La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967
Prohibited acts: the cases that interpreted this section
2,391 citing cases reviewed of 3,299 in the citation index: 744 interpreted the section (annotated below), 1,647 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-20 may not have been reviewed yet.
Have a situation under La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967?
These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.
Possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, subject to the statutory prescription and authorization exceptions; possession may be actual or constructive, with constructive possession assessed through dominion-and-control factors.
State of Louisiana v. Earnest Carr, III · filed 2024-05-22(C)
La. R.S. 40:967(C) defines possession of a Schedule II CDS as knowingly or intentionally possessing a CDS as classified in Schedule II, unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice or except as otherwise authorized by the statute. La. R.S. 40:964 states that methamphetamine is a Schedule II CDS. To convict a defendant of possession of a CDS, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed an illegal drug. State v. Durham, 53,922 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 525. Possession may be established by showing that the defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the substance. Id. Courts use several factors to determine whether a defendant exercised dominion and control to constitute constructive possession, including: (1) the defendant’s knowledge that drugs were in the area, (2) the defendant’s relationship with other persons found in actual possession, (3) the defendant’s access to the area where the drugs were found, (4) evidence of drug paraphernalia or of recent drug use, and (5) the defendant’s physical proximity to the drugs. Id.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(A) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, while subsection (B)(2)(a) provides a one-to-ten-year imprisonment range and possible fine when the aggregate weight is less than twenty-eight grams.
State of Louisiana Versus Eddie J Richards · filed 2024-11-20(A), (B)(2)(a)
A. Manufacture; distribution. Except as authorized by this Part or by Part VII-B of Chapter 5 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: ... (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II. ... To prove possession with intent to distribute, the State was required to show defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. See State v. Richardson, 13-886 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/14), 142 So.3d 314, 322, writ denied, 14-1353 (La. 2/13/15), 159 So.3d 461. ... Regarding count four, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(2)(a) states that the penalty for possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II substance with an aggregate weight of less than twenty-eight grams shall be imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than ten years and may include a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. Defendant received a ten-year sentence on this count.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Subsection (C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance without a valid prescription or other statutory authorization, and subsection (C)(2) sets a one-to-five-year imprisonment range and permits a fine of up to $5,000.
State of Louisiana v. Thompson · filed 2025-04-09(C), (C)(2)
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unless it was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner, as provided in La. R.S. 40:978, while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by the statute. La. R.S. 40:967(C). To convict a defendant of possession of a CDS, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed an illegal drug. ... A conviction under La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2) provides that a defendant “shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than five years and, in addition, may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.”Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Parole eligibility
For an offense committed before the 1997 amendment, Section 40:967(B)(1) did not authorize restrictions on parole eligibility.
State v. Johnson · filed 1998-07-02(B)(1)
Commission of the offense occurred before the effective date' of 1997 La.Acts, No. 1284, amending La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1), and restrictions on parole eligibility were not authorized.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The version of § 40:967 in effect when the offense was committed required five to thirty years' imprisonment and allowed a fine, but did not require any part of the sentence to be served without parole eligibility.
State v. Hardy · filed 1998-07-17(B)(4)(b)
At the time of the commission of offense herein, on August 8, 1996, La.R.S. 40:967 provided that persons convicted of distribution of a narcotic drug (including cocaine) " shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars." Thus, the sentencing provision in effect did not require that any portion of defendant's sentence be served without benefit of parole eligibility. Accordingly, we now revise defendant's sentence to delete any provision which would deny defendant parole eligibility.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
At the time of the offense, § 40:967(B)(1) set a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine but did not require the first five years to be served without parole.
State v. Watson · filed 2000-08-23(B)(1)
However, the offense for which the defendant was convicted occurred on October 5, 1995. At that time, La.R.S. 40:967 contained no provision mandating that the first five years of a sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine must be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Rather, La. R.S. 40:967 B(1) merely provided that a person found guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, "... shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years; ...". Because the defendant was adjudicated a second felony offender, his sentence must be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence per La.R.S. 15:529.1 G. However, the defendant's sentence is amended to delete that portion of the sentence requiring that the sentence be served without benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
For an offense committed on October 5, 1995, § 40:967(B)(1) required a person convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine to serve five to thirty years at hard labor but did not require the first five years to be served without parole.
State v. Watson · filed 2000-08-23(B)(1)
However, the offense for which the defendant was convicted occurred on October 5, 1995. At that time, La.R.S. 40:967 contained no provision mandating that the first five years of a sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine must be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Rather, La. R.S. 40:967 B(1) merely provided that a person found guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, "... shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years; ...". Because the defendant was adjudicated a second felony offender, his sentence must be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence per La.R.S. 15:529.1 G. However, the defendant's sentence is amended to delete that portion of the sentence requiring that the sentence be served without benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) sets the imprisonment and fine for possessing more than 28 but less than 200 grams of cocaine, while Section G makes the defendant ineligible for parole only until the minimum ten-year term is served.
State v. Toca · filed 2000-09-06(F)(1)(a)
La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a) provides that one convicted of possession of more than twenty-eight grams, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and not more than sixty years and to payment of a fine of not less than $50,000 and not more than $150,000. Section G provides that with respect to any person to whom the provisions of Section F apply, the sentence shall not be suspended and the defendant shall not be eligible for parole or probation prior to serving the minimum sentence. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence shall be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Thus, the sentence imposed on defendant improperly provides that the entire sentence is to be without benefit of parole when parole ineligibility should have been limited to the first ten years of the sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
At the time of the offense, § 40:967(B)(1) authorized a cocaine-distribution sentence of five to thirty years at hard labor but did not authorize a restriction on parole.
State v. Charles · filed 2000-12-22(B)(1)
The inclusion of the parole restriction rendered this sentence illegal.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(a) requires only the first five years of a sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Rutland · filed 2002-10-02(B)(4)(a)
For the foregoing reasons, we amend the defendant’s sentence to provide that only the first five years of the fifteen-year sentence shall be served without benefit of parole and to delete the provision of the sentence denying the defendant eligibility for good time credit.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C)(2) does not authorize a prohibition on parole eligibility for a sentence for cocaine possession.
State v. Young · filed 2004-05-14(C)(2)
Defendant’s sentence is amended to delete the prohibition on parole eligibility. See La. R.S. 40:967(0(2); R.S. 15:529.1(G).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) does not require that an enhanced sentence for a violation be served without parole.
State v. Fleming · filed 2005-04-26(C)
The trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it improperly imposed defendant's enhanced sentence without the benefit of parole. Neither La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), nor La. R.S. 40:967(C) provide that defendant's enhanced sentence be served without the benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that a cocaine-distribution sentence carries two to thirty years at hard labor, with only the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Coleman · filed 2007-01-24(B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), which pertains to distribution of cocaine, provides for a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Thus, after adjudicating the defender a second felony offender, the trial court was required to impose only two years of the 15-year sentence without benefit of parole. Accordingly, we amend the defendant's sentence to provide that only the first two years are to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence; the rest of the sentence is to be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For the covered drug convictions, the first two years of the sentence are subject to a parole-eligibility restriction, and that restriction is deemed imposed even if the trial court did not state it.
State v. Harvey · filed 2009-05-13
A review of the record fails to show that the district court restricted parole eligibility for the first two years of appellant’s sentences as required by La. R.S. 40:967 and La. R.S. 15:529.1.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires that only the first two years of a sentence for cocaine distribution be served without benefit of parole.
State of Louisiana v. Ballard · filed 2010-12-08(B)(4)(b)
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967 (B)(4)(b) provides only the first two years of a sentence imposed for distribution of cocaine to be served without the benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967 requires parole eligibility to be restricted for the first two years of the sentence, and that restriction is deemed imposed even when the trial court does not delineate it.
State v. Simmons · filed 2011-05-18
A review of the record fails to show that the district court restricted parole eligibility for the first two years of Simmons’ sentences as required by La. R.S. 40:967. However, as per La. R.S. 15:301.1 A and State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, the sentence is deemed to have been imposed with the restriction, even in the absence of the trial court’s failure to delineate the restriction. Thus, no need exists for this court to correct the sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Subsection (F)(l)(a) sets the penalty for possessing 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine, while subsection (G) bars suspension, deferral, probation, or parole until the minimum sentence under subsection F has been served; it does not make an entire enhanced sentence parole-ineligible.
State v. Wallace · filed 2011-08-10(F)(l)(a) (G)
La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a) provides: ... (a) Any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses twenty-eight grams or more, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine or of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine or of its analogues as provided in Schedule 11(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than five years, nor more than thirty years, and to pay a fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars. ... La. R.S. 40:967(G), however, provides: ... G. With respect to any person to whom the provisions of Subsection F are applicable, the adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentences provided by Subsection F. ... The potential sentence for a basic violation of La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a) is from 10 to 30 years at hard labor. By operation of the applicable habitual offender law, the enhanced sentence must be for a term of at least 20 years but not more than 60 years at hard labor, without benefits only for the first five years. ... The district court was without authority to order that Young’s entire sentence be served without benefit of parole. Accordingly, this court amends Young’s sentence to maintain the 50 years at hard labor, but requiring only the first five years to be served without benefit of suspension of sentence, probation, or parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) makes a defendant eligible for parole after serving the first two years of the sentence.
State v. Leonard · filed 2011-11-15(B)(4)(b)
Because La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) allows for parole eligibility after the first two years, and La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) prohibits only “probation or suspension of sentence” for the entire sentence, relator’s sentence should not prohibit parole eligibility after the first two years.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967 requires the first two years of the sentence to be served without parole.
State v. Denson · filed 2012-01-25
Regarding the second potential error patent, La. R.S. 40:967 requires that the first two years of appellant’s sentence be served -without the benefit of parole. In this case the district court failed to restrict parole eligibility; however, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) self-activates the correction of this error and eliminates the need to remand for a ministerial correction of the *1187sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 does not prohibit parole eligibility.
State v. Lewis · filed 2016-02-03(B)(1)
It is unclear if the court imposed the sentence without benefit of parole — which would be in error, as neither La. R.S. 40:967 nor La. R.S. 15:529.1 prohibits parole eligibility — or if the court was merely commenting that generally a defendant is not eligible for parole if he has three felony convictions. See La. R.S. 15:574.4 A(l)(a). Accordingly, we amended Mr. Lewis’ sentence to delete the prohibition of parole eligibility and affirm the sentence as amended.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For possession with intent to distribute cocaine, only the first two years of the sentence must be served without parole.
State v. Williams · filed 2016-09-28(B)(4)(b)
The statute at issue, La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), requires that only the first two years of the sentence to be served without the benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 does not restrict parole eligibility.
State v. Carr · filed 2018-09-26
Neither La. R.S. 15:529.1 nor La. R.S. 40:967 contains any restrictions on parole eligibility.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Mandatory fine
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) applies to possession of 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine and requires a mandatory fine of $50,000 to $150,000.
State of Louisiana v. Von Ross · filed 2015-10-07(F)(1)(a)
First, the trial court did not impose a mandatory fine of not less than $50,000.00 nor more than $150,000.00 for the defendant‘s conviction of possession of 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine as required by La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) requires a mandatory fine of $50,000 to $100,000 for possessing 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine.
State v. Patterson · filed 2010-05-12(F)(1)
This court has decided that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for the imposition of that fine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a $50,000 fine for the cocaine-distribution offense at issue.
State v. Williams · filed 1999-02-19(B)(4)(b)
In its response brief, the state notes that defendant's sentence was illegally lenient in that it did not include the mandatory $50,000 fine required in cases such as the present one. See La.R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b) and 40:981.3 E. The state requests that this case be remanded to the trial court for correction of the illegal sentence. While we agree that the sentence is illegally lenient, we cannot correct the sentence, nor grant the state's request for remand, since the state has not appealed, filed an application for review of an illegal sentence, or filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F) requires a mandatory fine for possession of cocaine between 28 and 199 grams, but failure to impose that fine makes the sentence illegally lenient without making the plea bargain an absolute nullity.
State v. Campbell · filed 2009-05-26(F)
Count two, possession of cocaine between 28 and 199 grams, mandates a sentence of not less than five years nor ... more than thirty years at hard labor, and a fine of not less than between $50,000 and $150,000. ... |flWe, therefore, hold that not every illegally lenient sentence imposed pursuant to a plea bargain constitutes an absolute nullity. In the matter before us, where the sentence is illegally lenient due to the failure to impose a mandatory fine, we do not find the plea bargain to be an absolute nullity.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For possession of more than 28 grams and less than 200 grams of cocaine, § 40:967 requires a minimum fine of $50,000.
State v. Legett · filed 2002-05-22
However, the same cannot be said for the trial court’s failure to assess a minimum fine of $50,000.00 as required by La. R.S. 40:967.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) and (G); the current statute uses § 40:967(D) for unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams. The cited former provision applies only to older offenses.
Section 40:967(C) and (F)(1)(c) require only general criminal intent for possession of 400 grams or more of cocaine, and constructive possession may be established through dominion and control rather than actual physical possession.
State v. Odle · filed 2002-11-13(C), (F)(1)(c)
Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(c), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed 400 grams or more of cocaine. ... A person may be in constructive possession of the substance, even though not in physical possession, if it is subject to his dominion and control. ... In order to convict a person on the basis of constructive possession, something more than mere presence in the area where the drug is found must be shown.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires knowing and intentional possession of cocaine, and possession of any amount—including residue in an obviously used crack pipe—may support the required inference of guilty knowledge and general intent.
State v. Sylvia · filed 2003-04-09(C)
There is no question that a conviction for possession of cocaine may rest upon possession of any amount of the drug. ... Thus, viewing the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the defendant's possession of an obviously used instrument with no utility other than the ingestion of cocaine satisfies the State's burden of proving the defendant had the requisite general intent to support a conviction for possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(b) requires a conviction to result in both imprisonment and a mandatory fine of $100,000 to $350,000, and an omitted fine requires remand for its imposition.
State v. Williams · filed 2003-10-06(F)(1)(b)
The trial court sentenced Mr. Williams under La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(b) only to imprisonment. However, La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(b) provides that a person convicted of the offense shall be sentenced to imprisonment and shall be fined "not less than one hundred thousand dollars, nor more than three hundred fifty thousand dollars." ... In Legett, we held that the failure to impose the mandatory fine under La. R.S. 40:967 required we remand the matter for the imposition of that fine. ... Following those cases, we remand this case to the trial court for the imposition of the mandatory fine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(b) requires a person convicted of possessing 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams of cocaine to receive ten to thirty years at hard labor and a fine of $100,000 to $350,000.
State v. August · filed 2004-04-07(F)(1)(b)
Louisiana Revised Statute 40:967(F)(1)(b) mandates the imposition of a fine of not less than $100,000 nor more than $350,000, in addition to imprisonment; in the matter on appeal, the defendant received a term of thirty years' imprisonment but no fine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) mandates a fine of $50,000.00 to $150,000.00 for possessing twenty-eight grams but less than two hundred grams of cocaine.
State of Louisiana v. Lamar Pierce Phillips · filed 2004-11-10(F)(1)(a)
The Defendant did not receive a fine although one is mandated by the penalty provision of La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a). That provision mandates a fine of not less than $50,000.00 nor more than $150,000.00. Thus, the Defendant received an illegally lenient sentence for the possession of twenty-eight grams but less than two hundred grams of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(c) requires a $250,000–$600,000 fine for knowingly or intentionally possessing 400 grams or more of cocaine; indigency does not excuse the fine, but no jail term may be imposed for nonpayment.
State of Louisiana v. Major III · filed 2005-03-02(F)(1)(c)
The trial court did not impose a fine although one is mandated by statute. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(F)(1)(c) requires the imposition of a fine of not less than $250,000.00 or more than $600,000.00. ... Following Dickerson, we find that the trial court in the present case, even in light of its determination that Major was indigent, should have imposed the mandatory fine but without imposing default time under La.Code Crim.P. art. 884. ... If, upon remand, the trial court finds that Major is indigent, it is to impose the mandatory fine without ordering default time in the event of nonpayment.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) requires a $50,000-to-$150,000 fine for possessing 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine, although an appellate court may decline to correct the omission when the State did not raise it.
State v. Evans · filed 2008-10-31(F)(1)(a)
The trial court failed to impose the mandatory fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars. See La. R.S. 40:967 F(1)(a).[6] Although the failure to impose the fine is error under La.C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), it certainly is not inherently prejudicial to the defendant. Because the trial court's failure to impose the fine was not raised by the State in either the trial court or on appeal, we are not required to take any action. As such, we decline to correct the illegally lenient sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(c) requires a mandatory fine of not less than $250,000.00 and not more than $600,000.00.
State v. Sutton · filed 2016-12-14(F)(1)(c)
La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(c) provides for a mandatory fine of not less than $250,000.00 and not more than $600,000.00.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) repealed the former large-quantity possession penalties in § 40:967(F) and the associated benefit restriction in (G); revised § 40:967(D) treats unauthorized possession of 28 grams or more as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) requires a fine of $50,000 to $150,000 for knowing possession of 28 to under 200 grams of cocaine; omitting the fine makes the sentence illegally lenient.
State v. Jacobs · filed 2009-03-04(F)(1)(a)
The trial court failed to impose a mandatory fine. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(F)(1)(a) provides that: Any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses twenty-eight grams or more, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine or of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine or of its analogues as provided in Schedule II(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than five years, nor more than thirty years, and to pay a fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars. The trial court’s failure to impose a mandatory fine renders Defendant’s sentence illegally lenient.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Penalty for cocaine classified as a narcotic drug
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(1) applies to cocaine because cocaine is a Schedule II narcotic drug, carrying a penalty of five to thirty years’ imprisonment and a possible fine; the lesser penalty in § 40:967(B)(4) does not apply.
State v. Brady · filed 1999-03-16(B)(1), (B)(4)
However, on further review, we find that La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4) as previously relied upon is not applicable to the instant case, and the sentence imposed was not illegal. We erred in determining otherwise. In count two of the information, defendants were convicted of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. At the time of their arrests in 1995, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1) provided the following penalty provision: (1) A substance classified in Schedule II which is a narcotic drug, or which is an amphetamine or methamphetamine, shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. Cocaine is included as a "narcotic drug" in La. R.S. 40:961(26), and 40:967(B)(1) applies to the facts of this case. The ten year sentence imposed by the trial judge is therefore legal.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing restrictions
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For distribution of cocaine, the first two years of the sentence must be served without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Garner · filed 2011-11-02(B)(4)(b)
Our error patent review discloses that the trial court failed to order that the first two years of this sentence be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, as required by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Subsection (F)(1)(a) requires a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentence and a $50,000-to-$150,000 fine for the specified cocaine quantity, while subsection (G) bars suspension, deferral, withholding, probation, or parole before the minimum sentence is served.
State v. Harrell · filed 2010-05-11(F)(1)(a), (G)
The sentencing provision, La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a) states: [The defendant] shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than five years, nor more than thirty years, and to pay a fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars. ... In addition, La. R.S. 40:967(G) states: [T]he adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentences provided by Subsection F. ... The trial court should have informed the defendant that at least five years of his sentence on Count 4 must be served without benefit of probation or parole. ... For the reasons described above addressing the trial court’s failure to impose mandatory statutory benefits on Count 3, we find that the trial court’s failure to impose a sentence without mandatory statutory benefits on Count 4 did not render the defendant’s plea unknowing and involuntary.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of the sentence to be served without the benefit of parole.
State v. NIONS · filed 2007-02-07(B)(4)(b)
However, the court failed to further order that the first two years be served without the benefit of parole as required by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). However, as per La. R.S. 15:301.1A and State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, the sentence is deemed to have been imposed with this restriction even in the absence of the trial court's failure to delineate it. Thus, there is no need for this Court to correct the sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a person convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute to receive 2 to 30 years at hard labor, with the first two years served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Small · filed 2006-06-28B(4)(b)
However, our review of the record reveals that the sentence is illegally lenient. The statute of conviction, La. R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b), provides that a person convicted thereof shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 2 years nor more than 30 years, “with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” The trial court neglected to direct that any portion of the sentence be served without benefits. The trial court’s failure to state that the first 2 years of this sentence shall be served without benefits will be automatically corrected by operation of La. R.S. 15:301.1.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For cocaine distribution, only the first two years of the sentence are to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. LANDOR · filed 2009-05-13(B)(4)(b)
We note that, as the defendant correctly asserts, the original sentence of fifteen years at hard labor, the first ten years of the sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, imposed an illegal condition. Under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), only the first two years of the sentence are to be without benefits.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires only general criminal intent for distribution of methamphetamine, permits distribution through a third party or by aiding and abetting, and does not authorize denying parole, probation, or suspension of sentence under Subsection (B)(1).
State v. Ruiz · filed 2008-06-06(A)(1), (A), (B)(1)
The defendant is guilty of the charged crimes if he knowingly or intentionally distributed methamphetamine, La. R.S. 40:967(A), and MDMA, La. R.S. 40:966(A). Only general criminal intent is required. Such intent is established by mere proof of voluntary distribution. ... Rather, distribution may be accomplished by the employment of a third party. A defendant may be guilty as a principal in the crime of distribution if he aids and abets in the distribution or directly or indirectly counsels or procures another to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. La. R.S. 14:24; 40:967; State v. Hutchins, 502 So. 2d 606, 608 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987). ... The sentence for the distribution of methamphetamine conviction is illegally harsh in that the trial court unlawfully denied eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence when La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1) does not so prescribe.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) repealed the former large-quantity possession penalties in § 40:967(F) and the associated benefit restriction in (G); revised § 40:967(D) treats unauthorized possession of 28 grams or more as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
For possessing 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine, § 40:967(F)(1)(a) requires a $50,000-to-$150,000 fine, and § 40:967(G) bars suspending the sentence.
State v. Sims · filed 2005-10-26(F)(1)(a), (G)
The agreed-upon sentence in this case is illegally lenient since the fine was suspended. La. R.S. 40:967 provides, in pertinent part: ... F. Other penalties for possession. ... (1) Except as otherwise authorized in this Part: ... (a) Any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses twenty-eight grams or more, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine or of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine or of its analogues as provided in Schedule II(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than five years, nor more than thirty years, and to pay a fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars. ... G. With respect to any person to whom the provisions of Subsection F are applicable, the adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentences provided by Subsection F. ... Since the suspension of this fine was part of the plea bargain and because the trial court specifically found Defendant to be indigent, it is therefore a viable option to decline to impose the fine in this case and we will not disturb the suspension of the fine in this case.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a fine and requires the first two years of imprisonment to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Williams · filed 2005-03-29(B)(4)(b)
As the State points out, La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides for imposition of a fine and also requires that the first two years of the sentence shall be without benefit of parole, as well as without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Curtis · filed 1999-06-01(B)(4)(b)
The record also reflects that the sentence is illegally lenient for two reasons. The trial judge failed to require that the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the first 5 years, as required by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C)(2) does not require a sentence to be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. McGee · filed 2000-03-15(C)(2)
The statute under which he was convicted, La. R.S. § 40:967 C(2), does not require that sentence be imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and La. R.S. § 15:529.1 G prohibits only probation or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967 permits only the first two years of the sentence to be served without benefits.
State v. Winn · filed 2003-05-14
However, the statute of conviction, as amended by Acts 2001, No. 403, effective June 15, 2001, allows only two years to be without benefits. Accordingly, this court must amend the sentence to provide for the denial of benefits as to the first two years only.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a two-year restriction on parole for the applicable cocaine-distribution sentence; if the sentencing court omits it, the restriction applies by operation of law.
State v. Johnson · filed 2003-12-09(B)(4)(b)
Lastly, defendant's multiple offender sentence is illegally lenient because the trial judge did not impose the two-year restriction on parole required by the reference statute, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). State v. Tate, 99-1483 (La.11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519, 520. However, according to State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799, this error does not require any action by this Court because La. R.S. 15:301.1(C), imposes the restrictions by operation of law.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a cocaine-distribution sentence to include five years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and that restriction applies to a habitual-offender sentence based on the underlying offense.
State v. Converse · filed 2003-12-30(B)(4)(b)
The judge ordered that defendant's habitual offender sentence be served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, as provided in La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), but did not impose the additional restriction of parole on the minimum sentence as prescribed by the underlying statute. Defendant's sentence is, therefore, illegally lenient.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
For distribution of cocaine under § 40:967(A), the sentence ranges from two to thirty years, with only the first two years imposed without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Darensbourg · filed 2004-03-30(B)(4)(b)
The penalty for a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A) ranges from two to thirty years of imprisonment, but only the first two years is without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Thus, the imposition of the entire sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence was illegal.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the sentence to be served without parole for five years, while the restrictions on probation and suspension apply to the sentence as specified by the statute.
State v. Sanders · filed 2004-05-14(B)(4)(b)
Granted. The defendant's sentence of 15 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is amended to provide that the defendant shall serve a term of 15 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and without benefit of parole for a period of five years. See La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) (1997 La. Acts 1284); La.R.S. 15:529.1(G). In cases in which the sentencing error made by the trial court does not involve the omission of a restrictive term specified by the legislature as part of the sentence but the imposition of limits beyond what the legislature has authorized in the sentencing statute(s), an appellate court should not rely on La.R.S. 15:301.1(A) to correct the error as a matter of law but should correct the sentence on its own authority under La.C.Cr.P. art. 882 to correct an illegal sentence "at any time".Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Alexander · filed 2004-05-19(B)(4)(b)
Furthermore, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), as it existed at the time the offense was committed, required that the first five years of the sentence be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On remand, the defendant's sentence should be applied in conformity with the provisions La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967 applies the sentencing version in effect when the offense was committed and requires the applicable minimum term for possessing 400 grams or more of cocaine to be served without parole.
State of Louisiana v. Ennis · filed 2004-07-07(F)(1)(c) and (G)
However, the trial court imposed sentence under the version of La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(c) in effect at the time of trial rather than at the time of the offense. At the time of the offense, the statute provided for a minimum term of imprisonment of thirty years at hard labor, with a maximum term of sixty years. However, by the time of trial, the legislature had amended the statute, decreasing the minimum sentence to fifteen years at hard labor with a maximum of thirty years. ... Louisiana Revised Statute 40:967(G) mandates that the minimum sentence for possession of cocaine weighing 400 grams or more be served without benefit of parole. However, since the minimum sentence at the time of the offense was thirty years, Mr. Ennis’ sentence is illegally lenient, as all thirty years should be without benefit of parole. Because the term of parole ineligibility required in the present case is mandatory, leaving no discretion to the trial court, we need not remand for sentencing. Rather, we amend the sentence to reflect that the thirty years are without benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(B)(1) does not authorize denying parole eligibility for a sentence imposed under that provision.
State v. Benedict · filed 2004-11-10(B)(1)
Furthermore, the penalty provisions for counts three (possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine) and four (possession of dihydrocodeinone) do not authorize the trial court to impose any portion of the sentence without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1) and La.R.S. 40:968(C). Thus, the trial court improperly denied parole eligibility on those counts.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the specified part of a second-offense cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and the restriction applies by operation of law.
State of Louisiana v. Colar · filed 2005-02-02(B)(4)(b)
La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires such a restriction. ... Instead, the judge’s sentence is deemed to include those restrictions by operation of law.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of an enhanced cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension.
State v. Moore · filed 2007-04-11(B)(4)(b)
The State correctly notes in its brief that the trial court did not impose the first two years of the enhanced sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension as required by the underlying statutes, La.R.S. 40:981.3(E) and La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 does not itself prohibit parole eligibility for a multiple-offender sentence; La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires only that the sentence be served without probation or suspension of sentence.
State v. Jones · filed 2007-12-28(C)(2)
La. R.S. 40:967 and La. R.S. 15:529.1 do not prohibit parole eligibility. La. R.S. 15:529.1 states that the sentences must be served without benefit of probation and suspension of sentence. Thus, the trial court erred when it imposed the sentence to be served without benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and that restriction is self-activating.
State v. Evans · filed 2009-12-29(B)(4)(b)
In March 2001, when the defendant committed the underlying offense, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provided that on conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine conviction, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of the sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The statute provided for discretionary imposition of a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. Thus, as a second felony offender, the defendant faced a possible sentencing range of 15 to 60 years imprisonment. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(a). The defendant received a 45-year sentence. ... Hence, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient enhanced sentence, because he restricted “benefits” for only five years, but no corrective action is required. Under La. R.S. 15:301.1 and State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, a statute’s requirement that a defendant be sentenced without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence is self-activating. State v. Stokes, 02-339, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/16/02), 831 So.2d 354, 357, writ denied, 03-2750 (La.11/8/04), 885 So.2d 1127.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b)'s restriction that the sentence be imposed without benefit of probation or suspension is self-correcting, so an illegally lenient sentence omitting that restriction requires no appellate action.
State v. Allen · filed 2013-10-09(B)(4)(b)
A review of the record reveals an error patent with respect to sentencing in that the sentence was illegally lenient because the trial court failed to impose the sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. With regard to illegally lenient sentences, this Court has recognized that the statute is self-correcting. State v. Tillman, 10-1717, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/28/11), 74 So.3d 761, 763 (citing State v. Phillips, 03-0304 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/03), 853 So.2d 675). Accordingly, this Court need take no action with regard to the trial court’s failure to impose the sentence without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) replaced this pre-2017 Schedule II distribution penalty with aggregate-weight ranges in § 40:967(B) and removed the former general two-year benefit restriction; earlier offenses may still use the prior penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) restricts parole, probation, and suspension of sentence for only the first two years of a sentence for distribution of cocaine.
State v. Durall · filed 2016-05-12(B)(4)(b)
The underlying offense of distribution of cocaine only provides for a restriction of parole, probation, of* suspension of sentence for the first two years. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). ... Therefore, we amend defendant’s sentence to eliminate the restriction on parole for the entire 30-year sentence and provide that only the first two years of defendant’s sentence are without the benefit of parole. The entire 30-year sentence remains without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
For a conviction under § 40:967(B)(4)(b), the first two years of the sentence must be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and that restriction is self-activating.
State v. Williams · filed 2017-08-30(B)(4)(b)
Sentencing under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) and La. R.S. 40:979(A) require “the first two years” of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In this case, when the trial judge sentenced Defendant on count two, he did not specify that the first two years of Defendant’s 15-year sentence was to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Thus, Defendant received an illegally lenient sentence. However, the tidal court’s failure to state this requirement at sentencing need not be corrected on remand because under State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/29/01); 800 So.2d 790, 799 and La. R.S. 15:301.1 (A), the “without benefits” provision is self-activating.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
At the time of the offense, Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) restricted sentencing benefits only for the first two years of the sentence.
State v. Luckett · filed 2017-12-27(B)(4)(b)
At the time of the offense, the sentencing provisions under La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) only provided for a restriction of benefits for the first two years of the sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For the offense at issue, the first two years of the sentence must be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Simmons · filed 2017-12-27(B)(4)(b)
At the time of the underlying offense on count three (November 15, 2014), La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) required the first two years of defendant's sentence to be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Excessive mandatory minimum sentence
The mandatory minimum sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute may be reviewed for excessiveness as applied to the particular offender.
State v. Fobbs · filed 1999-09-24(B)(4)(b)
This case is remanded to the court of appeal for reconsideration on the merits of the trial court's determination that the mandatory minimum term without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence specified by La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is excessive as applied to this particular offender. Our observation in State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993), that "the review of sentencing, including sentencing under R.S. 15:529.1, is a long established function of the judicial branch," does not, nor did we intend it to, restrict the sentence review principles espoused in that decision solely to the mandatory minimum penalties provided by La.R.S. 15:529.1.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) sets a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence and a mandatory fine for possessing more than twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams of cocaine, while subsection (G) restricts suspension, parole, and probation before the minimum is served, subject to a constitutionally required departure when the minimum is excessive under Dorthey.
State v. Dupart · filed 2000-05-10(F)(1)(a), (G)
La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a) provides that one convicted of possession of more than twenty-eight grams, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and not more than sixty years and to payment of a fine of not less than $50,000 and not more |athan $150,000. ... Therefore, we find that the trial judge was wrong in concluding that he could not deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence under Dorthey. Accordingly, this ease will be remanded to the trial court to determine whether the mandatory minimum sentence would be excessive under Dorthey. ... Also, La. R.S. 40:967(G) provides that with respect to any person to whom the provisions of Section F apply, the sentence shall not be suspended and the defendant shall not be eligible for parole or probation prior to serving the minimum sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
For a second offender convicted of cocaine distribution, the applicable sentencing scheme requires at least fifteen years at hard labor, with the first two years served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, absent clear and convincing proof that the sentence is constitutionally excessive.
State v. Ricks · filed 2002-07-10(B)(4)(b)
The State argues that the trial court erred by failing to impose the statutory minimum sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1 and La. R.S. 40:967, fifteen years at hard labor with the first two years to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The State correctly argues that the statutory minimum is fifteen years at hard labor with the first two years to be served without benefit of parole, probation,- or suspension of sentence. ... In light of State v. Lindsey, 770 So.2d at 339, the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant below the statutorily mandated fifteen years at hard labor, the first two years to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Subsection (B) requires a mandatory minimum five-year term without eligibility for probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Comena · filed 2003-03-19(B)
The version of La. R.S. 40:967(B) that was in effect at the time the crime was committed required that a defendant serve a mandatory minimum term of five years without eligibility for probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) repealed the former large-quantity possession penalties in § 40:967(F) and the associated benefit restriction in (G); revised § 40:967(D) treats unauthorized possession of 28 grams or more as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) sets a five-year minimum prison term for possession of more than twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams of cocaine, and that mandatory minimum was not excessive.
State v. Milligan · filed 2008-11-05(F)(1)(a)
The Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount greater than twenty-eight grams but less than two hundred grams. The penalty range for this offense is a term of imprisonment of not less than five years, nor more than thirty years, and a fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars. La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a). The Defendant was sentenced to serve five years, the minimum sentence. "A minimum sentence compelled by Louisiana law is presumed not to be excessive or violative of the guidelines." State v. Drane, 36,230, p. 11 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So.2d 107, 114, writ denied, 02-2619 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So.2d 566. The record before us is void of any evidence to rebut that presumption. Accordingly, we find the five year minimum sentence imposed in this case is not excessive.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(B)(3)(a) mandates a sentence of ten to thirty years at hard labor for manufacturing methamphetamine, with at least ten years served without benefits, unless an exceptional circumstance justifies a downward departure.
State of Louisiana v. Sharp · filed 2014-04-02(B)(3)(a)
The penalty provision for manufacturing methamphetamine, La.R.S. 40:967(B)(3)(a), is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten years nor more than thirty years, at least ten years of which shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and a possible fine of not more than $500,000.00. ... In the present case, Defendant has failed to prove that he is exceptional so as to justify a sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence. ... Considering the trial court’s reasoning, Defendant has failed to show exceptional circumstances to justify the imposition of a sentence below the mandatory minimum.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Parole eligibility—mandatory minimum terms
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(G) requires parole ineligibility only for the mandatory minimum term prescribed by § 40:967(F), not for the entire sentence enhanced under the multiple-offender statute.
State v. Tate · filed 1999-11-24(G)
However, La.R.S. 40:967(G) requires that a defendant serve without eligibility for parole the mandatory minimum terms provided by the legislature if convicted of an offense under La.R.S. 40:967(F). In addition, the restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 "are those called for in the reference statute." ... Because La.R.S. 40:967(G) allows and requires the district judge to deny parole eligibility only for the minimum terms provided by La.R.S. 40:967(F), the district judge erred in denying parole eligibility for the entire second offender term imposed under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B) required a five-year mandatory minimum sentence without eligibility for parole for the offense at the time it was committed.
State v. Bentley · filed 2003-03-12(B)
La. R.S. 40:967(B) as it existed at the time the offense was committed, required that a defendant serve the mandatory minimum term of five years without eligibility for parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
At the time of the offense, subsection (B)(4)(b) required the first five years of a cocaine-distribution sentence to be without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Young · filed 2003-01-22(B)(4)(b)
In this case, the sentencing provision for the underlying conviction is La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), which provided for a five year restriction on parole at the time of the offense.[2] The trial court erred insofar as it restricted Mr. Young's parole ineligibility beyond the first five years of his sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(G) permits and requires a judge to deny parole eligibility only for the minimum term provided by § 40:967(F), not for an entire enhanced sentence.
State v. Knight · filed 2002-10-30(G)
Because La.R.S. 40:967(G) allows and requires the district judge to deny parole eligibility only for the minimum terms provided by La.R.S. 40:967(F), the district judge erred in denying parole eligibility for the entire second offender term imposed under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(l)(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Mandatory no-benefit period for cocaine distribution
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties and benefit restrictions in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4) requires a portion of sentences for cocaine manufacturing and possession with intent to distribute cocaine to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Watson · filed 2013-05-15(B)(4)
We affirm both convictions but vacate the sentences and remand, directing the trial court to affix a portion of each sentence to be served without benefits.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b)'s two-year parole restriction is self-activating even if the sentencing court fails to state it.
State v. Howard · filed 2018-09-21(B)(4)(b)
Thus, the trial court failed to restrict parole on the first two years of the sentence as required by the statute for the underlying offense. See La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) (prior to amendment by 2017 La. Acts No. 281, § 2). However, as State v. Williams, 00-1725, p. 10 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 798-99 and La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) provide, the "without benefit" provision of La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) is self-activating.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence during the first two years.
State v. Davis · filed 2017-06-29(B)(4)(b)
Here, the trial judge imposed defendant’s enhanced sentence without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1(G), but did not also restrict parole during the first two years of the sentence as required by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Thus, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For distribution of cocaine, the first two years of the sentence must be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Kennon · filed 2016-04-13(B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires that the first two years of a distribution of cocaine conviction be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, only the first two years of the sentence must be served without benefit of parole.
State of Louisiana v. Steve Duane Williams -Aka- Ayaz Sutaria · filed 2016-09-28(B)(4)(b)
The statute at issue, La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), requires that only the first two years of the sentence to be served without the benefit of parole. Accordingly, we amend Defendant’s sentence for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine to require that only the first two years of his sentence be served without the benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of the sentence for the covered offense to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Duncan · filed 2017-02-08(B)(4)(b)
However, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires that the first two years of the sentence shall be without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.” State v. Esteen, 01-879 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79, n.24, writ denied, 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. Because the underlying offense carries a parole restriction, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole. See State v. Smith, 09-100 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/25/09), 20 So.3d 501, 509, writ denied, 09-2102 (La. 4/5/10), 31 So.3d 357.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of a sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine to be served without benefits.
State v. Thomas · filed 2015-05-20(B)(4)(b)
However, the trial court failed to specify that the first two years of the sentence be served without benefits, as required by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b), together with the attempt statute, requires the first two and one-half years of a sentence for attempted cocaine distribution to be served without parole, probation, or suspension.
State v. Jordan · filed 1999-11-24(B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) and 14:27 provide the first two and one-half years for the offense she was charged with committing must be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension. The judge did not have authority to suspend or probate this portion of the sentence; and, he should have informed Judith she was required to serve the two and one-half years without benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For a conviction under La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967, the first five years of the prison term must be served without benefits; omission of that restriction makes the sentence technically illegally lenient, but La. R.S. 15:301.1 automatically corrects the error.
State v. Klasek · filed 2003-04-11
The sentence technically is illegally lenient because the trial court failed to state that the first five years of the term must be served without benefits, as required by the statute of conviction. This error, however, will automatically be corrected by operation of La. R.S. 15:301.1.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Mandatory sentencing range and restrictions
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a sentence of five to thirty years, with the first five years served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Nelson · filed 1999-11-24(B)(4)(b)
According to LSAR.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), a sentence shall be imposed “for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967 requires that the first five years of a sentence for distribution be served without benefit.
State v. Williams · filed 2000-09-27
The sentence for distribution is illegally lenient since it does not provide that the first five years shall be without benefit as required by La. R.S. 40:967. Because the state failed to appeal, this sentencing error may not be corrected by this court, nor may we remand the matter for resentencing.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967 required the first five years of the sentence for the cocaine conviction to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Williams · filed 2006-05-03(A)
As to the re-sentencing on the second count of which Mr. Williams was convicted, the trial court failed to note that the first five years of the sentence for that conviction must be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as was required by La. R.S. 40:967 as in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. Because more than five years have elapsed since the conviction and original sentencing in this matter, this error is moot.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) repealed the former large-quantity possession penalties in § 40:967(F) and the associated benefit restriction in (G); revised § 40:967(D) treats unauthorized possession of 28 grams or more as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(b) sets imprisonment for possessing more than 200 but less than 400 grams of cocaine at 10 to 30 years and mandates a fine of $100,000 to $350,000.
State v. James · filed 2014-02-12(F)(1)(b)
The sentencing range for a defendant found guilty of possession of cocaine in excess of 200 grams, but less than 400 grams, is a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than ten years, nor more than thirty years. La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(b). The law also mandates that a person so convicted be fined “not less than one hundred thousand dollars, nor more than three hundred fifty thousand dollars.” Id. ... Defendant’s conviction on count two, for violating La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(b), should have resulted in him being fined not less than one hundred thousand dollars, nor more than three hundred fifty thousand dollars.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b)'s restrictions on parole, probation, and suspension of sentence apply automatically even when the sentencing court fails to state them.
State v. Celestain · filed 2014-07-30(B)(4)(b)
However, this patent error is self-correcting, as “those restrictions automatically are contained in the sentences whether or not imposed by the sentencing court.”Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F) mandates a fine of $50,000 to $150,000 and does not authorize restricting probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Payne · filed 2017-05-17(F)
La. R.S. 40:967(F) provides for a mandatory fine of not less than $50,000.00 nor more than $150,000.00. ... Defendant’s conviction of hpossession of 28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams, of cocaine does not provide for the restriction of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
For a cocaine-distribution offense committed in 2016, § 40:967(B)(4)(b) required a sentence of two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; omission of that restriction made the sentence illegally lenient and required correction of the court minutes.
State v. Williams · filed 2019-04-10(B)(4)(b)
In 2016, when the instant offenses were committed, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provided that a person convicted of distribution of cocaine shall be sentenced to not less than two, nor more than 30 years at hard labor, with the first two years to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The statute further provided that the defendant may be ordered to pay a fine of not more than $ 50,000.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Mandatory minimum sentences
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) repealed the former large-quantity possession penalties in § 40:967(F) and the associated benefit restriction in (G); revised § 40:967(D) treats unauthorized possession of 28 grams or more as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) sets a five-year minimum sentence for possessing 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine, and parole is unavailable until that minimum sentence is served.
State of Louisiana v. McCoy · filed 2007-01-10(F)(1)(a)
We note the minimum sentence under La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a) at the time of the commission of the offense was (and still is) five years. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(G) denies parole eligibility prior to Defendant's service of the minimum sentence. Thus, the trial court should have imposed the sentence without benefit of parole for the first five years; however, this restriction is self-activating pursuant to La.R.S. 15:301.1(A).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) sets a mandatory minimum sentence for possessing more than twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams of cocaine, but the court may review whether that minimum is excessive as applied under State v. Dorthey.
State v. Russell · filed 2000-05-10(F)(1)(a)
La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a) provides that one convicted of possession of more than twenty-eight grams, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and not more than sixty years and to payment of a fine of not less than $50,000 and not more than $150,000. ... Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that Dorthey applied only to sentences under the Habitual Offender Law and that he could not consider whether the mandatory minimum sentence would have been excessive as applied to defendant considering all of the facts and circumstances. This case will be remanded to the trial court to determine whether the mandatory minimum sentence would be excessive under State v. Dorthey.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) sets a mandatory minimum sentence for possessing more than twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams of cocaine, but the minimum may be reviewed for excessiveness as applied to the defendant under Dorthey.
State v. Russell · filed 2000-05-10(F)(1)(a)
La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a) provides that one convicted of possession of more than twenty-eight grams, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and not more than sixty years and to payment of a fine of not less than $50,000 and not more than $150,000.[1] ... Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that Dorthey applied only to sentences under the Habitual Offender Law and that he could not consider whether the mandatory minimum sentence would have been excessive as applied to defendant considering all of the facts and circumstances. This case will be remanded to the trial court to determine whether the mandatory minimum sentence would be excessive under State v. Dorthey.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former large-quantity cocaine-possession minimum; Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F). Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former penalty.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a)'s ten-year mandatory minimum for possessing more than 28 but less than 200 grams of cocaine may be reduced if imposing it would be constitutionally excessive under Dorthey.
State v. Dupart · filed 2000-05-10(F)(1)(a)
La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a) provides that one convicted of possession of more than twenty-eight grams, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and not more than sixty years and to payment of a fine of not less than $50,000 and not more |athan $150,000. ... Therefore, we find that the trial judge was wrong in concluding that he could not deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence under Dorthey. Accordingly, this ease will be remanded to the trial court to determine whether the mandatory minimum sentence would be excessive under Dorthey.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Penalty for possession of methamphetamine
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(C)(2) authorizes a maximum sentence of five years, with or without hard labor, and a fine of up to $5,000 for possession of methamphetamine.
State v. Strother · filed 2009-11-04(C)(2)
Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2), the maximum possible sentence for possession of methamphetamine is five years, with or without hard labor, and a possible fine of up to $5,000.00. Defendant received the maximum possible sentence but was spared a fine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(C) sets a maximum sentence of five years, with or without hard labor, and permits a fine for possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug.
State of Louisiana v. Slaydon · filed 2006-02-01(C)
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(C) states that the penalty for the possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug, is imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years and a possible fine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Substantive offenses and severability from sentencing enhancement
Section 40:967 defines substantive drug offenses, which are severable from the separate sentencing-enhancement provisions of § 40:982.
State of Louisiana v. Ruiz · filed 2006-05-24
We find that La.R.S. 40:982 and La.R.S. 40:967 are inherently severable because they are separate statutes and are of different genera, as the former is a sentencing enhancement provision, while the latter defines substantive offenses.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing range for manufacturing Schedule II controlled dangerous substances
Section 40:967(B)(3) sets a 10-to-30-year sentencing range for manufacturing methamphetamine, with at least 10 years served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Shumaker · filed 2006-12-13(B)(3)
According to La. R.S. 40:967(B)(3), the sentencing range for manufacturing methamphetamine is not less than 10 years nor more than 30 years, and at least 10 years of that sentence must be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(A)(1) makes knowing or intentional distribution of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unlawful, and subsection (B)(4)(b) provides a two-to-thirty-year sentencing range for distributing cocaine.
State v. Mosby · filed 2014-11-26(A)(1), (B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967 A(l) punishes the knowing or intentional distribution of controlled dangerous substances statutorily-classified in “Schedule II.” See La. R.S. 40:967 A(l). Cocaine is included in this statutory classification. See La. R.S. 40:964 A(4). “Distribution” includes, inter alia, the “physical delivery” of a controlled dangerous substance to another. See La. R.S. 40:961(14). See also State in the Interest of C.D., 11-1701, p. 10 (La.7/2/12); 93 So.3d 1272, 1278 (quoting State v. Celestine, 95-1393, p. 3 (La.1/26/96); 671 So.2d 896, 897) (“[I]n narcotics cases, distribution is ‘defined as the delivery or transfer of possession and control over controlled substances.’”) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the essential elements of this offense, which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, are: “(1) delivery or physical transfer; (2) guilty |sknowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.” State v. Johnson, 01-1455, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/29/02); 825 So.2d 1230, 1233.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A), as amended effective August 1, 2017, lowers the sentencing range for the offense, permits imprisonment with or without hard labor, and separates sentencing ranges by the aggregate weight of the Schedule II drug; the applicable range here is one to ten years.
State of Louisiana Versus Shawn A. Clark · filed 2020-06-24(A)
Effective August 1, 2017, La. R.S. 40:967 was amended to lower the sentencing range for the instant offense, to permit the sentence to be imposed with or without hard labor, and to separate sentencing ranges by aggregate weight of the Schedule II drug.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Possession of cocaine between 28 and 200 grams
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) repealed the former large-quantity possession penalties in § 40:967(F) and the associated benefit restriction in (G); revised § 40:967(D) treats unauthorized possession of 28 grams or more as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) sets a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentence and a $50,000-to-$150,000 fine for possession of Schedule II CDS over 28 but less than 200 grams.
State v. Egan · filed 2009-12-09(F)(1)(a)
The record reflects that the defendant was originally charged with possession of Schedule II CDS over 28 but less than 200 grams, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a). Pursuant to a plea bargain, she pled guilty to the attempted offense. The sentence range for the charged offense is from five years to 30 years imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of not less than $50,000 or more than $150,000. By pleading guilty to the attempted offense, the defendant cut her maximum sentence exposure in half. ... However the attempt charge to which the defendant pled guilty involved La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a), not La. R.S. 40:967(C).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) and (G); the current statute uses § 40:967(D) for unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams. The cited former provision applies only to older offenses.
Subsection (F)(l)(a) requires proof that a person knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine and that the cocaine, or a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, weighed 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams.
State v. Davis · filed 2010-01-26(F)(l)(a)
Thus, in order to convict the defendant of possession of 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of a controlled dangerous substance, to wit, Cocaine, you must find: ... 1. That the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine; and ... 2. That the amount of cocaine possessed was 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine weighing between 28 and 200 grams.
State v. Montgomery · filed 2008-01-09(F)(1)(a)
To find one guilty of possession of cocaine in an amount in excess of 28 grams, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine and that the amount of cocaine possessed was between 28 and 200 grams.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine and that the cocaine weighed between 28 and 200 grams; the required quantity may be established through the evidence presented at trial.
State v. Sims · filed 2009-06-24(C) and (F)(1)(a)
To find one guilty of possession of cocaine in an amount in excess of 28 grams, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine and that the amount of cocaine possessed was between 28 and 200 grams.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) repealed the former large-quantity possession penalties in § 40:967(F) and the associated benefit restriction in (G); revised § 40:967(D) treats unauthorized possession of 28 grams or more as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
For possession of 28 to 200 grams of cocaine, § 40:967(F)(1)(a) and (G) require the minimum five-year term to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Mandigo · filed 2014-02-26(F)(1)(a) and (G)
Regarding the imposition of a sentence without benefit of parole, the conditions imposed on the sentence are those called for in the sentencing provisions for the underlying felony offense. State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685 (La.1981); State v. Thurman, supra. The underlying offense here required that the first five years be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a) and (G). The trial court properly ordered that the sentence be imposed without parole for the first five years.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Penalty for distribution of methamphetamine
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(1) requires a person convicted of distributing methamphetamine to serve the sentence at hard labor.
State v. LeBlanc · filed 2018-01-10(B)(1)
At the time LeBlanc committed the offenses, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1) provided that any person convicted of distribution of methamphetamine shall serve his or her sentence at hard labor. Furthermore, the plea agreement stated the 18-year sentence was to be served at hard labor. Accordingly, we amend LeBlanc's sentence for distribution of methamphetamine to reflect that it be served at hard labor.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) replaced this pre-2017 Schedule II distribution penalty with aggregate-weight ranges in § 40:967(B) and removed the former general two-year benefit restriction; earlier offenses may still use the prior penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(1) sets a sentence of 2 to 30 years at hard labor and a fine of up to $50,000 for distribution of methamphetamine.
State v. Carter · filed 2008-01-09(B)(1)
Distribution of methamphetamine carries a sentence of 2 to 30 years at hard labor and a fine of up to $50,000. La. R.S. 40:967 B(1). At two-thirds of the maximum, Carter's sentence is long but is not out of proportion to the offense and offender.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
For distribution of methamphetamine, the pre-August 1, 2017 version of § 40:967(B)(1) provided two to thirty years of imprisonment and up to a $50,000 fine; the amended version makes the sentence depend on the aggregate weight of the substance.
State of Louisiana v. Lee · filed 2020-11-18(B)(1)
Defendant was convicted of two counts of distribution of methamphetamine, an offense punishable by a minimum sentence of two years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of thirty years imprisonment, in addition to a maximum fine of fifty thousand dollars. See La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(eff. 8/15/08–7/31/17). ... Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967 was amended effective August 1, 2017. However, Defendant committed these offenses in May of 2017, subjecting himself to the prior version of La.R.S. 40:967, which provided a possible sentencing range of two to thirty years and a fine of fifty thousand dollars. ... Effective August 1, 2017, La.R.S. 40:967 was amended and the sentence for distribution of methamphetamine became dependent on the weight of the substance. The new law provides for sentences from one to ten years imprisonment and a fine of up to fifty thousand dollars when the aggregate weight of the controlled substance is less than twenty-eight grams, and a sentence of one to twenty years and a fine of up to fifty thousand dollars when the aggregate weight is more than twenty-eight grams.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Knowledge or intent required for possession
Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine.
State v. Williams · filed 2008-02-13(C)
The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C). The State had to prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine. La. R.S. 40:967(C).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C)(2) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; possession of mere traces or residue can suffice, and guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.
State v. Ferguson · filed 2015-09-18(C)(2)
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(C) requires proof that a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II.3 Whether an accused knows *130a substance he possesses is a narcotic maybe proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. A conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance may rest on the possession of mere traces or residue of the substance, even absent admissions by the defendant, which might constitute guilty knowledge. State v. Leblanc, 2004-1032 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/17/04), 897 So.2d 736, 739, writ denied, 2005-0150 (La.4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1063, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 905, 126 S.Ct. 254, 163 L.Ed.2d 231 (2005). Furthermore, guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of cocaine. However, since knowledge is a state of mind, it need not be proven as fact, but rather may be inferred from the circumstances. State v. Major, 2003-3522 (La.12/1/04), 888 So.2d 798, 803.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing requirements
Section 40:967(C) permits imprisonment for cocaine possession with or without hard labor, so a sentence must specify the mode of imprisonment when that sentencing discretion applies.
State v. Dixon · filed 2018-03-14(C)
Defendant was convicted of attempted possession of cocaine. Under La. R.S. 40:979, he is to be imprisoned in the same manner as for the offense attempted. At the time of his offense, imprisonment for possession of cocaine was to be with or without hard labor. La. R.S. 40:967(C). When, as in this case, the applicable sentencing statute allows discretion, the sentencing court's failure to indicate whether the sentence is to be served at hard labor is an impermissible, indeterminate sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a sentence of 2 to 30 years at hard labor, with the first two years served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Cross · filed 2008-03-19(B)(4)(b)
The sentencing provision of the statute of conviction, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), provides that a person convicted thereof shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 2 years nor more than 30 years, with the first 2 years of the sentence to be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court failed to direct that the first 2 years of the sentence be served without benefit. This failure will be corrected automatically by operation of La. R.S. 15:301.1.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Version of statute in effect at time of offense
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and the penalty law in effect when the offense was committed controls.
State v. Nixon · filed 2018-08-15(B)(4)(b)
The law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty which is to be imposed upon the convicted accused. ... Nixon's offenses were committed in 2012; therefore, the 2017 amendments to the sentencing provisions do not apply to his sentences. ... The trial court failed to specify that the first two years of the sentence on the distribution of cocaine conviction are to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, as required by La. R.S. 40:967. ... When the trial court fails to order that a portion of a sentence be served without benefits as statutorily mandated, the sentence will automatically be served without benefits for the requisite time period. ... Accordingly, there is no need to remand for correction of the sentencing error; however, the trial court minutes and the uniform commitment order are to be amended to reflect the correction.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The penalty provision in effect when the offense was committed governs, although the sentencing court may consider ameliorative changes made by the 2017 amendment.
State of Louisiana v. McGowan · filed 2017-12-06(C)(2)
The penalty provision in effect at the time of the commission of the offense applies to this case in principle. ... Though not required to do so, the trial court is permitted to consider the ameliorative changes enacted by the 2017 amendment to the penalty provision in keeping with the spirit of the reforms articulated.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The penalty provision in effect when a § 40:967(C)(2) offense was committed applies, although at resentencing the court may consider later ameliorative amendments to that penalty provision.
State v. McGowan · filed 2017-12-06(C)(2)
The penalty provision in effect at the time of the commission of the offense applies to this case in principle. State v. Wilson , 02-700 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/18/02), 833 So.2d 560, writ denied , 03-216 (La. 5/2/03), 842 So.2d 1100, cert. denied , 540 U.S. 952, 124 S.Ct. 393, 157 L.Ed.2d 285 (2003). Though not required to do so, the trial court is permitted to consider the ameliorative changes enacted by the 2017 amendment to the penalty provision in keeping with the spirit of the reforms articulated.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967's version in effect when the drug offenses were committed governs the sentences for the conspiracy-to-distribute convictions.
State of Louisiana v. Delta Wayne White · filed 2008-12-11
Consequently, this matter is remanded to the trial court for imposition of non-enhanced sentences on counts one and three, both involving conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in accordance with the language of La.R.S. 40:967 and 40:979 that was in effect at the time of the commission of the offenses.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
For distribution of methadone committed before Act 68 took effect, the applicable version of La. R.S. 40:967 is the version in effect on the offense date, which authorized up to ten years of imprisonment and a fine of up to $15,000.
State v. Johnson · filed 2009-02-25(B)(5) and (B)(4)(b)
The offense in this case was committed on June 30, 2006, approximately two months prior to the effective date of the 2006 amendments to La. R.S. 40:967, which were made effective on August 15, 2006. Therefore, the maximum penalty that the defendant should have been exposed to was a maximum term of 10 years and a possible fine not to exceed $15,000. Nevertheless, the defendant was erroneously informed during his guilty plea colloquy that he was subject to a sentence in the range of 2-30 years, which is the range provided by Act 68. Although the trial court erred in stating the wrong sentencing range, the 10-year sentence imposed by the trial court was within the range outlined in pre-Act 68 La. R.S. 40:967. The question then becomes whether the trial court’s error had a significant impact on the sentence that the defendant ultimately received. The record indicates that the trial court, after considering the defendant’s age and criminal history, decided to impose a sentence on the defendant that was one-third of the maximum term that it believed that it could impose. It is unclear from the record whether the trial court, now cognizant of the proper sentencing range and after considering the requisite sentencing factors, would impose the maximum 10-year term on the defendant or impose some lesser term. Finding that this assignment of error bears merit, we vacate the defendant’s 10-year sentence and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Probable cause for possession of cocaine
Section 40:967(C)(2) makes possession of cocaine unlawful, and admitting to ingesting the drug can establish probable cause that the person possessed it.
State v. MARZETT · filed 2010-06-09(C)(2)
Whether or not probable cause existed for the defendant to be arrested for trespass need not be addressed because probable cause existed to arrest the defendant for a crime after he admitted to ingesting crack cocaine — the crime he was ultimately charged with — possession of crack cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(0(2). Reason dictates that in order to ingest a drug, one must possess it. Moreover, by admitting to consuming the drug, the defendant provided probable cause that he possessed more of the drug.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Separate offenses and sentencing range
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(A) prohibits both distribution and possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and those are separate offenses; § 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides the same sentencing range for distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
State v. Augustine · filed 2015-05-14(A), (B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967(A) makes it unlawful to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (which includes cocaine). ... Although both distribution of cocaine and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine are prohibited by the same statute and subsection, they are separate and distinct crimes. ... Distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine have the same sentencing range. See La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
The amended, more lenient penalty provisions of Section 40:967(F) do not apply retroactively without legislative language showing that they apply upon conviction; the penalty law in effect when the crime was committed governs.
State of Louisiana Versus Marvin S. Acevedo · filed 2019-05-08(F)
This Court has already provided a detailed analysis of this issue and held that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the crime determines the sentence that a defendant must serve and that the legislature failed to use language in the amendment of La. R.S. 40:967 to indicate that the more lenient sentencing provisions should apply upon conviction.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
For distribution of oxycodone, the penalty provision in effect when the offense was committed governed the sentence; later amendments reducing the range did not replace it, although ameliorative changes could be considered.
State of Louisiana v. Youngblood · filed 2019-07-31(B)(4)(b), (B)(1)(a)
At the time of the commission of the offense in 2015, the applicable penalty provision for distribution of oxycodone, pursuant to La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), provided for a sentence of “imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” ... Under the current penalty provision applicable to a conviction for La. R.S. 14:(26)402, involving the controlled dangerous substance oxycodone, the sentencing range for a first conviction would be zero to five years imprisonment with or without hard labor. See La. R.S. 14:402(G); La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a); La. R.S. 14:26(D). ... “[I]t is generally settled that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty which is to be imposed upon the convicted accused.” ... The well-settled jurisprudence of the Louisiana Supreme Court establishes that while ameliorative changes in the penalty provision of a statute should be considered as a factor in deciding an appropriate punishment, the trial court “should not derogate from the penalty provision in effect at the time of the commission of the offense.”Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing penalty and parole restriction
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of the sentence for the stated drug offense to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State Of Louisiana v. Benbow · filed 2020-05-12(B)(4)(b)
For a viclation of La. R.S 40:967 (A} (1) the penalty is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence and a fine of not more than $50,000. See La. R.S. 40:967(B) (4) (ob); see also State v. Payne, 2017-13 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/17/17), 220 So.3d 889, 897-98. Additionally, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that the sentence for a second felony habitual offender shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation ocr suspension of sentence; however, it does not restrict parole. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are thess called for in the reference statute.” State v. Esteen, 2001-879 (La. App. Sth Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79 n.24, writ denied, 2002-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. Thus, the district court erred in restricting parole eligibility for the entirety of relator’s sentences.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing range for possession with intent to distribute cocaine or methamphetamine under twenty-eight grams
Section 40:967(B)(1)(a) authorizes imprisonment of one to ten years, with or without hard labor, for possession with intent to distribute cocaine weighing less than twenty-eight grams or methamphetamine weighing less than twenty-eight grams.
State of Louisiana Versus Jontreal A. Fisher · filed 2020-06-24(B)(1)(a)
However, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a) provides that an individual who is convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine weighing less than twenty-eight grams (count two), and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine weighing less than twenty eight grams (count four), shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than ten years.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Divisibility; elements and means
Section 40:967(A) is divisible because the drugs listed in Schedule II are elements, not merely alternative means, of the offense.
United States v. Frierson · filed 2020-11-11(A)
Because the drugs listed in Schedule II are elements and not means, La. R.S. § 40:967(A) is divisible. Applying the modified categorical approach, § 40:967(A) constitutes a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Effect of reduced maximum penalty on habitual-offender sentencing
For a fourth felony offender, the reduction of § 40:967(C)'s maximum penalty for possessing the charged amount did not change the applicable sentence, which remained twenty years at hard labor.
State of Louisiana v. Hughes · filed 2021-05-05(C)
On appeal Defendant also contends that the trial court failed to consider ameliorative changes to the underlying crime, which reduced the maximum penalty for a first offense from five years to two years. According to Defendant the “amendment to [La.R.S.] 40:967 represents a shift in policy for possession of a small amount of drugs and demonstrates the legislature has chosen to impose more lenient sentencing provisions for this category of offenses.” However, Defendant has already benefited from ameliorative changes to the laws affecting his case; specifically, the 2017 amendments to the Habitual Offender Law decreased Defendant’s sentencing exposure from a range of twenty years to life imprisonment to a mandated twenty-year sentence. See Hughes, 19-547. Moreover, to the extent the maximum penalty for the underlying offense was decreased, the end result for a fourth offender remained the same: twenty years at hard labor. We find no error in the trial court’s sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing by aggregate weight
Subsection (C)(1) supplies the sentencing range for possession of less than two grams of a Schedule II substance; when the charged quantity was not found by the jury, the court required sentencing under that subsection.
State of Louisiana v. Solomon Burke Guillory, Jr. · filed 2021-05-12(C)(1)
Because the jury did not determine the quantity of crack cocaine possessed by Defendant, and because the quantity determines the sentencing range for the offense, we hold that Defendant must be sentenced under La.R.S. 40:967(C)(1). Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court for sentencing under La.R.S. 40:967(C)(1).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Possession of Schedule II controlled dangerous substances; penalty for less than two grams
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and § 40:967(C)(1) sets a maximum two-year sentence and optional $5,000 fine when the aggregate weight is less than two grams.
State of Louisiana v. Durham · filed 2021-06-30(C), (C)(1)
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, such as methamphetamine, unless it was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitoner, as provided in La. R.S. 40:978, while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by the statute. La. R.S. 40:967(C). To convict a defendant of possession of a CDS, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed an illegal drug. ... Constructive possession is established by evidence that the drugs were within the defendant’s dominion and control and that the defendant had knowledge of its presence. ... The sentence fell within the statutory limits of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1), which provides that the penalty for persons convicted for possession of a Schedule II CDS with an aggregate weight of less than two grams shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than two years and an optional fine of not more than $5,000.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
For an aggregate weight of less than twenty-eight grams, the applicable sentencing range is one to ten years, and the subsection does not authorize an exclusion of benefits.
State of Louisiana v. Jameel D. Green · filed 2021-10-27(B)(1)
Mr. Green was arrested and convicted of crimes taking place in November 2017, therefore, the amended version of the statute applied. The trial court sentenced Mr. Green believing that the proper sentencing range for his violations of La.R.S. 40:967 was two to thirty-one years. However, effective August 1, 2017, La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1) provides that the proper sentencing range in cases involving an aggregate weight of less than twenty-eight grams is one to ten years. Consequently, the fourteen-year sentence under docket number 17-4826 exceeds the maximum sentencing limit and must be vacated and remanded for resentencing. Additionally, each of the distribution sentences includes a two-year exclusion of benefits. Louisiana Revised Statues 40:967(B)(1) does not authorize the exclusion of benefits, and these exclusions are illegal.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Possession of cocaine weighing two grams or more but less than twenty-eight grams
Subsection (C)(2) covers possession of two grams or more but less than twenty-eight grams and authorizes one to five years of imprisonment, with or without hard labor, plus a possible fine of up to $5,000.
State of Louisiana v. Ezikel Ruben, Jr. · filed 2021-12-08(C)(2)
While the court may have said possession “over twenty-eight grams,” the record reflects the trial court read the correct statute and sentencing range from La.R.S. 40:967(C) both during the plea colloquy and sentencing and at no point mentioned subsection D, which discusses the amount greater than twenty-eight grams. The actual sentence imposed, four years, is consistent with the sentencing range found in La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2) and is less than the maximum sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Weight-based penalties for methamphetamine and morphine possession
Under La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967(B)(1)(a), possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine carries zero to ten years even when the aggregate weight is less than twenty-eight grams; § 40:967(C) makes morphine-possession penalties depend on the substance’s weight, with the greatest-weight provision carrying no more than five years.
State of Louisiana v. Cooley · filed 2021-10-06(B)(1)(a), (C)(1)
The legislature amended the penalty provisions of La.R.S. 40:967 effective August 1, 2017. 2017 La. Act 281 §2. Thus, the new penalty provision was in effect when Defendant committed the offense on August 8, 2017. Under the amended provision, the penalty for possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine depends on whether the aggregate weight of the methamphetamine was less than or more than twenty-eight grams. Although the bill of information does not specify the weight of the methamphetamine, Defendant faced a punishment of zero to ten years even if the weight was less than twenty-eight grams. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a). Thus, the trial court correctly determined the mandatory life penalty provision applied to Defendant’s convictions as a fourth habitual offender for both aggravated battery and possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. ... Count eight, possession of morphine sulphate, was punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years. La.R.S. 40:967(C)(1). As it did with La.R.S. 40:967(B) (discussed in the previous footnote), the legislature amended La.R.S. 40:967(C) to make the penalty dependent on the weight of the substance. 2017 La. Acts 281, §2. The bill of information did not specify the weight of the morphine sulphate at issue in this case. Even under the greatest weight provision, the penalty was not more than five years. La.R.S. 40:967(C).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) makes the penalty for possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance depend on the substance's aggregate weight, so the weight should be alleged in the charging instrument.
State of Louisiana v. Ryan · filed 2025-03-26(C)
The penalty for possession of methamphetamine is determined by the weight of the methamphetamine possessed. ... Because the penalty for possession of methamphetamine is dependent on the weight of the substance possessed, the weight should have been charged in the bill. ... Even so, we find the omission to be harmless.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Parole restrictions on sentences
At the time of these offenses, § 40:967(B)(4)(b) required only the first two years of a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, while § 40:967(C)(2) imposed no parole restriction on methamphetamine possession.
State of Louisiana v. Cassetti Dewayne Brown, Jr. · filed 2022-11-16(B)(4)(b) and (C)(2)
At the time of commission of the offenses, La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) required only the first two years of a sentence for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine to be imposed without the benefit of parole, and La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2) contained no parole restriction for possession of methamphetamine. Accordingly, this court amends Defendant’s sentence for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine to require that only the first two years be served without the benefit of parole, and we hereby strike the denial of parole eligibility from Defendant’s sentence for possession of methamphetamine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(B)(1) does not authorize a restriction on parole for the offense.
State of Louisiana Versus Kevin Johnson · filed 2024-10-16(B)(1)
The multiple offender statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1, however, does not provide for a restriction on parole. The underlying statute, La. R.S. 40:967, also does not provide for a restriction of parole. Thus, defendant’s enhanced sentence should not have been imposed with a restriction on parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing—version of statute in effect when offense was committed
The version of § 40:967(B)(1) in effect when the offense was committed governs the applicable punishment, even when a later amendment reduces the sentencing range.
State of Louisiana v. Sandifer · filed 2023-04-05(B)(1)
At the time Defendant committed the crime of distribution of methamphetamine in 2016, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1) stated: ... A substance classified in Schedule II which is an amphetamine or methamphetamine . . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. A strong presumption exists in Louisiana law that the statute in effect at the time of the offense governs the applicable punishment for the crime. ... The general rule applies even when the changes in sentence are ameliorative in nature. ... The 25-year sentence imposed by the trial court is within the statutory limits of the 2016 version of La. R.S. 40:967, and it is not out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Weight of substance determines penalty
Section 40:967(B)(1) makes the penalty for distributing a Schedule II substance depend on its aggregate weight, distinguishing less than twenty-eight grams from twenty-eight grams or more.
State of Louisiana v. Bruner · filed 2023-10-04(B)(1)
But while the penalty for distribution of methamphetamine is determined by the weight of the substance, the bill of information fails to specify the weight of the methamphetamine that was distributed by Defendant. ... And here, since the penalty is dependent on the weight of the methamphetamine distributed, it is apparent that the weight should have been charged in the bill. But even still, we consider this omission to be harmless. ... In addition, because Defendant was tried by a six-person jury, all parties had to have understood that Defendant was being charged under the lower-weight penalty provision (less than twenty-eight grams). After all, the lower-weight penalty provision is punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor, while the higher-weight penalty provision (twenty-eight grams or more) is punishable by imprisonment with mandatory hard labor. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1). ... In summary, even though the bill of information failed to state the weight of the methamphetamine distributed by Defendant, the error in our view was harmless.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing—hard labor designation
Section 40:967(C)(1) authorizes a sentence of up to two years, with or without hard labor, for possession of cocaine weighing less than two grams.
State of Louisiana Versus Oneil Gilbert, III · filed 2023-11-08(C)(1)
La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1) provides that the term of imprisonment for possession of cocaine weighing less than 2 grams is “with or without hard labor, for not more than two years.” ... Where the applicable sentencing statute allows discretion, the sentencing court’s failure to indicate whether the sentence is to be served with or without hard labor is an impermissible, indeterminate sentence. ... We must therefore vacate defendant’s sentence on count two for possession of cocaine weighing less than 2 grams and remand the matter to the trial court for the imposition of a determinate sentence in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 879.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
For possession of less than two grams of methamphetamine or fentanyl, § 40:967 permits imprisonment with or without hard labor, so the sentence must specify which option applies.
State of Louisiana Versus Malcolm J. Rochefort · filed 2024-02-07(C)(1), (C)(4)(a)
La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1) applies to a charge for possession of methamphetamine weighing less than two grams and provides for the sentence to be imposed either with or without hard labor, stating: ... (1) An aggregate weight of less than two grams, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than two years, and in addition, may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars. [Emphasis added.] ... Similarly, as to count two, possession of fentanyl weighing less than two grams, La. R.S. 40:967(C)(4)(a) provides as follows: ... (a) An aggregate weight of less than two grams, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than two years nor more than four years.” [Emphasis added.] ... If the applicable sentencing statute allows discretion, the failure to indicate whether the sentence is to be served with or without hard labor is an impermissible indeterminate sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing—whether the sentence must specify hard labor
Section 40:967(C) authorizes a sentence with or without hard labor, so the sentencing court must specify which applies.
State of Louisiana v. Lambert · filed 2024-03-27(C)
The penalty provisions for each of these offenses call for a sentence with or without hard labor. La.R.S. 14:69.1(B), La.R.S. 40:1041(E), and La.R.S. 40:967(C). Thus, the trial court’s failure to specify whether the sentences were to be served with or without hard labor renders the sentences indeterminate, requiring the sentences be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Knowledge that substance is controlled
Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, but only general knowledge that it was a controlled substance of some kind—not knowledge of its precise identity—and separately requires specific intent to distribute.
State of Louisiana v. Sterling · filed 2024-07-17(A)(1)
There is no case law to support Mr. Sterling’s argument that to prove a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, violating La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1), it must be shown that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a specific Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, in this case, fentanyl. Instead, the State, under La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1), was required to prove that Mr. Sterling knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. “The ‘knowingly’ element of this offense [(the guilty knowledge requirement)] refers to a general criminal intent, i.e., awareness that the substance possessed was a controlled substance of some kind.” Noibi, 780 F.2d at 1421.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing ranges and penalties
Law changed since Acts 2023, No. 399 confined the five-to-forty-year fentanyl distribution tier in § 40:967(B)(4)(a) to an aggregate weight under 28 grams and added higher-weight and repeat-conviction tiers. The charged offenses were alleged to have occurred May 17, 2023, so the quoted range describes the pre-amendment law.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(a) provides a five-to-forty-year prison range and a possible fine of up to $50,000 for fentanyl distribution or possession with intent to distribute, while § 40:967(C)(2) provides a one-to-five-year range for possession of two to less than twenty-eight grams of cocaine or methamphetamine.
State of Louisiana Versus Odell Lee Robertson · filed 2024-10-23(B)(4)(a), (C)(2)
At the time of the charged offenses in counts one and two, the penalty provision for distribution of fentanyl, as well as for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, provided for a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than 40 years, and in addition, a possible fine of not more than $50,000. ... As such, Defendant faced a sentence of five to 40 years imprisonment and a fine of $50,000 on each of his convictions on counts one and two, for which he was sentenced by the trial court to 10 years imprisonment on each count. Therefore, the imposed sentences are less than half the maximum sentence and are thus within the sentencing limits prescribed by the statute. ... At the time of the charged offenses in counts four and five, the penalty provision for possession of cocaine and possession of methamphetamine was governed by La. R.S. 40:967, which provided in pertinent part, “An aggregate weight of two grams or more but less than twenty-eight grams shall be imprisoned at hard labor, for not more than one year nor more than five years and, in addition, may be fined not more than five thousand dollars.” See La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2). As such, Defendant faced a sentence of one to five years imprisonment and a fine of $50,000 on each of his convictions on counts four and five, for which he was sentenced by the trial court to two years imprisonment on each count. Therefore, Defendant’s imposed sentences were half of the maximum sentences and within the sentencing limits prescribed by the statute.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Drug distribution and categorical approach
Section 40:967(A)(1) covers distribution of a Schedule II controlled substance without requiring commercial dealing, and its elements are sufficiently narrow to match the federal drug-trafficking offense.
Mana v. Garland · filed 2023-03-01(A)(1)
This court has explained that “[t]he fact that there are different punishments for different drugs and activities evidences that the types of drugs in Schedule II are elements and not merely a list of illustrative means,” and thus, § 40:967(A) is a divisible statute subject to the modified categorical approach. ... Thus, Mana argues—and we agree—that because § 40:967(A) does not require commercial dealing, it is broader than the generic offense of “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” ... Thus, employing the modified categorical approach and reviewing the elements of each offense, Mana’s state offense consists of elements sufficiently narrow to fall within the generic federal crime.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Parole restrictions
Section 40:967(C)(1) does not impose a parole restriction on the sentence for the underlying offense.
State of Louisiana Versus Brett H Elmer · filed 2024-12-18(C)(1)
Here, La. R.S. 40:967 (C)(1) does not impose a parole restriction.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Penalty for cocaine under 28 grams
Section 40:967(B)(1)(a) sets a sentence of one to ten years, with or without hard labor, plus a possible fine up to $50,000, for cocaine under 28 grams.
State of Louisiana v. Nguyen · filed 2025-02-26(B)(1)(a)
La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a) states that a defendant convicted of possession of a Schedule II CDS, cocaine, in an amount less than 28 grams shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than ten years and may, in addition, be required to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. ... After the charges were amended, the applicable statutes were La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(a) as to Count 2 and under La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1)(a) as to Count 3.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Distribution of fentanyl
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.
State Of Louisiana v. McGowan · filed 2025-02-28(A)(1)
Under La. R. S. 40:967( A)( 1), it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute fentanyl, which is classified as a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Notes 601–744 of 744, oldest cases first.
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