Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-56

A malicious-prosecution claim is subject to the ordinary subsection (c) standard requiring no genuine material factual issue and entitlement as a matter of law.

Allen v. Montgomery Ward & Co. · filed 1988-03-11(c)

A motion for summary judgment should be granted in a suit for malicious prosecution, as in other cases, when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Summary judgment is proper when undisputed facts reveal no legal basis for the asserted claim.

Comer v. Nat. Bank of Ga. · filed 1987-10-22(c)

There being no legal basis shown for any libel claim on the undisputed facts before the court, it was not error to grant summary judgment to NBG on the cross-claim. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

A genuine dispute about the parties' intent concerning a liquidated-damages provision makes summary judgment inappropriate.

Sutton v. Sullivan & Carden · filed 1988-01-04(c)

As for the second prong, the parties’ intent is at issue, thereby pointing up the unsuitability of summary judgment.

Section 56(c) does not permit summary judgment on intent or expectation when those issues must be decided by the factfinder.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Morgan · filed 1988-06-03(c)

The question of intent or expectation here uniquely fits the pattern of those issues of material fact which are not appropriate issues for summary judgment but are decided by the trier of fact. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Summary judgment is proper on claims that are barred by the applicable statute of limitation as a matter of law.

Cheeley v. Henderson · filed 1990-10-30(c)

Therefore, because the statute of limitation had run on all but the contractual aspect of Henderson’s legal malpractice claim, Cheeley was entitled to summary judgment on Henderson’s tort claims as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

A specific damages award cannot be entered on summary judgment without admissible record facts establishing both the amount and entitlement as a matter of law.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Ainsworth · filed 1991-02-12(c)

No facts exist in the record, as would be admissible in evidence establishing appellant suffered a loss of wages in this particular amount. OCGA § 9-11-56.

Summary judgment cannot be granted when the record lacks conclusive evidence about the disposition and value of property relevant to a claimed setoff.

Cho v. South Atlanta Associates, Ltd. · filed 1991-07-15(c)

There is no conclusive evidence regarding the disposition of the equipment left by defendants on the leased premises and the trial court did not credit defendants with any amount for the sale of said equipment.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the applicable limitations period has expired and the claimant has no other viable cause of action.

Department of Medical Assistance v. Hallman · filed 1992-03-19

Since the one-year statute of limitation for recovery on the lien had admittedly expired and there was no other viable cause of action made out by the department, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate. OCGA § 9-11-56.

Section 9-11-56(c) applies to a statutory forfeiture proceeding that is conducted as other civil cases in superior court.

Wilson v. State · filed 1992-11-19(c)

A forfeiture proceeding is conducted “as other civil cases in [the superior] court,” OCGA § 16-12-32 (f), so OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) applies.

Uncontroverted sworn testimony contained in a coroner's-inquest transcript may establish the absence of a genuine factual issue on summary judgment.

Keith v. Johnson · filed 1993-12-20(a), (e)

The court did not err in concluding that there was no genuine issue of fact regarding the order or the perpetrator of the couple’s deaths. OCGA § 9-11-56 (a) and (e).

Summary judgment is ill-suited to a parental-fitness challenge and is unavailable when the evidence does not preclude a finding of unfitness as a matter of law.

Miller v. Rieser · filed 1994-06-28(c)

If summary judgment is ever proper when the challenge is parental fitness, which for one thing is not a jury question, it is not proper here.

Summary judgment requires no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement as a matter of law, and under that standard it will rarely be appropriate in a Quiet Title Act proceeding.

Smith v. Georgia Kaolin Co. · filed 1994-10-17(c)

A party is entitled to summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

A court may grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party when the movant's own evidence demands dismissal of the movant's claim.

Jackson v. Jackson · filed 1975-05-27

The trial judge did not err, even in the absence of a motion for summary judgment by the wife, in dismissing *590the husband’s action also.

Section 9-11-56 does not require a trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on summary judgment.

Victor v. First Trust & Deposit Co. · filed 1980-03-20

The trial court was not required to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Code Ann. § 81A-156 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 660; 1967, pp. 226, 238; 1975, pp. 757, 759).

An appellate court will not reverse summary judgment merely because the trial court failed to consider part of the record unless the appellant shows that a genuine issue of material fact remains.

Miller Grading Contractors, Inc. v. Georgia Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1981-06-23(c)

Accordingly, we will not reverse the grant of summary judgment, even if it affirmatively appears that the trial court erroneously failed to consider a portion of the record, Unless the appellant can show that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. To the extent that Jackson v. Couch Funeral Home, supra and the other cases cited conflict with the views expressed herein, they are overruled.

On a superior-court appeal from probate court, either party may move for summary judgment, the probate transcript may be considered, and judgment may rest on that transcript if the record raises no genuine material factual issue.

Tony v. Pollard · filed 1981-09-08

On an appeal to superior court from the probate court of a proceeding to probate a will, under Code § 81A-156 either party, and certainly the prevailing party, may move for summary judgment, Taylor v. Donaldson, supra; the superior court may consider the transcript of proceedings in the probate court on motion for summary judgment, Brown v. Frachiseur, 247 Ga. 463 (277 SE2d 16 ) (1981); and where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact raised in the transcript of proceedings in the probate court, or in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions or affidavits before the court, the superior court does not err in granting summary judgment based on the probate court transcript.

Before granting summary judgment to a party who did not move for it, section 56(c) entitles the opposing party to at least 30 days’ notice and the opportunity to serve affidavits through the hearing date.

Thompson v. Hurt · filed 1981-09-22(c)

Such a situation does not obtain, however, where the movant prepares for and attends a hearing unprepared for a motion for summary judgment at or after the time of hearing in favor of his opponent. When such motion is made, the resisting party is entitled under Code § 81A-156 (c) to have notice at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing, and he has the right to serve opposing affidavits up to the date of hearing. Neither of these procedural safeguards was allowed the plaintiff in this case.

Subsection (b) permits a defending party to move for summary judgment at any time, so a local rule imposing an absolute four-month filing deadline is invalid.

Miles v. Edgewood Chenille, Inc. · filed 1982-04-20(b)

Code Ann. § 81A-156 (b) provides that “A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.”

Subsection (b) does not limit how many times a party may move for summary judgment.

Phillips v. Marcin · filed 1982-04-28(b)

Nothing in Code § 81A-156 (b) limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment.

A trial court may in its discretion consider a renewed summary-judgment motion even without any expansion of the record after the first motion was denied.

Southeastern Metal Products, Inc. v. Horger · filed 1983-04-06

A renewed or second motion for summary judgment may be considered within the discretion of a trial court even though there has been no expansion of the record since the denial of the first motion for summary judgment.

On cross-motions, the party entitled to judgment under undisputed stipulated facts should receive summary judgment.

Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. DeKalb County · filed 1983-07-15

The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment and in failing to grant appellant’s motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration of non-liability pursuant to the licensing ordinance in question. OCGA § 9-11-56 (Code Ann. § 81A-156).

A trial court need not deny an otherwise valid summary-judgment motion merely because the opposing party has a counterclaim still pending.

Concert Promotions, Inc. v. Haas & Dodd, Inc. · filed 1983-09-09

The trial court in the case sub judice did not err in granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment while reserving ruling on defendant’s counterclaim.

Section 56 cannot be used to grant judgment on a real-party-in-interest objection because summary judgment reaches the merits and the objection is a matter in abatement.

Warshaw Properties v. Lackey · filed 1984-01-27

It follows that summary judgment cannot properly be granted to a defendant on the basis of a real party-in-interest objection.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must enter judgment for the party whose nonliability is shown without any genuine material factual issue.

International Indemnity Co. v. Lott · filed 1984-04-11

The record demonstrates without any genuine issue of material fact (OCGA § 9-11-56) appellant’s non-liability for optional benefits. Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of appellee and in failing to enter summary judgment in favor of appellant.

Denial of a party's motion for summary judgment does not become a grant of summary judgment to the nonmoving opponent merely because the issues were resolved against the movant.

Avera v. Avera · filed 1984-05-22

That the trial court did not resolve these issues in appellant’s favor ... does not convert the trial court’s ruling to a grant of summary judgment to appellee.

Section 56 tests the merits of a claim and cannot be used to obtain judgment based on a defendant’s alleged default.

Williams v. Heykow, Inc. · filed 1984-09-05

The motion did not, however, invoke the applicable statutory provisions. OCGA § 9-11-55, not OCGA § 9-11-56, is the controlling statute on the issue of default. A motion for “partial summary judgment” is not an appropriate means by which a plaintiff can secure a judgment based upon the defendant’s alleged default.

A trial court may exercise discretion to consider a renewed summary-judgment motion even when the record has not expanded.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Thomas · filed 1984-11-13

Contrary to appellants’ contention, the trial court may in its discretion consider a renewed motion for summary judgment even when there has been no expansion of the record.

An order granting summary judgment need not state what evidence the court considered or include express findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Lewis v. Rickenbaker · filed 1985-03-15

The trial court is not required to make express findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on motions for summary judgment, although they are helpful to the appellate courts and instructive to the parties.

Section 56(c)’s state hearing requirement does not govern a summary-judgment motion in a federal diversity action, where federal procedure controls.

Helmich v. Reid W. Kennedy and Kennedy and Kennedy · filed 1986-08-18(c)

Helmich contends that the district court should have conducted a hearing as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) prior to granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In diversity actions, however, the federal court looks to the state law as to substantive matters but procedural matters are governed by federal law.

Subsection (c)'s thirty-day response period does not apply to a motion in limine that determines no issue on the merits and merely recognizes that an earlier writ foreclosed further litigation.

Diplomat Restaurant, Inc. v. Anthony · filed 1986-09-29(c)

The court’s order did not purport to be a decision on the merits with respect to any issue in the case but was simply a determination that the issuance of the writ of possession had foreclosed any further litigation with respect to the right of possession.

A local rule requiring a separate statement of disputed material facts supplements rather than conflicts with section 56.

Mills v. JE SHARBER OIL COMPANY · filed 1986-12-01

No conflict exists between the mandate of Rule 6.5 and OCGA § 9-11-56; rather, that rule’s requirement of filing a statement of material facts in issue is in addition to and not contrary to the Code provision.

A summary-judgment conclusion based on the evidence then in the record does not establish the underlying fact as a matter of law for a later trial where additional evidence may be introduced.

Barnes & Tucker Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1995-03-17(c)

The court did not hold that the acknowledgment was not a part of the contract as a matter of law. The court held that Westinghouse did not satisfy its burden, as must the movant for summary judgment, of showing Barnes’ acceptance of the acknowledgment as an amendment to the contract. ... the court “as...sumed” for “summary judgment purposes,” based on the evidence then in the record, that the acknowledgment never became part of the contract.

A trial court may not grant summary judgment on claims added by amendment when the movant did not amend its motion to address those claims.

Labat v. Bank of Coweta · filed 1995-07-27

The bank did not amend its motion for summary judgment to address the additional claims asserted against the bank in Labat’s ... amended complaint. Therefore, the trial court was not authorized to consider and grant summary judgment as to those claims that did not relate to the four grounds set forth in the bank’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment granted on those additional claims must be reversed.

Section 9-11-56 allows a renewed summary-judgment motion after denial, but appellate affirmance of the denial establishes as law of the case that the movant was not entitled to judgment on the record then existing.

William Goldberg & Co., Inc. v. Cohen · filed 1995-11-28

Nothing in OCGA § 9-11-56 limits the right of a party to move ... again for summary judgment after denial of such a motion. When the denial is affirmed on appeal, however, it establishes as the law of the case that the movant is not entitled, on the basis of the record as it then existed, to summary judgment.

Documentary evidence, as well as affidavits, may be used in deciding a summary-judgment motion under subsection (e).

Redding v. Walker · filed 1997-03-21(e)

Documentary evidence, as well as the affidavits expressly mentioned in the summary judgment provision of the Civil Practice Act (at OCGA § 9-11-56 (e)), may be used in considering such motions.

Section 9-11-56 does not require a trial court to enter express findings of fact and conclusions of law when ruling on summary judgment.

Thomas v. DeKalb County · filed 1997-06-27

The trial court is not required to make express findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on motions for summary judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56.

A motion seeking only an adjudication of a fact rather than disposition of a claim or part of a claim is not summary judgment and its grant is not directly appealable under subsection (h).

Saint Francis Hospital, Inc. v. Patton · filed 1997-09-17(d), (h)

In this case Dr. Patton’s motion sought only a determination that the defendants had breached the Hospital’s by-laws and not a ruling that he was entitled to recover on his claim. ... Accordingly, the grant of this motion was not a grant of summary judgment subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) ... And, this appeal must be dismissed.

A court may grant summary judgment sua sponte only if the record supports judgment and the adversely affected party receives full and fair notice and an opportunity to respond.

Walker v. Virtual Packaging, LLC · filed 1997-10-15

Although our law concerning motions for summary judgment allows a trial court to grant, sua sponte, a summary judgment, a trial court’s authority to do so is not unlimited. ... This means that in addition to ensuring the record supports such a judgment, the trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment.

A plaintiff responding to summary judgment need address only issues raised in the motion and need not present the entire case on unchallenged allegations.

Williams v. EMRO Marketing Co. · filed 1997-10-29

In responding to a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff need not address issues not raised in the motion or present his entire case.

A trial court may grant summary judgment sua sponte on an amended claim after advising both parties that it will consider the claim and allowing both sides to brief it fully.

Sherin v. Department of Human Resources · filed 1997-11-04

The court advised both parties it would consider the breach of contract claim and allowed both sides to fully brief that issue. ... A trial court may grant, sua sponte, summary judgment under these circumstances.

A trial court is not required to enter a detailed order when granting summary judgment.

City of College Park v. Sheraton Savannah Corp. · filed 1998-11-16(a)

Contrary to the City’s first enumeration of error, the trial court was not required to enter a more detailed summary judgment order.

A trial court’s adjudication of undisputed issues after a nonjury hearing is not a summary-judgment ruling under section 9-11-56 when no summary-judgment motion was made.

Bellamy v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 1999-02-19

After the hearing, the trial court adjudicated these remaining issues of undisputed fact against Bellamy as a matter of law. However, this was not a motion for summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, as erroneously characterized by Bellamy.

A court may grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party when the grant is otherwise proper and the record establishes no genuine issue of material fact.

Burt Development Co. v. Lee County Tax Assessors · filed 1999-10-04

“Summary judgment can be granted to a non-moving party provided that the grant is proper in all other respects.” ... Here, the court made specific factual and legal findings which support the conclusion that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See OCGA § 9-11-56. The court’s grant of summary judgment, without a motion by the tax assessors, was therefore appropriate.

Section 9-11-56 does not govern a motion to recuse a judge.

Kirkland v. Tamplin · filed 2007-02-01

So arguing, he incorrectly relies on OCGA§§ 9-11-56 (summary judgment) and 9-10-111 (verified pleadings). Without addressing his interpretation of those statutes, which do not apply here, we note that the trial court has discretion to rule on the question of whether the movant has overcome his burden to show bias regardless of any evidence presented by the nonmovant.

A written order that functions as a grant of summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h), regardless of how the order is styled.

Seale v. Bearden · filed 2014-02-27(h)

Here, we construe the order as the grant of summary judgment. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment may be appealed directly.

Parties may seek, and trial courts may grant, summary judgment on defenses even though subsections (a) and (b) expressly refer to claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims.

Woodstone Townhouses, LLC v. Southern Fiber Worx, LLC · filed 2021-02-23(a), (b)

Contrary to Southern Fiber and Turton’s argument, parties routinely move for summary judgment on defenses, and trial courts routinely consider the merit of defenses in the context of summary judgment motions.

When lack of standing deprives the court of jurisdiction over a declaratory-judgment claim, the proper disposition is dismissal without prejudice rather than summary judgment.

Knaack v. Henley Park Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2022-08-26

And while the trial court properly concluded that Knaack’s claim for a ruling that the new rules are void should be dismissed, the court improperly did so (as Knaack correctly asserts) in the context of an order granting summary judgment.

Affidavits supporting a personal-jurisdiction dismissal motion must comply with subsection (e), even though that motion does not convert into summary judgment merely because it is tried on affidavits.

Alcatraz Media, LLC v. Yahoo! Inc. · filed 2008-03-25(e)

Further, motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (2), when tried on affidavits, do not devolve to motions for summary judgment. ... However, affidavits in support of such motions, as discussed below, must adhere to OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) requirements.

Subsection (c)'s summary-judgment review standard does not apply when neither the parties nor the trial court treated the proceeding as a summary adjudication.

Fulton DeKalb Hospital Authority v. Miller & Billips · filed 2008-09-19(c)

Arguing for a different standard of review, the Authority contends that the trial court’s decision was, in essence, a summary judgment ruling. It thus claims that we must construe all evidence in its favor and review the lower court’s ruling de novo, in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We disagree. ... Neither the parties nor the trial court treated the proceedings below as a summary adjudication.

Section 9-11-56 contemplates a judgment on the merits and is designed to test a claim's merits, so lack of personal jurisdiction generally is not a proper subject for summary judgment.

Scanlan v. TATE SUPPLY CO., INC. · filed 2010-03-22

OCGA § 9-11-56 contemplates a judgment on the merits, and a motion for summary judgment is designed to test the merits of a claim. ... Accordingly, a defense such as lack of personal jurisdiction is generally not a proper subject for summary judgment.

Section 56 cannot be used to decide an insufficiency-of-service defense because that defense is a plea in abatement.

Cheshire Bridge Enterprises, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance · filed 1987-06-25

Although appellee’s motion for summary judgment did raise the issue of insufficiency of service of process, that defense is a plea in abatement and, as such, it is not properly a basis of a motion for summary judgment.

Uniform-rule response requirements supplement rather than conflict with § 9-11-56, and a trial court may strike an untimely or nonconforming response.

West v. Nodvin · filed 1987-07-13

there is no conflict between these requirements of the Uniform Rules and OCGA § 9-11-56; rather, the requirements are in addition to those set out in the Civil Practice Act.

Section 56 permits successive summary-judgment motions supported by additional evidence after an earlier motion is denied.

Hogans v. Food Giant, Inc. · filed 1988-01-27

OCGA § 9-11-56 does not prohibit successive motions for summary judgment based on additional evidence. Conversely, it does not prohibit the filing of additional evidence once a motion for summary judgment is denied.

Subsection (e)'s proof requirements apply to personal-jurisdiction motions, so mere factual allegations in unverified pleadings cannot be considered unless admitted.

Behar v. Aero Med International, Inc. · filed 1988-02-16(e)

Accordingly, this court will not consider mere allegations of fact found in the parties’ pleadings.

A defendant may obtain summary judgment as to all of a claim when the plaintiff's response relies on an unpleaded, materially different alleged publication.

Deal v. Builders Transport, Inc. · filed 1989-05-03(b)

Without even reaching the questions of whether the statement was not defamatory, or actionable, as a matter of law, plaintiff is not entitled to reversal of summary judgment given in defendant’s favor “as to all” of the claim asserted against it. OCGA § 9-11-56 (b).

A motion to dismiss for insufficient service does not become summary judgment merely because the court resolves jurisdictional facts through affidavits.

Terrell v. Porter · filed 1989-01-04(c)

A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the defendant, when tried on affidavits pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-43 (b), does not become a motion for summary judgment.

A third-party defendant may move for summary judgment against the original plaintiff on any ground that would entitle the original defendant to summary judgment.

Empire Shoe Co. v. Nico Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-10-29(b)

Accordingly, given the mandate of OCGA § 9-11-1, the broad interpretation to be given to the type of “claim” against which summary judgment may be sought, and the right of a third-party defendant to participate fully in the defense of the primary action to protect its own interests, we hold that a third-party defendant is entitled to move for summary judgment against the original plaintiff on any ground for which the original defendant would be entitled to summary judgment against the plaintiff.

Summary judgment on a claim establishes only that the plaintiff lacks evidence creating a genuine issue on one essential element.

Seckinger v. Holtzendorf · filed 1991-07-09

Appellant fails to recognize that the grant of a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s complaint establishes only that as to one essential element of the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists, notwithstanding any issue of material fact regarding any other essential element.

Summary judgment may resolve all or any part of a case despite a pending third-party claim.

Goodrum v. Ensign Bank · filed 1991-11-22

It is not inappropriate for a trial court to enter summary judgment against a defendant simply because a third-party claim remains pending. Summary judgment can be entered with regard to all or any part of a case. See OCGA § 9-11-56.

Section 56 imposes no limit on the number of summary-judgment motions a party may file.

T. L. Rogers Oil Co. v. South Carolina National Bank · filed 1992-02-07

There is nothing in [OCGA § 9-11-56] limiting the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment tests the merits and cannot be granted on a matter in abatement, which must instead be resolved by dismissal without prejudice.

Williams v. Taylor · filed 1992-02-07(b)

‘A motion for summary judgment is designed to test the merits of a claim and cannot be granted on matters in abatement. (Cits.) Such matters are properly disposed of pursuant to motion to dismiss.

Section 9-11-56 permits successive or renewed summary-judgment motions, especially when a better-supported motion can cure an evidentiary deficiency.

Nesmith v. Ellerbee · filed 1992-02-25

OCGA § 9-11-56 does not prohibit successive or renewed motions for summary judgment.

When one party's summary-judgment motion addresses every claim and defense and undisputed facts entitle the opponent to judgment, the court may grant summary judgment to the nonmoving party on its own motion.

Bethco, Inc. v. Cinema 'N' Drafthouse International, Inc. · filed 1992-05-04(c)

Even though only plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, the motion addressed all the issues in the case, both plaintiffs’ claims for relief and the defenses raised by defendants. Since the undisputed facts show defendants are entitled to judgment, the trial court did not err in awarding judgment to the non-moving party.

When a motion lacks depositions, affidavits, or testimony, the proper merits ruling may be judgment on the pleadings rather than summary judgment.

Bowers v. Estep · filed 1992-06-09(c)

Accordingly, we vacate the summary judgment ruling on this count of appellants’ complaint and remand with direction that the trial court enter judgment on the pleadings for appellees on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Although subsection (c) requires the movant to show no genuine material factual issue and entitlement as a matter of law, the trial court need not make an explicit finding reciting that standard.

Richards v. First Union National Bank · filed 1992-06-25(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) requires that the movant in a motion for summary judgment to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; however, the trial court is not required to make a specific finding of such.

A court deciding summary judgment does not find facts as at a bench trial but culls the undisputed material facts from the record.

Doyal v. Thornton · filed 1992-06-30(c)

In considering summary judgment, a court does not “find” facts as it would in a bench trial. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Instead, it culls from the record what the undisputed material facts are. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

A motion in abatement challenging personal jurisdiction must be adjudicated as a motion to dismiss rather than as a motion for summary judgment.

Booksing v. Holley · filed 1993-11-12

The defendants’ motions were in abatement, not bar, and should have been adjudicated as motions to dismiss for lack of per...sonal jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA §§ 9-11-12 (b) and 9-11-43, rather than as motions for summary judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56.

A trial court need not make express factual findings or legal conclusions when ruling on a summary-judgment motion, because appellate review is de novo.

Dixie Diners Atlanta, Inc. v. GWINNETT FEDERAL BANK, FSB. · filed 1993-11-29

The trial court is not required to make express findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling on motions for summary judgment [pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56], although they are helpful to the appellate courts and instructive to the parties.

Subsection (a) authorizes summary judgment only on a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or request for declaratory judgment, so it is unavailable after judgment has already been entered.

Eastlawn Corp. v. Bankers Equipment Leasing Co. · filed 1993-12-03(a)

Summary judgment is authorized only when seeking recovery on a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or a declaratory judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (a).

A summary-judgment motion may be filed after 30 days from commencement of the action even while discovery remains ongoing, and a ruling is not premature absent outstanding discovery or a request to defer.

Hoffman v. Fletcher · filed 2000-06-20(a)

A motion for summary judgment may be properly filed at any time after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action. OCGA § 9-11-56 (a). The motions in this case were filed long after the 30-day deadline. Moreover, there is no evidence that Hoffman was waiting on any additional discovery; she sought no discovery after the discovery period was extended. Nor did she file any request that the ... trial court defer its ruling until discovery was completed. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s ruling was not premature.

Section 9-11-56 does not limit how many times a party may move for summary judgment, even without additional evidence, and leaves consideration of successive motions to the trial judge's discretion.

Eastern Car Liner, Ltd. v. Kyles · filed 2006-07-10

Moreover, we note that nothing in OCGA § 9-11-56 limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment, even without proffering additional evidence, leaving it within the trial judge’s discretion to consider such motions.

Section 9-11-56 does not limit how many times a party may move for summary judgment.

Gold Creek Sl, LLC v. City of Dawsonville · filed 2008-04-08

[W]e note that nothing in OCGA § 9-11-56 limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment.

The summary-judgment procedure operates before trial, and a court lacks jurisdiction to decide pending summary-judgment motions after the trial has been held.

Fleeman v. Canal Insurance Co. · filed 2010-02-03

We hold that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the motions for summary judgment once the trial was held.

Section 9-11-56 does not limit how many times a party may move for summary judgment, so a trial judge may consider a renewed motion even without an expanded record.

Hubbard v. Department of Transportation · filed 2002-07-03

There is nothing in OCGA § 9-11-56 limiting the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment.

Section 9-11-56 does not limit how many times a party may move for summary judgment, and denial of an earlier motion does not foreclose a later grant.

Buchan v. Lawrence Metal Products, Inc. · filed 2004-11-01

Moreover, there is nothing in OCGA § 9-11-56 limiting the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment. ... A prior denial of a motion for summary judgment does not foreclose the subsequent grant of summary judgment, inasmuch as an order is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and liabilities of the parties.

Section 9-11-56 does not limit the number of times a party may move for summary judgment.

Davis v. Foreman · filed 2011-09-22

Nothing in the summary judgment statute limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment.

Denial of summary judgment does not conclusively resolve the issues presented or establish the converse facts for the nonmovant, so a renewed motion on the same issue may be considered without new evidence.

Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Everett · filed 2011-12-01

Finally, when a court denies summary judgment, it does not actually resolve the issues presented such that they have the conclusive effect of a judgment. Thus, a party’s renewed or second motion for summary judgment on the same issue may be considered, even if no new evidence has been introduced since the denial of the first motion for summary judgment.

A party may renew a summary-judgment motion after denial, but an appellate affirmance establishes only that the movant was not entitled to judgment on the record as it then existed.

City of Albany v. Dougherty County, Georgia · filed 2022-01-11

[n]othing in OCGA § 9-11-56 limits the right of a party to move again for summary judgment after denial of such a motion. When the denial is affirmed on appeal, however, it establishes as the law of the case that the movant is not entitled, on the basis of the record as it then existed, to summary judgment. It is well established that when a ruling is appealed, the appealing party must raise all available grounds.

Section 56(h) makes an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party a final judgment subject to direct appeal.

Bozard v. J. A. Jones Construction Co. · filed 1978-07-14(h)

An order granting summary judgment on any issue, or as to any party, is a final judgment subject to direct appeal. Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h); Davis v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 782 (240 SE2d 191) (1977); Security Branding, Inc. v. Corbitt, 144 Ga. App. 164 (1) (240 SE2d 728) (1977).

Subsection (h) lets a party losing a grant of summary judgment appeal either immediately or after final judgment, even when the grant was not certified as final.

Bozard v. J. A. Jones Construction Co. · filed 1978-12-01(h)

But Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h) also gives a losing party the right to a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party even though the judgment is not final under Code Ann. §§ 6-701 (a) (1) or 81A-154 (b). . . However, Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h) is an exception to the finality rule which is for the benefit of the losing party. The party against whom summary judgment was granted may appeal either after the grant of summary judgment or after the rendition of the final judgment.

Section 56(h) does not make an order directly appealable merely because it is labeled partial summary judgment when no outside evidence converted the underlying motion to strike.

Whatley v. Blue Cross of Georgia/Columbus, Inc. · filed 1983-02-04(h)

A review of the record in its entirety demonstrates that no evidence is encompassed therein. Accordingly, this court, for the first time, has been given sufficient information concerning the appeal by which to discover that appellees’ motion to strike was not converted into a motion for partial summary judgment by consideration of evidence outside the pleadings and that the previous characterization of the order as one granting partial summary judgment was erroneous and misleading.

The later issuance of a writ of fieri facias on a grant of summary judgment cannot extend the time to appeal by acting as a quasi-certificate of finality.

Newton v. K. B. Property Management of Georgia, Inc. · filed 1983-05-13(h)

Moreover, as regards a grant of summary judgment, the later issuance of a fi. fa., with or without notice, cannot possibly act as a “quasi” certificate of finality so as to extend the time for appeal.

Section 56(h) makes an order granting partial summary judgment directly appealable.

Becker v. Fairman · filed 1983-09-06(h)

Notwithstanding the defendants’ argument to the contrary, it is clear that the only appealable order of record is the order of July 15,1982, granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiff.

Section 56(h) makes an order granting partial or complete summary judgment directly appealable even while a counterclaim remains pending.

Gulf Oil Co. v. Mantegna · filed 1983-09-09(h)

We note here that under OCGA § 9-11-56 (formerly Code Ann. § 81A-156 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 660; 1967, pp. 226, 238; 1975, pp. 757, 759)) the granting of an order of summary judgment “shall be subject to review by appeal,” albeit the case sub judice was not final at that particular point in time due to the pendency of the counterclaim.

Section 56(h) permits a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment.

Middle Georgia Bank v. Continental Real Estate & Associates, Inc. · filed 1983-10-26(h)

The grant of a motion for summary judgment can be appealed directly to this court.

Section 56(h) allows direct appeal of partial summary judgment within 30 days or review after final judgment.

Olympic Development Group, Inc. v. American Druggists' Insurance · filed 1985-05-30(h)

The grant of partial summary judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties is reviewable by direct appeal if the notice of appeal is filed within 30 days of the rendition of such judgment.

A grant of partial summary judgment is appealable under subsection (h) even without an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

Advanced Contouring, Inc. v. McMILLAN DIVISION OF STATES ENGINEERING CORPORATION · filed 1986-05-16(h)

“Even in the absence of ‘an express determination that there is no just reason for delay’ [OCGA § 9-11-54 (b)] the order granting the partial summary judgment is nevertheless appealable. [OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).] (Cit.)”

A partial summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Hodges Plumbing & Electric Co. v. ITT Grinnell Co. · filed 1986-06-03(h)

The grant of a partial summary judgment is a hybrid. Ordinarily, tested by the applicable appeal provisions it would not be subject to direct review. However, it is expressly made directly appealable by OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Section 56(h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable, so the interlocutory-appeal procedure does not apply.

Terrell v. City Wide Cab, Inc. · filed 1986-09-02(h)

Because a grant of summary judgment is subject to direct appeal (see OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)), and because the interlocutory appeal procedure is applicable only to those orders, decisions, and judgments which are “not otherwise subject to direct appeal” (OCGA § 5-6-34 (b)), we conclude that the application was improvidently granted; and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Section 56(h) makes a grant of summary judgment directly appealable even when a motion to dismiss the party ordinarily would require interlocutory review.

McMullan v. Georgia Girl Fashions, Inc. · filed 1986-09-05(h)

this is a grant of a motion for summary judgment which is directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Subsection (h) permits a losing party to appeal directly from an order granting summary judgment on any issue or party even when the judgment is not otherwise final.

Williams v. Thomas · filed 1987-05-22(h)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) gives a losing party the right to a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party even though the judgment is not final under OCGA § 5-6-34 or § 9-11-54 (b).

A proper subsection (h) appeal from a later partial summary judgment permits review of a prior partial summary judgment in the same case for judicial economy.

Hardwick, Cook & Co. v. 3379 Peachtree, Ltd. · filed 1987-10-29(h)

Hardwick, Cook has perfected a proper appeal under the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) from the trial court’s subsequent order granting partial summary judgment to Peachtree on other issues, and thus under the facts of this case (in which a second order granting partial summary judgment has been entered) in the interest of judicial economy, the prior grant of partial summary judgment will be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the present direct appealability of the judgment.

A dismissal that considers outside matters and operates as summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Peeples v. City of Atlanta · filed 1989-01-05(h)

Accordingly, even though the trial court dismissed the action as to the City, it must be treated as one for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment is directly appealable under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

Under subsection (h), an order granting summary judgment is directly appealable even when other issues remain pending in the trial court.

Southern Guaranty Insurance v. Jeffares · filed 1989-02-06(h)

An order granting summary judgment is subject to review by direct appeal, OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), even if other issues remain pending before the trial court.

An appeal from a grant of summary judgment permits review of other rulings raised on appeal that may affect proceedings below, regardless of their standalone finality or appealability.

Reese v. Georgia Power Co. · filed 1989-03-17(h)

An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal, and where such appeal is taken, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability or finality of such judgments, rulings, or orders standing alone.

Subsection (h) makes a ruling granting summary judgment directly appealable, although a challenge must still be timely designated and enumerated.

Mitchell v. Kenya · filed 1995-01-13(h)

However, Mitchell attempts to expand the scope of this appeal by filing a supplemental enumeration of error challenging the directly appealable ruling on Bedford’s motion for summary judgment. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A direct appeal from partial or complete summary judgment may be taken within 30 days of that judgment or after entry of the final judgment in the case.

Studdard v. Satcher, Chick, Kapfer, Inc. · filed 1995-03-13(h)

Direct appeals from orders granting partial or complete summary judgment may be taken either within 30 days of rendition of the judgment or after the rendition of the final judgment in the case.

Subsection (h) makes grants of partial summary judgment immediately appealable without certification under the partial-final-judgment rule.

Faircloth v. A. L. Williams & Associates, Inc. · filed 1995-12-05(h)

Since grants of partial summary judgment are already immediately appeal-able under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), OCGA § 9-11-54 (b) does not generally come into play when they are involved.

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment appealable, allowing a joint-tortfeasor co-defendant to appeal another co-defendant's grant of summary judgment after final dismissal of the underlying suit.

National Foundation Co. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc. · filed 1995-12-11(h)

The order granting summary judgment was, by virtue of statute (OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)), an appealable order; it is from this order appellant has timely filed this appeal.

Subsection (h) authorizes a direct appeal from a summary-judgment ruling.

Grove v. Sugar Hill Investment Associates, Inc. · filed 1995-12-20(h)

A direct appeal is authorized by OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) and ... .

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo to determine whether a genuine material factual issue exists on the elements of the pleaded claims.

Artlip v. Queler · filed 1996-03-15

The standard of review of the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment is a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact as to the elements required to establish the causes of action stated by plaintiff in her complaint.

An order granting summary judgment is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Merastar Insurance v. Wheat · filed 1996-03-15(h)

The trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Wheat was directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, and the movant must show no genuine material factual issue and entitlement to judgment on facts viewed most favorably to the nonmovant.

Siegrist v. Iwuagwa · filed 1997-09-26

On appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence.

Subsection (h) permits a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment whether the order is final or partial.

Cherokee County v. Hause · filed 1997-11-05(h)

A direct appeal was taken by the county, which is the correct procedure whether the order is a final or a partial judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

On de novo review of summary judgment, an appellate court may determine the timeliness of an amended affidavit even when the trial court made no ruling on timeliness.

Porquez v. Washington · filed 1997-11-17(e)

The Court of Appeals was also authorized to make a determination regarding the timeliness of the amended affidavit even in the absence of a ruling by the trial court on the issue. This is so because in assessing whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant physicians, the Court of Appeals was to review the record de novo, construing the evidence and the inferences from it strongly in favor of the nonmoving party.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Martinez v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-01-05(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court reviews the record anew to determine whether material factual issues exist and whether the law was correctly applied to the undisputed facts.

Johnson v. Loy · filed 1998-03-20(c)

In reviewing a judgment based on the grant of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), the appellate court examines the record anew to ascertain whether first, the trial court accurately ruled that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and second, the trial court correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Watson v. Kroger Co. · filed 1998-03-31(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Urban v. Lemley · filed 1998-04-03(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County · filed 1998-06-05(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the nonmovant may argue that the movant failed to satisfy subsection (c)’s prima facie burden even if that objection was not raised below.

Dental One Asssociates, Inc. v. JKR Realty Associates, Ltd. · filed 1998-06-15(c)

We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in so holding, because the issue in an appeal from the grant of summary judgment is whether the movant met the burden established by OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) and, in addressing that issue on appeal, the non-moving party is entitled to advance all arguments without regard to whether they were raised by way of objections below.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Re/Max Executives, Inc. v. Vacalis · filed 1998-09-22(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”

Summary judgment is proper only when no material factual issue exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

White v. Cauthen · filed 1998-11-12(c)

“A grant of a motion for summary judgment is proper when there is no issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). This Court applies a de novo standard of review to a grant of summary judgment, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the respondent’s favor on appeal.

Empire Distributors, Inc. v. George L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority · filed 1998-11-18(c)

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Applying the proper de novo standard of review to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence, as well as all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the respondent.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Parker v. Welborn · filed 1999-02-09(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Crowder v. Larson · filed 1999-03-10(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Subsection (c) requires summary judgment when no genuine material factual issue exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with appellate review conducted de novo in the nonmovant’s favor.

Schwartz v. Harris Waste Management Group, Inc. · filed 1999-04-14(c)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

United Companies Lending Corp. v. Coates · filed 1999-06-28(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Paden v. Murray · filed 1999-10-04(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

On appeal, summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact remains and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Pulliam v. Southern Regional Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1999-12-03(c)

On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the ... moving party demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact remained and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Hansford v. Burns · filed 1999-12-13(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Ovrevik v. Ovrevik · filed 2000-01-05(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovarit.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Watts v. Promina Gwinnett Health System, Inc. · filed 2000-02-15(c)

Initially, we note that summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

On appeal from summary judgment, the court decides whether the movant established no genuine material factual issue and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, viewing all evidence and inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.

Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. DOT · filed 2000-03-16(c)

On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the moving party demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact remained and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ... We view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, de novo and in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Pickering Corp. v. Goodwin · filed 2000-05-05(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Bryant v. PMC Capital, Inc. · filed 2000-06-01(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Smith v. Persichetti · filed 2000-07-14(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Testamentary Trust of Moseley v. Barnes · filed 2000-09-07(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

On appeal, summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Davenport v. Northeast Georgia Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2000-12-08(c)

On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the moving party demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact remained and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Wang v. Moore · filed 2001-01-09(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment ... as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Bridges v. Mann · filed 2001-01-30(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Ellerbee v. Hawes · filed 2001-02-22(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Jordan v. Tri County AG, Inc. · filed 2001-02-26(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Matthews v. the Varsity, Inc. · filed 2001-03-08(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Salinas v. Skelton · filed 2001-04-13(c)

On appeal, we review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates any genuine issue of material fact. ... Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor on appeal.

Cotton v. Nationsbank, N.A. · filed 2001-04-19(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Appellate review under subsection (c) asks whether the movant showed no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Mulligan v. Rawls · filed 2003-05-28(c)

On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the moving party demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact remained and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).

When all evidence was submitted before the summary-judgment hearing and the hearing consisted only of oral argument on that evidence, a hearing transcript is unnecessary for meaningful appellate review.

Sapp v. Canal Insurance · filed 2011-02-28(c)

Where, as here, all evidence was submitted to the trial court in advance of the hearing as required under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), see ... and the hearing consisted simply of oral argument based on evidence already submitted, a transcript of proceedings is not required to enable meaningful appellate review.

Subsection (h) gives a direct appeal to the losing party against whom summary judgment was entered, but it does not give a prevailing party standing to appeal a grant in its own favor.

City of Dublin School District v. Mmt Holdings, LLC · filed 2019-06-26(h)

The grant of a motion for summary judgment will not, standing alone, necessarily authorize the initiation of a direct appeal therefrom by any party to the case. An appeal must be filed by one who has standing to pursue it. OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) gives a losing party [i.e., the party against whom summary judgment has been entered] the right to a direct appeal from an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party even though the judgment is not final. ... Because the trial court’s July 27, 2018 order was not a grant of summary judgment against the School District, a direct appeal under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) is not authorized here.

A grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal.

Nihad Al Jaberi v. Rahman · filed 2020-12-14(h)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment is reviewable by direct appeal.

An order granting summary judgment is directly appealable.

Wilkerson v. Morgan · filed 2022-02-11(h)

Wilkerson has a right of direct appeal from the May 2017 order on summary judgment. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A final order granting summary judgment is subject to direct appeal under subsection (h).

Andrews v. Regions Bank · filed 2023-11-27(h)

Nothing remains pending in the court below and the order dismissing the defendants and granting Regions summary judgment is a final judgment. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1); OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). As such, the order is subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (h) permits a direct appeal from a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party unless the case falls within a category requiring discretionary review.

Donahue v. Amica Insurance Company · filed 2024-02-07(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party may be appealed directly under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), and this action does not appear to fall within one of the categories of cases for which a discretionary application is required to seek appellate review under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a).

Subsection (h) permits a direct appeal from a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party unless the case falls within a category requiring discretionary review.

Memon v. Mountain Express Oil Company · filed 2024-04-10(h)

No discretionary application is required, however, as the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party may be appealed directly under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), and this action does not appear to fall within one of the categories of cases for which a discretionary application is required to seek appellate review under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a).

Subsection (h) makes an order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party directly appealable.

Sterling Planet, Inc. v. Grp Holdco, LLC · filed 2024-04-16(h)

“An order granting summary judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.”

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Hrib v. Sophy Properties, LLC · filed 2024-06-07(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

An order granting summary judgment after conversion of a motion to dismiss is directly appealable under subsection (h).

Warner v. Espitia · filed 2024-07-02(h)

Accordingly, the trial court’s order should ... be treated as an order granting summary judgment, giving Warner a right of direct appeal under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

A grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is directly appealable under subsection (h).

City of Atlanta v. Block, Inc. of Delaware F/K/A Square, Inc. · filed 2024-07-08(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.

An order that effectively grants summary judgment on an issue is directly appealable under subsection (h), regardless of how the order is labeled.

Gamsbart, LLC v. Smith · filed 2024-10-21(h)

Here, although the order does not state that it granted summary judgment to Sandra Smith, that is the effect of the trial court’s ruling. ... Thus, the order that the defendants seek to appeal is directly appealable and not subject to the interlocutory appeal requirements.

Subsection (h) makes a grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party reviewable by direct appeal.

Arkee S. Smith v. James B. Nutter & Company · filed 2025-03-25(h)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h), the grant of summary judgment on any issue or as to any party is reviewable by direct appeal.