Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-56

Subsection (e) requires certified medical records relied on by an expert affidavit to be attached to the affidavit for consideration on summary judgment.

Anthony v. Chambless · filed 1998-03-26(e)

However, no certified medical records were attached to the affidavit, as required by OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).

Subsection (c) does not permit a court to consider unauthenticated or uncertified pleadings from another case that are merely attached to a summary-judgment brief.

Durben v. American Materials, Inc. · filed 1998-06-03(c)

These documents are not competent evidence in this summary judgment proceeding. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) authorizes a trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, to consider “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any.” Nothing in the statute authorizes a trial court to consider uncertified pleadings from another case that are merely attached to a brief, without any attempt to authenticate or verify such documents or to offer them into evidence.

An expert affidavit based on records that are neither attached to the affidavit nor included in the record fails subsection (e)’s summary-judgment evidentiary standard and has no probative value.

Estate of Patterson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority · filed 1998-07-30(e)

However, this Court notes that the medical records upon which Dr. Franco reached his conclusions were not attached to his affidavit or included in the record. Therefore, even though the affidavit may have been sufficient for pleading purposes under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), the affidavit was insufficient under OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) to meet the evidentiary standards on a motion for summary judgment and, as a matter of law, lacked any probative value.

Subsection (e) requires summary-judgment affidavits to state admissible facts, affirmatively show the affiant’s competence, and attach sworn or certified copies of referenced papers.

Zampatti v. Tradebank International Franchising Corp. · filed 1998-11-03(e)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) mandates that affidavits “shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in the evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.”

An ordinance tendered on summary judgment must be certified or authenticated by an appropriate affidavit to satisfy subsection (e).

Roth v. Connor · filed 1998-12-10(e)

The Gilmer County Land Development Ordinance as amended was tendered, but it was neither a certified copy nor accompanied by an appropriate affidavit authenticating it as an ordinance duly enacted by the Commissioners of Gilmer County in order to satisfy OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).

Records referenced by a summary-judgment affidavit need not be attached when they are included in the record and clearly identified in the affidavit.

Howard v. McFarland · filed 1999-04-01(e)

The affidavit is insufficient only if the “records relied upon and referred to . . . are neither attached to the affidavit nor included in the record and clearly identified in the affidavit.”

Subsection (e)’s requirement that papers referenced in an affidavit be attached is satisfied when the medical records are already part of the case record and are clearly identified in the affidavit.

Tuten v. Costrini · filed 1999-05-28(e)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) requires that “[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit ... be attached” to the affidavit. This requirement is met in a medical malpractice action where the medical records are part of the record of the case and are clearly identified in the affidavit.

Expert affidavits fail subsection (e) when they neither attach nor specify the record evidence on which their opinions rely.

Habersham Venture, Ltd. v. Breedlove · filed 2000-06-12(e)

We need not address this enumeration, however, because the affidavits do not comply with OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) in that they do not attach or specify the “evidence currently of record” upon which the experts’ opinions were premised.

To create a fact issue through expert opinion, the expert must rely on personal knowledge or on sworn or certified records attached to the affidavit or clearly identified in the record.

Rudd v. Paden · filed 2006-04-28(e)

To be sufficient to controvert the defendant’s expert opinion and create an issue of fact for trial, the plaintiffs expert must base his opinion upon his own personal knowledge or on sworn or certified medical records that are either attached to the affidavit or clearly identified in the record.

An expert affidavit relying on medical records does not satisfy subsection (e) when those records are absent from the record.

Conley v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc. · filed 2006-05-16(e)

Thus the Conleys have failed to comply with OCGA § 9-11-56 (e), and the trial court did not err when it granted the defendants summary judgment on this basis.

Subsection (e) requires sworn or certified copies of all papers referenced in a summary-judgment affidavit to be attached or served with it.

Farrar v. MACIE · filed 2009-03-30(e)

Furthermore, for purposes of affidavits supporting or opposing summary judgment, “[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).

An affidavit relying on material already in the record need not attach it, but must specifically identify the material or risk summary judgment.

Bradford Mortgage Co. v. Johnnie Ganem Appraisal Co. · filed 2011-06-20(c)

While material need not be attached if the affidavit is based upon material that is part of the record and before the court, the affidavit still must specifically identify those documents[,] and failure to do so results in summary judgment.

Subsection (e) requires sworn or certified copies of all papers or portions referred to in a summary-judgment affidavit to be attached or served with it.

Denny Express Vinyl Siding, Inc. v. Boatright Roofing and General Contracting, Inc. · filed 2017-10-19(e)

The unspecified documents and information reviewed by Clark and Vining are not attached to their affidavits in violation of OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) (“[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit [supporting or opposing summary judgment] shall be attached thereto or served therewith”).

Subsection (e) requires papers referenced in an affidavit to be attached or served with it; unidentified records cannot supply probative value or be used to oppose summary judgment.

ELLIS v. OLES · filed 2022-05-16(e)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) requires that copies of all papers referred to in an affidavit shall be attached to the affidavit or served therewith. “Where records relied upon and referred to in an affidavit are neither attached to the affidavit nor included in the record and clearly identified in the affidavit, the affidavit is insufficient.” ... “Since the records were not attached to the [expert’s] affidavit or otherwise identified by their location in the evidence admitted of record, the references to these records cannot be used to contest the summary judgment motion.”

Section 9-11-56(e) requires sworn or certified copies of papers referred to in an affidavit supporting or opposing summary judgment.

Jacobsen v. Muller · filed 1986-12-05(e)

Rather, it is OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) which requires sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit filed in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.

Section 9-11-56(e) requires sworn or certified copies of papers referred to in an affidavit to be attached or served with it.

Oakes v. Magat · filed 2003-08-26(e)

The Oakeses’ claim to the contrary notwithstanding, the record shows that Dr. Magat properly attached to his affidavit a certified copy of the medical record to which he referred in his affidavit. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) (“Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.”)

When ruling on summary judgment, subsection (c) authorizes consideration of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions, and any affidavits on file.

Greater Georgia Life Insurance Co. v. Eason · filed 2008-07-10(c)

“OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) authorizes a trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, to consider the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any.”

Section 56(c) requires the trial judge to consider the entire record, and record materials need not be formally introduced into evidence to be considered on summary judgment.

Luedtke v. National Stor-All, Inc. · filed 1979-05-23(c)

Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c) provides that a summary judgment shall be entered, if ". . . the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” (Emphasis supplied.) "Nowhere in the statute is there any requirement that these items be introduced into evidence. [Indeed, in view of] the harsh nature of the remedy involved, a trial judge should always search the entire record before granting a motion for summary judgment, and should not limit himself to the evidence introduced at the hearing.”

The court must consider depositions on file when deciding summary judgment, but need not consider oral testimony that was not filed, cited in the motion, or available to the deciding judge.

Johnson v. Lastinger · filed 1979-11-14(c)

Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c) requires that depositions on file be considered; it says nothing about oral testimony not on file, not referred to in the motion, and not available to the memory of the judge conducting the hearing.

Section 56(c) allows a deposition on file before the ruling to be considered without its formal introduction into evidence.

Coatings v. Stein Steel & Supply Co. · filed 1981-01-29(c)

A deposition need not be introduced in evidence in order to be considered in ruling upon a motion for summary judgment because the Civil Practice Act requires only that it be “on file.” Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c).

Section 56(c) requires a trial judge to consider all pleadings, including an amended complaint, when ruling on summary judgment.

Gilbert v. Decker · filed 1983-01-04(c)

“The trial judge is bound to consider all the pleadings, including the amended complaint in ruling on the motion.”

Under subsection (c), a deposition that has not been filed before the summary-judgment hearing cannot be considered.

Brown v. City of Atlanta · filed 1983-01-04(c)

Appellant’s argument that his deposition testimony denying that he had received any notice precluded the grant of summary judgment is without merit as his deposition had not been filed before the hearing on the motion and thus could not be considered. Code Ann. § 81A-156 (c).

Summary judgment must rest on the record evidence concerning genuine material factual issues, not on one party's ex parte, self-serving stipulation.

Browning v. Powell · filed 1983-02-03(c)

A ruling on a motion for summary judgment should be predicated upon a review of the evidence of record for a determination of the existence of genuine issues of material fact and should not be based upon the ex parte and ultimately self-serving stipulation of one of the parties.

Section 56 permits summary judgment when the only properly submitted evidence eliminates every genuine issue of material fact.

Genins v. Boyd · filed 1983-05-11

Since the prior court order was the only evidence properly before the trial court at the time it ruled on the motion, no genuine issue of material fact remained as to appellant’s qualifications to serve as administrator of the Boyd and Hansen estates and summary judgment was properly awarded to appellees. OCGA § 9-11-56 (Code Ann. § 81A-156).

The court must consider all record evidence that satisfies the statute, including qualifying affidavits not specifically offered in opposition to the motion.

Hoh Co. v. Ethridge · filed 1983-09-14(c)

When all evidence in this record properly is considered, appellees’ proof falls far short of eliminating all issues of material fact as required by OCGA § 9-11-56 (Code Ann. § 81A-156).

Under subsection (c), a trial court may consider uncontroverted record evidence, including affidavit statements, in determining whether a foreign court had personal jurisdiction.

Cohen v. Publishers Paper Co. · filed 1984-05-24(c)

In determining whether appellant was properly subjected to .Oregon’s long arm jurisdiction, the trial court in the instant case was authorized to consider the uncontroverted evidence of record including the statements contained in any affidavits. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Appellant did not attempt to controvert appellee’s evidence in this regard.

Section 56 entitles a movant to summary adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, and other record evidence leave no genuine material factual issue.

Wisseh v. Bank of Credit & Commerce International · filed 1985-01-15

No federal questions were presented; appellant secured an attorney, who represented him during the proceedings below; and the trial court, after considering the pleadings, depositions, and other pertinent evidence on file, properly rendered judgment as to the sums plead and proven by appellee. Because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Count II, appellee met his burden under OCGA § 9-11-56 and was entitled to summary adjudication.

A brief supporting summary judgment is not evidence, and deposition testimony quoted only in the brief cannot eliminate a factual conflict when the deposition itself is not on file.

Lynch v. Georgia Power Company · filed 1986-09-02(c)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a brief in support of a motion for summary judgment is not proper evidence upon which summary judgment can be granted. Only the deposition testimony as quoted in the brief resolved the conflict of evidence which was found to exist by the trial court in ruling on the first motion. As the brief cannot be considered as evidence, a question of fact remains.

A complaint is not evidence and cannot itself create a factual issue in response to a summary-judgment motion.

Clements v. Hendi · filed 1987-03-11(e)

First, the complaint is not evidence and thus may not be considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).

A trial court decides summary judgment from the materials on file in the current action, so discovery from a dismissed predecessor action is unavailable unless timely filed in the renewed case.

Calhoun v. Bone · filed 1988-11-07(c)

The trial court is to make the summary judgment decision on what is “on file.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

A summary-judgment hearing transcript need not be reconstructed when the issues are legal and the record includes all proper evidence.

Hunt v. Lee · filed 1989-02-21

As the court observed in its order of denial, there was no necessity to reconstruct a record of these hearings because the issues to be decided are matters of law. OCGA § 9-11-56.

Subsection (c) permits supporting affidavits on a summary-judgment motion but does not require them.

English Restaurant, Inc. v. A. R. II, Inc. · filed 1990-02-23(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) permits motions for summary judgment to be supported by affidavits, but does not require them.

Sworn or certified copies are required under subsection (e) when documents are referred to in an affidavit, but documents submitted directly may support summary judgment without such certification.

Freeman v. City of Atlanta · filed 1990-04-24(e)

However, that Code section requires such certification when the copies are referred to in an affidavit, which was not the situation here. Submitting such documents is an acceptable means of presenting evidence in support of a motion for summary judgment.

A trial court may not consider evidence outside the record when deciding summary judgment.

Judge v. Wellman · filed 1991-02-28(c)

Because there was no “808 Clark Avenue,” the trial court in an otherwise commendable effort to ascertain the actual situation, considered evidence extrinsic to the record. This is not permitted.

The court deciding summary judgment must consider record documents bearing on the claimed entitlement and amount.

E. H. Crump Co. of Georgia, Inc. v. Millar · filed 1991-06-28(c)

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will presume that the trial court reviewed the entire record and verified appellee’s calculations prior to entering its judgment against appellants in the amount of $329,302.82.

Section 56(c) requires both trial and appellate courts to consider the entire record when reviewing summary judgment.

Sumner v. First Union National Bank · filed 1991-04-08(c)

the obligation of both the trial court and appellate court is to consider the entire record when such a motion is ruled on.

An admission is evidence but does not independently support summary judgment unless it removes every material factual issue and establishes entitlement as a matter of law.

Freeway Junction Bakery, Inc. v. Krupp Cash Plus III · filed 1992-02-05(c)

Requests for admission and responses thereto, or the failure to respond resulting in an implied admission, are not pleadings but are in the nature of evidence relating to proof.

Depositions delivered to the judge with a summary-judgment motion are part of the record even if the judge inadvertently fails to transmit them promptly to the clerk.

Custom Lighting & Decorating, Ltd. v. Hampshire Co. · filed 1992-05-20(c)

The depositions were filed with the judge, along with a copy of the motion when the motion was filed with the clerk. The judge through oversight failed to transmit them to the clerk’s office.

Section 9-11-56(c) requires a court ruling on summary judgment to consider the entire setting of the case.

Tower Financial Services, Inc. v. Smith · filed 1992-07-08(c)

In ruling on a Rule 56 motion, the court is obliged to take into account the entire setting of the case.

An employee-agent's statement about knowledge of a hazard can constitute admissible summary-judgment evidence under subsection (e) as an admission against interest or res gestae evidence.

Colevins v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. · filed 1994-04-19(e)

The testimony of appellant generally would constitute admissible evidence regarding the group manager’s knowledge of the foreign substance, within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-56 (e), either as an admission against interest by an employee-agent (OCGA § 24-3-33) or as a res gestae exception (OCGA § 24-3-3).

On de novo review from probate court, the superior court may decide summary judgment using all evidence presented to it, and the opposing party bears the consequence of failing to present evidence from the probate proceeding.

Yancey v. Hall · filed 1995-06-12(c)

The superior court was authorized to consider Yancey’s motion based upon all of the evidence that had been presented to it and to grant his motion if that evidence so authorized. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Evidence offered on summary judgment is subject to the same admissibility standards as trial evidence, so evidence inadmissible at trial generally cannot be considered on summary judgment.

Hall v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. · filed 1996-09-26(e)

Evidence offered on motion for summary judgment is held to the same standards of admissibility as evidence at trial, and evidence inadmissible at trial is generally inadmissible on motion for summary judgment.

Statements by counsel in an appellate brief or at a summary-judgment hearing do not constitute record evidence sufficient under subsection (e) to create a factual issue.

Bates v. Guaranty National Insurance · filed 1996-09-27(e)

Thus, the statements of Bates’ attorney supporting his argument of self-defense fail under OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) to create a question of fact.

Subsection (c) requires the trial court to consider the entire record, and an overlooked deposition may be considered on appeal to determine whether material factual issues exist.

Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co. · filed 1997-02-24(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires a consideration of the entire record by the trial court. Where the record shows that a deposition was not considered below, it may be considered on appellate review to determine the existence of genuine issues of disputed material fact.

Appellate review of summary judgment is limited to evidence presented before the trial court's ruling; evidence later produced at trial cannot be used to challenge the earlier ruling.

T & R Custom, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1997-07-03

We consider only the evidence before the court at the time of its ruling on the motion for summary judgment. ... Appellate courts will review only evidence presented to the trial court before its ruling on the motion.

Evidence offered on summary judgment is held to the same admissibility standards as trial evidence, so evidence inadmissible at trial generally cannot be considered.

Hagan v. Goody's Family Clothing, Inc. · filed 1997-07-03

Evidence offered on motion for summary judgment is held to the same standards of admissibility as evidence at trial, and evidence inadmissible at trial is generally inadmissible on motion for summary judgment.

Unauthenticated documents attached to a summary-judgment brief are not competent evidence and should not be considered.

White v. City of Atlanta · filed 2001-02-15(c)

Attached to White’s summary judgment brief are two letters which we do not consider as they are not authenticated and therefore are not competent evidence. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

A summary-judgment movant may rely only on supporting material that has been on file at least 30 days before the hearing.

Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co. · filed 2002-02-04(c)

Thus, “[o]nly supporting material which is ‘on file’ at least 30 days before the hearing shall be considered for the movant.”

A certified court transcript may be considered on summary judgment to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.

Patrick v. Floyd Medical Center · filed 2002-04-30(c), (e), (f)

A certified copy of a court transcript is one of the items a trial court is authorized to examine on motion for summary judgment to determine if there exists a genuine issue of material fact to be tried.

A summary-judgment motion may be served after 30 days from commencement, and a party seeking reliance on depositions or other discovery bears the burden of timely filing that material for the court's consideration.

All Fleet Refinishing, Inc. v. West Georgia National Bank · filed 2006-07-07(a), (c)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (a), motions for summary judgment may be served “at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action.” ... The burden of timely filing depositions and other discovery material with the trial court lies with the party [that] seeks to rely upon it.

Under subsection (c), a court considers all matters properly of record to decide whether a genuine material-fact issue exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Atlanta Bread Co. International v. Lupton-Smith · filed 2008-06-04(c)

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court will consider all matters properly of record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A trial court may rely on deposition excerpts filed by a party in support of a summary-judgment motion.

Jones v. Barrow · filed 2010-06-07(c)

[C]ase law specifically allows a trial court to rely on deposition excerpts filed by a party in support of a motion.

A court may not disregard affidavits submitted with briefs merely because they were not separately entered in the electronic filing system.

Smith v. Bell. · filed 2018-06-07(c)

The trial court entirely disregarded Smith’s affidavits, which were sufficient to create a factual dispute as to the existence of an oral agreement between the parties and performance under that purported agreement.

Unobjected-to hearsay in the summary-judgment record may be considered on review when no hearsay objection was made during the summary-judgment proceedings.

Callaway v. Quinn. · filed 2018-09-19(c)

We may consider that evidence in reviewing the summary judgment because Quinn did not object to it in the summary judgment proceedings.

A movant fails to establish the absence of a genuine issue when the critical insurance-policy evidence is incomplete and lacks meaningful context.

Unique Auto Sales, LLC v. Dunwody Insurance Agency · filed 2019-02-19(c)

Given the circumstances here,7 we conclude that the proof submitted was insufficient to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to whether, upon examination of the policy, it would have been readily apparent to a layman that the coverage requested had not been issued.

A sworn verification allows interrogatory responses to be considered as summary-judgment evidence under subsection (e), subject to ordinary admissibility requirements.

Myra Little v. Jim-Lar Corporation · filed 2019-10-30(e)

Little signed a sworn verification of her interrogatory responses, and so the trial court could have considered the responses as evidence when ruling on the motion for summary judgment. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).

The materials enumerated in subsection (c) are not the exclusive means of presenting summary-judgment evidence; a court may consider any material admissible or usable at trial.

University Health Services, Inc v. Clancy · filed 2021-07-07(c)

[I]t is well settled that the trial court on summary judgment need not limit its inquiry to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits set out in OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Those forms of evidence are not the exclusive means of presenting evidence on a motion for summary judgment. The trial court may consider any material which would be admissible or usable at trial.

An appellate court reviewing summary judgment will not consider a deposition that was not filed before the trial court ruled and that the trial court did not consider.

Terminal Investment Corporation v. Johnson · filed 2025-02-19(c)

Because the trial court did not consider his deposition in ruling on TICO’s motion for summary judgment (relying solely on his affidavits), we similarly will not consider it.

An opposing party may waive subsection (c)’s notice requirement by submitting evidence without objecting to the trial court’s consideration of matters outside the pleadings.

Auto-Owners Insurance v. Anderson · filed 2001-11-08(c)

But where both parties submit evidence in connection with the motion and the party opposing the motion raises no objection to the trial court’s consideration of such evidence, this notice requirement is waived.

Subsection (c) permits a movant’s supporting materials to be considered only if they were on file at least 30 days before the hearing, but the parties may waive that rule by acquiescence.

Fulmore v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2001-11-21(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires that only supporting material which is “on file” at least 30 days before the hearing shall be considered for the movant. ... The parties, however, may waive the 30-day rule by acquiescence.

A party waives notice of conversion to summary judgment by acquiescing in the opponent’s outside evidence and submitting its own evidence on the dismissal motion.

Thompson-El v. Bank of America, N. A. · filed 2014-05-14(c)

Where, as here, both parties submit evidence in connection with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, there is no indication of prejudice due to the trial court’s failure to give notice of the actual nature of the pending action.

Section 9-11-56 requires thirty days' notice before summary judgment may be granted unless the right to notice is waived.

Peachtree-Piedmont Associates v. Tower Place Billjohn, Inc. · filed 1979-06-13

The order granting the motion for summary judgment shows that the motion was granted without affording appellants 30 days notice as required by Code Ann. § 81A-156. This was procedurally improper and requires reversal of the summary judgment. Jaynes v. Douglas, 147 Ga. App. 678 (250 SE2d 14). Appellees’ assertion that appellants had waived such notice is not sustained by the record and will not be considered.

Section 56(c) does not permit summary judgment to be heard and granted without notice to the opposing party.

Jackson v. Bekele · filed 1979-11-19(c)

The summary judgment in his favor was obtained by Bekele in Jackson’s absence at the hearing on motion to compel, without notice to Jackson, without notice that summary judgment would be heard, without notice that a judgment for money damages would be sought on grounds entirely distinct from those plead in the summary judgment motion in May, 1978, and by support of an affidavit of which Jackson had likewise no notice. We have no difficulty in holding the grant to be error (Code §§ 81A-156 (c); 81A-107 (b) (1); 81A-105 (a)).

Violation of section 56(c)’s 30-day rule is not harmless unless the motion’s grounds are so indisputable that any defense would be patently specious.

Dixon v. Midland Insurance · filed 1983-09-14(c)

In the context of the record in this case, we do not feel that the Midland motion is based upon grounds so indisputable as to render patently specious any defense to the motion and the trial court’s failure to adhere to the thirty-day requirement harmless as a matter of law.

The thirty-day notice requirement is not violated by supplemental filings during the thirty days before the hearing when those materials are irrelevant to the motion and timely record materials independently support the ruling.

Georgia American Insurance v. Varnum · filed 1984-05-29(c)

Under these circumstances, there was no violation of the 30-day notice requirement set forth in OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Section 56(c) requires at least 30 days’ notice before a summary-judgment hearing, and a nunc pro tunc order entered after appeal cannot cure the lack of notice and opportunity to respond.

Leverich v. RODDENBERRY FARMS, INC. · filed 1984-10-11(c)

A motion for summary judgment must be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Appellants were entitled to the notice prescribed by the statute.

An affirmative defense cannot first be raised orally at the summary-judgment hearing without notice because subsection (c) requires service of the motion at least thirty days before the hearing.

Hansford v. Robinson · filed 1986-03-18(c)

To allow a party to raise the issue for the first time orally at a hearing on a summary judgment motion without any notice to the opposing party is contrary to this rationale. We note that OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires service of a motion for summary judgment on the opposing party at least 30 days prior to a hearing.

A cross-movant may receive summary judgment within thirty days of filing when both motions concern the same issue and the adverse party has a full and fair opportunity to respond.

Rasmussen v. Nodvin · filed 1985-03-11(c)

If summary judgment can be granted a non-movant, it follows that a cross-movant may obtain summary judgment when the issue of the two motions is the same, even if the hearing on the motions is within 30 days of the filing of the cross-motion.

Subsection (c)'s thirty-day period may be waived when the respondent requests a ruling and fails to object to the shortened interval at the hearing.

Mobley v. Coast House, Ltd. · filed 1987-03-09(c)

It is clear that this 30-day requirement can be waived. Unless the record unequivocally demonstrates that the respondent fails to raise the procedural defect at the hearing, the trial court’s entry of an order on the motion prior to the expiration of 30 days is waived.

Without legally served notice of the hearing date, an opponent is deprived of the statutory right to file opposing affidavits through the day before the hearing, making a ruling premature.

Goodwin v. Richmond · filed 1987-04-03(c)

Since plaintiff did not have legal notice of the hearing date for the motion for summary judgment, she was deprived of her statutory right to file opposing affidavits up to one day before that hearing. OCGA §§ 9-11-56 (c) and 9-11-6 (d).

The thirty-day notice period gives the opponent sufficient opportunity to prepare a response, and judgment entered before that period expires is erroneous absent consent or waiver.

Segrest v. Intown True Value Hardware, Inc. · filed 1989-03-03(c)

The purpose of the so-called 30-day notice is to inform timely “the opposing party ... as to the material relied upon by the movant ... so that [the opposing party] might have sufficient opportunity to prepare his response.”

A party waives the thirty-day response period by failing to raise the procedural defect at the summary-judgment hearing.

Dennisson v. LAKEWAY PUBLISHERS, INC. · filed 1990-06-21

However, appellant failed to raise this procedural defect at the hearing. Therefore, “the trial court’s entry of an order on the motion prior to the expiration of 30 days is waived. [Cits.]”

A court may not evade the thirty-day response period by converting a summary-judgment motion into judgment on the pleadings without advance notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.

Cohen v. William Goldberg & Co. · filed 1991-11-19(c)

Under these circumstances, the judgments on the pleadings against appellants were procedurally defective and the trial court should not have entered the judgments on the pleadings dismissing appellants’ complaints.

A converted oral dismissal motion requires a new hearing at least 30 days after the motion unless notice and response opportunity are waived.

Famble v. State Farm Insurance · filed 1992-05-22(c)

However, the trial court would be required to set a date for another hearing on the motion at least 30 days from the time the motion was made (OCGA § 9-11-56 (c)), unless such notice and opportunity to respond are waived.

Section 56 response periods are calculated with the service and time-computation statutes, including extension when the due date is a legal holiday.

First Community Bank v. Bryan Starr & Associates, Inc. · filed 1992-01-29

Thus, the period within which First Community was required to respond to the motion was extended by one day to February 19, 1991, which date fell within defense counsel’s leave of absence.

Subsection (b) allows a defendant to move for summary judgment at any time, but a requested hearing must occur at least 30 days after service so the respondent can submit opposing evidence.

Thurmond v. Richmond County Board of Education · filed 1993-02-22(b)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (b) permits the defendants to file such a motion “at any time.” If a hearing is desired, at least 30 days from service of the motion must elapse before a hearing can be held, to give respondent time to file opposing evidence.

A court granting summary judgment sua sponte to a nonmoving party must ensure both that the record supports judgment and that the opposing party has full and fair notice and an opportunity to respond.

Spivey v. Safeway Insurance · filed 1993-11-04

This means that in addition to ensuring the record supports such a judgment, the trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment.

A supporting affidavit filed less than 30 days before the scheduled summary-judgment hearing is not properly considered when the opposing party objects.

Brandon v. Mayfield · filed 1994-12-02(c)

Since Mayfield’s supplemental affidavit was not filed 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), it was not properly considered by the trial court.

Subsection (c) gives every party 30 days to respond to a summary-judgment motion; premature judgment generally requires reversal unless the nonmovant's defenses are wholly meritless and frivolous.

Larraga v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1996-08-06(c)

“OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) . . . mandates that any party have thirty days to respond to a motion for summary judgment. ... Upon review of this record, we find it to be one of those rare cases where this error does not demand reversal and remand.

Subsection (c)'s notice requirement is satisfied when the nonmovant receives notice of the summary-judgment hearing and an opportunity to be heard.

Purvis v. Ballantine · filed 1997-04-23(c)

Inasmuch as Purvis had notice of the summary judgment hearing and an opportunity to be heard, see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), ... Jackson ... provides no support for his position.

Subsection (c)’s service requirement may be waived when the opposing party receives full and fair notice of the summary-judgment motion and an opportunity to respond before judgment.

Ferguson v. Duron, Inc. · filed 2000-04-20(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires that a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” ... In its order granting Ferguson’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court in the case sub judice gave Ferguson fair notice of, and an opportunity to respond to, Duron’s motion for summary judgment. ... Accordingly, we hold that the statutorily mandated service requirement was waived under the limited circumstances presented in this case.

When a court converts a motion to dismiss into a summary-judgment motion by considering matters outside the pleadings, it must give the respondent 30 days and a full and fair opportunity to respond.

Bays v. River Oaks Construction, Inc. · filed 2000-06-09

Where the trial court treats a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, the trial court must give the respondent 30 days in which to respond to the motion. ... It is crucial that the party against whom summary judgment is sought has had a full and fair opportunity to meet and attempt to controvert the assertions against him, before judgment is entered.

When a court considers matters outside the pleadings and converts a dismissal motion into a summary-judgment motion, it must give 30 days’ notice and an opportunity to submit evidence and be heard.

Nix v. Cox Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2000-06-09

Under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), considering such matters outside the pleadings converts the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, requiring notice of the conversion of the motion and an opportunity to submit evidence and to be heard within 30 days.

A summary-judgment motion and supporting affidavit must be on file at least 30 days before the hearing unless the opposing party acquiesces or the filer obtains an extension.

U. S. Traffic Corp. v. Turcotte · filed 2000-09-28(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires that a motion for summary judgment be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for a hearing. In addition, an affidavit relied on in support of a motion for summary judgment must be on file for at least 30 days prior to the hearing. ... Furthermore, the filing requirement is not waived unless the opposing party acquiesces in the use of the untimely materials or the party seeking to file a late affidavit seeks and obtains an extension from the court pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-6 (b) to extend the time for filing.

Subsection (c)'s response period does not apply when a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not converted into a summary-judgment motion.

Sea Tow/Sea Spill v. Phillips · filed 2002-02-01(c)

Thus, Phillips’ motion to dismiss was not converted to a motion for summary judgment, and the required response period provided in OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) did not apply.

Subsection (c) requires a summary-judgment motion to be filed at least 30 days before the scheduled hearing.

Harrell v. Federal National Payables, Inc. · filed 2003-11-13(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires that a motion for summary judgment be filed “at least 30 days before the time fixed for [a] hearing.”

Section 9-11-56 requires 30 days' notice and an opportunity to respond before a court rules on a newly asserted ground for summary judgment, unless the opposing party waives that protection.

Travis Pruitt & Associates, P.C. v. Hooper · filed 2005-12-01(c)

The record shows that Hooper did not waive the requirement set forth in OCGA § 9-11-56 that she be given 30 days notice and opportunity to respond to TPA’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

Subsection (c) gives the opponent at least 30 days to respond to affidavits supporting a summary-judgment motion before the hearing or ruling.

Hicks v. Newman · filed 2007-01-31(c)

In other words, the Hickses had at least 30 days in which to respond to Newman’s affidavits.

Due process requires that a summary-judgment opponent receive a reasonable opportunity to refute the movant's showing and not be surprised by the issues decided.

Ferdinand v. City of East Point · filed 2007-10-31(c)

Amotion for summary judgment is a vehicle for disposing of a controversy without the necessity of a trial. It is, as the description shows, a summary disposition of the issues in order to efficiently resolve litigation. Nevertheless, due process requires that the respondent not be surprised; rather, that he be given reasonable opportunity to refute the movant’s showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.

Subsection (c)'s timing requirement is satisfied when the summary-judgment motion is filed more than 30 days before the hearing.

Fulton County Taxpayers Foundation, Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Commission · filed 2010-10-04(c)

The motion for summary judgment was filed by Appellees on August 21, 2009, which was more than 30 days prior to the date of the oral hearing as required by OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Subsection (c)'s 30-day service period before the time fixed for a summary-judgment hearing does not apply when no hearing is requested or held.

Shropshire v. Alostar Bank of Commerce · filed 2012-02-23(c)

We note that in both the underlying lawsuits, no hearing was requested or held. Thus, the 30-day period never applied in these cases.

A summary-judgment motion must be served at least 30 days before the hearing, and the adverse party may serve opposing affidavits before the hearing day.

McCobb v. Clayton County · filed 2013-03-28(c)

Rather, a motion for summary judgment must “be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

A summary-judgment motion must be served at least 30 days before the hearing, and the adverse party may serve opposing affidavits before the hearing day.

Clayton County v. Austin-Powell · filed 2013-03-28(c)

Rather, a motion for summary judgment must “be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Subsection (c) normally gives a summary-judgment opponent 30 days to respond before the court decides the motion, but a premature ruling is harmless when judgment was clearly mandated.

Barzey v. City of Cuthbert · filed 2014-09-22(c)

With respect to summary judgment motions, Rule 6.2 overlaps with OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), which requires that a motion for summary judgment be served “at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing,” a requirement that has been understood as normally allowing the opposing party 30 days to respond to such a motion before the court decides it, even in the absence of a request for an oral hearing under Rule 6.3 (as occurred in this case). ... Likewise, we have explained that a trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion less than 30 days after it was served, in violation of § 9-11-56 (c), would not require reversal “where summary judgment is so clearly mandated that appellant can show no harm in the [trial] court’s failure to follow the proper procedure.”

A summary-judgment motion must be served at least 30 days before the hearing.

McCabe v. Rainey · filed 2017-10-27(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides that a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.”

Subsection (c) gives every party thirty days to respond to a summary-judgment motion, and an order entered sooner without consent or waiver is premature.

MCCAULEY v. POWELL · filed 2024-10-16(c)

OCGA § 9–11–56 (c) mandates that any party have thirty days to respond to a motion for summary judgment.

Section 9-11-56 does not authorize striking an opposing summary-judgment response merely because the respondent fails to appear when the motion is called.

Tahoe Carpet Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc. · filed 1980-02-06

However, we find nothing in Code Ann. § 81 A-156 (Section 56 CPA) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 660; 1967, pp. 226, 238; 1975, pp. 757, 759) which authorizes the dismissal of a response in the form of affidavits and brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.

Section 9-11-56 does not authorize striking an opposing affidavit because counsel failed to appear for argument on the summary-judgment motion.

Holt v. Bray · filed 1981-06-23

“[W]e find nothing in Code Ann. § 81A-156... which authorizes the dismissal of a response in the form of affidavits ... in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.

Section 56(c) generally does not authorize oral testimony at a summary-judgment hearing over the opposing party’s objection.

Pierce v. Gaskins · filed 1983-10-17(c)

The trial court was also without authority to permit the introduction of oral testimony at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment over the opposing party’s objection.

Section 56(c) requires opposing affidavits to be served before the hearing date unless that requirement is waived.

Knight v. Bryant-Durham Electric Co. · filed 1984-01-12(c)

Opposing affidavits served by the adverse party, according to the statute, must be served “prior to the day of hearing.” There has been no waiver of this requirement.

Failure to hold a section 56 hearing is harmless when the movant’s liability is impossible as a matter of law regardless of what the hearing could show.

Drohan v. Carriage Carpet Mills · filed 1985-09-03

However, any such error is harmless in view of the fact that Wausau’s alleged liability was predicated solely on its status as indemnitor of Carriage Carpet Mills. Since the latter has been determined to have no liability to the appellant as a matter of law, it follows that Wausau can have no liability, either, regardless of what might have transpired at any hearing on its motion for its motion for summary judgment.

Rule 6.3 is consistent with subsection (c), and summary judgment may be granted without oral argument when neither party requests it.

Dallas Blue Haven Pools, Inc. v. Taslimi · filed 1987-03-03(c)

... Rule 6.3 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules (253 Ga. 801, 817) is not inconsistent with OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), and that, under each or all of three stated bases, it was not error for the trial court to grant a summary judgment in accordance with Rule 6.3 without an oral-argument hearing, where neither party requested such a hearing.

A trial court may decide summary judgment without an oral hearing when the opposing party did not request one as required by the uniform rules.

Murphy v. First National Bank · filed 1987-04-17

However, there is no indication in the record that the appellant ever requested such a hearing, as required by Rule 6.3 of the Uniform Rules of the Superior Courts, 253 Ga. 801, 817. It follows that this enumeration of error is also without merit.

Section 56(c) does not require oral argument when court rules provide decision on written submissions and neither party requests a hearing.

Dallas Blue Haven Pools, Inc. v. Taslimi · filed 1986-10-15(c)

it was not error for the trial court to arrive at this decision on summary judgment in accordance with Rule 6.3, Uniform Superior Court Rules, without an oral argument hearing, where neither party requested such a hearing.

The statute contemplates but does not mandate an oral hearing; a party obtains oral argument by making the written request prescribed by the court rule.

Kelley v. FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION · filed 1987-01-07

We hold the rule and the statute work together consistently. The statute contemplates but does not mandate a hearing. The rule fixes the method parties use to obtain a hearing.

Section 56(c) does not permit summary judgment solely because the opposing parties failed to appear at the hearing.

Anderson v. Matich · filed 1988-01-13(c)

The trial court was not authorized to grant summary judgment to the plaintiff solely because the defendants did not appear at the summary judgment hearing.

A party waives any claim to additional response time by rejecting a continuance and affirmatively asking the court to decide the summary-judgment motion promptly.

Southern Trust Insurance v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1990-03-07

Even if the response time was more appropriately computed from the time the motion was “perfected,” appellants waived expansion of the time and resetting of the trial by not only rejecting the court’s offer but by affirmatively asking the court to move forward with the summary judgment determination.

When a summary-judgment motion is served by regular mail, the opponent receives three additional days beyond the thirty-day response period.

Pyramid Construction Company, Inc. v. Star Manufacturing Company · filed 1990-05-15(c)

Consequently, since plaintiff served defendants with notice via regular mail, they had 33 days from the date of mailing to respond to the motion. It therefore follows that the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was premature since it was entered 32 days after the motion was filed.

Appearing at a summary-judgment hearing without objection waives a complaint that the hearing occurred less than thirty days after service of the motion.

Owen v. M & M Metro Supply, Inc. · filed 1991-01-31(c)

In addition, where, as here, a party appears at the summary judgment hearing without objection, he waives a complaint that the hearing is being held less than 30 days after service of the motion.

A summary-judgment motion may be decided without oral argument when neither party requests an oral hearing under the applicable court rules.

Weir v. McGill · filed 1992-03-18(c)

Since the record in this case reveals neither party requested an oral hearing by rule nisi or other proper procedure, we find it was not error for the trial court to grant McGill’s motion for summary judgment without first hearing oral argument.

Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3, which permits summary-judgment motions to be decided without oral argument unless argument is timely requested, is consistent with Section 9-11-56(c).

Dominiak v. Camden Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1992-09-08(c)

A review of the annotations to OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) reveals the existence of USCR 6.3, which is not inconsistent with OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Subsection (c) contemplates but does not require a summary-judgment hearing; a party secures oral argument by making the written request prescribed by court rule.

Thomas v. Schouten · filed 1993-09-13(c)

The statute contemplates but does not mandate a hearing. The rule fixes the method parties use to obtain a hearing.

A party's right to oral argument on a summary-judgment motion is satisfied by one hearing and does not entitle the party to additional oral hearings before the ruling.

Hosley v. Computer Transport of Georgia, Inc. · filed 1995-10-26

Insofar as plaintiff was entitled to oral argument on defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 and Uniform State Court Rule 6.3, such was satisfied by the hearing conducted on November 19, 1992.

When a litigant timely requests a hearing, the court may not grant summary judgment against that litigant without giving an opportunity for oral argument.

Fitzpatrick v. Harrison · filed 2009-10-30

Having timely requested a hearing, a litigant should not have summary judgment granted against him without having had the opportunity to convince the trial court to the contrary and a trial court should not grant summary judgment against him without having availed itself of the opportunity to interrogate counsel.

Subsection (c) contemplates but does not require an oral hearing; a party obtains oral argument by filing a timely written request under the applicable court rule.

Royal v. Blackwell · filed 2011-07-05(c)

The statute contemplates but does not mandate a hearing. The rule fixes the method parties use to obtain a hearing.... All a party need do is make a written request for oral argument and it shall be held.

Once a court schedules oral argument on a summary-judgment motion, the opposing party may rely on that hearing date even if it neither requested argument nor responded to the motion.

Holladay v. Cumming Family Medicine, Inc. · filed 2019-01-09(c)

While we acknowledge that it appears neither party filed a request for oral argument, once the trial court issued the rule nisi setting the summary judgment hearing for April 24, 2018, Holladay had a right to rely on that hearing date until the trial court vacated or withdrew the rule nisi, regardless of whether (a) she responded to the motion or (b) Cumming actually filed such a request.

Section 9-11-56(c) requires a summary judgment motion to be served at least 30 days before the hearing; a party who does not respond risks judgment.

Spikes v. Citizens State Bank · filed 1986-06-24(c)

The rule does not conflict with OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), which requires that “the motion be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for hearing,” nor does the rule impose any new requirement on a party; now, as before, he may choose not to respond and run the risk of having judgment rendered against him.

Under subsection (f), granting a continuance to obtain an unavailable affidavit is discretionary, and denial will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Donehoo v. Phillips · filed 1982-06-22(f)

We have held “[t]he grant or denial of a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and unless clearly abused will not be interfered with. Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 705 (175 SE2d 28). This applies in summary judgment proceedings. Code Ann. § 81A-156 (f).”

A party who needs discovery to oppose summary judgment must invoke subsection (f) by affidavit stating why essential opposing facts cannot yet be presented.

Buice v. Gulf Oil Corp. · filed 1984-09-13(f)

As Buice did not seek the court’s assistance by filing affidavits as permitted by OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) stating that he could not present by affidavits facts essential to oppose the motion for summary judgment because Gulf would not respond to his requests for discovery, he failed to invoke an available remedy and will not now be heard to complain.

A section 56(f) continuance to obtain opposing affidavits rests in the trial court’s discretion, and denial is not an abuse after ample time has elapsed.

Patterson v. Lanham · filed 1987-03-17(f)

In the case sub judice, after defendants filed their motions for summary judgment, over 3-Vi months elapsed before the trial court entered its order granting defendants’ motions. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for additional time in which to file counter affidavits.

A party seeking additional discovery under subsection (f) must show the expected facts, why they are essential to opposing summary judgment, and due diligence in pursuing them.

Brown v. Coastal Emergency Services, Inc. · filed 1987-02-13(f)

Second, there has been no showing of the facts expected to be developed by the additional discovery, and thus no showing, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (f), that such discovery was “essential to justify . . . opposition” to the summary judgment motions. Finally, the appellants have made no showing that they exercised due diligence in pursuing the additional discovery, an omission which is particularly glaring in light of the fact that the hearing on the summary judgment motions was not held until some six weeks after the motion for extension of time was filed.

A subsection (f) continuance requires reason to expect beneficial discovery results, not mere hope that a party's lost memory might return.

Gray v. Gober · filed 1988-01-25(f)

Since almost four years had passed at the time of trial with no return of memory, we cannot say that refusal to grant a continuance was an abuse of discretion.

A party needing further discovery to respond to summary judgment should invoke subsection (f), not make an untimely request for oral argument.

Thompson v. Tom Harvey Ford Mercury, Inc. · filed 1989-09-27(f)

If appellant needed additional discovery so as to make a response to appellee’s motion, she should have invoked OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) rather than make an untimely request for oral argument.

A party seeking to defer summary judgment for discovery must show a good reason why it cannot present opposing facts at the hearing.

Campbell v. Hyatt Regency · filed 1989-11-01(f)

Appellant showed no good reason why he was unable to oppose appellees’ motion.

A section 56(f) continuance for additional discovery rests in the trial court’s discretion.

Hall v. Scott USA, Ltd. · filed 1990-12-05(f)

The decision to grant a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. OCGA § 9-11-56 (f).

The grant or denial of a subsection (f) continuance is discretionary and will not be disturbed absent clear abuse.

Wilson v. Tara Ford, Inc. · filed 1991-06-20(f)

“ ‘We have held “(t)he grant or denial of a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and unless clearly abused will not be interfered with. [Cit.] This applies in summary judgment proceedings. [OCGA § 9-11-56 (f)].” [Cit.]’ [Cit.]”

A party may move for summary judgment after 30 days from commencement of the action, and judgment must be entered if the filed pleadings and evidence establish entitlement.

Belcher v. James · filed 1993-03-12(a), (c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (a) provides that “at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action ... [a party may] move [for summary judgment]”; if the pleadings and evidence on file show entitlement to judgment, it shall be granted forthwith.

Denial of the summary-judgment motion moots a subsection (f) request for a continuance to obtain additional evidence.

Federated Mutual Insurance v. Dunton · filed 1994-05-05(f)

Competent evidence as to Symbolet’s insurance and bankruptcy status was not before the trial court, although Dunton had requested a continuance under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) to secure the evidence. Denial of the motion rendered the request for continuance moot.

A party seeking additional discovery to oppose summary judgment may request a continuance by affidavit stating why the party cannot present sufficient opposing facts by affidavit.

Summers v. Deutsche Seereederei Rostok Gmbh · filed 1996-02-08(f)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) permits a party to request a continuance by affidavit stating that, for reasons given, he cannot present by affidavit facts sufficient to justify his opposition to a motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment should not be entered before the nonmovant has a fair opportunity to complete discovery from key witnesses whose affidavits support the motion.

Shipley v. Handicaps Mobility Systems, Inc. · filed 1996-06-19

This judgment deprived Shipley of an opportunity to develop proof which may well give rise to triable issues of fact as to Shipley’s claims based on ordinary negligence and for punitive damages.

A trial court has discretion to grant a continuance for additional discovery to oppose summary judgment, and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Tyson v. McPhail Properties, Inc. · filed 1996-11-25(f)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f), a trial court has discretion to grant the party opposing summary judgment , a continuance, "and the trial court’s' decision will not be overturned unless that discretion was abused.

A subsection (f) continuance request must state the reasons more time is needed and show what relevant, material evidence successful discovery would produce in opposition to summary judgment.

Nationsbank, N.A. v. Southtrust Bank of Georgia, N.A. · filed 1997-06-18(f)

However, even if we treat appellant’s motion as one under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f), which requires appellant to set forth the reasons for a continuance and to show that if the motion to compel were successful, then what relevant and material evidence would be produced in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, such deposition questions were prohibited by the attorney-client privilege. Appellant failed to make a proper showing to the trial court to constitute a meritorious motion.

A party seeking a continuance for discovery must show by affidavit why essential opposing facts are unavailable, and granting or denying the continuance lies within the trial judge’s sound discretion.

JarAllah v. Schoen · filed 2000-03-20(f)

When faced with a motion for summary judgment and the unavailability of evidence to rebut such motion, OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) provides, “(s)hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavits facts essential to justify his opposition, the court. . . may order a continuance to permit . . . discovery to be had.” . . . The granting or denial of a motion under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.

A pending discovery request warrants deferring summary judgment when the requested discovery could add substance to the nonmovant's case.

McCall v. Henry Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2001-07-02(f)

In contrast, if McCall succeeds in her motion to compel, it could add substance to her case. Accordingly, McCall’s motion to defer summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) should have been granted.

Subsection (f) allows a party to seek a summary-judgment continuance by affidavit showing a need for additional affidavits, depositions, or other discovery.

Herndon v. Mosley · filed 2002-09-19(f)

Herndon responded to the motions without invoking OCGA § 9-11-56 (f), which allows a party to ask for a continuance if that party shows by affidavit the need for additional affidavits or depositions or other discovery.

Additional discovery does not require delaying partial summary judgment under subsection (f) when it could not add substance to the claims being adjudicated.

Capital Construction Co. v. Professional Service Industries, Inc. · filed 2002-10-17(f)

Putting aside the matter of whether Capital complied with the procedural requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (f), ... the question is whether additional discovery could “add substance” to Capital’s counterclaim. ... Accordingly, the court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to PSI without permitting Capital additional discovery.

When a nonmovant's affidavits give reasons it cannot present essential facts, subsection (f) permits the court to deny judgment, order a continuance for evidence or discovery, or enter another just order.

Lee v. Department of Natural Resources · filed 2003-09-18(f)

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing [a motion for summary judgment] that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavits facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment, or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had, or may make such other order as is just.

A party seeking a subsection (f) continuance must state the reasons for it and show what relevant, material evidence the continuance would produce in opposition to summary judgment.

Gilco Investments, Inc. v. Stafford Cordele, LLC · filed 2004-04-22(f)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f), the movant must set forth the reasons for a continuance and show that if the continuance were granted, what relevant and material evidence would be produced in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

A party seeking a continuance under subsection (f) must state the reasons and show what relevant and material evidence the continuance would produce in opposition to summary judgment.

Wilson v. Edward Don & Co. · filed 2005-09-28(f)

A party moving for a continuance under this subsection “must set forth the reasons for a continuance and show that if the continuance were granted, what relevant and material evidence would be produced in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.”

A party seeking more time for discovery before responding to summary judgment must file a subsection (f) affidavit explaining why essential opposing facts cannot yet be presented.

Smyrna Development Co. v. Whitener Ltd. Partnership · filed 2006-07-11(f)

However, OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) requires that in order to extend the time to respond to a summary judgment motion so that additional discovery may be had, the party opposing the motion must file an affidavit explaining why “he cannot. . . present by affidavits facts essential to justify his opposition” and therefore needs time to conduct or obtain additional discovery.

A party needing discovery to oppose summary judgment must seek a subsection (f) continuance rather than merely complain that discovery remains unanswered.

Wright v. AFLAC, INC. · filed 2007-01-31(f)

If the Wrights ... believed that AFLAC’s discovery responses were necessary in order to adequately respond to the motion, they could have sought a continuance to obtain the discovery.

A trial court may deny additional discovery under subsection (f) when the requesting party waits until after discovery has lapsed and supplies no facts supporting the request.

Davis v. Harpagon Co. · filed 2008-05-19(f)

In denying this motion, the trial court pointed out that Davis waited at least three months after the discovery period lapsed to make this motion and she provided the trial court with no ... facts supporting any basis for granting the motion. Given these findings by the trial court, coupled with the fact that Davis has provided no facts or precedent supporting her contention on appeal, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for additional discovery.

A trial court may deny a subsection (f) discovery continuance when the party seeking it lacked diligence in pursuing discovery before the summary-judgment hearing.

Triple Net Properties, LLC v. Burruss Development & Construction, Inc. · filed 2008-08-15(f)

Given the apparent lack of diligence on Triple Net’s part, we cannot find that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing to allow mote time for discovery.

A subsection (f) request for additional time or discovery rests in the trial court's sound discretion, and denial is proper when the requesting party had ample time but failed to act diligently.

Fine v. Communication Trends, Inc. · filed 2010-07-16(f)

“The granting or denial of a motion under OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.” ... As such, over two years elapsed before the entry of the trial court’s order, which provided ample time for the parties to diligently conduct further discovery. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s failure to grant the request for additional time to file counter-affidavits was not erroneous.

A respondent needing further discovery to oppose summary judgment should seek more response time, compel overdue discovery, or file a subsection (f) affidavit explaining why opposition cannot proceed without further discovery.

Govindasamy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2011-07-22(f)

If a respondent requires further discovery to properly respond to a motion, possible responses may include filing a motion to extend time to respond to the motion, a motion to compel, if the responses are overdue, or an affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (f) setting forth why the respondent is unable to proceed without further discovery.

A nonmovant needing additional discovery to respond must invoke subsection (f); absent such a request, the court need not sua sponte determine whether discovery is complete before ruling.

Habibah Bell v. Freeport Title & Guaranty, Inc., as Trustee of the Flat Shoals Townhouse Development Trust · filed 2020-05-04(f)

“It [is] not, however, the trial court’s obligation to sua sponte determine,” whether discovery is complete.

A court may deny a continuance for further discovery when the nonmovant's affidavits do not explain why facts essential to opposing summary judgment cannot yet be presented.

Morris v. Real Estate Expert Advisors, LLC · filed 2020-06-05(f)

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavits facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment, or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had, or may make such other order as is just.