Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-35

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals in domestic-relations cases, including child-support-modification cases, to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Juan Antonio Sanchez Guerra v. Jaime · filed 2025-05-06(a)(2), (b)

As a general rule, appeals in domestic relations cases — including those involving a modification of child support — must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); Fitzgerald v. Dept. of Human Resources, 231 Ga. App. 129, 129 (497 S.E.2d 659) (1998).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b) require appeals from divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to be initiated by an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Sermons v. White-Sermons · filed 2025-05-13(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” ... Sermons’s failure to follow the required appellate procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals from domestic-relations judgments and orders, including contempt orders, to be brought by discretionary application.

McClendon v. Roberson · filed 2025-05-30(a)(2), (b)

Appeals from “judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” including orders “holding or declining to hold persons in contempt” of such orders must be made by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b) require an application for discretionary review when appealing a judgment or order in a divorce, alimony, or other domestic-relations case.

Rosenberg v. Raskin · filed 2025-06-13(a)(2), (b)

Ordinarily, appeals from “judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b).

For appeals in divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations cases, including contempt orders, the statute requires an application for discretionary review.

Bruce v. Evans · filed 2025-06-17(a)(2), (b)

First, appeals from orders in “divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases,” including orders holding persons in contempt of such orders, must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals of domestic-relations orders, including Family Violence Act orders, to be initiated through an application for discretionary review.

Tamantha Letrice Brown v. Harris · filed 2025-06-24(a)(2), (b)

Appeals of orders in domestic relations cases — including actions arising under the Family Violence Act — must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(2) and (b) require appeals from divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Burwinkel v. Matt Burwinkel · filed 2025-07-01(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (2) and (b) require an application for discretionary review to initiate appeals from divorce and other domestic-relations judgments or orders.

Mendoza v. Mendoza · filed 2025-08-13(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); see Onyemobi v. Onyemobi, 375 Ga. App. 538, 538 (916 SE2d 738) (2025). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996). Micah Mendoza’s failure to follow the required appellate procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Subsections (a)(2) and (b) require appeals from divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Gallaher v. Gallaher · filed 2025-08-15(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); see also Evans v. Jackson, 368 Ga. App. 170, 173 (1) (b) (889 SE2d 343) (2023). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996). Thus, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b) require appeals from divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to be initiated through an application for discretionary review.

Oloruntobi Isaiah John v. John · filed 2025-08-15(a)(2), (b)

We lack jurisdiction over this direct appeal because “[a]ppeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals of domestic-relations orders, including Family Violence Act orders, to begin with an application for discretionary review.

Federico Martinez, III v. King · filed 2025-08-19(a)(2), (b)

Appeals of orders in domestic relations cases — including actions arising under the Family Violence Act — must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); Phaneuf v. Anthony, 375 Ga. App. 636, 637 (917 SE2d 191) (2025).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b) require appeals from divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Willie Withers, Jr. v. Daniel · filed 2025-09-03(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (2) and (b) requires appeals from divorce and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to begin with an application for discretionary review.

Mbock v. Georgieva · filed 2025-09-08(a) (2), (b)

We, however, lack jurisdiction because “[a]ppeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review for appeals from divorce and other domestic-relations orders, including child-custody provisions within a divorce decree, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Suarez v. Marrero · filed 2025-09-08(a)(2), (b)

Appeals from orders in “divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases,” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b). ... Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional. ... Consequently, Husband’s failure to follow that procedure deprives us of jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an application for discretionary review for appeals from judgments or orders in domestic-relations cases, including child-support-collection cases.

Smallwood v. Boggess · filed 2025-09-08(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b). Because this case involves the collection of child support, it is a domestic relations case within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2).

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review to initiate an appeal from a domestic-relations order when child custody is not at issue, including an order denying a motion to set aside.

Marquez Walker v. Georgia Department of Human Services · filed 2025-09-15(a)(2), (a)(8), (b)

An appeal from a trial court order in a domestic relations case must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review where a child custody ruling is not at issue on appeal. Compare OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11), with OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); accord Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 (799 SE2d 160) (2017). An appeal from a trial court order denying an OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) motion to set aside likewise must be initiated via an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8), (b); Jim Ellis Atlanta, Inc. v. Adamson, 283 Ga. App. 116, 116 (640 SE2d 688) (2006).

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals from divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to be initiated through discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Ivacove v. Ivakhov · filed 2025-09-16(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); see also Evans v. Jackson, 368 Ga. App. 170, 173 (1) (b) (889 SE2d 343) (2023).

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals from domestic-relations judgments or orders to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2025-10-20(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary-review application for appeals in divorce and other domestic-relations cases and for orders denying motions to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d).

Gaddis v. Gaddis · filed 2025-11-07(a)(2), (a)(8), (b)

First, “[a]ppeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. ... In like manner, appeals from trial court orders denying motions to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an appellant in a domestic-relations case to initiate appellate review by application for discretionary review when the appeal concerns child support but does not challenge a substantive custody ruling.

Turner v. Dabney · filed 2025-11-21(a)(2)

But even if that is the case, Turner is not entitled to a direct appeal here; because the enumerations of error in his appellate briefs concern only child support issues, and he does not challenge any substantive custody rulings, he was required to initiate his appeal in this domestic relations case by filing an application for discretionary review under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2).

Section 5-6-35 (a)(2) requires appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases to be made by application for discretionary appeal.

Nam v. Engel · filed 2025-12-01(a)(2)

Appeals from “judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be made by application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires appeals from child-custody determinations made in divorce proceedings, including temporary orders, to be made by application for discretionary appeal.

Lily Li-Yi Patel v. Patel · filed 2025-12-03(a)(2)

when a trial court issues a child custody determination as part of divorce proceedings, any appeal seeking review of that child custody determination requires that the appellant utilize the discretionary appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), regardless of whether the child custody determination is made via final decree or, as here, as part of a temporary order.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b) require appeals in domestic-relations cases involving child-support awards or modifications or contempt findings to begin with an application for discretionary review.

Reid v. Bryant · filed 2025-12-04(a)(2), (b)

As a general rule, appeals in domestic relations cases — including those involving an award or modification of child support or a finding of contempt— must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals from orders in domestic relations cases, including child-support collection cases, to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

O'Dell v. O'Dell · filed 2025-12-17(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b). Because this case involves the collection of child support, it is a domestic relations case within the meaning of the statute.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires appeals from divorce and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to be brought by application for discretionary appeal, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Junior Hector Rosas v. Rosas · filed 2026-01-21(a)(2)

Appeals from “judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be made by application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review for appeals from domestic-relations judgments or orders, including contempt orders, and from orders awarding attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14.

KEBE v. VALDOSTA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT · filed 2025-12-04(a)(2), (a)(10), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases,” including orders holding persons in contempt of such orders, must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. ... Additionally, an appeal from a trial court order awarding OCGA § 9-15-14 ... attorney fees must also be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b) require appeals from divorce and other domestic-relations judgments or orders to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Natalie King Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2026-01-29(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Subsections (a)(2) and (b) require appeals from orders in divorce cases to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Larson v. Larson · filed 2026-04-01(a)(2),(b)

However, appeals from orders in divorce cases must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review for appeals from domestic-relations judgments and contempt orders and from orders awarding attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Randy Harling, Jr. v. Carter · filed 2026-04-16(a)(2), (a)(10), (b)

Appeals from judgments or orders in domestic relations cases, including orders holding persons in contempt of such orders, must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), (b); Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155, 156 (312 SE2d 319) (1984). Additionally, appeals from orders awarding OCGA § 9-15-14 attorney fees also must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(10), (b); Capricorn Systems v. Godavarthy, 253 Ga. App. 840, 841–42 (560 SE2d 730) (2002). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases to proceed by application for discretionary appeal, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Pearlie Baker v. Baker · filed 2026-05-28(a)(2), (b)

However, appeals from “judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be made by application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), (b). Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.

Section 5-6-35 requires discretionary review before an appeal from a domestic-relations order when no child-custody ruling is at issue, including an order denying relief under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d).

Beacham v. Beacham · filed 2019-09-23(a)(2), (a)(8), (b)

An appeal from a trial court order in a domestic relations case must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review where a child custody ruling is not at issue on appeal. Compare OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11), with id. § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); accord Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 (799 SE2d 160) (2017). ... An appeal from a trial court order denying relief sought in a § 9-11-60 (d) motion to set aside likewise must be initiated via an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8), (b); Jim Ellis Atlanta, Inc. v. Adamson, 283 Ga. App. 116, 116 (640 SE2d 688) (2006).

Section 5-6-35 (a) does not require a discretionary-appeal application for a judgment denying a motion to unseal records in a criminal case, and subsection (j) authorizes granting a timely application when the order is directly appealable.

Universal Protection Service, LLC D/B/A Allied Universal Protection Services v. Tyreese Rashun Brown · filed 2024-03-12(a), (j)

Moreover, a judgment denying a motion to unseal records in a criminal case does not fall within the purview of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a). Thus, Allied was not required to file an application to obtain review of the order at issue. We will grant a timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(a) lists the cases subject to discretionary appeal; if no listed category applies, a final judgment is directly appealable.

Dequintavious Rivers v. McCullers · filed 2022-10-07(a)

Except for cases listed in the discretionary appeal statute, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a), Georgia law permits a direct appeal from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below[.]” OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). Here, the trial court’s order dismissing Rivers’s appeal was a final judgment, and no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) appears to apply. Thus, Rivers had a right of direct appeal from the order dismissing his appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review when appealing a state court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

WILLIAMS v. TEP RAGAN, LLC · filed 2024-04-18(a)(11), (b)

An appeal from a state court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11), (b); Strachan v. Meritor Mtg. Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82, 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995). Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (11) requires an application for discretionary review when appealing a state court order reviewing a magistrate court decision de novo.

Clark v. Ace Homes, LLC · filed 2024-05-29(a)(11)

Moreover, an appeal from a state court order reviewing a decision of the magistrate court by de novo proceedings must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mtg. Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82, 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995).

Section 5-6-35 requires an appeal from a state-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision, and an appeal in a damages action with a judgment of $10,000.00 or less, to be brought by discretionary application.

LEWIS v. JOSEPH CHURCH · filed 2022-12-27(a)(11), (a)(6)

An appeal from a state court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82, 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995). Likewise, appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less must be brought by discretionary application. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996). Lewis’s failure comply with the discretionary review procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 requires discretionary-appeal applications for damages actions with judgments of $10,000 or less and for superior-court appeals from magistrate-court decisions.

JOHN ROBERT HARRIS v. DAVIS · filed 2023-01-19(a)(6), (a)(1)

First, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less. ... Second, because the order at issue concerns a de novo appeal to superior court from a magistrate court decision, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) required Harris to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review to appeal a sentence imposed upon revocation of probation.

Brooks v. State · filed 2024-07-11(a)(5), (b)

Because the underlying subject matter of this appeal is the sentence imposed upon the revocation of Brooks’s probation, he was required to file an application for discretionary review in order to appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) and (b) require a party seeking appellate review of an order terminating parental rights to file an application for discretionary review, and compliance is jurisdictional.

In the Interest of K. K. M., a Child (Mother) · filed 2024-08-08(a)(12), (b)

To obtain appellate review of an order terminating parental rights, however, a party must file an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), (b); In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 296 (788 SE2d 416) (2016). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Booker v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 317 Ga. App. 426, 427 (731 SE2d 110) (2012) (punctuation omitted). Thus, the mother’s failure to file a discretionary application deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a) identifies cases requiring discretionary applications, subsection (g) gives the applicant ten days to file a notice of appeal after the application is granted, and subsection (j) requires granting a timely application when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

ELANA COOPER v. PPF AMLI OAK VALLEY ROAD LLC D/B/A AMLI LENOX · filed 2024-08-13(a), (g), and (j)

No discretionary application is required, however, as a final judgment is directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), and this action does not appear to fall within one of the categories of cases for which a discretionary application is required to seek appellate review under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a). Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant a timely application for discretionary review if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See City of Rincon v. Couch, 272 Ga. App. 411, 412 (612 SE2d 596) (2005). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED. Cooper shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal in the state court. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (g).

Section 5-6-35 requires a party seeking discretionary review to file an application in the appropriate appellate court.

DARRYL PERNELL BUTLER v. BOZEMAN · filed 2024-08-16(d)

And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application for discretionary review in the appropriate appellate court. Butler’s failure to comply with the discretionary review procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (2) requires an application for discretionary appeal in an equitable caregiver case involving visitation.

Belflower v. Mohler · filed 2024-08-26(a)(2)

“Because this is not a child custody case, but is an equitable caregiver case in which [visitation] is an issue, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) requires an application for discretionary appeal.”

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary appeal in appeals involving de novo review of magistrate court rulings and damages judgments of $10,000 or less.

Wilbourn v. Galadriel Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2026-04-08(a)(1), (a)(6), (b)

First, because the underlying issue involves the superior court’s de novo review of a magistrate court ruling, Wilbourn was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures to appeal. ... Second, appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less also must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. ... “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Subsection 5-6-35(d) does not make a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently appealable.

Walker v. State · filed 2024-12-26(d)

Her motion for reconsideration did not extend the time to appeal from that order, and the November 4 denial of her motion for reconsideration is not itself appealable.

In a dispossessory case involving back rent, a discretionary application is required only when the sole issue is the amount of rent due and that amount is $2,500.00 or less; when the amount exceeds $2,500, the judgment is directly appealable.

Gripper v. Authentic Cedar Grove A/A/F Continental 634 Fund · filed 2025-04-22(a)(3)

Given that the amount of back rent at issue exceeded $2,500, it appears that Gripper had a right of direct appeal from the state court judgment. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (3) (a discretionary application is required in “cases involving distress or dispossessory warrants in which the only issue to be resolved is the amount of rent due and such amount is $2,500.00 or less”).

Section 5-6-35 (a) (1) and (b) requires appeals from superior court decisions reviewing lower court decisions by petition for review to be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Knighton v. Irvin · filed 2025-05-05(a)(1), (b)

Appeals from superior court decisions reviewing lower court decisions by petition for review must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) and (b) require an application for discretionary appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside.

William H. Waits, III v. Ea Homes, Lp · filed 2026-03-05(a)(8), (b)

And an appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) and (b) require an application for discretionary appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d).

Vo v. Bellmoore Park Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2026-04-17(a)(8), (b)

We lack jurisdiction, because an appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d) requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8), (b).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) and (b) require an appeal from a superior court decision reviewing a lower-court decision by certiorari or de novo proceedings to be initiated by an application for discretionary appeal.

Ebo v. McCoyd · filed 2021-05-12(a)(1), (b)

Appeals from superior court decisions reviewing lower court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), (b); Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996).

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) and (b) require a party seeking appellate review of an order terminating parental rights to file an application for discretionary review, and compliance is jurisdictional.

In the Interest of B. B., a Child (Father) · filed 2025-05-21(a)(12), (b)

To obtain appellate review of an order terminating parental rights, however, a party must file an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), (b); In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 296 (788 SE2d 416) (2016). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Booker v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 317 Ga. App. 426, 427 (731 SE2d 110) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, Bennett’s failure to file a discretionary application deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires a discretionary-appeal application for an order terminating parental rights, but does not apply when the underlying matter is an adoption case.

Trace McCune v. Johnson · filed 2026-02-03(a)(12)

Ordinarily, a party seeking to appeal an order terminating parental rights must file an application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12). But this is not a termination of parental rights case; it is an adoption case.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) and (b) require a party seeking appellate review of an order terminating parental rights to file an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest of J. G., a Child (Mother) · filed 2026-04-02(a)(12), (b)

To obtain appellate review of an order terminating parental rights, however, a party must file an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12), (b); In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 296 (788 SE2d 416) (2016).

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires appeals from orders terminating parental rights to be brought by filing an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest of L. G. L., Children (Mother) · filed 2019-12-24(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), however, appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be brought by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals of domestic-relations orders and denials of motions to set aside final judgments to be initiated through a discretionary-review application, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Oledzki v. Margarita Mesa · filed 2025-10-03(a)(2), (a)(8), (b)

Appeals of orders entered in domestic relations cases — including cases arising under the Family Violence Act — must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. ... Similarly, the denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) is also subject to the discretionary application requirement of OCGA § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35 requires a prisoner seeking review of a civil action to file an application for discretionary review rather than a direct appeal.

Jones v. James E. Hardy, Judge · filed 2018-01-30

And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to...appeal must file an application for discretionary review in the appropriate appellate court.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (5.3) requires a defendant to file an application for discretionary review to pursue a direct appeal from a guilty plea, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Juan Kirk Spurlin, Jr. v. State · filed 2025-10-16(a)(5.3)

Effective May 14, 2025, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5.3) requires defendants to file applications for discretionary review to appeal all “[d]irect appeals from guilty pleas.” See Ga. L. 2025, p. 621, § 1-2. Thus, to appeal the judgment resulting from the entry of his July 9, 2025 guilty plea, Spurlin was required to file an application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5.3). Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional. Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996).

For sentences entered before May 14, 2025, the amendment adding subsection (a)(5.3) did not require a direct appeal from a guilty plea to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Clark v. State · filed 2025-12-05(a)(5.3)

Effective May 14, 2025, the legislature amended OCGA § 5-6-35 (a), adding a new subsection (5.3), which requires “[d]irect appeals from guilty pleas” to be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. Here, the trial court sentenced Clark on May 8, 2025, and he filed a notice of appeal therefrom. Because the law governing appellate procedure at the time the sentence was entered allowed for a direct appeal, we have jurisdiction.

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a defendant seeking a direct appeal from a guilty plea to initiate review by filing an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Hester v. State · filed 2025-12-11(a)(5.3)

So to appeal from his October 23, 2025 guilty plea and the sentence imposed thereon, Hester was required to file an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3). He did not do so. Because compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure of OCGA § 5-6-35 is jurisdictional, Hester’s failure to follow that procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, and we must dismiss it.

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a defendant pursuing a direct appeal from a guilty plea to file an application for discretionary review.

Brown v. State · filed 2026-01-09(a)(5.3)

Effective May 14, 2025, OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires defendants to file applications for discretionary review for “[d]irect appeals from guilty pleas.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a defendant appealing a conviction entered after a guilty plea to file an application for discretionary appeal.

Voight v. State · filed 2026-01-08(a)(5.3)

Effective May 14, 2025, a defendant seeking to appeal a conviction entered following a guilty plea must file an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, to be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Thomas v. State · filed 2026-02-25(a)(5.3)

Our General Assembly recently amended OCGA § 5-6-35 so that any direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, must “be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a discretionary application for a direct appeal from a guilty plea.

Roberson v. State · filed 2026-03-17(a)(5.3)

Second, a direct appeal from a guilty plea must come by discretionary application.

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a discretionary application for a direct appeal from a guilty plea, but does not apply to guilty pleas entered before May 14, 2025.

Whatley v. State · filed 2026-03-30(a)(5.3)

The provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3), which require a discretionary application for direct appeals from guilty pleas, do not apply to Whatley since his guilty plea was entered before the statute’s effective date of May 14, 2025.

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a discretionary application for a direct appeal from a guilty plea, but that requirement does not apply to guilty pleas entered before May 14, 2025.

Rafael Santana, Jr. v. State · filed 2026-03-31(a)(5.3)

The provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3), which require a discretionary application for direct appeals from guilty pleas, do not apply to Santana since his guilty plea was entered before the statute’s effective date of May 14, 2025.

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires an application for discretionary appeal to appeal a guilty plea.

Mortain v. State · filed 2026-01-27(a)(5.3)

Effective May 14, 2025, the legislature amended OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3) to require the filing of an application for discretionary appeal in order to appeal a guilty plea.

For guilty pleas entered on or after May 14, 2025, a direct appeal must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Brewer v. State · filed 2026-03-13(a)(5.3)

Our General Assembly recently amended OCGA § 5-6-35 so that any direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, must “be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.”

For guilty pleas entered on or after May 14, 2025, a direct appeal must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Jackson v. State · filed 2026-04-16(a)(5.3)

Our General Assembly recently amended OCGA § 5-6-35 so that any direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, must “be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a defendant pursuing a direct appeal from a guilty plea to file an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Dotson v. State · filed 2026-05-12(a)(5.3)

Effective May 14, 2025, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5.3) requires defendants to file applications for discretionary review for “[d]irect appeals from guilty pleas.” See Ga. L. 2025, p. 621, § 1-2. Thus, to appeal the judgment resulting from the entry of his June 23 guilty plea, Dotson was required to file an application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5.3). Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.

Section 5-6-35 requires a direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Barnes v. State · filed 2026-05-15(a)(5.3)

Our General Assembly recently amended OCGA § 5-6-35 so that any direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, must “be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.” ... “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

The statute requires a direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

Fitzgerald v. State · filed 2026-05-27(a)(5.3)

Our General Assembly recently amended OCGA § 5-6-35 so that any direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, must “be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.”

Subsection (a)(5.3) requires an application for discretionary review to appeal the entry of a guilty plea, but permits a direct appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw that plea.

Kelvin Peoples v. State · filed 2026-02-27(a)(5.3)

Here, Peoples does not appeal from the entry of his guilty plea; rather, he appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw that plea. Therefore, we have jurisdiction.

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a discretionary-appeal application for a direct appeal from a guilty plea, while subsection (d) requires filing that application within 30 days of the challenged decision, and missing the deadline is jurisdictional.

Burkett v. State · filed 2026-05-19(a)(5.3), (d)

As an initial matter, the District Attorney argues that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because “direct appeals from guilty pleas” must be appealed by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3). But this is not a direct appeal from his guilty plea; it is an appeal from the dismissal of Burkett’s motion for leave to file an out-of-time appeal, which is directly appealable. See OCGA §§ 5-6-34(a)(1), 5-6-35. So the District Attorney’s jurisdictional argument fails. ... In the same act that created the new procedure for seeking leave to file an out-of-time motion for new trial or notice of appeal, the legislature also amended OCGA § 5-6-35, which lists the kinds of appeals that must be taken by application for discretionary appeal, to require filing such an application to bring “direct appeals from guilty pleas.” See Ga. L. 2025 at § 1–2. (codified at OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3)). Any such applications must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the challenged decision, OCGA § 5-6-35(d), or the appellate court in which the application is filed must dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction, see Gable v. State, 290 Ga. 81, 82 (2011). ... This means that if a defendant has missed the jurisdictional deadline to file an application under OCGA § 5-6-35 to seek a direct appeal from his guilty plea, he has missed his opportunity to appeal his guilty plea, notwithstanding the availability of leave to file an out-of-time notice of appeal under OCGA § 5-6-39.1.

Subsection (j) provides for granting a timely application for discretionary review when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Odum v. Brooks · filed 2025-11-05(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35(j), this Court will grant a timely application for discretionary review if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(j) provides that an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application will be granted when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Shanita Chandler v. Walmart, the Corporation · filed 2025-11-19(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35(j). Because the superior court’s order denying Chandler’s request to file her pleading is subject to direct appeal, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(5.2) and (b) require appeals from orders denying petitions for release under OCGA § 42-1-19 to be initiated by an application for discretionary review, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Bing v. State of Georgia · filed 2026-02-10(a)(5.2), (b)

Pretermitting the issue of whether Bing could appeal the denial of a motion for reconsideration, see Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 511 (536 SE2d 187) (2000), appeals from orders of superior courts denying petitions for release under OCGA § 42-1-19 must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a)(5.2), (b). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Subsection (j) allows the court to grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Gwenette Little v. Booker · filed 2017-07-19(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the ... lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

The discretionary-application requirement for a direct appeal from a guilty plea does not apply when the plea was entered before the statute’s May 14, 2025 effective date.

Barrionuevo v. State · filed 2026-05-27(a)(5.3)

The provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5.3), which require a discretionary application for direct appeals from guilty pleas, do not apply to Barrionuevo since his guilty plea was entered before the statute’s effective date of May 14, 2025.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) does not subject a case to discretionary-appeal procedures when it does not arise from a domestic-relations matter; under subsections (j) and (g), a timely application may be granted for a directly appealable order and the notice of appeal must then be filed within ten days.

Borden v. Houghland · filed 2026-06-22(a)(2), (g), and (j)

This case does not arise from a domestic relations matter that would otherwise subject it to the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). This Court will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is directly appealable. OCGA § 5-6-35(j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED. Borden shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal with the trial court if she has not already done so. OCGA § 5-6-35(g).

Section 5-6-35(j) provides for granting a timely discretionary appeal application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Chatman v. David Eugene Palmer, Jr. · filed 2013-07-24(j)

We will grant a timely-filed discretionary application if the lower court’s order ... is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(j) permits the court to grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Bishop v. Powell · filed 2016-01-11(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, these applications are hereby GRANTED, and the applicants shall have ten days from the date of this order to file their notices of appeal with the trial court.

Section 5-6-35(j) permits the court to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Florence v. Luke · filed 2016-10-25(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED, and Florence shall have ten days from the date of this order to file her notices of appeal with the trial court.

Section 5-6-35(a)(5.3) requires a direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, to be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Achee v. State · filed 2026-06-22(a)(5.3)

Our General Assembly recently amended OCGA § 5-6-35 so that a direct appeal from a guilty plea entered on or after May 14, 2025, must “be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.”

Collateral-source set-offs to a tort judgment are disregarded when deciding whether an application for discretionary appeal is required under § 5-6-35(a)(6).

Bales v. Shelton · filed 1990-05-17(a)(6)

In a tort action, set-offs to the judgment that arise from some collateral source — such as prior payments, or pre-existing debts ... — do not help to ascertain the price tag for the injury involved in the action. Therefore, such set-offs should not be considered when deciding whether an application for appeal is necessary.

Collateral-source set-offs do not reduce the judgment amount used to determine whether § 5-6-35(a)(6) requires a discretionary appeal application.

Lee v. Britt · filed 1991-01-31(a)(6)

However, the prospective application of Bales applies only to those pending appeals in which the appellant had relied on the City of Brunswick/Barikos holding. It was not our intention in Bales to require the dismissal of an appeal of a judgment that exceeds $2,500, prior to set-offs from a collateral source, on the ground that, at the time the notice of appeal was filed, an appeal application was required under Barikos.

Orders on motions to correct clerical errors under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) may be appealed directly without an application for discretionary appeal.

Leventhal v. Moseley · filed 1995-02-13(a)(8)

We agree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis in Crawford and adopt its holding that orders entered upon motions to correct a clerical error pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) do not require applications to appeal. It follows that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing defendant’s direct appeal in this case.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application to appeal a superior court judgment reviewing an auditor’s decision, but does not apply to decisions of special masters.

Alston & Bird LLP v. Mellon Ventures II, L.P. · filed 2010-12-16(a)(1)

We conclude, however, that OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) does not apply in this case because the statute specifically refers to decisions of “auditors” and not to those of “special masters.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal application for a judgment on an auditor’s report only when the report separately states findings of fact and conclusions of law; an incomplete report that was not recommitted permits direct appeal.

McCaughey v. Murphy · filed 1996-07-15(a)(1)

Based upon the foregoing, an application for discretionary appeal is required only when the auditor’s report contains separate findings of fact and conclusions of law and is, therefore, complete. When the report is incomplete and was not recommitted to the auditor, there has been no adjudication by two tribunals and the case is directly appealable.