Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-35

Section 5-6-35 requires a prisoner appealing a civil action to file an application for discretionary appeal.

Rasheed v. J. Darrell Hart, Warden · filed 2014-01-24

And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court.

Section 5-6-35 requires a prisoner appealing a civil action to file an application for discretionary appeal; a direct appeal does not give the appellate court jurisdiction.

Clay v. State of Georgia · filed 2018-09-26

Under OCGA § 42-12-8, an appeal of a civil action filed by a prisoner “shall be as provided in Code Section 5-6-35.” And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a prisoner has no right of direct appeal in civil cases, we lack jurisdiction to consider this direct appeal from the superior court’s order.

An appeal governed by § 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court.

Mobley v. State of Georgia Pardon & Parole Board · filed 2019-01-10

And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court.

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a completed application for discretionary appeal to be filed within 30 days of the order; an untimely application leaves the court without jurisdiction.

Wilson v. Carver · filed 2001-10-26(d)

Here, the completed application was not filed within 30 days of the entry of the order, as required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (d), and this court has no jurisdiction of an untimely application.

A discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of the order appealed, and the deadline is jurisdictional.

Adams v. State · filed 2013-09-25(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The requirements of OCGA § 5-6- 35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance therewith.

A discretionary appeal application must be filed within 30 days of the order being appealed; an untimely application leaves the Court of Appeals without jurisdiction.

Sapp v. Mark Butler Commissioner of Georgia Department of Labor · filed 2013-09-26(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). ... Because this application was filed 31 days after entry of the order to be appealed, it is untimely and we lack jurisdiction to consider it.

A discretionary appeal application must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Parker v. Peachtree Country Club Condominium Association Inc. · filed 2013-11-01(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

Subsection (d) requires an application for discretionary appeal to be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed.

Baez v. State · filed 2013-11-12(d)

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed.

A discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order being appealed.

Lecorp v. Cherokee Court Magistrate Court · filed 2013-11-20(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary appeal application to be filed within 30 days of entry of the order being appealed.

Kenney v. Kabani · filed 2014-03-20(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

Section 5-6-35 requires a party seeking appellate review to file an application for discretionary appeal with the appropriate appellate court.

Fredrick v. Glynn County Police Department · filed 2016-09-15

And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an ... application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court.

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order sought to be appealed; the applicant must establish that any motion relied on to extend that period was timely filed.

In the Interest Of: M. S., a Child (Mother) · filed 2017-02-22(d)

An application is timely if it is filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). ... By omitting from her application a stamped “filed” copy of her motion for a new trial, the mother has failed to show that this Court has jurisdiction to consider her application. Consequently, this application for discretionary appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

A discretionary appeal application must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Jarvis Ware v. Whitfield Superior Court · filed 2018-01-30(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires an application for discretionary appeal within 30 days after entry of the order or judgment; an untimely application is outside the court’s jurisdiction.

Canty v. State · filed 2019-04-30(d)

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance therewith.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary appeal; a direct appeal does not give the appellate court jurisdiction.

In Re Mitchell Lavern Ludy · filed 2019-06-20

And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application ... for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a prisoner has no right of direct appeal in civil cases, we lack jurisdiction to consider Ludy’s direct appeal from the superior court’s order.

Section 5-6-35 does not require an application for discretionary appeal to review the denial of a motion for an out-of-time appeal under the current statutory scheme.

Sullivan v. State · filed 2026-02-26

Neither OCGA § 5-6-39.1 nor the ... discretionary appeal statute, OCGA § 5-6-35, requires a defendant to file an application for discretionary appeal to obtain review of the denial of a motion for an out-of-time appeal under the current statutory scheme.

Section 5-6-35 requires certain appeals from superior-court review of state administrative decisions to proceed by application identifying the alleged errors, jurisdictional basis, and order or judgment appealed from, with appellate permission before filing.

Risner v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR · filed 1983-09-09

This statute involving appeals in certain cases provides for an application in the nature of a petition enumerating the errors to be urged on appeal and stating why the appellate court has jurisdiction, specifying the order or judgment being appealed, and this procedure has not been followed here.

Section 5-6-35(a)(4) requires an application for appeal in cases involving garnishment or attachment, subject to the specified exceptions.

Mason v. Osburn Hardware & Supply Co. · filed 1985-05-28(a)(4)

Effective July 1, 1984, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) was amended to include among the categories of cases in which an application for appeal must be taken “[a]ppeals from cases involving garnishment or attachment, except [for certain judgments and orders not in issue here].” OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (4). Appellants failed to obtain an order of this court permitting the filing of an appeal pursuant to the provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a). Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.

Subsection (a)(3) requires an application for appeals from distress or dispossessory-warrant cases when the only issue is rent due of $2,500 or less.

Nixon v. A. F. M., Inc. · filed 1985-10-23(a)(3)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (3) requires application in “[a]ppeals from cases involving distress or dispossessory warrants in which the only issue to be resolved is the amount of rent due and such amount is $2,500.00 or less; . . .”

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for review when an appeal arises from a superior court decision reviewing a local administrative zoning decision.

Trend Development Corp. v. Douglas County · filed 1989-09-11(a)(1)

However, in neither case is the appeal direct because it is an appeal from the decision of a court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application to appeal a court decision reviewing an administrative-agency decision.

Outdoor West, Inc. v. Coweta County · filed 1999-02-05(a)(1)

That statutory basis is found in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), which requires an application to appeal from court decisions reviewing administrative agency decisions.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for discretionary appeal under subsection (b) when a superior-court action joins injunctive relief with an appeal from a zoning decision, or the appellate court lacks jurisdiction.

Merritt v. City of Warner Robins · filed 2000-04-21(a)(1), (b)

Because plaintiff joined his action for injunctive relief with an appeal from a zoning decision, we conclude that the trial court’s order comes within the purview of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), requiring the grant of an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (b) in order to confer this Court’s jurisdiction in the case sub judice. ... A discretionary appeal not having been sought as required, the instant appeal must be and is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for discretionary appeal when appealing a superior court decision reviewing a local administrative agency decision by certiorari or de novo proceedings.

Du v. Lasharn Hughes, as Executive Director of Georgia Composite Medical Board · filed 2019-12-04(a)(1)

Because Du’s superior court actions sought review of an administrative decision, he was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures to obtain appellate review of the superior court’s ruling. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) (“[a]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . local administrative agencies . . . by certiorari or de novo proceedings” must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal); Consolidated Government of Columbus v. Barwick, 274 Ga. 176, 177 (1) (549 SE2d 73) (2001).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) and (b) requires appeals from superior court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings to be initiated by an application for discretionary appeal.

Jauntrica West v. Wri Property Management, LLC · filed 2019-12-04(a)(1), (b)

First, appeals from superior court decisions reviewing lower court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for appellate review before this type of appeal may proceed.

In re C. P. H. · filed 1983-11-29

The DeKalb County Department of Family and Children Services has filed a motion in this court to dismiss the appeal because appellants have failed to file an application for appellate review as required by OCGA § 5-6-35 (Code Ann. § 6-701.1). As appellee’s contention is correct, this appeal must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2)'s discretionary appeal procedures do not apply to child custody appeals made directly appealable by the 2007 amendment to § 5-6-34.

Taylor v. Curl · filed 2009-05-19(a)(2)

In addition, we recently held that the General Assembly’s amendment to OCGA § 5-6-34 also makes it unnecessary for appellants in child custody cases to comply with the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). ... As a result, Taylor was not required to comply with either the interlocutory or discretionary appeal procedures in this case.

Section 5-6-35(a)(11) permits direct appeals of custody determinations, even when interlocutory, but does not cover orders that make no custody or visitation determination.

Kelly v. Hetzer · filed 2025-03-06(a)(11)

And although “[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child custody” are directly appealable, even if interlocutory, see OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Lacy v. Lacy, 320 Ga. App. 739, 742 (3) (740 SE2d 695) (2013), the trial court’s orders here do not involve custody or visitation determinations.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) does not require a discretionary appeal application for an order in a child custody case; such an order is directly appealable.

Cohen v. Cohen · filed 2009-09-02(a)(2)

Also, Taylor explained that the amended statute made it “unnecessary for appellants in child custody cases to comply with the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2).” Here, because the issue on appeal is jurisdiction over the adjudication of child custody, Heather was not required to comply with either the interlocutory or discretionary appeal procedures in this child custody case, and the denial of her motion to dismiss was directly appealable.

Section 5-6-35 makes appeals from superior-court review of workers’ compensation decisions subject to appellate-court application and gives the superior court the authority and responsibilities formerly exercised by appellate courts.

Southeastern Aluminum Recycling, Inc. v. Rayburn · filed 1983-09-07

As a consequence of this Code section, enacted in 1979 (Ga. L. 1979, p. 619), the superior courts are the courts of last resort as a matter of right in workers’ compensation and other cases. Sitting as an appellate court of last resort of right, the superior courts are no longer merely a base which must be touched en route in the course of a workers’ compensation appeal. Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (Code Ann. § 6-701.1), supra, the superior courts have all of the authority and all of the responsibilities which the appellate courts formerly had in workers’ compensation cases. It therefore is imperative that the hearings in superior courts in workers’ compensation appeals, provided for by law, be conducted in a plenary manner.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing State Board of Workers’ Compensation decisions to proceed by a discretionary-appeal application filed in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals within 30 days.

Adivari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1996-05-03(a)(1), (b), and (d)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), in conjunction with OCGA § 5-6-35 (b) and (d), provides that appeals from the decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation shall be by application in the nature of a petition for discretionary appeal, filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals within 30 days of the entry of the order, decision, or judgment complained of.

Appeals from superior court decisions reviewing State Board of Workers’ Compensation decisions must follow the discretionary appeal procedure; failure to comply requires dismissal.

State v. Baldwin · filed 1988-06-22(a)(1)

The requirements of this code section are jurisdictional and in the absence of compliance, this court is without authority to accept an appeal. ... As the procedure mandated by OCGA § 5-6-35 was not followed, this appeal must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) does not require a discretionary appeal merely because the trial court’s order refers to a workers’ compensation settlement; the appeal must be from a decision of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation.

Kali Smith v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc. · filed 2017-10-20(a)(1)

Although the trial court’s order refers to a workers’ compensation settlement, this is not an appeal from a decision of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation such that the discretionary appeal procedures apply.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires the discretionary-appeal procedure for appeals from alimony-related contempt orders and bars a direct appeal from related orders denying a stay of incarceration or discharge from confinement when the underlying contempt order was not directly appealable.

Strickland v. Strickland · filed 1984-02-28(a)(2)

We hold that when, by virtue of OCGA § 5-6-35 (Code Ann. § 6-701.1), the contempt order itself could not be appealed directly, neither the denial of a motion to stay incarceration for contempt nor the denial of a motion for discharge can be appealed directly. The procedure for taking such appeals, if allowable at all, is governed by OCGA § 5-6-35 (Code Ann. § 6-701.1).

Section 5-6-35(a) requires appeals from superior-court judgments reviewing traffic-case convictions to follow the discretionary-appeal procedures.

Brown v. City of Marietta · filed 1994-10-17(a)

Therefore, all appeals from judgments of superior courts in such cases must follow the procedures in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires a discretionary appeal for judgments concerning the issues it enumerates, but does not apply to a judgment on the pleadings in an action to set aside a judgment.

Karsman v. Portman · filed 1984-03-09(a)(2)

Apparently, appellee seeks to bring the present case under the requirements set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). However, the foregoing Code section is inapplicable to the instant case in that the appeal presently before this court is not from a judgment concerning those issues enumerated in § 5-6-35 (a) (2), but is from a judgment on the pleadings in an action to set aside a judgment.

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) and (a)(10) do not require a discretionary appeal for a wilful-contempt order enforcing a prior judgment on a jury verdict when the judgment does not involve alimony or child custody; that contempt appeal is directly appealable.

Stephens v. Stephens · filed 1987-10-15(a)(6), (a)(10)

The appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that (1) no final judgment has been entered, and (2) an application for discretionary appeal is required pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), (10), and this court has already denied such an application filed by the appellant. ... This appeal is from a finding of wilful contempt of a previous court order entering judgment on a jury verdict (not dealing with alimony or child custody), and as such it is directly appealable. This court’s denial of the appellant’s application for discretionary appeal, filed simultaneously with the direct appeal, is not inconsistent with this holding. Accordingly, the appellee’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) requires an application for review for appeals within its scope, but an appeal from a trial court’s inherent power to modify or set aside its judgment within the same term is direct.

Harbor Light Marina v. Ellis · filed 1989-02-21(a)(8)

Appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to file an application for review pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8) is denied. Appellant does not rely on the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-60, but rather upon the inherent power of a trial court to modify or set aside its judgment within the same term of court. Appeal from this “discretionary” power of the trial court is direct.

Subsection (b) does not eliminate the requirement for a trial judge’s certificate of immediate review when interlocutory review is sought in a case otherwise appealable under subsection (a); it specifies what the application must contain in addition to that certificate.

Rogers v. Department of Human Resources · filed 1990-02-19(b)

Appellant’s reliance on OCGA § 5-6-35 (b) is misplaced. Clearly, if a final order had been entered, it would be subject to discretionary appeal procedures under OCGA § 5-6-35. However, this provision does not relieve appellant of the requirement of a certificate from the trial judge. Subsection (b) sets out what an application must contain, in cases appealable under subsection (a) where interlocutory review is sought, in addition to a certificate. If we were to conclude otherwise, it would deprive the trial court of the broad discretion it has in determining what preliminary matters are subject to review prior to entry of a final judgment.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (6) does not require an application for discretionary appeal when the main claim results in a zero award and the counterclaim award is under $10,000, so the plaintiff may file a direct appeal.

Robinwood, Inc. v. Baker · filed 1992-11-06(a)(6)

We do not construe OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) as requiring an application for discretionary appeal when the "zero" award is on the main claim and the award on the counterclaim is under $10,000, but allowing direct appeal when the "zero" award is on the counterclaim and the award on the main claim is under $10,000. A statute must be construed to avoid an absurd result. See generally Mansfield v. Pannell, 261 Ga. 243 (404 SE2d 104) (1991). Accordingly, appellant/plaintiff was authorized to file a direct appeal as to the "zero" award on the main claim. OCGA § 5-6-34 (a); see Boatner, supra.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) does not require an application for appeal in this situation, where an action enforcing a judgment provision against a nonparty is analogous to a garnishment action.

Bryant v. Employees Retirement System · filed 1994-04-18(a)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) does not apply to this situation, and Ms. Bryant’s direct appeal is proper.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for appeal when the underlying subject matter falls within the statute, even if the judgment would otherwise be directly appealable.

Rebich v. Miles · filed 1994-09-21(a)

We reiterate that the underlying subject matter generally controls over the relief sought in determining the proper procedure to follow to appeal. A party should review the discretionary application statute to see if it covers the underlying subject matter of the appeal. If it does, then the party must file an application for appeal as provided under OCGA § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary appeal when a superior court reviews a magistrate-court decision de novo and when the resulting judgment awards contractual damages of less than $10,000.

English v. Delbridge · filed 1995-02-10(a)(1), (a)(6), (b)

In the case sub judice, the judgment of the superior court entered on the jury verdict after a trial de novo represents review of lower court proceedings, i.e., the judgment of the magistrate court, and requires an application to this court for permission to pursue a discretionary appeal. Moreover, this final judgment awards contractual damages in an amount less than $10,000, and so would require an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6).

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary appeal when a state court reviews a magistrate court decision de novo in a matter not otherwise directly appealable and when a damages judgment is $10,000 or less.

Salaam v. Nasheed · filed 1996-01-30(a)(11), (a)(6)

“Because the appeal to this Court is taken from the decision of a state court reviewing a decision of a magistrate court by a de novo proceeding involving a subject matter not otherwise subject to a right of direct appeal, the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 were required and this appeal must be dismissed. ... This direct appeal should also have been filed by application in that the state court’s judgment is for less than $10,000. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) requires that all appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less, an application for discretionary appeal must be made to this Court. ... As the defendant has not complied with the discretionary appeal procedures, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. This direct appeal must be dismissed.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) and (d) require a timely application for permission to pursue a discretionary appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment, unless the order is tied to a directly appealable order.

Thierman v. Thierman · filed 1998-09-30(a)(8), (d)

Unless tied to a directly appealable order, an appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) requires a timely application to this Court for permission to pursue a discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8) and (d).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary-appeal application for a superior-court decision reviewing a state or local administrative agency, but not for an original mandamus action that does not involve such review.

Sprayberry v. Dougherty County · filed 2001-03-02(a)(1)

"Where a zoning case does not involve superior court review of an administrative decision, the trial court's order does not come within the purview of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1) and no application for appeal need be filed. [Cit.]" King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427, 428(1), 531 S.E.2d 350 (2000). ... Appellants did not file an appeal to the superior court seeking review of the Board's administrative decision to rezone the adjoining property. Instead, they brought a mandamus action directly against the Board, attacking the validity of the rezoning and seeking to prevent enforcement thereof. "Because the order appealed from in this case does not involve the review of the decision of a local administrative agency, we find the order is directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34(a) ([6])." King v. City of Bainbridge, supra at 428(1), 531 S.E.2d 350.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal application when the superior court reviews a local administrative agency decision through certiorari or mandamus.

Consolidated Government of Columbus v. Barwick · filed 2001-06-25(a)(1)

We find that because both the petition for certiorari and petition for mandamus filed by appellee in the superior court sought review of the City’s decision not to renew the alcoholic beverage license and the superior court, in ruling on such petitions, reviewed the decision of a local administrative agency, an application for discretionary appeal was required in each appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(7) requires an application for leave to appeal when an extraordinary motion for new trial is filed in a case in which no original appeal was filed.

Clark v. State · filed 2005-01-26(a)(7)

The statute mandates the discretionary appeal process in all “[a]ppeals, when separate from an original appeal, from the denial of an extraordinary motion for new trial.” ... We hold, therefore, that the phrase “separate from an original appeal” in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (7) includes an extraordinary motion for new trial filed in a case in which no “original” appeal has been filed. ... Clark’s appeal, being “separate” because no original appeal was filed, comes within the purview of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (7), which requires an application for leave to appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary-appeal application when the superior court has reviewed a decision of a state or local administrative agency, including an administrative zoning decision.

Ladzinske v. Allen · filed 2006-01-17(a)(1)

Although the trial court’s order was appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a), Ladzinske was nevertheless required to obtain permission to file the appeal, and could not circumvent the discretionary application requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35. ... Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35 does not require an application for appeal from a juvenile court order denying a petition under OCGA § 15-11-40(b) to modify a final order in a child-deprivation proceeding.

In Re JN · filed 2010-03-05

Moreover, nothing in OCGA § 5-6-35 (requiring applications for appeal in certain cases) applied to Neese's petition brought pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-40(b).

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for appeal in certain cases, but it does not apply to a petition under § 15-11-40(b) seeking modification of a juvenile court order.

In the Interest of J. N. · filed 2010-03-05

As set forth above, the order denying Neese’s petition under OCGA § 15-11-40 (b) was a fined judgment subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). Moreover, nothing in OCGA § 5-6-35 (requiring applications for appeal in certain cases) applied to Neese’s petition brought pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-40 (b).

Section 5-6-35 does not require a discretionary appeal when the superior court has not reviewed a decision rendered by an administrative agency or local governmental department.

Fulton County v. T-Mobile South, LLC · filed 2010-07-30

OCGA § 5-6-35, however, does not encompass the County’s decision under the facts of this case.

Subsection (j) directs the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Huynh Hung v. State · filed 2012-06-14(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Subsection (j) authorizes the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application when the order at issue is subject to direct appeal.

Oviedo v. Sanchez · filed 2012-07-03(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the order is subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary-appeal application for appeals from the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) and from the denial of a temporary restraining order.

Terry v. Be Capital Lending, Inc. · filed 2012-07-25(a)(8), (a)(9)

An appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) must be taken by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8); see MMT Enterprises, Inc. v. Cullars, 218 Ga. App. 559, 561 (2) (462 SE2d 771) (1995). An appeal from the denial of a temporary restraining order must also be taken by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (9). In this case, the plaintiffs-appellants have not complied with the discretionary appeal procedure. Their failure to do so deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is accordingly DISMISSED.

Subsection (j) directs the Court to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Lawson v. Lawson · filed 2012-07-26(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) permits a timely discretionary application to be granted when the lower court's order is directly appealable, and subsection (g) gives the applicant ten days after the grant to file a notice of appeal.

Coker v. State · filed 2012-08-08(j), (g)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, Coker’s application is GRANTED. He shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal with the trial court, if he has not already done so. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (g).

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) requires an application for discretionary appeal when appealing an order denying a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d).

Thomas Holcombe, III v. Richie · filed 2012-08-28(a)(8)

We lack jurisdiction. Appeals from orders denying motions to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) must be made by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8). Holcombe’s failure to comply with the discretionary appeal procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Fred Jones Enterprises LLC v. Williams · filed 2012-09-10(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(j) provides that an otherwise timely discretionary application should be granted when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Hunt v. Hunter · filed 2012-09-13(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, Hunt’s application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is directly appealable, and subsection (g) gives the applicant ten days from the grant to file a notice of appeal.

Cunningham v. State · filed 2012-09-19(j), (g)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, Cunningham’s application is GRANTED. He shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal with the trial court, if he has not already done so. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (g).

Subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Zverkov v. Criswell · filed 2012-09-20(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant a timely discretionary-appeal application when the order is directly appealable and the applicant has not timely filed a notice of appeal.

Anna Marie Dillard as of the Estate of James Gregory Dillard v. Bennett · filed 2012-09-21(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) if the order is subject to direct appeal and the applicant has not timely filed a notice of appeal.

Section 5-6-35(j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Blanchard v. Fowler · filed 2012-09-25(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11), “[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases including . . . awarding or refusing to change child custody” are directly appealable. A party seeking to challenge an order in a child custody case, therefore, may file a direct appeal. See Cohen v. Cohen, 300 Ga. App. 7, 8 (1) (684 SE2d 94) (2009); Taylor v. Curl, 298 Ga. App. 45 (679 SE2d 80) (2009). We will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Latham v. Dawn C. Alvan · filed 2012-10-10(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(j) permits an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court's order is directly appealable and the applicant has not already filed a notice of appeal.

Collier v. Economy Auto Sales, Inc. · filed 2012-10-11(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is directly appealable and the applicant has not already filed a notice of appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Collier, however, has already filed a timely notice of appeal in the trial court, and the resulting appeal has been docketed here as A13A0309. Accordingly, this application is superfluous and is hence DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary application for appeals from superior-court orders actually reviewing state or local administrative decisions and for attorney-fee rulings under § 9-15-14, but not for fee rulings under other statutes; when no subsection applies, the application is granted under subsection (j), followed by the subsection (g) notice-of-appeal procedure.

Lakeview Behavioral Health System, Llc. v. Uhs Peachford, Lp D/B/A Peachford Behavioral Health System of Atlanta · filed 2012-10-19(a)(1), (a)(10), (j), (g)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), a discretionary application is required to appeal “decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . state and local administrative agencies,” but this provision applies only where the superior court order to be appealed actually reviews an agency decision. ... Thus, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) does not apply here. ... Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (10), a discretionary application is required to appeal trial court rulings on requests for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14. This provision applies only to fee awards granted or denied under OCGA § 9-15-14; it does not apply to fee awards granted or denied under other statutes, such as OCGA § 31-6-44.1 (c). ... Because no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) applies here, this application is hereby GRANTED as required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). ... See OCGA § 5-6-35 (g).

Subsection (j) provides that an otherwise timely discretionary application should be granted when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Callicutt v. Callicutt · filed 2012-10-30(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Price v. Brown · filed 2012-12-05(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Eagle Realty, LLC v. Seesaw Construction, LLC · filed 2012-12-20(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) requires a discretionary-appeal application for an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60(d).

Curry v. the Villages at Lake Ridge Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2013-02-08(a)(8)

An appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) must be taken by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8); Jim Ellis Atlanta, Inc. v. Adamson, 283 Ga. App. 116 (640 SE2d 688) (2006). Curry’s failure to comply with the requisite appellate procedure deprives this Court of jurisdiction over her appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Subsection (j) provides that an otherwise timely discretionary application should be granted when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Middleton v. State · filed 2013-02-19(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal for money judgments in damages actions totaling $10,000 or less and for review of a superior court order reviewing a magistrate-court judgment.

Litman v. Taylor · filed 2013-04-05(a)(6), (a)(1)

First, the discretionary appeal procedure is required where a money judgment in an action for damages totals $10,000.00 or less. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); Hill v. Rose Electric Co., 220 Ga. App. 603, 604 (469 SE2d 844) (1996). The discretionary appeal procedure also applies when a party seeks review of a superior court’s order reviewing the judgment of a magistrate court. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Scott v. Randall · filed 2013-04-16(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the order is subject to direct appeal. As the order at issue is subject to direct appeal, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Subsection (j) permits an otherwise timely discretionary application to be granted when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Parker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2013-04-17(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary appeal in damages actions with judgments of $10,000.00 or less and in de novo appeals from magistrate court decisions.

Marlena Martin v. Walter C. Woodyard, II · filed 2013-05-16(a)(6), (a)(1)

First, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal “in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less.” Second, because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) also required Martin to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Section 5-6-35's discretionary-appeal procedure does not apply to an order denying filing under OCGA § 9-15-2(d) when no subsection (a) category applies; the order is directly appealable, and the application for appeal is granted under subsection (j).

Fred L. Murray, Jr. v. U-Haul Company Incorporated · filed 2013-05-16(a), (j)

An order denying filing under OCGA § 9-15-2 (d) is not in and of itself subject to the discretionary appeal procedure requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35. Moreover, no provision of subsection (a) of OCGA § 5-6-35 is applicable to this case. The order, therefore, is directly appealable, and Murray’s application for appeal is hereby GRANTED as required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) provides that a timely discretionary application will be granted when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Morgan v. Fordham · filed 2013-06-26(j)

We will grant a timely-filed discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(j) provides that a timely discretionary application will be granted when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Ansell v. Anna A. Ansell (n/K/A Lessard) · filed 2013-07-31(j)

We will grant a timely-filed discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a) does not require an application for discretionary appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate an allegedly void sentence.

Jaryn Ware v. State · filed 2013-08-22(a)

There is no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) that requires an application for discretionary appeal from a trial court’s order denying a motion to vacate an allegedly void sentence. If an applicant applies for discretionary review of a directly appealable order, we grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) provides that a timely discretionary appeal application should be granted when the challenged order is subject to direct appeal.

Ingram v. Loudermilk · filed 2013-08-29(j)

We will grant a timely-filed discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary appeal for an order denying a motion to set aside and for a final judgment involving $10,000.00 or less.

Kendrick v. Toni Miller · filed 2013-10-18(a)(8), (a)(6)

An appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) must be taken by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8); Jim Ellis Atlanta, Inc. v. Adamson, 283 Ga. App. 116 (640 SE2d 688) (2006). In addition, the final judgment was not subject to direct appeal because, where the amount of the judgment is $10,000.00 or less, an application for discretionary appeal is required. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); Hill v. Rose Electric Co., 220 Ga. App. 603, 604 (469 SE2d 844) (1996).

Subsection (a) does not require a discretionary application when the challenged order is a final, directly appealable order, and subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant the application on that basis.

Cox Jr v. 2012 C Property Holdings LLC · filed 2013-10-22(a), (j)

Based on the sparse application materials submitted, no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) appears to require the filing of a discretionary application in this case. And an order dismissing all claims in a civil complaint is generally a final, directly appealable order. ... Because it appears that Cox has a right of direct appeal here, this application is hereby GRANTED under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a) does not require a discretionary-appeal application from an order denying a motion to vacate an allegedly void sentence; under subsection (j), an application is granted when the order is directly appealable.

Wells v. State · filed 2013-11-27(a), (j)

There is no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) that requires an application for discretionary appeal from a trial court’s order denying a motion to vacate an allegedly void sentence. If an applicant applies for discretionary review of a directly appealable order, we grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Here, however, Wells does not have a right of direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal application for damages actions with judgments of $10,000 or less, but not for an appeal from a zero award or from the denial of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68.

Victore v. Novitsky · filed 2013-12-04(a)(6), (a)(10), (j)

That statute requires a discretionary application in actions for damages “in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less.” ... No application is needed, however, for the appeal of a “zero” award. ... And while an appeal from the denial of a request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 requires an application for discretionary appeal, see OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (10), an appeal from the denial of a request for fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 does not.

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) requires discretionary-appeal procedures for damage actions when the judgment is $10,000 or less, and subsection (j) permits an otherwise timely discretionary application when the order is directly appealable and no timely notice of appeal was filed.

Southern Star Automotive, Inc. v. Medina · filed 2014-04-24(a)(6), (j)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) requires that appeals in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less must be brought in accordance with the discretionary appeals procedures. But the total judgment of $24,000 in this case makes OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) inapplicable. See Castleberry’s Food Company v. Smith, 205 Ga. App. 859, 861 (1) (424 SE2d 33) (1992). ... This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) if the order is subject to direct appeal and the applicant has not timely filed a notice of appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appellant to use the discretionary appeal procedure when appealing to the superior court from a magistrate court decision by de novo appeal.

Walker v. Direct Properties, LLC · filed 2014-07-31(a)(1)

First, when a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp., 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995). Accordingly, the Walkers’ notice of direct appeal does not give rise to a valid appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court order in a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision to follow discretionary-appeal procedures.

Loncke v. Ruis · filed 2014-09-15(a)(1)

Because the order at issue concerns a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Loncke was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). His failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Subsection (j) permits a timely application for discretionary appeal when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Davis v. State · filed 2014-10-09(j)

Davis’s conviction is a directly appealable final judgment. We will grant a timely-filed application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED, and Davis shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal in the trial court.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(11) requires an application for discretionary appeal when litigation begins in magistrate court and reaches state court through a de novo appeal, but it does not apply when the case was merely transferred from magistrate court without de novo review.

Spence v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2014-10-29(a)(11)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11), an application for discretionary appeal is required where litigation begins in magistrate court and reaches the state court by means of a de novo appeal. ... But this provision applies, by its terms, only where the state court exercises de novo review of the magistrate court’s decision. Here, the trial court’s order indicates that case was transferred from magistrate court. Thus, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11) does not apply.

Section 5-6-35 does not apply when the order is a final judgment subject to direct appeal, but a timely discretionary-appeal application may be granted on that basis.

Goldring v. Spencer · filed 2014-12-12(j)

The order that Goldring wishes to appeal is a final judgment, and no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, appears to apply here. ... We will grant a timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Thompson v. Reichert · filed 2014-12-25(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

When a final superior-court order does not fall within any category listed in subsection (a), it is subject to direct appeal rather than discretionary appeal.

Straus v. Renasant Bank, Successor in Interest to Crescent Bank & Trust Company · filed 2014-12-25(a)

The superior court’s order appears to be final, and no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) appears to apply. Therefore, the order is subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (a)(2) requires a discretionary-appeal application for appeals in domestic-relations cases, including child-support cases, and subsection (a)(4) requires one for appeals from garnishment or attachment cases.

Diane Forehand Grindell v. Grindell · filed 2015-02-26(a)(2), (a)(4)

First, appeals in domestic relations cases, including child support cases, must be taken by application for discretionary appeal as required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). See Fitzgerald v. Department of Human Resources, 231 Ga. App. 129 (497 SE2d 659) (1998). Second, “[a]ppeals from cases involving garnishment or attachment” also must be brought by discretionary application. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (4).

Subsection (j) requires the appellate court to grant a timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Moore v. Moore-Mckinney · filed 2015-04-10(j)

We will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for discretionary appeal when a superior court has reviewed a lower-court decision by certiorari or de novo proceedings.

Morales v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2015-05-05(a)(1)

First, “appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings shall be by application for discretionary appeal.” Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003); see also OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). Because Morales did not follow the proper procedure for requesting appellate review in this case, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires a party seeking to appeal a qualifying prisoner civil action to file an application for discretionary appeal rather than taking a direct appeal.

Hayward v. State · filed 2015-05-05

And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a prisoner has no right of direct appeal in civil cases, we lack jurisdiction to consider this direct appeal from the superior court’s order.

Section 5-6-35(a) does not require a discretionary-appeal application for an order outside the subsection's listed categories.

Lilly v. City of Carrollton Georgia · filed 2015-05-20(a)

Because no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) applies here, Lilly was not required to file an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) no longer requires an application to appeal from an order awarding, modifying, or refusing to change child custody, including an order holding or declining to hold a person in contempt of such a custody order.

Froehlich v. Froehlich · filed 2015-07-13(a)(2)

And as a result of a 2007 amendment to § 5-6-35 (a) (2), an application to appeal is no longer required to obtain an appeal from an order awarding, modifying, or refusing to change child custody, including an order holding or declining to hold a person in contempt of such a custody order.

Section 5-6-35(a) does not require an application for discretionary appeal from a trial court order denying a motion to modify a sentence.

Mallory v. State · filed 2015-08-11(a)

Neither of these statutes, however, mandate the filing of an application for discretionary appeal. There is no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) that requires an application for discretionary appeal from a trial court’s order denying a motion to modify a sentence.

Section 5-6-35(a) does not apply to the final order at issue, so the order is subject to direct appeal.

Higdon v. Higdon · filed 2015-12-11(a)

The superior court’s order is final as to Higdon’s proposed petition, and no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) appears to apply. Therefore, it appears that Higdon has a right of direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(11) requires a discretionary appeal to obtain review of a state-court order resolving a de novo appeal from a magistrate court dispossessory judgment.

Hines v. Midfirst Bank · filed 2015-12-11(a)(11)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Hines was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures to obtain review before this Court. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mtg. Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a) does not apply when the lower court’s order is directly appealable, and subsection (j) supports granting a timely discretionary application in that circumstance.

Caterro v. State · filed 2015-12-16(a), (j)

No provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) applies here, and the order that Caterro wishes to appeal was directly appealable. We will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (a)(6) does not apply when no money damages were awarded, while subsection (a)(11) requires discretionary appeal procedures for an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Chuck's Gun & Pawn, Inc. v. Lendmark Finance Services · filed 2016-01-28(a)(6), (a)(11)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) is not applicable because no money damages were awarded. See Brown v. Associates Financial Svcs. Corp., 255 Ga. 457 (339 SE2d 590) (1986). However, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11) required that Chuck’s Gun & Pawn comply with discretionary appeal procedures because the state court’s order disposed of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision. See Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior court's review of a state administrative agency decision to use the discretionary-appeal procedure, including when the agency issued an investigative demand.

Financial Education Services, Inc. v. State of Georgia · filed 2016-03-11(a)(1)

We conclude that under binding Georgia Supreme Court authority, that demand constitutes the decision of an “administrative agency” for the purpose of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), and consequently that Financial Education Services was required by that provision to apply for a discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal when a superior-court order resolves a de novo appeal from magistrate court and when a damages judgment is less than $10,000.

Gordon v. Whittington · filed 2016-03-11(a)(1), (a)(6)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Gordon was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). His failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal. Moreover, a discretionary application was also required because this appeal involves an action for damages where the judgment entered was less than $10,000.00. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). For these reasons, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) requires an appellant to use discretionary-appeal procedures to obtain review of the denial of an order seeking relief under OCGA § 9-11-60(d).

Al Ozelci A/K/A Ali Ozwlci v. Poyraz · filed 2016-04-04(a)(8)

To obtain review of the denial of such an order, an appellant must follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8); Rogers v. Estate of Harris, 276 Ga. App. 898, 899 (625 SE2d 65) (2005). Ozelci did not follow those procedures here.

Subsection (a) does not require a discretionary application for an order confirming an arbitration award and entering final judgment; the order is directly appealable, and subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application in that circumstance.

Mira Brown v. Rac Acceptance · filed 2016-04-25(a) and (j)

However, no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) requires the filing of a discretionary application from such an order. Therefore, the order is subject to direct appeal. See, e. g., Green Tree Servicing v. Jones, 333 Ga. App. 184) (775 SE2d 714) (2015). ... Ordinarily, we will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6- 35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a)(11) requires a party seeking review of an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Jihad X. Al-Mujaheed v. Stuhrman · filed 2016-05-17(a)(11)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Al-Mujaheed was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures to obtain review before this Court. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82, 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995). His failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) generally requires an application for discretionary appeal when the judgment is $10,000 or less, but an appeal is directly appealable when the final judgment, viewed in its entirety, includes foreclosure of a statutory lien.

Adewumi v. Amelia grove/ashland Park Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2016-06-02(a)(6)

“Although the grant of a motion for summary judgment is in general directly appealable, where the amount of the judgment is $10,000 or less, an application for discretionary appeal is required.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ca-Shar, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 204 Ga. App. 865 (420 SE2d 810) (1992); OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6). However, in determining whether an appeal falls within the ambit of the discretionary appeals procedure, the final judgment is considered in its entirety and not merely in its various parts. See Alexander v. Steining, 197 Ga. App. 328 (1) (398 SE2d 390) (1990). In this case, the trial court permitted the Association to foreclose on a statutory lien, which we have held renders this case directly appealable. See Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga. App. 391, 391-392 (469 SE2d 469) (1996) (even though damages awarded were less than $10,000, final judgment in an action that arose as a complaint on a lien against real property is directly appealable.)

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) requires discretionary-appeal applications for actions for damages with judgments of $10,000 or less, while subsection (j) permits granting a timely application when the order is directly appealable.

Castleberry Square Condominium Association, Inc. v. Tdres 2012 LLC · filed 2016-06-10(a)(6), (j)

The Association seeks to appeal this ruling and filed an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), which requires an application for “[a]ppeals in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less[.]” However, this case commenced as a quiet title action that involved disbursement of excess tax sale proceeds. Thus, it is not properly characterized as an “action for damages” necessitating a discretionary application. ... Even if we were to assume that this case is an action for damages under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), we would look to the aggregate amount of the “damages” – here, over $30,000 – to determine jurisdiction rather than the amount awarded to the Association. ... Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), we will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35 (j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant a timely discretionary application when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Montia v. Sand Canyon Corp Fka Option One Mtg Company · filed 2016-08-10(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) requires an application for discretionary appeal when a summary judgment results in a judgment of $10,000 or less.

Roberts v. Stone Gate Cottages Condominium Association, Inc. · filed 2016-12-07(a)(6)

Second, Roberts has failed to file an application for discretionary appeal as required by OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6). “Although the grant of a motion for summary judgment is in general directly appealable, where the amount of the judgment is $10,000.00 or less, an application for discretionary appeal is required.” (Punctuation omitted.) ... As the total judgment in favor of Stone Gate Cottages Condominium Association is less than $10,000.00, the entry of summary judgment provides no basis for a direct appeal in this case.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary-appeal application when the underlying subject matter falls within subsection (a), even if the challenged order is otherwise directly appealable.

Hotchkiss v. Stonecrest Acquisitions, LLC · filed 2016-12-28(a)(1)

“An application for appeal is required when the “underlying subject matter” is listed in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a), and therefore, “the discretionary application procedure must be followed, even when the party is appealing a judgment or order that is procedurally subject to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a).”

Subsection (a)(6) requires an application for discretionary appeal when the judgment is $10,000.00 or less, rather than permitting a direct appeal.

Canady v. Osprey Cove Owners' Association, Inc. · filed 2017-01-19(a)(6)

“Although the grant of a motion for summary judgment is in general directly appealable, where the amount of the judgment is $10,000.00 or less, an application for discretionary appeal is required.” Ca-Shar v. McKesson Corp., 204 Ga. App. 865 (420 SE2d 810) (1992) (citing OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6)) (punctuation omitted). As the total judgment in favor of Osprey Cove Owners’ Association is less than $10,000.00, the entry of summary judgment provides no basis for a direct appeal in this case. See Ca-Shar, 204 Ga. App. at 865-866. Canady’s failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedure deprives us of jurisdiction to consider his appeal. See Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998).

Section 5-6-35(a) does not require a discretionary-appeal application for an order confirming an arbitration award, and subsection (j) permits the court to grant a timely application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

McSmith v. Labor Ready Southeast, Inc. · filed 2017-01-19(a), (j)

However, no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) requires the filing of a discretionary application from such an order. ... This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6- 35 (j).

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal application for a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision and for an appeal involving damages when the judgment is less than $10,000.

Beasley v. Unifund Ccr, LLC, as Assignee of Citibank, N.A. · filed 2017-02-07(a)(1) and (a)(6)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Beasley was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). ... Moreover, a discretionary application was required because this appeal involves an action for damages where the judgment entered was less than $10,000.00. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998).

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) requires an application for discretionary appeal in damages actions when the judgment is $10,000 or less, and subsection (a)(11) requires discretionary-appeal procedures for appeals from de novo magistrate-court decisions.

Dixon v. Howard · filed 2017-02-22(a)(6) and (a)(11)

First, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal “in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less.” ... Second, because the order at issue concerns a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11) also required Dixon to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Section 5-6-35 governs discretionary appeals, but no provision of the statute applies when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

McAllister v. State · filed 2017-03-30(j)

Based on the limited record before us, we conclude that no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, appears to apply to this case. ... We will grant a timely application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires a discretionary appeal application when a case reaches superior court from magistrate court through a de novo appeal, but it does not apply when the matter was transferred from magistrate court without de novo review.

Goldman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2017-03-30(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), an application for discretionary appeal is required where litigation begins in magistrate court and reaches the superior court by means of a de novo appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). But this provision applies, by its terms, only where the superior court exercises de novo review of the magistrate court’s decision. Here, the trial court’s order indicates that case was transferred from magistrate court. Thus, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) does not apply.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary-appeal application for appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings.

Sims v. Altisource Residential, Lp · filed 2017-05-17(a)(1)

“[A]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings shall be by application for discretionary appeal.” Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003); see also OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). The defendants’ failure to comply with the discretionary appeal procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal when a superior court order disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Joanna v. Au · filed 2017-05-17(a)(1)

Because the Superior Court’s order disposed of a de novo appeal from a Magistrate Court decision, Joanna was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). Joanna’s failure to follow this procedure deprives us of jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(j) permits a discretionary appeal when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal; an order not subject to direct appeal does not qualify.

Williams v. State · filed 2017-07-19(j)

As a threshold matter, we note that no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, appears to apply to this case. Ordinarily, we will grant a timely application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Here, however, the trial court’s order is not subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (a)(2) treats paternity petitions as domestic relations cases requiring an application for discretionary appeal to obtain appellate review.

Braunstein v. Blair · filed 2017-08-23(a)(2)

Paternity petitions are domestic relations cases within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). ... Accordingly, Braunstein was required to file an application for discretionary appeal to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s order dismissing her petition.

Section 5-6-35(a)(7) requires an order denying an extraordinary motion for new trial to be appealed by application for discretionary appeal.

Ross v. State · filed 2017-11-14(a)(7)

Second, an order denying an extraordinary motion for new trial must be appealed by application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (7).

Section 5-6-35 governs discretionary applications, but it does not apply when the lower court's order is directly appealable; a timely discretionary application is granted when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Barnes v. Trever Cannon · filed 2017-10-11(j)

It appears that no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary application statute, applies in this case, and that the trial court’s order denying Barnes’s motion to intervene is a final order. Therefore, the trial court’s order is directly appealable under OCGA 5-6-34 (a) (1). See Burruss v. Ferdinand, 245 Ga. App. 203, 203 (1) (536 SE2d 555) (2000). We will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) requires an application for discretionary appeal in an action for damages when the judgment is $10,000 or less.

Kimbrough v. Cliatt · filed 2017-12-04(a)(6)

Although final judgments of the Municipal Court of Columbus, Muscogee County are directly appealable as if a judgment from a state or superior court, Ga. L. 1983, p. 4443, 33 (c), appeals of all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); see also Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998).

Section 5-6-35 requires discretionary-appeal procedures for specified appeals, including challenges to denials of motions to set aside final judgments, de novo appeals from magistrate-court decisions, and damages actions with judgments of $10,000 or less.

Carr v. Wanda Gray · filed 2018-02-07(a)(6), (a)(8), (a)(11), (b)

First, “the denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 is not directly appealable and instead requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (b).”

Section 5-6-35(a)(11) requires a discretionary appeal application for appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings, and subsection (a)(6) requires the same procedure for damages actions with judgments of $10,000 or less.

Diaz v. Taylor · filed 2018-02-15(a)(11) and (a)(6)

First, “[a]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings shall be by application for discretionary appeal.” Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003); see also OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11). Because this is an appeal from the decision of a superior court conducting a de novo review of a magistrate court order, Diaz was required to file an application for discretionary appeal. Bullock, 260 Ga. App. at 875. Second, appeals in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less shall comply with the discretionary appeals procedure. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6). Because this suit is an action for damages and the judgment entered was less than $10,000, a discretionary application was required for this reason too. See Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998); see also Brunswick v. Todd, 255 Ga. 448 (339 SE2d 589) (1986).

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary-appeal application in covered cases, but not for a zero-dollar award or for denial of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, and the court may grant an otherwise timely application when the order is directly appealable and no timely notice of appeal was filed.

Astoria of Middle Ga, LLC v. Astoria Anesthesia Associates, LLC · filed 2018-05-08(a)(6), (a)(10), (j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), a party may file a direct appeal from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below, except as provided in Code Section 5-6-35[.]” It does not appear that any provision of OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, applies here. The defendants suggest that a discretionary application was required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), which requires an application in actions for damages “in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less[.]” No application is needed, however, for the appeal of a “zero” award. Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 470 n. 1 (486 SE2d 699) (1997). The defendants also suggest that an application was required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (10), but that provision only applies to the denial of a request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14, not to the denial of a request for fees under OCGA § 9-11-68. This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) if the order is subject to direct appeal and the applicant has not timely filed a notice of appeal.

Subsection (a) identifies when a discretionary appeal is required, while subsection (j) permits granting a timely discretionary application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Pittman v. Summit Restaurant Development, LLC · filed 2018-06-04(a), (j)

From the limited information included in the application materials, the trial court’s order appears to have resolved all pending issues in the case and no provision of the discretionary appeal statute, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a), appears to apply. The order, therefore, appears to be subject to direct appeal. This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings must be pursued by discretionary appeal.

WHALEN v. WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, D/B/A CHRISTIANA TRUST · filed 2018-07-19(a)(1)

First, “appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings shall be by application for discretionary appeal.” Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003); see also OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). Because Whalen did not follow the proper procedure for requesting appellate review in this case, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(2) requires an application for discretionary appeal to appeal a divorce decree.

Singh v. Singh · filed 2018-09-26(a)(2)

We, however, lack jurisdiction. Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), an application for discretionary appeal is required in order to appeal a divorce decree. Singh’s failure to file a discretionary application deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Subsection (a) does not require a discretionary appeal in this dispossessory case; the civil court's order is therefore subject to direct appeal.

Dardy v. MacOn Housing Authority · filed 2018-09-26(a)

As to Dardy’s request for appellate review, it is unclear why Dardy filed an application for discretionary appeal rather than a direct appeal. No provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) appears to apply to this case. Thus, the civil court’s order appears to be subject to direct appeal.

For a post-judgment attorney-fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14, § 5-6-35(a)(10) requires a discretionary application only when no direct appeal has otherwise been taken from the underlying judgment; subsection (j) permits the court to grant a timely discretionary application when the order is subject to direct appeal and no notice of appeal has been filed.

In Re Estate of Sierra Leigh Wertzer, Ward. · filed 2018-09-26(a)(10), (j)

As the Supreme Court has made clear, “a party aggrieved by a post-judgment OCGA § 9-15-14 award is required to comply with the discretionary application procedure of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (10) only where no direct appeal has been otherwise taken from the underlying judgment.” ... Because Grace filed direct appeals from other orders entered contemporaneously with the order awarding OCGA § 9-15-14 attorney fees, no discretionary application is required to appeal the fee award. This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) if the order is subject to direct appeal and the applicant has not already filed a notice of appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal application for review of superior-court decisions reviewing state or local administrative agencies, but no application was required for this Anti-SLAPP appeal because the superior court was not reviewing agency action.

Grogan v. City of Dawsonville · filed 2019-02-04(a)(1)

The discretionary application procedure must be followed if the “underlying subject matter” is listed in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a), “even when the party is appealing a judgment or order that is procedurally subject to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a).” Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 468 (448 SE2d 192) (1994). As relevant here, a discretionary application is required for “[a]ppeals from decisions of . . . state and local administrative agencies.” OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). ... Whether or not a stand-alone appeal from the superior court’s dismissal of Grogan’s appeal from the City’s removal action would require an application for discretionary review as a decision “of the superior courts reviewing decisions of the . . . state and local administrative agencies,” OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), need not be resolved here. ... In denying Grogan’s motion to dismiss filed pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-11.1, the superior court was not reviewing the decision of an administrative agency. ... As a result, Grogan was not required to file a discretionary application to pursue his appeal to this Court.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary application for an appeal in a damages action where the judgment is $10,000 or less, while the provision for dispossessory proceedings does not apply when state-court review was not de novo.

Zarem v. Southeast Properties, LLC · filed 2015-07-23(a)(6), (a)(11)

We granted the application because, although the litigation began as a dispossessory proceeding in magistrate court, the state court’s review was not de novo and, thus, the discretionary appeal procedure required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11) did not apply here. However, a closer review reveals that a discretionary application was indeed required, albeit on a different basis - namely, that Zarem sought to appeal in an action for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6).