La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it to sustain a possession conviction.

State v. Barker · filed 2009-09-29(C)

Likewise, in order to support a conviction of possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the cocaine and that the defendant knowingly possessed it.

Section 40:967(C)(2) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance, so the State must prove knowing possession.

State v. VanBuren · filed 2008-12-30(C)(2)

In the case at bar, Vanburen was convicted of possession of cocaine, which makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance. To convict an individual for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the state must prove that the accused knowingly possessed it.

Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance without a prescription or other authorization; concealment and attempted disposal of crack cocaine supported the required knowledge.

State of Louisiana v. Beaudion · filed 2009-12-23(C)

Further, Defendant’s attempt to conceal, then discard, the illicit substance shows Defendant was aware of the nature of the substance.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.

State v. Beaudion · filed 2009-12-23(C)

Further, Defendant’s attempt to conceal, then discard, the illicit substance shows Defendant was aware of the nature of the substance.

Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled substance without a valid prescription or other authorization; jury instructions that track this rule adequately state the law.

State v. Thibodeaux · filed 1996-12-11(C)

La.R.S. 40:967(C) provides: It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner, as provided in R.S. 40:978 while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this Part. ... It is readily apparent that the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the applicable law for possession of a Schedule II narcotic, as the instructions almost track the law as set forth above.

Section 40:967 A(1) makes production of marijuana unlawful when done with the specific intent to produce it; it does not require an intent to distribute or dispense, and the provision is not vague or ambiguous.

State v. Albert · filed 1983-04-05A(1)

Defendant argues that under La.R.S. 40:967 A (1) it is unlawful to produce marijuana only if such production is done with the intent to distribute or dispense it; in the alternative, if this interpretation is not correct, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. We find no merit to defendant's argument. The Legislature clearly intended to make the production of marijuana (with the specific intent to do so) unlawful, and we find no vagueness or ambiguity in the statute.

Subsection (C)(1) authorizes imprisonment with or without hard labor for up to two years and a fine of up to $5,000 for possession of methamphetamine weighing less than two grams.

State of Louisiana Versus Matthew F. Siekmann · filed 2025-02-05(C)(1)

Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine weighing less than two grams in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1). As such, the sentencing range was imprisonment with or without hard labor for up to two years. Additionally, the trial court could have imposed a fine of up to $5,000.

Section 40:967(A) treats distribution initiated in one parish through a third party for delivery elsewhere as a complete offense in each parish through which the controlled substance passes.

State v. Gentry · filed 1984-05-15(A)

In the instant case the trial court could reasonably conclude that the defendant “delivered” a controlled dangerous substance within Jefferson Parish via the imposition of the third party Associated Forwarders, Inc. who in turn transferred it to DHL Worldwide Courier Service in Jefferson Parish in furtherance of his attempt to have the drugs reach France. The presence of the cocaine in Jefferson Parish was a “continuing crime”, thus proper venue lies in any parish along its way. LSA-C. Cr.P. Article 611. Much like possession in several parishes would constitute a complete offense in each parish, distribution which initiates in one parish through a third party for delivery in some other parish constitutes a complete offense of distribution in each parish through which it passes.

Section 40:967(A) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and distribution can occur through a third party rather than only by direct physical transfer.

State v. Gentry · filed 1985-01-14(A)

The court of appeal was correct in their conclusion that the transfer of possession or control, i.e. distribution, is not limited to an actual physical transfer between the culpable parties. State v. Lewis, 328 So.2d 75 (La.1976). Rather, distribution may be accomplished by the imposition of a third party.

For a § 40:967 offense, the applicable penalty is the version in effect when the crime was committed; a later enhanced pentazocine-specific penalty cannot be applied retroactively.

State v. Bethley · filed 1984-06-26(B)(2)

It is well settled that defendant is to be tried and sentenced under the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the crime.

A later amendment increasing the penalty under § 40:967 cannot be used to impose a sentence beyond the penalty authorized when the offense was committed.

State v. Raheem · filed 1984-06-26(A)

Defendants also contend that the trial court relied on an amendment to the criminal statute which increased the length of sentence which may be imposed. Here the trial court did not impose a longer sentence because of the subsequent legislative amendment to the statute; the judge merely noted the legislative enactment. In any event, legislative action which increases or decreases the penalty for an offense after it was committed may be considered by a court as representing a legislative determination relative to the seriousness of the offense. State v. Schaeffer, 414 So.2d 730 (La.1982) (concurring opinion); State v. Phillips, 412 So.2d 1036 (La.1982); State v. Wright, 384 So.2d 399 (La.1980). The sentence imposed was within that authorized for the crime at the time of its commission.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine; constructive possession requires dominion and control, and mere presence or association is insufficient.

State v. Clay · filed 1996-03-06(C)

In order to convict a defendant for possession of cocaine under La.R.S. 40:967(C), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the cocaine. ... Constructive possession is sufficient to violate the prohibition against possession, and a person may be in constructive possession of a drug, even though not in physical possession, if it is subject to his dominion and control. ... However, the mere presence of an individual in an area where the drugs are found or the mere association with a person found to be in possession of the drugs is insufficient to constitute constructive possession. ... While the jury could have reasonably found that the defendant was aware of the medicine bottle and its contents as well as the drug sale, a rational fact finder could not have concluded that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the crack cocaine. Thus, we reverse the defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C) and order that he be discharged from further custody on that charge.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof of possession of the controlled substance and intent to distribute it; constructive possession may satisfy the possession element.

State v. Hall · filed 1992-06-24(A)(1)

Two elements must be proved to support Hall's conviction: (1) possession of the CDS and (2) intent to distribute it. La.R.S. 40:967 A(1); State v. Tyler, 544 So.2d 495 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989).

Section 40:967's possession prohibition can be satisfied by constructive possession; mere presence or association with a person controlling the drug is insufficient by itself.

State v. Papillion · filed 1990-02-07(C)

It is not necessary for a person to actually possess a controlled dangerous substance to violate the prohibition against possession thereof. Constructive possession is sufficient.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine; mere presence near drugs is insufficient to establish constructive possession.

State v. Holland · filed 2009-05-20(C)

Additionally, this Court has held that “mere presence in an area where drugs are found is insufficient to establish constructive possession.”

Section 40:967(C)(2) permits constructive possession when the evidence shows dominion and control over the drugs, assessed through factors including proximity, access, and relationship to the person in actual possession.

State v. Davidson · filed 2010-02-10(A)(1), (C)(2)

Applying the dominion and control factors, we agree with the trial court that the defendant constructively possessed the drugs.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it.

State v. Collins · filed 1991-07-30

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine in violation of La. R.S. 40:967, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the cocaine and that he knowingly possessed it.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the accused possessed the Schedule II substance, including through dominion or control rather than mere presence, and that possession with intent to distribute was accompanied by specific intent to distribute.

State v. Harvey · filed 1985-01-11

La.R.S. 40:967 prohibits the possession of a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II (unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription ...), and makes that crime a more serious violation when the possession is with intent to distribute. Further, La.R.S. 40:967 particularizes violations involving pentazocine. ... To convict defendant the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the drug with the intent to distribute the drug. The prosecution is not required to prove actual possession, but needs only to show that the defendant exercised dominion or control over the illegal substance. ... The mere presence of someone in the area where the controlled dangerous substance is found, or mere association with a person found to be in possession of the contraband, is insufficient to constitute constructive possession. ... There is no evidence, however, that she exercised dominion or control over the drugs. No rational trier of fact could have found this essential element of the crime to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Without proving this essential element the State cannot establish that Carolyn Harvey possessed talwin with the intent to distribute. We must reverse her conviction.

Section 40:967(C) makes possession of the listed controlled substance an offense, and possession may be constructive when the substance is subject to the accused's dominion and control.

State v. Sheppard · filed 1985-02-26(C)

Possession is an essential element of this crime. La.R.S. 40:967(C). Possession need only be constructive [State v. Little, 353 So.2d 255 (La.1977)] and constructive possession exists if the thing is subject to the dominion and control of the accused. State v. Cann, 319 So.2d 396 (La.1975).

Section 40:967(C) covers cocaine possession, and possession may be established by evidence that the accused attempted to exercise actual or constructive possession of the cocaine.

State v. Gultry · filed 1985-05-13(C)

In this case, we must therefore review the record to determine whether the evidence established that the defendant attempted to exercise actual or constructive possession of the cocaine. ... We therefore conclude that the overall evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to possess the cocaine in the envelope delivered to Clay.

Section 40:967 prohibits possession of a controlled dangerous substance when the defendant has constructive possession—dominion and control plus knowledge—even without physical possession.

State v. Hayes · filed 1986-05-12

Physical possession of a controlled dangerous substance is not required to violate the prohibition against possession; constructive possession is sufficient. ... Constructive possession exists if the thing is subject to the dominion and control of the accused and if he has knowledge of its presence even though it is not in his physical possession.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance and knowingly possessed it; constructive possession satisfies the possession requirement.

State v. Walker · filed 1987-10-07

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, the state must prove that the defendant was (1) in possession of the illegal drug and (2) that he knowingly possessed the drug. The state need not prove that a defendant was in actual physical possession of the drugs found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the controlled dangerous substance, and constructive possession is sufficient.

State v. Kingsmill · filed 1987-10-07

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:967, the state must prove that the defendant was (1) in possession of the illegal drug and (2) that he knowingly possessed the drug. The state need not prove that a defendant was in actual physical possession of the drugs found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the accused knowingly possessed a controlled substance, and constructive possession may satisfy the possession requirement when the accused exercised dominion or control over the substance.

State v. Love · filed 1988-04-06(C)

The essential elements of the crime of possession of controlled substances are that (1) the defendant had dominion and control over the illegal substance and (2) the defendant knowingly possessed it. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983). The prosecution is not required to prove actual possession, but need only show that the defendant exercised dominion or control over the illegal substance. State v. Walker, 369 So.2d 1345 (La.1979); State v. Norman, 434 So.2d 1291 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1983).

Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a controlled dangerous substance, which may be proved through constructive possession and inferred guilty knowledge.

State v. Newsome · filed 1988-11-09(C)

In the present case the fact that the cocaine was found in a mug belonging to defendant, and that the mug was found in a room regularly occupied by defendant alone, is evidence of constructive possession. The fact that the cocaine was in a packet and that there was a separate cutting agent located in another container in the same mug is additional evidence from which guilty knowledge may be inferred. Under these circumstances, a rational trier of fact could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine. The evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under the standard of review required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance and knowingly possessed it; constructive possession satisfies the possession requirement.

State v. Davis · filed 1989-12-28

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, the state must prove that the defendant was (1) in possession of the illegal drug, and (2) that he knowingly possessed the drug. The state need not prove that a defendant was in actual physical possession of the drugs found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.

Section 40:967's cocaine-possession offense may be proved through constructive possession; the State need not show actual physical possession.

State v. Marquez · filed 1989-12-28

On May 31, 1985 defendant, Caridad Marquez, was charged by bill of information (Case No. 308-251) with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (count one) and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (count two), violations of La.R.S. 40:967 and La.R.S. 40:966. ... In this case, the State was required to prove that the defendant possessed cocaine. The state *641need not prove the defendant was in actual physical possession of the drugs found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.

Section 40:967's possession offense may support an attempted-possession conviction when the State proves constructive possession, but mere proximity to cocaine residue and paraphernalia is insufficient to establish dominion and control.

State v. Jackson · filed 1990-02-15

The State need only establish constructive possession, rather than actual or attempted actual possession of the controlled substance, to support an attempted possession conviction. ... We conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that the defendant exercised any dominion or control over the objects which had residue and traces of cocaine.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that a defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed cocaine or knowingly or intentionally possessed it with intent to distribute; actual possession is unnecessary when the defendant exercised dominion and control over the substance.

State v. Carouthers · filed 1992-11-04A(1)

In order for the state to obtain a conviction, it must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In regard to the charge of distribution of cocaine, La.R.S. 40:967 reads in pertinent part as follows: ... Thus, the state had to prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed cocaine to obtain a conviction. ... In regard to the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967A(1) set forth above, the state had to prove the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine with intent to distribute in order to obtain a conviction. The prosecution is not required to show actual possession in order to convict. The state need only show that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal substance. ... What must be shown is that the defendant had a direct right and ability to exercise control. ... The prosecution proved that the defendant was in constructive possession of the narcotics.

For cocaine possession under § 40:967(C), the State must prove knowing possession, and constructive possession can satisfy the possession element.

State v. Ruffin · filed 1996-08-28C

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the cocaine and that he knowingly possessed it. ... One does not need to be in actual possession of a controlled dangerous substance to support a conviction; constructive possession is sufficient to convict.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally had actual or constructive possession of cocaine.

State v. Washington · filed 1997-01-15(C)

In order to convict the defendant of possession of over four hundred grams of cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C) & (F)(1)(c), the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had actual or constructive possession of cocaine weighing in excess of four hundred grams.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine and intended to distribute it; constructive possession may satisfy the possession element when the drug is subject to the defendant's dominion and control.

State v. Brown · filed 1997-04-09

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, the State needed to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed cocaine. In order to prove possession, the State is not obligated to prove actual possession, but rather such conviction may be supported by a showing of constructive possession. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983); State v. Jackson, 557 So.2d 1034 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990). The defendant’s presence in the area where the drug is found, or the mere fact that the defendant knows the person in actual possession, is insufficient to prove constructive possession. Trahan; Jackson. However, a person may be considered to be in constructive possession if the illegal substance is subject to his dominion and control, or if he willfully and knowingly shares with another person in actual possession of a drug the right to control the drug. Trahan.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and specifically intended to distribute it; possession may be constructive only when the drug is subject to the defendant's dominion and control and he knows it exists.

State v. Douglas · filed 1998-02-25(A)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine requires the state to show the defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance with specific intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Elzie, 343 So.2d 712 (La.1977). The element of possession may be established by showing that the defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the substance. State v. Young, 618 So.2d 1149 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). In this case, there was no evidence that the defendant had actual possession of the cocaine; therefore, the state was required to prove that he constructively possessed the drugs. For a person to constructively possess a drug, it must be subject to his dominion and control, and he must have knowledge of its existence. State v. Martin, 29,352 (La.App.2d Cir. 5/13/97), 694 So.2d 1209.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that a defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it; possession may be constructive when the drug is subject to the defendant's dominion and control.

State v. Walker · filed 2000-05-17(C)

Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine. To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly possessed. La. R.S. 40:967(C). A person found in the area of illegal contraband can be considered in constructive possession if the illegal substance is subject to his dominion and control.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute; possession may be constructive when the substance is within the defendant’s dominion or control, and intent to distribute may be proved from the circumstances, including quantity and actual distribution.

State v. Scott · filed 2000-06-07(A)(1)

Thus, we find the evidence supports a finding that the defendant had constructive possession of the crack cocaine, in that he had knowledge that the drugs were in the refrigerator and that he exercised dominion and control over the drugs by padlocking it shut and maintaining the key. Moreover, we find the evidence sufficient to prove the defendant's intent to distribute the drugs.

Section 40:967 permits a cocaine-possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knowingly exercises dominion and control over the drug, including joint control shared with another.

State v. Ballansaw · filed 2000-09-06

To support a conviction for possession of narcotics, the State must prove that a defendant knowingly possessed narcotics. ... The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support conviction. ... A person not in physical possession of narcotics may have constructive possession when the drugs are under that person’s dominion and control. ... A person may be deemed to be in joint possession of a drug which is in the physical possession of another if he willfully and knowingly shares with the other the right to control it.

Section 40:967 prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled dangerous substance, and possession may be constructive rather than physical when the defendant exercises dominion and control over the drug.

State v. Toups · filed 2002-10-15

Toups was charged with possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967, which makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance. The State need not prove that the defendant was in physical possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction. ... However, it is well settled that the mere presence in an area where drugs are located or the mere association with one possessing drugs does not constitute constructive possession. ... A determination of whether there is "possession" sufficient to convict depends on the peculiar facts of each case. Factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant exercised dominion and control sufficient to constitute constructive possession include his knowledge that drugs were in the area, his relationship with the person found to be in actual possession, his access to the area where the drugs were found, evidence of recent drug use, and his physical proximity to the drugs.

Section 40:967(C) permits a possession conviction based on constructive possession, requiring dominion and control or joint possession of the controlled dangerous substance and guilty knowledge.

State of Louisiana v. Magdaleno · filed 2003-10-01(C)

Regarding the charge of possession, the State is not required to prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the cocaine; instead, the defendant may be found to have been in constructive possession. ... If the State’s case is premised upon constructive possession, the State must prove that the controlled dangerous substance was within the defendant’s dominion and control or in his joint possession. ... In addition, the State must prove the defendant’s guilty knowledge.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the controlled dangerous substance; constructive possession can suffice, but mere presence does not.

State v. Toups · filed 2003-10-08(C)

The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967, which makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance. To convict for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed it. ... The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support conviction. ... However, mere presence in an area where drugs are found is insufficient to establish constructive possession. ... While any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant had knowledge of the cocaine and crack pipes on the coffee table, there was no evidence from which any rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband was subject to the defendant’s dominion and control at the point when police entered. ... There is merit to this assignment of error. Consequently, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are hereby vacated.

Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing cocaine, and constructive possession may be established through evidence showing sufficient dominion and control even when the defendant was not in physical possession.

State v. Lee · filed 2003-12-09(C)

According to LSA-R.S. 40:967(C), it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess cocaine. ... The mere presence of the defendant in the area where a controlled dangerous substance is found is insufficient to constitute constructive possession. ... A person who is not in physical possession of drugs may have constructive possession when the drugs are under that person's dominion and control. ... It is not necessary to prove that each and every factor was present, and further, our review shows that several of the factors were met: Lee knew the driver, as he lived across the street from him, and Lee had access to the area where the drugs were found. These facts, along with the evidence discussed above, show that Lee exercised sufficient dominion and control so as to constitute constructive possession of the cocaine.

Section 40:967 defines possession broadly to include actual and constructive possession, including joint possession when a person knowingly shares control of the drug.

State v. Manning · filed 2004-03-12

The term possession in La. R.S 40:967 is broad enough to encompass both actual and constructive possession.

Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly and intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and constructive possession is sufficient when the substance is subject to the defendant’s dominion and control with knowledge of its presence.

State v. Mingo · filed 2007-09-19(C)

La. R.S. 40:967(C), in part, prohibits one from “knowingly and intentionally” possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. ... The knowing and intentional possession of cocaine is a general intent crime. ... To be guilty of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, one need not actually possess the contraband. Constructive possession is sufficient to convict. Constructive possession is defined as having an object subject to one’s dominion and control, with knowledge of its presence, even though it is not in one’s physical possession. ... Mere presence in the area where narcotics are discovered is insufficient to support a finding of possession. However, the fact finder may draw reasonable inferences based upon the evidence presented at trial. ... Thus, with this general intent crime of possession, the evidence must show that the defendant must have averted to the fact that he had the cocaine within his dominion and control.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it; possession may be actual or constructive.

State v. Thompson · filed 2009-09-29(C)

In order to support a conviction of possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the cocaine and that the defendant knowingly possessed it. La. R.S. 40:967(C); ... The element of possession may be established by showing that the defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the drug. ... We find the evidence presented by the State was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the cocaine, constituting constructive possession.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it, which may be established through constructive possession.

State of Louisiana v. Messick · filed 2009-10-07(C)

To support a conviction of possession of cocaine, the State of Louisiana was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of cocaine and that he knowingly possessed it. La.R.S. 40:967.

Section 40:967 requires proof that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled substance, and constructive possession based on dominion and control is sufficient.

State v. Every · filed 2010-03-24(F)(1)(b)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:967, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug. ... The state need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support the conviction. ... A person not in physical possession of narcotics may have constructive possession when the drugs are under that person’s dominion and control. ... Determination of whether a defendant had constructive possession depends on the circumstances of each case. ... In determining whether a defendant exercised the requisite dominion and control, factors which may be considered are his knowledge that illegal drugs are in the area, his relationship with one found to be in actual possession, his access to the area where drugs were found, his physical proximity to the drugs and the evidence that the area was frequented by drug users.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute it; constructive possession satisfies possession when the defendant had knowledge of the drug and dominion and control over it.

State of Louisiana v. Hollier · filed 2010-04-07(A)

In order to convict a defendant for possession of a CDS with the intent to distribute pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:967(A), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the CDS and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. ... The defendant need not be in actual possession of the contraband if the state can prove that he had constructive possession of it, which means that he had knowledge of its presence and “dominion and control” over it.

Section 40:967 requires the State to prove knowing and intentional possession, and constructive possession satisfies the possession element.

State v. Sylvester · filed 2011-03-30

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:967, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug. ... The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support the conviction. ... A person not in physical possession of narcotics may have constructive possession when the drugs are under that person’s dominion and control. ... Determination of whether a defendant had constructive possession depends on the circumstances of each case.

Subsection (C) requires knowing and intentional possession of cocaine; possession may be actual or constructive, with constructive possession requiring dominion and control.

STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS ERIC DARELL COSEY AKA HENRY CARTER AKA KENDRICK CARTER · filed 2012-02-01(C)

The Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:497. Accordingly, the State had to show that the Defendant knowing and intentionally possessed cocaine. ―Possession of narcotic drugs can be established by actual physical possession or by constructive possession. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La.1983).‖ State v. Major, 03-3522, p. 7 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 798, 802. ... There is no evidence in the record to show the Defendant was in actual physical possession of cocaine. The police did not recover the substance from his mouth or body, nor did the police test the white residue remaining on the Defendant‘s mouth after he swallowed the substance. The only evidence of cocaine possession, constructive possession, was the cocaine found on the floorboard of the driver‘s side of the vehicle. Accordingly, the evidence that he had a substance in his hand before putting it in his mouth and swallowing it showed he was guilty of obstruction of justice only, not actual physical possession of cocaine.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed cocaine and knowingly possessed it; possession may be actual or constructive, including when the drug is subject to the defendant's dominion and control.

State v. Kenner · filed 2012-12-11(C)

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine under La. R.S. 40:967(C), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in possession of the cocaine and. that he knowingly possessed it. State v. Ruffin, 96-226 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/28/96), 680 So.2d 85. The element of possession may be established by showing that the defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the |ssubstance. A person may be in constructive possession of a drug even though it is not in his physical custody, if it is subject to his dominion and control. Id. In determining whether a defendant exercised dominion and control sufficient to constitute constructive possession, courts have considered the following factors: (1) his knowledge that drugs were in the area, (2) his relationship with the person found to be in actual possession, (3) his access to the area where the drugs were found, (4) evidence of recent drug use, and (5) his physical proximity to the drugs. State v. Robinson, 11-12, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/29/11), 87 So.3d 881, 893.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled dangerous substance, and constructive possession through dominion and control satisfies possession.

State v. Hayes · filed 2013-01-23

Addressing the issue of dominion and control, to support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:967 and La. R.S. 40:966, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug. State v. Perron, 01-*3640214, p. 6, (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/16/02), 806 So.2d 924, 928. The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support the conviction. Perron, 01-0214, p. 6, 806 So.2d 924, 928, citing State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La.1983). A person not in physical possession of narcotics may have constructive possession when the drugs are under that person’s dominion and control.

Section 40:967 permits a possession conviction without proof of actual physical possession; constructive possession suffices, provided the defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine, and the statute also covers possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II substance.

State v. Lewis · filed 2013-09-25(F)(l)(a) (A)(1)

The state need not prove that the defendant was in actual physical possession of the drugs found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the specific intent to distribute it, and possession may be constructive when the cocaine is under the defendant’s dominion and control.

State v. Smith · filed 2017-08-30(A)

In this case, Defendant challenges his conviction on count nineteen, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967. To prove that offense, the State was required to show that Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. ... Possession can be either “actual” or “constructive.” ... Although Defendant was not found in actual possession of the cocaine on November 18, 2013, we find he was at least in constructive possession. A person not in physical possession of a drug may have constructive possession when the contraband is under the person’s dominion and control.

Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the controlled substance and intended to distribute it, which may be shown through constructive possession.

State of Louisiana v. Arnold · filed 2019-08-14(A)(1)

To convict a defendant of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the contraband and that he did so with the intent to distribute it. ... The State need not prove the defendant actually possessed the drugs, as evidence of constructive possession is sufficient. ... Constructive possession is established by evidence that the drugs were within the defendant’s dominion and control and that the defendant had knowledge of its presence.

Sections 40:967(F) and 40:967(A) permit the possession element to be established through constructive possession, shown by dominion and control even without physical custody.

State of Louisiana Versus Eric Richardson · filed 2019-09-04(F), (A)

In Louisiana, the element of possession may be established by showing defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the substance. State v. Lewis, 04-1074 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/6/05), 916 So.2d 294, writ denied, 05-2382 (La. 3/31/06), 925 So.2d 1257. A person not in physical possession of the drug is considered to be in constructive possession of the drug, even though the drug is not in his physical custody, when it is under that person’s dominion and control. Id. ... Defendant’s admissions, coupled with his access to the area where the drugs were found, defendant’s prior drug activities, and existence of paraphernalia, are sufficient to satisfy the possession element of the charged offenses. Thus, based on the testimony presented at trial and the factors discussed in Lewis, supra, we find that the State produced sufficient evidence to show defendant constructively possessed the drugs found in his backyard and, therefore, find the evidence is sufficient under the Jackson standard to support the convictions.

Section 40:967 covers constructive possession as well as actual possession of a drug.

State of Louisiana Versus Kevin Barker · filed 2019-12-11(A)

The term “possession” in La. R.S. 40:967 is broad enough to encompass both actual and constructive possession.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, while § 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing one absent authorization.

State v. Green · filed 1996-12-10(A)(1), (C)

To be convicted of possession of cocaine under La. R.S. 40:967(C), the state must show that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine. ... However, in order to convict of distribution of cocaine under La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), the prosecution is not required to show actual possession; it need only establish general criminal intent and show that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal substance. ... The two offenses are not the same for double jeopardy purposes under Blockburger.

Section 40:967(C)'s cocaine-possession offense is subsumed within La. R.S. 14:95(E), so a defendant convicted under 14:95(E) cannot be subsequently prosecuted or punished for the same possession offense.

State v. Warner · filed 1995-03-16(C)

Under the Blockburger analysis, the elements of La.R.S. 40:967(C) are clearly subsumed into the provisions of La.R.S. 14:95(E) in its entirety. Thus, when the defendant plead guilty to having violated La.R.S. 14:95(E) he admitted his guilt to possession of cocaine. Additionally, the very bootstrap which converted a misdemeanor into a felony (with a much more severe sentencing scheme than that for the possession of cocaine charge) required the use of the same evidence as would the impermissibly charged second offense. Constitutional and statutory prohibitions protect the defendant from punishment for the La.R.S. 14:95(E) charge and subsequent punishment for the cocaine charge.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unless authorized by the statute, and requires the State to prove those elements.

State v. Franks · filed 1986-02-05(A)(1)

Accordingly, it was necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.

Section 40:967's possession offense may be proved by actual or constructive possession; constructive possession requires dominion and control, guilty knowledge is essential, and the statute is not a recidivist statute.

State v. Collins · filed 1986-09-12

Constructive possession as well as actual possession of an illegal substance, satisfies the possession element of La.R.S. 40:967. Constructive possession exists when the contraband is subject to the defendant’s dominion and control. Guilty *334knowledge is an essential element of the crime of unlawful possession of an illegal drug. ... La.R.S. 40:967, however, is not a recidivist statute.

Section 40:967(C) makes the prescription exception relevant only to Schedule II drugs capable of being prescribed, so cocaine possession does not require proof that the defendant lacked a prescription.

State v. Johnson · filed 1987-09-23(C)

It is apparent that La.R.S. 40:967(C) refers to Schedule II drugs which are capable of being prescribed, not Schedule II drugs per se. Defendant makes no allegation that cocaine is a prescription drug. This assignment of error is without merit.

Section 40:967(A) requires knowing or intentional distribution of cocaine; general criminal intent is established by voluntary distribution, and a defendant may be convicted as a principal when he aids and abets another's distribution.

State v. Parker · filed 1988-11-22(A)

A defendant is guilty of the charged crime if he knowingly or intentionally distributes cocaine. La.R.S. 40:967(A). Only general criminal intent is required. See State v. Banks, 307 So.2d 594, 596 (La. 1975). Such intent is established by mere proof of voluntary distribution. State v. Williams, 352 So.2d 1295, 1296 (La.1977). ... A defendant may be guilty as a principal in the crime of distribution if he aids and abets in the distribution or directly or indirectly counsels or procures another to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. La.R.S. 14:24; 40:967; State v. Hutchins, 502 So.2d 606, 608 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1987).

Section 40:967(A)(1) makes knowing or intentional distribution of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unlawful, and distribution requires only general criminal intent.

State v. Jones · filed 1991-10-02(A)(1)

As the statute indicates, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant distributed a substance which is classified under Schedule II as a controlled dangerous substance. Distribution of a controlled dangerous substance requires only general criminal intent.

Section 40:967(A)(1) does not require proof that an active methamphetamine laboratory was operating at the defendant’s residence; participation in manufacturing may be established through circumstantial evidence.

State of Louisiana v. Arnold · filed 2013-11-06(A)(1)

There need not be an active lab at Defendant‟s residence in order to find him guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. ... Based on Defendant‟s remarks and the evidence of two prior methamphetamine cooks at his residence, Defendant‟s conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine is affirmed.

Section 40:967(A)(1) applies to attempted manufacture of a controlled dangerous substance when the evidence shows the defendant participated in the production operation.

State v. Kalathakis · filed 1989-04-19(A)(1)

Kalathakis, as a principal pursuant to La.R.S. 14:24, is criminally liable for the felony of attempted manufacturing of a controlled dangerous substance. ... The State sufficiently proved each element of attempted manufacturing so that any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:967 prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.

State v. Williams · filed 1989-12-06

The unequivocal testimony of the undercover agent, Fields, was that defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed cocaine, a Schedule II CDS. 1) to ... distribute, or dispense ... a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II; ..." The unequivocal testimony of the undercover agent, Fields, was that defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed cocaine, a Schedule II CDS. Fields asked for "a half", which he testified means one-half gram of cocaine, and he received cocaine. Defendant left the parking lot where he met Fields and returned in a few minutes with a package of cocaine which he handed to Fields. The forensic chemist who chemically analyzed the substance determined it was cocaine. Cocaine is listed under Schedule II, La.R.S. 40:964, as a controlled dangerous substance.

Section 40:967(A) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile distributed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, such as cocaine.

State ex rel. Babineaux · filed 1990-09-20(A)

In order to obtain a conviction under La.R.S. 40:967(A), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed a delinquent act by distributing a substance which is classified under Schedule II as a controlled dangerous sub*695stance; in this case, cocaine.

Section 40:967(C)(2) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine; guilty knowledge is an essential element and may be inferred from the circumstances.

State v. Jones · filed 1989-09-28(C)(2)

By his final assignment, defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden to prove that defendant "knowingly or intentionally" possessed cocaine, as is required by La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2). Louisiana courts have consistently held that guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession. State v. Knight, 298 So.2d 726 (1974); State v. Edwards, 354 So.2d 1322 (La.1978). Guilty knowledge and intent, though questions of fact, need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. La.R.S. 15:445.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides for a discretionary fine for distribution of cocaine.

State v. Nixon · filed 2017-05-19(B)(4)(b)

On the other hand, because the penalty provision for distribution of marijuana, La. R.S. 40:966(B)(3), provides for a mandatory fíne, and the penalty provision for distribution of cocaine, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), only provides for a discretionary fine, we conclude that the $15,000 fíne was imposed for one of the counts of distribution of marijuana.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a maximum fine of $50,000 for distribution of cocaine.

State v. Robinson · filed 2015-04-15(B)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that the maximum fine that may be imposed for distribution of cocaine is $50,000.00.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the controlled dangerous substance, and constructive possession may satisfy the possession requirement when the substance is subject to the defendant's dominion and control or is jointly possessed.

State v. Preston · filed 1990-10-11

"To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, the state must prove that the defendant was (1) in possession of the illegal drug and (2) that he knowingly possessed the drug. The state need not prove that a defendant was in actual physical possession of the drugs found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction. (citation omitted)

Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, including cocaine, and permits possession to be established constructively through dominion and control together with guilty knowledge.

State v. King · filed 1992-06-18(C)

The defendant was also convicted under R.S. 40:967(C) which states in part, "It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II...." The elements of the crime of possession of cocaine are: 1) knowingly or intentionally 2) possessing 3) cocaine. State v. Desdunes, 576 So.2d 520 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990), writ granted and transferred by 577 So.2d 1011 (La.1990). ... We find the defendant had the requisite guilty knowledge as to the crack pipe in her purse. She had constructive possession of the cocaine due to her dominion and control. See Chambers, at 581.

Section 40:967(C)(2) requires proof that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled dangerous substance; constructive possession is sufficient.

State v. Lyles · filed 1993-03-30(C)(2)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled substance. The state need not prove that the defendant was in actual physical possession of the drug found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.

Subsection (C) requires proof that the accused knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and possession may be proved by cocaine residue.

State v. McMooain · filed 1996-09-27(C)

La.R.S. 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant "knowingly or intentionally" possesses a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II. ... Defendant in the present case could be convicted for possession of cocaine using only evidence of the crack cocaine residue found in the pipe on his person.

Subsection (C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unless it was obtained by prescription or order, or is otherwise authorized, and the State must prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Veazie · filed 1996-11-06(C)

In order for the State to obtain a conviction, it must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. La.R.S. 40:967(0 provides in pertinent part: C. It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner, as provided in R.S. 40:978 while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this Part. UDefendant claims the State did not prove he possessed the cocaine. We disagree.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that a person knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance, and possession of a pipe containing cocaine residue may support that finding.

State v. Gaines · filed 1997-01-29(C)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (cocaine), the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. La.R.S. 40:967; State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990). ... Once the jury rejected defendant's claim that he was not in possession of the pipe, the issue becomes whether defendant had the requisite knowledge under R.S. 40:967. ... In the instant case the defendant ran when he saw the officers approaching him. Although part of this could be attributable to his wanted status and his possession of the gun, the jury could have also found that this action was partially due to his possession of the pipe containing the drug residue. In addition, one officer testified without contradiction as to the purpose of the pipe. See, State v. Spates, supra. At trial the appellant did not argue that the residue was so small that he could not have known it was in the pipe; instead, his defense was that one of the officers falsely told the others that he found the pipe on him while he was still sitting in the police care outside the police station. Given these factors, it appears the jury could have disbelieved the appellant's story, found beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed the glass pipe as well as the cocaine residue inside it. This assignment is without merit.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine knowingly or intentionally; possession of even a slight amount may suffice, with the amount bearing on guilty knowledge.

State v. Lewis · filed 1998-03-06(C)

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. La. R.S. 40:967; ... Although a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance can stand on the possession of the slightest amount of the drug, the amount of the substance will have some bearing on the defendant's guilty knowledge. ... As in Jones and Spates, the possession at issue in the present case is actual physical possession rather than constructive possession as in Trahan. ... Accordingly, we conclude that evidence as to the pipe's limited use was available for the jury's consideration. This assignment lacks merit.

Section 40:967(C) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance, and possession may be established constructively; conduct tending directly toward possession may support an attempted-possession conviction.

State v. Montgomery · filed 1999-01-27(C)

It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance. La.R.S. 40:967(C). An individual who does or omits an act tending directly toward possessing cocaine can be found guilty of attempted possession. However, an attempt is a separate but a lesser grade of the intended crime. A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, even though it appears at trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt. La.R.S. 14:27. ... After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the contraband found was either constructively possessed by the Defendant or that he was attempting to possess the cocaine, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the controlled dangerous substance; actual possession is unnecessary because constructive possession can suffice, but mere presence where drugs are found does not.

State v. Allen · filed 2001-05-09(C)

To convict for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed it. ... The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support conviction. ... However, mere presence in an area where drugs are found is insufficient to establish constructive possession.

Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled dangerous substance and permits conviction based on constructive possession, but mere presence where drugs are found is insufficient.

State v. Toups · filed 2001-05-23(C)

The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967, which makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance. To convict for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed it. ... The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support conviction. ... However, mere presence in an area where drugs are found is insufficient to establish constructive possession.

Section 40:967 permits a possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knowingly exercises dominion and control over the narcotics; mere presence where the narcotics are found is not enough.

State v. Barthe · filed 2001-12-27

To support a conviction for possession of narcotics, the State must prove that a defendant knowingly possessed narcotics. ... The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support the conviction. ... The mere presence of a defendant in the area where the narcotics were found is insufficient to prove constructive possession. ... A person not in physical possession of narcotics may have constructive possession when the drugs are under that person's dominion and control.

Section 40:967 requires proof of knowing and intentional possession of the controlled dangerous substance, and constructive possession is sufficient to meet that requirement.

State v. Perron · filed 2002-01-16

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the contraband, here cocaine in the amount of at least twenty-eight but less than two hundred grams. La. R.S. 40:967. The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support conviction.

Section 40:967's term “possession” includes actual and constructive possession, but mere presence where drugs are located or association with a drug possessor is not constructive possession; constructive possession may be found when the drugs are under the person's dominion and control.

State v. Brisban · filed 2002-02-26(C)

The term "possession" in La. R.S. 40:967 is broad enough to encompass both actual and constructive possession. State v. Blanchard, 99-3439 (La.1/18/01), 776 So.2d 1165; State v. Sandifer, 95-2226 (La.9/5/96), 679 So.2d 1324. It is settled, however, that the mere presence in an area where drugs are located or the mere association with one possessing drugs does not constitute constructive possession. State v. Harris, 94-0970 (La.12/8/94), 647 So.2d 337; State v. Bell, 566 So.2d 959 (La.1990). Constructive possession may be found where the material is not in a person's physical possession, but is under his dominion and control.

Section 40:967(C) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.

State v. Frith · filed 2008-04-29(C)

In the present case, the Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. La. R.S. 40:967(C) provides in pertinent part that "it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II...." Cocaine is classified as a Schedule II drug under La. R.S. 40:964(A)(4). ... The State proved through the testimony of law enforcement officers that the Defendant had constructive possession of the firearm and the cocaine. ... Thus, considering the foregoing, we find that the Defendant's admission to ownership of the firearms and cocaine found in his residence, coupled with the other evidence, was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed a firearm and cocaine, and, therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the Defendant's convictions.

Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly and intentionally possessing a controlled dangerous substance, and constructive possession may satisfy the possession element when the drug is subject to the defendant’s dominion and control or knowingly jointly controlled.

State of Louisiana v. Johnson · filed 2009-11-04(C)

The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine, which makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance. The State is not required to prove that the defendant was in physical possession of the drug found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute it, and constructive possession may be shown through dominion and control over the drugs.

State v. Russell · filed 2011-08-17(A)(1)

It is unlawful for a person knowingly or intentionally to “produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance * * * classified in Schedule II.” La. R.S. 40:967 A(1). Possession of a controlled dangerous substance may be established by actual physical possession or by constructive possession. State v. Major, supra. Constructive possession depends on dominion and control over the drugs, even in the absence of physical possession. State v. Harris, 94-0970 (La.12/8/94), 647 So.2d 337. Mere presence in an area where drugs are located or mere association with one possessing drugs does not constitute constructive possession, but the courts consider various factors to determine whether a defendant exercised sufficient dominion and control to constitute constructive possession, including (1) his knowledge that drugs were in the area, (2) his relationship with the person, if any, found to be in actual possession, (3) his access to the area where the drugs were found, (4) evidence of recent drug consumption, and (5) his physical proximity to the drugs. State v. Toups, 2001-1875 (La.10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910; State v. Douglas, supra. A person may be deemed to be in joint constructive possession of drugs that are in the physical control of a companion, if he willingly and knowingly shares with that person the right to control them. State v. Toups, supra; State v. Jenkins, 41,281 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/07), 949 So.2d 563, writ denied, 2007-0699 (La.11/2/07), 966 So.2d 600.

Section 40:967(A) prohibits knowingly or intentionally producing or manufacturing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; a cocaine-base manufacturing conviction is supported when the evidence permits a rational jury to find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Chaisson · filed 2009-10-07(A)

Defendant is contesting his conviction for manufacturing a cocaine base in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A), which states in part: “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce [or] manufacture, ... a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II.” ... Given Ms. Prejean’s denial of using the microwave to cook cocaine base and Defendant’s admission that the other drugs in the kitchen belonged to him, when the |12evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the ciime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Section 40:967 permits conviction for possession of cocaine or methamphetamine when the State proves actual or constructive possession, including dominion and control over the substance.

State of Louisiana v. Cedric Charles Edwards AKA Cederic C. Edwards · filed 2013-02-06

Possession of narcotic drugs can be established by actual physical possession or by constructive possession. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La.1983). A person can be found to be in constructive possession of a controlled substance if the State can establish that he had dominion and control over the contraband, even in the absence of physical possession. State v. Harris, 94-0970, p. 4 (La.12/8/94), 647 So.2d 337, 338-39. ... Officers Hardy and White testified the defendant stated the drugs found in the apartment were his. This testimony was sufficient to prove the defendant had constructive possession of the drugs found. The jury clearly chose to believe this testimony over that of the defendant, and this court will not second guess that credibility determination. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant‟s convictions for possession of cocaine, marijuana, MDMA, alprazolam, and methamphetamine, when reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution in accordance with the Jackson standard.

The former possession charge under § 40:967(C)(2) is not defeated at the motion-to-quash stage by a claim that the defendant retrieved prescribed hydrocodone for someone else; that claim is a merits defense for the fact finder at trial.

State v. Faggin · filed 2014-10-24(C)(2)

The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to quash her pending prosecution for possession of hydroco-done in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(0(2), and the court of appeal erred in affirming that ruling. ... In the present ease, defendant claims as a basis for quashing the prosecution not that the prescription for hydro-codone was in her name but that she was retrieving the pills on behalf of the holder of a valid prescription for the drugs whom she identified as her live-in partner. ... Defendant’s claim she lived with the holder of the prescription and acted as an agent for him in retrieving the pills on his behalf, and thus did not have possession of the pills for her own use when arrested, is in the nature of a defense on the merits for a fact finder at trial.

Section 40:967 requires proof that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled dangerous substance, and constructive possession based on dominion and control is sufficient.

State v. Young · filed 2019-05-01

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:967, the State must prove that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug. State v. Perron, 01-0214, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/16/02), 806 So.2d 924, 928. Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of illegal drugs. State v. Major , 03-3522, p. 8 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 798, 803. However, since knowledge is a state of mind, it need not be proven as fact, but rather may be inferred from the circumstances. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222, 1227 (La. 1983).

Section 40:967 requires knowing possession of a scheduled controlled dangerous substance; constructive possession may satisfy possession, and intent to distribute may be inferred from the circumstances of possession.

State of Louisiana v. Bernard Grant a/k/a Lucius B. Cummings · filed 2022-12-14(A)(1), (B)(1)(a), and (C)(1)

To convict a defendant of possession of CDS, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed an illegal drug. ... The state need not prove the defendant actually possessed the drugs, as evidence of constructive possession is sufficient. ... Constructive possession is established by evidence that the drugs were within the defendant’s dominion and control and that the defendant had knowledge of its presence. ... Intent to distribute illegal drugs may be established by proving circumstances surrounding the defendant’s possession which give rise to reasonable inference of intent to distribute. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the state presented sufficient evidence at trial for a reasonable jury to convict the defendant of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of cocaine.

Section 40:967(A)(B)(1)(a) prohibits knowingly possessing a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to distribute, and constructive possession may be established when the substance is found in a location the defendant customarily occupies.

State of Louisiana v. Hyatt · filed 2026-05-20(A)(B)(1)(a)

Regarding the first conviction, La.R.S. 40:967 states that it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II. ... Consequently, we find that the evidence presented by the state established Defendant’s constructive possession of the methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and the firearm that were found in Defendant’s residence. It is well established Louisiana law that constructive possession can be found when the items are seized from a location customarily occupied by a defendant. Therefore, concerning Defendant’s first and third conviction, we find there was sufficient evidence to support them.

Section 40:967(C) sets a statutory maximum sentence for possession that a ten-year sentence on the possession counts exceeds.

State v. Davis · filed 1991-01-09(C)

Furthermore, ten years exceeds the maximum sentence statutorily provided on the two counts of possession of pentazo-cine. La.R.S. 40:967(C).

For an offense committed before the 1997 amendment took effect, § 40:967(B) did not authorize a restriction on parole eligibility; the amendment's five-year parole restriction could not be applied retroactively.

State v. Jones · filed 1999-04-28(B)

The penalty provision for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, provided for in La.R.S. 40:967(B), was amended in 1997 by Act 1284, § 1 effective August 15, 1997. In effect, the amendment provides for the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole. On the contrary, the penalty provision prior to the amendment did not provide for a restriction of parole benefits. In the case sub judice, the offense was committed June 22, 1997, prior to the effective date of the amendment. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifteen years, with five years to be served without the benefit of parole or probation. Since the pre-amendment penalty provision was in effect at the time the Defendant committed the present offenses, his parole eligibility should not have been restricted. State v. Hopkins, 367 So.2d 346 (La.1979).