O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6

Section 51-1-6 permits damages for breach of a legal duty protecting a trade name, even when the law does not expressly provide a cause of action.

Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Associates, Architects & Planners, Inc. · filed 1985-09-26

The contention is made that if the right to protection of a trade name exists, the remedy is limited to injunctive relief and damages do not lie. We disagree. “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” OCGA § 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 does not itself create a cause of action; it authorizes damages for breach of an independently existing legal duty.

Second Continental, Inc. v. Atlanta E-Z Builders, Inc. · filed 1999-03-16

This Court has held that this Code section does not create a cause of action but simply authorizes the recovery of damages for breach of a legal duty. ... Defendants argue that the charge of this Code section provides the jury with alternative criteria for determining their verdict without application of the four elements of a claim for tortious interference with business relationships. However, we do not view the Code section, albeit inapplicable to the issues on trial, as likely to confuse or mislead a jury of ordinary intelligence, particularly when the charge as a whole is considered in the light of the evidence and arguments.

Section 51-1-6 standing alone creates no tort cause of action and only authorizes damages for breach of an otherwise existing legal duty.

Kaiser v. Tara Ford, Inc. · filed 2001-03-07

does not confer a separate cause of action in tort upon one who has suffered a breach of a legal or a private duty. OCGA § 51-1-6, standing alone, creates no cause of action. Rather, it simply authorizes the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise created.

Section 51-1-6 does not permit negligence recovery for economic loss from a defective product absent personal injury or damage to other property.

Sofet v. Roberts · filed 1987-12-17

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another . . . although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” It is clear from the pleadings, however, that appellant did not allege that appellee’s negligence caused appellant damage to his person or property but that appellant sought damages “ ‘attendant to his receiving a vehicle not up to the standards that he contracted to purchase [from a third party]; he simply sued for loss of the benefit of his bargain.’ [Cit.] Under these particular circumstances, ‘such damages are not recoverable in negligence. [Cits.]’ ”

Section 51-1-6 permits an injured party to recover for breach of a legal duty to refrain from conduct that may injure another, even when no express cause of action is provided.

Sutter v. Hutchings · filed 1985-03-14

However, OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person ... to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” We therefore find that the defendant hostess and her daughter owed a duty to those using the highways not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm by furnishing alcohol to a person under 19 who was noticeably intoxicated and who these defendants knew would soon be driving his car.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for damage caused by breaching a legal duty even when no express cause of action is provided, including the duty to swear truthfully outside a judicial proceeding.

Peters v. IMPERIAL CABINET CO., INC. · filed 1988-11-04

While OCGA Title 51 does not contain a tort expressly called “false swearing,” OCGA § 51-1-6 provides that “[w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Appellee’s allegation that appellant knowingly swore falsely, thereby injuring appellee, set forth a cause of action for breach of the legal duty to swear truthfully.

Section 51-1-6 supplies a cause of action for injury caused by breach of a legal duty, including the statutory duty not to furnish alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated person.

Whelchel v. Laing Properties, Inc. · filed 1989-01-23

If this duty is breached, OCGA § 51-1-6 provides the cause of action.

Section 51-1-6 provides a cause of action when a person breaches a legal duty, allowing liability for resulting harm.

Peters v. Hyatt Legal Services · filed 1993-12-20

Peters points out that OCGA § 51-1-6 provides for a cause of action against any person who breaches a legal duty. Moreover, OCGA § 45-17-8 (e) provides that “[i]n performing any notarial act, a notary public shall confirm the identity of the document signer, oath taker, or affirmant based on personal knowledge or on satisfactory evidence.” ... Peters argues that since the document is an undisputed forgery, there is an inference that Ms. Storey failed to perform her statutory duty with due care such that she may be held liable for the harm done to Peters. We agree. Under the facts alleged, Peters states a sufficient cause of action against Storey.

Section 51-1-6 does not itself create a tort cause of action; it permits recovery of damages only for breach of a legal duty created elsewhere.

Parris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1997-11-06

OCGA § 51-1-6, standing alone, creates no cause of action. Rather, it simply authorizes the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise created.

Section 51-1-6 does not create a standalone cause of action; it permits recovery of damages for breach of a legal duty when the injured party suffers damage.

Project Control Services, Inc. v. Reynolds · filed 2001-02-07

“[OCGA § 51-1-6] does not create a cause of action, of course; it simply authorizes the recovery of damages for a breach of a legal duty.” ... We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Project Control’s OCGA § 51-1-6 claim because the defendants did not owe Project Control a legal duty.

Section 51-1-6 makes a hospital's violation of its legal duty to follow its existing bylaws actionable.

Katz v. Hospital Authority · filed 2002-03-12

A hospital has a legal duty to follow its existing bylaws, and the violation of that duty is actionable under OCGA § 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for damage caused by breach of a legal duty imposed by law even when the underlying statute does not expressly create a cause of action, provided the plaintiff is within the protected class and the harm is covered by that statute.

Amick v. BM & KM, INC. · filed 2003-08-05

Under both the common law and statutory theories of recovery, however, the fulfillment of the duty and breach elements depends on “(1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons [the statute] was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm [the statute] was intended to guard against.” ... Accordingly, the purpose of the statute relied on by the plaintiff as creating a legal duty for the defendant is important in assessing claims under both section 51-1-6 and the negligence per se doctrine. ... Where the cited statute does not govern the relationship between the parties, no cause of action exists, and recovery of damages based on violation of that particular statute is unwarranted. ... Instead, Georgia decisions applying the general tort provision in section 51-1-6, and recognizing causes of action for violations of statutes without specific civil remedy provisions, govern this case. Accordingly, Amick may seek recovery based on section 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 permits an injured physician to sue for damages when a hospital breaches a legal duty, such as complying with its bylaws, and thereby arbitrarily revokes staff privileges.

Jerry Jackson Lee, II v. Hospital Authority · filed 2005-01-27

When hospitals fail to comply with their bylaws and arbitrarily revoke staff privileges the injured physician can maintain an action under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. See St. Mary’s Hosp., 205 Ga. App. at 126-27.

Section 51-1-6 does not create an independent cause of action; it permits damages for breach of an otherwise existing legal duty arising under statute or common law.

Jastram v. Williams · filed 2005-11-18

This section does not create a separate cause of action, but simply authorizes the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise arising, though not expressly stated, under a statute or common law.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery of damages for breach of a legal duty imposed by law, including a federal statute, even when that statute does not provide an express private cause of action.

Jenkins v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-02-21

And OCGA § 51-1-6 authorizes a plaintiff to recover damages for the breach of a legal duty even when that duty arises from a statute that does not provide a private cause of action. See ... (OCGA § 51-1-6 does not create a legal duty but defines a tort and authorizes damages when a legal duty is breached). OCGA § 51-1-6 states, “[w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” A duty imposed by a federal statute such as the GLBA is a duty imposed by law under OCGA § 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 permits damages for breach of a legal duty only when the duty was imposed for the benefit of the injured person, requiring the claimant to belong to the statute’s protected class.

Newman v. Johnson · filed 2012-10-26

As to the ADA, OCGA § 51-1-6 provides for recovery of damages upon breach of a legal duty and specifies that the requirement under the law to perform or refrain from doing an act must be for the benefit of the injured person. To recover on a claim of breach of statutory duty, the person claiming the breach must be within the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty arising from a statute without an express private cause of action, but it does not itself create the legal duty.

Pulte Home Corp. v. Simerly · filed 2013-07-08

OCGA § 51-1-6 authorizes a plaintiff to recover damages for the breach of a legal duty even when that duty arises from a statute that does not provide a private cause of action. OCGA § 51-1-6 does not create a legal duty but defines a tort and authorizes damages when a legal duty is breached.

Section 51-1-6 permits an injured person to recover damages for breach of a legal duty imposed for the person's benefit even when the law does not expressly create a cause of action.

Schaff v. Snapping Shoals Electric Membership Corp. · filed 2014-11-18

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Assuming that a violation of a statute or mandatory regulation has occurred, before negligence per se can be determined, a trial court must consider (1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against. Finally, if the court finds negligence per se, the plaintiffs must then demonstrate a causal connection between the negligence per se and the injury.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty only when the duty has an ascertainable standard of conduct; a statutory violation alone does not automatically create a private cause of action.

The Best Jewelry Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Fulton County, Georgia · filed 2015-11-23

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” On its face, this statute authorizes suit only when there has been an “alleged breach of a legal duty,” whether intentional or negligent, “with some ascertainable standard of conduct.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 164 (744 SE2d 686) (2013) (citations omitted). But “‘it is well settled that violating statutes and regulations does not automatically give rise to a civil cause of action by an individual claiming to have been injured from a violation thereof.’” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Hernandez Auto Painting & Body Works, 312 Ga. App. 756, 761 (2) (719 SE2d 597) (2011), quoting Govea v. City of Norcross, 271 Ga. App. 36, 41 (1) (608 SE2d 677) (2004). “Rather, the statutory text must expressly provide a private cause of action.” State Farm, 312 Ga. App. at 761 (2); see also Anthony v. American Gen. Financial Svcs., 287 Ga. 448, 455 (2) (697 SE2d 166) (2010) (even the violation of a criminal statute “‘does not create a civil cause of action for damages in favor of the victim or anyone else,’” quoting Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 201 (2) (647 SE2d 54) (2007)).

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty imposed for another's benefit when the breach causes damage, even if no express cause of action is provided.

Rowell v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2016-09-14

A hospital has a legal duty to follow its existing bylaws and any alleged breach of that duty can be asserted as a cause of action under OCGA § 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty that benefits or protects another, but it does not itself create a private cause of action unless the law imposing the duty provides a civil remedy.

Parm v. National Bank of California, N.A. · filed 2017-03-06

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 provides for a cause of action for violation of a duty. See O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 (“When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.”). This statute, however, “does not give rise to a private cause of action unless the statutes outlining the legal duty provide for a civil remedy.”

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty only when the defendant was subject to an underlying duty to act for another's benefit or refrain from injuring another.

Nicollette Black v. Trinh · filed 2018-10-10

However, EMTALA only imposes a legal duty upon hospitals, not individual doctors. ... Because EMTALA imposes no legal duty on individual doctors, Black cannot maintain a cause of action against the individual doctors under OCGA § 51-1-6 and, thus, the trial court properly granted the doctors’ motions to dismiss her violation of a legal duty claim.

Section 51-1-6 does not itself create a cause of action; it permits recovery of damages for breach of an otherwise existing legal duty.

ADU v. United States · filed 2021-09-27

Standing alone, the statute creates no cause of action. Parris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Ga. App. 522, 524 (1997). “Rather it simply authorizes the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise created.” Id. Therefore, to the extent the Plaintiff tries to assert a separate cause of action it is DISMISSED.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty only when the law creating that duty provides a civil remedy.

Frazier v. Southeast Georgia Health System, Inc. · filed 2023-08-31

However, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 “does not give rise to a private cause of action unless the statutes outlining the legal duty provide for a civil remedy.” ... To the contrary, HIPAA creates no civil remedy, so O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 cannot salvage these claims.

Section 51-1-6 makes a breach actionable when a statute imposes a legal duty for another’s benefit, but it does not itself create the underlying duty.

NAVICENT HEALTH, INC. v. OTHMAN · filed 2024-10-23

Additionally, our recognition of the right to sue in tort in St. Mary’s was premised upon OCGA § 51-1-6 and the physician’s common-law right to hospital staff privileges (and the ensuing duty of a hospital not to infringe upon that common-law right arbitrarily or capriciously). 205 Ga. App. at 126-127 (3) (c). ... Indeed, the Court in St. Mary’s recognized that a cause of action may lie for “breach of a duty arising under a statute,” and also recognized that hospital bylaws are generally required under state administrative law. But, the Court did not conclude that it was the state regulatory rules that create the duty upon which a claim is based.

Section 51-1-6 allows an injured person to recover for breach of a legal duty imposed for their benefit even when the law creating the duty does not expressly provide a private cause of action.

Roof Serv LLC v. Ruth & Associates Business Solutions LLC · filed 2025-05-29

This statute authorizes a plaintiff to recover for the breach of a legal duty “even when that duty arises from a statute that does not provide a private cause of action.”

Section 51-1-6 does not authorize damages for failing to perform an alleged oral contract for the sale of realty when the statute of frauds bars an enforceable contract and the parties did not agree on all essential terms.

Zappa v. Basden · filed 1988-09-08

We find both Code sections inapplicable to the facts of this case. First, the statute of frauds prevented the formation of an enforceable contract for an oral agreement for the sale of realty. Secondly, the parties failed to agree on all necessary elements of a contract. Appellant has failed to cite us to any legal authority authorizing damages for the failure of a party to carry out the purported terms of an oral contract for the sale of realty.

Section 51-1-6 permits an injured party to recover for breach of a legal duty imposed elsewhere in the law.

Roof Serv LLC v. Ruth & Associates Business Solutions LLC, et al. · filed 2025-10-24

The Court expressly stated that O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6—the statute the Plaintiff references—permits injured parties to recover for the breach of a legal duty laid out elsewhere in the law.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty only when the underlying law imposes a substantive duty, not merely a procedural rule.

Hose v. JASON PROPERTY MGMNT. CO. &C. · filed 1986-04-07

The complaint here is apparently founded upon OCGA § 51-1-6, which provides in pertinent part: “When the law requires a person ... to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may ... recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” However, OCGA § 9-2-5 (a) does not impose upon plaintiffs a substantive legal duty, but rather is simply a procedural matter.

Section 51-1-6 permits damages for breach of a legal duty only when the duty to act or refrain from acting was imposed for the injured person's benefit.

Dupree v. Keller Industries, Inc. · filed 1991-02-28

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides for recovery of damages upon breach of a legal duty and specifies that the requirement under the law to perform or refrain from doing an act must be for the benefit of the injured person. ... Since plaintiffs were not Keller’s employees and thus were not persons who were intended to be benefitted by OSHA, any violation by it of the OSHA regulations would not be negligence per se in this case, as a matter of law. OCGA § 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legally imposed duty benefiting or protecting another, but it does not create a negligence claim when the underlying law imposes no such duty.

U. S. Bank v. Phillips · filed 2012-11-28

Phillips nevertheless points to OCGA § 51-1-6 in support of his claim that Georgia law authorizes a negligence claim notwithstanding the fact that no cause of action is given in express terms. OCGA § 51-1-6 provides that “[w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” This statutory provision does not apply here. ... The provisions of HAMP do not plainly impose a legal duty intended to benefit homeowners, so as to authorize a private negligence cause of action. See Miller, supra, 677 F.3d at 1116 (III); Warren, supra, 2011 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 55777, at *8 (III) (A) (2). Dismissal of Phillips’s negligence claim under HAMP was therefore required.

Section 51-1-6 permits damages for breach of a legal duty only when the duty to act or refrain from acting is intended to benefit the injured person.

Brantley v. Custom Sprinkler Systems, Inc. · filed 1995-09-01

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides for recovery of damages upon breach of a legal duty and specifies that the requirement under the law to perform or refrain from doing an act must be for the benefit of the injured person.

Section 51-1-6 authorizes damages for a tort after an independently existing legal duty is breached but does not itself create the substantive legal duty.

Landis v. Rockdale County · filed 1992-12-04

Appellant contends that the duty emanates from OCGA §§ 51-1-1 and 51-1-6, but they merely define a tort and authorize damages when a legal duty is breached. Neither creates a legal duty substantively.

Section 51-1-6 permits OSHA regulations to serve as evidence of a legal duty whose violation may support a cause of action.

Cardin v. Telfair Acres of Lowndes County, Inc. · filed 1990-04-25

Generally, there is not much room to doubt that civil cause of action will lie for damages carried by a breach of a legal duty of diligence prescribed by a statute or by incorporated regulations enacted thereunder. ... Georgia statutory law gives a cause of action for breach of legal duty under the law requiring a person to perform an act or refrain from doing an act which may injure another. OCGA § 51-1-6. We have no doubt that OSHA regulations by definition constitute as much a duty under the law and are as enforceable as the laws authorizing their creation and promulgation (see 29 USCA § 651 et seq.), and breach of those regulations is a violation of law. They should be admissible not merely as “standards” of performance, but as evidence of legal duty, violation of which may give a cause of action under OCGA § 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 makes a hospital’s violation of a legal duty created by its existing staff bylaws actionable in tort, whether the hospital is public or private.

St. Mary’s Hospital of Athens, Inc. v. Radiology Professional Corp. · filed 1992-07-08

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides that “[w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Pursuant to this statute, a cause of action will lie for breach of a duty arising under a statute or common law. ... Accordingly, we hold that Cohen may assert a cause of action in tort against St. Mary’s for failure to follow existing bylaws with regard to termination of his staff privileges.

Section 51-1-6 does not create an additional implied civil remedy for violating a criminal child-abandonment statute when the legislature provided other remedies.

Bridges v. Wooten · filed 2010-08-26

We find nothing in the language of the statute [ ] or in the criminal statutory scheme that provides a basis to infer that the legislature intended to create an implicit civil cause of action for damages caused by violation of the statutes. Criminal statutes, which express prohibitions rather than personal entitlements and specify a particular remedy other than civil litigation, are accordingly poor candidates for the imputation of private rights of action. ... Thus, pretermitting whether David and Margaret’s actions as pled in the complaint constituted aiding and abetting Eric’s felony abandonment of a child, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to create additional implied remedies under OCGA § 51-1-6 for violation of OCGA § 19-10-1.

Section 51-1-6 authorizes recovery for breach of a duty only when no otherwise available private cause of action affords a remedy.

Jairath v. Dyer · filed 1997-07-24

After having reviewed the case law and statutory language of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, the Court finds that § 51-1-6 provides recovery for the breach of a duty only when a private cause of action which affords a remedy is not otherwise available. Plaintiff has failed to point to any case in which a court has applied O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 when a private cause of action already existed. Clearly, the inference to be drawn is that courts only allow a party to use O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 when no private cause of action exists. Consequently, the Court concludes that plaintiff may not rely on O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 to recover monetary damages from defendant. Plaintiff is restricted to recovery under the ADA, as that statute provides a private cause of action and a remedy.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty benefiting the injured person even when the law creating the duty does not expressly provide a private cause of action.

Paul N. Smith and Bernice Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-01-27

By statute, Georgia addresses the right of a party to recover for injuries when no cause of action expressly exists. ... When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby. ... Ga.Code Ann. § 51-1-6. ... Nor is there any mention in § 51-1-6 that an injured person must have a private cause of action under the statute in order for it to be used to establish a duty of care.

Section 51-1-6 supplies a tort remedy for breach of a legal duty only when no express cause of action otherwise exists.

Cruet v. Emory University · filed 2000-01-28

Section 51-1-6 is designed to provide a cause of action for the breach of a legal duty where one does not otherwise exist. The plain language of the statute shows that it operates where “no cause of action is given in express terms.” § 51-1-6. The breach of a legal duty Cruet seeks to rely on here is one where an express cause of action already exists as part of a remedial scheme set out by Congress under the VRA and the ADA. Since a cause of action already exists for violations of the VRA and ADA, Cruet may not recover under § 51-1-6 for any alleged violations of these legal duties.

Section 51-1-6 permits a tort claim for breach of a legal duty when no other cause of action exists, but it does not provide a duplicative remedy when an express cause of action is available.

Higdon v. Jackson · filed 2004-12-16

Georgia Code Annotated section 51-1-6 states “[w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-6. ... Section 51-1-6 allows an individual to assert a tort claim for the violation of a legal duty where a cause of action does not otherwise exist. ... Section 51-1-6 does not allow her to pursue duplicative remedies for an alleged violation of federal law. See id. The district court, therefore, properly entered summary judgment against Higdon’s claim under section 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 applies only when no other cause of action exists and does not provide duplicative remedies for a violation of a law that already creates a private right of action.

Doe v. McCoy · filed 2024-02-28

To the extent Plaintiff suggests the purported duty VAWRA imposed on McCoy is actionable under § 51-1-6—putting aside that Plaintiff did not bring a claim under § 51-1-6—that statute applies only “where a cause of action does not otherwise exist.” Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1221 (11th Cir. 2004). Because VAWRA creates a private right of action, § 51-1-6 “does not allow [Plaintiff] to pursue duplicative remedies for an alleged violation of federal law.” Id. at 1222.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty when the plaintiff is among the persons the underlying statute was intended to protect and suffers the type of harm that statute was intended to prevent.

Odem v. Pace Academy · filed 1998-12-04

In determining whether the violation of a statute creates a cause of action in a particular person, it is necessary to examine the purposes of the legislation and decide whether the injured person falls within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect and whether the harm complained of was the harm it was intended to prevent. ... OCGA § 19-7-5 (a) specifically states that the purpose behind the statute is “to provide for the protection of children whose health and welfare are adversely affected and further threatened by the conduct of those responsible for their care and protection.” Thus the statute was explicitly designed to protect children affected by child abuse. Odem clearly does not fall within that class of protected persons, and his claim under OCGA § 51-1-6 cannot survive summary judgment.

Section 51-1-6 does not create a private cause of action for violating a statute that does not specify a civil remedy.

Mattox v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. · filed 2000-05-11

Thus we must address whether OCGA § 51-1-6 gives Mattox a cause of action if Yellow Freight dismissed him because of his “first offender” conviction. We hold that it does not.

Section 51-1-6 does not create a private cause of action unless the statute establishing the breached legal duty provides a civil remedy.

Northrup v. Conseco Finance Corp. · filed 2001-03-30

While creative, this cause of action also fails because O.C.G.A. § 16-10-32 and 16-10-93 are criminal statutes and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 does not give rise to a private cause of action unless the statutes outlining the legal duty provide for a civil remedy.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty only when the breach causes compensable damage; it does not itself create a cause of action when the statutory violation was not a proximate cause of the injury.

Lumpkin v. Mellow Mushroom · filed 2002-06-24

For the same reason, OCGA § 51-1-6 does not establish a cause of action based on the violation of OCGA § 3-3-23. Notwithstanding Mellow Mushroom’s breach of a statutory duty, the legislature has declared that the breach of that duty was not a proximate cause of Christian’s death.

Section 51-1-6 states a general tort principle but does not create an exception to at-will employment or a civil action for age-discrimination wrongful discharge.

Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. · filed 2000-03-27

We therefore conclude that the general tort provisions of §§ 51-1-6 and 51-1-8 cannot be read so as to create a civil action for age discrimination based upon a violation of either § 34-1-2 or the ADEA.

Section 51-1-6 supports negligence per se for violation of a mandatory school-reporting duty when the student is protected, the harm is within the statute’s purpose, and causation can be shown.

Bajjani v. Gwinnett County School District · filed 2006-03-30

[Generally, negligence per se arises when a statute or ordinance is violated. The violation of certain mandatory regulations may also amount to negligence per se if the regulations impose a legal duty. OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Assuming that a violation of a statute or mandatory regulation has occurred, before negligence per se can be determined, a trial court must consider (1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against. Finally, if the court finds negligence per se, the plaintiffs must then demonstrate a causal connection between the negligence per se and the injury. And it is generally a jury question as to whether or not such negligence proximately caused the injury.

Section 51-1-6 permits a claim only when the breached licensing law protects the plaintiff’s class; insurance-counselor licensing protects clients, not insurance providers.

Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall County · filed 2006-10-10

In determining whether the violation of a particular statute creates a cause of action in a particular person per OCGA § 51-1-6, we “examine the purposes of the legislation and decide whether the injured person falls within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect and whether the harm complained of was the harm it was intended to prevent.” ... This requirement cannot be construed as designed to protect or benefit providers of insurance, who may indeed at times be seen as adversarial to counselors or consultants who are advising potential clients about them.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty imposed for another’s benefit even when the law creating the duty does not expressly provide a cause of action, including through a negligence-per-se theory.

Crosby v. OneTouchPoint Inc · filed 2024-09-23

But Section 51-1-6 is Georgia’s codification of negligence per se. See Pulte Home v. Simerly, 746 S.E.2d 173, 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). While that statute might authorize recovery under a negligence theory for violation of a duty imposed by the GSBNA, the Consolidated Complaint pleads no such claim.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty even without an express cause of action, and negligence per se based on a statutory or mandatory regulatory violation requires showing that the plaintiff is within the protected class, suffered the protected harm, and was proximately injured.

Norman v. Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. · filed 2006-02-15

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Assuming that a violation of a statute or mandatory regulation has occurred, before negligence per se can be determined, a trial court must consider (1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against. Finally, if the court finds negligence per se, the plaintiffs must then demonstrate a causal connection between the negligence per se and the injury.

Section 51-1-6 permits a claim based on OSHA regulations to proceed to a jury when the regulations establish a legal duty and evidence supports the defendant’s violation and causation.

Baker v. Harcon, Inc. · filed 2010-03-30

“[OSHA regulations] should be admissible not merely as ‘standards’ of performance, but as evidence of legal duty, violation of which may give a cause of action under OCGA § 51-1-6.” And while there are conflicts in the evidence, there was some evidence that it was Harcon that failed to securely cover and guard the exposed opening after removing the underlying wooden deck, and further that it was Harcon’s employees who threw the discarded wood over the hole. This evidence was sufficient to create a jury question as to Harcon’s negligence.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty imposed for another’s benefit, and a qualifying statutory or regulatory violation may constitute negligence per se when the plaintiff is within the protected class, the harm is within the statute’s intended protection, and the violation is causally connected to the injury.

Womack v. Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc. · filed 2010-10-29

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Assuming that a violation of a statute or mandatory regulation has occurred, before negligence per se can be determined, a trial court must consider (1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against. Finally, if the court finds negligence per se, the plaintiffs must then demonstrate a causal connection between the negligence per se and the injury. And it is generally a jury question as to whether or not such negligence proximately caused the injury. ... Womack falls within the class of persons the law was intended to protect from exploitation and harm, and the club’s county Code violations are “capable of having a causal connection” to Womack’s injuries and damage. This is sufficient to constitute negligence per se.

Section 51-1-6 negligence claims require proof of actionable economic damages; without such damages, the claim fails as a matter of law.

Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Doles-Smith Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2016-06-09

Consequently, for the same reasons discussed supra in Division 1, the DSE Parties failed as a matter of law to establish any economic damages to support their claim for negligence under OCGA § 51-1-6, and thus the trial court should have granted the Legacy Parties’ motions for directed verdict and j. n. o. v. on this claim as well.

Section 51-1-6 provides a remedy for breach of a legal duty but does not itself create the duty; the duty must include an ascertainable standard of conduct and arise from another legal source.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins · filed 2013-06-17

A duty in this case cannot rest solely upon OCGA § 51-1-6 because this statute sets forth merely general principles of tort law. ... By its express terms, tort liability under OCGA § 51-1-6 mandates that the alleged tortfeasors have breached a legal duty to perform a beneficial act or to refrain from doing an injurious act. ... In order for a plaintiff to invoke OCGA § 51-1-6, there must be the alleged breach of a legal duty with some ascertainable standard of conduct.

Section 51-1-6 does not create a negligence claim from HAMP because HAMP does not plainly impose a legal duty intended to benefit homeowners.

U. S. Bank, N.A. v. Phillips · filed 2012-11-28

This statutory provision does not apply here. ... While homeowners incidentally benefit from HAMP’s incentives, homeowners are not intended third-party beneficiaries to whom servicers owe a legal duty under HAMP. ... The provisions of HAMP do not plainly impose a legal duty intended to benefit homeowners, so as to authorize a private negligence cause of action.

Section 51-1-6 states general principles of tort law and cannot, standing alone, establish a duty.

Branch Banking and Trust Company v. Morrisroe · filed 2013-07-16

A duty cannot rest solely on OCGA § 51-1-6, however, because it merely sets forth general principles of tort law.

Section 51-1-6 states general tort-law principles but does not by itself establish a legal duty supporting a civil claim.

Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Morrisroe · filed 2013-07-16

A duty cannot rest solely on OCGA § 51-1-6, however, because it merely sets forth general principles of tort law.

Section 51-1-6 states general tort principles but does not, by itself, create a standalone wrongful-death cause of action.

Dion v. Y.S.G. Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2014-11-17

Of course, a wrongful death action “cannot rest solely upon OCGA § 51-1-6 because this statute sets forth merely general principles of tort law. [Cit.]”

Section 51-1-6 sets forth general principles of tort law but does not itself impose a legal duty.

Hyers v. Bacon County, Georgia · filed 2025-05-19

However, § 51-1-6 does not impose a legal duty on Defendants. It “merely set[s] forth general principles of tort law.”

Section 51-1-6 does not impose a statutory duty, but a negligence claim may proceed when a common-law duty supplies the underlying legal duty.

Barrett v. Reeves Construction Company · filed 2025-05-14

True, neither § 51-1-6 nor § 51-1-8 imposes a legal duty on Defendant because both statutes “merely set forth general principles of tort law.” ... Accordingly, while O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-6 and 51-1-8 do not impose a statutory duty on Defendant, common law does, and Plaintiff’s negligence claim may be sustained via common law negligence.

Section 51-1-6’s reference to a “person” means a dog cannot be liable for negligence under the statute.

Jones v. Officer S. Fransen · filed 2017-05-19

Georgia has codified the tort of negligence. And under the express terms of Georgia law, only a person may be held liable for breaching a legal duty: ... O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 (emphasis added); see also O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (“A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person . . . may be liable in damages . . . .”) 7 (emphasis added). ... A dog does not qualify as any of these things.

Section 51-1-6 requires the plaintiff to identify the specific statute, ordinance, or regulation allegedly violated to establish negligence per se.

Schaff v. Snapping Shoals Electric Membership Corporation · filed 2014-11-18

Thus, in order to establish negligence per se, plaintiffs must specify the statute, ordinance, or regulation that they allege SSEMC violated. ... This statement, without more specificity, is insufficient to establish negligence per se.

Section 51-1-6 states a general tort principle allowing recovery for breach of a legal duty arising under statute or common law, but it does not itself create a cause of action.

Gobran Auto Sales, Inc. v. Bell · filed 2016-03-11

However, those statutes do not create causes of action, but simply set forth general principles of tort law, “authoriz[ing] the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise arising, though not expressly stated, under a statute or common law.” ... Therefore, in spite of Bell’s reference to those general tort statutes, this particular claim is actually based on Gobran Auto’s violation of the Act, a criminal statute. And, as detailed above, a private civil cause of action may not be implied to remedy such a violation. OCGA §§ 51-1-6 and 51-1-8 do not change this outcome.

Section 51-1-6 does not itself create the legal duty underlying a negligence claim; it permits recovery for breach of a duty imposed elsewhere.

McCONNELL Et Al. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR · filed 2016-06-16

“A legal duty that will support an actionable claim of negligence “cannot rest solely upon OCGA § 51-1-6 because this statute sets forth merely general principles of tort law. By its express terms, tort liability under OCGA § 51-1-6 mandates that the alleged tortfeasor[ ] ha[s] breached a legal duty to perform a beneficial act or to refrain from doing an injurious act. So, the legal duty to support [a plaintiff’s] negligence claim must be found in another legislative enactment”

Section 51-1-6 states general tort principles and permits recovery only for breach of a legal duty arising elsewhere; it does not itself create that duty.

Shapiro v. Oglethorpe Power Corporation · filed 2017-06-09

But as explained by our Supreme Court, the alleged duty “cannot rest solely upon OCGA § 51-1-6 because this statute sets forth merely general principles of tort law.” ... Thus, the legal duty necessary to support the former-member appellants’ claims “must be found in another legislative enactment,” ... But for the reasons set forth in Division 4 infra, OCGA § 46-3-340 does not impose the legal duties on EMCs that the former-member appellants allege that it does, and they cannot rely on OCGA § 51-1-6 to create them.

Section 51-1-6 allows recovery for breach of a legal duty, including one arising from a statute without an express private cause of action, but does not itself create the duty.

MCCONNELL Et Al. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. · filed 2018-05-11

“OCGA § 51-1-6 authorizes a plaintiff to recover damages for the breach of a legal duty even when that duty arises from a statute that does not provide a private cause of action. OCGA § 51-1-6 does not create a legal duty but defines a tort and authorizes damages when a legal duty is breached.”

Section 51-1-6 describes general Georgia tort principles but does not itself impose a legal duty on defendants.

Hyers · filed 2025-11-24

But O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 does not seek to impose a legal duty on Defendants. Rather, it provides a general description of tort law principles applicable in Georgia.

Section 51-1-6 cannot be used to enforce fiduciary duties owed to someone else; it provides damages only for an otherwise existing duty owed to the claimant.

Duncan v. Rawls · filed 2021-06-15

But those statutes do not “create causes of action, but simply set forth general principles of tort law, authorizing the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise arising, though not expressly stated, under a statute or common law.” And respondents cite to no case or statutory authority supporting their novel theory that fiduciary duties not owed to them can, nonetheless, be derivatively enforced.

Section 51-1-6 cannot support a negligence claim where the plaintiff identifies no duty owed by the defendant and an alternative statutory lien remedy exists.

Eastside Recovery, LLC v. Calhoun · filed 2023-06-26

In the instant case, Eastside’s claim is for towing and storing Calhoun’s vehicle. However, Eastside has cited no cases, and we have found none, that would support a driver’s common-law duty to a towing company such as Eastside where there is no contractual relationship between the two parties. Thus, Eastside cannot establish that Calhoun had a duty to it that she breached.

Section 51-1-6's general tort remedy does not plainly and unmistakably authorize a county to sue to collect a tax without specific statutory authority.

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. COBB COUNTY · filed 2019-02-18

To the extent the Counties suggest that OCGA § 51-1-6 provides sufficient explicit authorization for them to bring these suits even if the 911 charge is a tax, they are wrong. That general tort statute, which provides for recovery “[w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another,” OCGA § 51-1-6, does not satisfy the Counties’ burden to show that authority to bring this action has been “plainly and unmistakably granted by the State[.]” Gower, 216 Ga. at 370.

Section 51-1-6's general tort remedy does not provide a county with explicit authority to sue to collect a tax when the State has not plainly and unmistakably granted that authority.

Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC v. Cobb Cnty. · filed 2019-02-18

To the extent the Counties suggest that OCGA § 51-1-6 provides sufficient explicit authorization for them to bring these suits even if the 911 charge is a tax, they are wrong. That general tort statute, which provides for recovery "[w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another," OCGA § 51-1-6, does not satisfy the Counties' burden to show that authority to bring this action has been "plainly and unmistakably granted by the State[.]"

Section 51-1-6 does not create a standalone cause of action; it permits recovery of damages only for breach of a legal duty created elsewhere.

NULPH v. HOUSTON HEALTHCARE SYSTEM INC · filed 2025-02-05

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, “standing alone, creates no cause of action” but simply “authorizes the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise created.” ... O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 requires a statutory breach, and without a valid EMTALA claim, there is no basis for Dr. Nulph’s breach of legal duty claim.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery for breach of a legal duty when no express cause of action is provided, but its implied right of action does not displace specific remedies governing estate administration.

In Re: Estate of Joseph Elbert Cheeley, Jr. · filed 2025-07-01

William is attempting to proceed under an implied right of action via OCGA § 51-1-6, but we do not read that right of action so broadly as to apply to this context.

Section 51-1-6 permits recovery of damages for breach of a legal duty arising under a statute or common law, but does not itself create a private right of action.

Coleman v. H2S Holdings, LLC · filed 2017-01-18

Second, none of the three Georgia statutes that Plaintiff claims Oasis violated provides a private right of action. ... They authorize “the recovery of damages for the breach of a legal duty otherwise arising, though not expressly stated, under a statute or common law.” ... those statutes have no application here. ... Hanover Ins. Co. v. Carroll, No. 1:13-cv-01802-SCJ, 2014 WL 5472520, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2014) (“[Sjupport for a claim under § 51-1-6 must be found in a legislative enactment outside of § 51-1-6.”). Counts Four, Five, and Ten, then, fail.

Section 51-1-6 permits an injured party to recover for breach of a legal duty imposed by law even when the statute creating the duty does not expressly provide a cause of action.

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LLC Et Al. v. COBB COUNTY Et Al. · filed 2017-06-15

As to this point, we hold that the Counties may pursue claims against the Defendants due to their alleged failure or refusal to collect these charges; the 9-1-1 Act imposed a duty upon the Defendants to do so, ... and OCGA §§ 51-1-6 and 51-1-8 allow the Counties to enforce that statutorily imposed duty.

Section 51-1-6 does not make private hospital policies negligence per se because those policies are not imposed by statute, regulation, or common law.

Wages v. Amisub of Georgia · filed 1998-11-06

The plaintiffs assert that violations of these policies constitute negligence per se under OCGA § 51-1-6. ... Such protocols and procedures do not have the force and effect of a statute or an administrative regulation. ... Accordingly, there was no error.

Section 51-1-6 does not provide a duplicative remedy when an express ADA cause of action already exists.

Miller v. General Wholesale Co., Inc. · filed 2000-03-16

It seems clear from the language of the statute that no cause of action is created where, as here, an express cause of action already exists. ... Plaintiff cannot maintain his action under § 51-1-6.

Section 51-1-6 does not itself impose a legal duty; negligence per se requires a mandatory legal source, protected class and harm, and causation.

Hubbard v. Department of Transportation · filed 2002-07-03

OCGA § 51-1-6 provides: “When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.” Assuming that a violation of a statute or mandatory regulation has occurred, before negligence per se can be determined, a trial court must consider “(1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons it was intended to protect and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm [the statute] was intended to guard against.”

Section 51-1-6 claims require duty, breach, and actionable damages; emotional-distress damages additionally require malicious, willful, or wanton conduct.

Munn v. CPI Images, LLC · filed 2011-09-07

Accordingly, to prove a claim under § 51-1-6, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant owed him a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) the breach caused the plaintiff actionable damages. ... Where the only injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff, damages are recoverable only if the defendant acted maliciously, willfully, or wantonly.

Section 51-1-6 provides only general tort principles and cannot create a duty absent another legislative enactment.

Walker v. Oglethorpe Power Corp. · filed 2017-06-09

But as explained by our Supreme Court, the alleged duty “cannot rest solely upon OCGA § 51-1-6 because this statute sets forth merely general principles of tort law.” ... Thus, the legal duty necessary to support the former-member appellants’ claims “must be found in another legislative enactment,” ... they cannot rely on OCGA § 51-1-6 to create them.