42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(d) defines labor organizations to include unions that represent workers in collective bargaining.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sheet Metal Workers, International Ass'n, Local No. 122 · filed 1978-11-24(d)

Local 122 is a labor organization, as that term is defined in Section 701(d) of Title VII, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d).

Section 2000e(a) includes labor unions in Title VII’s definition of “person.”

United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers · filed 1968-03-26(a)

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include “one or more individuals, labor unions, * * *; ” § 2000 e-2(c) specifically lists the acts of labor organizations which constitute “unlawful employment practices” under Title VII; § 2000e-2(c) (3) makes it unlawful for a labor organization “to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of [Title VII].”

Section 2000e(a) defines a labor union or one or more individuals as a “person” eligible to use Commission procedures.

Local 186, International Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1969-06-02(a)

Congress specifically provided that a labor union, or one or more individuals, defined as a “person” under Section 2000e(a) and therefore “person aggrieved” under Section 2000e-5(a), could utilize the Commission procedures.

Section 2000e(a) includes governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions in its definition of “person.”

Anderson v. Tennessee Office of Economic Opportunity · filed 1974-10-23(a)

When the Act was amended in 1972, the exemption of the states and political subdivisions thereof from the Act was deleted, and § 2000e(a), which defines “person” under the Act, was amended to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions.”

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of employer, allowing suit against an individual employee who participates in discriminatory managerial decisions.

Padilla v. Stringer · filed 1974-12-31(b)

Sec. 2000e(b) defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce . . . and any agent of such a person . . . ” Accordingly, an individual employee of an employer can be sued for participating in the managerial decisions that constitute the alleged discriminatory conduct. Dr. Stringer in his capacity as director of the zoo is an agent of the city of Albuquerque within the meaning of § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e includes local government agencies in its definition of “persons” who may be Title VII employers.

Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Board of Education · filed 1975-01-08(a)

Agencies of local government, such as the defendant, were included within the definition of “persons” who may be “employers” subject to Title VII by § 2(1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).

Section 2000e(a)'s definition of “person” can include several individuals for purposes of EEOC charge procedures.

Patton v. Conrad Area School District · filed 1975-01-13(a)

A “person” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and regulations “includes one or more individuals . . . associations . . . unincorporated organizations.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), 29 CFR § 1601.2. Thus, several individuals may constitute a “person.”

The 1972 amendment expanded Title VII's definition of “person” to include governments and governmental agencies, bringing state employment within its coverage.

Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Commission · filed 1975-02-28(a)

Congress, aware that millions of state employees were not protected by Title VII, amended the statutory language so that “person” now includes: ... governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, .... § 2000e(a).

The 1972 amendment to § 2000e(a) including governmental agencies in the definition of “person” applies only prospectively.

Weldon v. BOARD OF ED. OF SCH. DIST. OF CITY OF DETROIT · filed 1975-11-17(a)

Under the original enactment, a school district was not a “person,” but a 1972 amendment broadened the definition of “persons” to include governmental agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). The unfair employment practice alleged in this complaint occurred on June 21, 1971. Therefore, jurisdiction over the school board exists only if the 1972 amendment expanding the definition of “person” was intended to have retroactive effect. It is the opinion of this court that section 2000e(a) was intended to have prospective effect only.

Section 2000e(a) brought governmental units within Title VII coverage on March 24, 1972, leaving a city's earlier conduct outside that coverage.

Zichy v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1975-12-29(a)

While the City of Philadelphia undoubtedly did discriminate before March 24, 1972, by denying sick leave to women with maternity-related disabilities, the City at that time was exempt from the provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e(a) and (b) include the defendants in this public school employment case within Title VII’s definitions of persons and employers.

Fabian v. IND. SCH. DIST. NO. 89 OF OKL. CTY., OKL. · filed 1976-02-09(a), (b)

2. The defendants are "persons" and "employers" within the purview of the above-cited civil rights legislation, §§ 2000e(a) and (b).

Section 2000e(a) and (b) covers the defendant school district and officials as “persons” and “employers” under Title VII.

Fabian v. Independent School District No. 89 · filed 1976-02-09(a), (b)

The defendants are “persons” and “employers” within the purview of the above-cited civil rights legislation, §§ 2000e(a) and (b).

Section 2000e(a)’s 1972 expansion of “person” to include governments and political subdivisions does not apply retroactively to discrimination that occurred before the amendment.

12 Fair empl.prac.cas. 836, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,755 Jane Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New · filed 1976-03-08(a)

We must conclude, however, that the 1972 amendment to Title VII does not apply retroactively so as to permit an award of back pay against the city in this case.

Section 2000e(a) includes governmental agencies within the definition of “person,” so a state hospital qualifies.

Henry v. Link · filed 1976-03-16(a)

Under Title VII, the term “person” is defined to include governmental agencies and political subdivisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). Consequently a state hospital is a “person” under Title VII even though it is an agency of the state.

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include governmental agencies, allowing the EEOC to be sued as an entity for a civil claim under Title VII’s charge confidentiality provision.

Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1976-06-25(a)

“Person” is defined in Title VII as including “one or more individuals, governments, [or] governmental agencies. . . .” ... To the extent therefore that the plaintiff states a cause of action under this Title VII provision, the Commission may be sued eo nomine.

Section 2000e(a)’s definition of “person” includes a government-created university corporation.

Solin v. State University of New York · filed 1976-06-28(a)

As a government-created corporation, SUNY fits this definition.

Section 2000e(a) includes labor unions in its definition of “person,” allowing them to qualify as persons aggrieved under Title VII.

Schoeppner v. General Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania · filed 1976-08-10(a)

The foregoing analysis suggests that unions are similar to individuals in that both unions and individuals qualify as “persons”, and as “persons aggrieved” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include individuals and associations, including unincorporated associations.

Josephine WELLS, Appellant, v. SHERWOOD MEDICAL INDUSTRIES, INC., Et Al., Appellees · filed 1977-02-23(a)

Both associational and individual complaints have always been permitted under Title VII. “Person” is defined for the purpose of Title VII to include “one or more individuals,” “associations” and “unincorporated associations.”

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include governmental bodies, allowing Title VII pattern or practice suits against public employers.

United States v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1977-11-10(a)

The language of that section was not changed, but because of the above-mentioned expansion of the definition of “person” to include a “governmental agency, government or political subdivision,” the Attorney General became authorized to pursue pattern or practice actions against public as well as private employers under § 2000e-6(a).

Section 2000e(a) includes labor unions in Title VII’s definition of “person.”

International Woodworkers v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1977-12-16(a)

Labor unions are expressly included in the definition of “person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).

Section 2000e(a) includes labor unions in its definition of “person,” allowing them to qualify as persons aggrieved under Title VII.

International Woodworkers of America v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1978-01-05(a)

In addition, it appears that there are no legislative limitations on IWA's standing. Under Title VII, a suit alleging discrimination can be brought by any "person claiming to be aggrieved." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (e). Labor unions are expressly included in the definition of "person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).

Section 2000e(a) brings political subdivisions within Title VII’s coverage effective March 24, 1972.

Kirkland v. Buffalo Board of Education · filed 1979-10-09(a)

In 1972, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) to include “political subdivisions” within the purview of the statute, effective March 24, 1972 for the first time.

Section 2000e(a) includes governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions within Title VII’s covered entities.

20 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1728, 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,313 Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Coleman A. Young, Mayo · filed 1979-10-12(a)

March 24, 1972 is the effective date of Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, which amended Title VII to include “governments, governmental agencies [and] political subdivisions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).

Section 2000e(a) includes governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions in its definition of “person.”

Whiting v. Jackson State University · filed 1980-04-28(a)

The 1972 amendments to Title VII altered the definition of "person" in § 701(a) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), to provide that "governments, governmental agencies, (and) political subdivisions" are included within that term. For the first time, state and local governments, and their agencies, had to abide by the statute.

The definition of “employer” includes a political subdivision and its agent, so an elected county sheriff is an agent of the county for hiring and firing employees.

24 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1563, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,401 Anne Owens v. Rush · filed 1980-12-15(a), (b)

In short, we think it is clear that for purposes of Title VII an elected county sheriff is an agent of the county for all matters properly committed to his discretion-including the hiring and firing of employees.

Section 2000e(f) defines “employee” for Title VII and excludes certain elected officials, personal staff, and policy-level appointees.

Calderon v. Martin County · filed 1981-03-13(f)

We must reverse the dismissal because a plaintiff’s status as an employee under Title VIL is a question of federal, rather than of state, law; it is to be ascertained through consideration of the statutory language of the Act, its legislative history, existing federal case law, and the particular circumstances of the case at hand.

Section 2000e(a) includes state and local governments within the persons covered by Title VII.

Wilmore v. City of Wilmington · filed 1982-01-19(a)

In 1972 Congress amended Title VII to include State and local governments within the class of persons liable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), Pub.L. 92-261 § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103.

Section 2000e(a) includes associations in its definition of “person,” allowing an association with a sufficient connection to affected workers to file an EEOC charge on their behalf.

Webb v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1982-08-13(a)

It is unquestioned that a discrimination charge may be filed with EEOC by any person claiming to have been discriminated against or by others on behalf of any aggrieved person. ... The Court is persuaded that the nexus between Federation, the plaintiffs and the purported class is sufficient to establish standing for Federation to act in representative capacity in the EEOC and these proceedings.

Section 2000e defines covered persons, employers, and States for purposes of Title VII.

Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands · filed 1983-07-01(a), (b), (i)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i) includes the fifty states and Guam within the definition of the "States" to which Title VII applies. Under Covenant § 502(a)(2), the NMI also is a "State" for purposes of Title VII. ... The Trust Territory government and the High Commissioner are both "persons" under § 2000e(a) and therefore fit within § 2000e(b)'s definition of "employers" who must comply with Title VII.

Section 2000e(a) includes governmental agencies in the definition of “person” for Title VII remedies.

Snow v. Nevada Department of Prisons · filed 1984-01-30(a)

Governmental agencies are included within the definition of “person” against whom remedies may be imposed for unlawful (discriminatory) employment practices.

Section 2000e includes partnerships as persons and defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees for the specified period.

Hishon v. King & Spalding · filed 1984-05-22(a), (b)

The statute defines an "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year," § 2000e(b), and a "person" is explicitly defined to include "partnerships," § 2000e(a). The complaint alleges that respondent's partnership satisfies these requirements.

Section 2000e(f) does not count union board members as employees for Title VII coverage when they do not perform traditional employee duties.

Chavero v. Local 241, a Division of the Amalgamated Transit Union · filed 1986-04-03(f)

As such, the individual board members are not employees for Title VII coverage.

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include governments, governmental agencies, and associations.

Greater Buffalo Chapter, American Red Cross v. State Division of Human Rights · filed 1986-07-11(a)

Significantly, the term "person” as used in the statute specifically is defined as including "one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies * * * [and] associations” (42 USC § 2000e [a]; emphasis added).

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include governments, government agencies, and political subdivisions.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Illinois State Tollway Authority · filed 1986-09-03(a)

Title VII's definitional provision, § 710(a), defines "person" (see 29 U.S.C. § 161(1)) to include governments, government agencies, and political subdivisions. Thus the EEOC is empowered to enforce subpoenas against state agencies.

Section 2000e(b) treats city officials acting as agents of the city in their official capacities as employers under Title VII.

Storey v. City of Sparta Police Department · filed 1987-05-26(b)

They are liable for unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory acts in their official capacity as agents of the City of Sparta and therefore as “employers.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(a) includes governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions within Title VII’s definition of a person.

Coleman v. Wayne State University · filed 1987-07-07(a)

In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to bring within its purview “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions ...,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), as persons forbidden from subjecting individuals to employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Section 2000e(a) includes governments and governmental agencies in Title VII’s definition of a person.

Lindas v. Cady · filed 1989-06-23(a)

Indeed, Title VII includes within the definition of "person," "governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(a).

Section 2000e(a) includes labor unions in its definition of “person,” allowing a union to be an aggrieved plaintiff under Title VII.

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. LTV Aerospace & Defens · filed 1991-03-26(a)

Defendants’ argument is defective because it fails to address the fact that for the purposes of Title VII, a union is a person. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (defining the term “person” as including labor unions). Accordingly, because a union is a person under Title VII, a union may also be a “person aggrieved” or a “person claiming to be aggrieved” who has standing to sue under Title VII—that is, a member of an aggrieved class.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer does not make a franchisor the employer of a franchisee’s workers when the franchisor lacks control over the franchisee’s labor relations.

Evans v. McDonald Corporation, a Delaware Corporation McDonald of Claremore, a Defunct Oklahoma Corporation D · filed 1991-04-09(b)

Thus, on the record before us, we hold, as a matter of law, that McDonald’s did not have the control over Everett Allen’s franchises necessary to make it liable as an employer of Everett Allen’s employees under Title VII.

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include individuals and governmental agencies, so Title VII principles can apply to a board’s alleged discrimination.

Farias v. Bexar County Board of Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Services · filed 1991-04-12(a)

Farias's contention appears to be that Title VII principles are inappropriate because the statute applies only to the actions of individuals, not to groups or agencies such as the Board members which allegedly discriminated against him. This is incorrect. Title VII defines "persons" as including "one or more individuals" and "governmental agencies". 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(a).

Section 2000e limits Title VII coverage to employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations.

Graham v. Secretary of Health and Human Services · filed 1992-02-07

The defendants listed in her complaint are not employers, employment agencies, or labor organizations under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and are not subject to suit under Title VII.

Section 2000e does not treat a pharmacy board performing licensing activities as an employer under Title VII.

Johnson v. Charles O. Walgreen, Leroy H. Johnson v. Stanley Goldstein · filed 1992-12-07(b)

In any event, as noted by the district court, the Board, in performing licensing activities, is not an employer within the meaning of either statute.

Section 2000e(a) includes governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions in its definition of a person.

Ethridge v. State of Ala. · filed 1993-11-15(a)

42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(7) incorporates the definition of person in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(a). That section defines person to include “governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions.” Slocomb, therefore, satisfies the definition of employer to that extent.

Section 2000e(a) defines “person” to include governments and governmental agencies.

Pazer v. New York State Board of Law Examiners · filed 1994-04-26(a)

The term “person” is defined as having the same meaning given the term in § 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 12111(7) (Supp. IV 1992), which defines “person” to include governments and governmental agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(1988). ... Although the express of language of this regulation refers to “a private entity,” since the statute quoted above defines “person” to include governments and government agencies, the regulation must be interpreted to apply to the Board.

Section 2000e(b)’s fifteen-employee threshold does not count an owner whose services are not performed in exchange for compensation.

Vick v. Foote, Inc. · filed 1995-08-01(b)

In considering the motion to dismiss the Title VII claims, the question is whether, as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) requires, the defendant had “fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” ... The economic reality of Foote’s relationship with his company is that he is an owner, not an employee.

Related companies may be treated as a single Title VII employer when they meet the integrated enterprise test.

Eichenwald v. Krigel's, Inc. · filed 1995-12-13(b)

Moreover, the evidence is abundantly clear both that the. defendants meet the integrated enterprise test and that Mr. Shine’s conduct is attributable to them.

Section 2000e(b) does not make an individual an employer merely because he recommends an employee’s termination without delegated authority over employment decisions.

Hamm v. Lake View Community Hospital · filed 1996-12-02(b)

Second, Hamm has not alleged a sufficient delegation of rights to Todd to establish that Todd is an employer for Title VII purposes. Hamm has merely averred that Todd recommended that she be terminated. There is no allegation that Todd was delegated responsibility for deciding whether or not Hamm would be terminated nor any allegation that Todd had authority to decide Hamm’s employment status or conditions. Merely recommending that Hamm be fired does not rise to the level of exercising rights traditionally reserved to the employer.

Referral fees alone do not make recipients employees for counting under § 2000e(b) without evidence that the business controlled their work.

McIntire v. Bowen-Leavitt · filed 1996-12-05(b)

McIntire argues that the Far West Bank personnel who occasionally direct potential customers to Bowen-Leavitt must be counted as employees. This is without merit. The only basis McIntire offers for finding these individuals to be employees is that Bowen-Leavitt paid them a small fee for referrals. McIntire does not offer any evidence showing that Bowen-Leavitt controlled, in any way whatsoever, the means and manner of their work.

Section 2000e(b) counts a restaurant proprietor and her husband as employees when they work in the business.

Coulstring v. Topic of the Town · filed 1998-02-11(b)

As the record shows her husband was the primary cook for the restaurant and that she oversaw most of its operations, it is proper, the court finds and rules, to include them as employees for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s fifteen-employee threshold does not count volunteers whose service awards guarantee no compensation for their work.

Keller v. Niskayuna Consolidated Fire District 1 · filed 1999-06-08(b)

This Court concludes that, absent a guarantee of direct or indirect financial consideration for the work provided, an individual cannot be considered to be “hired.” ... Thus, the volunteer firefighters cannot be considered employees under Title VII as a matter of law and the Fire District therefore lacked the requisite fifteen employees during the years 1994 and 1995.

Section 2000e(f) requires both an employment relationship shown by the payroll method and employee status under common-law agency principles; directors who fail either requirement do not count as employees.

Owens v. Southern Development Council, Inc. · filed 1999-08-17(f)

Therefore, for an individual to be an ‘employee’ under Title VII, the ‘payroll method’ and the traditional agency-law definition of ‘employee’ must be satisfied. ... The failure to satisfy either element precludes a finding that an individual is an ‘employee.’

Section 2000e(a) includes governments and governmental agencies in Title VII’s definition of “person,” supporting Title VII claims against state agencies.

Gaynor v. Martin · filed 1999-11-29(a)

This clear congressional intent appears in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended the definition of “person” in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions.” ... Thus, plaintiffs Title VII claims against the Commission and Martin sued in his official capacity are not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

A person who controls an employer’s policies as its sole shareholder and director is not counted as an employee toward Title VII’s 15-employee threshold.

Dawn Drescher v. Todd E. Shatkin, Dds, Samuel Shatkin, Sr., Dds, Md, Samuel Shatkin, Jr., Dds, Samuel Shatkin, Dds, Md, · filed 2002-02-08(f)

The persons who are “employees” empowered to enforce the statute against their employers are the ones to be counted as “employees” in determining whether the employer has 15 or more employees. We conclude that Shatkin Sr. is not an “employee” for purposes of the act, and that Shatkin P.C. therefore falls below the fifteen-employee threshold of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s employee threshold includes workers whose working relationship shows they are employees rather than independent contractors.

Kaiser v. ACCO Management Company LLC · filed 2025-02-20(b)

Because each of the five Knight factors is either neutral or weighs in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Per-Visit Nurses were employees, and thus ACCO falls within the Title VII definition of “employer” and is therefore subject to Title VII liability for events occurring during 2020 and 2021.

Section 2000e(c) defines an employment agency as a person who regularly procures employees for employers or work opportunities for employees; the worker must have an employment relationship with the employer.

Girard v. International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, Inc. · filed 2021-01-22(c)

Title VII defines an "employment agency" to mean "any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c). ... Because Girard has failed to allege that she was employed by the schools, she has also not alleged that defendants are liable as "employment agencies" under Title VII.

Section 2000e(c) defines an employment agency by its regular procurement of employees or work opportunities; screening applicants for an employer does not qualify.

Simpson v. Cook County Sheriff's Office · filed 2019-08-08(c)

Although Title VII makes it illegal for an employment agency to engage in racial discrimination, the term “employment agency” is defined as only encompassing those who regularly undertake to “procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c). Here, there is no allegation that the Merit Board is procuring employees or employment. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the Merit Board screens potential applicants on behalf of the Sheriff. The Court does not interpret this activity as falling within the scope of “procuring” those applicants or their employment, and thereby disagrees with the limited authorities from other jurisdictions holding to the contrary.

Section 2000e(c) does not treat a body that screens applicants on an employer’s behalf as an employment agency merely because it performs that screening.

Simpson v. Cook County Sheriff's Office · filed 2019-07-24(c)

Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the Merit Board screens potential applicants on behalf of the Sheriff. The Court does not interpret this activity as falling within the scope of “procuring” those applicants or their employment, and thereby disagrees with the limited authorities from other jurisdictions holding to the contrary.

Section 2000e(c) defines an employment agency to include a person who regularly procures employees for employers or work opportunities for employees, as well as that person’s agents.

Olvera-Morales v. International Labor Management Corp. · filed 2007-11-07(c)

“The term ‘employment agency’ means any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to proeure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c). Regardless of the label attached to Defendants’ role in the recruitment process, it is evident that they regularly procured temporary foreign workers for employers.

Section 2000e(c) includes federally assisted state employment services within its definition of an employment agency.

Johnson v. LOUISIANA STATE EMP. SERVICE IN SHREVEPORT · filed 1968-12-31(c)

Defendants’ contention that they are not an “employer” within the meaning of the Act is without merit because it erroneously presupposes that the Act reaches only discriminatory acts by “employers.” The Act, at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, prohibits discriminatory practices by “an employment agency.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e defines an “employment agency” as “ * * * any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation, to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person; but shall not include * * * an agency of a State or political subdivision of a State, except that such term shall include * * * the system of State and local employment services receiving Federal assistance.”

Section 2000e(c) defines an employment agency as a person regularly procuring employees or employment opportunities as a profession or business.

Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Company · filed 1970-06-12(c)

However, the statutory requirement that an employment agency be one that “regularly” undertakes to procure employees or employment opportunities indicates that the Congress had in mind to include only those engaged to a significant degree in that kind of activity as their profession or business.

Section 2000e(c) defines employment agency broadly enough to include a law school placement office that helps students and graduates find work.

Kaplowitz v. University of Chicago · filed 1974-10-22(c)

However, we agree with plaintiffs that a liberal construction of the term employment agency is required to best effectuate the purposes of Title VII, and that the Placement Office of the University of Chicago Law School is within the scope of the definition.

Section 2000e(c) covers a federally funded employment service under Title VII’s employment-agency definition.

17 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1430, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8520 Eroneous Shipp v. Memphis Area Office, Tennessee Department of E · filed 1978-08-07(c)

Title VII jurisdiction over TDES was properly invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c). TDES is a federally funded employment service.

The definitions of “employer” and “employment agency” in § 2000e do not cover a state commission's licensing activities when it neither employs registered persons nor procures workers or jobs.

National Organization for Women v. Waterfront Commission · filed 1979-03-23(b), (e)

A simple reading of the above definitions suffices to demonstrate that they are not intended to apply to the kind of licensing activity in which the Commission engages. In its licensing role, the Commission neither pays the wages nor engages the services of persons it registers. Nor does it undertake to obtain workers for employers or jobs for workers. It is, therefore, neither an “employer” nor an “employment agency” with respect to persons desiring registration.

Section 2000e(c) defines an employment agency to include a person regularly undertaking to procure employees or employment opportunities, including that person's agent.

Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n · filed 1979-10-11(c)

The Act itself defines an employment agency as follows: ... The term “employment agency” means any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person. ... As she has alleged that defendant Georgia Section has a “principal function” of “referring” the Court concludes that she has sufficiently alleged a “regular undertaking ... to procure for employees opportunities to work. . . ”

A governmental agency may qualify as an employment agency under Title VII.

Liberles v. County of Cook · filed 1983-05-26(a)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976), a governmental agency may be an employment agency.

Section 2000e(c)’s definition of “employment agency” applies only to Title VII claims, not to § 1981 claims.

Anderson v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1984-03-12(c)

The definition of “employment agency” in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) applies only to claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(c) does not treat an entity as an employment agency when it procures neither employees for a Title VII employer nor opportunities for employees to work for one.

Lavrov v. NCR Corp. · filed 1984-04-20(c)

Thus, the Court concludes that NCR is not an employment agency when it neither procured employees for an employer, nor procured, for an employee, the opportunity to work for an employer.

Section 2000e(c)'s definition of an employment agency includes a state employment service that refers applicants for jobs.

Hazel Hill v. Mississippi State Employment Service · filed 1991-04-15(c)

MSES is a division of MESC and constitutes an employment agency as defined in Sec. 701(c), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(c) ... The district court found that MSES's did not comply with EMSII in one respect.

Section 2000e(c) does not treat a business that refers nurses only to individual patients as an employment agency because those patients are not Title VII employers.

Cecil C. Shrock, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Altru Nurses Registry, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 1987-01-20(c)

The reference is to the statutory definition of employer. Since — according to affidavits that Shrock failed to rebut in the manner prescribed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 — Altru refers nurses only to individual patients and to persons (mainly doctors) acting on behalf of individual patients, and since neither patient nor doctor is a Title VII employer, the district court was unquestionably correct in granting Altru’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.

Section 2000e(c) defines an employment agency as an entity that regularly procures workers for an employer, without a minimum number of employees or weeks of employment for the agency.

Jones v. Southeast Alabama Baseball Umpires Ass'n · filed 1994-08-12(c)

Unlike the definition for “employer” under the ADA, the definition for “employment agency” does not require a minimum number of either employees or weeks of employment for the agency. Nevertheless, the definition does require that, in order to be an “employment agency,” the entity must regularly do business with an “employer,” and the term “employer” as used in the definition of “employment agency” is limited to those employers that fall within the definition of “employer”.

Section 2000e(c) includes agencies that procure opportunities to work for employees within its definition of an employment agency; the employees need not already hold jobs.

Wynn v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. · filed 2002-01-24(c)

Thus, this definition is identical to the ADEA definition, except that it includes the additional phrase “or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer.” ... Therefore, Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the use of the word “employees” in the “employment agency” definition is unavailing and does not disturb the Court’s analysis.

Section 2000e(c) covers an employment agency that procures work opportunities for an employer when the worker has adequately pleaded an employment relationship with that employer.

Covington v. International Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials · filed 2013-03-14(c)

An “employment agency” is defined under Title VII as “any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person.” §2000e(c). Board 193 does not deny that it comes within the Title VII definition of employment agency. However, it states that it cannot be liable because to be liable as an employment agency, there has to be an employment relationship between Covington and Hamilton. As stated above, Covington has adequately pled an employment relationship with Hamilton. Therefore, Board 193 is liable as an employment agency.

Section 2000e(c)’s definition of an employment agency requires active referral of workers to employers; maintaining a career assistance website alone does not qualify.

Gunawardana v. American Veterinary Medical Association · filed 2021-01-28(c)

To be an “employment agency” under Title VII, the entity must “regularly undertak[e] with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ... Dr. Gunawardana fails to allege that the AVMA actively refers veterinarians to animal clinics, hospitals, or other organizations that employ veterinarians.

Section 2000e(c)'s definition of an employment agency includes the Mississippi State Employment Service.

Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc. · filed 1969-02-14(c)

which administers the Mississippi State Employment Service, an employment agency as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c).

Section 2000e(c) includes the Mississippi State Employment Service within Title VII’s definition of an employment agency.

Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc. · filed 1970-06-12(c)

Defendant Aldridge is Chairman of MESC, ... which administers the Mississippi State Employment Service, an employment agency as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c).

Section 2000e(f) uses common law agency principles to distinguish employees from independent contractors, who are outside Title VII’s coverage.

Cilecek v. Inova Health System Services · filed 1997-06-02(f)

Considering all the relevant factors, we conclude that Cilecek was an independent contractor and that, therefore, he is not entitled to sue either Emergency Physicians or Inova under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on their termination of the relationship.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII protection.

Alfred v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance · filed 1997-03-31(f)

In this case, applying the proper standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and treating all of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff as true, the court finds as a matter' of law that had the plaintiff obtained the agency position she wanted, she would have been an independent contractor, not the defendant’s employee, for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee broadly and does not exclude in-house attorneys from Title VII protection.

Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys Inc · filed 1997-03-26(f)

Title VII defines the "employee" who can bring suit in broad terms. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994). Although that same section contains discrete exclusions, such as exempting persons elected to public office, their personal staff, and policy-making appointees, Congress did not exclude in-house attorneys.

Section 2000e(f) excludes assistant state’s attorneys from Title VII’s definition of employee as appointees on a policy-making level.

Guy v. State of Illinois · filed 1997-02-14(f)

It is apparent to this court that, based on this precedent, ASAs are “appointees on a policy-making level” under § 2000e(f).

A bona fide partner is not an employee entitled to Title VII protection for an allegedly discriminatory discharge.

Rhoads v. Jones Financial Companies · filed 1997-02-11(f)

The evidence before the Court shows that at the time of plaintiff's alleged discriminatory discharge, plaintiff was a bona fide partner and not an employee of the partnership. As such, plaintiff cannot invoke the protection of the federal antidiscriminatory statutes to support her claims of discriminatory discharge as alleged in Counts I and II of her Complaint.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors, whose status is determined under common law agency principles.

Dr. Mark F. Alexander v. Rush North Shore Medical Center · filed 1997-02-07(f)

Given that Doe’s holding is inconsistent with Knight and Ost, Dr. Alexander’s status as an independent contractor precludes him from bringing a Title VII action against the hospital, and thus the entry of summary judgment against Dr. Alexander would have been appropriate.

Section 2000e’s employee definition is applied through a hybrid test that focuses on the hiring party’s right to control how the work is done while considering other aspects of the working relationship.

Lambertsen v. Utah Department of Corrections · filed 1996-03-28(f)

Both approaches emphasize the right of the hiring party to control the means and manner by which the work is accomplished, but allow ... consideration of other factors as well. ... Accordingly, we conclude it was proper for the district court to apply the hybrid approach for purposes of determining whether the Department was plaintiff's employer under Title VII.

Whether a worker is an employee under Title VII may present a factual dispute that precludes summary judgment.

Robbins v. Fragrance Impressions Ltd. · filed 1996-03-31(f)

The Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was an employee or an independent contractor at the time of her resignation in February 1993 and, therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate on this ground.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer; an independent contractor is outside that definition.

Daniell v. Old Line Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 1996-02-26(f)

The term “employee” is defined as “an individual employed by an employer.” ... The uncontradicted, undisputed facts establish that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was not defendants’ employee.

Section 2000e(f) defines who qualifies as an employee for Title VII coverage.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic Knights Insurance Society · filed 1996-02-16(f)

The central issue before the court is whether an insurance agent for Catholic Knights is an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of Title VII. ... Accordingly, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that Catholic Knights did not control the means and manner of the agent’s work, and that the insurance agent are independent contractors.

Section 2000e(f) defines “employee,” and courts apply a hybrid economic realities and common law control test to determine whether a worker qualifies.

Barnes v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance · filed 1993-04-05(f)

Title VII defines the term “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). To determine employee status within that broad and circular definition, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a hybrid economic realities/eommonlaw control test. ... In this case, the evidence taken as a whole conclusively establishes the existence of an independent contractor relationship.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes unpaid volunteers, so they do not count toward the fifteen employees required for Title VII coverage.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc. · filed 1993-02-10(f)

The case law in this area clearly indicates that unpaid volunteers, such as the members of the Fire Company, are not to be considered “employees” for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e limits Title VII employment protections to employees, so a federal prisoner is not covered.

Plunkett v. Benjamin F. Baer, Chairman, U.S. Parole Commission · filed 1992-05-06

Finally, Plunkett's claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment. Because Plunkett is a federal prisoner, not an employee, Title VII is inapplicable.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee includes undocumented aliens employed in the United States.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Tortilleria "La Mejor" · filed 1991-02-20(f)

Consequently, the court concludes, as a matter of law, that the protections of Title VII were intended by Congress to run to aliens, whether documented or not, who are employed within the United States.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors when the business does not meaningfully control the details of their work.

Krijn v. Pogue Simone Real Estate Co. · filed 1990-10-09(f)

Nowhere in the record is it shown that Pogue Simone exhibited such control over Krijn as to be deemed her “employer” sufficient to defeat the presumption that Krijn was no more than an independent contractor.

Section 2000e(f) excludes independent contractors from the definition of employee; courts assess the working relationship, especially the employer’s control and the method of compensation.

Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1990-07-24(f)

In order to prevail under Title VII, however, she must also show that she was the defendant’s employee. In light of the facts discussed above, particularly Farm Bureau’s minimal control over Ms. Knight, and the method and manner of her compensation, the court concludes that Ms. Knight’s relationship to Farm Bureau was and is that of an independent contractor, not that of an employee.

Section 2000e(f)'s definition of employee is assessed under the economic realities test, which excludes an independent contractor.

Kirby v. Swimfashions · filed 1990-06-01(f)

To fall within the concept of an "employee" for the purposes of these acts, this Circuit applies the "economic realities" test. ... On the contrary, the record shows that Kirby was an independent contractor.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee limits Title VII protection to people who qualify as employees.

Makram Tadros, M.D. v. D. Jackson Coleman, M.D., and Cornell University Medical College · filed 1990-03-09(f)

We agree with the district court’s thoroughly reasoned conclusion that Tadros was not an employee entitled to the protection of Title VII and that neither his EEOC charge nor his complaint were timely filed.

Employee status under Title VII depends on the economic realities of the work relationship, with particular emphasis on the putative employer’s right to control how the work is performed.

Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc. · filed 1988-06-21(f)

We agree with the district court that Diggs was not an employee of Harris Hospital for purposes of Title VII.

Employee status under Title VII depends on the economic realities of the relationship, including access to comparable work and the nature of the disciplinary process; a physician with hospital staff privileges can qualify.

Ross v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 1988-01-15(f)

Beaumont contends that it is not subject to the strictures of Title VII, in that Ross was an independent contractor — not an employee — who had privileges to perform surgery at its Hospital facility. This Court disagrees. ... This Court believes that issues which address an employee’s ability to obtain comparable employment and the nature of the disciplinary mechanism are additional factors which should be explored in an attempt to resolve this issue. ... Ross clearly satisfies Title VII under this standard.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied using a test that focuses on the employer’s control while considering other features of the work relationship.

Mary M. MARES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John O. MARSH, Secretary of the Army, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-12-10(f)

In addition, we are persuaded that a test .which focuses on the extent of control exercised by the employer, against the backdrop of the other factors, is particularly suited for claims by alleged federal employees.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee does not exclude former employees from Title VII retaliation protection for conduct arising from their employment relationship.

Bilka v. Pepe's Inc. · filed 1985-01-09(f)

Title VII defines an “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... We disagree with this overly literal interpretation of the statute. ... Section 704(a) was obviously written to prevent employers from chilling employees’ assertions of Title VII rights, and the section should be read broadly to protect former employees as well as current employees.

A temporary worker may be an employee of both a staffing agency and the business directing her work, even when the agency pays her.

Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. · filed 1984-10-10(f)

That plaintiff was paid directly by Mature Temps is not conclusive that she was solely its employee. That she was subject to the direction of Merrill Lynch in her work assignments, hours of service, and other usual aspects of an employee-employer relationship permits an inference that she was an employee of both Mature Temps and Merrill Lynch during the two-week period in question.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee status by the economic realities of the work relationship; a contract’s description of a worker as an independent contractor does not control.

Trudy UNGER, Plaintiff-Appellee, Counter-Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED FOODS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, Counter-Appe · filed 1981-08-14(f)

Thus, although plaintiff’s contract was in evidence, its language does not control plaintiffs status under Title VII. ... The district court did not abuse its discretion by weighing these factors and concluding that plaintiff was an “employee” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of “employee” does not determine who has standing to seek Title VII remedies.

Hackett v. Mcguire Brothers, Inc. · filed 1971-07-08(f)

In reaching the conclusion that Hackett, as a pensioner, lacked standing the district court relied upon the definition of "employee" in Section 701(f) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), as "an individual employed by an employer." But that definition, in a general section of the Title devoted to definitions, does not speak to the issue of standing to invoke the remedies of the Act.

Section 2000e(f)'s definition of “employee” does not determine who has standing to seek Title VII remedies.

Hackett v. McGuire Bros. · filed 1971-07-08(f)

In reaching the conclusion that Hack-ett, as a pensioner, lacked standing the district court relied upon the definition of “employee” in Section 701(f) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), as “an individual employed by an employer.” But that definition, in a general section of the Title devoted to definitions, does not speak to the issue of standing to invoke the remedies of the Act.

Section 2000e(f) covers a minister selected, controlled, trained, and paid by a church as an employee.

Mrs. Billie B. McCLURE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the SALVATION ARMY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1972-04-26(f)

Thus the record shows that Mrs. McClure was selected, employed, controlled, trained, and paid by The Salvation Army. When the existence of such factors is shown, the individual falls within the definition of “employee”.

Section 2000e’s definition of “employee” does not limit Title VII’s references to “any individual” to a defendant’s own employees.

Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson · filed 1973-11-29(f)

The Act defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer,” but nowhere are there words of limitation that restrict references in the Act to “any individual” as comprehending only an employee of an employer.

Section 2000e covers state employees, except elected officials and specified members of their personal or policy staff.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer · filed 1974-09-16(f)

Clearly, the law requires that all state employees, except those specifically exempted (such as those elected to public office or their personal or policy staff of advisers) are subject to and protected by the discrimination prohibitions of the federal law.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an assistant district attorney who serves on an elected district attorney’s personal staff from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Wall v. Coleman · filed 1975-04-18(f)

It is thus the court’s considered judgment that giving the statutory language the narrowest possible construction, an assistant district attorney is a member of the personal staff of this publicly elected defendant district attorney and as such is not a position of employment subject to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 2000e(f) can cover attorneys at a small law firm as employees despite their professional independence; employee status depends on the totality of the firm’s arrangements.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rinella & Rinella · filed 1975-07-22(f)

Accordingly, we do not find that the greater independence and authority generally afforded attorneys associated with smaller law firms precludes their being employees of the firm. Rather, the court must examine the totality of the firm’s arrangements to determine whether an employer-employee relationship in fact exists.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is interpreted under common-law agency principles.

Smith v. Dutra Trucking Company · filed 1976-04-02(f)

While the Court agrees with plaintiff that Title VII is not to be construed narrowly, there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act to indicate a Congressional intent to construe the term “employee” in any manner other than in accordance with common-law agency principles.

Section 2000e(f)’s immediate-adviser exemption requires a close advisory relationship with an elected official; bill drafting and research for legislators did not establish that relationship.

Gearhart v. State of Oregon · filed 1976-03-29(f)

Her responsibilities to legislators who called upon her for bill drafting, research and other allied chores were not of the sort that necessitate sensitive and intimate relationships of the sort that the Congress seems to have had in mind when drafting the exemption.

Section 2000e(f)’s exclusions for an elected official’s personal staff and policy-level appointees are construed narrowly and did not cover a North Dakota deputy sheriff.

Howard v. Ward County · filed 1976-07-30(f)

So, construing the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) narrowly, I find that Plaintiff was not “chosen by [the Sheriff] to be on [his] personal staff.” Nor can I find that the Plaintiff is “an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the [Sheriff’s] office.”

Section 2000e(f) does not treat partners who own and manage a business as employees for purposes of the fifteen-employee threshold.

BURKE v. FRIEDMAN · filed 1977-06-20(f)

Thus, the Court's statement in Walling that the common law definition for employee does not control in the face of a statutory definition is not persuasive in the case at bar since § 2000e(f) does not expand the definition of employee to include a partner.

Section 2000e(f) does not treat partners who own and manage a business as employees for the fifteen-employee threshold.

Burke v. Friedman · filed 1977-06-20(f)

For the foregoing reasons, we find based on the facts of this particular case that defendant partners are not employees.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an independent contractor from Title VII employee status.

Jenkins v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1977-09-14(f)

All these indicia point to the conclusion that Jenkins was an independent contractor and not a Title VII employee.

Section 2000e(f)'s definition of “employee” includes former employees for purposes of Title VII's protection against retaliation by a former employer.

Bertha M. RUTHERFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN BANK OF COMMERCE, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1977-11-21(f)

In the definition section of the subchapter, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), the term “employee” is defined as meaning “an individual employed by an employer . . . .” ... At the time of the alleged discrimination by the Bank, Rutherford was not an “employee” of the Bank, only a “former employee,” and because of that fact the statute does not apply to the present case. The trial court rejected this argument, as do we.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of “employee” includes former employees when applying Title VII’s retaliation provision.

Irene PANTCHENKO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C. B. DOLGE COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1978-08-15(f)

With these principles in mind we view the term “employee” as used in the statute as including a former employee.

Section 2000e(f) determines employee status from the economic realities of the work relationship, considering all the circumstances rather than the worker’s contract label alone.

Spirides v. John E. Reinhardt, Director of United States International Communication Agency · filed 1979-07-10(f)

Rather, determination of whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of the Act involves, as appellant suggests, analysis of the “economic realities” of the work relationship.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is construed under common law principles, with the employer’s right to control the worker’s conduct as the essential factor.

Members of Bridgeport Housing Authority Police Force v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1980-01-29(f)

Section 701(f) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), defines an employee as “an individual employed by an employer.” In the absence of any further direction from the statute or its legislative history, the Court will construe those terms in accordance with common law principles. ... The essential characteristic of the employer-employee relationship is the employer’s power or right to control the employee’s conduct. ... It is clear from the facts set out above that the City is the plaintiffs’ employer; it determines and pays their salaries, controls their conduct on the job, directs their assignments and alone possesses the power to fire them.

Section 2000e(f) excludes a person on an elected official's personal staff from the definition of employee, unless the person is subject to state civil service laws.

Ramirez v. San Mateo County District Attorney's Office · filed 1981-02-12(f)

We conclude that when a job includes this level of personal accountability to one elected official, it is precisely the sort of job Congress envisioned to be within the "personal staff" of that official and thus exempt from Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is construed using common-law agency principles, considering the economic realities of the work relationship and the employer’s right to control the worker.

Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc. · filed 1982-04-12(f)

This does not mean, however, that the economic realities with respect to the dependence of the individual on the employment will control. Rather, it is the economic realities of the relationship viewed in light of the common law principles of agency and the right of the employer to control the employee that are determinative.

Section 2000e(f)'s definition of employee excludes partners in a law firm partnership from employees of the firm.

Elizabeth Anderson HISHON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KING & SPALDING, a Partnership, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-06-17(f)

The partnership is the appellant's employer; the partners own the partnership; they are not its "employees" under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) requires consideration of the deputy’s working relationship with the sheriff to determine whether a sheriff’s deputy is an employee under Title VII.

Brewster v. Shockley · filed 1983-01-13(f)

The court is of the opinion that the determination of whether a sheriff’s deputy is an “employee” under the Act should be made by considering evidence relevant to the factors used in the Kyles case and other like evidence rather than including wholesale, sheriff’s deputies in the definition of “employee” as the Howard case did.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee broadly, requiring employee status to be determined from the economic realities of the relationship rather than the worker's label.

Armbruster v. Quinn · filed 1983-08-19(f)

Title VII defines employee in broad language: "the term 'employee' means an individual employed by an employer ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Rather, one must examine the economic realities underlying the relationship between the individual and the so-called principal in an effort to determine whether that individual is likely to be susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the act was designed to eliminate.

Section 2000e(f) excludes policymaking appointees from Title VII's definition of employee.

Cronovich v. Dunn · filed 1983-09-21(f)

On October 28, 1981 I entered an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., on the grounds the position of Friend of the Court is a policymaking position excluded from Section 701(f) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee requires examining the economic realities of the relationship, especially the employer’s right to control the worker; voluntary physicians without an employment relationship are excluded.

Beverley v. Douglas · filed 1984-07-30(f)

Determination of whether an individual is an employee for the purposes of Title VII requires an analysis of the “economic realities” of the situation “viewed in light of the common law principles of agency and the right of the employer to control the employee.” ... Consideration of each of the relevant factors leaves no room to doubt that the relationship between the Hospital (and the College) and the voluntary staff is not one of employment.

Section 2000e(f) excludes board members from the definition of employee when they perform director duties rather than traditional employee duties.

Chavero v. Local 241 · filed 1986-04-03(f)

Section 701(f) defines an "employee" simply as an individual employed by an employer. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(f). ... While courts generally construe the term "employee" broadly under all provisions of Title VII, Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir.1983), members of boards of directors are not employees for purposes of Title VII coverage under any standards. ... As such, the individual board members are not employees for Title VII coverage.

Employee status under Title VII requires careful consideration of the facts of the work relationship.

Miller v. Advanced Studies, Inc. · filed 1986-05-08(f)

What is clear from all of these cases is that no matter what test applies, a plaintiffs status as an “employee” under Title VII can be determined only upon careful analysis of the myriad facts surrounding the employment relationship in question.

Section 2000e(f) defines who is an employee under Title VII; under the economic realities test, the right to control is the most important factor.

Donnie Sue Coker Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc. · filed 1986-05-16(f)

With magnificent circularity, Title VII defines an employee as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Under this test, the right to control is the most important factor in determining employee status. ... Based on the economic realities test, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Broussard was not an employee for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(f)'s definition of employee does not require a Title VII plaintiff to be a common law employee.

Mitchell v. Tenney · filed 1986-12-24(f)

Defendants rely on the language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) for their conclusion that Mitchell must be an employee to maintain a Title VII action. However, this section does not provide any definition for “employee” other than to state that “[an] employee [is] an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(f) limits Title VII protection to employees; disputed evidence about a worker’s status can prevent that question from being resolved on summary judgment.

Ullmann v. Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O'Donnell & Weyher · filed 1987-01-23(f)

The protections of Title VII are only available to “employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... She has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was an employee or independent contractor. Therefore the Court assumes for purposes of the pending motions that she should be characterized as an employee.

Section 2000e(f) excludes unpaid volunteers from the definition of “employee.”

Smith v. Berks Community Television · filed 1987-03-09(f)

... I conclude that unpaid volunteers are not employees within the meaning of the Act.

An insurance field underwriter can qualify as an employee under Title VII rather than an independent contractor.

Packard-Knutson v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York · filed 1987-07-06(f)

Plaintiff is an employee under Title VII. The Court incorporates here by reference its earlier order finding that plaintiff was indeed an employee for the purposes of Title VII and not an independent contractor as alleged by defendants.

A general partner is not an employee under Title VII’s definition of employee.

Wheeler v. Main Hurdman · filed 1987-07-27(f)

In its order denying the motion the district court concluded that although a partner, Wheeler was also an employee for purposes of each of the Acts. ... We reverse.

Section 2000e’s employee definition is assessed by considering the putative employer’s control over the work and the economic realities of the relationship.

Mallare v. St. Luke's Hospital of Bethlehem · filed 1988-11-28(f)

We must keep in mind, however, that the factors themselves are mere aids in determining the ultimate question of control of the means and manner of the “employee’s” job performance and that the Court is also required to consider the economic realities of the situation.

Section 2000e(f) requires a Title VII employee to be paid by the defendant and subject to its control; volunteers are excluded.

Tadros v. Coleman · filed 1989-08-15(f)

A Title VII plaintiff is only an “employee” if the defendant both pays him and controls his work.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, with employee status determined under an economic realities test.

Moore v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1991-06-25(f)

Title VII defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer," but this definition provides little guidance in determining the nature of the working relationship between the parties. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(f); see Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir.1986). The Court applies an "economic realities" test to determine whether a Title VII claimant is an employee or an independent contractor. See Unger v. Consol. Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 915 n. 8 (7th Cir.1981), vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir.1984).

Section 2000e(b) counts employees to determine employer coverage, while § 2000e(f) defines employee as a person employed by an employer.

Norman v. Levy · filed 1991-07-02(b), (f)

While we believe that Armbruster’s economic realities approach is appropriately broad for purposes of Title VII standing, we believe that the Sixth Circuit erred to the extent that it imported that breadth into its interpretation of §§ 2000e(b) and (f).

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employee and an employer under Title VII.

Garvey v. Dickinson College · filed 1991-08-23

Garvey was an employee of Dickinson College within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) and 43 P.S. § 954(c). ... Dickinson College was an employer of Garvey within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and 43 P.S. § 954(b).

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee broadly, and employee status under Title VII depends on the economic realities of the relationship and the employer's control.

Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company · filed 1991-12-03(f)

Title VII defines employee very broadly: "The term 'employee' means an individual employed by an employer...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). "In determining whether a business relationship is one of employee-employer, courts look to the 'economic realities' of the relationship and the degree of control the employer exercises over the alleged employee."

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, excluding independent contractors from Title VII protection.

Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1991-12-03(f)

Knight must prove the existence of an employment relationship in order to maintain a Title VII action against Farm Bureau. Independent contractors are not protected by Title VII. ... Title VII defines employee very broadly: “The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an employer_” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e defines who counts as an employee and employer for Title VII coverage.

Matthews v. New York Life Insurance · filed 1992-01-17

As a general rule, independent contractors may not sue their employers for discrimination under Title VII. But cases like this depend on the facts.

Section 2000e(f) exempts only appointees of elected officials serving as advisors or at the policymaking level, and does not exempt the plaintiff from employee status.

Allen v. City of Yonkers · filed 1992-04-15(f)

As applied here, this législative history is in accord with the plain language of the statute. As commissioner of DCD plaintiff was appointed by the city manager, who is not an elected official in Yonkers: as director of YCDA plaintiff was appointed by the board of YCDA only one out of seven of whom was an elected official. Since the Section 2000e(f) exemption applies only to appointees of elected officials, whether as advisors or as department heads, literally read it does not apply to plaintiff. ... Plaintiff was an employee within the meaning of that term in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e both as commissioner of DCD and as director of YCDA and not exempt.

Section 2000e(f) includes a county department director within Title VII’s definition of employee when the director does not serve at a policymaking level or as an immediate advisor to an elected official.

Brown v. Polk County, Iowa · filed 1992-12-22(f)

The record does not support a finding that Brown served on a policymaking level or that he was an “immediate advisor” to the Polk County Board of Supervisors.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied through a hybrid test that considers the whole working relationship, with the employer’s right to control the worker as the most telling factor.

Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi · filed 1993-01-25(f)

The court concludes that the hybrid test is the proper standard for determining whether a worker is an employee under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, and the common-law agency test determines whether a person qualifies.

Lattanzio v. Security National Bank · filed 1993-06-17(f)

Title VII vaguely defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Under this test, Ms. Gibbs cannot be counted as an employee against the Bank for Title VII purposes. ... Given the totality of the circumstances, Lennon is not an employee under Title VII. ... Consequently, neither Hartenstine nor Wheeler are employees under Title VII. ... Even if Kalis had performed CEO duties, he served as CEO for only eight weeks, well short of the “twenty or more calendar weeks” required by Title VII.

Section 2000e protects employees from discrimination but does not cover independent contractors.

Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Idaho, Inc. · filed 1993-05-25

The statutes on which Ostrander bases her public policy claim were not intended to protect independent contractors. Title VII and the ADEA apply exclusively to employees, and not to independent contractors.

A volunteer's benefits may qualify as indirect but significant remuneration for employee status under § 2000e(f); whether they do is a question of fact.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Company Of Rising Sun, Inc. · filed 1993-10-04(f)

The district court's decision that benefits received by Fire Company members are not sufficient to make them employees under Title VII involves the resolution of a disputed material fact. Because compensation is not defined by statute or case law, we hold that it cannot be found as a matter of law. The district court must leave to a factfinder the ultimate conclusion whether the benefits represent indirect but significant remuneration as Haavistola contends or inconsequential incidents of an otherwise gratuitous relationship as the Fire Company argues.

Title VII's employee coverage includes a former employee alleging retaliation based on incidents arising during the employment relationship.

Yudovich v. Stone · filed 1993-12-27(f)

Although Title VII protects only "employees” from discrimination and reprisal, and plaintiffs were not "employees” when they applied for the contractor positions at issue, it is established that reprisal by an employer against a former employee based upon incidents arising during the employer/employee relationship is actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee using common-law agency principles, including economic factors, and excludes independent contractors.

Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi · filed 1994-01-27(f)

Under both tests, all aspects of the working relationship are considered. The Restatement's list of common-law factors used in both tests is nonexhaustive, and consideration of the additional economic factors does not broaden the traditional common-law test. Indeed, by adding employee benefit and tax treatment factors to the Restatement factors in its explanation of the common-law test, the Supreme Court recognized the common-law test encompasses economic factors. We thus conclude the district court applied the proper test to decide whether Wilde was an employee for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) defines employee status under common-law agency principles, including relevant economic factors; the broader economic realities test does not apply.

Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi · filed 1994-01-27(f)

Because the economic realities test is based on the premise that the term should be construed in light of Title VII’s purpose and the construction is broader than at common law, Darden precludes the test’s application.