discrimination claim under § 4(16) fails when the employee cannot satisfy even a pretext-only standard.

Laurin v. The Providence Hospital and Massachusetts Nurses Association · filed 1998-07-28(16)

Whatever the current state of Massachusetts law, however, we conclude that Laurin likewise failed to satisfy the lesser “pretext-only” standard, see infra.

In a race discrimination claim under § 4, an employer must produce some competent evidence supporting its stated nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action.

Allder v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons · filed 1998-09-11

Under M.G.L. ch. 151B, on the other hand, the employer must produce at least some competent evidence in support of its articulated reason.

A finding that an employer’s stated reason is pretextual does not require a finding of race or national origin discrimination when the factfinder finds no discriminatory motive.

Michel v. Factory Mutual Engineering Corp. · filed 1998-10-02(1)

Indeed, I find that a finding of pretext does not mandate a finding of discrimination. Consequently, I find that Factory Mutual engaged in unlawful retaliation in violation of G.L.c. 151B, §4 but not race or national origin discrimination.

A race discrimination claim under § 4(1) follows the same disparate-treatment analysis as a gender discrimination claim.

Zhang v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology · filed 1999-04-05(1)

A claim of race discrimination brought under G. L. c. 151B, § 4(1), follows the same analysis as that applied to a gender-based claim.

A handicap discrimination claim can reach a jury when conflicting performance evidence and an employer’s statements about health care costs support an inference of discriminatory discharge.

Wooster v. Abdow Corp. · filed 1999-04-28(16)

But it is just this kind of “smoking gun” evidence that is not required, because it is “rare.” ... As to count V, claiming handicap discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 15 IB, § 4(16), the judgment of the Superior Court is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for proceedings on that count in accordance with this opinion.

Section 4(1) allows employees with different job descriptions or tenure to be treated as similarly situated in a disparate treatment claim.

City of Boston v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1999-09-27(1)

We cannot say that the MCAD erred in rejecting this position, taking instead the view that similarly situated employees, for purposes of disparate treatment analysis, need not hold identical job descriptions or tenure.

Section 4 permits a discrimination plaintiff to use the mixed-motive framework, the pretext framework, or both, depending on the evidence.

Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination · filed 2000-06-06(1)

A plaintiff in a discrimination case, pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 4, may proceed on one or both of the available analytic frameworks, namely the mixed-motive and or pretext frameworks, to establish her case against an employer, depending on the nature of the evidence.

Section 4(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to prove that discriminatory animus was the determinative cause of the employer’s adverse action.

Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc. · filed 2001-08-13(1)

In reaching her decision, the judge did not make all of the findings that are required under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1). On a claim of unlawful discrimination, a plaintiff must prove at trial that she is a member of a protected class, she suffered harm as a result of an employer’s adverse employment action, and the employer harbored discriminatory animus, which was the determinative cause of the adverse action.

Under § 4(1), evidence that an employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment decision is false permits an inference of unlawful discrimination.

Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College · filed 2000-07-14(1)

Evidence that the employer’s reasons are untrue gives rise, therefore, to an inference that the plaintiff was a victim of unlawful discrimination.

A section 4 gender discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision and the employee presents no evidence of pretext.

McKearney v. Answer Think Consulting Group, Inc. · filed 2001-03-09

Once Think Inc. articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision, the burden shifts back to McKearney to convince the court that defendants’ reasons for its employment decision were a pretext. ... McKearney has not presented any evidence to demonstrate that Think Inc.’s stated reasons for not giving her an office in their new location were a pretext. Therefore, the November 1998 incident does not survive summary judgment.

Section 4(1) requires a plaintiff relying on indirect evidence to prove that discriminatory animus was the determinative cause of an adverse employment decision.

Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co. · filed 2001-07-09(1)

We agree with Raytheon that in indirect evidence cases the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s discriminatory animus was the determinative cause, which we describe below, in bringing about the adverse decision.

Section 4 requires an age-discrimination plaintiff to prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive or intent.

Ventresco v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 2002-06-13

Thus, while the judge told the jury that they were required to find for the plaintiff if they found pretext, she also told the jury that, by pretext, she meant pretext for discrimination. Read as a whole, these instructions were adequate to inform the jury that the plaintiff was required to prove that Liberty had acted with a discriminatory motive or intent.

Section 4 discrimination claims without direct evidence follow a three-stage order of proof.

Swallow v. Vineyards · filed 2002-09-03

Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, we follow a three-stage order of proof similar to that prescribed by the United States Supreme Court for Title VII claims.

In an age discrimination claim under § 4, a prima facie case and proof that at least one of the employer’s stated reasons was false permit a jury to infer discriminatory intent.

Waite v. Goal Systems International, Inc. · filed 2002-09-05(1B)

Where the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, that falsity alone would permit a jury to infer that Goal was covering up a discriminatory animus which was the determinative cause of Waite’s discharge.

Section 4(1) sex discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Gu v. Boston Police Department · filed 2002-12-02(1)

Turning to the substantive merits of plaintiffs' case, the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to both the federal and state claims.

In an indirect age discrimination claim, a replacement less than five years younger does not by itself establish a prima facie case, though other evidence may support an inference of age discrimination.

Knight v. Avon Products, Inc. · filed 2003-01-10(1B)

We conclude that an age disparity of less than five years, by itself, is too insignificant to support a prima facie case of age discrimination.

In a reduction in force, assigning a discharged employee’s duties to existing employees does not by itself support an inference of racial discrimination under § 4(1).

Lewis v. City Of Boston · filed 2003-01-28(1)

Merely demonstrating that, as a result of the reduction in force, the employer consolidated positions or allocated duties of discharged employees to other existing employees does not itself raise a reasonable inference that the employer harbored discriminatory animus toward any one employee.

Section 4(1B) does not permit an inference of age discrimination solely because younger employees perform surviving duties when the employer eliminates jobs rather than replacing an employee.

Dickerson v. Hub Fabric Leather Co. · filed 2004-11-10(1B)

When it is undisputed that the employer’s purpose was to eliminate jobs rather than replace a present employee, a prima facie base of age discrimination may not be established simply by showing that younger employees are performing the surviving duties, because this does not reasonably permit an inference of discrimination.

An English Language Policy does not, by itself, establish disparate treatment of bilingual employees under § 4.

Cosme v. Salvation Army · filed 2003-09-23

As a preliminary matter, an English Language Policy does not, in and of itself, constitute discrimination or disparate treatment for bilingual employees.

Section 4 treats the denial of overtime opportunities because of race or gender as discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.

Core-Boykin v. Boston Edison Co. · filed 2004-04-13

If credited by a juiy, the evidence that plaintiff was denied overtime opportunities adequately establishes that she was “materially disadvantaged" in the terms and conditions of her employment. A worker’s salary, including the opportunity for overtime pay, is clearly a condition of employment that cannot be impaired on account of gender or race.

To survive summary judgment on an age discrimination claim under § 4(1B), an employee must produce evidence creating a genuine factual dispute about the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons.

Lee v. President & Fellows of Harvard College · filed 2004-04-20(1B)

Harvard stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for eliminating the plaintiff’s position. The plaintiff did not produce any evidence that creates an issue of material fact concerning Harvard’s articulated reasons.

Section 4(1B) prohibits firing an employee because of age; once the employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason, discriminatory intent turns on the evidence.

Joyal v. Hasbro, Inc. · filed 2004-08-19(1B)

Under Massachusetts law, as under federal law, the employer's provision of a non-discriminatory reason or reasons rebuts the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie case, and the issue of discriminatory intent then turns upon the evidence.

A single incident that was not particularly offensive or extreme and did not prevent the employee from working is insufficient to establish a race or national-origin hostile work environment under § 4(1).

Burke v. Chatbar, Inc. · filed 2004-11-18(1)

Though it is theoretically possible to prove hostile environment based on a single act, this is not such a case. There is no evidence in this record that the event on the evening of May 6, 2002 was particularly offensive or extreme that Burke was unable to report for work or that once present, he was unable to participate fully in discharging his duties. While it is undisputed that Burke was treated for nausea at the emergency room, he reported to work as usual the following day. Accordingly, the event alone is insufficient to prove a hostile environment claim based on racial or national origin discrimination.

Section 4(1B) permits evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently to establish that an employer’s stated reason for an adverse job action was a pretext.

Dorman v. Norton Co. · filed 2005-07-15(1B)

The principle, i.e., that evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently can establish that a proffered reason for an adverse job action was a pretext, is sound.

Section 4 does not require a similarly situated comparator to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination when other evidence supports an inference of discrimination.

Trustees of Health & Hospitals of the City of Boston, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2005-12-23

In our view, it is unnecessary to decide whether Navin was similarly situated in all relevant ways to the complainants, because regardless whether Navin was similarly situated, the record reflects that the complainants were treated worse than all potential comparators. This was enough of a showing to meet the complainants’ burden. Although providing a similarly situated comparator is usually the most probative means of proving that an adverse action was taken for discriminatory reasons, it is not absolutely necessary.

Section 4(1B) covers age-based employment actions that materially disadvantage an employee, beyond subjective disappointment or disillusionment.

Bray v. Community Newspaper Co. · filed 2006-08-03(1B)

It serves no purpose to outline other alleged adverse actions which subsequently led to the plaintiffs resignation, except to say that, if believed, a trier of fact could conclude that these events were to her “material disadvantage,” and not merely “subjective feelings of disappointment and disillusionment.”

Section 4(4) protects employees who file discrimination complaints, but supervisor nitpicking and snubbing do not establish an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim.

Boutin v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2007-05-18(4)

Here, Plaintiffs claim fails because he cannot show that he suffered any adverse employment action. His supervisors’ “nitpicking” simply will not suffice. Personality conflicts and “snubbing” by supervisors at work do not constitute actionable conduct.

Section 4 prohibits discharge because of race; evidence that an employer replaced a qualified employee with a less qualified white employee and gave pretextual reasons for the firing can support a discrimination claim.

Boston Public Health Commission v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2006-09-20

Lewis’s racial discrimination claim is based on alleged violations of G. L. c. 151B, § 4, as amended by St. 1989, c. 516, § 4, which, in relevant part, makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer, by himself or his agent, because of the race ... of any individual to . . . discharge from employment such individual. . . unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.” ... We conclude that the MCAD’s determination that Lewis satisfied her prima facie case met the required standard. ... The record also shows that Lewis was replaced by a white person with lesser qualifications.

Section 4 permits a sex discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence creates a genuine dispute about the employer’s motive for discharge.

Gimas v. Bialy · filed 2008-02-22(1)

For summary judgment purposes, the plaintiff sufficiently has established the existence of a genuine dispute as to whether the defendants discriminated against Gimas on the basis of her sex.

Section 4 uses the same standards for proving employment discrimination as Title VII.

DeRosa v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY COMMUTER RAIL COMPANY · filed 2010-03-17

The legal standards for establishing a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 are the same as those for establishing a Title VII claim.

Section 4(1) does not require comparator evidence to prove employment discrimination; a complainant may establish protected status, harm, discriminatory animus, and causation.

Trustees of Health & Hospitals of the City of Boston, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 2007-08-10(1)

The four elements of the complainants’ proof are (1) membership in a protected class; (2) harm; (3) discriminatory animus; and (4) causation. Comparator evidence is not specifically required.

Section 4 does not categorically bar relief to someone who did not apply for a job if discrimination made applying futile.

Nguyen v. William Joiner Center for the Study of War & Social Consequences · filed 2007-12-21

In the context of proving a discrimination claim under G. L. c. 15IB, a per se prohibition of relief to a nonapplicant on the basis of futility would contravene the remedial purpose of the statute.

An employer defending a disability discrimination claim need not exhaustively investigate suspected benefits fraud, but must offer credible evidence that its nondiscriminatory reason for termination was genuine.

Brooks v. Peabody & Arnold, LLP · filed 2008-01-07(16)

Nothing required the defendant to engage in exhaustive review of either the plaintiff’s physical condition or the plaintiff’s apparent fraudulent behavior to eliminate the question of pretext. Here, the defendant only had to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination and credible evidence that the reason advanced was the real reason.

Section 4(1) requires a discriminatory discharge claimant to show protected status, an adverse employment action, and discriminatory animus that determined the employer’s decision.

Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co. · filed 2008-04-15(1)

To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1),4 Thompson must prove that he "is a member of a protected class, [that he] suffered harm as a result of [Coca-Cola's] adverse employment action, and [that Coca-Cola] harbored discriminatory animus, which was the determinative cause of the adverse action."

In a discriminatory failure-to-hire claim, meeting the job’s minimum requirements does not establish a prima facie case when the person hired had substantially stronger qualifications.

Delva v. Brigham & Women's Hospital, Inc. · filed 2008-10-03(1), (1B)

Viewing this element in light of the above, we reject Delva’s argument that he could make a prima facie case for discrimination without regard to the degree of his qualifications as compared to those of Browne.

Section 4(16) prohibits discharging a qualified handicapped person when the handicap motivated the discharge in whole or in part.

Kelly v. Cort Furniture · filed 2010-05-07(16)

An employer may not “dismiss from employment ... because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16). To prevail in her action, Kelly must demonstrate that her handicap was in whole or in part the cause of her discharge.

A Section 4 race discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment on allegations alone when the employer offers evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons and the employee offers no rebuttal evidence.

Pearson v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2012-07-09

While the MBTA has presented credible record evidence of non-discriminatory motives for each action it took, Pearson has offered no rebuttal evidence and has even failed to explain most of his allegations.

Section 4 allows an employee to survive summary judgment by presenting evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the employer’s stated reason for termination was not the real reason.

Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hospital · filed 2016-02-29

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff need only present evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that "the respondent's facially proper reasons given for its action against him were not the real reasons for that action." Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 139 (1976) (Wheelock College).

Section 4 permits race and age discrimination claims to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges protected status, qualifications, termination, and replacement by someone with similar qualifications.

Butler v. Adecco USA Inc. · filed 2016-05-24(1), (1B)

This framework applies to both state and federal claims. ... Considering that Plaintiffs pro se filings should be liberally construed, I find that the factual allegations in her complaint state a plausible claim that she was a member of a protected class; that she was qualified for the Sun Life position; that she was terminated; and that she was replaced by someone with similar qualifications. Sun Life’s and Adecco’s motions to dismiss are denied with regard to counts I-IV.

Section 4 employment discrimination claims cannot establish pretext merely by showing that the employer conducted an incomplete or cursory investigation.

Campos v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. · filed 2018-07-05

However, an incomplete or cursory investigation is not a basis for a finding of pretext.

An employee cannot survive summary judgment on a § 4 discrimination claim without evidence that the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext.

Tam v. Desjardins · filed 2018-08-01

Because Tam had no expectation of proving pretext at trial, summary judgment was properly granted in the defendants' favor as a matter of law.

An employee claiming racial discrimination under § 4 can survive summary judgment by making a prima facie showing and presenting evidence that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse action was false.

Scarlett v. City of Boston · filed 2018-07-19

Here, Scarlett has produced evidence that BPS provided at least one false rationale for her nonrenewal, as well as evidence from which a jury could infer that the remaining rationales proffered were also false. Coupled with her prima facie showing, that was enough to survive summary judgment.

Section 4 prohibits discriminatory discharge based on protected characteristics or opposition to illegal discrimination, and a claim requires facts suggesting discrimination.

Reid v. UBER Inc · filed 2018-09-26

Similar to federal law, Massachusetts law prohibits an employer from firing or otherwise discriminating against an employee on the basis of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or because the employee has opposed illegal discrimination by the employer. See M.G.L. ch. 151B, §4. Yet, as noted above, Reid has failed to alleged facts suggesting that Uber’s conduct was discriminatory.

Section 4(16) treats uniform application of an attendance policy to unexcused absences as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Miceli v. JetBlue Airways Corp. · filed 2019-01-28(16)

Uniform application of a facially neutral policy that proscribes unexcused absences is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination that is distinct from the employee's disability.

Section 4 requires a race or sex discrimination claim to allege facts that plausibly link an adverse employment action to the employee’s protected status.

Bottomley v. Boston Public Schools · filed 2018-12-19

Bottomley’s MCAD complaint alleges that she suffered adverse employment actions on the basis of her race and sex, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4, and Title VII; on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA; and on the basis of a disability in violation of the ADA. With respect to BPS’ actions in February and August 2013, the MCAD complaint does not include specific facts that plausibly suggest that those actions were motivated by discriminatory animus because of Bottomley’s race, sex, age, or disability. Simply alleging membership in a protected class and an adverse employment action is insufficient to state a claim for relief. Rather, the complaint must allege facts that make it plausible that the former caused the latter.

Section 4 permits a discrimination claim for a denied lateral transfer when the positions materially differ in compensation opportunities or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Yee v. Massachusetts State Police · filed 2019-01-29

We thus conclude that where an employee can show that there are material differences between two positions in the opportunity for compensation, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, the failure to grant a lateral transfer to the preferred position may constitute an adverse employment action under c. 151B.

Section 4(16) requires a person claiming disability discrimination to show an adverse employment action, such as a significant change in job responsibilities or benefits.

Eichenholz v. Brink's Incorporated · filed 2019-03-06(16)

In the context of the discrimination and state law retaliation claims, Eichenholz must show that he was subject to an adverse employment action, which “typically involves discrete changes in the terms of employment, such as ‘hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.”

Section 4(1) permits a gender and pregnancy discrimination claim based on a severance condition requiring an employee to sign a noncompetition agreement when comparable male employees did not have to.

Dexter v. Dealogic, LLC · filed 2019-07-26(1)

A requirement to sign a noncompetition agreement affects the terms of employment between an employer and employee and would be material to a reasonable employee. This theory therefore adequately alleges an adverse employment action to support a claim of gender and pregnancy discrimination. And the fact that two male colleagues did not have to sign a noncompetition agreement renders plausible the inference that Dealogic imposed this requirement on Dexter due to her gender and pregnancy.

A racial discrimination claim under § 4 fails when the employer gives legitimate reasons for a pay disparity and the employee does not show pretext.

Persson v. Boston University · filed 2019-02-25

For the same reasons, the plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4 must also fail.

Under § 4(1B), an age discrimination plaintiff can show pretext by casting doubt on the employer’s stated hiring reason without separately proving discriminatory motive.

Higgins v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co ( USA) · filed 2019-09-19(1B)

However, under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff need only raise doubt that the proffered reason for the hiring decision is not true, without having to show that the real reason for an adverse action was discriminatory.

When a plaintiff relies on comparators to prove gender discrimination under § 4(1), employees whose circumstances materially differ do not support a disparate treatment claim.

Brinig v. Illinois Central School Bus, LLC · filed 2019-02-27(1)

Massachusetts similarly prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination based on gender. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1). ... Accordingly, these employees are not “similarly situated in all respects” to Brinig (in whose case the City intervened). ... Given the absence of any admissible comparator evidence, Brinig’s federal and state discrimination claims fail.

Section 4(1B) covers age discrimination in termination and employment benefits; claims may proceed when a reasonable factfinder could find that age motivated those actions.

Beaupre v. Seacoast Sales, Inc. · filed 2020-12-16(1B)

Because a reasonable factfinder could determine that defendants were motivated by age-based discrimination in denying benefits to plaintiff and terminating his employment, defendants’ motion for summary judgment will, with respect to Counts I and II, be denied.

For a Section 4 age or gender discrimination claim without direct evidence, an employee must show acceptable job performance to establish a prima facie case.

Hennessy v. Hill-Rom Company, Inc. · filed 2020-11-30

In Counts II and III of the Complaint, Hennessy alleges that Hillrom terminated his employment on the basis of his age or his gender, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4. ... Here, Hennessy cannot establish a prima facie case because his performance reviews establish that he was not performing at an acceptable level.

Section 4 does not require a discharged employee to show that the position remained open or that the employer sought a similarly qualified replacement to establish a prima facie discrimination case.

Morales v. Federal ExpressCorporation · filed 2022-06-24

Second, in accordance with the SJC’s most recent articulation of the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, see, e.g., Bulwer, 46 N.E.3d at 32, this Court does not interpret Chapter 151B to require an employee in a discharge case to show that the position remained open or that the employer sought to fill the position with a person of similar qualifications.

Section 4(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a plaintiff claiming discriminatory termination must show acceptable job performance to establish a prima facie case.

GLOWACKI-BISHOP v. WESTERN & SOUTHERN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. · filed 2022-09-27(1)

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she performed her job at an acceptable level, and thus cannot establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Section 4 permits a race and national origin discrimination claim to proceed under a mixed-motive analysis when a supervisor’s comments directly tie an employee’s accent to a proposed demotion.

Taveras v. Northeast Foods, LLC · filed 2021-03-04

Because Taveras has adduced direct evidence of discrimination, the court will apply a mixed-motive analysis under which Taveras “need prove only that the discriminatory action was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.’” Id. (emphasis in original).

Section 4(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin or ancestry, but does not prohibit discrimination based solely on citizenship or immigration status.

Hod v. The General Hospital Corporation · filed 2021-03-30(1)

However, to the extent Dr. Hod’s claim is that she is a member of a protected class consisting solely of “foreigners,” her claim may not proceed without a showing that the resultant discrimination is based on national origin or ancestry, which is prohibited by Title VII and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, rather than citizenship or immigration status, which is not prohibited by either statute.

Section 4 discrimination claims use the same legal standards as Title VII claims.

Savage v. City of Springfield · filed 2022-07-14

Thus, the court’s analysis will proceed in reference to Title VII, which will be equally applicable to the ch. 151B, § 4 claims.

Under § 4(1B), whether a remark is material evidence of age discrimination depends on who said it and its context.

MARK A. ADAMS v. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA. · filed 2022-08-17(1B)

Whether a statement demonstrating illegal animus is a discriminatory remark that is material for purposes of G. L. c. 151B, § 4, depends on the speaker and the context.

An age discrimination plaintiff need not disprove the employer’s stated reason for termination to establish a prima facie case.

Dusel v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2022-11-01(1B)

As such, by requiring Dusel to respond to FM Global's stated reasons for his termination at the outset (to wit, Dusel's improper cell phone charges, staff management issues, and suspicious after-hours visits to company property), the district court placed too much heft onto a burden that, at the prima facie stage, is intended to be light.

Section 4(1B) requires a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of age discrimination to show acceptable job performance as part of a prima facie case.

Garg v. VHS Acquisition Subsidiary Number 7 · filed 2023-05-08(1B)

Although the parties pay little attention to whether Garg can establish a prima facie case at the first step, leaving that dispute to the footnotes, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he performed his job at an acceptable level and thus cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Section 4 requires an employee claiming discrimination to show protected status, an adverse employment action, discriminatory animus, and that the animus caused the action.

MARIE E. COLEMAN & Another v. CAMBRIDGE SAVINGS BANK. · filed 2023-08-17

An employee bringing a complaint under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, must demonstrate that: (1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) the employer bore discriminatory animus in taking that action; and (4) animus was the actual reason for that action (i.e., causation).

Under § 4, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment at the pretext stage by producing evidence that one of the employer’s stated reasons was pretextual.

Matz v. University of Massachusetts, Amherst. · filed 2023-12-07

In order to survive a motion for summary judgment at the third stage, Matz need only produce sufficient evidence that one of the proffered reasons by UMass was pretextual. He has done so here.

Section 4 requires an adverse employment action for a prima facie age discrimination claim; a resignation without a constructive discharge does not satisfy that requirement.

Walsh v. HNTB Corporation · filed 2023-12-21

Discrimination based on age is impermissible under both ADEA and M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4. ... Because the Court agrees that plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action, it finds that plaintiff has not stated a prima facie case and will, for the following reasons, allow summary judgment for defendant.

Section 4 permits summary judgment on a racial discrimination claim when the evidence cannot support a reasonable inference that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Boykin v. Genzyme Therapeutic Products, LP · filed 2024-02-16

Given that the federal and state standards do not meaningfully differ in the present application, we address these claims together. ... Given that the summary judgment record contains no evidence from which a rational jury could infer, without making insupportable inferences, that Beausoleil's reason for giving the plaintiff a rating of 3 was ... actually a pretext for racial discrimination, we are unable to find any error in the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

Section 4(1) allows differences in how an employer investigates comparable male and female employees to support a disparate treatment claim, even if their final punishments are the same.

Downey v. Johnson · filed 2024-07-03(1)

Second, assuming the ultimate punishments imposed were the same (a transfer from the academy and a letter of reprimand), a reasonable jury could conclude that the State police did not conduct an investigation of all of Johnson's alleged misconduct, but did of Downey's.

Section 4(1) sex and age discrimination claims follow the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when direct evidence is absent.

O'Sullivan v. Strategus RG, Inc. · filed 2024-09-25(1)

O’Sullivan brings claims for sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) (Count II); age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (the “ADEA”) (Count III); and sex and age discrimination pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 151B, § 4(1) (Counts V and VI) (collectively, her “Discrimination Claims”). ... In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, as is the case here, discrimination claims under all three statutes are analyzed under the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Section 4(1) permits a racially hostile work environment claim when the alleged harassment is severe enough to support constructive discharge.

Samah · filed 2026-01-08(1)

Because Samah has, as explained, plausibly alleged constructive discharge, he also states claims of a racially hostile work environment under Title VII and Chapter 151B.

Section 4(1) allows a failure-to-promote claim when the alleged facts plausibly connect the decision to the employee’s race or sex.

Osinubi · filed 2026-04-13(1)

These allegations give rise to a plausible causal nexus between Osinubi’s race and the denial of a promotion. ... She fails, however, to plead facts that support a plausible causal connection between the failure to promote or other timely adverse employment action and her sex. She does not allege, for example, that women were subject to more rigorous interview requirements than men, or that women on her team were not promoted. Accordingly, Osinubi’s race discrimination claims under Title VII and Chapter 151B survive, but the corresponding sex discrimination claims will be dismissed.

Section 4 requires a race discrimination plaintiff to plead an adverse employment action; warnings and a performance improvement plan that do not alter employment conditions do not establish constructive discharge.

Waithe v. Cardinal Cushing Centers, Inc. · filed 2025-09-08

Both Title VII and Chapter 151B prohibit employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis of sex or race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4. ... Here, once again, plaintiff fails to allege that the warnings or the PIP altered the conditions of her employment. ... The complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute such conditions. As such, the motion to dismiss will be allowed as to Count IV.

Section 4(1) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of sex.

Mugavero v. Merrimack Valley Federal Credit Union, Inc. · filed 1993-11-22(1)

Section 4(1) expressly prohibits sex-based discrimination in the employment setting: ... to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.

Section 4 covers claims that an employer treated an employee differently in compensation or other employment terms because of a protected status.

Andujar v. Nortel Networks, Inc. · filed 2005-10-28(1)

Claims of disparate treatment on the basis of an employee’s protected status fall squarely within the purview of these statutes.

Section 4(9) does not bar the commission from investigating noncompliance and recommending sanctions under a preferential hiring plan authorized outside chapter 151B.

Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler · filed 1973-05-31(9)

Construing § 2 liberally, the Court finds the MCAD does have the authority to act pursuant to the relevant provisions of § IB and upon examination of those provisions finds the commission’s duties thereunder are not proscribed by § 4(9) of c. 15IB.

Section 4, clause 15, covers city and town clerks who record births and marriages as persons responsible for recording an individual's name.

Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell · filed 1977-08-04(15)

We have no doubt that a city or town clerk recording a birth or marriage is a "person responsible for recording the name of ... an individual" within the meaning of that statute.

Section 4(14) bars sex discrimination by a fraternal benefit society that, through an arrangement with a city, is the only source of a significant insurance benefit for municipal employees.

Franklin v. Order of United Commercial Travelers · filed 1984-07-25(14)

Instead, I hold only that, given the distinctive role the defendants have undertaken in their consensual arrangement with the City of Lynn, the law of Massachusetts subjects them to the statutory ban on sex discrimination contained in ch. 151B, § 4(14).

Section 4(10) does not require physicians to enroll in Medicaid.

Hennessey v. Berger · filed 1988-12-27(10)

We first address the plaintiff’s .contention that a physician violates G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (10), unless he or she enrolls in the Medicaid program, and conclude that § 4 (10) does not of its own force mandate enrollment.

A Superior Court decision construed § 4(14) as limited to credit services and held that it did not govern an attorney’s refusal to represent a client.

Nathanson v. Commonwealth · filed 2003-09-16(14)

G.L.c. 151B, §4, ¶14 focuses solely on credit services, which are not in any way involved in this case.

A mortgage lending discrimination claim under §4(3B) can survive dismissal when the alleged discriminatory pricing policy is pleaded with sufficient specificity.

Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc. · filed 2008-11-25(3B)

Under G.L.c. 151B, §4(3B), it is an unlawful practice “[f]or any person whose business includes granting mortgage loans ... to discriminate against any person in the granting of any mortgage loan or in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a loan or transaction, because of race, color, . . . [or] national origin . . .” G.L.c. 151B, §4(3B). ... Consequently, assuming that a disparate impact claim under G.L.c. 151B requires the same degree of specificity as a comparable claim under a federal anti-discrimination statute (a legal issue this Court expressly does not decide), this Court finds that the Attorney General has pleaded with sufficient specificity to defeat the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Consequently, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the discrimination claim is denied.

A plaintiff using indirect evidence to prove mortgage lending discrimination under § 4(3B) must show that similarly situated applicants outside the protected class were treated differently.

Arango v. TD Bank, N.A. · filed 2018-03-30(3B)

Even assuming that there are triable issues with respect to whether the plaintiffs were members of a protected class, qualified for the loan, and rejected despite their qualifications, the plaintiffs fail to show that other similarly situated non-Hispanic applicants were treated differently or continued to have loans approved by the bank.

Section 4(3B) prohibits sex discrimination in mortgage loan modification services.

Saint Vil v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage · filed 2019-02-12(3B)

Thus, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(3B), Defendants are prohibited from providing loan modification services in a manner that discriminates based on sex.

Section 4 does not prohibit disability discrimination by public accommodations; that conduct is prohibited by chapter 272, section 98.

LaBonte v. Riverside Park Enterprises, Inc · filed 2022-11-28

disability discrimination by public accommodations is not declared unlawful by ch. 151B, § 4; it is declared unlawful in section 98.

Section 4 prohibits an employer from excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from a comprehensive disability benefits plan as sex discrimination.

Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1978-05-04(1)

Thus, the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from the company’s comprehensive disability plan is discrimination because of sex in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4.

Section 4 prohibits employers from denying sick leave benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities when they provide sick leave for other disabilities.

School Committee v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1979-02-28

We share the commission’s view that the school committee’s policy of denying female employees accrued sick leave benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities, like Massachusetts Electric Company’s former practice of excluding temporary disabilities related to pregnancy from a comprehensive disability insurance plan, constitutes unlawful sex discrimination in employment under G. L. c. 151B, § 4.

Section 4 prohibits denying accrued sick leave for a pregnancy-related disability at the start of an extended maternity leave, even under a general policy denying sick leave during extended leaves.

School Committee v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1979-03-06

The single issue we are asked to decide is whether an employer who denies accumulated sick leave to employees on long-term leaves of absence discriminates on the basis of sex in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4, by applying this policy to pregnancy-related disabilities occurring at the beginning of maternity leaves. We hold that such an exclusion is unlawful sex discrimination and affirm the orders of the commission.

Section 4(1) permits a jury to infer sex discrimination in hiring from disparate treatment, sex stereotyping, and an unstructured selection process.

Riffelmacher v. Board of Police Commissioners · filed 1989-03-24(1)

The jury could find preponderant evidence of discrimination by the board in the following facts and circumstances: A, disparate treatment of the plaintiff and other women applicants in relation to male applicants; B, use of invidious standards expressly stated; C, uncontrolled subjectivity of the process. The jury could find that the reason assigned for bypassing the plaintiff was a pretext, that is, not the truly actuating reason.

Section 4 prohibits discharging an employee based on a stereotype that pregnancy will make her unable to meet the job’s requirements.

Alexandra TROY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. BAY STATE COMPUTER GROUP, INC., Defendant, Appellant · filed 1998-04-14

Under the law, this kind of stereotyping amounts to gender discrimination: the company could not discharge her simply for being pregnant on the speculation that she would probably be rendered unable to fulfill the requirements of the job.

Section 4 covers discrimination against mothers of young children when the employer’s bias is based on sex, although parental status alone is not a protected category.

Sivieri v. Commonwealth, Department of Transitional Assistance · filed 2003-06-26

Parental status is not a per se protected category under G.L.c. 15 IB. However, it can be a characteristic that is closely linked to gender. Therefore, in order to successfully state a claim for discrimination based on gender, Sivieri must allege that DTA demonstrated a bias against her parental status which was based on her sex.

Section 4(1) treats sexual harassment and disparate treatment as forms of sex discrimination that may be considered together for limitations purposes.

White v. Massachusetts State Police · filed 2003-11-18(1)

Claims of sexual harassment and disparate treatment are subsets of the broad sex discrimination category made unlawful in §4(1). ... Because plaintiffs allegations of disparate treatment, as well as her allegations of sexual harassment, are included under the general category of sex discrimination as defined in G.L.c. 151B, I decline to separate the two claims for purposes of the six-month statute of limitations.

Section 4 treats employment decisions based on stereotypes about mothers’ commitment to work as sex discrimination; remarks reflecting those stereotypes can be evidence of discrimination.

Sivieri v. Commonwealth, Department of Transitional Assistance · filed 2006-06-22

In light of these decisions, and the legislative directive that c. 15 IB be applied liberally, ... the court finds that stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and employment can be evidence of gender discrimination.

Section 4(11A) does not make an employer’s refusal to restore an employee an unlawful practice when the employee’s maternity leave exceeded eight weeks.

Global NAPs, Inc. v. Awiszus · filed 2010-08-09(11A)

Where, as here, an employee's maternity leave was not taken in accordance with G. L. c. 149, § 105D (because it exceeded eight weeks), and the employer subsequently refused to restore the employee to employment, the employer did not commit an "unlawful practice" pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (11A).

Section 4(1) does not protect employees based on caregiver status alone; a sex discrimination claim requires evidence that the employer acted because of the employee’s gender.

Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP · filed 2012-10-17(1)

While those facts suggest Ayanna may have been terminated because of the time he allotted to his caregiving duties, Chapter 151B does not provide protection for employees based on their caregiver status alone. Because Ayanna has proffered no evidence that his termination was based on his gender, Dechert is entitled to summary judgment on this count.

Section 4 prohibits pregnancy discrimination in hiring.

Bennett v. Capitol BC Restaurants, LLC · filed 2014-10-23

Discrimination based on pregnancy is also unlawful under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied as to the refusal-to-hire claims.

Section 4(1) prohibits demoting an employee or placing her on a performance improvement plan because of her sex.

Ferranto · filed 2026-04-16(1)

Although Quincy contests whether Ferranto plausibly alleged his involvement in those actions and their causal connection to her sex, the Court need not reach those issues as they relate to Count I because Ferranto has plausibly alleged that Quincy violated Chapter 151B, § 4(1) by demoting her and placing her on a PIP based on her sex.

Section 4(9)’s restriction on questions about nonconviction criminal history in employment applications does not apply to renewal of an insurance broker’s license.

Commonwealth v. McDuffee · filed 1979-03-05(9)

We do not think that an application for renewal of an insurance broker’s license constitutes "an application for employment” within the meaning of G. L. c. 151B, § 4(9).

Section 4(1) does not prohibit a voluntary early retirement plan favoring older workers when younger workers show no injury to an expected employment benefit.

Rock v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1981-08-04(1)

The commission’s determination that this voluntary early retirement plan is not an unlawful term or condition of employment is a common sense and practical reading of the statute. The commission’s requirement that the plaintiffs make some showing of injury to an expected employment benefit is well within the history, language, and spirit of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1), to protect older workers.

Section 4 does not treat independent contractors as employees; its employment discrimination claims require a traditional employer-employee relationship.

Comey v. Hill · filed 1982-07-30(1) & (5)

Although the Commonwealth’s employment discrimination law, G. L. c. 151B, affects a “broad array of employment practices” and extensively prohibits discrimination against certain protected classes, we do not read the statute as intending to broaden the definition of employee to include an independent contractor.

Section 4(1) makes a bona fide occupational qualification an affirmative defense that the employer must prove under an objective standard.

Sarni Original Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. Cooke · filed 1983-04-04(1)

A BFOQ is an affirmative defense. The burden of proving the defense is on the employer. The standard is an objective one, and the subjective opinions of the employer, however sincere, are irrelevant if not shown, objectively, to be reasonable.

Section 4 permits layoffs under a bona fide seniority system even when they disproportionately disadvantage a protected group, and does not require an affirmative action exception.

CONCERNED MIN. EDUCATORS v. Sch. Comm. of Worcester · filed 1984-06-13

This language indicates that it is not unlawful under G. L. c. 151B, § 4, to make layoffs pursuant to á bona fide seniority system, even when to do so will work to the disadvantage of a particular group generally protected by G. L. c. 151B, § 4, and that an affirmative action component in the determination of layoffs was not required in the arbitrator’s award.

Section 4(1) and (2) cover claims of discriminatory discharge from employment and expulsion from union membership.

Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union · filed 1986-09-23(1), (2)

The cause of action alleged by Egger in counts eight and nine is covered by the provisions of Chapter 151B. Mass.Gen. Laws Ann. c. 151B, § 4(1) and (2). No similar common law action has been recognized by the Massachusetts courts. This Court cannot create a new common law action to protect a public policy already protected by the comprehensive legislative scheme found in Chapter 151B.

Section 4 does not apply to an employer with fewer than six employees.

O'CONNELL v. Chasdi · filed 1987-08-12

The provisions of G.L.c. 151B, § 4 (1986 ed.), do not apply in this case because the Institute has fewer than six employees.

The bona fide seniority system exception in § 4(17)(a) does not apply to sex discrimination claims.

Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037 v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination · filed 1990-01-22(17)(a)

We agree with the commissioner that, by its addition of paragraph (17) ( a ) to G.L.c. 151B, § 4, the Legislature did not intend to screen bona fide seniority systems from the scrutiny of all of the Commonwealth's antidiscrimination laws. Because the present case involves a case of discrimination on the basis of sex, the provisions of G.L.c. 151B, § 4 (17) ( a ), do not apply.