Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-56

A grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal under subsection (h).

Mignott v. Segal · filed 2025-06-10(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment reviewable by direct appeal unless the case independently requires a discretionary application.

Chuck v. Amica Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2025-10-22(h)

No such application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal, see OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), and this case does not appear to be a type of case requiring a discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a).

Subsection (h) generally makes an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable.

Oliveras v. Cumberland Harbour Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2025-10-30(h)

“An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party” generally is directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56(h).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment reviewable by direct appeal.

Tepper v. Sarasota Ccm Inc · filed 2025-11-18(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal.

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h).

HAYNES v. VALCOURT BUILDING SERVICES OF GEORGIA, L.C. · filed 2025-12-12(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56(h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Section 9-11-56(h) allows a direct appeal from a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party.

Aberra v. Idlewood Condominium Association Inc. · filed 2020-03-13(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as: (i) the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party may be appealed directly under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); (ii) under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), a party may file a direct appeal from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below, except as provided in Code Section 5-6-35”; and (iii) this action does not appear to fall within one of the categories of cases for which a discretionary application is required to seek appellate review under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a).

Subsection (h) permits review of an order granting summary judgment, but an appeal must follow the procedures in §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-35.

Jarrett v. Ford Motor Credit Company · filed 1986-03-19(h)

Although OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) provides that “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal,” this statute does not provide for direct appeals from all grants of summary judgment, but must be read in conjunction with OCGA §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-35 regarding the procedure for appeal to this court.

Subsection (h) gives a losing party the right to directly appeal an order granting summary judgment even when the judgment is not final.

National Equipment Sales, Service & Supplies, Inc. v. Hamrick Manufacturing & Services, Inc. · filed 1988-03-16(h)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) gives a losing party [i.e., the party against whom summary judgment has been entered] the right to a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment on ... any issue or as to any party even though the judgment is not final.

Subsection (h) allows direct appellate review of an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party and permits direct appeal from an order denying summary judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).

Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. · filed 1992-06-29(h)

“An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal. An order denying summary judgment shall be subject to review by direct appeal in accordance with [OCGA § 5-6-34 (b)].” OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Subsection (h), “which permits direct appeal from any grant of summary judgment, is an exception to the finality rule expressed in [OCGA § 9-11-54].”

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with the evidence and all reasonable conclusions and inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Holden v. Smith · filed 1999-02-03(c)

“A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo and is proper only when no genuine material factual issue exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A Tow, Inc. v. Williams · filed 2000-08-24(c)

A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, which grant is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Appellate review of a grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo as to both law and evidence.

Northside Hospital, Inc. v. Ruotanen · filed 2000-10-19

When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this court conducts a de novo review of the law and the evidence.

On appeal from summary judgment, the court determines whether any genuine material factual issue remains and whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, reviewing the evidence de novo.

Georgialina Enterprises, Inc. v. Frakes · filed 2001-06-28(c)

whether the trial court erred in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact remains and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This requires a de novo review of the evidence.

On appeal from summary judgment, the court determines whether the movant showed no genuine material factual issue and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Mulligan v. Alta Anesthesia Associates of Georgia, P.C. · filed 2003-03-19(c)

On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the moving party demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact remained and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

On appeal from summary judgment under subsection (c), review is de novo and all inferences must be drawn for the nonmoving party.

Middlebrooks v. Bibb County · filed 2003-05-22(c)

[T]his Court applies a de novo standard of review and must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

An appeal from summary judgment under subsection (c) is reviewed de novo with evidence and reasonable inferences viewed favorably to the nonmovant.

Federated Department Stores v. Superior Drywall & Acoustical, Inc. · filed 2003-12-18(c)

A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

An appeal from summary judgment under subsection (c) is reviewed de novo with all reasonable conclusions and inferences construed for the nonmovant.

Howard v. Gram Corp. · filed 2004-07-13(c)

We review the evidence and record de novo, construing all reasonable conclusions and inferences in favor of the nonmovant.

An appeal from summary judgment under subsection (c) is reviewed de novo with evidence and reasonable inferences viewed favorably to the nonmovant.

Jackson v. Real Property Services Corp. · filed 2004-07-22(c)

A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Subsection (c)'s de novo review standard applies to both grants and denials of summary judgment.

Steel Magnolias Realty, LLC v. Bleakley · filed 2005-10-31(c)

A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from either a grant or a denial of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Subsection (c) requires de novo review of whether any genuine issue of material fact remains and whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Mowell v. Marks · filed 2006-02-08(c)

On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo and determine if the trial court erred in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact remains and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Subsection (c) requires de novo appellate review of whether any genuine issue of material fact remains and whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Staten v. Beaulieu Group, LLC · filed 2006-03-10(c)

“It is well established that on appeal of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact remains and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This requires a de novo review of the evidence.”

An appeal from summary judgment under subsection (c) is reviewed de novo with evidence and reasonable inferences viewed favorably to the nonmovant.

Carroll v. City of Carrollton · filed 2006-06-27(c)

A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

On appeal from summary judgment, the court reviews de novo whether any genuine factual issue remains and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Baskette v. Atlanta Center for Reproductive Medicine, LLC · filed 2007-05-30(c)

On appeal from a grant of a motion of summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, viewing it in the light most favorable to the non-movant, to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that no genuine issue of fact remains and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Subsection (c) requires de novo review of whether any genuine factual issue remains and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with evidence viewed for the nonmovant.

Allen v. Family Medical Center, P.C. · filed 2007-09-12(c)

On appeal from a grant of a motion of summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo, viewing it in the light most favorable to the non-movant, to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that no genuine issue of fact remains and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

On summary-judgment review under subsection (c), the court reviews de novo whether record evidence viewed favorably to the nonmoving party shows a genuine material-fact issue.

CDP Event Services, Inc. v. Atcheson · filed 2008-01-16(c)

On appeal, we review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo to determine whether the evidence of record, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.

Subsection (c) requires de novo review of whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether undisputed facts viewed for the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Merlino v. City of Atlanta · filed 2008-02-25(c)

On appeal from the grant of summary judgment this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Subsection (c) requires de novo review of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether undisputed facts viewed for the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Patrick v. Huff · filed 2009-03-02(c)

On appeal from the denial... of summary judgment, this Court must conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

On appeal under section 9-11-56, review is de novo and asks whether undisputed facts viewed favorably to the nonmoving party warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Chester v. Smith · filed 2009-05-18(c)

On appeal from the grant of summary judgment this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Subsection (c) requires de novo review of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether undisputed facts viewed for the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Weaver v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc. · filed 2009-07-01(c)

On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, this court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warranted judgment as a matter of law.

On appeal from summary judgment, the court reviews the evidence de novo and asks whether the undisputed facts, viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Jones v. Kirk · filed 2011-11-07

On appeal from the grant of summary judgment this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

On appeal from summary judgment, the court reviews the evidence de novo and views all reasonable conclusions and inferences most favorably to the nonmovant.

Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Lafarge Building Materials, Inc. · filed 2011-11-22(c)

A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgments carry no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently confirm that subsection (c) is satisfied.

Lawson v. Bloodsworth · filed 2012-01-18(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Freund v. Neil Warren, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Cobb County · filed 2013-03-26(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

An appellate court reviews summary judgment de novo without deference to the trial court and views the evidence in the nonmovant's favor.

Johnson v. Burrell · filed 2013-11-18(c)

That might be so, but we may affirm an award of summary judgment if it is “right for any reason,” ... and in an appeal from such an award, our review is de novo, and we owe no deference to the decision of the trial court. ... Accordingly, we examine the evidence for ourselves, viewing it in the light most favorable to the caveators.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Community & Southern Bank v. Dcb Investments, LLC · filed 2014-07-31(c)

If summary judgment is granted by a trial court, it enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal, “and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.”

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Rollins v. Rollins · filed 2014-11-19(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

A summary-judgment ruling is reviewed de novo to determine whether undisputed facts warrant judgment as a matter of law, with doubts and inferences resolved for the opposing party.

Wright v. Ic Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2014-11-21

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the undisputed facts warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56; Vick v. Tower Place, L. P., 268 Ga. App. 108 (601 SE2d 348) (2004).

On summary judgment, appellate review is de novo and the evidence is viewed for the nonmovant to determine whether a genuine material factual issue exists and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Jackson County v. Upper Oconee Basin Water Authority · filed 2014-11-21(c)

[O]n appeal from a grant or denial of summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review of the law and evidence. In applying this standard of review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A summary-judgment order, including its factual findings, receives no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

GODWIN v. MIZPAH FARMS, LLLP Et Al. · filed 2014-11-21(c)

Nevertheless, a trial court’s order of summary judgment, including any findings of fact, “enjoy[s] no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.”

An appellate court reviews de novo whether subsection (c)'s summary-judgment requirements have been met, viewing evidence and reasonable inferences favorably to the nonmovant.

Lowry v. Fenzel · filed 2015-03-03(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met. ... And in our de novo review of the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

An appellate court independently determines whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met, viewing evidence and reasonable inferences favorably to the party opposing summary judgment.

Sanders v. Riley · filed 2015-03-16(c)

In this posture, courts must view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. ... Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

An appellate court reviews denial of summary judgment de novo, determining whether a genuine material factual issue exists and whether undisputed facts viewed for the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Brown v. georgiacarry.org, Inc. · filed 2015-04-10(c)

“On appeal from the denial of summary judgment the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”

An appellate court reviews denial of summary judgment de novo, determining whether a genuine material factual issue exists and whether undisputed facts viewed for the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Seago v. Estate of Berry Earle III · filed 2015-04-10(c)

On appeal from the denial of summary judgment the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

House Hasson Hardware Company, Inc. v. Lawson · filed 2015-05-05(c)

If summary judgment is granted by a trial court, it enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal, “and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.”

An appellate court reviews summary judgment de novo to determine whether a genuine material factual issue exists and whether facts viewed favorably to the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Quintez Brown v. Dekalb County · filed 2015-06-22(c)

On appeal from the denial of summary judgment the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. ... see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Section 9-11-56 requires de novo review of whether undisputed facts warrant judgment as a matter of law, with reasonable doubts and inferences resolved for the opponent.

FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. ANDREWS Et Al. · filed 2015-06-22

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the undisputed facts warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56. ... And, “[t]he opposing party should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions arising therefrom most favorably toward the party opposing the motion.”

An appellate court reviews denial of summary judgment de novo, determining whether a genuine material factual issue exists and whether undisputed facts viewed for the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Forest Cove Apartments, LLC v. Wilson · filed 2015-08-21(c)

On appeal from the denial of summary judgment[,] the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Plantation Pipe Line Company v. Stonewall Insurance Company · filed 2015-11-23(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

ROLLINS Et Al. v. ROLLINS Et Al. · filed 2016-07-15(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Columbia Casualty Company v. Plantation Pipe Line Company · filed 2016-08-31(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

An appellate court reviews summary judgment de novo to determine whether a genuine material factual issue exists and whether undisputed facts viewed for the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Suntrust Bank v. Venable · filed 2016-09-12(c)

“On appeal from the grant of summary judgment this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”

An appellate court independently determines whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met, viewing evidence and reasonable inferences favorably to the nonmovant.

Lucas v. Beckman Coulter, Inc. · filed 2016-10-26(c)

If summary judgment is granted by a trial court, it enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal, “and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.” ... Moreover, in our de novo review of a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment, we are charged with “viewing the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Fair v. Cv Underground, LLC · filed 2017-03-16(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

vif/valentine Farms Building One, LLC v. J. B. Wright · filed 2017-03-16(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Aldredge v. Smith · filed 2017-03-30(c)

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

MATTA-TRONCOSO Et Al. v. TYNER. · filed 2017-10-04(c)

If summary judgment is granted by a trial court, it enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal, “and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.”

Summary judgments receive no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court must independently determine whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Sure, Inc. v. Premier Petroleum, Inc. · filed 2017-10-19(c)

[S]ummary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

Because appellate review of summary judgment is de novo, an alleged error in the trial court's formulation of the summary-judgment standard supplies no basis for reversal when independent review supports the result.

Haulers Ins. Co. v. Davenport · filed 2018-02-02(c)

Pretermitting whether the trial court applied the wrong standard, we review the record de novo. ... Applying this standard of review, we conclude that this argument provides no basis for reversal.

A grant or denial of summary judgment receives no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court independently determines whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

Teri Meadows v. Dollar General Store · filed 2024-05-29(c)

Whether summary judgment is granted or denied, that decision enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

A grant of summary judgment receives no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court independently determines whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS, LONDON, SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO. AMR-64794 v. SRNG, LLC · filed 2025-02-12(c)

Furthermore, if summary judgment is granted, it enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.

Appellate review of a summary-judgment ruling is de novo and asks whether a genuine issue of material fact exists after viewing undisputed facts in the nonmovant's favor.

DEBORAH B. SMITH v. BILL GRANT · filed 2025-10-24(c)

On appeal from the denial or grant of summary judgment, the appellate court must conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

A summary-judgment ruling receives no presumption of correctness on appeal, and the appellate court independently determines whether subsection (c)'s requirements are met.

MENDOZA v. PHILLIPS · filed 2025-11-03(c)

Trial court rulings on summary judgment “enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.”

Section 9-11-56(c) calls for de novo appellate review of summary judgment, with the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Rollins v. Rollins · filed 2013-03-29(c)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), on appeal from the denial or grant of summary judgment[,] the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

A partial summary judgment in a domestic-relations matter must be appealed by discretionary application despite subsection (h).

McCrary v. Department of Human Resources · filed 1989-04-10(h)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) applies to this appeal even though the underlying judgment involved the grant of partial summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56.

Section 56(h) permits but does not require immediate direct appeal from a grant of partial summary judgment.

Hutchison v. National Services Industries, Inc. · filed 1989-06-13(h)

Although not required to do so, a losing party has the right under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) to bring a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment on any issue, even though other issues may remain for adjudication.

An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable even when another claim remains pending.

Barnes v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. · filed 1989-03-31(h)

“An order granting summary judgment ... party” is always subject to review by direct appeal. OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) does not authorize a direct appeal when an order labeled summary judgment is substantively a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Pettus v. Drs. Paylay, Frank & Brown, P.C. · filed 1989-10-31(h)

Consequently, as this appeal is not the appeal of a grant of summary judgment against Pettus, it cannot be based upon OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), and as we note that the record shows other claims are pending against all the parties in the trial court, the order appealed from is not an appealable final order within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).

Section 56(h) permits direct review of a grant and the ancillary denial of summary judgment.

Chavers v. Kent Diversified Products, Inc. · filed 1989-11-20(h)

The grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee and the denial of summary judgment in favor of appellants must be reversed.

When a motion to dismiss is converted to summary judgment because the court considers affidavits and depositions, the grant is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Mann Electric Co. v. Webco Southern Corp. · filed 1990-02-15(h)

here the trial court considered affidavits and depositions outside the pleadings and thus appellee’s motion to dismiss was required to be converted to a motion for summary judgment, OCGA § 9-11-12 (b), the grant of which is directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Section 56(h) allows a direct appeal from a grant of summary judgment.

Cleveland v. Fulton County · filed 1990-06-08(h)

The instant appeal is predicated on OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), which allows a direct appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to all appellees on the federal claims.

Subsection (h) does not support a direct appeal when the order actually denies both parties' summary-judgment motions, despite a party's characterization of it as a partial grant.

Miller v. Jeff Davis Apartments, Ltd. II · filed 1990-06-20(h)

It is clear that the order appealed from in both appeals is the order denying the parties’ motions for summary judgment, and both appeals seek a reversal of the trial court’s conclusions of law. Therefore, our consideration of Case No. A90A0302 renders Case No. A90A0303 moot and the same is hereby dismissed pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (3).

A direct appeal under section 56(h) allows review of otherwise nonappealable trial rulings.

Hudgins v. Bawtinhimer · filed 1990-07-13(h)

Because Hudgins has the right to directly appeal the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Bawtinhimer, OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), he also has the right to have this court review rulings of the trial court otherwise not directly appealable.

Subsection (h) authorizes a direct appeal from a grant of summary judgment against a party even when the case remains pending against another party.

Lewis v. McDowell · filed 1990-01-10(h)

This argument overlooks the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) which specifically authorize a direct appeal from the grant of summary judgment against a party. Accordingly, the motion is denied.

An order granting partial summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), but the notice of appeal must designate that order.

Whiddon v. Stargell · filed 1989-09-18(h)

Thus, an order granting ' partial summary judgment is directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A grant of summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), so the interlocutory-application procedure does not apply.

Artis v. Gaither · filed 1991-03-12(h)

“Because a grant of summary judgment is subject to direct ap peal ... see OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), and because the interlocutory appeal procedure is applicable only to those orders, decisions, and judgments which are ‘not otherwise subject to direct appeal’ (OCGA § 5-6-34 (b)), we conclude that the application was improvidently granted; and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

Section 56(h) makes an order granting summary judgment on any issue or party directly appealable.

Jarallah v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company · filed 1991-04-01(h)

An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is, of course, subject to review by direct appeal. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable without a finality certification, but a party still must have standing to appeal that grant.

CW MATTHEWS CONTRACTING CO., INC. v. Studard · filed 1991-09-30(h)

Despite the order’s appealability, we agree with appellees’ contention that in the instant case, appellant has no standing to appeal the grant of summary judgment to its co-defendant, Moreland.

A losing party may appeal a nonfinal grant of summary judgment immediately or wait and appeal it after final judgment.

Adams v. Moffatt · filed 1992-05-06(h)

The party against whom summary judgment was granted may appeal either after the grant of summary judgment or after the rendition of the final judgment. Therefore, when the losing party appeals after the rendition of the final judgment, the grant of summary judgment is still subject to appellate review.”

Subsection (h) permits an immediate appeal from partial summary judgment but does not require one; the party may wait until final judgment to appeal the ruling.

Daniell v. Clein · filed 1992-11-05(h)

At the outset, we point out that while defendants were permitted to appeal directly from the order granting plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment motion pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), they were not required to do so. Defendants were entitled to wait until the entry of final judgment to appeal from the partial summary judgment ruling.

An order granting partial summary judgment is an appealable judgment under subsection (h).

Crolley v. Haygood Contracting, Inc. · filed 1993-02-22(h)

OCGA § 9-11-54 (a) defines the term “judgment” as including “a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.” Given the specific provision for appeal in OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), it is clear that this includes an order for partial summary judgment.

A direct appeal from a grant of partial summary judgment permits review of related rulings in the same action that were contemporaneously granted or denied but were not independently directly appealable.

Green v. Sams · filed 1993-06-28(h)

The direct appeal by Green from the trial court’s December 17, 1991 order granting partial summary judgment against him supports consideration of the remaining appeals not otherwise directly appealable in this action, which are tied to the direct appeal.

A directly appealable partial-summary-judgment order not appealed within 30 days may be appealed only after final judgment is entered.

Jones v. Walker · filed 1993-07-15(h)

However, since that order was directly appealable (see OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)) but was not appealed within 30 days after it was entered (OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)), it can now only be appealed after a final judgment has been entered.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable.

Smith v. Tommy Roberts Trucking Co. · filed 1993-07-16(h)

A grant of partial summary judgment is subject to direct appeal. “An order granting summary judgment ... on any issue ... or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A grant of summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Young Construction, Inc. v. Old Hickory House 3, Inc. · filed 1993-10-14(h)

The record reveals that the final decision referred to is a grant of motion for summary judgment and is directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Orders granting summary judgment are directly appealable under subsection (h).

Families First v. Gooden · filed 1993-11-22(h)

Therefore, the trial court’s decisions are directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) does not authorize a direct appeal from a dismissal that was not converted into summary judgment.

Church v. Bell · filed 1994-04-18(h)

The trial court’s dismissal of this action was not converted to a grant of summary judgment to appellees ... and, therefore, the dismissal was not directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) makes the appealability of a partial grant of summary judgment an exception to the general rule requiring a final judgment.

Little v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1997-12-10(h)

While Little cites cases showing that grants of partial summary judgment may be appealed, this appeal is “an excep...tion to the finality rule” provided by OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A grant of summary judgment is directly appealable even while the case remains pending, but that appeal right does not make the order a final judgment.

McConnell v. Moore · filed 1998-05-28(h)

In other words, although one may directly appeal the grant of summary judgment, OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), that right exists by law even though the order is not a final judgment; the law does not reclassify the grant of summary judgment while the case remains pending, as a final order.

A direct appeal under subsection (h) is unavailable when the order concerns matters in abatement, such as standing or real-party-in-interest issues, because those matters cannot properly support summary judgment.

Financial Investment Group, Inc. v. Cornelison · filed 1999-04-28(h)

In so holding, we note that a direct appeal under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) is not available in this case because matters in abate ... ment, such as standing and real party in interest issues, cannot form a proper basis for entry of summary judgment.

An order granting summary judgment is a directly appealable judgment under subsection (h), although a separate judgment may still be required by another governing statute.

Barge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance · filed 2000-06-14(h)

Thus, as so defined, “judgment” would include an order granting summary judgment, for such is directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A party may directly appeal a partial summary judgment under subsection (h), but may instead wait to appeal until entry of final judgment.

Liberty v. Storage Trust Properties, L.P. · filed 2004-06-17(h)

Although this order was subject to a direct appeal by Liberty (see OCGA§ 9-11-56 (h)), Liberty was not required to file an appeal at that time.

A direct appeal from a summary-judgment grant under subsection (h) permits the appellant to enumerate other judgments, rulings, and orders rendered in the case when the appealed judgment is not otherwise final.

City of Decatur v. DeKalb County · filed 2008-10-06(h)

However, the grant of summary judgment to the municipalities on the counterclaim allowed the county to file a direct appeal in the Court of Appeals (OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)), and permitted the county to enumerate as error in that appeal the denial of the county’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the parties’ agreement violated the Intergovernmental Contract Clause of the Georgia Constitution. ... when a direct appeal is filed from the grant of summary judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) and the judgment is not a final judgment under ... OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), any other judgments, rulings or orders rendered in the case may be enumerated as error in the appeal.

A party may directly appeal a summary-judgment grant under subsection (h) and enumerate as error another summary-judgment denial in the same case.

DeKalb County v. City of Decatur · filed 2009-04-06(h)

The trial court also granted summary judgment to the Cities on certain separate issues. DeKalb County was authorized to file a direct appeal from that order under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) and then enumerate as error the trial court’s denial of the County’s motion for summary judgment as to whether the Agreement violated the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause.

Subsection (h) permits a party to challenge earlier nonfinal orders when timely taking a direct appeal from a later grant of summary judgment.

Stephens v. ALAN v. MOCK CONST. CO., INC. · filed 2010-01-25(h)

Rather, the Stephens were entitled to challenge the orders pertaining to the settlement agreement upon their timely direct appeal from the trial court’s subsequent entry of summary judgment in favor of Mock Construction.

When a court considers evidence outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment and the losing party may directly appeal the resulting grant under subsection (h).

Alexander v. Hulsey Environmental Services, Inc. · filed 2010-09-13(h)

“required to be treated as [one] for summary judgment (OCGA § 9-11-12 (b)), and the losing party has the right to a direct appeal from an order granting . . . summary judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).”

An order granting summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), so a cross-appeal challenging that grant can stand independently of the main appeal.

Trey Inman & Associates, P.C. v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2010-10-13(h)

However, in this matter, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Bank on its conversion claim against TLA was directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). ... Thus, TIA’s cross-appeal of that grant of summary judgment can stand on its own merit.

Subsection (h) does not make every grant of summary judgment directly appealable and must be read together with Georgia’s statutes governing appellate procedure.

Alston & Bird LLP v. Mellon Ventures II, L.P. · filed 2010-12-16(h)

Although a grant of partial summary judgment may be directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “this statute does not provide for direct appeals from ... all ... grants of summary judgment, but must be read in conjunction with OCGA §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-35 regarding the procedure for appeal to this court.”

Subsection (h) does not authorize a direct appeal from an order that leaves the parties’ summary-judgment motions pending without ruling on them.

Clark v. Atlanta Independent School System · filed 2011-06-01(h)

We do not interpret the August 3 order as a ruling on an issue raised in the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment, which remain pending in the trial court. Accordingly, neither the August 3 order nor the August 19 order is subject to direct appeal.

A partial grant of summary judgment is reviewable under subsection (h) even though the appealed order is otherwise nonfinal.

Emerson v. BROOKMERE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. · filed 2011-08-08(h)

Because this appeal is taken from a partial grant of summary judgment, however, it is subject to review pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A party may directly appeal a grant of partial summary judgment under subsection (h) by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days of the order.

Jones v. White · filed 2011-10-04(h)

A party may elect to appeal a grant of partial summary judgment by notice of appeal filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment.

Subsection (h) authorizes a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party even while other claims remain pending.

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shelton · filed 2012-02-27(h)

Chase, USAA, and the Johnsons (collectively, “Appellants”) filed a timely joint notice of appeal. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) (authorizing direct appeal of an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party). Chase and the Johnsons’ third-party complaint against Shelton and the children’s mother remains pending in the trial court.

A grant of partial summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), although a party may instead seek interlocutory review.

Aiken Dermatology & Skin Cancer Clinic, P.A. v. Davlong Systems, Inc. · filed 2012-03-09(h)

Although Aiken Dermatology had the right to file a direct appeal from that order pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), it instead sought a certificate of immediate review, which the trial court issued, and then filed an application for interlocutory appeal in this Court, which this Court granted on March 3, 2005.

Subsection (h) makes orders granting summary judgment directly appealable.

Ates v. Calvary Portfolio Services, LLC as Assignee of Calvary Spv I LLC as Assignee of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-06-20(h)

Orders granting summary judgment are subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment reviewable by direct appeal.

Robbin E. Smith v. Discover Bank · filed 2012-07-20(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment reviewable by direct appeal.

In Re: Estate of Harriett Grey Nesbitt · filed 2012-09-14(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable, although an appeal still must be timely.

Maddox v. Reggie Davis, Officer in His Official and Individual Capacities · filed 2012-10-19(h)

The August 7 orders were directly appealable because they granted summary judgment and because the trial court certified them as final pursuant to ... (b). See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); OCGA § 9-11-54 (b).

A grant of summary judgment certified as final is subject to direct appeal under subsection (h).

Price v. Brown · filed 2012-12-05(h)

Based on the limited information available at this time, the September 12 order appears to be subject to direct appeal because it granted summary judgment and because the trial court certified it as final pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-54 (b). See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); OCGA § 9-11-54 (b).

A final summary-judgment order is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Keogh v. Dulsie T. Bryson as Administratrix of the Estate of Richard Gingrich · filed 2012-12-12(h)

Here, however, we also have a final order on summary judgment, which may be directly appealed.

A final summary-judgment order is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Keogh v. Bryson · filed 2012-12-12(h)

Here, however, we also have a final order on summary judgment, which may be directly appealed. See OCGA §§ 9-11-56 (h); 5-6-34 (a) (1).

A grant of summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), and a later consent judgment cannot revive the time to appeal that earlier order.

O'Dell v. Mahoney · filed 2013-02-07(h)

An order granting summary judgment is directly appealable, and in an appeal from that order, O’Dell would have been authorized to appeal the grant of the motion to dismiss. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); OCGA § 5-6-34. However, the judgment entered upon the settlement agreement cannot be used as a vehicle for obtaining appellate review of rulings entered by the trial court more than 30 days from the filing of the notice of appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable, and an improper motion for new trial does not extend the appeal deadline.

Lesman v. Law · filed 2013-04-05(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable, and a motion for new trial does not extend the time to appeal it.

Pierre v. Rbs Citizens, N.A. · filed 2013-04-26(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a summary-judgment order directly appealable.

Noble Parking, Inc. v. Centergy One Associates, LLC · filed 2013-05-30(h)

The trial court’s orders are directly appealable. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) and OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4).

A grant of summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), but the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of that order to confer appellate jurisdiction.

Vennings v. Citimortgage, Inc. · filed 2013-07-09(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment reviewable by direct appeal.

James L. Lingo, Jr. v. Smith · filed 2013-07-16(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable.

Boyd v. Morehouse College, Inc. · filed 2013-09-23(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly. See Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes orders granting summary judgment directly appealable without an application.

King v. Peeples · filed 2013-09-25(h)

Orders granting summary judgment may be appealed directly; no application is necessary. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

A summary-judgment grant is directly appealable under subsection (h), and a motion for new trial cannot extend the appeal deadline because it is not a proper method for challenging summary judgment.

Parker v. Pinetree Country Club Condo Association · filed 2013-10-28(h)

Here, Parker had a right to appeal the trial court’s order granting the Association’s motion for summary judgment.

Subsection (h) gives a losing party a direct appeal from a summary-judgment grant on any issue or as to any party even when the judgment is not otherwise final.

O'Dell v. Mahoney · filed 2013-10-28(h)

This Court has held that OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) “gives a losing party the right to a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party even though the judgment is not final under OCGA § 5-6-34 or 9-11-54 (b).”

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable.

Seago v. the Estate of Berry Earle, III · filed 2014-01-21(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly. See Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

A summary-judgment grant is directly appealable under subsection (h), and a motion to set aside does not extend the 30-day deadline for appealing that grant.

Anzo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Successor by Merger to Wachovia Bank, N.A. · filed 2014-02-25(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable.

Barbour-Amir v. Comcast of georgia/virginia, Inc. · filed 2014-09-22(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly. See Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable, including after a transfer from magistrate court rather than a de novo state-court appeal.

Spence v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2014-10-29(h)

The grant of summary judgment may be directly appealed. ... Here, the trial court’s order indicates that case was transferred from magistrate court. Thus, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11) does not apply.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Joseph Thomas, by and Through His Attorney-In-Fact, Joann Thomas v. Metterview, LLC D/B/A Pleasant View Nursing Center · filed 2014-11-19(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-28 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment directly appealable.

Thompson v. Reichert · filed 2014-12-25(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the trial court’s order may be appealed directly.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without interlocutory procedures.

Brandsmart USA of Ga, LLC v. Michael Denny as Administrator of the Estate of Jason Denny · filed 2015-04-10(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Thus, the order that BrandsMart seeks to appeal is directly appealable and is not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

A party that does not timely appeal a directly appealable partial summary-judgment order cannot obtain review of it through a later appeal from another nonfinal partial summary-judgment order.

Headrick v. Stonepark of Dunwoody Unit Owners Associations Inc. · filed 2015-04-10(h)

The order, therefore, was directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), but the appellants chose not to appeal at that time. This Court has held that where a party has failed to timely appeal from a grant of partial summary judgment, “[that party cannot] obtain appellate review of that ruling in an appeal from a subsequent grant of partial summary judgment, where the latter order [does] not constitute a final judgment in the case.”

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment subject to direct appeal.

Odion v. Varon · filed 2015-05-05(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the trial court’s July 16 order granting summary judgment was subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable without a discretionary application.

Grant v. Select Specialty Hospital Inc · filed 2015-06-22(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable, and the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days.

Milledge v. Discover Bank · filed 2015-06-22(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal. Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989). ... Milledge, however, did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the grant of summary judgment.

Subsection (h) does not authorize a direct appeal from a dismissal order when the trial court did not convert the dismissal motion into one for summary judgment.

Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Tara Rabun as Administrator of the Estate of Oscar C. Herringdine, Sr. · filed 2015-08-12(h)

Under these circumstances, the Estate’s motion to dismiss was not converted to one for summary judgment, and the grant of the motion is not directly appealable ... Rather, the order was appealable only through the interlocutory appeal procedure set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).

A partial-summary-judgment grant as to fewer than all claims or parties is directly appealable under subsection (h), and other nonfinal rulings may be reviewed in that appeal.

American Safety Indemnity Company v. Sto Corp. · filed 2016-04-04(h)

As recognized by American Safety, the grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties may be directly appealed.

A summary-judgment grant is directly appealable under subsection (h), so no discretionary application is required, and other nonfinal rulings may be challenged in that appeal.

Thomas v. Bahia Bleu Condominium · filed 2016-04-25(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable without a discretionary application.

Montia v. Sand Canyon Corp Fka Option One Mtg Company · filed 2016-08-10(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party may be appealed directly. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable, allowing other nonfinal rulings in the case to be challenged in that appeal.

Lafontaine v. Alexander · filed 2016-11-21(h)

As recognized by the LaFontaines, the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985). Thus, the order that the LaFontaines seek to appeal is directly appealable and is not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements. In addition, all rulings within that order and any other non-final rulings entered in the case may be challenged as part of such a direct appeal.

An underlying-subject-matter discretionary-appeal requirement controls even when a summary-judgment order otherwise would be immediately appealable under subsection (h).

Wolfe v. Board of Regents · filed 2016-11-21(h)

The application requirement for appeals in the types of cases listed in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) applies based on the underlying subject matter of the appeal, even if an order like the superior court’s final order granting summary judgment against Wolfe on his mandamus claim would otherwise be immediately appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) or § 5-6-34 (a) (1) or (7).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable.

Goldman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2017-03-30(h)

The grant of summary judgment may be directly appealed.

A partial-summary-judgment grant as to fewer than all claims or parties is directly appealable under subsection (h), together with other nonfinal rulings in the case.

Homelife on Glynco, LLC v. Gateway Center Commercial Association, Inc. · filed 2017-07-26(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties may be directly appealed.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

White v. Nicholle Jeanette Gens · filed 2017-09-15(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. See City of Demorest v. Town of Mt. Airy, 282 Ga. 653, 654 n.1 (653 SE2d 43) (2007); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 827-828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Kali Smith v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc. · filed 2017-10-20(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425 (1) (333 SE2d 622) (1985).

Subsection (h) allows a direct appeal from a summary-judgment grant despite a pending counterclaim, but without such a grant or Rule 54(b) certification the appeal is premature.

Bennett v. Najarian Holdings, LLC · filed 2017-11-27(h)

“Unless summary judgment is granted on a claim (see OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)) or the matter is certified pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-54 (b), a direct appeal is premature and must be dismissed where a counterclaim remains pending in the court below. In light of [Najarian Holdings’] pending counterclaim, the trial court’s judgment is interlocutory, and because [Bennett] filed a direct appeal, we have no jurisdiction to consider the matter.”

Subsection (h) permits an immediate appeal from a summary-judgment grant but does not prevent the losing party from waiting to appeal until final judgment.

EDOKPOLOR v. GRADY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION · filed 2017-12-11(h)

It is undisputed that the plaintiffs could have immediately appealed the order that granted summary judgment to Grady even though the issue of expenses remained pending. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). But this entitlement did not preclude them from waiting to appeal until a final judgment was rendered.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable without a discretionary application.

Restored Church Association of Georgia, LLC v. New Faith Christian Church, Inc. · filed 2017-12-19(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

In Your Dreams Farm Inc. v. Raisin's Ranch, LLC · filed 2018-06-26(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment directly appealable without a discretionary application.

McIntyre v. Jeffrey Moss, Trustee · filed 2018-07-19(h)

Orders granting summary judgment may be appealed directly; no application is necessary. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826, 828 (386 SE2d 884) (1989).

Although subsection (h) ordinarily permits a direct appeal from a summary-judgment grant, an order ancillary to divorce proceedings must be reviewed through the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Blase v. Blase · filed 2018-12-19(h)

Ordinarily, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” However, appeals from “judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be made by application for discretionary appeal.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable and permits review of all rulings within the same order.

Gordon v. Delaperriere · filed 2019-03-21(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal. ... Accordingly, the order in this case is subject to direct appeal. Moreover, all rulings within that order may be raised as part of such a direct appeal.

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable.

Hunter v. Progressive Mountain Insurance Company · filed 2019-04-11(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.”

An order awarding partial summary judgment to some parties is directly appealable under subsection (h), permitting review of the other rulings in the same order that affect the proceedings below.

Donna Andrews, as the Administrator of the Estate of Johnny L. Fleak v. Blue Ridge Nh Associates, LLC · filed 2019-11-04(h)

In sum, we conclude that because the trial court’s March 2019 Order included an award of partial summary judgment to Chatsworth LP and Blue Ridge HC, the order was subject to direct appeal pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). As such, we have jurisdiction to review all of the trial court’s rulings contained in the March 2019 Order challenged by Andrews on appeal.

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable.

White v. Enterprise Car Sales, Inc. · filed 2020-07-13(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), “[a]n order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.”