Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-30

Section 16-13-30(a) permits a methamphetamine possession conviction when the evidence proves the defendant had the power and intention to control the drug.

Mantooth v. State · filed 2016-02-18(a)

We conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mantooth had both the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over the methamphetamine found in the apartment.

Section 16-13-30 (a) permits a cocaine possession conviction based on circumstantial evidence that establishes constructive possession and excludes other reasonable hypotheses.

Johnson v. the State · filed 2016-03-11(a)

In light of this evidence, which showed more than Johnson’s mere spatial proximity to the cocaine, the finder of fact was authorized to conclude that the circumstances excluded any ... reasonable hypothesis that Johnson did not possess both the marijuana and cocaine hidden side-by-side behind the same panel.

A cocaine-possession conviction requires evidence linking the accused to the drugs beyond mere presence near them.

McCrory v. State · filed 2017-03-16(a)

To sustain a conviction against him, there must be something which linked McCrory to the drugs other than his mere presence at the scene of a crime.

Possession of methamphetamine, including possession with intent to distribute, may be proved constructively; contraband found in a defendant’s residence supports a rebuttable presumption of possession.

DUNCAN v. the STATE. · filed 2018-06-19(a), (b)

Here, the State presented ample evidence of Duncan’s constructive possession of the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia found inside the Crown Royal bag. To begin with, the contraband was found in Duncan’s residence, which authorizes a jury to presume that he possessed it.

Subsection (a) prohibits possession of a controlled substance regardless of what the person intends to do with it.

United States v. Harold Hall, Jr. · filed 2017-06-01(a)

For example, the Georgia possession statute under which Defendant was convicted prohibits “any person to purchase, possess, or have under his or her control any controlled substance”—regardless of what the person intends to do with the controlled substance.

Section 16-13-30 permits possession convictions for trace amounts of cocaine or marijuana; neither provision sets a minimum amount.

FRANCIS v. the STATE. · filed 2018-05-01(c)(1), (j)(1)

The record also shows that trace amounts of both marijuana and cocaine were found in Francis’s possession, and neither statute criminalizing possession of these substances requires more. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (c) (1) (defining the felony offense of possession of “less than one gram of a solid substance” of a controlled substance, including cocaine), 16-13-30 (j) (1) (defining the offense of possession of marijuana, without specifying any lower limit as to amount), 16-13-2 (b) (providing that possession of “one ounce or less” of marijuana is a misdemeanor).

Possession of marijuana requires proof that the defendant intended to possess and control it.

Watkins v. State · filed 2020-02-12(j)(1)

The charged crime and the prior drug offenses required evidence that Watkins intended to possess the drug at issue.

A cocaine possession conviction under subsection (a) does not require proof that the defendant had sole constructive possession when another person had access to the drug.

Morrio Freeman v. State · filed 2022-09-15(a)

Freeman’s argument here rests on the flawed presumption that, to convict him of possession, the State was required to prove he had sole constructive possession of the cocaine.

Possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute requires proof of possession; presence at a drug house and knowledge or approval of the drugs do not alone establish constructive possession.

Portillo v. State · filed 2022-09-26(b)

However, such circumstantial evidence of knowledge and approval is not enough to prove that Portillo was in constructive possession of the contraband found in the residence.

Section 16-13-30(h) provides imprisonment of one to ten years for violating subsection (b) with a Schedule III, IV, or V controlled substance, but does not authorize a fine.

Castillo v. State · filed 1983-05-19(h)

OCGA § 16-13-30(h) (Code Ann. § 79A-811) provides: “Any person who violates subsection (b) of this Code section with respect to a controlled substance in Schedule III, IV, or V shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years.” The statute does not authorize imposition of any fines and therefore the trial court was without authority to impose the $5,000 fine oh defendant Eduarte and the $10,000 fines on each of the other defendants.

Section 16-13-30(g) treats a prior conviction for possession of any controlled substance as a prior offense when sentencing a later possession of a Schedule III, IV, or V substance.

Ray v. State · filed 1986-11-24(g)

We disagree, reading the phrase "subsequent offense" to mean possession of any controlled substance (see OCGA § 16-13-30 (a)) rather than "a controlled substance in Schedule III, IV, or V." See OCGA § 16-13-30 (g).

Section 16-13-30 does not itself authorize a fine for these felony drug offenses, though a fine may be imposed as a condition of probation.

Todd v. State · filed 1984-09-25

While the statute does not authorize the fine which the defendant seeks to set aside the above cases are not applicable inasmuch as the fine was imposed as a condition of probation.

Section 16-13-30(j)(2) prescribes imprisonment for marijuana distribution but does not authorize a fine.

Etchison v. State · filed 1985-09-03(j)(2)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (2) provides that “any person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years.” The statute makes no provision for the imposition of fines.

Subsection (d) does not authorize a life sentence for a first conviction under subsection (b) based on prior drug convictions in Florida.

Taylor v. State · filed 1988-02-29(d)

In the instant case this was not appellant's second conviction for a violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), but his first; his two prior drug convictions were in Florida. Thus, § 16-13-30 (d), supra, is not applicable and does not authorize imposition of life imprisonment under the facts of this case.

Section 16-13-30 does not preclude probation as a punishment.

Lester v. State · filed 1989-01-26

The punishments provided in OCGA § 16-13-30 do not preclude probation as a punishment.

Subsection (d) authorizes a life sentence for a repeat offense only when the prior conviction was also a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act.

Smith v. State · filed 1989-11-01(d)

Appellant contends on appeal that his sentence was illegal because subsection (d) authorizes a life sentence only for a second violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, which was not in effect in 1971. We agree. In Taylor v. State, 186 Ga. App. 113 (3) (366 SE2d 422) (1988), this court held that "it is only when appellant is convicted a second time for a violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) that a sentence to life imprisonment is authorized." The Georgia Controlled Substances Act, now codified as OCGA Ch. 16-13, was first enacted in 1974 (Ga. L. 1974, p. 221 et seq.), after appellant's conviction for selling heroin. He has not, therefore, been convicted of two violations of the Act, and the life sentence was not authorized.

Section 16-13-30(d)’s mandatory life sentence cannot be imposed when the State has not notified the defendant before trial that it seeks recidivist punishment.

State v. Marshall · filed 1990-05-07(d)

In the instant case there is nothing in the record showing that the State apprised appellee or his attorney that it intended to demand recidivist punishment if he were convicted of more than one count of the indictment. Therefore, the State’s position that the trial court was required to impose a mandatory life sentence and that the sentence imposed was void, is in error, consequently, this appeal is hereby dismissed.

Section 16-13-30(j)(2) permits felony sentencing for marijuana possession when a prior marijuana sales conviction makes misdemeanor sentencing unavailable.

Mobley v. State · filed 1989-02-24(j)(2)

Accordingly, appellant's prior conviction for selling marijuana renders OCGA § 16-13-2 inapplicable and he was properly sentenced for a felony pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (2).

A later drug conviction counts as a second or subsequent offense when revocation of first-offender probation results in a conviction for the earlier offense before the later conviction is entered.

Dean v. State · filed 1991-07-16(d)

Under these circumstances, the later conviction clearly constituted a “conviction of a second or subsequent offense” within the contemplation of the statute.

Subsection (d) permits a life sentence for a cocaine sale when the defendant’s prior cocaine sale conviction is established.

Banks v. State · filed 1991-09-20(d)

In his fifth and final enumeration of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing a life sentence pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), inasmuch as it was not established that he had previously been convicted of selling cocaine. ... In any event, there was uncontroverted evidence via copy of the prior drug indictment, verdict, and sentences that appellant was indeed the “Major Banks, Jr.” who committed the earlier sale of cocaine.

A life sentence under subsection (d) requires a prior conviction for violating subsection (b) before trial; two convictions from the same trial cannot serve as predicates for each other.

State v. Sears · filed 1991-12-02(d)

Thus, in order for the imposition of life sentences to be mandatory pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), Sears' prior conviction need not have preceded his instant violations of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), but his prior conviction must necessarily have preceded his instant trial for violating OCGA § 16-13-30 (b). Obviously, neither of Sears' instant convictions can serve as the predicate for the imposition of a life sentence as to the other.

Section 16-13-30(d) requires a prior conviction before a defendant’s trial to trigger its mandatory life sentence; convictions from the same trial cannot serve as predicates.

State v. Sampson · filed 1992-02-25(d)

In State v. Sears, 202 Ga. App. 352, 354 (8) (414 SE2d 494) (1991), this court held that in order to apply the mandatory life sentence of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), a defendant’s prior conviction must' necessarily have preceded his instant trial for violating OCGA § 16-13-30 (b). ... Thus, the concurrent six-year sentences imposed upon defendant are not void, and the State’s appeal must be dismissed.

A conviction must be final when the State gives pretrial notice before it can support a mandatory life sentence for a subsequent offense under subsection (d).

Nunnally v. State · filed 1992-02-28(d)

Accordingly, we hold that since appellant’s conviction on the first count of the instant indictment was not final at the time the State gave its pre-trial notice pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-2 (a), the conviction on the first count could not be the basis for the imposition of a life sentence on either of the remaining counts of the indictment.

Subsection (d)'s life sentence for a repeat offense depends on when the offenses were committed, not when convictions were entered.

Mays v. State · filed 1992-03-20(d)

Thus, it is not the date of the conviction which determines the applicability of enhanced punishment but the date of the commission of the offense.

Subsection (d) authorizes a life sentence for a repeat cocaine seller when the State gives timely notice that it will seek an enhanced sentence.

Crawford v. State · filed 1992-06-08(d)

Appellant had a prior conviction for selling cocaine. The State gave appellant timely pre-trial notice of its intent to rely upon that prior conviction in aggravation of his sentence for the instant offense. ... Accordingly, the trial court correctly imposed a life sentence upon appellant pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Section 16-13-30(d) does not permit enhanced punishment for an offense committed before the offense underlying a prior conviction.

Doe v. State · filed 1992-07-31(d)

It appears from these documents that appellant was in fact previously convicted and sentenced for a sale of cocaine which occurred June 5, 1989, after the instant sale of cocaine occurring on May 19, 1989. The State has not shown otherwise in rebuttal. Therefore, the imposition of the enhanced punishment under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) was error.

Mandatory life sentences under subsection (d) are subject to the pretrial notice requirement for prior convictions in OCGA § 17-10-2 (a).

Moss v. State · filed 1992-11-17(d)

The notice requirement of OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) applies to mandatory life sentences imposed under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

When a defendant agrees to a life sentence under subsection (d) for a repeat offense, § 17-10-2(a) does not require a second notice of the already disclosed predicate conviction.

Martin v. State · filed 1993-03-16(d)

OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) requires prior notification of the conviction or convictions upon which the State will subsequently rely for enhanced punishment. It does not require subsequent renotification of the conviction or convictions for which the defendant has already contracted to receive enhanced punishment.

A prior Georgia cocaine-trafficking conviction under § 16-13-31 counts as a prior violation of subsection (b) and triggers subsection (d)'s life sentence for a later qualifying offense.

Gilbert v. State · filed 1993-03-17(d)

Clearly, the legislature did not intend that violators of OCGA § 16-13-31 be exempt from the severe punishment of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d). Given our conclusion that Gilbert’s prior conviction constituted a violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), we find that the life sentence was properly imposed.

Section 16-13-30(d) requires prior convictions used to enhance punishment to be final.

Dunn v. State · filed 1993-03-29(d)

When previous convictions are relied upon as the ground for imposing enhanced punishment, the convictions must be final. ... This rule also applies to enhanced punishment pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Section 16-13-30(d) permits a life sentence for a later offense even if the defendant was not convicted of the first offense before committing the later one.

Hailey v. State · filed 1993-06-07(d)

Hailey's final contention is that, properly interpreted, § 16-13-30 (d) permits a life sentence for conviction of a second offense only if the defendant has been convicted of the first offense before he commits the second offense. Here, Hailey had not been convicted of the first offense at the time he committed his second offense. He thus contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to life in prison under § 16-13-30 (d). We disagree. Both State v. Hendrixson, 251 Ga. 853, 854-855 (310 SE2d 526) (1984), and State v. Sears, 202 Ga. App. 352, 354-355 (414 SE2d 494) (1991), interpreted § 16-13-30 (d) to mean that the conviction of a defendant for a first offense does not have to precede the commission of the "second or subsequent offense." § 16-13-30 (d).

A prior cocaine-sale conviction based on a nolo contendere plea may be considered when imposing a recidivist sentence under subsection (d).

James v. State · filed 1993-07-12(d)

Defendant also contends the trial court should not have considered his prior conviction for the sale of cocaine in imposing sentence pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) because such prior conviction resulted from a plea of nolo contendere. However, this court previously has sanctioned the use of convictions resulting from pleas of nolo contendere in sentencing under recidivist statutes. Miller v. State, 162 Ga. App. 730 (4) (b) (292 SE2d 102) (1982). See also OCGA § 17-10-2 (a). We thus find no merit to this enumeration.

Clear pretrial notice of a prior conviction suffices for recidivist sentencing under subsection (d), even without written notice.

Hightower v. State · filed 1993-09-09(d)

Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant received adequate notice that he faced treatment as a recidivist under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Section 16-13-30 does not authorize a monetary fine for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Rawls v. State · filed 1993-09-27

Under OCGA § 16-13-30, the penalty for that offense consists of various terms of imprisonment, but no monetary fines.

Pretrial notice detailing similar drug transactions, including one that resulted in a conviction and sentence, adequately notified the defendant that the state would seek a life sentence under subsection (d).

Dean v. State · filed 1993-11-03(d)

Dean also contends that he did not receive adequate notice that the state would seek a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d). This contention has no merit. Before trial, the state filed a “Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Similar Transactions and Evidence in Aggravation of Punishment,” detailing two similar transactions, one of which had already resulted in an indictment, plea and sentence.

A prior drug conviction under South Carolina law does not trigger the life sentence under § 16-13-30(d).

Peterson v. State · filed 1994-02-22(d)

Similarly, in this case, we must conclude that Peterson's prior conviction under South Carolina law did not invoke the provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), and thus we remand the case for resentencing.

A life sentence under subsection (d) requires the state to give the defendant notice before trial of any prior conviction it intends to use in aggravation of punishment.

Armstrong v. State · filed 1994-05-16(d)

We now so hold and reiterate that if a life sentence is to be imposed under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), the state must notify defendant of any conviction it intends to use in aggravation of punishment pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-2 (a).

Mandatory life sentences under § 16-13-30(d) are subject to the requirement that the State notify the defendant before trial of prior convictions it intends to use in aggravation.

Washington v. State · filed 1995-02-21(d)

This notice requirement applies to mandatory life sentences imposed under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Subsection (d) permits a life sentence only for a second violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act; a prior federal drug conviction does not qualify.

Query v. State · filed 1995-03-17(d)

The State concedes that a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) may only be imposed for a second violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and we decline to find otherwise, despite the State’s urging. The prior offense used against Query was his 1983 federal methamphetamine conviction; thus, the life sentences were not authorized by law.

A life sentence under subsection (d) requires notice of the prior conviction used to increase punishment, but a defendant who does not object when that conviction is introduced waives the notice error.

Tillman v. State · filed 1995-04-10(d)

It is true that “if a life sentence is to be imposed under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), the state must notify defendant of any conviction it intends to use in aggravation of punishment pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-2 (a). . . . The purpose of § 17-10-2 is to give defendant a chance to examine his record to determine if the convictions are in fact his, if he was represented by counsel, and any other defect which would render such documents inadmissible during the pre-sentencing phase of the trial.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Armstrong v. State, 264 Ga. 237, 238 (1), (2) (442 SE2d 759) (1994). In this case, however, Tillman did not object when the state introduced his prior drug conviction into evidence during the pre-sentencing phase of the trial. In fact, when the state presented a copy of the conviction and recommended a life sentence, defense counsel responded “there isn’t any argument we can effectively make.” Defense counsel added that he had inspected the drug conviction, that it was entered with an attorney, and that “there is no challenge that we can make on that particular plea.” The error is therefore deemed waived.

Subsection (d)'s life sentence for a second covered drug offense has a rational basis, and the statistical evidence presented did not establish an equal protection violation.

Stephens v. State · filed 1995-04-21(d)

We hold that OCGA § 16-13-30(d) does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the Federal or State Constitutions based on the statistical evidence that Stephens presents and affirm.

Subsection (d)'s life imprisonment provision does not violate due process or equal protection as applied on the statistical evidence considered in Stephens.

Holcomb v. State · filed 1995-05-08(d)

We held in Stephens v. State, 265 Ga. 356 (456 SE2d 560) (1995), that the life imprisonment provision as applied does not violate due process or equal protection. Since this appeal relies on the same statistical evidence considered in Stephens, we affirm.

Section 16-13-30(d) provides a five-to-30-year sentence when the State has not given clear pretrial notice that it will seek an enhanced life sentence based on a prior drug conviction.

Jordan v. State · filed 1995-05-10(d)

As the life sentence imposed without clear pre-trial notice is unauthorized, we vacate the judgment as to sentence and remand with direction that defendant be “punished by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than 30 years.” OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Section 16-13-30(e) sets a 15-year maximum sentence for a first offense of cocaine possession.

Johns v. State · filed 1996-11-14(e)

If Johns received no credit for the time he successfully served on probation, his sentence in this case would exceed the maximum 15-year sentence for the subject violation.

Section 16-13-30(c) sets a sentence of two to fifteen years’ imprisonment for a first conviction of possession of cocaine.

Palmore v. State · filed 1999-02-05(c)

Our legislature has provided that a first conviction of possession of cocaine carries with it a sentence of two to fifteen years imprisonment. OCGA § 16-13-30 (c). Thus, the five-year sentence imposed by the trial court falls within the statutory limit.

Section 16-13-30(d) sets a 30-year maximum sentence for a first offense of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.

O'Neal v. State · filed 1999-06-07(d)

The maximum sentence for a first offense of possession with intent to distribute is 30 years. OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

A prior conviction for cocaine possession with intent to distribute counts as a prior possession conviction when sentencing a second simple possession offense under subsection (c).

Smiley v. State · filed 2000-01-05(c)

Smiley argues that his previous conviction for cocaine possession with the intent to distribute was not a previous conviction for cocaine possession and, therefore, he should not have been sentenced for a second offense of cocaine possession under OCGA § 16-13-30 (c). We disagree and affirm.

The penalty for purchasing crack cocaine supports a ten-year sentence for an attempted purchase when the indictment and verdict identify a substance appearing to be crack cocaine.

Lovain v. State · filed 2002-01-14(e)

Here, the indictment charged Lovain with a violation of our drug laws in that he attempted to purchase what looked like a rock of crack cocaine; the jury found Lovain violated our drug laws by attempting to purchase what looked like a rock of crack cocaine; and Lovain was sentenced within the parameters of the statute which specifies the penalties for the purchase of a rock of crack cocaine.

Section 16-13-30(c) sets a maximum sentence of thirty years for a subsequent conviction of cocaine possession.

Gray v. State · filed 2002-01-25(c)

Thirty years is the maximum sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (c) for a subsequent conviction of possession of cocaine.

Section 16-13-30 sets a maximum sentence of thirty years, with at least five years to serve, for a first conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Morrison v. State · filed 2002-06-19(b), (d)

The maximum punishment for a first conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine is thirty years, with a minimum of five to serve. OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), (d). This is the sentence Morrison received. Accordingly, there was no error.

Section 16-13-30(e) provides a 30-year maximum prison term for cocaine possession in the recidivist sentencing context.

Taylor v. State · filed 2003-05-13(e)

Given Taylor’s prior drug convictions and the mandate of OCGA § 17-10-7 (c), Taylor faced a maximum punishment of 30 years in prison under OCGA § 16-13-30 (e) with no possibility of parole. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison with no possibility of parole. Since this sentence is within the statutory guidelines, we decline to review it.

Section 16-13-30(d) permits a sentence of five to thirty years for a first conviction of possessing a Schedule I or II drug with intent to sell.

McElreath v. State · filed 2007-03-20(d)

McElreath miscontrues OCGA § 16-13-30, which provides that upon a first conviction for manufacturing, delivering, distributing, dispensing, administering, selling, or possessing with intent to sell a Schedule I or Schedule II drug, a person may be sentenced to not less than five years nor more than thirty years. OCGA § 16-13-30 (d). Upon conviction of a second or subsequent offense, he can be imprisoned for not less than ten years nor more than forty years or life imprisonment. Id. Therefore, his sentence of 30 years was within the legal limit for even a first conviction of amphetamine possession with intent to sell, and accordingly was not illegal.

Section 16-13-30(d) permits a life sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute when the defendant has prior drug convictions and the recidivist provision applies.

Jackson v. State · filed 2007-03-28(d)

Given Jackson’s prior drug convictions and the mandate of OCGA § 17-10-7 (c), he faced a maximum punishment of life in prison under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d). He was sentenced to 30 years in prison. Because this sentence is within the statutory guidelines, we decline to review it.

Section 16-13-30(b)'s general punishment for manufacturing methamphetamine gives way to the specific punishment under § 16-13-31(f)(1).

Richards v. State · filed 2008-03-04(b)

Furthermore, the most reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 16-13-31 (f) (1) was to supplant the general punishment provision of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) with a specific and potentially more harsh punishment provision for manufacturing methamphetamine.

Section 16-13-30(d)’s imprisonment terms permit the additional special probation required by section 42-8-35.2(a).

Mike v. State · filed 2008-03-10(d)

Here, the plain language of the statute requires that a term of special probation be served “in addition to any term of imprisonment” rendered under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d). OCGA §§ 16-13-30 (d); 42-8-35.2 (a). The two statutes thus do not conflict.

Subsection (d) sets a prison term of five to 30 years for a first offense involving a Schedule I or II controlled substance, and ten to 40 years or life for a subsequent offense.

Thomas v. State · filed 2008-06-04(d)

OCGA § 16-13-30 provides the punishment for the charged offense in the instant case. Subsection (d) provides that ... any person who violates subsection (b) of this Code section with respect to a controlled substance in Schedule I or Schedule II shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than 30 years. Upon conviction of a second or subsequent offense, he or she shall be imprisoned for not less than ten years nor more than 40 years or life imprisonment. ... Therefore, the trial court did not err when it sentenced Thomas to 30 years, with 15 to be served without parole and the remaining 15 on probation.

Section 16-13-30 sets a sentence of five to thirty years for possession with intent to distribute any controlled substance.

State v. Slaton · filed 2008-11-13(b), (d)

The statutory sentencing range for a conviction of possession with the intent to distribute any controlled substance is not less than five years nor more than thirty years. OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), (d).

Section 16-13-30 makes selling marijuana a felony punishable by one to ten years’ imprisonment.

Reed v. State · filed 2009-03-02(j)(1), (2)

In this case, however, Reed’s sentence is lawful. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1), (2) (sale of marijuana a felony and, upon conviction imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years).

Section 16-13-30 contains no ambiguity that triggers the rule of lenity for a cocaine possession sentence.

Adams v. State · filed 2009-05-27

Adams cites no ambiguity in OCGA § 16-13-30, the statute under which he. was sentenced, and we find none. Accordingly, the rule of lenity is inapplicable.

A second conviction for cocaine possession carries a sentence of five to thirty years under subsection (c).

Shook v. State · filed 2009-09-10(c)

Because Shook’s conviction in this case was his second for possession of cocaine, he was subject to a sentence of between five and thirty years under OCGA § 16-13-30 (c), and the trial judge’s sentence of twenty-five years was within the legal range of punishment.

Section 16-13-30(j)(2)'s penalty range includes a ten-year probated sentence for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Jones v. State · filed 2010-01-20(j)(2)

In 1999, Bruce Jones pled guilty to and received a ten-year probated sentence for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. ... And the court imposed a sentence in 1999 that was within the applicable penalty range for the offense.

Section 16-13-30(c) does not authorize a fine for possession of cocaine.

In Re At · filed 2010-03-09(c)

However, OCGA § 16-13-30, which governs the offense of possession of cocaine, does not provide for the imposition of a fine for the commission of that offense.

Section 16-13-30(c) does not authorize a fine for possession of cocaine.

In the Interest of A. T. · filed 2010-03-09(c)

However, OCGA § 16-13-30, which governs the offense of possession of cocaine, does not provide for the imposition of a fine for the commission of that offense.

Section 16-13-30(d) classifies possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute as a felony, so the rule of lenity does not require sentencing under that section instead of the felony trafficking statute.

Fyfe v. State · filed 2010-07-07(d)

Because both of Fyfe’s offenses are classified as felonies, the rule of lenity did not apply. See OCGA §§ 16-13-30 (d), 16-13-31 (e) (1); Poole, 302 Ga. App. at 466 (2).

Section 16-13-30(d) authorizes five to thirty years of imprisonment for selling cocaine.

FEW v. State · filed 2011-09-08(d)

Few’s present sentence of 20 years, as modified by the Sentence Review Panel, falls within the statutory range of sentencing for the sale of cocaine, even as a first offender. ... OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) (authorized sentencing range for the sale of cocaine is not less than five years nor more than thirty years imprisonment); see Moseley, 284 Ga. at 129 (1) (recognizing that the Sentence Review Panel was vested with “the actual power to change a criminal sentence”).

Subsection (g) sets a one-to-five-year imprisonment range for possession of a Schedule III controlled substance; a ten-year sentence is void.

Simmons v. State · filed 2012-03-22(g)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (g) provides that persons who have violated OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) “with respect to a controlled substance in Schedule III ... shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years.” It follows that the ten-year felony sentence entered by the trial court on April 20, 2007, is outside the statutory range and void.

Section 16-13-30(d) permits a 30-year sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Benford v. State · filed 2012-06-01(d)

Benford first argues that his sentence was excessive and constituted cruel and unusual punishment because he is 56 years old, and a sentence of 30 years, with 15 to serve, is “the same as a life sentence.” But Benford’s sentence does not exceed the permissible maximum for the offense to which he pled guilty. See OCGA § 16-13-30(d).

Section 16-13-30 sets different sentencing ranges for sales of Schedule II and Schedule III substances, so the applicable schedule must be determined before sentencing.

Williams v. State · filed 2013-03-11(d), (h)

Under these circumstances, we are compelled to vacate Williams’ sentences as to Counts 9 and 10 and to remand the case sub judice to the trial court for a hearing to determine on which schedule the controlled substances at issue belong, and to impose a lawful and appropriate sentence.

The applicable version of § 16-13-30(e) limits the sentence for possession of cocaine to fifteen years.

James v. Smith v. State · filed 2013-07-01(e)

The applicable version of OCGA § 16-13-30 (e) provides for a maximum penalty of fifteen years.

Under the applicable version of § 16-13-30(e), the maximum sentence for possession of cocaine is fifteen years.

Smith v. State · filed 2013-07-01(e)

The applicable version of OCGA § 16-13-30 (e) provides for a maximum penalty of fifteen years. Thus, as the trial court erred in sentencing Smith to 20 years for possession of cocaine, we vacate Smith’s sentence and remand the case for resentencing in accordance with OCGA § 16-13-30 (e).

For methamphetamine possession offenses committed before July 1, 2013, § 16-13-30(c) capped imprisonment at 15 years, making a longer sentence void.

Royals v. State · filed 2014-05-21(c)

At the time Royals engaged in and was indicted for possession of methamphetamine, Georgia law provided that any person convicted of possessing methamphetamine “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years nor more than 15 years.” OCGA § 16-13-30 (c) (2011). ... Accordingly, because the 25-year sentence imposed by the trial court exceeds the statutory maximum, that sentence is void and the trial court erred in denying Royals’s motion for a modification of that sentence.

Section 16-13-30(d) allows a 30-year total sentence for two counts of selling cocaine.

Wicker v. State · filed 2014-08-11(d)

Here, Wicker’s 30-year sentence is within the statutory range for his offenses. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Section 16-13-30(d) permits a 30-year recidivist sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Williams v. State · filed 2015-02-18(d)

Here, Williams’s 30 year recidivist sentence for possession with intent to distribute falls within the statutory guidelines. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

A 30-year sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, including 10 years in prison without parole under the repeat offender statute and 20 years on probation, is authorized.

Clyde Martin, Jr. v. State · filed 2015-07-08(d)

Here, despite Martin’s argument to the contrary, the record shows that Martin pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, 10 years to serve in prison without parole pursuant to the repeat offender statute and 20 years to serve on probation. This sentence does not impose punishment that the law does not allow. See OCGA §§ 16-13-30 (d); 17-10-7.

The reduced sentencing range for methamphetamine possession does not apply to offenses committed before the amendment took effect; the earlier sentencing range remains in force.

Thompson v. the State · filed 2015-04-10(c)

Notably, while the statute has been amended to reduce the range of punishment, the General Assembly included a savings clause making clear its intention to maintain the sentencing structure for crimes committed prior to the effective date of any amendment.

A 30-year recidivist sentence for possession of cocaine was within the statutory sentencing range when imposed.

Otha David Rutledge, Jr v. State · filed 2016-05-11(d)

Rutledge’s sentence as a recidivist, to 30 years imprisonment for possession of cocaine was within the statutory range.

Subsection (d) permits a 30-year sentence for a recidivist drug offender.

Brown v. State · filed 2018-09-26(d)

Here, the trial court sentenced Brown to 30 years, which is a lawful sentence for a recidivist drug offender. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Section 16-13-30 permits a seven-year sentence for possession of cocaine.

Snipes v. State · filed 2019-08-21

Here, the trial court sentenced Snipes to seven years, which is a lawful sentence for possession of cocaine. See OCGA § 16-13-30. Snipes has thus not raised a colorable void sentence claim.

Section 16-13-30(c)(1)’s 2017 sentencing range for less than one gram does not apply to crimes committed before that version took effect.

Oneill v. State · filed 2019-10-04(c)(1)

While the current version of OCGA § 16-13-30 (c) (1), which became effective five years after the crime at issue, in 2017, provides that if the aggregate weight of a controlled substance or any mixture is less than one gram, imprisonment shall be not less than one nor more than three years, this version of the Code is inapplicable to Oneill.

Under the 2006 version of § 16-13-30, the maximum sentence for possession with intent to distribute marijuana was ten years, and the maximum for a second or subsequent possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance was forty years.

Price v. State · filed 2019-10-25(j)(2), (d)

When Price committed his crimes, the maximum sentence upon a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana was ten years, see OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (2) (2006), and the maximum sentence upon a second or subsequent ... conviction for possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance, such as MDMA, was forty years.

Subsection (d) authorizes up to 30 years’ imprisonment for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute; the three-year special probation term required by § 42-8-35.2 may be added to that sentence.

Robert Benton, Jr. v. State · filed 2020-09-10(d)

As mandated by OCGA § 42-8-35.2, the trial court imposed a special term of probation of three years in addition to the thirty-year term of imprisonment expressly authorized by OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

Section 16-13-30(j) makes purchasing marijuana a felony regardless of the amount purchased.

Middleton v. State · filed 2020-10-19(j)

Purchasing marijuana is a felony, regardless of the amount of marijuana involved.

Section 16-13-30(d)’s penalty for selling cocaine is determined by the law in effect when the offense was committed; a later reduction in the maximum sentence does not apply.

Felder v. State · filed 2022-09-14(d)

Felder’s crimes, however, had to be “punished according to the provisions of the law existing at the time of [their] commission.” ... And Felder does not dispute that the law in effect at the time he committed the crimes at issue allowed a sentence of life in prison on each count. Felder, therefore, has not raised a colorable argument that his sentence is void, and thus the trial court’s denial of his motion to modify his sentence is not subject to direct appeal.

For the Schedule I possession offense at issue, the maximum prison sentence under subsection (c)(1) is three years.

Hood v. State · filed 2023-03-07(c)(1)

But the maximum sentence for possession of a controlled substance in Schedule I, under the circumstances of this case, is three years. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (c) (1).

Subsections (d) and (j)(2) provide punishment ranges; a sentence within those ranges is not void for exceeding the authorized punishment.

Lightsey v. State · filed 2023-06-12(d), (j)(2)

Here, Lightsey’s sentences were within the statutory ranges of punishment and do not exceed the maximum punishment allowed by the law. See OCGA §§ 16-13-30 (d) and 16-13-30 (j) (2).

Section 16-13-30(c)-(f) makes the narcotic or nonnarcotic classification relevant to recidivist sentencing, but an indictment need not specify it when recidivist sentencing is not at issue.

Martin v. State · filed 1985-09-03(c)-(f)

The “narcotic/non-narcotic” description makes a difference only when one is being sentenced as a recidivist. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (c)-(f).

An indictment alleging unlawful possession of cocaine under § 16-13-30(a) sufficiently alleges the required intent and knowledge.

Dye v. State · filed 1986-01-31(a)

The language of the indictment tracks exactly the language of the applicable section of the Code. OCGA § 16-13-30. ... The indictment followed the exact language of the Code, charging that appellant had “unlawfully” possessed cocaine. The allegation that appellant acted “unlawfully” is sufficient to encompass both the intent to commit the proscribed act and the knowledge necessary to form that intent.

Section 16-13-30 permits a marijuana charge based on possession or control, including constructive possession.

Partridge v. State · filed 1988-05-12

The court charged, immediately after instructing the jury as quoted above, that the statute specified actual possession as to the cocaine count and another statute specified possession or control as to the marijuana count. Since the two counts properly charged different types of possession as to each crime, and since there is a legal as opposed to an ordinary usage meaning for the term “actual possession,” the court did not err in defining the terms and describing the distinction.

Section 16-13-30(b) prohibits selling a controlled substance; an indictment sufficiently charges that offense when it states the sale and its details, even if it identifies the drug’s schedule instead of subsection (b).

Freeman v. State · filed 1991-09-03(b)

We hold the indictment at issue was sufficient in form and substance because it contained the elements of the charged crime of sale of a controlled substance as defined in OCGA § 16-13-30 (b); it spelled out the details of the alleged criminal act with sufficient certainty to apprise appellant of the proof he must have been prepared to meet; and it was phrased in substantially the language of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).

A charge of conspiracy to sell or distribute cocaine under § 16-13-30 does not include conspiracy to sell a non-controlled substance represented as cocaine as a lesser offense.

Smith v. State · filed 1992-02-03

Here the offense for which Smith was convicted was not included in the indicted offense, nor was it otherwise embraced within the language of the indictment. A conviction for conspiracy to sell or distribute cocaine requires different proof than the offense of unlawfully selling a non-controlled substance while representing it to be a controlled substance.

A jury may be charged on all of subsection (b) when the indictment and instructions make clear that the defendant is on trial only for possession with intent to distribute.

Watkins v. State · filed 1992-11-17(b)

We do not agree with appellant that it was reversible error for the trial court to charge the jury the entirety of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), since the trial court read the indictment to the jury and instructed the jury that appellant was on trial only for the charge of possession with intent to distribute in the indictment.

Manufacturing marijuana by cultivating or planting does not require possession, so misdemeanor possession is not a lesser included offense as a matter of law.

Galbreath v. State · filed 1994-04-15(j)(1)

Possession of marijuana is not a necessary element of the crime of knowingly manufacturing marijuana by cultivating or planting, and so misdemeanor possession is not a lesser offense included in the crime of manufacturing as a matter of law, within the meaning of OCGA § 16-1-6.

Simple possession of cocaine under § 16-13-30(a) is a lesser included offense when the trafficking indictment alleges possession of more than 28 grams of cocaine.

Howard v. State · filed 1996-02-28(a)

Since the indictment in the case sub judice alleged that defendant possessed more than 28 grams of cocaine, we hold that simple possession of cocaine was a lesser offense included as a matter of fact in the greater indicted offense of trafficking by possessing more than 28 grams of cocaine.

Section 16-13-30(b) lists several prohibited acts; when only possession with intent to distribute is charged, instructions may recite the full statute if they confine the jury to the indicted offense.

Brown v. State · filed 2000-04-17(b)

Second, the court adequately instructed the jury on the elements of the remaining count with the statutory language of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b). ... This verdict form and the instructions vitiate any valid concern that the jury was confused or might have convicted Brown of some offense other than that with which he was charged.

Simple possession of cocaine is a lesser included offense of trafficking by possession when the evidence supports a finding that the amount was below the trafficking threshold.

Lumpkin v. State · filed 2000-08-21(a)

Under OCGA § 16-13-30 (a), a person who knowingly possesses any amount of cocaine or any mixture with a purity of ten percent or more of cocaine commits the offense of possession of cocaine. ... Thus, the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on simple possession.

Possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under § 16-13-30(b) may be charged as a lesser included offense of trafficking when the indictment alleges possession of more than 28 grams and the evidence supports the charge.

Rupnik v. State · filed 2005-04-19(b)

Therefore, as Rupnik was indicted for possession of more than 28 grams, she had sufficient notice that the lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute might be submitted to the jury if the evidence warranted it. By charging the lesser offense, the trial court did not permit the jury to convict Rupnik of committing the crime of possession of methamphetamine in a manner not alleged in the indictment.

Subsections (a) and (b) define possession and distribution as separate legal offenses.

Crutchfield v. State · filed 2008-04-10(a), (b)

Crutchfield’s possession and distribution charges did not merge as a matter of law because they are separate legal offenses.

For a cocaine possession charge, an equal access instruction is unnecessary when evidence beyond ownership or control of the vehicle shows possession.

Hight v. State · filed 2008-08-08(b)

Thus, even if Hight owned or was in exclusive control of the vehicle, it was not the sole evidence of his possession of cocaine, and the trial court therefore did not err in refusing to give the equal access charge.

Simple possession of methamphetamine is a lesser included offense of trafficking in methamphetamine because possession of any amount is included in trafficking.

Gonzalez v. State · filed 2009-08-20

Because possession of any amount of methamphetamine is necessarily included in the elements of trafficking, which elements include knowingly possessing 28 grams or more of methamphetamine, simple possession of methamphetamine is a lesser included offense of trafficking in methamphetamine.

Section 16-13-30(b) manufacturing is a lesser included offense of methamphetamine trafficking, and evidence of manufacture requires a requested jury charge on that offense.

Poole v. State · filed 2010-02-23(b)

Here, there was evidence that Poole manufactured methamphetamine (as prohibited by OCGA § 16-13-30 (b)), and therefore, under the express language of Edwards, the trial court was required to charge the jury on OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) as a lesser included offense to OCGA § 16-13-31 (f) as requested by Poole in writing.

An indictment alleging knowing, intentional, unlawful possession of cocaine states a possession offense under subsection (a), even if labeled possession with intent to distribute.

Bryant v. State · filed 2013-03-27(a)

Although the challenged offense was denominated as “possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,” the allegations tracked the language of possession of a controlled substance and fully apprised Bryant of the offense charged. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (a).

Section 16-13-30(a) does not require a detailed jury definition of possession when the instructions otherwise cover the offense’s elements, circumstantial evidence, mere presence, and reasonable doubt.

Owens v. State · filed 2014-03-28(a)

This record shows that the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of methamphetamine possession and on the law of circumstantial evidence, mere presence and reasonable doubt. Because “[u]pright and intelligent jurors would have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of a simple word like ‘possession,’” a trial court has no responsibility to give any detailed definition of the term, even when the gravamen of the case is a drug charge based on constructive possession.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires proof of possession of codeine, but an indictment’s Schedule V designation need not be proved.

Evans v. the State · filed 2014-12-12(a)

The State was not required to show that the codeine fell specifically within Schedule V.

A charge of possession under § 16-13-30(a) must identify a substance that qualifies as a controlled substance.

The State v. Wright · filed 2015-07-13(a)

The state appeals from the trial court’s grant of a general demurrer against an indictment’s count alleging that Tommy Lugene Wright committed the offense of possession of a controlled substance in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (a). We affirm, because the indictment does not identify a substance listed as a controlled substance under the statute.

An indictment for sale or possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled substance need not expressly allege that the statutory exclusions from Schedule I are inapplicable.

BUDHANI v. the STATE. · filed 2018-03-07(b)

Consequently, although the indictment does not explicitly allege the inapplicability of the exemptions, it inherently does so by alleging that the substance possessed and sold by Budhani was, in fact, by definition, a “schedule I controlled substance.”

An indictment for selling or possessing with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled substance under § 16-13-30(b) is sufficient when it identifies the substance and alleges the prohibited act.

Budhani v. State · filed 2019-06-28(b)

The indictment withstands a general demurrer and satisfies due process here because it alleges the essential elements of the offenses — that Budhani sold, or possessed with intent to distribute, a specific Schedule I controlled substance — under OCGA § 16-13- 30 (b), and put Budhani “on notice of the crimes with which he is charged and against which he must defend.” Jackson, 301 Ga. at 141.

Possession of marijuana is not a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to purchase marijuana because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Diamanta R. Hunter v. State · filed 2020-06-15(j)

The offense of possession of marijuana is not a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to purchase marijuana, as the facts necessary to prove each offense are different.

An accusation under § 16-13-30(a) sufficiently charges possession of a controlled substance when it alleges unlawful possession of a named substance without expressly alleging knowledge.

Tate-Jesurum v. State · filed 2023-06-22(a)

The accusation in this case charged Tate-Jesurum with “unlawfully” possessing a named controlled substance in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) by tracking the language of that statute. As such, it was legally sufficient, and the trial court did not err by denying both the general demurrer and the plea in bar.

Subsection (i) prohibits distributing counterfeit substances, including pills presented as methaqualone and bearing its identifying mark even when they contain a different substance.

Skinner v. State · filed 1987-03-13(i)

Appellant ignores Code Ann. § 79A-811 (i) (now OCGA § 16-13-30 (i)), which prohibits possession, control, delivery, distribution or sale of a “counterfeit substance.” “Counterfeit substance” is defined as “a controlled substance which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, number or device, or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer. . . .” Code Ann. § 79A-802 (f) (now OCGA § 16-13-21 (6)). Hence, the substance transferred was not a “legal substance” because Barnes advised the undercover officer the substance was methaqualone and the officer observed the marking on each pill of “ ‘Lemmon 714,’ which is common to methaqualone tablets.”

Section 16-13-30(i)’s counterfeit substance offense does not cover wax pieces that qualify as an imitation controlled substance.

Guzman v. State · filed 1992-11-04(i)

We find no error. It appears from the record that the wax pieces used in the reverse sting operation fell within the definition of an “imitation controlled substance” (OCGA § 16-13-21 (12.1)) rather than a “counterfeit substance” (OCGA § 16-13-21 (6)).

Subsection (i) makes selling a counterfeit substance a felony; the misdemeanor penalty for an imitation controlled substance does not apply when the substance does not meet that offense’s definition.

Chandler v. State · filed 2008-10-10(i)

Chandler was charged with violating OCGA § 16-13-30 (i), a felony offense. ... Because the evidence here reveals that the substance would not fall under either definition of “imitation controlled substance,” Chandler’s conduct does not fall within the scope of OCGA § 16-13-30.2 (a). The rule of lenity does not apply, and the trial court properly sentenced him for a felony.

A conviction for possessing a counterfeit substance requires evidence that the substance was held out or falsely identified as a controlled substance.

Demarco Montez Cooper v. State · filed 2013-11-04(i)(1)

The State, however, failed to adduce any evidence establishing that the pill bore markings that misidentified or misrepresented it as being MDMA.

The State must notify the defendant that it intends to seek a mandatory life sentence under subsection (d); notice that it will use prior convictions as similar transaction evidence alone is insufficient.

Miller v. State · filed 1995-12-01(d)

The State must provide notice of its intent to seek the mandatory life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30(d) because the notice requirement of OCGA § 17-10-2(a) applies to mandatory life sentences imposed under OCGA § 16-13-30(d).

Section 16-13-30(d) requires a life sentence when a trafficking conviction follows a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Cody v. State · filed 1996-08-12(d)

Cody’s conviction for the more serious offense of trafficking in cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-31 was sufficient in conjunction with his previous conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) to trigger the mandatory life sentence provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).

A pretrial notice identifying prior convictions for use in aggravation permits a life sentence under former subsection (d) when the defendant can investigate and rebut them.

Woods v. State · filed 1996-11-27(d)

Unlike the defendant in Stephens, the record reveals the State provided Woods with pretrial notice that it would use evidence of certain prior convictions in aggravation of Woods' sentence.

Former subsection (d) required a life sentence when a trafficking conviction followed a qualifying conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Brundage v. State · filed 1998-03-20(d)

Brundage’s “conviction for the more serious offense of trafficking in cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-31 was sufficient in conjunction with his previous conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) to trigger the mandatory life sentence provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d). See Gilbert v. State, 208 Ga. App. 258, 259-262 (430 SE2d 391) (1993).”

Section 16-13-30(d) authorizes a life sentence for possession with intent to distribute and cocaine trafficking when prior cocaine sale convictions are final at resentencing.

Covington v. State · filed 1998-04-01(d)

The trial court was authorized by OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) to resentence Covington to life imprisonment for possession and trafficking, as the two earlier cocaine sales convictions were final at the time of resentencing.

Before the 1996 amendment, § 16-13-30(d) required a life sentence for a second conviction for selling or possessing with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance.

Daniels v. State · filed 2000-06-21(d)

The court based its sentence of Daniels on OCGA § 16-13-30 (d), which, at the time, mandated a life sentence for conviction of a second offense of selling or possessing with intent to distribute Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substances. ... Daniels’s life sentence was mandated by law, and it was not void.

The 1996 amendment to subsection (d) allows a sentence of ten to forty years or life imprisonment for a second or subsequent violation of subsection (b).

Jackson v. State · filed 1996-11-05(d)

As amended, OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) imposes, for a second or subsequent violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), a sentence of “not less than ten years nor more than 40 years or life imprisonment.”

Section 16-13-30 permits a separate life sentence for each cocaine-sale count when the defendant has prior cocaine convictions.

Smith v. State · filed 1996-04-05

We find no error in the trial court’s sentencing of Smith to consecutive life sentences. Less than two years before this trial, Smith had been convicted of two counts of possession of cocaine and two counts of sale of cocaine. Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to impose a separate life sentence for the conviction on each separate count.

Section 16-13-30(d) provides a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a second or subsequent offense of selling a controlled substance.

Mims v. State · filed 1997-03-10(d)

Mims was sentenced to life without parole under OCGA §§ 16-13-30 (d) & 17-10-7 (c). The former provides a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a second or subsequent offense of sale of a controlled substance.

At the time of Mikell’s offense, § 16-13-30(d) required a life sentence for repeat drug offenders; the later amendment allowing lesser sentences did not apply retroactively.

Mikell v. State · filed 1998-06-15(d)

The trial court did not err in concluding that it was required to give defendant the maximum sentence of life in prison for selling cocaine in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) due to his prior drug convictions. At the time defendant violated OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) required that repeat drug offenders receive a life sentence.

Section 16-13-30(d) permits enhanced punishment based on prior convictions only when those convictions are final at sentencing.

Covington v. State · filed 1997-05-15(d)

This rule also applies to enhanced punishment pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (d).” ... Accordingly, upon remand Covington should be resentenced for the offense of which he was convicted by the jury.