Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-30

The 1996 amendment to subsection (d), which gave courts discretion to impose a lesser sentence on repeat drug offenders, does not apply retroactively.

Maddox v. State · filed 1997-07-25(d)

At the time Maddox was sentenced, OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) required that repeat drug offenders receive a life sentence, which the trial court imposed on September 26, 1995. That statute was amended effective July 1, 1996, to give the trial court greater discretion in imposing a lesser sentence. Maddox now claims, for the first time on appeal, that he should have the benefit of the 1996 amendment. We disagree. The amendment was not retroactive.

Section 16-13-30(d) requires notice of prior convictions before trial when the state seeks a life sentence; notice given before trial starts is timely.

Howard v. State · filed 1998-09-08(d)

It is true that if a life sentence is to be imposed under OCGA § 16-13-30(d), the state must notify the defendant before trial of any conviction it intends to use in aggravation of punishment so the defendant has a chance to discover any defects that render the convictions inadmissible during the pre-sentencing phase of the trial. ... But contrary to Howard's contention, we have previously held that notification on the day of trial, so long as it was given before the trial started, is sufficient. ... Consequently, the notice given by the state to Howard before the trial started was timely.

Section 16-13-30(d) permits sentencing a second-time offender under the remaining provisions of § 17-10-7, including subsection (c), but excludes subsection (a).

Blackwell v. State · filed 1999-04-23(d)

Therefore, we interpret OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) as providing that although the court may not sentence second time offenders under both OCGA §§ 16-13-30 (d) and 17-10-7 (a), it may sentence second time offenders under both OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) and any remaining provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7.

Section 16-13-30(d)’s sentencing range for selling cocaine does not conflict with the repeat-offender sentencing mandate in section 17-10-7(a).

Harden v. State · filed 1999-08-24(d)

Initially, we see no conflict between OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) and OCGA § 17-10-7 (a).

For a second or subsequent violation of subsection (b), subsection (d) allows the judge to impose a sentence of ten to forty years or life imprisonment.

Mann v. State · filed 1999-11-05(d)

Consequently, the sentencing judge retains the discretion either to impose any sentence within the statutory mandatory minimum and maximum sentence range or else to impose a life sentence.

Section 16-13-30(d) made a life sentence discretionary for a second or subsequent violation committed after July 1, 1996.

Moton v. State · filed 2000-02-16(d)

Effective July 1, 1996, OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) was amended to make a life sentence discretionary and no longer mandatory. ... The trial court erred in imposing mandatory life sentences for crimes committed in 1997, that is, after the legislative enactment making a life sentence discretionary.

Section 16-13-30(d) gives trial courts discretion to sentence a defendant convicted a third or subsequent time of possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute to ten to forty years or life imprisonment.

Mann v. State · filed 2001-01-22(d)

We conclude that the Court of Appeals properly held that the trial court had discretion in sentencing Mann under the specific recidivist provisions of § 16-13-30 (d) and was not required to sentence Mann to life in prison under the general recidivist provisions of § 17-10-7 (a).

A second conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute is punishable by life imprisonment under subsection (d).

Wells v. State · filed 1999-03-18(d)

Pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), a second conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is punishable by life imprisonment. ... In this case, the trial court was authorized to apply a presumption of regularity to the prior convictions, and Wells offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that his plea was voluntary. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the prior plea for sentencing purposes.

Section 16-13-30(d) does not require written notice of the State’s intent to seek a life sentence.

Washington v. State · filed 1999-05-28(d)

But neither OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) nor § 16-13-30 (d) requires the State to give such notice in writing.

For a second or subsequent violation of subsection (b), subsection (d) lets the sentencing judge choose a term of ten to 40 years or life imprisonment.

Scott v. State · filed 2001-03-09(d)

The judge’s failure to exercise discretion when sentencing Scott to “not less than ten years nor more than 40 years or life imprisonment” under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) was error which we cannot find harmless under the circumstances.

Section 16-13-30(d) permits applying § 17-10-7(c) to a second or later controlled-substance offense.

Brown v. State · filed 2001-12-03(d)

The plain language of these statutes undermines Brown’s argument that he could not be sentenced under both OCGA §§ 16-13-30 (d) and 17-10-7 (c) for his offenses. OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) explicitly states that, for a third or subsequent offense of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), the provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 other than subsection (a) will be applicable. In fact, OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) applies even to a second offense of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).

Section 16-13-30(d) authorizes a life sentence for a person with a prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Smart v. State · filed 2002-02-11(d)

As a recidivist with a prior conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the judge was authorized to sentence Smart to life pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Section 16-13-30(j) has no special sentencing rule for multiple convictions, so the general recidivist statute controls.

West v. State · filed 2002-05-10(j)

The provision under which West was convicted, however, does not contain any mandatory sentencing guidelines for multiple convictions. OCGA § 16-13-30 (j). Therefore, we conclude that the general recidivist statute controls and the trial court properly sentenced West to the maximum of ten years.

Section 16-13-30(d) allows a court to sentence a second-time drug seller or distributor to 10 to 40 years or life imprisonment.

Johnson v. State · filed 2003-02-05(d)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) empowers the trial court with discretion to sentence a second time convicted drug seller or distributor to a range of punishment of not less than ten nor more than forty years, or alternatively, to a life term.

Subsection (d) bars use of § 17-10-7(a) when sentencing possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Papadoupalos v. State · filed 2001-04-19(d)

This is important because OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), and its prohibition against using OCGA § 17-10-7 (a), does not apply to a simple possession case but does apply to a possession of cocaine with intent to distribute charge.

Section 16-13-30(d) sets a ten-year minimum sentence for a second conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.

Hester v. State · filed 2003-06-11(d)

Under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), the minimum sentence for a second conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute is ten years.

Under the version of subsection (d) in effect in 1994, a second or subsequent subsection (b) offense involving cocaine required life imprisonment.

Dennard v. State · filed 2004-01-16(d)

Based on the mandatory sentencing provision of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) in place at the time of Dennard’s conviction, the trial court properly sentenced him to life in prison.

Section 16-13-30(d) requires a person convicted a second time of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute to serve at least ten years in prison; the court cannot probate part of that minimum term.

State v. Jones · filed 2004-02-10(d)

However, the decision to probate a portion of the sentence, requiring Jones to serve only seven years, is in direct contravention to the statute, which states specifically that a second time offender “shall be imprisoned for not less than ten years. . . .”

Subsection (d) permits a maximum sentence of life without parole for attempted methamphetamine manufacture when the defendant has two prior convictions for selling methamphetamine.

Elliot v. State · filed 2005-06-28(d)

He has two prior drug convictions for sale of methamphetamine. The maximum sentence permitted under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) is therefore life without parole, and the State requested the imposition of that sentence.

Former subsection (d) required life imprisonment for a repeat offense under subsection (b) and could be applied alongside the recidivist parole restriction in § 17-10-7(c).

Butler v. State · filed 2005-12-06(d)

Second, he contends that the court erred in “stacking two recidivist sentencing provisions” by first sentencing Butler to life in prison under former OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), which at the time of Butler’s crime and sentencing required a life sentence for repeat offenders of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), ... and by then sentencing Butler to life without parole under OCGA § 17-10-7 (c), which required that upon conviction of a fourth felony, a defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Under similar circumstances, Mims v. State ... approved a life without parole sentence, and we discern no reason to hold otherwise here.

The 1994 version of § 16-13-30(d) required life imprisonment for a repeat controlled-substance offense, and the general recidivist statute could require that sentence to be served without parole.

Butler v. State · filed 2006-11-20(d)

Therefore, because Butler was convicted and sentenced before the effective date of the 1996 amendment to OCGA § 16-13-30(d), a life sentence was the only sentence that the trial court could impose [4] ; likewise, because Butler's conviction was his fourth felony conviction, OCGA § 17-10-7(c) applied to his sentence by operation of subsection (e) of that statute, as enacted in 1994, so as to require Butler to serve the sentence imposed by the trial court without the possibility of parole.

Section 16-13-30(c) permits a prior conviction to enhance a sentence even when that conviction also supports recidivist sentencing under § 17-10-7(c).

Johnson v. State · filed 2007-03-30(c)

He also argues that the State "double-counted" his other convictions because it used one of these to enhance his punishment under OCGA § 16-13-30(c) and the same conviction to do so under OCGA § 17-10-7. Pretermitting whether the State established a valid adjudication of guilt for this first offender plea, however, proof of Johnson's other convictions was sufficient to authorize punishment under both of these code sections. See Butler v. State, 277 Ga.App. 57, 62(4), 625 S.E.2d 458 (2005) (a conviction may be used to enhance punishment under both OCGA §§ 17-10-7(c) and 16-13-30).

Section 16-13-30(e) provides a sentencing scheme for multiple possession convictions involving Schedule II nonnarcotic drugs, but does not prevent application of the general recidivist sentencing statute.

Thomas v. State · filed 2007-09-11(e)

And although subsection (e) sets forth its own specific sentencing scheme for multiple convictions, the trial court did not err in applying the more general provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 in sentencing Thomas.

Section 16-13-30(d) permits a life sentence for a second drug conviction.

Mosley v. State · filed 2009-11-13(d)

In the case sub judice, Mosley was sentenced to life imprisonment for a second drug conviction pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), which permitted the imposition of a life sentence.

Section 16-13-30(d) punishes a second or subsequent drug sale with ten to forty years or life imprisonment and excludes application of § 17-10-7(a) to a sentence imposed under it.

State v. Blue · filed 2010-06-18(d)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) prescribes the punishment for convictions involving the sale of controlled substances, and second or subsequent drug sale offenses are punishable by ten to forty years or life imprisonment. That Code section specifies that the provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) do not apply to a sentence imposed under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), although the other provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 shall apply to any subsequent offense.

Section 16-13-30(e) does not prevent sentencing under the habitual felon provisions of Section 17-10-7 when those provisions apply.

Kipple v. the State · filed 2014-10-09(e)

Upon his conviction in this case, Kipple was, for sentencing purposes, more than a mere two-time methamphetamine possession offender under the specific recidivist provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30 (e). Given his five prior felony convictions, Kipple was an habitual felon subject to the supplemental provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7. Therefore, the trial court was authorized to sentence Kipple as an habitual felon under OCGA § 17-10-7.

Section 16-13-30(d) permits a prior trafficking conviction under § 16-13-31 to enhance the sentence for a second trafficking conviction.

Duron v. the State · filed 2017-01-19(d)

Accordingly, we conclude that a first conviction for trafficking under OCGA § 16-13-31 may be used to enhance a second conviction for trafficking pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

A prior nolo contendere plea to selling cocaine cannot be used to enhance a later selling cocaine sentence under subsection (d).

Beasley v. State · filed 2018-03-15(d)

James involved the issue of whether a defendant’s prior plea of nolo contendere to selling cocaine could be used to enhance his sentence for a current conviction of selling cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) of the Controlled Substances Act. ... Regardless Miller cannot support the conclusion in James that a trial court may consider a plea of nolo contendere to enhance a sentence simply because “this court previously has sanctioned the use of convictions resulting from pleas of nolo contendere in sentencing under recidivist statutes.” James, 209 Ga. App. at 390 (2) (citations omitted). For these reasons, we overrule James to the extent it so holds.

For a second or subsequent cocaine sale, subsection (d) lets the judge choose a sentence of ten to forty years or life, even when recidivist sentencing applies.

Waller v. State · filed 2022-10-21(d)

As noted above, the trial court judge retains discretion to sentence a defendant to either ten to forty years in confinement or a life sentence for a subsequent violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), even if the State pursues a recidivist sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7 (c).

Subsection (d) bars probation for a second conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Langley v. State · filed 2022-02-01(d)

Instead, it was the final sentence of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), which has remained the same since 1996, see Ga. L. 1996, p. 1023, § 1.1, that prohibited the trial court in Jones from imposing a probated sentence.

Section 16-13-30(j)(2) makes possession of one ounce or less of marijuana a felony unless the exception in section 16-13-2 applies.

Washington v. State · filed 1997-06-12(j)(2)

Although the State contends that the true intent of the General Assembly is that possession of one ounce or less of marijuana is always a misdemeanor regardless of the defendant’s criminal history, we cannot ignore the plain language of OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (2), specifying it as a felony unless the exception of OCGA § 16-13-2 applies.

Section 16-13-30(j) makes marijuana possession a felony unless the conditions for misdemeanor treatment under § 16-13-2(b) apply.

Banks v. State · filed 1997-11-17(j)

Banks correctly asserts that OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) makes possession of marijuana a felony unless the conditions of OCGA § 16-13-2 (b) apply.

Section 16-13-30(j) makes possession of more than one ounce of marijuana a felony; the State must prove the weight exceeded one ounce but need not present evidence of how many grams equal an ounce.

Gaudlock v. State · filed 2011-06-01(j)

The possession of an ounce or less of marijuana is a misdemeanor, see OCGA § 16-13-2 (b), and the possession of more than an ounce of marijuana is a felony. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (j). So, to prove felony possession of marijuana, the State must prove that the weight of the marijuana exceeded one ounce. ... But to discharge this burden, we do not think that it is necessary for the State to come forward with evidence of how many grams equal an ounce, even if its witnesses testify about the weight of the marijuana in terms of grams.

Section 16-13-30 (j) (1) prohibits possession of any amount of marijuana; when marijuana is found in multiple places, possession of any of it can support a conviction.

McGLYNN v. THE STATE · filed 2017-06-28(j)(1)

Thus, a jury’s finding that McGlynn was in possession of any of the marijuana found in the vehicle would have been sufficient to convict him, and his only viable defense was to deny possession of all of the marijuana found in the vehicle.

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) lists possession of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana as separate offenses.

United States v. Stevens · filed 2016-07-06(j)(1)

Because section 16-13-30(j)(1) lists disjunctively “possession” and “possession with intent to distribute” -- thereby creating separate offenses -- the statute is divisible.

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) makes simple marijuana possession and possession with intent to distribute separate offenses.

United States v. Titus Bates · filed 2020-05-28(j)(1)

The statute lists simple “possession” of marijuana and “possession with intent to distribute” in the disjunctive, which indicates that they are elements in the alternative (i.e. separate offenses). See O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1). Accordingly, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j) is divisible such that the modified-categorical approach applies.

Section 16-13-30(j) criminalizes possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, conduct that qualifies as a serious drug offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act when the applicable drug definitions match.

United States v. Thirkield · filed 2025-07-10(j)

First, as Thirkield essentially concedes, section 16-13-30(j) criminalizes the same conduct as predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

A methamphetamine sale conviction under § 16-13-30(b) merges into a trafficking conviction under § 16-13-31(e) arising from the same sale.

Nunery v. State · filed 1997-11-06(b)

We conclude, however, that the convictions on the two counts charging violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) for selling methamphetamine on November 22 and November 30 were lesser included offenses of the convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine on those dates in violation of OCGA § 16-13-31 (e) and, therefore, merged into the trafficking convictions.

Manufacturing methamphetamine is a lesser included offense of trafficking by manufacturing methamphetamine, so the sentences for those offenses merge.

Wesson v. State · filed 2006-05-16(b)

However, the State concedes, and we agree, that the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine is a lesser included offense of this particular type of trafficking methamphetamine, and thus the sentences for those two offenses should have merged.

A cocaine possession with intent to distribute offense under subsection (b) merges into a trafficking offense when both arise from the same conduct.

Jackson v. State · filed 2009-01-05(b)

Here, the two offenses arose from the same conduct, and as we have previously held, a distribution offense under OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) is included in a trafficking offense under OCGA § 16-13-31. ... Accordingly, the two offenses should have merged.

A marijuana manufacturing conviction under subsection (j)(1) merges into a trafficking conviction when both arise from the same marijuana and manufacturing requires no additional element.

Preval v. State · filed 2010-03-10(j)(1)

Because OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1) (Count 2) contains no unique elements not satisfied by OCGA § 16-13-31 (c) (the Count 1 trafficking offense), Count 2 merges into Count 1.

Possession of a controlled substance under § 16-13-30(a) does not require proof that the defendant possessed drug-related objects.

LEE v. the STATE. · filed 2018-10-04(a)

Given that the conviction for possession of methamphetamine did not require proof that Lee possessed drug-related objects, and the conviction for possession of drug-related objects did not require proof that he possessed methamphetamine, the convictions did not merge.

A manufacturing conviction does not merge with a conviction for possessing altered ephedrine or pseudoephedrine when separate conduct supports each offense.

Mitchell v. State · filed 2023-02-22(b)

“Because the evidence supported a conclusion that different conduct by [Mitchell] resulted in the commission of both . . . manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of ... ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, the two crimes do not merge[,]”20 and therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge Count 5 and Count 2.

An officer’s testimony can establish that a substance was marijuana even if the officer was not qualified as an expert at trial.

Bass v. State · filed 2011-05-17(j)(1)

Therefore, even though the officer had not been qualified as an expert at trial, his testimony was admissible to prove that the substance was marijuana. ... We conclude that the evidence presented, as recounted above, was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find Bass guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses for which he was charged.

Section 16-13-30(b) requires admissible evidence linking a drug’s trade name to a listed controlled substance to sustain a distribution conviction.

DELONG v. State · filed 2011-07-06(b)

Thus, while the State presented evidence that DeLong admitted to distributing Ambien to both T. C. and J. F. and produced testimony that “Ambien” is a Schedule IV controlled substance, our well-established case law explicitly required the State to identify “Ambien” as a trade name for Zolpidem through admissible evidence.

Possession of a controlled substance requires proof that the defendant knew the chemical identity of the drug possessed.

Mohamed v. State · filed 2012-02-16(a)

Given ... we conclude that the State failed to establish that Mohamed knowingly possessed the khat with the knowledge that it contained cathinone.

A chemical field test alone can establish that a substance is cocaine for a conviction under § 16-13-30(b).

Donyell Pate v. State · filed 2012-11-15(b)

“[A] chemical field test alone is sufficient to support a conviction for selling or possessing cocaine,”3 so this enumeration presents no basis for reversal.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires a person charged with possessing a controlled substance to know the substance’s chemical identity.

Patterson v. State · filed 2014-07-10(a)

Under the charge as given, however, the jury could have convicted Patterson of possession of hydrocodone based solely on a finding that he intended to possess the pill, without making a finding regarding his knowledge that the pill contained hydrocodone.

A cocaine possession conviction does not require the State to introduce the drug itself at trial when other evidence establishes its identity.

Williams v. the State · filed 2015-10-06(a)

That the cocaine [possessed by Williams] was not produced at trial is of no significance [because] the State is not required to introduce the illegal drug itself into evidence.

Section 16-13-30(b) permits a conviction for selling a controlled substance when circumstantial evidence shows the seller knew the product contained a controlled substance, even if the seller did not know its precise chemical compound.

Awtrey v. State · filed 2018-06-27(b)

Based on this and other evidence, the jury was authorized to find that the Awtreys knew that they were selling a controlled substance, even though they claimed that they were unaware of the precise chemical compound in the products, and reversal is not required on this basis.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires the State to prove that the substance possessed is controlled.

Roundtree v. State · filed 2021-01-25(a)

As to the possession of a controlled substance, namely “Alpha-PVP (alpha-pyrrolidinopentiophenone),” the State failed to present sufficient evidence as to this count because “Alpha-PVP (alpha-pyrrolidinopentiophenone)” is not listed in any of the controlled substance schedules.

Section 16-13-30 treats the identity of the controlled substance as an element of the offense, so the modified categorical approach applies when determining whether a conviction is a federal drug trafficking felony.

Gordon v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2020-06-24(b), (d)

We therefore conclude that § 16-13-30 is divisible, and the modified categorical approach applies.

Section 16-13-30 (b) does not require a minimum weight for a controlled substance sale conviction.

Johnny Elder Yeomans, III. v. State · filed 2023-08-10(b)

The State did test, however, the methamphetamine actually involved in the sale, and OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) does not contain a minimum weight required for conviction.

Section 16-13-30(b)’s general provisions for manufacturing controlled substances do not apply when the specific methamphetamine trafficking statute governs.

State v. Nankervis · filed 2014-06-30(b)

Thus, because a more specific law applies to trafficking methamphetamine, the general provisions of § 16-13-30 (b) for manufacturing controlled substances do not apply.

Subsection (d)'s sentencing range does not apply to a conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine under § 16-13-31 (e).

LOVELESS v. the STATE. · filed 2018-02-26(d)

Thus, it is clear that the trial court initially erroneously sentenced Loveless under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) and not OCGA § 16-13-31 (e).

Section 16-13-30(c)(1) does not require a lesser sentence under the rule of lenity when there is no ambiguity about whether the trafficking statute applies.

Cooper v. State · filed 2019-10-30(c)(1)

We find nothing in OCGA § 16-13-31 renders it ambiguous, and no ambiguity is created by the existence of OCGA § 16-13-30.