Statute Annotations › Louisiana › La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967

La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967

Prohibited acts: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Louisiana
Case notes
744
Cited in passing
1,647
Citing cases indexed
3,299
Case dates
1976–2026
Screened through
2026-05-20
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-02
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

2,391 citing cases reviewed of 3,299 in the citation index: 744 interpreted the section (annotated below), 1,647 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-20 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Sentencing—probation, parole, or suspension of sentence

Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

Subsection (G) bars suspending, deferring, or withholding adjudication or sentence and bars probation or parole until the person serves the minimum sentence required by Subsection (F).

State v. Lucas · filed 2000-09-29(G)

To the extent that the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum penalty required by applicable version of La.R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a), the court avoided any unnecessary confusion by lawfully denying the defendant eligibility for suspension of sentence and probation, or parole, on the entire term, as opposed to sentencing the defendant to 10 years at hard labor, the first 10 years of which shall run without those benefits. See La.R.S. 40:967(G) (“With respect to any person to whom the provisions of Subsection F are applicable, the adjudication o'f guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentences provided by Subsection F.”).
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

Subsection (B)(4)(b) requires only the first five years of the sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Kirk · filed 2000-11-15(B)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that only the first five years of the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Because the defendant was sentenced without those benefits on the entire fifteen year sentence, the denial of those benefits on the last ten years of his sentence are deleted.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced former § 40:967(D) with a provision treating unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation; the older (D)(2) reference is no longer current.

Section 40:967(D)(2) does not restrict parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for possession of cocaine.

State v. Dawson · filed 2000-11-15(D)(2)

La. R.S. 40:967(0(2) does not limit the right to parole, probation or suspension of a sentence for possession of cocaine.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B). Under La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) and State v. Williams (2001), an omitted mandatory benefit restriction is deemed imposed by operation of law.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Robinson · filed 2000-11-29(B)(4)(b)

A review of the record shows an error with regard to defendant's sentence *970 in that the trial court failed to order that the first five years of the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). The sentence is illegally lenient; but, because this is an error patent favorable to defendant and the State has not complained, the illegally lenient sentence cannot be corrected on appeal.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of the sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Stanley · filed 2001-02-28(B)(4)(b)

We note that the trial court failed to order that the first five years of the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B). Under La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) and State v. Williams (2001), an omitted mandatory benefit restriction is deemed imposed by operation of law.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of a sentence for cocaine distribution to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; an appellate court will not correct an unraised sentencing error that favors the defendant.

State v. Holmes · filed 2001-06-27(B)(4)(b)

In addition, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that the first five years of a sentence for distribution of cocaine must be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Bowie and Bailey were not denied these benefits. However, this court will not correct an error patent favorable to the defendant where not raised by the State or the defense.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) limits the denial of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence to the first five years of a sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

State v. Fontenot · filed 2001-08-08(B)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that only the first five years of a sentence for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Here, the defendant was sentenced to fifteen years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The sentence is amended to provide for the denial of those benefits as to the first five years only.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For cocaine offenses, the statute makes only the first five years of the hard-labor sentence ineligible for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Stewart · filed 2001-11-21(B)(4)(b)

In the instant case, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to seven years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. As the statute read at the time of the offense, the prohibition of parole, probation, and a suspended sentence could be applied only to the first five years of the sentence. Clearly, the sentence was illegal in part. Therefore, we amend the sentence to prohibit parole, probation or suspension for the first five years of the sentence only.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a sentence for cocaine distribution or possession with intent to distribute to include five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Antoine · filed 2001-12-26(B)(4)(b)

First, the trial court did not indicate that the first five years of the defendant's sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence as is required by La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).[3] Despite this omission, La.R.S. 15:301.1 indicates that the sentence is deemed to contain this restriction, by providing: ... Accordingly, the defendant's sentence is deemed to contain a provision indicating that the first five years are to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two and one-half years of the sentence for attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Dunbar · filed 2001-08-08(B)(4)(b)

However, the court erred by failing to order that the first two and one-half years be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of a sentence for distribution of cocaine to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Barnes · filed 2002-03-27(B)(4)(b)

When the defendant was sentenced, the trial court did not restrict the benefits of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for five years as mandated under La. R.S.40:967(B)(4)(b) in effect at the time of the offense.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b), applied with the attempt statute, limits the period without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for attempted cocaine distribution to the first two and one-half years.

State v. Sellers · filed 2002-04-10(B)(4)(b)

However, La. R.S. 40:967 and La. R.S. 14:27 require that only the first two and one-half years of the sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. Therefore, the defendant’s sentence is amended to provide that only the first two and one-half years of the sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

Section 40:967(G)'s required restriction against parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is self-activating even when the sentencing court does not expressly state it.

State v. Esteen · filed 2002-05-15(G)

However, we need not remand for correction as to the former because under State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La.11/29/01), 800 So.2d 790,799, and La. R.S. 15:301.1(A),[23] the "without benefits" provision is self-activating. ... Therefore, under La. R.S. 40:967(G) and the self-activating language of La. R.S. 15:301(A), the first 30 years (minimum sentence described in paragraph G of La. R.S. 40:967) of the sentences imposed for Counts 2 and 5 shall be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, the first 15 years (minimum sentence) imposed for Count 10 shall be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, and the first 15 years (minimum sentence) of the sentence imposed Count 8 for the Defendant as a habitual offender shall be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

For possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, § 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires five years of the sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, even when the trial court fails to pronounce that restriction.

State v. Daniel · filed 2002-02-13(B)(4)(b)

In the present case, the trial court failed to pronounce Daniel’s sentence to include five years without the benefit of parole. Considering that there is no discretion concerning the element of five years without the benefit of parole, this Court recognizes that five years of Daniel’s sentence is without the benefit of parole as well as five years without probation or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires a sentence to include denial of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the covered offense.

State v. Hogan · filed 2003-01-28(B)(4)(b)

The trial judge also failed to include the denial of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in the sentence, as required by La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). However, La.R.S. 15:301.1(A) deems that the required statutory restriction is contained in the sentence, and that no correction is needed.
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Law changed since Acts 1997, No. 1284 later imposed a five-year benefit restriction on covered cocaine distribution and possession-with-intent offenses; Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced it to two years, and Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific distribution penalties with weight tiers. The offense date controls, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

Subsection (B)(1) provides a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor penalty and a possible fine of up to $50,000 for distribution of cocaine; it does not authorize making the sentence ineligible for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Buckley · filed 2003-03-05(B)(1)

However, at the time of the commission of the offense, the penalty for distribution of cocaine was five to thirty years at hard labor and a possible fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. See La. R. S. 40:967(B)(1). Thus, restriction on benefits eligibility renders the sentence illegal.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

For a conviction under § 40:967(B)(4)(b), only the first five years of the sentence must be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Sanders · filed 2003-11-12(B)(4)(b)

However, LSA-R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires that only the first five years of the sentence are to be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the specified period of a sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and that restriction applies automatically without court action.

State v. Williams · filed 2004-01-27(B)(4)(b)

We note that at the time the offense was committed, La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) required the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.[6] The Defendant was not so sentenced herein. However, the mandatory specified and limited restriction on the eligibility of the benefits is self-activating and requires no action by this Court. State v. Williams, 00-1725, p. 10 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 798-799; State v. Jerome, 03-126, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 5th Cir.4/29/03), 845 So.2d 1194, 1199.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires only the first five years of a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Harris · filed 2004-02-23(B)(4)(b)

While the State concedes that the trial court erred in imposing all of defendant's thirty-year sentences without benefits, the State also points out that, at the time of the commission of defendant's offenses, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provided that the first five years of the sentence were to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In this case, imposition of the entire sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentences was illegal. See, State v. Morris, 01-179 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/28/01), 798 So.2d 1004, 1011. An illegal sentence, however, may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 882; La. R.S. 15:301.1(C). Accordingly, we amend the sentence to reflect that only the first five years of defendant's thirty-year sentences on counts two through five are to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires that two years of a sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, second offense, be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; that restriction applies by operation of law even if the sentencing court does not state it.

State v. Colar · filed 2005-02-02(B)(4)(b)

It must also be noted that the record of the proceedings in the court below does not indicate that the trial judge told the Defendant at sentencing that, pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), two years of the sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, second offense, must be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires such a restriction. ... Thus, pursuant to the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Williams, we find that the trial judge's failure to specify that Defendant's sentence was subject to the restrictions listed in La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) and does not require remand for correction. Instead, the judge's sentence is deemed to include those restrictions by operation of law.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(A) requires the first two years of a sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Austin · filed 2005-03-01(A)

The trial court failed to order that the defendant serve the first two years of his sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, as required by La.R.S. 40:967(A). No corrective action is necessary, however, because under La.R.S. 15:301.1 the sentence is deemed to contain that restriction.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension, but permits those benefits after the two-year minimum and does not authorize the judge to deny parole for the excess sentence.

State v. Jones · filed 2006-06-28(B)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) states that there is a minimum sentence of two years and that these two years shall be imposed without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The trial judge may allow probation or suspension of sentence for a sentence that is in excess of the minimum two year sentence. The trial judge is not given the authority to deny parole for sentences in excess of two years under this statute.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of a sentence for distribution of cocaine to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. McMillion · filed 2007-06-20(B)(4)(b)

The record reflects that the trial court failed to impose the first two years of the sentence for distribution of cocaine without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as required by La. R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b). This deficiency will be automatically corrected by operation of La. R.S. 15:301.1.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires that the sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute be served without suspension of sentence, probation, or parole only for the mandatory minimum two-year term at hard labor.

State v. Davis · filed 2007-12-14(B)(4)(b)

La.R.S. 15:529.1(G) does not purport to restrict parole eligibility on any habitual offender sentence, and the underlying offense of conviction, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, subjects the offender to a sentence imposed without benefit of suspension of sentence, probation, and parole, *983 only on the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years at hard labor.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires two years of a cocaine-distribution sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Simon · filed 2009-01-14(B)(4)(b)

Our error patent review discloses that the trial court failed to order that two years of this sentence shall be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, as required by La. R.S. 40:967 |sB(4)(b). ... Consequently, we order that the sentence of 12 years be served at hard labor, with two years of the sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
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Section 40:967(C)(2) does not authorize a sentence for simple possession of cocaine to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Brown · filed 2010-02-10(C)(2)

In sentencing Watson to two years imprisonment at hard labor for attempted possession of heroin in Count One and two years at hard labor for simple possession of cocaine in Count Two, the trial court stated that each sentence was to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Neither La. R.S. 40:966 C(l), providing the sentence for attempted possession of heroin, nor La. R.S. 40:967 C(2), providing the sentence for possession of cocaine, allows for the sentence to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension |7of sentence. Nothing in the attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27 D(3), alters how the sentence is to be served in that respect. Accordingly, Watson’s sentence must be amended to delete those limitations.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

For possession of 400 grams or more of cocaine, subsection (F)(l)(c) sets a 15-to-30-year sentence and subsection (G) bars parole, probation, or suspension of sentence only until the minimum sentence is served.

State v. Lawrence · filed 2010-03-03(F)(l)(c) and (G)

La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(c) provides in pertinent part that “[a]ny person who knowingly or intentionally possesses four hundred grams or more of cocaine ... shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than fifteen years, nor more than thirty years.” ... nor shall such person be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentences provided by Subsection F.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(G) makes a defendant convicted under § 40:967(F) ineligible for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence until the minimum sentence under § 40:967(F) has been served, and the restriction is self-activating.

State v. Howard · filed 2010-05-25(G)

La. R.S. 40:967(G) provides that no defendant convicted under LSA-R.S. 40:967(F) is eligible for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence until he has served the minimum sentence provided under La. R.S. 40:967(F). In this case, the minimum sentence to which Howard was exposed was five years. The trial court should have, but did not, required that the first five years of his sentence on Count 2 be served without benefits. However, the provision is self-activating under La. R.S. 15:301.1, and no corrective action is needed.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

For distribution of cocaine, only the first two years of the sentence are without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Thurman · filed 2011-06-22(B)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 40:967 provides that only the first two years of a sentence for distribution of cocaine are to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Accordingly, we amend the defendant’s sentences to provide that only the first two years of the sentences are to be served without benefit of parole.
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Subsection 40:967(C)(2) does not authorize a possession-of-cocaine sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Randall · filed 2011-06-22(C)(2)

Furthermore, La. R.S. 40:967 C(2), which provides the sentence for possession of cocaine, does not provide that the sentence be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the trial court is illegal.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (B)(4)(b) requires a two- to 30-year prison term for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, with the first two years served without parole, probation, or suspension.

State v. Smith · filed 2011-11-02(B)(4)(b)

This crime is punishable by a term of imprisonment for not less than two years nor more than 30 years, with the first two years without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of a sentence for distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Henry · filed 2012-07-25(B)(4)(b)

Louisiana R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), which sets forth the underlying sentence to be enhanced under La. R.S. 15:529.1, requires that the first two years of Henry’s sentence be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of ^sentence. The trial court omitted to include that his sentence was without benefit of parole. However, in instances where such restrictions are not recited at sentencing, La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) deems that those required statutory restrictions are contained in the sentence whether or not imposed by the sentencing court. State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790. Therefore, the first two years of Henry’s sentence must be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of the sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Williams · filed 2013-02-27(B)(4)(b)

The underlying offense mandates that the first two years of the sentence be imposed without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 (effective Aug. 1, 2017) replaced this pre-2017 Schedule II distribution penalty with aggregate-weight ranges in § 40:967(B) and removed the former general two-year benefit restriction; earlier offenses may still use the prior penalty.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) authorizes a two-to-thirty-year sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, with parole, probation, and suspension of sentence denied only during the first two years.

State v. Marshall · filed 2014-09-17(B)(4)(b)

This statute provides that the sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine shall be “not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

Subsection (G) bars suspension, deferral, or withholding of sentence and bars probation or parole until the applicable minimum sentence under Subsection (F) has been served.

State v. Spencer · filed 2015-01-14(G) with (F)(l)(a)

In the instant case, as was stated previously, La. R.S. 40:979(A) provides that the defendant shall be fined or imprisoned in the same manner as for the offense planned or attempted. La. R.S. 40:967(G) sets forth that the imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentences provided by Subsection F. The maximum sentence set forth in La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a) (28g or more but less than 200g) is one-half of 30 years or 15 years imprisonment at hard-labor. In light of this Court’s opinion in Collins, supra, and the cases of Caldwell, supra; Williams, supra; Dunbar, supra; and Armstead, supra; we find that defendant would not be eligible for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence until he served the minimum fifteen-year sentence. Since defendant was only sentenced to fourteen years, we find that the trial judge did not err by ordering the entire fourteen-year sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

For cocaine distribution, the statute permits imprisonment at hard labor for two to thirty years, with parole, probation, and suspension of sentence barred only for the first two years.

State v. LeBlanc · filed 2015-06-05(B)(4)(b)

However, the applicable sentencing provision provides that a defendant convicted of distribution of cocaine shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, the defendant’s sentence is illegal because it restricts the benefits of parole, probation, and suspension of sentence for a longer period pthan is allowable under the applicable statute.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (B)(4)(b) authorizes a sentence of two to thirty years at hard labor for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, with only the first two years without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, plus a possible fine up to $50,000.

State v. Payne · filed 2017-05-17(B)(4)(b)

Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), defendant faced a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years.nor more than 30 years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The statute also provides for a possible fine of not more than $50,000. ... Defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, La. R.S. 40:967(A), only provides for a restriction of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for the first two years. See La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first two years of the sentence to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Carter · filed 2017-10-25(B)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires that the first two years of the sentence shall be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Because the underlying offense carries a parole restriction, the habitual offender sentence is to likewise be imposed without parole.
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Section 40:967(B)(1) does not authorize a restriction on probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Shelby · filed 2018-12-27(B)(1)

However, La. R.S. 40:967 B(1) does not provide for a restriction on benefits.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) requires the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State of Louisiana v. Wade · filed 2020-01-15(B)(4)(b)

The applicable version of the underlying offense statute, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), requires that the first five years of the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Regarding the imposition of a parole restriction, the conditions imposed on the statute of the underlying offense are those called for in the sentencing as a habitual offender. Thus, the 50-year sentence should have restricted parole for five years. However, this error does not require corrective action because the “without benefits” provisions of the statutes are self-activating under La. R.S. 15:301.1.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

For an offense committed on March 27, 2017, § 40:967(B)(4)(b) authorized two to thirty years at hard labor, with only the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Rudolph Perkins Versus State of Louisiana · filed 2022-06-28(B)(4)(b)

However, according to the bill of information dated May 19, 2017, relator’s offense occurred on March 27, 2017. At that time, La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b)3 provided for “a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”
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Possession of cocaine—knowledge and penalty

Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(C)(2) sets a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine for possession of a Schedule II drug.

State of Louisiana v. Nolen · filed 2014-02-12(C)(2)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(C)(2) provides that for the offense of possession of a Schedule II drug, the offender shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years and may be ordered to pay a fine of not more than $5,000.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(C)(2) makes knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unlawful and sets a maximum sentence of five years, with or without hard labor, plus a fine of up to $5,000.

State v. Chaplain · filed 2013-05-29(C)(2)

Because the Defendant’s third felony offense is possession of cocaine and punishable by “imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years,” the Defendant was exposed to a minimum sentence of forty months and a maximum sentence of ten years. See, La. R.S. 40:967(0(2); La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). The five year sentence the Defendant received was thus within the statutory range.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(C) makes knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unlawful, and subsection (C)(2) authorizes imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than $5,000.

State v. Fontenot · filed 1991-04-17(C), (C)(2)

The statutory sentencing range for violating La.R.S. 40:967(C) is imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years and a possible fine of not more than $5,000.00. "It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner as provided in R.S. 40:978, while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this Part." ... The statutory sentencing range for violating La.R.S. 40:967(C) is imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years and a possible fine of not more than $5,000.00. La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2).
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Section 40:967(C) prohibits possession of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.

State v. DeCuir · filed 1992-04-16(C)

Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance and possession of cocaine is a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C). ... The evidence in this case supports the existence of every element of the crime of possession of cocaine and defendant's guilt of that crime. The jury implicitly found defendant guilty of that lesser and included crime by the verdict it rendered. Defendant's conviction and sentence of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of guilty of possession of cocaine against defendant and to sentence him accordingly.
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Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance absent a valid prescription or other statutory exception, and a cocaine-possession conviction requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the drug.

State v. Hopson · filed 1997-11-25(C)

The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine. La. R.S. 40:967C defines possession of cocaine as follows: C. Possession. It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner as proved in R.S. 40:978 while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise provided by this Part. To support a conviction of possession of cocaine in violation of La. R.S. 40:967 C, the state must prove that the defendant was knowingly in possession of the drug. "Determination of whether there is `possession' sufficient to convict depends on the peculiar *770 facts of each case." State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222, 1226 (La.1983).
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Section 40:967 requires proof of knowing possession of cocaine for a possession conviction.

State v. Lipscomb · filed 2000-09-13

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was knowingly in possession of the illegal drug. ... These factors were sufficient to establish the element of guilty knowledge in those cases, and they are sufficient to establish the element of guilty knowledge in this case as well. Viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all of the essential elements of the offense of possession of cocaine present beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The 1995 version made simple possession of cocaine punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years.

State v. Lewis · filed 2001-03-07(C)(2)

The sentence for the instant conviction for simple possession of cocaine under the 1995 version of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2) was imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five-years; the third felony was not an enumerated felony under the statute.
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Section 40:967(C)(2) made possession of cocaine punishable by imprisonment for no more than five years, so it did not meet the habitual-offender provision's requirement of a drug offense punishable by more than five years.

State v. Harbor · filed 2002-04-10(C)(2)

When the Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine in 1999, the punishment was imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years. See: La.R.S. 40:967 C(2).
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Section 40:967(F) requires proof that a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine; constructive possession exists when the cocaine is under the defendant's dominion or control.

State v. Bush · filed 2002-06-26(F)

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the cocaine. La. R.S. 40:967(F); ... A person not in physical possession of contraband may have constructive possession when the contraband is under that person's dominion or control. ... Based on the factors and jurisprudence discussed above, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant exercised dominion and control over the drugs and gun found on the bed. We hold, therefore, that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of more than 28 grams of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
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Section 40:967(C) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and the court held that the evidence proved all elements of cocaine possession.

State v. Fortenberry · filed 2009-10-23(C)

With certain exceptions inapplicable here, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in La. R.S. 40:964, Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:967(C). ... After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced that the evidence presented in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of possession of cocaine.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(C)(2) permits imprisonment with or without hard labor for possession of cocaine, for up to five years, and an attempt conviction does not alter how the sentence is served.

State v. Randall · filed 2010-10-27(C)(2)

Further, La. R.S. 40:967 C(2), which provides the sentence for possession of cocaine, states that “[a]ny person who violates this Subsection as ] 4to any other controlled dangerous substance shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years and, in addition, may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.” The attempt statute, La. R.S. 14:27 D(3), does not alter how the sentence is to be served in that respect.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(C)(2) makes possession of cocaine, including crack or powder cocaine, punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labor for up to five years.

State v. Galle · filed 2013-02-13(C)(2)

Possession of cocaine, crack or powder form, is a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(0(2), which provides for, and provided for at the time of defendant Galle’s arrest and conviction in 2004, a sentence upon conviction of imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years.
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Section 40:967(A) prohibits knowing possession of cocaine; possession may be actual or constructive, and guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.

State v. Belvin · filed 2014-12-16(A)

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of cocaine and that he knowingly possessed it. See State v. Mitchell, 09-996 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1122, writ denied, 10-1557 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So.3d 370. The element of possession may be established by demonstrating that the defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the controlled dangerous substance. Id. Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession and such knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. Id.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former large-quantity cocaine possession range; Acts 2017, No. 281 later repealed § 40:967(F) and (G), with revised (D) treating unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former penalty.

Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) set a 10-to-60-year hard-labor range and a $50,000-to-$150,000 fine for possessing 28 to 200 grams of cocaine in 1997, while § 40:967(C)(3) made simple possession punishable by up to five years with or without hard labor.

State v. Mead · filed 2015-04-22(F)(1)(a); (C)(3)

The penalty for possessing that amount of cocaine on that date was a sentence of a term of imprisonment “at hard labor of not less than ten years, nor more than sixty years, and ... a fíne of not less than fifty thousand dollars, nor more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars.” La R.S. 40:967 F(l)(a) (West 1997). ... At the time of the commission of these predicate offenses, the penalty was a term of imprisonment “with or without hard labor for not more than five years and, in addition, ... a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.” La. R.S. 40:967 C(3).
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For cocaine possession under § 40:967(C), the State must prove knowing possession, which may be actual or constructive; subsection (C)(1) authorizes up to two years’ imprisonment for cocaine weighing less than two grams.

State of Louisiana Versus Tommy Horton · filed 2024-12-04C(1)

To support a conviction for possession of cocaine under La. R.S. 40:967 C, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of the cocaine and that he knowingly possessed it. Robinson, 87 So.3d at 893; State v. Mitchell, 09-996 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/25/10), 40 So.3d 1122, 1126, writ denied, 10-1557 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So.3d 370. The element of possession may be established by showing that the defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the controlled dangerous substance. Mitchell, 40 So.3d at 1126.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(C)(2) makes cocaine possession punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.

State v. 2002 Chevrolet Trail Blazer · filed 2012-11-16(C)(2)

We therefore subscribe to the view of the state that respondent’s use of the vehicle to conceal and transport the drugs in his possession, using the fuse box area as a convenient hiding place to retain possession of the drugs while he went about his business that might, or might not, have included additional sales of cocaine, fell within the broad compass of R.S. 40:2604(2)(b), because possession of cocaine carries a sentence in excess of one year’s imprisonment, La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2) (imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years), and thus |squalifies as conduct giving rise to forfeiture for purposes of R.S. dO^OSD).
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Mandatory fine for first conviction involving over 400 grams of cocaine

Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

For a first conviction for possessing over 400 grams of cocaine, the statute requires a fine between $250,000.00 and $600,000.00.

State v. Dickerson · filed 1991-04-17(F)(1)(c)

La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(c) provides that upon a first conviction for possession of over 400 grams of cocaine that the trial court must impose a mandatory fine of not less than $250,000.00 and not more than $600,000.00.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(F)(1)(b) requires a person possessing 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams of cocaine to receive 10 to 30 years at hard labor and pay a fine of $100,000 to $350,000, so a sentence omitting the fine is illegally lenient.

State of Louisiana v. August · filed 2004-04-07(F)(1)(b)

First, we find that the sentence for possession of cocaine in amounts greater than 200 grams but less than 400 grams is illegally lenient. Louisiana Revised Statute 40:967(F)(1)(b) mandates the imposition of a fine of not less than $100,000 nor more than $350,000, in addition to imprisonment; ... The trial court’s failure to impose a fine within the parameters of La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(b) requires that we vacate this sentence and remand for resentencing.
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Prescription-based exemption from criminal sanctions

Subsection (C) makes knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled substance unlawful unless the possessor obtained it directly from a practitioner or pursuant to a valid prescription.

State v. Love · filed 2006-12-06(C)

La. R.S. 40:967(C) contemplates that possession of Schedule II drugs is illegal unless the possessor obtained them directly from a practitioner or that the possessor obtained them pursuant to a valid prescription. That is, it would subvert the obvious purpose of the statute to interpret it to mean that one could legally possess Schedule II drugs as long as someone in the chain of possession had obtained them pursuant to a valid prescription.
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Section 40:967(C) makes possession of a Schedule II drug unlawful unless the possessor obtained it directly from a practitioner or pursuant to the possessor's own valid prescription or order.

State v. Clark · filed 2005-05-18(C)

La. R.S. 40:967(C) contemplates that possession of Schedule II drugs is illegal unless the possessor obtained them |ñdirectly from a practitioner or that the possessor obtained them pursuant to a valid prescription. That is, it would subvert the obvious purpose of the statute to interpret it to mean that one could legally possess Schedule II drugs as long as someone in the chain of possession had obtained them pursuant to a valid prescription.
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Section 40:967(C) exempts from criminal sanctions a person who possesses a Schedule II drug obtained directly or under a valid prescription or practitioner order while acting in the course of professional practice.

Opinion Number · filed 1991-05-31(C)

Additionally, the penalty provision for Schedule II drugs as provided in La. R.S. 40:967(C) specifically exempts from criminal sanctions anyone who possesses a Schedule II drug when "obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner as provided in R.S. 40:978 or R.S.40:1239, while acting in the course of his professional practice . . ."
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Sentencing provision for Dilaudid

Section 40:967(B)(1) is the proper sentencing provision for possessing Dilaudid because Dilaudid is a narcotic drug.

State v. Marks · filed 1991-08-23(B)(1)

WRIT DENIED: Dilaudid is a narcotic drug, see La.R.S. 40:961(23) and R.S. 40:964 Schedule II(A)(1)(1), and the proper sentencing provision for Dilaudid is La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1).
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Effect of amendment on penalty provisions

Law changed since La. R.S. 15:308(B), as construed in State ex rel. Esteen (2018), creates a limited exception to the 2001/2002 amendments’ prospective-only rule for listed earlier sentences when the reduction helps the person; a district court corrects a sentence above the new maximum, while a sentence within both ranges follows the parole-committee route.

Section 40:967 B(4)(b) applies the penalty provision in effect when the offense was committed, even if a later amendment reducing the mandatory minimum takes effect before sentencing.

State v. Williams · filed 2005-05-31B(4)(b)

On the date of defendant’s offense, which was May 8, 2001, La. R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b) provided that an offender that was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was to serve not less than five years and not more than thirty years in prison, with the first five years to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that the applicable sentencing scheme is the one in effect at the time the offense is committed. ... Accordingly, we' find no error in the sentence imposed by the trial judge.
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The 1990 amendment to § 40:967 did not remove the existing penalty provisions for Schedule II dangerous substances other than anabolic steroids.

State v. Kyle · filed 1992-01-23(C)

The penalty provisions of La.R.S. 40:967(C) therefore remained in full force and effect at the time of the offense alleged against the defendant.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The statute’s penalty amendment applies prospectively, but later ameliorative changes may still be considered when assessing whether a sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Everidge · filed 2002-12-11(F)(1)(a)

The amendments effected by Acts 2001, No. 403, § 4, eff. June 15, 2001, including the one to La. R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(a), are prospective only in application. ... This was error insofar as the trial court believed it was barred by law from considering the dramatic reductions in sentences for drug offenses effected by Act 403 as a palliative factor when assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence under Dorthey. To the contrary, the legislature’s subsequent changes in criminal statutes are relevant sentencing considerations.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The amended penalty in La. Stat. Ann. § 40:967(F)(1)(a) for possessing twenty-eight grams or more but less than two hundred grams of cocaine applies only prospectively, so an earlier offense is sentenced under the penalty in effect when it was committed.

State v. Guilbeau · filed 2003-02-05(F)(1)(a)

However, we note that Section 6 of Act 403 specifically provides that the provisions of the Act "shall only have prospective effect." Furthermore, in State v. Sugasti, 01-3407 (La.6/21/02); 820 So.2d 518, the Louisiana Supreme Court referenced the legislative pronouncement of Section 6 of Act 403 and observed that, while the trial court should consider the new sentencing provision in imposing sentence, "the trial judge should not derogate from the penalty provision in effect at the time of the commission of the offense." Id. at p. 5; 521. ... Due to the supreme court's discussion in Sugasti, we conclude that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant under the revised sentencing range of La. R.S. 40:967, resulting in an illegally lenient sentence. ... Accordingly, we recognize the defendant's sentence as illegally lenient and vacate the defendant's sentence for possession of cocaine, in excess of twenty-eight grams, but less than two hundred grams, and remand for resentencing in accordance with La.R.S. 40:967(F) as it existed at the time of the commission of the offense.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(F) requires the applicable mandatory minimum penalty to be determined by the law in effect when the offense was committed, and a later reduction does not benefit the defendant.

State v. Hardy · filed 2003-01-29(F)

However, the reduction in sentence does not benefit the defendant. The defendant’s sentence is controlled by the penalty at the time of the offense and not that at the time of conviction.
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Elements of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance

To prove distribution under § 40:967, the State must establish the exact identity and schedule of the hydrocodone, because the schedule determines the applicable maximum sentence and is an essential element of the offense.

State v. Chaisson · filed 2012-06-06(A), (B)

Hydrocodone is found in both Schedule II and Schedule III as defined in La.R.S. 40:964. Schedule II lists hydrocodone, and Schedule III lists hydrocodone when found in certain amounts and/or mixed with other nonnarcotic ingredients. The penalties for Schedule II and Schedule III violations involving hydrocodone differ greatly. ... The legislature saw fit to include some forms of hydrocodone in Schedule II and others in Schedule III and for the penalties involving each to differ. The exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance at issue determines the maximum authorized sentence, and is an essential element of the crime of distribution of hydrocodone. See James, 517 So.2d at 291. Consequently, the State was required to prove which Schedule the pills at issue herein fell within. We cannot simply “fix” the State’s failure to meet its burden of proof by “amending” the bill of information to make the evidence fit a crime.
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Section 40:967(A) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally distribute cocaine, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.

State v. Akins · filed 1996-12-11(A)

In order for the state to obtain a conviction, it must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was convicted of distribution of cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A). That statute provides in pertinent part: [I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.
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Section 40:967(A) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.

State v. Baker · filed 1996-05-08(A)

The statute under which Baker was charged makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally, among other acts, to distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. La.R.S. 40:967 A.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful knowingly or intentionally to distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.

State v. Hopkins · filed 1994-11-02(A)(1)

La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) provides: ... (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II; ... Thus, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found from Agent Jackson's testimony that the defendant committed the crime charged, unlawful distribution of cocaine, on the date and time alleged.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally producing, manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to do any of those acts a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.

State v. Maze · filed 1992-03-11(A)(1)

It is submitted that after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found defendant guilty of distribution of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and the State must prove each element of distribution beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Fann · filed 1992-04-16(A)(1)

The evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to prove each element of the offense of distribution of cocaine.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant distributed or dispensed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance and possessed the general intent to do so.

State v. Mitchell · filed 1994-11-02(A)(1)

Therefore, the state must have proven the intent and the act elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In the terms of this particular statute, the evidence must have established that defendant distributed or dispensed cocaine or a derivative thereof and that he possessed the intent to do so. ... Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the circumstances recited herein indicate that the defendant "must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences" as certain to result from his actions. The exchange of a rock of cocaine for money clearly indicates an intent to distribute or dispense an illegal drug. ... The state showed that the defendant distributed a controlled dangerous substance to Officer Sample on the evening of July 27, 1990, satisfying the act element of La.R.S. 40:967.
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Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; possession may be constructive when the substance is subject to the defendant’s dominion and control.

State v. Brooks · filed 1995-12-06(C)

To convict a defendant for possession of cocaine pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967(0, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II of La.R.S. 40:964. Determination of whether there is possession sufficient to convict depends on the peculiar facts of each case.
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Section 40:967 makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.

State v. Moore · filed 1997-01-22

Further, the record established the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. La.R.S. 40:967 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. The substance which Officer Edmiston purchased in connection with this case was determined by a laboratory test to be cocaine, which is classified as a controlled dangerous substance in Schedule II.
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Section 40:967(C) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance without a valid prescription or other authorization.

State v. Joseph · filed 1998-07-01(C)

Louisiana Revised Statute 40:967© states in pertinent part: It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance classified as Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner, as provided in R.S. 40:978 while acting in the course and scope of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this Part.
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Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unless it was obtained directly or under a valid prescription or practitioner order.

State v. Ayche · filed 1998-07-28C

Defendant was convicted of a violation of La.C.Cr.P. art. 967 C, which provides in part that "[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner...." Cocaine is classified as a schedule II narcotic. La. R.S. 40:964. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a controlled substance classified in Schedule II, and a conviction requires proof of the offense's elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Coleman · filed 1998-10-07(A)(1)

To obtain a conviction, the state must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was convicted of distribution of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance classified in Schedule II. We find the evidence in the record did support the jury's verdict.
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Section 40:967 prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing or dispensing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; in a cocaine-distribution prosecution, the State must prove delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and the substance's identity.

State v. Smith · filed 1999-04-07

Smith was convicted of distribution of cocaine. La. R.S. 40:967 provides that it is shall be unlawful for any person "knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II." Cocaine and its derivatives are listed in Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:964. A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of cocaine to his intended recipients. State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132; see La. R.S. 40:961(14). The state must show (1) "delivery" or "physical transfer;" (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. State v. Miller, 587 So.2d 125, 127 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991).
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Section 40:967(C) requires proof that the defendant possessed a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance and did so knowingly or intentionally; possession may be actual or constructive.

State v. Walker · filed 1999-09-24(C)

Thus, to convict the defendant for possession of cocaine, the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the CDS and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the CDS.
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Section 40:967 requires the State to prove that the defendant possessed the illegal drug knowingly or intentionally.

State v. Recasner · filed 1999-12-22

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990). ... In this case, there was no evidence that the defendant attempted to flee when the officers approached. However, the jury heard evidence that the tube found on the defendant was commonly used to smoke crack cocaine. (See State v. Spates, 588 So.2d 398 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1991) where the court held that the peculiar nature of the pipe, commonly known as a "straight shooter" and used exclusively for smoking crack cocaine, was indicative of guilty knowledge that the pipe contained cocaine residue.[1]) We find that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the crime of attempted possession of cocaine.
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Section 40:967 prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing or dispensing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; for cocaine distribution, the State must prove delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and the substance's identity.

State v. McGee · filed 2000-02-23

La. R.S. 40:967 provides that it is shall be unlawful for any person "knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II." Cocaine and its derivatives are listed in Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:964. A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of cocaine to his intended recipients. State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132; see La. R.S. 40:961(14). The state must show (1) "delivery" or "physical transfer;" (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful knowingly or intentionally to distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II; the court held the evidence sufficient to establish Johnson's distribution of cocaine.

State v. Johnson · filed 2000-01-26(A)(1)

Winters' testimony showed that Johnson provided the cocaine to Ernest who in turn sold it to Winters. Johnson received the proceeds of the sale from Ernest. ... Accordingly, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence presented was sufficient to support the distribution of cocaine conviction.
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Section 40:967 makes it unlawful knowingly or intentionally to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance; cocaine distribution requires a physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and proof of the substance's identity.

State v. McGee · filed 2000-02-23

La. R.S. 40:967 provides that it is shall be unlawful for any person "knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II." Cocaine and its derivatives are listed in Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:964. A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of cocaine to his intended recipients. State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132; see La. R.S. 40:961(14). The state must show (1) "delivery" or "physical transfer;" (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. State v. Miller, 587 So.2d 125, 127 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991).
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled substance, and an intermediary who facilitates the transfer may be convicted as a principal even without physically handing over the drugs.

State v. Black · filed 2001-05-09(A)(1)

A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of the cocaine to his intended recipients. State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132; State v. Manning, 30,809 (La.App. 2d Cir. 6/24/98), 715 So.2d 668; State v. Hubbard, 30,604 (La.App. 2d Cir. 4/8/98), 711 So.2d 393. The State must show (1) "delivery" or "physical transfer," (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. State v. Manning, supra. ... As a general rule, the law of principals applies to all crimes, including those for the offense of narcotics distribution, defined as the "delivery" or transfer of possession and control over controlled substances. La.R.S. 40:961(9) & (13); State v. Martin, 310 So.2d 544 (La.1975). In Louisiana, an intermediary who arranges for, or facilitates, the transfer of narcotics from the seller to the buyer may be charged and punished as a principal in the act of distribution. State v. Goins, 568 So.2d 231 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1990), writ denied, 573 So.2d 1117 (La.1991); State v. Parker, 536 So.2d 459 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988), writ denied, 584 So.2d 670 (La.1991); State v. Hutchins, 502 So.2d 606 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1987); State v. Celestine, 95-1393 (La.1/26/96), 671 So.2d 896; but see State v. Parker, 627 So.2d 210 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993); cf. State v. Mallery, 364 So.2d 1283 (La.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 940, 99 S.Ct. 2881, 61 L.Ed.2d 310 (1979). ... Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant was not the individual who actually handed Deputy Farris the cocaine and discounting the testimony of Deputy Farris, viewing the remaining evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find it clear that Defendant was acting as an intermediary to facilitate a transfer of cocaine to a buyer and was, therefore, a principal in the distribution of that cocaine.
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Section 40:967 prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing or dispensing a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance; distribution requires delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and proof of the substance's exact identity.

State v. Thomas · filed 2003-02-19

In this case, the defendant was convicted of attempted distribution of heroin. La. R.S. 40:967 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person “knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I.” Heroin is a Schedule I opiate derivative. La. R.S. 40:964(B)(11). A defendant is guilty of distribution of 1 Rheroin when he transfers possession or control of heroin to his intended recipient. See La. R.S. 40:961(14). To support a conviction for attempted distribution of heroin, “the State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the crime and did or omitted some act toward accomplishing his goal.” State v. McGee, 98-2116, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/23/00), 757 So.2d at 58. A person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even where it appears that the defendant actually perpetrated the offense. La. R.S. 14:27; McGee, at p. 10, 757 So.2d at 58. To convict for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must show (1) “delivery” or “physical transfer;” (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. State v. Kanost, 99-1822 (La.App. 4 Cir.3/29/00), 759 So.2d 184.
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(A)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally produce, manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to do so a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.

State v. Cooks · filed 2002-12-04(A)(1)

La. R.S. 40:967A provides in part that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: ... (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II; ... (2) To create, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute, a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. ... Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. La. R.S. 40:964, Schedule II(A)(4). ... This record reveals that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accord with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have reasonably concluded that all of the elements of the offense of distribution of cocaine were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 40:967(C) makes knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance unlawful, subject to prescription and other statutory-authority exceptions; the possession and intent elements may be established from the circumstances.

State v. McLeod · filed 2003-04-30(C)

C. Possession. It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner, as provided in R.S. 40:978 while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this Part. ... Thus, there is no question, Defendant physically possessed the cocaine. Defendant contests the intent element with his argument that he merely picked up the rock of crack and the crack-pipe, because he was startled by the officers' entry. We find that, considering the factual scenario of the case, this is not a plausible explanation of his possession and we conclude the jury was reasonable in rejecting such a theory.
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Section 40:967(C) prohibits knowing and intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and possession may be constructive when the defendant has dominion and control over the substance and knows it is present.

State v. Brown · filed 2004-03-12(C)

La. R.S. 40:967(C), in part, prohibits the knowing and intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. La. R.S. 40:964, Schedule II(A)(4). To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the state must establish that the defendant was in possession of the drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed it. State v. Shields, 1998-2283 (La.App. 4th Cir.9/15/99), 743 So.2d 282. However, to be guilty of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, one need not actually possess the contraband; constructive possession is sufficient to convict. Constructive possession means having an object subject to one's dominion and control, with knowledge of its presence, even though it is not in one's physical possession. State v. White, 37,261 (La. App.2d Cir.6/25/03), 850 So.2d 987.
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Section 40:967(C) requires knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and possession of mere traces or residue can support a conviction.

State v. LeBlanc · filed 2004-12-17C

Louisiana Revised Statute 40:967C requires proof that the defendant "knowingly or intentionally" possessed a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II. ... A conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance may rest on the possession of mere traces or residue of the substance, even absent admissions by the defendant, which might constitute guilty knowledge.
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Section 40:967 requires proof that a defendant possessed the controlled dangerous substance and knowingly possessed it.

State v. Lewis · filed 2005-10-06

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must prove that the Defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly possessed the drug. La.R.S. 40:967 C, F; State v. Alo, 04-62, p. 4 (La.App. 5th Cir.10/12/04), 886 So.2d 1130, 1132, writ denied, 04-2992 (La.3/24/05), 896 So.2d 1035.
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Section 40:967(C) makes it unlawful knowingly or intentionally to possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, requiring proof of knowing or intentional possession.

State v. Authement · filed 2007-02-07(C)

The Defendant in this case was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C), which states in pertinent part: "[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II. . . ." Thus, the State had to prove two elements: 1) the Defendant knowingly or intentionally; 2) possessed a controlled dangerous substance. We find that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for a jury to conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the offense of possession of methamphetamine and cocaine.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and the offense is established where the accused acted as a principal by negotiating and prompting another person to complete the sale.

State v. Hall · filed 2010-08-11(A)(1)

Under La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1), it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense a Schedule II CDS. Cocaine is a Schedule II CDS. La. R.S. 40:964. ... The evidence established that Hall was a principal to the offense in that he negotiated the sale with Scott and prompted Brown to complete the sale by telling him twice to “serve” Scott or “hurry up.” The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall was a principal in the drug transaction.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II, including cocaine.

State of Louisiana v. Ballard · filed 2010-12-08(A)(1)

The elements of distribution of cocaine are knowingly or intentionally distributing a controlled dangerous substance classified in schedule II, namely, cocaine. La.R.S. 40:967(A).
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and distribution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and the substance's exact identity.

State of Louisiana v. Parker · filed 2011-05-04(A)(1)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(A)(1) provides that it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II.” ... “A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of cocaine to his intended recipients.” ... To establish the offense of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, the state’s burden is to establish beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) ‘delivery’ or ‘physical transfer;’ (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.” ... Taken in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for distribution of cocaine.
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Section 40:967(C) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance and knowingly and intentionally possessed it; possession may be actual or constructive.

State v. Merrill · filed 2012-12-27(C)

To convict an offender for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, the State must present evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of the substance and that he knowingly and intentionally possessed it. La. R.S. 40:967(C); State v. Toups, 01-1875 (La.10/15/02); 833 So.2d 910. Possession of cocaine is a general intent crime. ... The element of possession maybe proven by showing that the defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the cocaine.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) does not require possession of finished methamphetamine or completion of processing to establish manufacture of a controlled dangerous substance.

State v. Balentine · filed 2013-07-10(A)(1)

Our review of the two crimes charged in the separate parishes reveals that both involve the same offense of manufacture of methamphetamine, though expressed in distinct statutory provisions. Critically, neither statute [^requires possession of the finished methamphetamine. Of the two statutes, only Section 967(A)(1) mentions possession as a possible element for the crime of distribution. Yet, that was not the statute of conviction in Webster Parish, the only place where the finished methamphetamine was found. Likewise, both statutes’ use of the statutorily defined term “manufacture” reveals that the common element of intent to manufacture may be proven by the preparation and processing of compounds that might lead to the finished controlled dangerous substance. Finishing the processing of the compounds is not required as an element of either crime.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally producing or manufacturing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, requires only general criminal intent, and does not require proof of an active laboratory.

State v. Arnold · filed 2013-11-06(A)(1)

In spite of the words that ‘it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... ’ to do the prohibited acts, the statute requires no more than general criminal intent. LSA-R.S. 14:11; State v. Banks, 307 So.2d 594 (La.1975). ... There need not be an active lab at Defendant’s residence in order to find him guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. See State v. Shumaker, 41,547, (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So.2d 277, writ denied, 07-144 (La.9/28/07), 964 So.2d 351.
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Penalty for distribution of narcotic drugs

Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B)(1) provides a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor imprisonment range for distributing a narcotic drug such as Dilaudid.

State Ex Rel. Marks v. Thompson · filed 1992-03-26(B)(1)

La.R.S. 40:964 Schedule II(A)(1)(1) lists Dilaudid according to its pharmacological properties as a derivative of opium, along with other derivatives such as codeine and morphine. Dilaudid is therefore a narcotic drug within the definition provided by La.R.S. 40:961(23), which encompasses opium, coca leaves, and opiates, and their derivatives. Relator thus faced a penalty range of five to thirty years' imprisonment at hard labor and his sentence is not illegal. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1).
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Penalties and sentencing

Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

Subsection (F)(2)(c) set a fifteen-to-thirty-year prison range and a $250,000-to-$600,000 fine for possessing over four hundred grams of methamphetamine, while subsection (G) barred suspension of the sentence and probation or parole before the minimum term was served.

State v. Priest · filed 2019-02-06(F)(2)(c), (G)

At the time of the instant offense in June of 2016, a defendant convicted of violating La. R.S. 40:967 was subject to a penalty range of fifteen to thirty years at hard labor and a fine of not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars nor more than six hundred thousand dollars. See La. R.S. 40:967(F)(2)(c). The sentencing statute further mandated that the entirety of the sentence not be suspended and that the defendant not be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentence, which is at least fifteen years. See La. R.S. 40:967(G). ... Furthermore, we note that, if defendant had committed the instant offense approximately one year later, he would have been subject to a maximum sentence of only twenty years. In Acts 2017, No. 281, effective August 1, 2017, the Legislature amended the sentencing range for possession of over four hundred grams of methamphetamine by reducing it to a range of one to twenty years. At the same time, the Legislature also repealed Section (G) of La. R.S. 40:967regarding the imposition of the restriction of benefits for the instant crime of conviction. While the amendments to La. R.S. 40:967 were not given retroactive effect, that does not mean this Court cannot consider the expression of legislative will at the time the amendment reducing the applicable penalties was passed.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

For a cocaine distribution, dispensing, or possession-with-intent offense, the statute requires imprisonment at hard labor for two to thirty years, with the first two years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Thompson · filed 2016-09-16(B)(4)(b)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(B)(4)(b), provides, in pertinent part, *1003that on a conviction of distribution, dispensing, or possession with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense cocaine, the offender “shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than thirty years, with the first two years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence[.]”
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Law changed since La. R.S. 15:308(B), as construed in State ex rel. Esteen (2018), creates a limited exception to the 2001/2002 amendments’ prospective-only rule for listed earlier sentences when the reduction helps the person; a district court corrects a sentence above the new maximum, while a sentence within both ranges follows the parole-committee route.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) uses the sentencing penalty in effect when the offense was committed; here, that penalty was five to 30 years, with the first five years served without benefit.

State v. Wyatt · filed 2002-06-12(B)(4)(b)

After the commission of the instant offense, but before defendant was sentenced, the legislature amended La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) by reducing the minimum term of incarceration from five years to two years and by reducing the "without benefit" requirement to mandate that only the first two years of imprisonment had to be without benefit. Acts 2001, No. 403. Section Six of this Act specifically states that its provisions were to have prospective effect only. This Act became effective on June 15, 2001, five days before sentence was imposed in this case. By its own terms, the amendment was inapplicable to an offense committed before the amendment took effect.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The penalty provision applicable to a violation of § 40:967(A)(1) is the one in effect when the offense was committed; a later ameliorative amendment applies prospectively only.

State v. Drane · filed 2002-09-18(A)(1)

In 1999, at the time Defendants committed the current offenses, La. R.S. 40:967 provided for a sentence of not less than 40 years and not more than 99 years at hard labor for manufacturing methamphetamine. In 2001, the legislature amended the penalty provision for manufacturing methamphetamine to not less than 10 and not more than 30 years. Irrespective of the amendment, the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty which the convicted accused must suffer. ... The trial judge should consider the amendments to the law, but he should not derogate from the penalty in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. Further, the legislature specifically stated in the 2001 amendment to La. R.S. 40:967 that the amendment would have prospective effect only. If the legislature had wanted the amendment to be retroactive, it would have stated as much.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B) requires a person who distributes a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance to receive five to thirty years at hard labor and permits a fine of up to $50,000; a twenty-year sentence is within that statutory range.

State v. Williams · filed 1996-06-26(B)

La.R.S. 40:967(B) provides in pertinent part that whoever distributes a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. In the case sub judice, defendant was sentenced to twenty years at hard labor, less than the maximum provided by law.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

At the time of the offenses, § 40:967(F) set a ten-to-thirty-year imprisonment range for possessing more than 200 but less than 400 grams of cocaine; an attempted offense was subject to half the maximum term.

State v. Page · filed 1996-08-21(F)(2)(b)

Thus, he argues that he could not have been sentenced to a term greater than 15 years. La.R.S. 40:967(F)(2)(b) and 40:979[9]. While defendant is correct that his original sentence exceeded the maximum allowed, the argument is moot. ... At the time of the offenses, La.R.S. 40:967(F) provided that anyone convicted of possession of more than 200 but less than 400 grams of cocaine would be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than ten years but no more than thirty years.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former large-quantity cocaine possession range; Acts 2017, No. 281 later repealed § 40:967(F) and (G), with revised (D) treating unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former penalty.

Section 40:967(F)(1)(c) sets a 1993 penalty of fifteen to thirty years' imprisonment and a fine of $250,000 to $600,000 for the offense at issue.

State v. Zabaleta · filed 1996-10-02(F)(1)(c)

The 1993 version of La.R.S. 40:967(F)(l)(c) provides for a penalty of fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years imprisonment and a fine of not less than $250,000.00 nor more than $600,000.00. Subsection G of 40:967 also provides for defendant’s minimum sentence, fifteen (15) years, to be served without benefit of suspension, deferment, or withholding and without benefit of probation or parole. The trial judge in the case sub judice sentenced defendant to twenty-five (25) years at hard labor, with the first fifteen (15) being without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. Although refusing to impose the fine in defendant’s original sentencing, the trial judge returned on the same day and ordered defendant to pay a fine of $250,000.00, in default thereof, to serve one additional year in jail. The sentence imposed by the trial judge was within the statutory range of sentences provided for in the 1993 version of La.R.S. 40:967(F).
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former substance-based § 40:967(C) possession penalties with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(C) limits imprisonment for possession of cocaine to five years, so added jail time imposed as a probation condition cannot increase the defendant's total exposure beyond that maximum.

State v. Alexander · filed 1996-12-26(C)

The record reflects that defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine under La.R.S. 40:967(C), which provides for a sentence of imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years. The defendant was given the maximum sentence of five years, and an additional 160 days in parish jail as a condition of probation. ... Since defendant is now exposed to a term of imprisonment of five years, 160 days, his sentence exceeds the maximum allowed under 40:967(C).
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B) sets a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor imprisonment range for violating its distribution-of-cocaine provision.

State v. Merrill · filed 1995-01-31(B)

The penalty for violating La.R.S. 40:967(B) is imprisonment at hard labor for a period of not less than five years nor more than 30 years.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

Subsection (F), together with the Habitual Offender Law, requires a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence for this sentencing combination.

State v. Eggerson · filed 1995-09-15(F)

Under La.R.S. 40:967(F) and La.R.S. 15:529.1 the mandatory minimum sentence is twenty years at hard labor.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B)(1) requires a person convicted of distributing cocaine to receive a minimum five-year prison sentence.

State v. Johnson · filed 1995-12-13(B)(1)

Since the trial court erroneously informed defendant that she was eligible for probation when she was in fact not eligible for probation and had to receive a minimum jail sentence of five years under La.R.S. 40:967, we believe that she is entitled to have the guilty plea set aside.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

Section 40:967(F), together with the habitual-offender statute, mandated a thirty-year sentence, but a lower sentence could be imposed only after a proper finding that the mandated sentence was constitutionally excessive.

State v. Webster · filed 1996-02-02(F)

This sentence was below the sentence of thirty years at hard labor mandated by La.R.S. 40:967(F) and La.R.S. 15:529.1. ... Although the trial judge gave reasons for imposing the eleven year sentence, it does not appear that he made a proper finding that imposition of the statutorily mandated sentence would be constitutionally excessive. See State v. Lombard, 95-2107, 662 So.2d 1039 (La. 11/27/95). Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court to justify its deviation from the statutorily-mandated minimum sentence. In the event the court concludes the statutorily-mandated minimum sentence should be imposed, it should give defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B)(1) requires a sentence of five to thirty years at hard labor for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, while permitting a fine of up to $15,000.

State v. Thomas · filed 1994-03-11(B)(1)

The penalty for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years. Additionally, the court may impose a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1). ... The five year sentence imposed upon defendant is the minimum term allowed by the statute. See La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1). Thus, the court was required to impose that term although it exceeds the range suggested by the guidelines.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(B) authorizes five to thirty years at hard labor and a possible fine up to $15,000; when paired with § 40:981.3(E), it supplies the applicable maximum and minimum sentencing framework.

State v. Shillow · filed 1992-05-20(B)

La.R.S. 40:967(B) provides for a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years and a possible fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars. Based on both of these statutes, under which defendant was convicted, the trial court was mandated to impose the maximum fine of fifteen thousand dollars, and not less than one-half of the thirty year maximum sentence, fifteen years, which must be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) makes the fine mandatory for possession of 28 to under 200 grams of cocaine; failure to impose it is patent error.

State v. Martin · filed 2000-11-15(F)(1)(a)

A fine is mandatory, and the failure to impose a fine on a defendant sentenced under this provision is an error patent.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former large-quantity cocaine possession range; Acts 2017, No. 281 later repealed § 40:967(F) and (G), with revised (D) treating unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former penalty.

Section 40:967(F)(1)(a) requires a sentence of ten to sixty years' imprisonment and a fine of $50,000 to $150,000 for the covered offense.

State v. Lewis · filed 2000-10-18(F)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 40:967 F(1)(a) provides that the offender shall be imprisoned for ten to sixty years and fined fifty thousand to one hundred fifty thousand dollars.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a two-to-thirty-year sentencing range and permits a fine of up to $50,000 for the cocaine offense at issue.

State of Louisiana v. Collins · filed 2003-10-08(B)(4)(b)

Under La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), Defendant was subject to a sentence from two to thirty years and a possible fine of up to $50,000.00.
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Section 40:967(B)(3) prescribes 10 to 30 years at hard labor for manufacturing methamphetamine, with at least 10 years without benefits, but an attempt prosecuted under the amended § 40:979 has no mandatory minimum and carries a current range of 0 to 15 years at hard labor.

State v. Howard · filed 2003-10-23(B)(3)

La. R.S. 40:967 provides that the penalty for manufacture of methamphetamine is a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 10 years nor more than 30 years, at least 10 years of which shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. ... Because the language in La. R.S. 14:27 and 40:979 is now virtually identical, it would appear that the reasoning of State v. Callahan, supra, would apply and there is no longer a mandatory minimum sentence for an attempt. The current sentencing range for attempted manufacturing of methamphetamine is 0-15 years at hard labor, to be served with or without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 repealed former § 40:967(F) large-quantity possession penalties and § 40:967(G) benefit restrictions; revised (D) treats unauthorized possession of at least 28 grams as a Subsection A violation. Earlier offenses may still use the former provisions.

Section 40:967(F)(1)(c), as amended in 2001, reduced the penalty for possession of cocaine over 400 grams to 15 to 30 years and thereby reduced the attempted-offense penalty to not more than 15 years.

State Ex Rel. John Esteen v. State of Louisiana · filed 2018-01-30(F)(1)(c)

In 2001, La.R.S. 40:967(F)(1)(c) was amended to reduce the penalty for possession of cocaine over 400 grams to 15 to 30 years (and thereby reduce the penalty for the attempted offense to not more than 15 years. Therefore, three of relator's sentences are for terms of imprisonment that are no longer authorized by law.
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Law changed since Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific Schedule II distribution penalties in § 40:967(B) with aggregate-weight ranges; earlier offenses may still use the former penalty.

For distribution of cocaine, § 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a maximum fine of $50,000 and permits probation, parole, and suspension of sentence to be restricted only for the first two years.

State v. Payne · filed 2017-05-17(B)(4)(b)

La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that the maximum fine that may be imposed for distribution of cocaine is $50,000.00. ... Defendant’s sentence on count two is also illegal due to the restriction of benefits imposed. On count two, defendant was convicted of violating La. R.S. 40:981.3 and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:981.3(D)(2) and La. R.S. *89840:967(B)(4)(b), probation, parole, and suspension of sentence should only have been restricted for the first two years.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For a 2016 offense, § 40:967(B)(1)'s then-effective penalty provision governed, authorizing 2 to 30 years at hard labor and a fine of up to $50,000 for distribution of methamphetamine.

State of Louisiana v. Sandifer · filed 2020-01-15(B)(1)

In 2016, the sentencing range for distribution of schedule II CDS, methamphetamine, was a minimum of 2 years but not more than 30 years’ imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of up to $50,000. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1) (2016). ... However, even though Sandifer was sentenced after the amendment was in effect for offenses committed after 2017, the court correctly applied the 2016 version of the statute when the offenses were committed. It was, therefore, within the court’s discretion to impose a near-maximum sentence of 25 years for distribution and the maximum 15 years for attempted distribution.
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Elements of distribution of cocaine

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine to support a conviction for distribution of cocaine.

State v. Dearmas · filed 1992-09-29A

To support such a conviction the prosecution must have established that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) covers the physical delivery of cocaine to another person as distribution.

State v. Watson · filed 1992-12-09(A)(1)

Agent Baker described in detail defendant’s conduct during the transaction which included the actual physical delivery of cocaine by him to the agent by placement in the agent’s vehicle ashtray. This overt activity was sufficient to constitute the offense of distribution of cocaine as defined in La.R.S. 40:961(13).
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Section 40:967(A) makes it unlawful knowingly or intentionally to distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II, and proof of money is not necessary to establish distribution.

State v. Slan · filed 1993-11-29(A)

The elements of the crime of distribution of crack cocaine are as follows: "... it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute ... a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II." La.R.S. 40:967(A). The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sold rock cocaine to a police officer. The State put into evidence the crime lab report and the cocaine that the defendant sold to Officer Livingston. The State proved every essential element of R.S. 40:967(A). Money is not necessary to prove distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. Admission of the twenty dollar bill was harmless error.
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Section 40:967 prohibits distributing cocaine, and distribution requires proof that the defendant transferred possession or control of the cocaine to intended recipients.

State v. Cummings · filed 1996-02-28(A)(1)

In order to prove distribution of cocaine, the state had to prove that defendant transferred possession or control of the rocks of cocaine to his intended recipients. State v. Martin, 310 So.2d 544 (La.1975). Under the circumstances presented, we find that the state met its burden of proof, that is, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact-finder could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant transferred possession or control of the rocks of cocaine to his intended recipients. The court of appeal erred in holding otherwise.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) requires the state to prove that a defendant knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine to establish distribution.

State v. Harris · filed 1996-08-21(A)(1)

The crime of distribution of cocaine requires the state to prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally delivered the controlled dangerous substance. La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1); State v. Martin, 595 So.2d 592 (La.1992).
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Section 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful, absent authorization, knowingly or intentionally to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and cocaine distribution requires proof of knowing and intentional distribution.

State v. Henton · filed 1996-09-25(A)(1)

The offense of distribution of cocaine is defined in pertinent part in LSA-R.S. 40:967(A): Except as authorized by this Part or by Part VII-B of Chapter 5 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance. See La. R.S. 40:964, Schedule II(A)(4). State v. Williams, 618 So.2d 606 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). The crime of distribution is the knowing and intentional distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. State v. Fairley, 25,951 (La.App.2d Cir. 5/4/94), 645 So.2d 213. Therefore, to convict the defendant of this offense, the state must prove that Walter Henton did knowingly and intentionally distribute cocaine.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 lowered the former cocaine-distribution minimum, and Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced its drug-specific range with weight tiers; the quoted 15-to-60-year habitual-offender range depends on the older base penalty.

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and Section 40:967(B)(1) sets the underlying penalty for distribution of cocaine, considered here with the habitual-offender statute.

State v. McIntyre · filed 1998-01-27(A)(1), (B)(1)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of distribution of cocaine in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1), which provides in pertinent part: A. Manufacture; distribution. Except as authorized by this Part or by Part VII-B of Chapter 5 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.[1] ... The state established that defendant distributed cocaine on two occasions to Agent Jackson through the testimony of Agents Crawford and Jackson. ... We find the evidence sufficient to support defendant's two convictions for distribution of cocaine. ... As a second felony offender, defendant could have received a sentence that ranged between 15 and 60 years. La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1); La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).
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Section 40:967(A)(1) makes distribution of cocaine an offense when a person knowingly or intentionally distributes, physically delivers, or administers cocaine, including by transferring possession or control to the intended recipient.

State v. Hubbard · filed 1998-04-08A(1)

The crime of distribution of cocaine occurs when any person knowingly or intentionally distributes, physically delivers or administers cocaine, a Schedule II CDS. La. R.S. 40:967 A(1). The defendant is guilty of this offense when he transfers possession or control of cocaine to his intended recipients.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing cocaine, and a conviction for cocaine distribution requires transferring possession or control to the intended recipient.

State v. Daniels · filed 1999-05-05(A)(1)

A violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1) occurs when any person knowingly or intentionally distributes, physically delivers or administers cocaine, a schedule II CDS. ... A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers its possession or control to the intended recipient.
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Section 40:967 prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing cocaine, requiring proof of delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance, and its exact identity.

State v. Caldwell · filed 1999-09-22(A)(1)

La. R.S. 40:967 makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally, among other acts, to distribute cocaine, a Schedule II CDS. ... A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of the cocaine to his intended recipients. ... The State must show (1) "delivery" or "physical transfer"; (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally producing, manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to do so a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and distribution requires delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and exact identity.

State v. Bradford · filed 1999-10-27A(1)

A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of the cocaine to his intended recipients. State v. Cummings, 95-1137 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132, 1135; State v. Manning, 30,809 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/98), 715 So.2d 668; State v. Hubbard, 30,604 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/8/98), 711 So.2d 393. The State must show (1) "delivery" or "physical transfer"; (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. State v. Manning, supra.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine, which is established by showing a transfer of the drug's possession or control; the quantity transferred is irrelevant.

State v. Boles · filed 2000-05-10(A)(1)

The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, distribution of cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). The statute provides that, "[e]xcept as authorized by this Part or by Part VII-B of Chapter 5 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950," it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute cocaine. In order to prove distribution of cocaine, the State had to show that the defendant transferred its possession or control to his intended recipient. ... The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, distribution of cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967 A(1). As discussed in the previous assignment, the State simply had to prove the defendant transferred possession of the drug to another person. Quantity is irrelevant.
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Law changed since Acts 2001, No. 403 reduced the former cocaine-distribution minimum and benefit restriction from five years to two; Acts 2017, No. 281 replaced the former drug-specific § 40:967(B) penalties with aggregate-weight tiers. Earlier offenses may still use the applicable former rule, subject to La. R.S. 15:308(B).

Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, including cocaine, and Section 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor sentencing range for cocaine distribution, with the first five years without benefits.

State v. Ross · filed 2000-05-17(A)(1); (B)(4)(b)

In the present case, Defendant was convicted of one count of distribution of cocaine in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1), which provides in pertinent part: A. Manufacture; distribution. Except as authorized by this Part or by Part VII-B of Chapter 5 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.... ... Based on this direct testimony, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the finding that the Defendant distributed cocaine. ... The penalties for distribution of cocaine, set out in La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b), state that: Distribution, dispensing, or possession with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense cocaine or cocaine base or a mixture or substance containing cocaine or its analogues as provided in Schedule II(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964 shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. ... Based on Defendant's record and the sentencing range for the offense, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing a sentence in the lower end of the sentencing range. The sentence imposed is not excessive.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing cocaine, and a distribution conviction does not require proof of the quantity transferred.

State v. Boles · filed 2000-05-10(A)(1)

The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, distribution of cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1). ... In order to prove distribution of cocaine, the State had to show that the defendant transferred its possession or control to his intended recipient. ... Quantity is irrelevant.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967 requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed cocaine and authorizes a sentence of five to 30 years at hard labor, with the first five years without benefits, plus a possible fine.

State v. George · filed 2001-04-04

To convict the defendant of distribution of cocaine, the state is required to prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed cocaine. La. R.S. 40:967. ... The evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed cocaine. ... The penalty for distribution of cocaine under La. R.S. 40:967 is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than 30 years, with the first five years of said sentence being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence; and may, in addition, include a fine of not more than $50,000.00.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(A) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled substance, and § 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets the penalty for cocaine distribution at five to thirty years at hard labor, with the first five years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Harris · filed 2001-04-18(A); (B)(4)(b)

Defendant was charged with and convicted of distribution of cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A), which makes it unlawful for any person to |7knowingly or intentionally, among other things, distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II, which includes cocaine. ... A defendant distributes a controlled dangerous substance when he transfers possession or control of it to his intended recipient. ... The state must show (1) “delivery” or “physical transfer;” (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. ... Guilty knowledge need not be proven as fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances. ... La. R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b) provides that upon conviction for distribution of cocaine a defendant shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with the first five years without the benefit of parole, probation of suspension of sentence.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that a defendant produced, manufactured, distributed, or dispensed cocaine, or possessed it with intent to do so; only general intent is required, and voluntary distribution establishes that intent.

State v. Magee · filed 2001-10-10(A)(1)

Under La. R.S. 40:967 A(1), the state must prove that defendant produced, manufactured, distributed, or dispensed or possessed with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, cocaine. Only general intent is required, and such intent is established by mere proof of voluntary distribution. See State v. Williams, 352 So.2d 1295, 1296 (La.1977); State v. Banks, 307 So.2d 594, 596 (La. 1975).
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Section 40:967 requires proof of a delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer, and the exact identity of the substance to convict for distribution of cocaine.

State v. Davis · filed 2001-11-09

In order to convict an individual of distribution of cocaine, the state must prove a delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer, and the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 40:967(A) requires proof that a defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine, while § 40:967(B)(4)(b) sets a five-to-30-year hard-labor range, makes the first five years ineligible for parole, probation, or suspension, and permits a fine up to $50,000.

State v. Anderson · filed 2002-01-15(A), (B)(4)(b)

To prove distribution of cocaine, the State must show that the Defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine, a dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. ... Distribution of cocaine is punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than 30 years, with the first five years being without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence[1]. Additionally, it may carry a fine of not more than $50,000.
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Section 40:967(B)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, and a cocaine-distribution conviction requires physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and proof of the substance's identity.

State v. Armstead · filed 2002-11-06(B)(1)

The defendant was also convicted of attempted distribution of cocaine. La. R.S. 40:967 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person “knowingly or intentionally ... [t]o ... distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II.” Cocaine and its derivatives are listed in Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:964. A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of cocaine to his intended recipients.
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Section 40:967(A) requires the State to prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine.

State v. Rogers · filed 2003-06-19(A)

The defendant was convicted of violating LSA-R.S. 40:967(A), distribution of cocaine. Pursuant to that statute, the State was' required to prove that defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine.
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Section 40:967(A) requires the State to prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine.

State v. Addison · filed 2004-03-30(A)

Defendant was convicted of violating La. R.S. 40:967(A), distribution of cocaine. Pursuant to that statute, the State was required to prove that defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing a Schedule II controlled substance, and a person who arranges or facilitates the transfer from seller to buyer may be punished as a principal to that distribution.

State v. Brown · filed 2005-05-31(A)(1)

Distribution of cocaine is defined in La. R.S. 40:967(A)(1), which provides that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. ... As a general rule, the law of principals applies to all crimes including those for the offense of narcotics distribution, defined as the “delivery” or transfer of possession and control over controlled substances. ... In Louisiana, an intermediary who arranges or facilitates the transfer of narcotics from the seller to the buyer may, therefore, be charged and punished as a principal in the act of distribution.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing cocaine, and distribution requires delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and proof of the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.

State of Louisiana v. Perkins · filed 2007-10-31(A)(1)

It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute cocaine, which is classified as a controlled dangerous substance. La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1); La.R.S. 40:964. “A defendant is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of cocaine to his intended recipients.” State v. Anderson, 29,282, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/18/97), 697 So.2d 651, 655. To establish the offense of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, the state’s burden is to establish beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) ‘delivery’ or ‘physical transfer;’ (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.” Id.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) requires the State to prove that a defendant charged with cocaine distribution intended to distribute cocaine.

State v. Carmouche · filed 2008-01-30(A)(1)

Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), the State has the burden of proving that Defendant had the intent to distribute cocaine.
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Section 40:967(A) makes distribution of cocaine require a delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge that the substance is controlled, and proof of the substance’s exact identity.

State v. Alexander · filed 2009-01-14(A)

An individual is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of the cocaine to his intended recipient. The state must show (1) delivery or physical transfer; (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.
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Section 40:967(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed cocaine, including delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge, and the identity of the controlled dangerous substance.

State v. Griffin · filed 2009-10-23(A)(1)

The crime of distribution is the knowing or intentional distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. Distribution is defined as "delivery" or "physical transfer." In addition to delivery, the State must prove the defendant must have known or had guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance when he or she transferred it. The exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance is an essential element of the crime of distribution thereof.
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Section 40:967 prohibits distribution of cocaine and requires proof of delivery or physical transfer, guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance, and its exact identity.

State v. Cox · filed 2009-12-09

An individual is guilty of distribution of cocaine when he transfers possession or control of the cocaine to his intended recipient. The state must show: (1) delivery or physical transfer; (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance.
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Notes 301–450 of 744, oldest cases first.

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