La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967
Prohibited acts: the cases that interpreted this section
2,391 citing cases reviewed of 3,299 in the citation index: 744 interpreted the section (annotated below), 1,647 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-20 may not have been reviewed yet.
Have a situation under La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967?
These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.
Elements of distribution of cocaine
Subsection (A)(1) prohibits the distribution of cocaine.
State v. Suggs · filed 2011-12-13(A)(1)
Distribution of cocaine is prohibited by La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). ... At trial, the State presented evidence to show that Suggs distributed cocaine within 1000 feet of Jesse Owens playground. Agent Gueldner testified that he purchased cocaine from an individual, whom he later identified from a photographic lineup as Suggs, within 1000 feet of Jesse Owens playground. ... Based on the foregoing, we find that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the State met its burden of proving the essential elements of the crime, including the perpetrator’s identity, be*822yond a reasonable doubt.10 Accordingly, we find no merit in this assignment.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, and distribution of cocaine requires delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and proof of the substance's exact identity.
State v. Washington · filed 2012-02-01(A)
An individual is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of the cocaine to his intended recipient. The State must show: (1) delivery or physical transfer; (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A) prohibits distribution of a Schedule II controlled substance such as cocaine, and the offense is established by proof of physical delivery.
State of Louisiana v. Jonathan L.citizen · filed 2012-10-03(A)
Defendant was convicted of distribution of a Schedule II substance, cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A). ―‗Distribute‘ means to deliver a controlled dangerous substance . . . by physical delivery. . . .‖ La.R.S. 40:961(14). The evidence showed that Officer Laborde purchased a substance from a suspect. The purchase was monitored by Lieutenant Trahan and Sergeant Boddye. Officer Laborde identified the suspect as Defendant from a photographic lineup and at trial. The substance was identified by an expert at trial as crack cocaine. We find that the evidence sufficiently showed that Defendant physically delivered cocaine to Officer Laborde. Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally distribute a Schedule II controlled substance, and § 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a cocaine-distribution sentence of two to thirty years at hard labor with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension.
State v. Smith · filed 2012-10-03(A)(1) and (B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that any person who is convicted of distribution of cocaine: [S]hall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person “knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance ... classified in Schedule II.”Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance and requires proof of delivery, guilty knowledge, and the substance’s identity.
State v. Beason · filed 2016-12-07(A)(1)
La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1) provides that it is unlawful for any person “knowingly or intentionally ... to ... distribute, or dispense, ... a controlled dangerous substanee ... classified in Schedule 'II[.]” Cocaine and its derivatives aré classified in Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:964. To establish the offense of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove: (1) delivery or physical transfer; (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer;2 and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. State n. Cox, 44,878 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/9/09), 26 So.3d 929, 933, writ denied, 09-2829 (La. 6/18/10), 28 So.3d 320. A person is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of cocaine to its intended recipient(s). State v. Jones, 05-840 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/28/06), 927 So.2d 514, 522.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A) prohibits distributing cocaine; conviction requires proof of a transfer, knowledge that the substance was controlled, and the substance’s identity.
State v. Dowell · filed 2009-09-09(A)
To convict for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, such as cocaine or marijuana, the State must prove: (1) "delivery" or "physical transfer;" (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. ... Viewing all the direct and circumstantial evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offenses of distribution of cocaine and distribution of marijuana present beyond a reasonable doubt, and found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of those offenses.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Distribution of cocaine—sufficiency of evidence
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits distributing cocaine, and the court held the evidence was sufficient to prove that offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including unobjected-to hearsay that was not the exclusive evidence and was not contradicted by a sworn recantation.
State v. Beach · filed 1992-11-20(A)(1)
Concerning his distribution of cocaine conviction, the defendant contends that the Feeback sisters provided the only evidence linking him to cocaine distribution. ... Considering the above, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence as favorable to the prosecution as any rational fact finder can, could have concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense of distribution of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits distribution of cocaine, and the offense may be proved through circumstantial evidence establishing that the substance transferred was cocaine.
State v. Smith · filed 2013-12-10(A)(1)
We agree with Judge Lombard that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the small white object defendant removed from his mouth and handed to the bicycle rider was crack cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Penalty for distribution of cocaine
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b), together with the drug-free-zone provision in § 40:981.3, sets the punishment for cocaine distribution at two to forty-five years at hard labor with a $50,000 fine and requires the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Jones · filed 2010-10-26(B)(4)(b)
Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:981.3 and La. R.S. 40:967, the sentencing range for distribution of cocaine in a drug-free zone is between two and 45 years at hard labor with a fine of $50,000.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a two-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentencing range for distribution of cocaine, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine up to $50,000.
State v. Henderson · filed 2011-03-02(B)(4)(b)
Each count carries a sentencing range of 2 to 30 years. La. R.S. 40:967.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(1) requires five to thirty years of hard-labor imprisonment for cocaine distribution and permits a fine of up to $15,000.
State v. Williams · filed 1992-12-23(B)(1)
The penalty provision for distribution of cocaine requires the imposition of a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years. Additionally, the trial court may impose a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1). Thus, defendant's sentence of five years imprisonment at hard labor complies with the statutory requirements.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967 sets a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor prison range and permits an additional fine for distribution of cocaine.
State v. Roberts · filed 1997-12-10
La.R.S. 40:967 provides that a person convicted of distribution of cocaine will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more Rthan fifty thousand dollars.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor penalty for cocaine distribution, requires the first five years to be served without parole, probation, or suspension, and permits a fine up to $50,000.
State v. Iron · filed 2001-02-14(B)(4)(b)
The penalty for distribution of cocaine as set forth in La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) is five to thirty years at hard labor, the first five to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. A fine of up to $50,000 may also be imposed. In this case, the Defendant received twenty years at hard labor, five years suspended, and the first five years to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. No fine was imposed. Thus, the Defendant's midrange sentence falls within the statutory limits.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B) sets the penalty for cocaine distribution at five to thirty years at hard labor, with an optional fine of up to $15,000, making five years the minimum sentence.
State v. Grogan · filed 2001-05-02(B)
The penalty for distribution of cocaine at the time the offense was committed was five to thirty years at hard labor and an optional fine of not more than $15,000.00. La.R.S. 40:967(B). Thus, the Defendant received the minimum sentence allowed, five years at hard labor.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) subjects the offense at issue to a sentence of two to thirty years and a possible fine of up to $50,000.
State v. Collins · filed 2003-10-08(B)(4)(b)
Under La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), Defendant was subject to a sentence from two to thirty years and a possible fine of up to $50,000.00.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets cocaine-distribution punishment at two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits an additional fine of up to $50,000.
State v. Skipper · filed 2003-12-10(B)(4)(b)
The penalty for distribution of cocaine is given in La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) as follows: *801a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) makes distributing cocaine punishable by two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine up to $50,000.
State v. Jones · filed 2006-03-28(B)(4)(b)
Employing both of the foregoing statutes, the Defendant's sentencing range for Count One was two to 45 years' imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the first two years.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a two-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentencing range for cocaine distribution, with the first two years served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
State of Louisiana v. Semien · filed 2007-01-31(B)(4)(b)
The sentencing range for distribution of cocaine is two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years of the sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) makes cocaine distribution punishable by two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension, plus a discretionary fine of up to $50,000.
State of Louisiana v. Rogers · filed 2010-05-05(B)(4)(b)
Under La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), distribution of cocaine is punishable by “a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence” and also by a discretionary fine of not more than $50,000. Being convicted of an attempted distribution of cocaine reduced Defendant’s sentencing and fine exposure by half. La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Thus, the penalty range for attempted distribution of cocaine was zero to fifteen years at hard labor. Therefore, Defendant’s ten-year hard labor sentence fits within the statutory sentencing range for the offense; it is two-thirds the maximum penalty provided by law.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967 supplies the underlying maximum penalty for cocaine distribution, which, together with the attempt statute, results in a 15-year maximum sentence for attempted distribution of cocaine.
State v. Cook · filed 2008-04-30
The maximum sentence of incarceration for attempted distribution of cocaine is 15 years at hard labor. La. R.S. 40:967; La. R.S. 14:27; State v. Myles, 34,520 (La.App. 2d Cir.5/9/01), 786 So.2d 906.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires two to thirty years at hard labor for distributing cocaine, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Nelson · filed 2013-01-16(B)(4)(b)
As stated in the law and discussion portion of this opinion, La. R.S. 40:96T(B)(4)(b) sets the penalty for this offense, and provides for a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more than 30 years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) makes distribution of cocaine punishable by up to 30 years in prison.
State v. Heard · filed 2002-07-17(B)(4)(b)
Defendant's crimes of first degree robbery and purse snatching are, pursuant to La. R.S. *458 14:2(13), crimes of violence and his conviction for distribution of cocaine, a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, is one that is punishable for a maximum of 30 years. See La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Counterfeit controlled substances
Section 40:967(A)(2) requires a counterfeit controlled substance to satisfy the statutory counterfeit-substance definition; possession of an uncontrolled substance merely represented as cocaine is not enough.
State v. Johnson · filed 1994-06-03(A)(2)
The separate offense defined by La.R.S. 40:967 A(2) is not a general "bunk" statute. As defined by R.S. 40:961(8), "counterfeit substance" means a drug, substance or immediate precursor listed in Schedule I through V of La.R.S. 40:964, which, without authorization, bears the identifying mark of one manufacturer or distributor when it has been produced by another manufacturer, and which "thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by, such other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser."Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Purchaser of narcotics is not guilty of distribution
Section 40:967(A)(1) does not make a narcotics purchaser who takes delivery guilty of distribution; the purchaser commits a possessory offense only.
State v. Celestine · filed 1996-01-26(A)(1)
In accord with the overwhelming weight of authority at the federal and state level, however, we hold to the contrary that when a purchaser takes delivery of the narcotics transferred into his possession by the distributor he has committed a possessory offense only. We therefore reverse relator's conviction for distribution of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Attempted possession—actual cocaine not required
For an attempted-possession charge under Section 40:967(C), the State need not prove that actual cocaine was present; the defendant's objective acts may corroborate the subjective intent to possess cocaine.
State v. Hollis · filed 1997-01-28(C)
We find this reasoning to be both logical and persuasive and adopt it herein. The elements of knowledge and intent are states of mind and need not be proven as facts, but rather may be inferred from the circumstances. The jury may draw reasonable inferences to support these contentions based upon the evidence presented at trial. ... Based upon the evidence presented at trial, we find that the jury could have reasonably inferred that the actions of the defendant described by the witnesses corroborated his subjective intent to possess cocaine. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Possession of cocaine: principal liability and sentencing restrictions
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowing or intentional distribution of a Schedule II controlled substance, and an intermediary who facilitates the transfer may be held liable as a principal in the distribution.
State v. Mazique · filed 2005-12-13(A)(1)
The Defendant's actions here constituted more than merely directing the undercover agents to a source. His intent to distribute cocaine was manifested by his actions. He approached the undercover agents indicating that he could get cocaine. He negotiated a fee for his services. Furthermore, he was seen talking to the actual seller immediately prior to the transaction. ... Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution in this case, we find that the Defendant acted as an intermediary to facilitate transfer of cocaine to a buyer and, therefore, was a principal in the distribution of that cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(c) does not require proof of the defendant's actual possession or dominion and control when the State proves he was a principal under La. R.S. 14:24, and § 40:967(G) requires at least 30 years of the sentence to be without suspension, probation, or parole.
State v. Franklin · filed 1997-04-16(F)(1)(c), (G)
The applicable statute is La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(c) which read at the time of the offense: ... (c) Any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses four hundred grams or more of cocaine or of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine or of its analogues as provided in Schedule II(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than fifteen years, nor more than thirty years and to pay a fine of not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, nor more than six hundred thousand dollars. ... The state need not prove actual possession or actual dominion and control over a controlled dangerous substance when the state proves that a defendant is a principal in the crime under LSA-R.S. 14:24. ... For this offense, La.R.S. 40:967(G) requires that the sentence for at least 30 years be without suspension, probation, or parole; in this respect the trial court imposed the minimum sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Penalties for possession and distribution of cocaine
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For possession of 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine, § 40:967(F)(1)(a) requires imprisonment and a $50,000–$100,000 fine, while § 40:967(G) restricts suspension, deferral, withholding, probation, and parole before the minimum sentence is served.
State v. Major · filed 2002-10-02(F)(1)(a) and (G)
Mr. Major was convicted of possession of cocaine in an amount of twenty-eight grams or more, but less than two hundred grams, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967 C. Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:967 F(l)(a), the applicable sentence for that offense is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten years, nor more than sixty years, and a fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred thousand dollars. La. R.S. 40:967(G) requires that the adjudication of guilt or imposition of a sentence under L¿. R.S. 40:967(F) “shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentences provided by Subsection F.” By failing to impose a fine on Mr. Major, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence. We, however, decline to remand for correction of that patent sentencing error.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(C)(2) makes possession of cocaine punishable by a maximum of five years, while § 40:967(B)(1) makes distribution of cocaine punishable by five to thirty years.
State v. Keys · filed 1997-05-07(B)(1), (C)(2)
It is true that the instant offense (as well as one of the predicate offenses) was possession of cocaine, which carries a maximum sentence of only five years. R.S. 40:967 C(2). However, the amended bill of information alleged that one of the predicate offenses was for distribution of cocaine, which carries a sentence of not less than five nor more than 30 years. R.S. 40:967 B(1).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(1) authorizes five to thirty years at hard labor and a fine of up to $50,000 for distribution of cocaine; an attempted-distribution sentence is governed in part by the attempt statute.
State v. Spradley · filed 1998-11-06(B)(1)
At the time the crimes were committed, the penalty for a defendant convicted of distribution of cocaine was a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years and in addition a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. See La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(prior to its amendment by 1997 La. Acts No. 1284, § 1). The penalty for a conviction of attempted distribution of cocaine was imprisonment for not more than fifteen years at hard labor and a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars. See La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3) and 40:967(B)(1). Thus, the defendant's sentences of thirty years for each conviction of distribution of cocaine and fifteen years for his conviction of attempted distribution of cocaine were within the statutory requirements.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires cocaine distribution to be punished by five to thirty years at hard labor, with the first five years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine up to $50,000.
State v. King · filed 2000-02-02(B)(4)(b)
The sentence range for distribution of cocaine is set forth in La.R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b) as follows: Distribution, dispensing, or possession with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense cocaine or cocaine base or a mixture or substance containing cocaine or its analogues as provided in Schedule II(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964 shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Subsection (F)(1)(a) sets the imprisonment range for possessing 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine, while subsection (G)'s restriction on suspension does not bar probation or parole for an attempted offense when the attempt statute eliminates the underlying offense's minimum sentence.
State v. Rodriguez · filed 2001-02-14(F)(1)(a), (G)
La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a) provides that a person convicted of possessing cocaine in the amount of twenty-eight grams or more, but less than two hundred grams, shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten years, nor more than sixty years. La. R.S. 40:967(G) provides that the sentence of a person sentenced under Subsection F shall not be suspended. The provision bars a defendant's eligibility for probation or parole only prior to his serving the minimum sentence. Defendant was convicted of an attempt. La. R.S. 14:27 provides that a person convicted of an attempt of the variety in the instant case shall be imprisoned in the same manner as for the offense attempted, with such imprisonment not exceeding one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted. Thus, there effectively is no minimum sentence for a person convicted of attempted possession of cocaine in an amount more than twenty-eight grams but less than two hundred grams. Therefore, defendant's sentence must be amended to delete the provision denying him the benefits of probation and parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(C) requires knowing and intentional possession of cocaine, and § 40:967(F)(1)(b) requires a $100,000 to $350,000 fine for possessing 200 to 400 grams, with a mandatory minimum fine of $100,000.
State v. Furgerson · filed 2001-03-02(C); (F)(1)(b)
Possession of a controlled dangerous substance is defined in La. R.S. 40:967C as the knowing and intentional possession of cocaine without a valid prescription or order from a practitioner while acting in the course of his profession. ... La. R.S. 40:967F(1)(b), provides, in pertinent part: ... Any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses two hundred grams or more, but less than four hundred grams, of cocaine or of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine or of its analogues as provided in Schedule II(A)(4) of La. R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than twenty years, nor more than sixty years, and to pay a fine of not less than one hundred thousand dollars, nor more than three hundred fifty thousand dollars. (Emphasis added.) ... The court, however, was mandated to impose a fine of at least $100,000.00.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
For cocaine distribution, § 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides 5 to 30 years at hard labor, with the first 5 years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine up to $50,000; combined with § 40:981.3 for a first drug-free-zone conviction, it yields a 15-to-30-year term with 15 years without those benefits.
State v. McCraney · filed 2001-09-25(B)(4)(b)
A conviction for distribution of cocaine carries a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than 30 years, with the first five years being served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The court may also impose a fine of not more than $50,000.00. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). ... Construing this provision with La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), we conclude that the court was required to sentence this defendant, as a first time offender under La. R.S. 40:981.3, to a fine of $50,000 and imprisonment for a term between 15 and 30 years, with 15 years being served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor penalty for cocaine distribution, requires the first five years to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine of up to $50,000 per count.
State v. Dillon · filed 2002-02-26(B)(4)(b)
The penalty for distribution of cocaine is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In addition, the trial judge may impose a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars on each count. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a thirty-year hard-labor maximum, rather than life imprisonment or death, and provides the same penalty for cocaine distribution and possession with intent to distribute.
State v. Delandro · filed 2002-05-10(B)(4)(b)
The maximum legislative penalty provided for this felony is imprisonment at hard labor for thirty years, not life imprisonment or death. La. R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b). ... We also note that the defendant incorrectly argues that the amendment resulted in the defendant being charged with a greater offense and subjected to greater penalties. This argument is unfounded. The applicable statute, La. R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b), provides the same penalty for both charges.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Subsection (B)(4)(b) sets a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentence for cocaine distribution, with the first five years without parole, probation, or suspension, and permits a fine up to $50,000.
State v. Marcotte · filed 2002-05-15(B)(4)(b)
[A] term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) makes distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute offenses punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more.
State v. Zeigler · filed 2006-01-25(B)(4)(b)
Zeigler's instant offense (distribution of cocaine committed on September 9, 2003) and two predicate offenses (distribution of cocaine in 1991 committed on June 24, 1991, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute committed on October 15, 1998) are violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by ten years imprisonment or more. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Therefore, under the habitual offender statute as it existed at the time of the commission of this offense (September 9, 2003), Zeigler was subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) makes cocaine distribution punishable by more than ten years, while § 40:967(C)(2) makes cocaine possession punishable by no more than five years.
State v. Zeigler · filed 2006-12-20(B)(4)(b) (C)(2)
Defendant's present conviction for distribution of cocaine, and his 1992 conviction for distribution of cocaine are both convictions under the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law which are punishable by more than ten years. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine is not punishable by more than ten years and, therefore, does not qualify defendant for a life sentence under this subsection of La. R.S. 15:529.1.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For cocaine distribution, subsection (B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of the sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and authorizes a fine of up to $50,000.
State v. McCray · filed 2007-07-30(B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967 is the applicable provision for distribution of cocaine and subsection B(4)(b) provides that the first two years of the sentence is to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... La. R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b) provides that a fine of "not more than fifty thousand dollars" may be imposed.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) imposes two to thirty years at hard labor for cocaine distribution, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine of up to $50,000.
State v. Watkins · filed 2007-11-21(B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets the penalty for distribution of cocaine, and provided, at the time of the defendant's arrest, for imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of the sentence being without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The statute also provided, in addition to the term of imprisonment, that the defendant could be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires cocaine distribution to be punished by two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine of up to $50,000.
State of Louisiana v. Simon · filed 2008-01-30(B)(4)(b)
The penalty for the distribution of cocaine is set forth in La.R.S.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets cocaine distribution and possession-with-intent-to-distribute penalties at two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years without benefits, plus a discretionary fine of up to $50,000.
State v. Harris · filed 2008-01-30(B)(4)(b)
Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), the sentencing range for both distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 2 years nor more than 30 years, 2 years of which to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, and a discretionary fine of not more than $50,000.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides a maximum fine of $50,000 for distribution of cocaine.
State v. Young · filed 2008-03-25(B)(4)(b)
The maximum fine for distribution of cocaine is $50,000. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Thus the defendant's sentence is illegally lenient.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(C)(2) makes cocaine possession punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor for up to five years and a possible fine of up to $5,000.
State of Louisiana v. Insley · filed 2009-11-04(C)(2)
Here, the underlying felony is the possession of cocaine, which carries a penalty of imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years, and a possible fine of not more than five thousand dollars. La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2). Thus, Defendant’s maximum sentencing exposure was five years, as this was the lesser penalty. Because Defendant pled guilty to the lesser included offense of attempt, his maximum sentencing exposure was further reduced.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
For possession of 28 to 199 grams of cocaine, § 40:967(F)(1)(a) requires a $50,000 to $150,000 fine, while § 40:967(G) requires specified restrictions on probation, parole, and suspension of sentence.
State v. Williams · filed 2012-12-11(F)(1)(a), (G)
First, we note that defendant received an illegally lenient sentence on Count Two under La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a), which requires a fine between $50,000 and $150,000. ... Next, we note that defendant’s sentence on Count Two and defendant’s enhanced sentence were imposed without restriction of benefits. With respect to Count Two, La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a) and La. R.S. 40:967(G) mandate a minimum sentence of five years. As such, the first five years of the sentence should have been imposed without benefit of probation or parole and defendant’s entire sentence should have been imposed without suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a cocaine-distribution sentence of two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine of up to $50,000.
State v. Hackett · filed 2013-08-21(B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b) requires that a person convicted of distribution of cocaine be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of the sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; the defendant may, in addition, be ordered to pay a fine of not more than $50,000.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(A)(1) makes cocaine distribution punishable by 2 to 30 years at hard labor, with the first 2 years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine of up to $50,000.
State v. Johnson · filed 2013-11-20(A)(1)
The sentencing range for distribution of cocaine is a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 2, nor more than 30, years, with the first 2 years being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of |fisentence. In addition, the sentence may include a fine of not more than $50,000. La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) makes distribution of cocaine punishable by more than ten years’ imprisonment.
State v. Harris · filed 2013-12-11(B)(4)(b)
Additionally, both the distribution of marijuana and dis*701tribution of cocaine convictions were for violations of the controlled dangerous substances law and |swere punishable by sentences of more than ten years. See La. R.S. 40:966(B)(3); La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Penalty for possession of 400 grams or more of cocaine
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) and (G); the current statute uses § 40:967(D) for unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams. The cited former provision applies only to older offenses.
Section 40:967(F)(c) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed more than four hundred grams of cocaine, and constructive possession satisfies the possession element.
State v. Alvarez · filed 2001-07-18(F)(c)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drugs and that she knowingly possessed it. State v. Lavigne, 95-0204 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/22/96), 675 So.2d 771, writ denied, 96-1738 (La.1/10/97), 685 So.2d 140. Additionally, the State was required to prove that 17the amount of cocaine possessed was an amount in excess of four hundred grams. The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual physical possession of the cocaine; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former large-quantity cocaine possession range; Acts 2017, No. 281 later repealed § 40:967(F) and (G), with revised (D) treating unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former penalty.
Section 40:967(F) requires a person who knowingly or intentionally possesses 400 grams or more of cocaine to receive 30 to 60 years at hard labor and a fine of $250,000 to $600,000.
State v. Cormier · filed 1997-10-15(F)
The defendant did not receive a fine for count two (2) although one is mandated by the penalty provision of La.R.S. 40:967(F). That provision states: Any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses four hundred grams or more of cocaine or of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine or of its analogues as provided in Schedule 11(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than thirty years, nor more than sixty years and to pay a fine of not less than two- hundred fifty thousand dollars, nor more than six hundred thousand dollars. Therefore, defendant received an illegally lenient sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(l)(c) sets the penalty range for possessing 400 grams or more of cocaine, and its 1994 amendment doubled that range.
State v. Cormier · filed 1999-10-08(F)(l)(c)
The 1994 amendment of La.R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(c), doubling the penalty range for possession of 400 grams or more of cocaine, reflects the legislature’s renewed concern for the seriousness of the offense. Given this clear expression of legislative intent, the factual basis articulated by the trial court adequately supported the sentence imposed at the midpoint of the range provided by the statute as amended.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(c) mandates a $250,000.00 to $600,000.00 fine for possessing 400 grams or more of cocaine, even when the defendant is indigent, although default imprisonment for nonpayment may not be imposed.
State v. Major · filed 2005-03-02(F)(1)(c)
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(F)(1)(c) requires the imposition of a fine of not less than $250,000.00 or more than $600,000.00. ... Following Dickerson, we find that the trial court in the present case, even in light of its determination that Major was indigent, should have imposed the mandatory fine but without imposing default time under La.Code Crim.P. art. 884. ... Therefore, we vacate the sentence and remand the case for resentencing. If, upon remand, the trial court finds that Major is indigent, it is to impose the mandatory fine without ordering default time in the event of nonpayment.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Subsection (F)(1)(a) makes knowing or intentional possession of 28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine punishable by five to thirty years at hard labor and a $50,000 to $150,000 fine.
State of Louisiana v. Edwards · filed 2007-06-13(F)(1)(a)
In conclusion, we find that although the State did not prove all the elements essential of La.R.S. 40:981.3 regarding possession in a school zone, the remaining offense of possession of a Schedule II substance, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a), is supported by the evidence. ... Thus, in accordance with Ruiz, we vacate the Defendant’s conviction and sentence for possession of more than 28 grams, but less than 200 grams of cocaine, second offense, and enter a conviction for the lesser offense of possession of more than 28 grams, but less than 200 grams of cocaine. Further, we remand the case for resentencing on this conviction.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(b) provides a ten-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentence and a $100,000.00 to $350,000.00 fine for possessing more than 200 but less than 400 grams of cocaine.
State of Louisiana v. Broussard · filed 2013-04-17(F)(1)(b)
Defendant was convicted of a violation of La.R.S. 40:967. The applicable penalty provision for possessing more than 200 grams of cocaine but less than 400 grams of cocaine is contained in Section F(1)(b) of La.R.S. 40:967. It provides a sentence of ten to thirty years at hard labor with a fine of $100,000.00 to $350,000.00.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(c) sets a 15-to-30-year hard-labor sentence and a $250,000-to-$600,000 fine for knowingly or intentionally possessing 400 grams or more of cocaine, while subsection (G) bars suspension, deferral, withholding, probation, or parole until the minimum sentence is served.
State of Louisiana v. Bell-Brayboy · filed 2020-07-22(F)(1)(c), (G)
F. Other penalties for possession.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Possession—elements
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) and (G); the current statute uses § 40:967(D) for unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams. The cited former provision applies only to older offenses.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) applies to knowing or intentional possession of cocaine weighing 28 to less than 200 grams, and constructive possession satisfies the possession element even without actual physical custody.
State v. Lewis · filed 2007-09-19(F)(1)(a)
In the instant case, the elements of the offense are that: (1) the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine; and (2) the amount of cocaine possessed was between 28 and 200 grams. La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a). One need not actually possess the controlled dangerous substance to violate the prohibition against possession. Constructive possession is sufficient. A person may be in constructive possession of a drug even though it is not in his physical custody if it is subject to his dominion and control.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(F) does not require the State to prove the value of the cocaine to obtain a conviction for possession.
State v. Wright · filed 2005-02-15(F)
Any evidence regarding distribution of cocaine would have been irrelevant to the Defendant's prosecution for possession. Similarly, Lieutenant Harrison's testimony regarding the value of the seized cocaine was not necessary to the State's case. The State was not required to prove value to obtain a conviction.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires proof that a defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance and did so knowingly or intentionally.
State v. Taylor · filed 1997-10-29
To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it; constructive possession is sufficient.
State v. Nowak · filed 1998-12-09(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that she knowingly possessed it. ... The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual physical possession of the cocaine; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction. ... Thus, in the case at bar, the evidence suggests that the defendant was aware of the contraband and the contraband was subject to her control. Under the jurisprudence, the State produced sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C)(2) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it; constructive possession is sufficient.
State v. Guillard · filed 1999-04-07(C)(2)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly possessed it. State v. Lavigne, 95-0204 (La. App. 4th Cir.5/22/96), 675 So.2d 771, writ den., 96-1738 (La.1/10/97), 685 So.2d 140; State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990). The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual physical possession of the cocaine; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance and knowingly or intentionally possessed it; mere possession of drug paraphernalia does not establish guilty knowledge.
State v. Postell · filed 1999-04-22(C)
To convict a defendant for possession of cocaine pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:967(C), the State must present evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of a controlled dangerous substance and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the substance.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine; constructive possession is sufficient, and knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.
State v. Shields · filed 1999-09-15(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that she knowingly possessed it. ... The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual physical possession of the cocaine; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction. ... The elements of knowledge and intent are states of mind and need not be proven as facts, but may be inferred from the circumstances. ... Accordingly, under the Taylor doctrine, supra, there is a sufficient amount of cocaine in the residue in the pipe to sustain the defendant's conviction and sentence notwithstanding her protests to the contrary.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) defines cocaine possession as knowing and intentional possession without a valid prescription or order from a practitioner acting in the course of the profession.
State v. Myers · filed 2000-03-01(C)
The crime of possession of cocaine is the knowing and intentional possession of cocaine without a valid prescription or order from a practitioner while acting in the course of his profession. La. R.S. 40:967(C). ... When viewed in the light most favorable to the state, this evidence is sufficient to convict Myers of the crime of possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it.
State v. Tassin · filed 2000-03-15
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the drug and that she knowingly possessed it. ... Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires the State to prove that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it.
State v. Rice · filed 2000-03-15
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly possessed it.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and a trace amount of cocaine in a crack pipe can support a possession conviction when possession and guilty knowledge are established.
State v. Monette · filed 2000-03-22(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must establish that the defendant was in possession of the drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed it. ... A trace amount of cocaine in a crack pipe can be sufficient to support a conviction for possession.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed the illegal drug and knowingly or intentionally possessed it to support a possession conviction.
State v. Bullock · filed 2000-06-14
To support a conviction for possession of narcotics, the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. La. R.S. 40:966; La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires the State to prove knowing and intentional possession of cocaine weighing more than twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams.
State v. Brown · filed 2000-07-12
To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the contraband, here cocaine in the amount of more than twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams. La. R.S. 40:967. Brown argues the state did not prove possession. However, the drugs were in his front pants pocket. Therefore, the State proved possession. Brown argues the State did not prove that he possessed at least twenty-eight grams. Krone testified that he weighed the substance and it weighed forty-four grams.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Subsection (C) prohibits knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine without a valid prescription or order from a practitioner acting in the course of professional practice.
State v. Myers · filed 2000-03-01(C)
The crime of possession of cocaine is the knowing and intentional possession of cocaine without a valid prescription or order from a practitioner while acting in the course of his profession. La. R.S. 40:967(C). In this case, McConnell discovered cocaine in a matchbox seized from the pocket of Myers' shirt. The jury obviously rejected Myers' claim that he found the box and his denial of knowledge of the contents. Considering Myers' exit from a known drug location, we find this conclusion to have been a reasonable one. When viewed in the light most favorable to the state, this evidence is sufficient to convict Myers of the crime of possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 makes knowing possession of cocaine an offense, so the State must prove both possession and guilty knowledge.
State v. Tassin · filed 2000-03-15
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the drug and that she knowingly possessed it.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knew he possessed it; possession of cocaine residue in a pipe supports conviction when the evidence establishes guilty knowledge.
State v. Rice · filed 2000-03-15
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly possessed it. ... The defendant admitted he was in possession of the pipe and that he knew there was crack cocaine residue in the pipe. The parties stipulated at trial that the residue in the pipe tested positive for cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed the illegal drug and knowingly possessed it; possession may be constructive when the drug is subject to the defendant’s dominion and control.
State v. Walker · filed 2000-05-17(C)
Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine. To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly possessed. La. R.S. 40:967(C). A person found in the area of illegal contraband can be considered in constructive possession if the illegal substance is subject to his dominion and control.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly or intentionally possessed it; guilty knowledge is an essential element.
State v. Bullock · filed 2000-06-14
To support a conviction for possession of narcotics, the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. La. R.S. 40:966; La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990). Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine weighing more than twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams for this charged offense.
State v. Brown · filed 2000-07-12
To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the contraband, here cocaine in the amount of more than twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams. La. R.S. 40:967.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed an illegal drug; discarding a bag containing cocaine after attempting to conceal it can establish knowing possession.
State v. Watkins · filed 2000-09-27
To support a conviction of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the state must prove the defendant possessed an illegal drug and that he did so | ¡¡knowingly. State v. Matthews, 552 So.2d 590 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989), writ denied, 559 So.2d 137 (La.1990). ... We believe that this evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine. Therefore, this assignment of error has no merit.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it; for attempted possession, conduct directly tending toward that intent suffices, and visible residue in a crack pipe can support the inference.
State v. Handy · filed 2001-01-24(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly possessed it. ... To prove attempt, the State must show that the defendant committed an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of his intent to possess cocaine. ... In the case at bar, Officers Noel and Stevens testified they saw the defendant with what appeared to be a pipe to his lips, and when he noticed them, he appeared startled and put the pipe and lighter down. When retrieved, the crack pipe was still warm and contained a visible residue. Such evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted possession of cocaine. The defendant's possession of a crack pipe with visible cocaine residue in it allows an inference that the defendant had the intent to attempt to possess cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and possession may be proven through circumstantial evidence such as cocaine residue in a crack pipe and conduct showing guilty knowledge.
State v. Knight · filed 2001-05-23(C)
La. R.S. 40:967(C) provides: "[I]t is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II ...." Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. ... To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must establish that the defendant was in possession of the drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed it. ... These facts are sufficient to prove attempted possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly or intentionally possessed it; knowledge and intent may be inferred from the circumstances.
State v. Jones · filed 2001-07-25(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed it. ... The elements of knowledge and intent need not be proven as facts, but may be inferred from the circumstances by the factfinder. ... Additionally, the fact that the defendant had the pipe to his mouth, was warm to the touch when retrieved, and contained wire mesh and cocaine residue, may have indicated to the jury that the defendant had the requisite intent to attempt to possess cocaine, even though no lighter or matches were recovered.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires the state to prove that the substance involved was cocaine, but scientific testing is not required when expert, lay, and circumstantial evidence establishes the substance's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Harris · filed 2003-05-20
In the instant case, as in J.W. and Hollis, the state failed to introduce scientific evidence that the substance was cocaine. However, we find that there was sufficient evidence presented, when considered in its entirety, to support a guilty verdict of the charged offense. The evidence presented clearly shows that the substance was packaged like cocaine and that defendant had on his person over $500.00, in denominations recognized by experts as those carried by those who distribute cocaine. Sergeant Wilson, a narcotics detective with ten years experience in the field and Lieutenant Jacques, an expert in the retail distribution of cocaine with over eleven years of experience in the field, identified the substance as cocaine. This evidence, coupled with the surveillance conducted on defendant on the date of the incident and in the days preceding the incident, provides direct and circumstantial evidence to support a rational trier of fact's conclusion that the substance seized by the detectives was, in fact, cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) does not make the date of the possession offense an essential element that the State must prove.
State v. Trotter · filed 2003-08-22(F)(1)(a)
Most importantly, the date is not essential to the crime of possession of Schedule II CDS. La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) makes knowing or intentional possession of cocaine an element of the offense and does not itself require an enhanced sentence to be served without parole.
State v. Bailey · filed 2004-05-26(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the substance. La.R.S. 40:967(C). ... Neither La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i), nor La.R.S. 40:967(C) provide that this enhanced sentence must be served without benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(F)(1)(c) requires proof that the defendant possessed at least 400 grams of cocaine and knowingly and intentionally possessed it; possession may be actual or constructive.
State v. Major · filed 2004-12-01(F)(1)(c)
The defendant in the instant case was charged with possession of cocaine in excess of 400 grams, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(c). ... Possession of narcotic drugs can be established by actual physical possession or by constructive possession.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly or intentionally possessed it; guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.
State v. Robinson · filed 2005-02-15(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that a defendant was in possession of the drug and that she knowingly or intentionally possessed it. La. R.S. 40:967(C); State v. Reyes, supra. Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of contraband. It is a state of mind that need not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant possessed cocaine knowingly and intentionally.
State v. Jones · filed 2005-04-26(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must present evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was in possession of cocaine and knowingly and intentionally possessed it. La. R.S. 40:967(C); State v. Sylvia, 01-1406, p. 3 (La.4/9/03), 845 So.2d 358, 361. Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of contraband. Since guilty knowledge is a state of mind, it need not be proven as fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
For a conviction under § 40:967(C), the state must prove that the defendant possessed cocaine and did so knowingly and intentionally.
State of Louisiana v. Marcus Quinn, Sr. · filed 2007-02-07(C)
In this matter, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of cocaine and that he knowingly and intentionally possessed it. See La.R.S. 40:967(C). Applying the Jackson standard to the record before us and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires the State to prove that the defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance and knowingly possessed it.
State v. DHILLY · filed 2008-11-19(C)
To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of R.S. 40:967, the State must prove that the defendant was 1) in possession of the illegal drug and 2) that he knowingly possessed the drug.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; a cocaine-possession conviction requires proof of possession and guilty knowledge.
State v. Mitchell · filed 2010-05-25(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the cocaine and that he knowingly possessed it.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that a defendant knowingly possessed cocaine, and possession may be constructive when the cocaine is subject to the defendant’s dominion and control.
State of Louisiana v. Jackson · filed 2010-06-02(A)(1)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was knowingly in possession of the illegal drug; and, to prove an attempt, the State must show that the defendant committed an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of his intent to possess cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it.
State v. Maldonado · filed 2012-12-11(C)
In order to support a conviction for possession of cocaine pursuant to La. R.S. 40:967, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of the cocaine and that he knowingly possessed it.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires the State to prove both possession of cocaine and knowing or intentional possession to obtain a conviction.
State v. Cox · filed 2013-12-12(C)
To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State is required to prove that defendant was in possession of the drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed it. La. R.S. 40:967(C); State v. Robinson, 04-964 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05), 896 So.2d 1115.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the substance and knowingly or intentionally possessed it.
State v. Gayton · filed 2015-01-28(C)
To support a conviction for possession of any illicit substance or object, the district attorney must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of the substance or object and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed it. See La. R.S. 40:967 C; La. R.S. 40:966 C; La. R.S. 40:1023 C.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Sentencing range for cocaine distribution
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
For possession with intent to distribute cocaine, subsection (B)(4) requires a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentence with the first five years served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine of up to $50,000.
State v. Griffin · filed 2001-12-05(B)(4)
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the first five years of the sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute be without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. ... (b) Distribution, dispensing, or possession with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense cocaine or cocaine base or a mixture or substance containing cocaine or its analogues as provided in Schedule 11(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964 shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. ... The trial court in the case sub judice, however, imposed an illegally lenient sentence of ten years at hard labor, with benefit of parole consideration.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(1) requires a person who violates its provision to be sentenced to five to thirty years of imprisonment at hard labor.
State v. Blanchard · filed 1997-10-29(B)(1)
La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1) states “any person who violates this provision shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years.” ... The trial court has wide discretion in imposing sentence, and a sentence imposed within statutory limits is not necessarily constitutionally excessive absent manifest abuse of discretion.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of a qualifying cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Sanders · filed 1999-05-19(B)(4)(b)
The trial court failed to specify that the first five years of each sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as required by LSA-R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b). When restrictions on parole, probation, and suspension of sentence are placed on a sentence by law and the trial judge fails to impose them, the sentence is "illegally lenient."Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires 5 to 30 years of hard labor for the offense, with the first five years served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Jones · filed 2000-03-01(B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides the applicable sentence which is "imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of said sentence being served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence...." The trial court did not order that the defendant serve the first five years of his sentence without benefit, and the state has not appealed this sentencing error. As such, we may not correct this illegality nor may we remand the matter for re-sentencing.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967 requires the first five years of a sentence for distribution of cocaine to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Harris · filed 2000-05-03
The sentence imposed on the distribution conviction is illegally lenient. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve twenty years at hard labor but failed to state that the first five years of the sentence was to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S. 40:967.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the methamphetamine-distribution minimum from five to two years; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight ranges. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(1) sets a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentencing range for distribution of methamphetamine.
State v. Watson · filed 2002-06-12(B)(1)
The prison sentence exposure for distribution of methamphetamine is a hard labor term of not less than five years nor more than thirty years. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1). ... Watson's ten year sentence at hard labor is well within the statutory limits for his guilty plea to count two, attempted distribution of methamphetamine. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1); La. R.S. 40:979(A).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).
For a 1998 cocaine-distribution offense, § 40:967(B)(4)(b) authorized five to 30 years' imprisonment, with only the first five years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Frazier · filed 2004-03-30(B)(4)(b)
The statute in effect at the time of the Defendant's offense in 1998 provided for a penalty ranging from five to 30 years of imprisonment, with only the first five years of the sentence being served without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) required five years of a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension, while making a fine of up to $50,000 optional.
State v. Jones · filed 2006-09-20(B)(4)(b)
The trial court sentenced Ms. Jones to ten years' imprisonment with the Department of Corrections, but did not impose the first five years of the sentence without parole[5]. However, this omission is cured by the operation of La. R.S. 15:301.1, and requires no correction on appeal. The trial court elected not to impose the optional fine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Subsection (A) provides a two-to-thirty-year imprisonment range for distribution of cocaine.
State of Louisiana v. Lemelle · filed 2006-09-27(A)
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(A) provides for imprisonment of no less than two years and no more than thirty years. Defendant was sentenced to one-half the possible term of imprisonment.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) makes 30 years the longest prescribed sentence for a first conviction of distribution of cocaine, which supplies the mandatory minimum for a fourth felony offender under the Habitual Offender Law.
State v. Zeigler · filed 2007-10-24(B)(4)(b)
Because Zeigler was convicted of distribution of cocaine, the mandatory minimum sentence that could be imposed upon him as a fourth felony offender was 30 years. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For distribution of cocaine, it sets imprisonment at hard labor for two to thirty years and requires the first two years to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State of Louisiana v. Jackson · filed 2009-05-06(B)(4)(b)
The defendant received a legal sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty as the incarceration sentencing range for distribution of cocaine is imprisonment at hard labor for two to thirty years, with the first two years being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Thus, the sentence is in the lower range for the offense charged, and the record suggests that the defendant is a third-felony offender.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For cocaine distribution under the version in effect on November 1, 2007, § 40:967(B)(4)(b) required only the first two years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Moore · filed 2009-08-26(B)(4)(b)
The version of La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) in effect at the time of the crime on November 1, 2007, provided that only the first two years of the sentence be imposed without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Accordingly, we will amend the sentence to set aside that portion which provides for a period in excess of two years to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(1) sets a two-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentence and a fine of up to $50,000 for distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.
State of Louisiana v. Davis · filed 2009-10-07(B)(1)
The defendant was convicted of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). The sentencing range for that offense is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years and a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For distribution of cocaine, § 40:967 requires only the first two years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Nickles · filed 2011-04-13(B)(4)(b)
La. R.S. 40:967 provides that only the first two years of a sentence for distribution of cocaine are to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Accordingly, we amend the defendant’s sentence to provide that only the first two years of the sentence are to be served without benefit of parole.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a 2-to-30-year hard-labor sentencing range for distribution of cocaine, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine up to $50,000.
State v. Palmer · filed 2012-09-20(B)(4)(b)
The penalty for a conviction of distribution of cocaine shall be a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 2 years nor more than 30 years, with the first 2 years of said sentence being without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, include a fíne of not more than $50,000. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). ... The sentences are squarely within the statutory ranges and far less than half of the possible maximum allowable sentences.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets cocaine-distribution punishment at two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine of up to $50,000.
State v. Davis · filed 2013-11-20(B)(4)(b)
According to La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), a person convicted of distribution of cocaine “shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.” ... Twenty years is within the sentencing range of two to 30 years, allowed by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides a two-to-thirty-year sentencing range for a violation of § 40:967(A)(1), distribution of cocaine.
State v. Celestain · filed 2014-07-30(B)(4)(b)
In this case, the statutory range for violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1), distribution of cocaine, is two to thirty years. See La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
For cocaine offenses involving distribution or possession with intent to distribute, Section 40:967(B)(4) requires two to thirty years at hard labor, with the first two years served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Dowell · filed 2016-08-10(B)(4)(a) and (B)(4)(b)
Ms. Dowell’s most recent conviction for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine carries a sentence of “imprisonment at hard labor for not less | fithan two years nor more than thirty-years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 40:967 B(4)(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
At the time of the offense, La. R.S. 40:967(C) authorized imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years for a conviction involving possession of cocaine.
State v. Stokes · filed 2016-12-07(C)
At the time the offenses were committed, a conviction under La. R.S. 14:95.1 carried a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; a conviction under La. R.S. 40:967(C) carried a term of imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years; and a conviction under La. R.S. 14:108.2 carried either a fine and/or a term of imprisonment with or without hard labor for not less than one year nor more than three years.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967 requires a cocaine-distribution sentence to be at hard labor for two to thirty years, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Brown · filed 2016-12-07
La. R.S. 40:967 provides that the penalty for distribution of cocaine is “a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” Therefore, the trial court did not impose a sentence in accordance with the statute since it did not specify that defendant’s original sentences were to be served at hard labor.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for its first two years.
State v. Gumms · filed 2018-03-14(B)(4)(b)
Here, the trial judge imposed defendant's enhanced sentence without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, ... but did not also restrict parole during the first two years of the sentence as required by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). Thus, the trial court imposed an illegally lenient sentence. ... Thus, the omission does not require corrective action.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole for the first two years and without probation or suspension for the entire sentence.
State v. Turner · filed 2018-11-28(B)(4)(b)
In resentencing defendant as a third felony offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the trial court failed to stipulate that defendant's sentence shall be served without benefit of parole for the first two years, and without the benefit of probation or suspension for the entirety of his sentence, in accordance with La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) and 15:529.1(G).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
State v. Kennon · filed 2019-05-22(B)(4)(b)
Second, the applicable version of the underlying offense statute, La. R.S. 40:967 (B)(4)(b), requires that the first two years of the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C)(1) applies when the quantity of cocaine possessed was not determined and authorizes imprisonment for up to two years plus a possible fine of up to $5,000.
State of Louisiana v. Solomon Burke Guillory, Jr. · filed 2022-03-09(C)(1)
Looking first to the nature of the crime, we note that this court held that Defendant must be sentenced under La.R.S. 40:967(C)(1), since the quantity of cocaine possessed was not determined. Guillory, 318 So.3d at 382. The sentencing range for possession of cocaine under this statute requires imprisonment for not more than two years and the possibility of a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C)(2) authorizes a sentence of one to five years, with or without hard labor, for the charged cocaine-possession offense.
State of Louisiana Versus Jesse Durant · filed 2025-02-26(C)(2)
For count three, La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2) provides for a sentencing range of not less than one year nor more than five years with or without hard labor. The trial court imposed the maximum term of imprisonment of five years at hard labor.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Maximum imprisonment and fine
Law changed since Acts 2018, No. 677 added specific fentanyl distribution penalties to § 40:967(B)(4); this ten-year maximum governs the earlier 2016 offense, not offenses subject to the later provision.
At the time of the offense, the maximum sentence for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl under Section 40:967(A) was ten years at hard labor.
State of Louisiana Versus Jontreal A. Fisher · filed 2020-12-23(A)
At the time of the offense, November 17, 2016, La. R.S. 40:967(A) provided for a penalty of imprisonment at hard labor for not more than ten years. Therefore, defendant’s sentence on count six is illegal ... because the twenty-year sentence on that count is higher than the maximum ten-year sentence set forth by the statute at the time of the offense.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967 authorizes a cocaine-distribution sentence of up to 30 years at hard labor and a fine, but default jail time for nonpayment cannot cause the sentence to exceed the statutory maximum.
State v. Fikes · filed 2012-06-20(A)(1)
However, this court recognizes that the default jail time imposed in the event that Fikes fails to pay the $30,000 fine causes the imposed sentence of 30 years to exceed the maximum 30 years allowed by La. R.S. 40:967. ... Here, Fikes was considered indigent by the trial court. Therefore, this court modifies Fikes’s sentence to delete the imposition of default jail time for failure to pay the fine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) and (G); the current statute uses § 40:967(D) for unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams. The cited former provision applies only to older offenses.
The cited provisions set a 30-year maximum term for the covered Schedule II cocaine offenses.
State v. Montgomery · filed 2010-01-27(B)(4)(b), (F)(1)(a)
However, according to La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) and La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a), the maximum term for either is 30 years.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(C)(2) sets a maximum sentence of five years for possession of cocaine.
State v. Jarreau · filed 2005-12-14(C)(2)
The longest possible sentence for the crime of possession of cocaine is not more than five years. La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2). Therefore, had he committed the crime of possession of cocaine after June 15, 2001, he would have been subject to a maximum sentence of ten years and to a minimum sentence of forty months.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a maximum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment at hard labor for a single count of distributing a Schedule II CDS.
State v. Lewis · filed 2008-12-10(B)(4)(b)
With regard to the second part of the analysis, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) allows for a maximum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment at hard labor for a single count of distribution of a Schedule II CDS.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(C)(2) authorizes up to five years' imprisonment, with or without hard labor, and permits an additional fine of up to $5,000 for cocaine possession.
State v. McCorkle · filed 1998-02-25(C)(2)
La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2) provides that any person convicted of possession of cocaine: ... shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years, and in addition, may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars. Here, the defendant was sentenced to five years at hard labor. No fine was imposed. ... First, while defendant received the maximum imprisonment allowed by La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2), he did not receive the ... maximum sentence allowed by this statute. The judge also could have imposed a fine of not more than five thousand dollars in addition to five years imprisonment.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(C) makes five years at hard labor the maximum prison term for simple possession of cocaine.
State of Louisiana v. Coys Thomas, Jr. · filed 2009-05-06(C)
Under La.R.S. 40:967(C), five years at hard labor is the maximum prison term allowable for simple possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Same change as noted above.
Section 40:967(C) sets a maximum prison term of five years at hard labor for simple possession of cocaine.
State v. Thomas · filed 2009-05-06(C)
Under La.R.S. 40:967(C), five years at hard labor is the maximum prison term allowable for simple possession of cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 authorizes a fine of up to $50,000 for the offense.
State v. Thompson · filed 2012-11-21
Although the statute of conviction, La. R.S. 40:967, authorizes a fine of up to $50,000, the statute of enhancement, |sLa. R.S. 15:529.1(A), does not authorize the imposition of a fine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Charging a distribution offense
Section 40:967 treats distribution of cocaine as an offense that is not punishable by death or life imprisonment.
Lewis v. Parish · filed 2017-01-11
Distribution of cocaine, under La. R.S. 40:967, is not punishable by death or life imprisonment and, therefore, may be instituted by a bill of information.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
For possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the correct statutory provision is § 40:967(A)(1), while subsection (G)'s special restrictions apply only to persons covered by subsection (F).
State of Louisiana v. Wilturner · filed 2010-05-05(A)(1)
The bill of information erroneously cited La.R.S. 40:967 “A1G” for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. The correct citation for that offense is La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). Subsection (G) of La.R.S. 40:967 provides special restrictions for those persons to whom subsection (F) applies. However, subsection (F) is not applicable to the present Defendant, thus, subsection (G) is likewise inapplicable.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A) prohibits several distinct activities involving Schedule II controlled substances, and a charging bill alleging distribution need not also allege dispensing.
State v. Gaines · filed 1998-02-25(A)
This bill of information alleged that defendant "violated R.S. 40:967 A in that he did knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled dangerous substance, to wit: Cocaine...." That language fully explains the offense with which defendant was charged. Moreover, the language is not misleading. The term "dispense" was not necessary to the bill, as the state alleged distribution, one of the various activities prohibited by the statute. Based on the foregoing, this assignment of error is without merit.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.
Section 40:967(F)(2)(a) is the proper provision for possessing more than 28 grams of methamphetamine, and citing the wrong provision in the charging bill is harmless when the defendant was not misled and the sentencing provisions are the same.
State v. Raborn · filed 2000-11-15(F)(2)(a)
Defendant did not challenge the misidentification of the charging article. While the amended bill does miscite the statute of the charged offense, the bill does correctly identify the drug as methamphetamine. The evidence shows that the contraband seized was in fact methamphetamine. The proper statute would have been La. R.S. 40:967(F)(2)(a). This, however, is harmless error. Defendant was not misled and the sentences provided for by both articles were the same in 1997.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 is not the proper statute for charging distribution of marijuana; that offense falls under Section 40:966(A).
State v. Deville · filed 1984-10-10
The defendant was erroneously charged under La.R.S. 40:967; he should have been charged under La.R.S. 40:966(A).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance
Section 40:967(A)(1) criminalizes possession with intent to distribute cocaine without requiring proof that the defendant possessed 28 to 200 grams; that quantity allegation corresponds to § 40:967(F)(2)(a).
State of Louisiana v. Bivens · filed 2011-10-05(A)(1), (F)(2)(a)
With regard to the remaining alleged error pertaining to the charge of possession with intent to distribute, Bivens incorrectly asserts that the bill of information charged him with the possession of 28 to 200 grams of cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(F)(2)(a). The bill of information charged Bivens with violating La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), possession with intent to distribute cocaine, which does not require proof that he possessed 28 to 200 grams of cocaine. Accordingly, there is no merit to this allegation of error.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to distribute, and § 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a two-to-thirty-year hard-labor range for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, with the first two years without benefits.
State v. Ceaser · filed 2009-11-04(A)(1), (B)(4)(b)
Likewise, under La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and La.R.S. 40:964(II)(A)(4), “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To ... possess with intent to ... distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II[,]” such as cocaine or a cocaine base. ... Under La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), the sentencing range for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is “a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.... ” Thus, the Defendant’s eighteen-year sentence at hard labor with the first two years to be served without benefits falls within the statutory sentencing range for the offense.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute it.
State v. Haley · filed 1998-03-06(A)(1)
In the present case, the testimony of Deputies Semmes and Kettler was sufficient to establish beyond, a reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed the cocaine in question. Furthermore, based on the quantity of crack cocaine found, fourteen rocks, Land the circumstances surrounding the Defendant’s arrest, a rational juror could have also concluded that the Defendant intended to distribute the cocaine.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and possession may be proved through the defendant's dominion and control rather than actual physical possession.
State v. Brooks · filed 1999-12-22C
La.R.S. 40:967 C makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II. Cocaine is listed in Schedule II(A)(4) of La.R.S. 40:964. The State need not show actual possession to obtain a conviction, but only that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal substance.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C)(2) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.
State v. Drummer · filed 1999-12-22(C)(2)
Defendant was charged with and convicted of possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2), which provides that "[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II...." Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. La. R.S. 40:964. To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must establish that the defendant was in possession of the drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed it.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Subsection (A) covers distribution of narcotics and possession with intent to distribute, either of which may serve as the predicate felony for felony manslaughter.
State v. Myers · filed 2000-05-12(A)
Violations of the Act include a variety of offenses, including distribution of narcotics, possession, and possession with the intent to distribute. La. R.S. 40:967(A), (C). ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lopez was aiding and abetting defendant in one or more of the following violations of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act: distribution of crack cocaine, possession of crack cocaine or possession with the intent to distribute.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Subsection (A)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute it.
State v. Jenkins · filed 2003-02-12(A)(1)
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(A)(1) provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o... possess with intent to ... distribute... a controlled dangerous substance ... classified in Schedule II." ... While the police officers could clearly have better assisted the trier of fact with a more thorough investigation, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have concluded that the state established the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Therefore, we find no merit in these assignments of error.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowing and intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and a cocaine-possession conviction requires proof of possession plus knowing or intentional possession.
State v. Holland · filed 2003-12-10(C)
La. R.S. 40:967(C), in part, prohibits the knowing and intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. La. R.S. 40:964, Schedule II(A)(4). To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the state must establish that the defendant was in possession of the drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed it.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; the required possession may be constructive, meaning the defendant exercises dominion and control with knowledge of the substance's presence.
State v. Carmack · filed 2005-06-29
Subject to limited exceptions, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:967. Cocaine is classified as a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. La. R.S. 40:964. To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly possessed the drug. To be guilty of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, one need not actually possess the contraband; constructive possession is sufficient to convict.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.
Section 40:967(C) authorizes a sentence of up to five years at hard labor and a fine of up to $5,000 for possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.
State v. Gill · filed 2008-01-09(C)
In the instant case, Defendant was convicted of one count of possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C). The sentence for possession of this controlled dangerous substance is not more than five years' imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of not more than $5,000.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance and intended to distribute it, which may be shown through constructive possession and circumstances such as quantity and packaging.
State v. Holden · filed 2010-01-27
The state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Holden knowingly or intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. With regard to each of the controlled substances, the state was able to show that the substances were found in the locker used by Holden to hold his possessions. When roused from his cell and told to gather his belongings, Holden independently removed the lockers to the hallway, evidencing his dominion over them. While Holden maintained two lockers, only the locker containing the drugs was locked. Several weeks prior to the discovery of the drugs, Holden had obtained a lock for use on the locker containing the contraband. Holden was seen locking the locker when departing his cell and unlocking it upon his return. It was reasonable for the jury to infer that Holden was aware that the contraband was in that locker. The quantity and packaging of the contraband was consistent with someone selling drugs, and inconsistent with personal use, and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude as much.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A)(1) covers manufacturing methamphetamine as a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.
State v. Mitchell · filed 2010-08-11(A)(1)
When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the state met its burden of proving the defendant was in fact guilty of manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). So considering, this assignment of error is without merit.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance without a valid prescription, and the offense may be proved through actual or constructive possession established by circumstantial evidence.
State v. Fontenot · filed 2012-02-22(C)
“It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess any controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription.” La. R.S. 40:967 C.5 The essential elements of the offense are that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed, actually or constructively, the substance methamphetamine. See State v. Sylvester, 10-1021, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 63 So.3d 288, 291.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A) prohibits knowing or intentional distribution or dispensing of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, while § 40:967(B)(4)(b) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of one with intent to distribute, which may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.
State ex rel. G.E. · filed 2012-05-16(A), (B)(4)(b)
La. Rev.Stat. 40:967(A) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.4 To prove distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, the state had to prove (1) delivery or physical transfer, (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous, substance at the time of transfer, and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. State v. Kanost, 99-1822, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/29/00), 759 So.2d 184, 187. ... La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. Intent to distribute can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the arrest.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with the specific intent to distribute it, and requires proof of both possession and specific intent to distribute.
State v. Wallace · filed 2015-12-23(A)(1)
Under La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute,, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II (cocaine, in this case). ... To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the State is required to prove both possession and specific intent to distribute it.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense it.
State v. Rapp · filed 2015-02-18(A)(1)
Under La. R.S. 40:967 A(l), “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II.”Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance without a valid prescription or other statutory authorization.
State v. Francis · filed 2017-01-11(C)
The elements of attempted possession of a CDS require a person to knowingly or intentionally do or omit an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of the possession of the CDS, without a valid prescription or in the absence of an enumerated professional practice. La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 40:967(C); La. R.S. 40:968(C).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, and § 40:967(B)(1)(b) provides a one-to-twenty-year hard-labor range when the Schedule II substance weighs 28 grams or more.
State of Louisiana v. Mister Ford · filed 2023-08-09(A)(1), (B)(1)(b)
He was convicted pursuant to La. R.S. 40:967, which in relevant part, provides: ... The defendant admitted that the methamphetamine found in his bedroom was indeed his. This admission alone constitutes sufficient evidence for possession. Furthermore, the circumstances corroborate that admission. ... Viewed as a whole, the five guns, two scales, numerous unused plastic baggies, $361 cash, and amount of methamphetamine worth as much as $3600, constitute sufficient proof that the defendant had intent to distribute. ... Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit and is rejected.Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Section 40:967(B)(4)(a) requires a sentence for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl to include a portion served without benefit of parole.
State of Louisiana v. Gregory Harville, Jr. · filed 2023-11-29(B)(4)(a)
First, the sentence imposed for possession with the intent to distribute fentanyl is illegally lenient because the trial court failed to impose any portion of the sentence without benefit of parole as required by La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(a).Read the full opinion on CourtListener →
Notes 451–600 of 744, oldest cases first.
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