Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-56

Granting or denying a subsection (f) request for additional time to obtain evidence lies within the trial court's discretion and is reversed only for clear abuse.

Amason v. Highland Park Homeowners' Association, Inc. · filed 2021-12-02(f)

“The granting or denial of a motion under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.”

Additional discovery need not be allowed under subsection (f) when it would add no substance to the claim and could not alter conclusions based largely on law.

Malcolm Sidney Moore, Jr. v. Humble · filed 2023-06-21(f)

As to the second argument, we fail to discern how the additional discovery Humble seeks — probing Moore’s alleged indiscretions and net worth — would alter our conclusions above, which are based largely on matters of law.

Subsection (g) applies only when a party files a summary-judgment motion in bad faith or solely for delay and does not support fees against the nonmoving opponent.

Ravenwood Church of Wicca v. Starbright, Inc. · filed 1983-11-16(g)

However, this reliance is ill-founded because this subsection only applies when a party to a lawsuit files a motion for summary judgment and it becomes apparent that the motion was filed in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay.

Subsection (g) authorizes reasonable attorney fees and expenses when an affidavit is presented in bad faith or solely for delay, with the sanction reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Malloy v. Cauley · filed 1984-01-31(g)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (g) (Code Ann. § 81A-156) authorizes certain sanctions, including reasonable attorney fees and expenses, “[s]hould it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this Code section are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay____”

Section 56(g) permits assessment of expenses for a bad-faith affidavit, but refusal is harmless when the remaining evidence independently authorizes summary judgment.

Spell v. Port City Adhesives, Inc. · filed 1987-07-14(g)

As to appellee’s submission of the affidavit, we likewise find no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to assess reasonable expenses pursuant to appellant’s invocation of OCGA § 9-11-56 (g).

Section 9-11-56 does not violate the right to a jury trial because summary judgment is available only when no material factual issue exists, leaving nothing for a jury to decide.

Harry v. Glynn County · filed 1998-06-01(c)

The same reasoning applies equally to summary judgment since summary judgment may be entered only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . . . .”

A party's entitlement to a jury trial does not preclude summary judgment when no material facts are disputed.

Capitol View Community Church v. Achor Center, Inc. · filed 2002-09-04(c)

First, it is moot, since whether they were entitled to a jury trial does not preclude summary judgment if there are no disputed material facts. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Summary judgment does not violate the jury-trial right when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Ware v. Multibank 2009-1 Res-Adc Venture, LLC · filed 2014-04-30(c)

However, where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

A malpractice affidavit sufficient for pleading under section 9-11-9.1 is not necessarily sufficient to satisfy section 9-11-56’s evidentiary standard or defeat summary judgment.

Ezor v. Thompson · filed 2000-05-01

A valid OCGA § 9-11-9.1 affidavit standing alone is not necessarily sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes a pleading requirement; it does not require that the affidavit be sufficient to satisfy the evi-dentiary standards of OCGA § 9-11-56.

A summary-judgment motion may challenge both the evidentiary sufficiency of a malpractice expert affidavit and compliance with the malpractice-affidavit pleading requirement.

Grier-Baxter v. Sibley · filed 2001-01-16

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was a proper method by which to seek an adjudication in their favor. The trial court did not err in granting the motion.

A party relying on evidence outside the complaint to defeat a pleaded claim must pursue summary judgment rather than dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Greene County School District v. Circle Y Construction, Inc. · filed 2011-03-28(c)

If there was evidence otherwise establishing that Circle Y’s services were not covered by the ELOST funding, the school district needed to pursue a motion for summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Although subsection (e) prevents a nonmovant from resting solely on pleaded allegations, subsections (c) and (d) still require the court to examine and favorably construe the pleadings when deciding summary judgment.

Kuhlman v. State · filed 2023-09-06(c), (d), (e)

The Civil Practice Act provides that, on motion for summary judgment, although the non-movant “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,” OCGA § 9-11-56 (e), the pleadings nevertheless must be examined, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), (d). ... on motion for summary judgment, both “the evidence and pleadings will be construed in favor of the non-moving party”.

A plaintiff cannot obtain summary judgment solely on an unverified complaint or an unsworn brief because neither constitutes evidence.

Welker-Reyes v. Velocity Investments, LLC, as Assignee of X1, Inc., as Assignee of Coastal Community Bank · filed 2026-02-25(c)

[U]nsworn pleadings such as an unverified complaint do not constitute evidence and thus cannot be considered in addressing a motion for summary judgment. Likewise, a brief in support of a motion for summary judgment is not proper evidence upon which summary judgment can be granted.

A party cannot obtain summary judgment on a new claim first asserted in the summary-judgment motion rather than pleaded in the case.

Sagicor Enterprises, LLC v. Coleman · filed 2026-06-25(c)

This “completely new claim made for the first time in a motion for summary judgment does not satisfy even the liberal requirements of the Georgia Civil Practice Act for notice pleading[.]”

Subsection (e) requires the original summary-judgment affidavit to be filed with the court and copies to be served on opposing parties.

Clauss v. PLANTATION EQUITY GROUP, INC. · filed 1999-02-03(e)

The affidavit included in the record on appeal is labeled “original copy 2 of 2” and does not contain original signatures. In addition, the Carroll County Clerk’s office has indicated that the ... original affidavit was not filed in this case. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) provides that the original affidavit must be filed with the court, with copies served on opposing parties.

A corporate officer’s affidavit can authenticate an attached mailing receipt for consideration on summary judgment when it identifies the document as the receipt obtained in connection with the mailing.

Oriental Farmers Food Corp. v. Agency Services, Inc. · filed 1999-03-17(e)

However, there is nothing in OCGA § 33-22-13 (c) requiring proof of the accuracy of the receipt, and defendant has complied with that provision by providing the receipt which it did obtain in connection with the mailing. In other words, no hearsay was involved in the matter to be proven by defendant, that the bulk mailing document was the receipt received from the post office in connection with the mailing to plaintiff. The required evidence was provided by the statements in the affidavit of defendant’s president which also authenticated the bulk mailing document so as to permit its consideration by the superior court.

Affidavits opposing summary judgment must comply with subsection (e)'s evidentiary requirements.

McCarter v. La Hacienda Condominium Assn. · filed 2002-04-15(e)

Affidavits in opposition to motions for summary judgment must conform to OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) as to the rules of evidence, which is the “codification of the common law requirements as to affidavits.”

A document lacking a jurat showing that witnesses swore to personal knowledge and signed before a notary is not a valid affidavit under subsection (e).

Jennings v. PSYCHIATRIC HEALTH SERVICES, INC. · filed 2002-10-21(e)

This does not constitute an affidavit because there is no jurat stating that the witnesses were sworn in the presence of a notary public; stating such facts under oath of their own knowledge; and stating such document was signed in the presence of a notary.

An unauthenticated document attached to an unverified complaint or summary-judgment brief is not competent evidence capable of creating a genuine issue of material fact.

Jones v. City of Willacoochee · filed 2009-08-18(c)

As such, the unauthenticated, purported notice was not competent evidence that could create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment.

A summary-judgment movant does not establish entitlement under subsection (c) with affidavits or answers absent from the appellate record or with an unauthenticated document.

Goodson v. Pointer · filed 2012-10-31(c)

But the affidavit and answers are not in the appellate record, and the lease stands unauthenticated.

Section 9-11-56(e) requires a summary judgment affidavit to include pertinent records it relies on and refers to, but does not require a copy of the credit application in this circumstance.

Melman v. FIA Card Services, N.A. · filed 2011-10-28(e)

A copy of the credit application was not required.

A court cannot grant summary judgment on an unrequested ground without giving the affected party an opportunity to respond formally.

Akins v. Couch · filed 1999-06-14

The Couches had not filed a ... motion for summary judgment on this basis, but had sought to amend the pretrial order to add the issue of waiver. In granting summary judgment without providing the Akinses an opportunity to respond formally, the trial court ignored OCGA § 9-11-56.

When a forfeiture claimant moves for summary judgment with evidence of an illegal search, the court must allow the State to respond before determining whether a material factual issue exists.

Woods v. State · filed 2000-03-28(c)

The proper procedure would have been to allow the State to respond to the motion to determine if there were a material issue of fact as to the search’s legality.

A court may grant summary judgment sua sponte only if the affected party receives full and fair notice and an opportunity to respond; no response is required on issues the motion did not raise.

Forsyth County v. WATERSCAPE SERVICES, LLC · filed 2010-03-16(c)

Nothing in the applicable law places a burden on the nonmovant to respond to issues which are not raised in the motion for summary judgment. But a trial court may grant summary judgment sua sponte under certain circumstances, so long as it ensures that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment.

A summary-judgment grant may be affirmed on an unstated ground when the movant raised it below and the nonmovant had a fair opportunity to respond.

HILL v. JACKSON Et Al. · filed 2016-03-24(c)

A grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason, whether stated or unstated in the trial court’s order, so long as the movant raised the issue in the trial court and the nonmovant had a fair opportunity to respond.

A court may grant summary judgment sua sponte on an unraised issue only after giving the adversely affected party full and fair notice and an opportunity to respond.

ROBERTS Et Al. v. MULKEY Et Al. · filed 2017-10-31

Although a trial court may, sua sponte, grant summary judgment on an issue not raised by the parties, in so doing the trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment.

A summary-judgment respondent must receive notice and a reasonable opportunity to refute the movant's no-genuine-issue showing.

SERENITY BUILDERS AND DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. LINCOLN COUNTY · filed 2024-10-30(c)

A motion for summary judgment is a vehicle for disposing of a controversy without the necessity of a trial. It is, as the description shows, a summary disposition of the issues in order to efficiently resolve litigation. Nevertheless, due process requires that the respondent not be surprised; rather, that he be given reasonable opportunity to refute the movant’s showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. It is error to grant a motion for summary judgment without giving notice or the opportunity to be heard.

A summary-judgment grant may be affirmed on an alternative ground only if the movant raised that issue below and the nonmovant had a fair opportunity to respond.

R. H. v. ED WAGNER · filed 2022-10-11

A grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason, whether stated or unstated in the trial court’s order, so long as the movant raised the issue in the trial court and the nonmovant had a fair opportunity to respond.

Section 9-11-56(c) requires service of a summary judgment motion at least 30 days before the hearing and allows the opposing party to serve affidavits before the hearing.

Hart v. Appling County School Board · filed 2004-03-08(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.”

Subsection (a) allows a party to move for summary judgment after 30 days from commencement of the action or after the adverse party serves its own summary-judgment motion; discovery need not be complete.

Allgood Farm, LLC v. Johnson · filed 2002-06-25(a)

Also, there is no requirement that a motion for summary judgment be filed after the close of discovery. ... party may move for summary judgment “at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (a).

A party may move for summary judgment after 30 days from commencement of the action even if discovery is incomplete, and the court must grant the motion forthwith if the filed pleadings and evidence establish entitlement.

Garner v. Roberts · filed 1999-06-29(a), (c)

First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by hearing Dr. Roberts’ motion for summary judgment before discovery was complete. To the extent Garner argues that the motion was premature, OCGA § 9-11-56 (a) provides that a party may move for summary judgment “at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the com...mencement of the action.” If the pleadings and evidence on file show entitlement to judgment, it shall be granted forthwith. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Subsection (b) permits a defendant to move for summary judgment at any time, including after a proposed pretrial order has been filed.

Gomez v. Chao · filed 1999-07-29(b)

The argument is without merit because the only pretrial order we have found in the record is not a final consolidated order signed by both sides, but is simply the Gomezes’ proposed version of such an order. Moreover, the argument is without merit because a defendant ... may move for summary judgment at any time. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (b).

A defendant may move for summary judgment at any time.

Boaz v. Latson · filed 2003-03-07(a)

A defendant, however, may move for summary judgment “at any time.”

A claimant may move for summary judgment after 30 days from commencement of the action, and the court need not await completion of discovery when the case is otherwise ripe.

Vick v. Tower Place, L.P. · filed 2004-05-13(a)

Likewise, the trial court is not required to wait until the completion of discovery to rule on a motion for summary judgment, if the case is otherwise ripe for a ruling thereon.

A defendant may move for summary judgment at any time, with or without supporting affidavits.

Udoinyion v. Michelin North America, Inc. · filed 2011-12-08(b)

But Michelin submitted the affidavit contemporaneously with its motion for summary judgment in compliance with OCGA § 9-11-56 (b), which allows a defendant in a civil action to, “at ... any ... time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor.”

A plaintiff may move for summary judgment after 30 days from commencement, but the motion must be filed early enough not to delay trial and the opponent must receive at least 30 days to respond before it is heard.

COSTA Et Al. v. HAMILTON STATE BANK · filed 2017-06-19(a), (c)

A party, such as the bank, seeking to recover upon a claim, “may, at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action . . . move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in [its] favor upon all or any part thereof.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (a). ... And more than 30 days elapsed before the trial court ruled on the motion, giving Costa and Achecar the opportunity to respond to it. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing”).

Subsection (b)'s permission for a defendant to move for summary judgment “at any time” does not eliminate filing-time limits, and a court may decline a motion filed too late to decide without delaying trial.

Steele v. RIVERCHASE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. · filed 2011-08-01(b)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (b) states that a defending party “may, at any time, move . . . for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part” of the claim against him. However, this Court has held that the phrase “ ‘[a]t any time’ . . . does not mean that a motion for summary judgment may be filed without time limit whatsoever.”

A verified pleading has no greater effect than a subsection (e) affidavit and must be based on personal knowledge.

Allstate Insurance v. Sutton · filed 2008-03-07(e)

“a verified pleading has no greater effect than an affidavit tendered pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) and must comply with the Rule 56 (e) requirement that both supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge”.

A verified answer asserting payment, set-off, and accord and satisfaction creates a jury issue on an open-account claim when it pleads specific facts satisfying the affidavit standard.

Five Star Steel Construction, Inc. v. Klockner Namasco Corp. · filed 1999-11-08(e)

A verified answer to a claim for open account that sets out the defenses of payment, set-off, and accord and satisfaction creates a factual issue. The sworn answer creates a proper jury question to a suit on an open account on motion for summary judgment when the verified answer sets forth a scintilla of rebuttal evidence on such issues by pleading specific facts, because the verified answer meets the standard for affidavits as to specific facts.

A verified pleading that does not show it was based on personal knowledge is insufficient to create a jury issue under subsection (e).

Adcock v. Adcock · filed 2003-02-07(e)

Such verification, as not showing that it was made upon personal knowledge, however, was insufficient to raise a jury issue.

A verified pleading opposing summary judgment must be based on personal knowledge to serve as evidence against supporting affidavits.

Hansen v. Mt. Yonah Scenic Estates Club, Inc. · filed 1997-07-11(e)

However, a verified pleading has no greater effect than an affidavit tendered pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) and must comply with the Rule 56 (e) requirement that both supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge. ... Accordingly, the pleadings were not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment supported by sworn affidavits based on personal knowledge of the defendants.

Subsection (c) requires the trial court to review the entire record before ruling on a summary-judgment motion.

Georgia Receivables, Inc. v. Welch · filed 2000-01-31(c)

On summary judgment, the trial court must consider the entire record. ... Since the trial court has an obligation to review the entire record before rendering judgment on a motion for summary judgment, there was no error in the trial court reviewing the contract, which was part of the record, to ensure it met the requirements of OCGA § 10-1-393.2 (b)-(m) arid (o).

Because appellate review of summary judgment considers the entire record de novo, an asserted failure by the trial court to review particular depositions is not itself grounds for reversal.

Glover v. Georgia Power Company · filed 2018-09-26(c)

In our review of the grant or denial of summary judgment, however, this Court “considers de novo the entire record.” ... Thus, Glover’s claim is not grounds for reversal.

A trial court’s failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when granting summary judgment under section 9-11-56 is not a basis for reversal.

Desmond v. Mitsubishi · filed 2000-03-24

Although findings of fact and conclusions of law are helpful for appellate review, a trial court’s failure to issue them in granting summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56 provides no basis for reversal.

A trial court need not issue express findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on a summary-judgment motion under section 9-11-56.

Tyler v. Thompson · filed 2011-03-04

“The trial court is not required to make express findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on motions for summary judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56.”

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment directly appealable without compliance with interlocutory-appeal requirements.

Garrett v. Southern Health · filed 2012-04-27(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); see also Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989). Because the order at issue is directly appealable and is not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Bonds v. Nesbitt · filed 2012-05-08(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Willis v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2012-05-09(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Allstate Insurance v. Willis · filed 2012-05-09(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

A denial of summary judgment is not directly appealable under § 9-11-56(h) merely because the order contains factual findings; the trial court must clearly grant partial summary judgment.

Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Crenshaw · filed 2012-05-10(h)

Because the trial court did not clearly grant partial summ ary judgm ent to Crenshaw, we conclude that Norfolk Southern Railway Company could not file a direct appeal pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment directly appealable and not subject to interlocutory-appeal requirements.

Merrill Jackson Carter, as of the Estate of Gordon W. Jackson v. Scott · filed 2012-05-16(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment, however, is directly appealable. It is not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Olympic Dev. Group, Inc. v. American Druggists' Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985).

Under § 9-11-56(h), a grant of summary judgment is directly appealable even when it does not resolve every outstanding claim.

G. Edward Robertson, Jr. v. Ridge Environmental, LLC · filed 2012-05-21(h)

Because a grant of summary judgment is directly appealable, even if it does not resolve the case as to all outstanding claims, Robertson’s interlocutory application is hereby GRANTED. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) (“An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.”).

Under § 9-11-56(h), a grant of summary judgment is directly appealable even when it does not resolve every outstanding claim.

C & H Quality Homes, Inc v. Ridge Environmental, LLC · filed 2012-05-21(h)

Because a grant of summary judgment is directly appealable, even if it does not resolve the case as to all outstanding claims, C&H’s interlocutory application is hereby GRANTED. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) (“An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.”).

A grant of partial summary judgment on fewer than all claims or parties is directly appealable under subsection (h) if the notice of appeal is filed within 30 days.

Presidential Financial Corp. v. Francis A. Bonanno, Inc. · filed 2000-06-12(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties is reviewable by direct appeal if the notice of appeal is filed within 30 days of the rendition of such judgment.”

When an interlocutory appeal authorized by subsection (h) is taken, the trial court loses power to revise the summary judgment, which becomes final and gains res judicata effect after affirmance and exhaustion of appellate review.

Benedict v. Snead · filed 2002-01-30(h)

On the other hand, if an appeal is taken pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the trial court is divested by the appeal of the power to revise the summary judgment, and the judgment as to that party becomes final with res judicata effect after it is affirmed on appeal and the right to appellate review has been exhausted.

Subsection (h) does not authorize a direct appeal from every summary-judgment grant and must be read with the statutes governing direct and discretionary appellate procedure.

Bullock v. Sand · filed 2003-03-26(h)

Although OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) provides that “(a)n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal,” this statute does not provide for direct appeals from ... grants of summary judgment, but must be read in conjunction with OCGA §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-35 regarding the procedure for appeal to this court.

Subsection (h) lets the losing party appeal a summary-judgment grant immediately or wait until final judgment, when the earlier grant remains reviewable.

Willis v. City of Atlanta · filed 2004-02-17(h)

[OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)] is an exception to the finality rule which is for the benefit of the losing party. The party against ... whom summary judgment was granted may appeal either after the grant of summary judgment or after the rendition of the final judgment. Therefore, when the losing party appeals after the rendition of the final judgment, the grant of summary judgment is still subject to appellate review.

Section 9-11-56 contemplates a merits judgment, so an evidentiary ruling that resolves no claim or element of damages is not a partial summary judgment directly appealable under subsection (h).

Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County · filed 2006-06-30(h)

[OCGA § 9-11-56] contemplates a judgment on the merits. ... Because such rulings were not judgments on the merits of any element of damage, they did not constitute a viable grant of partial summary judgment.

A party may appeal an order granting partial summary judgment immediately or wait until final judgment to appeal it.

Perrett v. Sumner · filed 2007-07-06(h)

A party, however, may wait until final judgment to appeal an order granting partial summary judgment.

An order granting partial summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), but immediate appeal is optional and review may instead be sought after final judgment.

Patterson v. Bristol Timber Co. · filed 2007-07-09(h)

The trial court’s March 6 order was directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), but such an appeal was not mandatory.

An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h), including a converted dismissal motion that grants partial summary judgment.

City of Demorest v. Town of Mount Airy · filed 2007-11-05(h)

The grant of summary judgment to appellee Ivy Hills LLC is directly appealable. OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Since the motions to dismiss asserted, among other things, that the complaint failed to state a claim and the trial court considered material beyond the pleadings in ruling on the motions to dismiss, those motions were required to be treated as motions for summary judgment (OCGA § 9-11-12 (b)), and the losing party has the right to a direct appeal from an order granting partial summary judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h)'s direct-appeal exception applies only to a true merits judgment; an order dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not summary judgment regardless of its label.

First Christ Holiness Church, Inc. v. Owens Temple First Christ Holiness Church, Inc. · filed 2008-01-08(h)

However, a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a summary judgment, regardless of how it is styled. A summary judgment is a judgment on the merits of the underlying claims or defenses.

Unless summary judgment has been granted on a claim or the ruling is certified, a direct appeal is premature while a counterclaim remains pending below.

Yates v. CACV OF COLORADO, LLC · filed 2008-12-03(h)

Unless summary judgment is granted on a claim (see OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)) or the matter is certified pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-54 (b), a direct appeal is premature and must be dismissed where a counterclaim remains pending in the court below.

An order granting partial summary judgment is immediately appealable without certification even when other cross-claims remain pending.

MCG Health, Inc. v. Owners Insurance Co. · filed 2010-03-12(h)

While it is true that Morgan’s cross-claims remain pending, the trial court treated Morgan’s motion to dismiss as a cross-motion for summary judgment, and an order granting partial summary judgment is immediately appealable even if the trial court has not certified the order for immediate review.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties directly appealable.

Gaulden v. Green · filed 2012-06-08(h)

The grant of summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties may be appealed directly. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Olympic Dev. Group, Inc. v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985).

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment reviewable by direct appeal.

Dean v. Regency Square Apartments and Tovolli II LLC · filed 2012-07-03(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989). Therefore, the order in this case is subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment subject to direct appeal.

Oviedo v. Sanchez · filed 2012-07-03(h)

An order granting summary judgment is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 243 (248 SE2d 641) (1978).

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment subject to direct appeal.

Rivera v. Sanchez · filed 2012-07-03(h)

An order granting summary judgment is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 243 (248 SE2d 641) (1978).

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without interlocutory-appeal procedures.

Teter v. Leaf Financial Corporation · filed 2012-07-13(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Primary Investments, LLC, F/K/A Primary Prep Academy, Llc. v. Wee Tender Care III, Inc. · filed 2012-07-16(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Chicago Title Insurance Company v. Dewrell Sacks, LLP · filed 2012-09-12(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. See Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Lawson v. Richman · filed 2012-09-25(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Donald Gay, Jr. v. Smith · filed 2012-09-25(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment reviewable by direct appeal.

Collier v. Economy Auto Sales, Inc. · filed 2012-10-11(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989). Therefore, the order in this case is subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment subject to direct appeal.

Cerezo v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc · filed 2012-10-11(h)

An order granting summary judgment is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 243 (248 SE2d 641) (1978).

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of summary judgment reviewable by direct appeal.

Aubain-Gray v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. · filed 2012-10-30(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal.

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of summary judgment or partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Grizzle v. Progressive Premier Insurance Company of Illinios · filed 2012-11-05(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment or partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Under subsection (h), a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable without satisfying interlocutory-appeal requirements.

Diamond v. Department of Transportation · filed 2013-02-13(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Thus, the order that the plaintiffs seek to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

City of Tybee Island, Georgia v. Live Oak Group, LLC · filed 2013-02-21(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Evert v. Jenkins · filed 2013-06-27(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Orders granting summary judgment are directly appealable under subsection (h), so no discretionary application is necessary.

Mahdi v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC · filed 2013-07-10(h)

Orders granting summary judgment may be appealed directly; no application is necessary.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Johnson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 2013-08-21(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment directly appealable even when other claims or parties remain pending.

Forks Timber Company, Inc. v. Heritage Bank of the South, as Successor-In-Interest to the Tattnall Bank · filed 2013-09-27(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. ... Although the trial court retained jurisdiction over the parties with respect to claims seeking expenses of litigation and punitive damages, and although the third-party claim between Forks Timber Company and James O. Hardwick remains pending, “[t]he grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties is reviewable by direct appeal if the notice of appeal is filed within 30 days of the rendition of such judgment.”

Orders granting summary judgment are directly appealable under subsection (h), so no discretionary application is necessary.

Welch v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2013-11-06(h)

Orders granting summary judgment may be appealed directly; no application is necessary.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Southwestern Emergency Physicians P.C. v. Nguyen · filed 2013-11-07(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Cooper v. Gradient Holdings, LLC · filed 2013-11-21(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Hospital Authority of valdosta/lowndes County, D/B/A South Georgia Medical Center v. Brinson · filed 2013-11-21(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Under subsection (h), an unresolved declaratory-judgment issue does not prevent a direct appeal from summary judgment on a separate mandamus issue.

SOUTHERN LNG, INC. v. MacGINNITIE · filed 2014-03-03(h)

We note that under OCGA§ 9-11-56 (h), the apparent pendency of the declaratory judgment issue in the trial court does not preclude Southern from directly appealing the court’s summary judgment order on the mandamus issue.

A summary-judgment grant as to fewer than all claims or parties is directly appealable under subsection (h) even though another defendant remains in the case.

Hardison v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., D/B/A Enterprise Rent-A-Car · filed 2014-03-04(h)

Although Hardison’s suit against another defendant remains pending below, the grant of summary judgement as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties is reviewable by direct appeal.

A partial-summary-judgment order is directly appealable under subsection (h), and discretionary zoning-appeal procedures do not apply merely because the underlying case concerns zoning.

Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2014-04-03(h)

The trial court’s order is directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Although this case concerns zoning matters, it is not an appeal from a zoning decision.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment directly appealable.

Atlanta Independent School System v. Rogers · filed 2014-07-08(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); see also Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without interlocutory-appeal requirements.

Multi Bank 2009-1 Cml-Adc Venture, LLC v. Hamilton State Bank · filed 2014-09-10(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. See Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989). The order Multibank seeks to appeal is thus directly appealable and is not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

American Alternative Insurance Corporation v. Bennett · filed 2014-09-10(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Robertson v. Robertson · filed 2014-09-29(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

A summary-judgment grant is directly appealable under subsection (h), and discretionary zoning-appeal procedures do not apply merely because the case concerns zoning.

Olympus Media, LLC v. City of Dunwoody, Georgia · filed 2014-11-19(h)

The trial court’s order is directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Although this case concerns zoning matters, it is not an appeal from a zoning decision.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Community & Southern Bank v. First Bank of Dalton · filed 2015-01-12(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Graham v. Wellstar Health System, Inc. · filed 2015-04-10(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without interlocutory-appeal requirements.

Greenberg Farrow Architecture, Inc. v. Jmls 1422, LLC · filed 2015-07-23(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Section 9-11-56(h) authorizes a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party.

Castle Point Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Simmons · filed 2015-07-23(h)

This appeal is authorized by OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) (“An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.”).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without interlocutory procedures.

The Georgia Department of Administrative Services v. Coen Company, Inc. · filed 2015-09-21(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists' Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Thus, the order that The Georgia Department of Administrative Services seeks to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without interlocutory procedures.

Argo v. G-Tec Services, LLC · filed 2015-10-06(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Thus, the order that Argo seeks to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable even when it does not resolve all outstanding claims.

Harrell Wilkerson, Jr. v. Wells · filed 2015-11-23(h)

Because a grant of summary judgment is directly appealable, even if it does not resolve the case as to all outstanding claims, Wilkerson’s interlocutory application is hereby GRANTED. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) (“An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.”).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without interlocutory-appeal requirements.

Rintoul v. Tolbert · filed 2015-12-11(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. ... Thus, the order that the plaintiffs seek to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without interlocutory-appeal requirements.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Kaydon Custom Filtration Corp. · filed 2015-12-14(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. ... Thus, the order that Caterpillar, Inc. seeks to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Senior Life Insurance Company v. Holland Insurance Group, LLC · filed 2016-01-25(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Pulliam v. Georgia Ophthalmologists, LLC · filed 2016-01-28(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Under subsection (h), a summary-judgment grant on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Sabino v. Sabino · filed 2016-05-11(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Sheila M. Beckham, as Administrator of the Estate of Mildred Y. Clark v. Bryan County Health and Rehabilitation Center · filed 2016-08-10(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. See City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment directly appealable.

Badichi v. Albion Trading Inc. · filed 2016-08-25(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); see also Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Matta-Troncoso v. Tyner · filed 2016-10-25(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Section 9-11-56(h) makes a summary-judgment grant on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Natasha Ingram Administratrix of the Estate of Johnnie Mae Ingram v. Foy & Associates, Pc · filed 2017-01-06(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

A grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Davis v. Ganas · filed 2017-02-07(h)

However, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

A summary-judgment grant on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal under subsection (h).

Southern Trust Insurance Company v. Cravey · filed 2017-02-22(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

A summary-judgment grant on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Connie C. Sanders v. Mighty Oak, LLC · filed 2017-02-22(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes an order granting partial summary judgment directly appealable even without an express finality determination.

JOHN A. JAMES v. FIRST SOUTHERN BANK F/K/A THE PATTERSON BANK · filed 2017-05-17(h)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” Even without the express determination that there is no just reason for delay, an order granting partial summary judgment may be appealed directly.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Frederica Road Holdings, LLC v. Cuyler · filed 2017-05-17(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Candice Reis v. Ooida Risk Retention Group · filed 2017-06-08(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal under subsection (h).

Duvall v. Cronic · filed 2017-07-19(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

A partial-summary-judgment grant is directly appealable under subsection (h), permitting a timely discretionary application to be granted despite a defective immediate-review certificate.

Oswald Family Investments, Lllp v. Department of Transportation · filed 2017-07-21(h)

A grant of partial summary judgment may be appealed directly.

Unresolved claims for an injunction and attorney fees do not prevent an immediate subsection (h) appeal from a partial summary-judgment order.

Shelley v. Town of Tyrone · filed 2017-10-16(h)

The grant of summary judgment to Tyrone was only partial because it appears that the issues of the injunction and the attorney fees Shelley is seeking have not yet been decided. ... but those ... pending matters did not prevent Shelley’s immediate appeal of the order granting partial summary judgment. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party may be appealed directly without a discretionary application.

Franchesa Favors v. Atlanta Independent School System · filed 2017-11-14(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party may be appealed directly under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), and this action does not appear to fall within one of the categories of cases for which a discretionary application is required to seek appellate review under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a).

A grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly without a discretionary application.

Ellyson v. Livingston Properties Management, Inc. · filed 2017-11-14(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment directly appealable.

Dreisbach v. Baskin & Baskin, P.C. · filed 2018-01-30(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); see also Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 Ga. App. 884) (1989).

A grant of partial summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Southern Trust Insurance Company v. Mountain Express Oil Company · filed 2018-03-15(h)

As recognized by Southern Trust, the grant of partial summary judgment may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Olympic Dev. Group, Inc. v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Accordingly, the order in this case is subject to direct appeal.

A grant of partial summary judgment resolving one or more but fewer than all claims or parties may be appealed directly.

Country Preferred Insurance Company v. Stephens · filed 2018-04-20(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Olympic Dev. Group, Inc. v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425, 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Accordingly, the order in this case is subject to direct appeal.

A grant of partial summary judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Mathew Terry v. Payne · filed 2018-12-05(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Olympic Dev. Group, Inc. v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425, 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Thus, the order in this case is subject to direct appeal.

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal under subsection (h).

Bosby v. McMorris · filed 2018-12-19(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable, along with other rulings in the same order and prior nonfinal rulings.

Peterson v. Peterson · filed 2019-02-11(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. See City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989). Accordingly, the order in this case is subject to direct appeal.

An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable.

The Columbus Clinic, P.C. v. Williams · filed 2019-02-26(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.”

An order granting summary judgment may be appealed directly without a discretionary application.

Richardson v. Great Expressions Dental Centers of Georgia, P.C. · filed 2019-02-26(h)

Moreover, orders granting summary judgment may be appealed directly; no application is necessary. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of partial summary judgment directly appealable even while other claims remain pending.

Lewis v. Ikner · filed 2019-03-21(h)

Lewis’s direct appeal from the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to Ikner is proper, however, because “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue . . . shall be subject to review by appeal.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A grant of partial summary judgment resolving fewer than all claims or parties may be appealed directly.

Ironwood Capital Partners, LLC v. Gordon Jones, II · filed 2019-08-23(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n. 1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Olympic Dev. Group, Inc. v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425, 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Thus, the trial court’s order here is subject to direct appeal.

A grant of partial summary judgment may be appealed directly.

The City of Rincon, Georgia v. Ernest Communities LLC · filed 2019-09-23(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Nugent v. Myles, 350 Ga. App. 442, 444 (1) n. 4 (829 SE2d 623) (2019).

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Camacho v. US Bank National Association · filed 2019-10-25(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

A grant of partial summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), even when the party instead seeks interlocutory review.

BENESH v. CITY OF LOGANVILLE · filed 2019-11-06(h)

The trial court’s July 25 order was directly appealable because the court granted partial summary judgment and directed the entry of final judgment as to the City. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); OCGA § 9-11-54 (b).

An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Monroe v. Excel Federal Credit Union · filed 2019-12-04(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” Here, Monroe seeks to challenge the grant of summary judgment in favor of Excel.

An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Salvati v. Deloach Brokerage Inc., D/B/A Deloach Sotheby's International Realty · filed 2020-01-06(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” Here, Salvati seeks to challenge the grant of summary judgment in favor of Deloach.

Subsection (h) makes a partial grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable.

Brixmor Cedar Plaza, LLC v. the Kroger Company · filed 2020-09-10(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” Here, Brixmor seeks to challenge the partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Kroger.

A grant of partial summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Lamar v. Lamar Jr. · filed 2020-10-21(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” Here, Constance seeks to challenge the partial grant of summary judgment in favor of the Executors.

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party may be appealed directly without a discretionary application.

Robinson v. Eagle West, LLC · filed 2020-11-20(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party may be appealed directly under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), and this action does not appear to fall within one of the categories of cases for which a discretionary application is required to seek appellate review under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a).

A grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal rather than interlocutory-appeal procedures.

Curry v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins. Co. · filed 2021-04-20(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of partial summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425, 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Thus, the order that Curry seeks to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Lewis v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company · filed 2021-08-26(h)

Furthermore, a direct appeal is proper from an “order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party[.]” OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); accord Andrews v. Blue Ridge NH Assocs., LLC, 353 Ga. App. 75, 77 & n. 6 (1) (836 SE2d 197) (2019).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable even while the case remains pending against another party.

Smoot-Lee v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2022-03-18(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. ... Thus, the order that Smoot-Lee seeks to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

A grant of partial summary judgment as to fewer than all claims or parties is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Ashlyn Martin v. Rse Capital Partners, LLC · filed 2023-01-30(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties is reviewable by direct appeal. OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425, 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985).

An order is directly appealable under subsection (h) when it effectively grants summary judgment on elements of a claim, even if it nominally denies the movant’s motion.

Gleaton & Associates, Inc. v. Cornelius · filed 2023-02-08(h)

Although a denial of summary judgment generally is not directly appealable, ... this appeal is properly before us because the trial court’s order effectively granted summary judgment to Cornelius on elements of her negligence per se claim, and “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); see also 905 Bernina Avenue Cooperative v. Smith/Burns LLC, 342 Ga. App. 358, 360 (802 SE2d 373) (2017).

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h) and is not subject to discretionary-application requirements.

Vaughn v. U.S. Bank Trust, N. A. as Trustee for Lsfa Master Participation Trust · filed 2023-02-15(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. ... Thus, the order that Vaughn seeks to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the discretionary application requirements.

An order that functionally grants summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h) even if it does not use that label.

Premier Petroleum, Inc. v. Heer, Inc. · filed 2023-02-17(h)

Meanwhile, under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. ... Here, although the order does not state that it granted summary judgment to Heer on Premier’s claims, that is the effect of the trial court’s ruling. ... Thus, the order that Premier seeks to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

A grant of partial summary judgment on any issue is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Trademark Quality Homes, Inc. v. Free · filed 2023-03-28(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment on any issue may be directly appealed. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n. 1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007). Because the defendant here challenges the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, the trial court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

An order granting partial summary judgment is subject to direct appellate review.

PANGBORN, LLC v. ROGER STONECIPHER · filed 2023-06-27(h)

Although the defendants sought to appeal the trial court’s order by filing an application for interlocutory review under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), the order is subject to direct appellate review. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Watkins v. Edward J. Brady, II · filed 2023-10-26(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. ... Thus, Charles Watkins was not required to file an application to obtain review of the order in question.