Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-35

For an action for damages with a judgment of $10,000 or less, Section 5-6-35 requires the appeal to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

DORMAN v. LEGACY AT STONEY CREEK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. · filed 2024-06-21(a)(6), (b)

First, appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), (b); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

For damages judgments of $10,000 or less, Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review instead of a direct appeal, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Igbinoba v. Accura Engineering and Consulting Services, Inc. · filed 2024-06-28(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), (b); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals in actions for damages with judgments of $10,000 or less to be initiated by an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

MOHAMED v. EMORY GARDEN CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. · filed 2024-07-15(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), (b); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996).

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) and (b) require an appeal from a damages judgment of $10,000 or less to be initiated by an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Tobo v. Regency Oaks Neighborhood Association, Inc. · filed 2024-07-23(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. ... “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

For appeals in actions for damages where the judgment is $10,000 or less, Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Phillips v. Poplar Farm Homeowners' Association, Inc. · filed 2024-07-29(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), (b); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

For damages judgments of $10,000 or less, an appeal must be initiated through discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Azizan v. Ng · filed 2025-03-07(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), (b); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). ... “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” ... Azizan’s failure to comply with the discretionary review procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(6) and (b) require appeals in damages actions with judgments of $10,000 or less to begin with an application for discretionary review.

TOLBERT v. AMERICAN STNADARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF OHIO AS SUBROGEE OF JAMIE ALVAREZ GARCIA · filed 2025-03-25(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary application for appeals covered by subsection (a)(10) and for actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less under subsection (a)(6).

Phillips v. Petsmart, LLC · filed 2025-04-22(a)(6) and (a)(10)

Generally, appeals from awards of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 must be made by discretionary application. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (10). ... But the trial court only awarded $10,000 in fees. That does not meet the threshold of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), which requires a discretionary application “in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less[.]” ... Thus, because the judgment Phillips seeks to appeal does not meet the statutory threshold, we lack jurisdiction over this direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (6) and (b) require an application for discretionary review when an appeal in an action for damages involves a judgment of $10,000 or less.

Spearman v. Eagle's Brooke Property Owners Association, Inc. · filed 2025-07-23(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires an appeal from an action for damages with a judgment of $10,000 or less to be initiated by an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

MICHAEL D. SMITH v. CHESTNUT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. · filed 2025-08-07(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), (b); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Smoak v. Dept. of Human Resources, 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996). Thus, while the Smiths properly followed the discretionary review procedure in Case No. A25D0494, we lack jurisdiction over this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(6) requires an application for discretionary appeal in an action for damages when the judgment is $10,000 or less.

Nana Haven v. Dnf Associates, LLC, Assignee of Cnu Online Holdings, LLC · filed 2025-09-08(a)(6)

However, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6) requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less.

For damages judgments of $10,000 or less, § 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Bristol Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Barros · filed 2025-09-17(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), (b); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357, 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review before appealing a damages judgment of $10,000 or less.

Kiefer v. Spring Oaks Capital Spv, LLC · filed 2025-10-15(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review in an action for damages when the judgment is $10,000 or less, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Boakye v. Dnf Associates, LLC, Assignee of Synchrony Bank · filed 2025-12-16(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(6), (b); Jarrett, 178 Ga. App. at 600-601. “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

For damages actions with a judgment of $10,000 or less, Section 5-6-35 requires the appeal to begin with an application for discretionary review.

Harris v. the Housing Authority of the City of Decatur · filed 2026-01-15(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review before an appeal in a damages action with a judgment of $10,000 or less may be initiated.

Jones v. Oakley Township Homeowners Association, Inc. · filed 2026-01-21(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review to initiate an appeal in an action for damages when the judgment is $10,000 or less.

Pollard v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, Inc. · filed 2026-03-31(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(6), (b); ... “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” ... Pollard’s failure to comply with the discretionary appeals procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary-review application for an appeal in an action for damages when the judgment is $10,000 or less.

Berrios v. Crown Asset Management, LLC , Assignee of Comenity Bank · filed 2026-05-29(a)(6), (b)

Appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Subsection (a)(6) requires an application for discretionary appeal to initiate appeals in actions for damages when the judgment is $10,000 or less.

Brown v. Velocity Investments, LLC, Assignee of Upstart Network, Inc. · filed 2026-06-08(a)(6)

Second, under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

For a damages judgment of $10,000 or less, a party must apply for a discretionary appeal to obtain appellate review.

Farquharson v. Huntington Debt Holding, LLC, Assignee of Capital on Tap · filed 2026-06-24(a)(6)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(6), an application for discretionary appeal is required to obtain appellate review in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(6) requires appeals in actions for damages involving a judgment of $10,000.00 or less to be pursued by discretionary application.

Nneoma S. Idika Ndukwe v. N'zi Luxury Auto Sales, LLC · filed 2021-08-26(a)(6)

Appeals in all actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less must be pursued by discretionary application.

An appeal from a damages counterclaim judgment of less than $10,000 requires a discretionary appeal application; failure to comply requires dismissal.

Harpagon Co., LLC v. Davis · filed 2008-03-10(a)(6)

It is undisputed in this case that the factfinder entered judgment on the counterclaim for damages in an amount less than $10,000. Consequently, the present appeal of such counterclaim judgment must be dismissed for failure to comply with the mandatory provision for discretionary appeal in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6).

Appeals in damages actions with judgments of $10,000 or less, including attorney-fee awards, require an application for discretionary appeal.

GULNAZ v. CC CLARKSTON, LLC · filed 2025-03-04(a)(6)

But, under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), appeals in actions for damages in which the judgment is $10,000 or less — including awards of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11- 68 — must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a) does not make an order denying a request to seal records subject to discretionary appeal, and subsection (j) permits a timely discretionary application when the ruling is directly appealable.

Udi v. State · filed 2024-01-16(a), (j)

As a threshold matter, no provision of the discretionary application statute applies to the trial court’s order. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a). An order denying a request to seal records is directly appealable. ... This Court will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s ruling is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Under Section 5-6-35, denial of a motion to correct a void sentence is directly appealable rather than subject to discretionary-application procedures.

Martin v. State · filed 2023-09-15(a)(5), (b)

We consider the substance of a motion and not its nomenclature, and have routinely considered motions seeking to discharge First Offender status as motions to correct void sentences, the denial of which would be subject to a direct appeal. ... We therefore conclude that Martin was permitted to file a direct appeal of the denial of his motion.

Section 5-6-35(a) permits an appeal when an administrative case has reached a final, appealable order, and finality depends on the order’s function and substance rather than the use of the word “remand.”

Hughey v. Gwinnett County · filed 2004-11-23(a)

The mere use of the word "remand," however, does not automatically render the superior court's decision non-final and not appealable under state law. [3] Whether an order is final and appealable is judged by its function and substance, rather than any "magic language." [4] In this case, the return of the case to the ALJ did not require any further proceedings in that forum, nor was the ALJ ordered to reconsider any issues under a different standard than previously applied. [5] The superior court merely reversed the ALJ's decision on legal issues. Under these circumstances, the superior court's order was final and appealable under OCGA § 5-6-35(a).

Subsection (j) provides that an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal will be granted when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Mirza v. Law Office of Esther Panitch, P.C. · filed 2012-06-28(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the order is subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Dean v. Regency Square Apartments and Tovolli II LLC · filed 2012-07-03(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) directs the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Rivera v. Sanchez · filed 2012-07-03(j)

An order granting summary judgment is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 243 (248 SE2d 641) (1978). Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the order is subject to direct appeal. As the order at issue is subject to direct appeal, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application when the challenged order is subject to direct appeal.

Cerezo v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc · filed 2012-10-11(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the order is subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) does not govern an appeal from a final judgment that is directly appealable, and under subsection (j) the Court of Appeals grants a timely discretionary application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Bethelmie v. Heritage Place, LLC · filed 2013-05-08(a)(8), (j)

This is an appeal from a final judgment. See Lanier v. Foster, 133 Ga. App. 149, 153 (3) (210 SE2d 326) (1974). It is not an appeal from the denial of the motion to set aside, as contemplated by OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8), nor does it fall within any other provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a). The order in this case is thus directly appealable and is not subject to the discretionary appeal requirements. This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), if the order is subject to direct appeal. Therefore, this application is GRANTED as required under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a) does not apply to every discretionary-appeal order, and an otherwise timely discretionary application may be granted when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal under subsection (j).

Odion v. Odion · filed 2013-06-24(a), (j)

The superior court’s order dismissing Gege Odion’s Application and Complaint is a final, directly appealable order within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a). Moreover, no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) relating to discretionary appeals appears to apply to the order. This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

When both direct-appeal and discretionary-appeal provisions could apply, the underlying subject matter determines whether the appeal must proceed directly or by discretionary application.

Sauls v. Atchison · filed 2014-03-18(a)(12)

Both OCGA §[§] 5-6-34 (a) and 5-6-35 (a) are involved when, as here, a trial court issues a judgment in a case covered by the direct appeal statute, but where the subject matter may also be covered under the discretionary appeal statute. Where both the direct and discretionary appeal statutes are implicated, it is always the underlying subject matter that will control whether the appeal must be brought pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 or OCGA § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35(j) permits the court to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Davis v. State · filed 2014-08-06(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(j) permits an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application to be granted when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Clemons v. Delta Airlines, Inc. · filed 2015-12-11(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(j) permits an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Bailey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Successor by Merger to Wells Fargo Dealer Services · filed 2016-04-25(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Subsection (j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant a timely discretionary-appeal application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

TAYLOR INVESTMENT PARTNERS, II, LLC v. MOE’S FRANCHISOR LLC · filed 2017-02-07(j)

As the trial court’s order, in substance, was a final order granting Moe’s the relief it sought, we find that the order is subject to direct appeal. See Dolinger, 269 Ga. at 142 (2). We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED, and the Defendants shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal with the trial court.

Subsection (j) permits the court to grant a timely discretionary-appeal application when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Thompson v. State · filed 2017-03-15(j)

As a threshold matter, we note that no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, appears to apply to this case. Ordinarily, we will grant a timely application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Here, however, the trial court’s order is not subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (j) requires granting a timely discretionary-appeal application when the lower-court order is subject to direct appeal, including an order granting partial summary judgment.

Dreisbach v. Baskin & Baskin, P.C. · filed 2018-01-30(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j); see also Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003) (OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) applies to the grant of partial summary judgment).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires discretionary review of protective orders entered under the Family Violence Act because those cases are domestic-relations cases, while subsection (j) permits granting a timely discretionary application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Herbert v. Jordan · filed 2018-02-12(a)(2), (j)

A party must file an application for discretionary appeal to obtain review of a protective order that was entered in an action brought under the Family Violence Act, OCGA § 19-13-1 et seq., because such cases are domestic relations cases within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). See Schmidt v. Schmidt, 270 Ga. 461, 461-462 (1) (510 SE2d 810) (1999). ... We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35 does not provide a discretionary appeal route when the challenged trial-court order is not subject to direct appeal.

Ross v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank · filed 2018-04-20(j)

As a threshold matter, we note that no provision of OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, appears to apply to the case at bar. Ordinarily, we will grant a timely application when the trial court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Here, however, the trial court’s order is not subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) requires discretionary appellate review for certain appeals involving a judgment of $10,000 or less, but that requirement does not apply when the opposing party also prevailed on counterclaims filed by the appellant.

Moore v. Childs. · filed 2018-10-05(a)(6)

Citing OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), Childs argues that Moore instead was required to apply for discretionary appellate review because Childs’s judgment against Moore was for $10,000 or less. That Code section does not apply, however, because Childs also prevailed on counterclaims filed by Moore. Honester v. Tinsley, 183 Ga. App. 146, 147 (1) (358 SE2d 295) (1987). So Moore was allowed to file a direct appeal in this case. Id.

Section 5-6-35 does not eliminate the separate certificate-of-immediate-review requirements for an interlocutory appeal, and a timely discretionary application is granted when the order is otherwise subject to direct appeal.

Sundy v. Martha C. Christian, Judge · filed 2017-07-04(j)

And OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, does not excuse a party seeking appellate review of an interlocutory order from complying with the additional requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See Bailey v. Bailey, 266 Ga. 832 (471 SE2d 213) (1996). ... Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (j) provides that an otherwise timely discretionary application will be granted when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Ellyson v. Livingston Properties Management, Inc. · filed 2017-11-14(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (j) directs the Court of Appeals to grant a timely application for discretionary appeal when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Benton v. Baltimore Crab and Seafood Pearl, II, LLC · filed 2019-10-30(j)

We will grant a timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a)(10) requires a discretionary appeal for a post-judgment attorney-fee award under OCGA § 9-15-14 only when no direct appeal has been taken from the underlying judgment.

Cleveland v. Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd. D/B/A the Hartford · filed 2019-11-04(a)(10), (j)

“[A] party aggrieved by a post-judgment OCGA § 9-15-14 award is required to comply with the discretionary appeal procedure of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (10) only in those instances where no direct appeal has been otherwise taken from the underlying judgment. However, in those instances where . . . a direct appeal has been taken from the underlying judgment, a party may also appeal directly from the OCGA § 9-15-14 post-judgment award without regard to the discretionary appeal procedures.”

Section 5-6-35(j) provides that the Court of Appeals will grant a timely discretionary application when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Butler v. State · filed 2022-03-07(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Ashlyn Martin v. Rse Capital Partners, LLC · filed 2023-01-30(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a) identifies cases subject to discretionary review, while subsection (j) permits a timely discretionary-appeal application to be granted when the challenged order is directly appealable.

Watkins v. Edward J. Brady, II · filed 2023-10-26(a), (j)

Additionally, except for cases listed in the discretionary appeal statute, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a), Georgia law permits a direct appeal from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below[.]” OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). Thus, Charles Watkins was not required to file an application to obtain review of the order in question. And we will grant a timely-filed application for discretionary appeal where a trial court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j); Ahearn v. Westrec Mgmt., 244 Ga. App. 699, 699, n.1 (536 SE2d 606) (2000).

Section 5-6-35(a) identifies the cases excluded from Georgia's general right to directly appeal final judgments, and subsection (j) permits discretionary review when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

City of Atlanta v. Block, Inc. of Delaware F/K/A Square, Inc. · filed 2024-07-08(a), (j)

Additionally, except for cases listed in the discretionary appeal statute, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a), Georgia law permits a direct appeal from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below[.]” OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). It does not appear that any provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) applies here. See Fulton County. v. T-Mobile South, LLC, 305 Ga. App. 466, 468-69 (1) (699 SE2d 802) (2010) (allowing direct appeal from grant of summary judgment in tax refund action). Thus, defendants were not required to file an application to obtain review of the order in question. Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant a timely application for discretionary review if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) does not require discretionary review for a stalking protective order outside a domestic-relations matter, section 5-6-35(j) permits granting an otherwise timely discretionary application when the order is directly appealable, and section 5-6-35(g) provides ten days to file a notice of appeal after the application is granted.

Butkus v. O'Brien · filed 2025-02-04(a)(2), (g), and (j)

This Court has “consistently treated stalking protective orders as directly appealable,” Bruno v. Light, 344 Ga. App. 799, 800 n. 2 (811 SE2d 500) (2018), and has explained that where, as here, the protective order does not arise out of a domestic relations matter that would subject it to the discretionary appeal procedures under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), it is directly appealable. Bodi v. Ryan, 358 Ga. App. 267, 268 n. 3 (855 SE2d 11) (2021). Additionally, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (2) allows for direct appeals from “[a]ll judgments involving applications for discharge in . . . contempt cases.” This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Because the underlying June 26, 2024 order was not subject to the discretionary appeal procedures, and because Butkus filed a timely application for discretionary review of the directly appealable December 18, 2024 order finding her in contempt, her application is hereby GRANTED. Butkus shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal with the trial court, if she has not already done so. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (g).

Section 5-6-35(j) permits an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application to be granted when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Slotnick v. Smith · filed 2026-05-28(j)

Based on the application materials, no provision of the discretionary appeal statute, OCGA § 5-6-35, appears to apply here. Thus, it appears that Slotnick has a right of direct appeal. We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35(j).

Deprivation proceedings that include a temporary custody decision fall outside § 5-6-35(a)(2)'s application requirement and permit a direct appeal.

In Re SJ · filed 2004-11-23(a)(2)

This case is properly considered as a deprivation proceeding that further necessitated a determination of child custody. ... The Court held that deprivation proceedings do not fall within the scope of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), which sets forth the types of custody orders that require application for appellate review. ... Therefore, the notice of appeal was timely filed.

Subsection (a)(2) does not govern appeals from deprivation/dependency cases; final dependency orders are directly appealable.

In the Interest Of: H. G. and L. G., Children · filed 2016-06-15(a)(2)

The trial court’s final order finding the children to be dependent was directly appealable. See In the Interest of J. P., 267 Ga. 492, 492-493 (480 SE2d 8) (1997) (deprivation/dependency cases do not fall within the purview of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) and therefore are directly appealable).

Section 5-6-35 does not require a discretionary appeal application to appeal a supersedeas bond order, so the order is directly appealable.

Fuller v. State · filed 2015-09-21(j)

No provision of OCGA § 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary appeal in order to appeal a supersedeas bond. The order, therefore, is directly appealable, and Fuller’s application is hereby GRANTED. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) permits discretionary review when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal, including a grant of partial summary judgment.

The City of Rincon, Georgia v. Ernest Communities LLC · filed 2019-09-23(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j); see also Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003) (OCGA § 5-6-35 (j) applies to the grant of partial summary judgment).

Final orders in deprivation cases are directly appealable because they are neither child custody nor domestic relations cases subject to § 5-6-35's discretionary appeal procedure.

In Interest of AVB · filed 1997-03-03

In that case we held that appeals from final orders in deprivation cases are directly appealable and are not subject to the discretionary appeal procedure because deprivation cases under Title 15 are neither child custody cases nor domestic relations cases under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35.

Subsection (a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal application when appealing a superior-court decision reviewing a state board of education decision.

Cox v. Academy of Lithonia, Inc. · filed 2006-06-20(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), the discretionary appeal procedures must be followed to appeal the decision of a superior court reviewing the decision of the state board of education. ... Similarly, here, the underlying subject matter is a review of the decision of the board of education. Therefore, the appellants were required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appeal from a superior court decision reviewing a State Board of Education decision to be taken by application for discretionary appeal.

Turley-Moore v. Atlanta Independent School System · filed 2018-06-28(a)(1)

An appeal from a decision of the superior court reviewing a decision of the State Board of Education must be taken by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); see also Hogan v. Taylor County Bd. of Ed., 157 Ga. App. 680 (278 SE2d 106) (1981).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary-appeal application for an appeal from a superior-court decision reviewing a State Board of Education decision, including when the superior court dismissed the action without reaching the merits.

Woldeab v. Dekalb County Board of Education · filed 2017-07-04(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires an appellant to file an application for discretionary appeal from “decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . the State Board of Education.” ... For the purpose of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), a superior court’s dismissal of an action, without reaching the merits, constitutes a “review” of the decision rendered below. ... Woldeab’s complaint, although filed as a separate lawsuit, asked the superior court to review a decision of the state board. Accordingly, to appeal the superior court’s order dismissing the complaint, Woldeab was required to file an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(11) requires appeals from state court decisions reviewing lower court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings to be initiated by an application for discretionary appeal.

Yevette B. Freeman v. Mary Hall Freedom House Inc. · filed 2020-06-05(a)(11)

Appeals from state court decisions reviewing lower court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for discretionary appeal when the superior court reviews a local government's zoning decision as a local administrative agency decision.

AGBE v. CITY OF ATLANTA · filed 2025-02-24(a)(1)

A zoning decision made by a local government constitutes the action of a local administrative agency within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), and an appeal from a superior court decision reviewing a local administrative agency’s decision must come by way of an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires an appeal in a domestic-relations case, including a legitimation action, to be initiated by an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest of H. F., a Child (Father) · filed 2021-03-30(a)(2), (b)

A legitimation action is a domestic relations case, and an appeal in a domestic relations case must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

A legitimation action is a domestic-relations case, so its appeal must be initiated by an application for discretionary review under section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b).

In the Interest of C. M. T., a Child (Father) · filed 2021-04-20(a)(2), (b)

A legitimation action is a domestic relations case, and an appeal in a domestic relations case must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

A legitimation action is a domestic-relations case whose appeal must be initiated by discretionary review.

Mascorro v. Monjaraz · filed 2021-07-23(a)(2), (b)

A legitimation action is a domestic relations case, and an appeal therefrom must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b) generally require an application for discretionary appeal in legitimation cases, but a direct appeal is available when the case also includes a child-custody order.

In THE INTEREST OF N. C., CHILDREN (MOTHER) · filed 2022-03-08(a)(2), (b)

Normally, appeals in legitimation cases must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); see also Brown v. Williams, 174 Ga. App. 604, 605 (332 SE2d 48) (1985). However, a party seeking to challenge a child custody order entered in a legitimation case may file a direct appeal.

Subsection (a)(3) requires an application for discretionary appeal in a distress or dispossessory-warrant case only when the sole issue is the amount of rent due and that amount is $2,500 or less.

Smith v. R. JAMES PROPERTIES, INC. · filed 2008-06-26(a)(3)

Applications for discretionary appeal are required in “[ajppeals from cases involving distress or dispossessory warrants in which the only issue to be resolved is the amount of rent due and such amount is $2,500.00 or less.” ... A review of Smith’s notice of appeal shows that she seeks to raise issues other than the amount of rent due. Therefore, an application for discretionary appeal was not required.

Section 5-6-35(a)(3) requires discretionary review in distress or dispossessory-warrant appeals when the only issue is rent due and the amount is $2,500 or less, while subsection (j) permits granting a timely discretionary-review application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Levine v. Georgia Alloy, LLC · filed 2019-04-30(a)(3), (j)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (3) provides that applications for discretionary review are required for “[a]ppeals from cases involving distress or dispossessory warrants in which the only issue to be resolved is the amount of rent due and such amount is $2,500 or less[.]” However, this is not such a case. First, as shown by the appeal in Case No. A19A0187, the case involves issues other than the amount of rent due. ... Second, even assuming, arguendo, that the case only involves the amount of rent due, that amount is currently more than $2,500. Therefore, Levine appears to have a right of direct appeal. ... We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary review if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED, and Levine shall have ten days from the date of this order to file his notice of appeal with the superior court.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an application for discretionary review to appeal an order terminating parental rights.

In the Interest Of: D. S., T. D. and C. S., Children (Mother) · filed 2015-02-18(a)(12)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), however, appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary review. See In the Interest of K. R., 285 Ga. 155 (674 SE2d 288) (2009). The mother’s failure to file an application for discretionary review deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires a discretionary application to appeal an order terminating parental rights only when the underlying proceeding was filed on or after January 1, 2008.

In Re Kr · filed 2009-03-09(a)(12)

But, the Court of Appeals' analysis is flawed; it erred in finding that OCGA § 5-6-35, as amended in 2007, and specifically paragraph (a)(12), applies to appeals from termination orders entered after January 1, 2008. The Act plainly states that it "shall become effective on January 1, 2008, and shall apply to all child custody proceedings and modifications of child custody filed on or after January 1, 2008. " (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Laws 2007, p. 569, § 8. Thus, the salient date for triggering the change in appellate procedure in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights is the time the legal action is filed, not the date that an order sought to be appealed in such action is issued. The Department's petition to terminate the mother's parental rights was filed on December 3, 2007, and therefore, it is not subject to amended OCGA § 5-6-35, specifically paragraph (a)(12).

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires a discretionary application for an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, but does not require one for a later dispositional custody order.

In the Interest of C. B. · filed 2009-10-01(a)(12)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) requires that appeals from orders terminating parental rights be taken pursuant to discretionary application. The Bardos, however, do not appeal from the order terminating the father’s parental rights, nor do they challenge the court’s termination decision. Instead, they appeal from the subsequent dispositional order placing C. B. in DFCS’s custody. The Bardos may directly appeal from this order.

Section (a)(12) requires an application for appellate review of a parental-rights termination order and makes that review discretionary, a classification the court upheld as reasonable because it provides expedited review while allowing a full appeal when warranted.

In Re AC · filed 2009-10-05(a)(12)

Parents have the right to directly appeal all orders effecting custody of a child except for a termination of parental rights order which OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12) makes discretionary. ... The classification created by OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12) is reasonable. ... The discretionary appeal process provided in OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12) helps accomplish this goal by offering effective appellate review in an expedited manner, yet permitting a full appeal of the termination of parental rights if that is shown to be warranted.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires a parent challenging an order terminating parental rights to seek discretionary appellate review rather than an appeal as of right, and that procedure does not violate due process.

In Re NAUE · filed 2010-09-20(a)(12)

However, we granted his application to decide whether OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12), a relatively new statute that took effect on January 1, 2008, violates due process. We conclude that it does not, and we therefore affirm. ... It follows that OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12) does not violate due process.

Subsection (a)(12) requires an application for discretionary appeal from an order terminating parental rights.

In the Interest Of: D. B., L. J. and J. J., Children (Mother) · filed 2013-05-16(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an application for discretionary appeal to obtain review of an order terminating parental rights when the termination petition was filed after January 1, 2008.

In the Interest Of: N. L., a Child (Mother) · filed 2013-06-27(a)(12)

Under the revised code section, however, an application for discretionary appeal must be filed to obtain appellate review of an order terminating parental rights where, as here, the termination petition was filed after January 1, 2008. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12); In the Interest of K. R., 285 Ga. 155 (674 SE2d 288) (2009).

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an application for discretionary appeal to challenge an order terminating parental rights.

In the Interest Of: A. M. W., a Child (Father) · filed 2013-10-28(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal. ... The parents’ failure to file applications for discretionary review deprives us of jurisdiction over these appeals, which are hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires a discretionary appeal application to obtain appellate review of a parental-rights termination order when the termination petition was filed after January 1, 2008.

In the Interest Of: A. v. a Child (Father) · filed 2014-06-02(a)(12)

Under the revised Code section, however, an application for discretionary appeal must be filed to obtain appellate review of an order terminating parental rights where, as here, the termination petition was filed after January 1, 2008. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12); In the Interest of K. R., 285 Ga. 155 (674 SE2d 288) (2009).

Section 5-6-35 requires a party seeking appellate review of a parental-rights termination order to file a discretionary application, rather than a direct appeal, within 30 days after the order is entered.

In the Interest of B. R. F., a Child · filed 2016-07-05(a)(12), (b), and (d)

OCGA § 5-6-35 provides that a party must file an application in order to seek an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) and (b). ... Thus, litigants in this state cannot obtain relief from an order terminating parental rights by filing a direct appeal. A discretionary application seeking appellate review of an order terminating parental rights must be filed with the clerk of the appellate court within 30 days of entry of the termination order. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) ordinarily requires a discretionary appeal application to challenge an order terminating parental rights, but the interlocutory appeal procedure applies when the order leaves the case pending.

Metter v. Metter · filed 2017-07-04(a)(12)

Ordinarily, a party seeking to appeal an order terminating parental rights must file an application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12). But where, as here, the contested order did not resolve all issues in the case, the case remains pending in the trial court. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) (providing for a direct appeal from a “final judgment[ ], that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below”). Thus, Christine Metter was required to follow the interlocutory appeal procedure of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See Bailey v. Bailey, 266 Ga. 832, 832-833 (471 SE2d 213) (1996); Scruggs v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 261 Ga. 587, 588-589 (1) (408 SE2d 103) (1991); Park v. Bailey, 329 Ga. App. 569, 571 (765 SE2d 721) (2014); Gray v. Springs, 224 Ga. App. 427, 427 (481 SE2d 3) (1997). Because she did not do so, we lack jurisdiction to consider this application, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) ordinarily requires discretionary review of an order terminating parental rights, but when the adoption remains pending the order is interlocutory and the appellant must follow the interlocutory-appeal procedures.

James Lupo, IV v. State of Georgia · filed 2020-08-19(a)(12)

Ordinarily, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) requires a party to seek discretionary review of an order terminating parental rights. However, here, it is clear from the superior court’s order that, although it is labeled as a “Final Judgment,” the adoption had not yet been granted at the time Lupo filed his notices of appeal. Thus, there was no final order, the adoption remained pending, and the order being appealed is interlocutory. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) (providing for a direct appeal from a “final judgment[ ], that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below”). Lupo was required to follow the interlocutory procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), which he failed to do.

Section 5-6-35 requires a party to file an application before appealing a termination-of-parental-rights order.

In THE INTEREST OF B. J. R., CHILDREN (MOTHER) · filed 2022-03-30(a)(12) and (b)

OCGA § 5-6-35 provides that a party must file an application in order to seek an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) and (b) requires a party seeking to appeal an order terminating parental rights to file an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest of K. R., a Child (Father) · filed 2023-01-10(a)(12) and (b)

Under Georgia law, a party seeking to appeal an order terminating his or her parental rights must file an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) and (b); In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 296 (788 SE2d 416) (2016).

Section 5-6-35 requires a party to file an application to appeal an order terminating parental rights.

Arehart v. Arehart · filed 2026-02-05(a)(12), (b)

“OCGA § 5-6-35 provides that a party must file an application in order to seek an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights. OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12) and (b).”

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) does not require a discretionary appeal for child-custody cases after the 2007 amendment removed child-custody references from the subsection.

Moore v. Moore-McKinney · filed 2009-05-06(a)(2)

Accordingly, we find that it was the intent of the General Assembly to remove child custody cases from the operation of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) when it excised references to such cases from the statute.

Section 5-6-35 requires a party seeking to appeal a termination of parental rights to file an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest of M. R. B., a Child (Mother) · filed 2024-01-29(a)(12), (b)

This Court, however, lacks jurisdiction because a party must file an application for discretionary review to seek an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights.

Section 5-6-35 requires a party seeking appellate review of an order terminating parental rights to file an application for discretionary review, and compliance is jurisdictional.

In THE INTEREST OF Z. H., CHILDREN (MOTHER) · filed 2024-04-09(a) (12), (b)

To obtain appellate review of an order terminating parental rights, however, a party must file an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), (b). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Section 5-6-35 requires a party seeking to appeal a termination-of-parental-rights order to file an application for discretionary review, and compliance is jurisdictional.

In the Interest of S. Z., a Child (Father) · filed 2023-08-17(a)(12), (b)

However, a party must file an application for discretionary review in order to seek an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), (b); In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 296 (788 SE2d 416) (2016). “Compliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Subsection (a)(12) requires a discretionary appeal from an order terminating parental rights, but a direct appeal is proper from a subsequent dispositional order placing the child in DFCS custody.

In Re CB · filed 2009-10-01(a)(12)

OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(12) requires that appeals from orders terminating parental rights be taken pursuant to discretionary application. The Bardos, however, do not appeal from the order terminating the father's parental rights, nor do they challenge the court's termination decision. Instead, they appeal from the subsequent dispositional order placing C.B. in DFCS's custody. The Bardos may directly appeal from this order.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an appeal from an order terminating parental rights to be brought by application for discretionary appeal.

In the Interest Of: D. O. W., a Child (Father) · filed 2013-09-13(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal. See In the Interest of K. R., 285 Ga. 155 (674 SE2d 288) (2009). The father’s failure to file an application for discretionary review deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Subsection (a)(12) requires an application for discretionary appeal from an order terminating parental rights.

In the Interest Of: A. M. W., a Child (Mother) · filed 2013-10-28(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an appeal from an order terminating parental rights to be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

In the Interest Of: C. K. S., a Child (Mother) · filed 2014-04-30(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

Subsection (a)(12) requires an application for discretionary appeal from an order terminating parental rights.

In the Interest Of: T. L. A/K/A T. J., a Child (Father) · filed 2014-08-28(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal. See In the Interest of K. R., 285 Ga. 155 (674 SE2d 288) (2009). Thus, the father was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures, as he attempted to do.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an appeal from an order terminating parental rights to be brought by filing an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest Of: K. D. L. R., a Child (Mother) · filed 2015-05-20(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), however appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary review.

Subsection (a)(12) requires an application for discretionary review, rather than a direct appeal, from an order terminating parental rights.

In the Interest Of: A.M.R., a Child (Father) · filed 2015-05-29(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), however, appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary review. See In the Interest of K. R., 285 Ga. 155 (674 SE2d 288) (2009). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider this direct appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(12) requires an application for discretionary appeal from an order terminating parental rights.

Harrow v. Mousseau · filed 2016-03-11(a)(12)

Accordingly, this appeal is governed by OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), which provides that an application for discretionary appeal is required in “[a]ppeals from orders terminating parental rights.” Harrow’s failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an appeal from an order terminating parental rights to be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest Of: Q. S. and A. S., Children (Mother) · filed 2016-09-21(a)(12)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), however, appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. See In the Interest of K. R., 285 Ga. 155, 156 (674 SE2d 288) (2009). The mother’s failure to follow the proper appellate procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) generally requires a discretionary-appeal application for orders terminating parental rights, but allows a direct appeal when the order also grants an adoption and the appellant challenges the adoption; under subsection (j), a timely application must be granted when the order is directly appealable.

Johnson v. Hauck · filed 2016-11-21(a)(12), (j)

While OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) provides that appeals from orders terminating parental rights require an application for discretionary appeal, orders that both terminate parental rights and grant adoptions may be appealed directly, as long as the appellant raises arguments on appeal challenging the adoption. See Sauls v. Atchison, 326 Ga. App. 301, 303-304 (1) (756 SE2d 577) (2014); see also Hafer v. Lowry, 320 Ga. App. 76 (739 SE2d 84) (2013) (direct appeal of order terminating father’s rights and granting stepparent adoption of child). Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the trial court’s order is subject to direct appeal. Accordingly, Johnson’s application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary-appeal application for orders terminating parental rights, but allows direct appeals of orders that also grant an adoption when the appellant challenges the adoption; an otherwise timely application is granted when the order is directly appealable.

James v. James · filed 2017-06-08(a)(12), (j)

While OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) provides that appeals from orders terminating parental rights require an application for discretionary appeal, orders that both terminate parental rights and grant adoptions may be appealed directly, as long as the appellant raises arguments on appeal challenging the adoption. See Sauls v. Atchison, 326 Ga. App. 301, 303-304 (1) (756 SE2d 577) (2014); see also Hafer v. Lowry, 320 Ga. App. 76 (739 SE2d 84) (2013) (direct appeal of order terminating father’s rights and granting stepparent adoption of child). Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the trial court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Orders that both terminate parental rights and grant an adoption may be appealed directly when the appellant challenges the adoption, and the Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

Hewlett v. Hewlett · filed 2018-03-15(a)(12), (j)

Ordinarily, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) provides that appeals from orders terminating parental rights require an application for discretionary appeal. However, orders that both terminate parental rights and grant adoptions may be appealed directly, so long as the appellant raises arguments on appeal challenging the adoption.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an application for discretionary review when appealing an order terminating parental rights.

In the Interest of v. F. E. B., Children (Mother) · filed 2018-08-13(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12); however, appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary review.

Subsection (a)(12) requires an application for discretionary review to appeal an order terminating parental rights.

In the Interest of B. L., Children (Father) · filed 2020-04-03(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be brought by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(12) requires appeals from orders terminating parental rights to be brought by application for discretionary review.

Delgesso v. Delgesso · filed 2020-04-07(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be made by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(12) requires appeals from orders terminating parental rights to be brought by filing an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest of N. G., Children (Mother) · filed 2020-05-22(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), however, appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be brought by filing an application for discretionary review.

Subsection (a)(12) requires appeals from orders terminating parental rights to be brought by filing an application for discretionary review.

In the Interest of N.G., Children · filed 2020-09-22(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be brought by filing an application for discretionary review — as the parents have done in Case No. A21D0011.

Subsection (a)(12) requires appeals from orders terminating parental rights to be brought by application for discretionary review.

In the Interest of B. N., a Child (Mother) · filed 2021-09-07(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), however, appeals from orders terminating parental rights must be brought by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) ordinarily requires a discretionary appeal application for an order terminating parental rights, but it does not excuse the interlocutory-appeal requirements when the case remains pending.

Tunchez v. Perez · filed 2022-07-27(a)(12)

Ordinarily, a party seeking to appeal an order terminating parental rights must file an application for discretionary appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12). However, where, as here, the case remains pending in the court below, the losing party is required to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), including obtaining a certificate of immediate review. See Bailey v. Bailey, 266 Ga. 832, 833 (471 SE2d 213) (1996). The discretionary appeal statute does not excuse a party seeking appellate review of an interlocutory order from complying with the additional requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). Id.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires discretionary review for orders terminating parental rights, but allows a direct appeal when the order also grants an adoption and the appellant challenges the adoption; subsection (j) directs the Court to grant a timely discretionary application when the order is subject to direct appeal.

McDonald v. Reyes · filed 2023-05-01(a)(12), (j)

While OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) provides that appeals from orders terminating parental rights require an application for discretionary review, orders that both terminate parental rights and grant adoptions may be appealed directly, as long as the appellant raises arguments on appeal challenging the adoption. ... Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the trial court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires an appeal from an order terminating parental rights to be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

In THE INTEREST OF Z. H., CHILDREN (MOTHER) · filed 2025-08-05(a)(12), (b)

An appeal from an order terminating parental rights must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), (b); In the Interest of B. R. F., 299 Ga. 294, 296 (788 SE2d 416) (2016).

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires an application to appeal an order terminating parental rights, but no application is required when the appellant also challenges the final adoption decree.

Sauls v. Vanessa v. Atchison · filed 2014-03-18(a)(12)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12), “[a]ppeals from orders terminating parental rights” require an application for appeal. ... Here, Sauls’s brief contains enumerations of error addressing the order terminating his parental rights and the final decree of adoption. Under these circumstances, Sauls was not required to file a discretionary application.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (12) constitutionally requires an application for appeal from an order terminating parental rights and provides expedited appellate review while permitting a full appeal when warranted.

In the Interest of A. C. · filed 2009-10-05(a)(12)

The classification created by OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) is reasonable. ... The discretionary appeal process provided in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) helps accomplish this goal by offering effective appellate review in an expedited manner, yet permitting a full appeal of the termination of parental rights if that is shown to be warranted.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires a discretionary application to appeal a custody ruling entered in a divorce proceeding, even when custody is the only issue raised.

Ford v. Ford · filed 2018-08-30(a)(2)

This case is part of a divorce proceeding between the parties. ... In those cases, the Supreme Court determined that even though child custody was at issue on appeal, because that issue was being addressed in a divorce proceeding, the appellant was required to bring the appeal via the discretionary application procedure set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). ... As the father did not pursue discretionary review in this case, we lack jurisdiction.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires a discretionary appeal, rather than a direct appeal, for a final divorce judgment when no child-custody issue is involved.

Bohannon v. Bohannon · filed 2018-07-19(a)(2)

This is a direct appeal of a final judgment and decree of divorce, not involving any issue of child custody. Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), such appeals require the discretionary appeal procedures. The appellant’s failure to comply with those discretionary appeal procedures deprives us of jurisdiction, and for that reason this direct appeal is hereby dismissed.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an application for discretionary appeal when a divorce case includes child-custody issues.

Thompson v. Amber Louise Thompson · filed 2022-05-06(a)(2)

Because this is not a child custody case, but is a divorce case in which child custody is an issue, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) requires an application for discretionary appeal, and a direct appeal is not authorized by OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11).

Section 5-6-35 (a) (2) requires a discretionary application to appeal a child custody determination made in divorce proceedings, whether the determination is in a final decree or a temporary order.

Onyemobi v. Onyemobi · filed 2025-05-29(a)(2)

Therefore, when a trial court issues a child custody determination as part of divorce proceedings, any appeal seeking review of that child custody determination requires that the appellant utilize the discretionary appeal procedures set forth in ... OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), regardless of whether the child custody determination is made via final decree or, as here, as part of a temporary order.

Subsection (a)(12)’s discretionary appeal process for termination of parental rights does not violate state or federal due process rights.

In the Interest of A. B. · filed 2011-09-08(a)(12)

In accordance with the controlling precedent of N. A. U.E., the discretionary appeal process of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) does not violate the mother’s due process rights under the State and Federal Constitutions.

Section 5-6-35(a)(12) requires discretionary appellate review of a juvenile-court order terminating parental rights rather than an appeal as of right, and that requirement does not violate due process.

In the Interest of N. A. U. E. · filed 2010-09-20(a)(12)

It follows that OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12) does not violate due process.

Section 5-6-35 does not excuse a party appealing an interlocutory order from also complying with the certificate-of-immediate-review requirements in § 5-6-34(b).

Tivoli Properties, Inc. v. Fsp One Overton Park LLC · filed 2013-05-01

OCGA § 5-6-35, the discretionary appeal statute, does not excuse a party seeking appellate review of an interlocutory order from complying with the additional requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).

Section 5-6-35 (a) (9) requires an appeal from the grant of a temporary restraining order to be taken by application for discretionary appeal.

Schroder v. Westchester Wiltshire Condo. Assoc. · filed 2015-11-23(a)(9)

An appeal from the grant of a TRO must also be taken by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (9).

Section 5-6-35(a)(5) places appeals from probation orders within the discretionary appeals procedure.

Rogers v. State · filed 2018-05-11(a)(5)

As we have previously advised Rogers, however, probation orders are subject to the discretionary appeals procedure.1 See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5); Todd v. State, 236 Ga. App. 757, 758 (513 SE2d 287) (1999); White v. State, 233 Ga. App. 873, 874 (505 SE2d 228) (1998).

Section 5-6-35(a)(5) requires an application for discretionary review to appeal an order revoking probation, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Palmer v. State · filed 2019-08-21(a)(5), (b)

An appeal from an order revoking probation must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5), (b); see Andrews v. State, 276 Ga. App. 428, 430-431 (1) & n. 3 (623 SE2d 247) (2005).

Section 5-6-35(a)(5) requires an appeal from an order revoking probation to be initiated by an application for discretionary review, and compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Jackson v. State · filed 2020-02-12(a)(5), (b)

An appeal from an order revoking probation must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5), (b); see Andrews v. State, 276 Ga. App. 428, 430-431 (1) & n. 3 (623 SE2d 247) (2005).

Section 5-6-35(a)(5)'s discretionary-appeal requirement for probation-revocation orders does not apply to juvenile probation revocations, while subsection (j) permits the Court of Appeals to grant a timely discretionary-appeal application when the order is directly appealable.

In the Interest of H. E. P., a Child · filed 2022-08-10(a)(5), (j)

The discretionary appeals statute, OCGA § 5-6-35, provides that in certain cases, a party must file an application for discretionary appeal to obtain appellate review. No provision of that statute appears to apply to this case. Notably, although OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5) provides that “[a]ppeals from orders revoking probation” must follow the discretionary appeal procedures, that provision does not apply to appeals from orders revoking juveniles’ probation. ... We will grant a timely filed application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

When the underlying subject matter calls for a discretionary appeal, future appeals from mandamus orders concerning retail alcohol licenses must proceed under § 5-6-35.

Augusta-Richmond County v. Lee · filed 2004-01-12

... we hold that in the future such appeals must be brought under the discretionary appeals statute, OCGA § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) permits a discretionary appeal when the award is less than $10,000.

Emerson v. BROOKMERE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. · filed 2011-08-08(a)(6)

Brookmere contends this appeal should be dismissed because the order appealed is nonfinal and Emerson failed to follow the interlocutory appeal procedure. Because this appeal is taken from a partial grant of summary judgment, however, it is subject to review pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Further, the appeal was properly brought pursuant to the discretionary appeal procedure, because the award was less than $10,000. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary-appeal application to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order or judgment, while subsection (j) permits the court to grant an application involving a directly appealable order.

Robinson v. State · filed 2012-04-24(d), (j)

Ordinarily, when a party applies for discretionary review of a directly appealable order – such as one denying a motion to correct a void sentence – we grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). To fall within this general rule, however, the application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v State, 204 Ga App 582 (420 SE2d 393) (1992).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires an application for discretionary appeal to be filed within 30 days of the order on appeal, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Kerlin v. Johnson · filed 2012-04-27(d)

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order on appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance therewith. See Boyle v. State, 190 Ga. App. 734 (380 SE2d 57) (1989).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appellant challenging a superior-court order involving a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court ruling to use the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Stanley v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2012-05-18(a)(1)

When a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court ruling, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appeal from a superior court's de novo review of a magistrate-court ruling to follow the discretionary appeal procedure.

Reddish v. US Bank National Association · filed 2012-05-23(a)(1)

This appeal involves a de novo appeal of a magistrate court ruling. Thus, the Reddishes were required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). Their failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction, and this appeal is therefore DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal when a superior-court order disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Jean v. Suntrust Bank · filed 2012-05-30(a)(1)

We lack jurisdiction. Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Jean was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a de novo magistrate-court ruling to use the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Molina-Salas v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation · filed 2012-06-06(a)(1)

Because this appeal involves a de novo appeal of a magistrate court ruling, Molina-Salas was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appellant challenging a superior-court order arising from a de novo appeal of a magistrate-court decision to use the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Bumbury v. HSBC Bank USA, N. A. · filed 2012-06-08(a)(1)

First, when a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Subsection (j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary application when the lower court's order is directly appealable.

Drawdy Cpa Services, LLC v. North Ga Cpa Services, P.C. · filed 2012-06-07(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appellant to use the discretionary-appeal procedure when appealing a superior-court order entered on a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision.

Eshun v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2012-06-21(a)(1)

When a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary-review application to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order at issue.

In the Interest Of: D. E. T., B. P. L., C. P., D. B. P., K.P., AKA G. J., Children (Mother) · filed 2012-06-28(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order at issue. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582 (420 SE2d 393) (1992). Pearson’s application was filed 63 days after the order terminating her parental rights.

Section 5-6-35 requires an application for discretionary review of a directly appealable order to be filed within 30 days of the order's entry.

Preston v. State · filed 2012-07-11(d) and (j)

Ordinarily, if a party applies for discretionary review of a directly appealable order, we grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). To fall within this general rule, however, the application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d) & (j); Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582 (420 SE2d 393) (1992).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary appeal application to be filed within 30 days after the order being appealed is entered.

Lott v. Ralph Kemp, Warden · filed 2012-07-26(d)

Because Lott was incarcerated when he filed his action, his appeal is controlled by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, which requires that an appeal of a civil action filed by a prisoner “be as provided in Code Section 5-6-35.” OCGA § 42-12-8. However, to be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582 (420 SE2d 393) (1992).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary application to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order to be appealed.

Gregory v. State · filed 2012-07-26(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582 (420 SE2d 393) (1992). Because this application was filed 72 days after entry of the order Gregory seeks to appeal,1 it is untimely and we lack jurisdiction to consider it.

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a valid discretionary appeal application to be filed within 30 days after entry of the challenged order, and the statute's requirements are jurisdictional.

Gregory v. Giddene · filed 2012-07-26(d)

To be valid, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order at issue. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). Gregory’s application was filed 62 days after the superior court entered its order. The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance therewith.

Section 5-6-35(j) authorizes discretionary review when a party seeks review of a directly appealable order.

Marshall v. State · filed 2012-06-29(j)

When a party applies for discretionary review of a directly appealable order, we grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary application for appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Conner v. State · filed 2012-07-10(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. ... Because this application was filed 31 days after entry of the order Conner seeks to appeal, it is untimely and we lack jurisdiction to consider it.

Subsection (d) generally requires an application for discretionary appeal within 30 days, but the appeal's underlying subject matter controls which appellate procedure and deadline apply.

Daley v. U.S. Bank N.A. as Trustee for Tbw Mtg. · filed 2012-07-16(d)

Generally, an application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). But the underlying subject matter of an appeal controls over the relief sought in determining the proper appellate procedure.

Subsection (j) provides that an otherwise timely discretionary application will be granted when the lower court’s order is directly appealable and the applicant has not already filed a notice of appeal.

Morris v. Ricy Weldon Morris, Jr · filed 2012-07-20(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is directly appealable and the applicant has not already filed a notice of appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal from a de novo appeal of a magistrate-court decision and from a damages judgment of less than $10,000.

Gardner v. Sherrer · filed 2012-08-14(a)(11), (a)(6)

Because the state court’s order disposed of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Gardner was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995). A discretionary appeal is also required from a judgment of less than $10,000 in an action for damages. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision to use discretionary-appeal procedures.

Quality Works Management LLC v. Phan · filed 2012-08-14(a)(1)

Because the order that Quality Works seeks to appeal disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, it was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision to use discretionary-appeal procedures.

Felix v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. · filed 2012-08-28(a)(1)

First, because the superior court’s order disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, the Felixes were required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) requires a party appealing the denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d) to comply with the discretionary-appeal procedures.

In Re: Estate of Harriett Grey Nesbitt · filed 2012-09-14(a)(8)

And the denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) may only be appealed by complying with the discretionary appeal procedures.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision to use discretionary-appeal procedures.

Niba v. Mohsen · filed 2012-10-09(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Niba was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(11) requires an application for discretionary review of a state-court order reviewing a magistrate-court decision.

Rhodes v. Devan Kimani Brown · filed 2012-08-28(a)(11)

Appeals from state court orders reviewing decisions of the magistrate court, however, must be taken by application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Salaam v. Nasheed, 220 Ga. App. 43 (469 SE2d 245) (1996).

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary application to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order at issue, and the requirement is jurisdictional.

Kelvin Beard v. State · filed 2012-09-12(d)

A discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order at issue. ... The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance therewith.

Subsection (d) requires a discretionary application to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Mayfield v. State · filed 2012-09-20(d)

A discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed.