42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(j) can cover an individualized religious belief when the pleaded facts plausibly show its religious character and its conflict with an employment requirement.

Munroe v. Boston Medical Center · filed 2024-09-16(j)

Title VII defines “religion” as including “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ... For purposes of evaluating her claim at this preliminary stage, the Court concludes that the complaint is sufficient, if only barely so, to plead a claim of a bona fide religious belief.

At the pleading stage, a court found an employee’s individual Shamanic beliefs religious under Title VII without requiring a recognized religious organization.

Fernandez v. Central States Pension Fund · filed 2024-09-17(j)

The question before the Court, then, is not whether the Society for Shamanic Practice or any other organization is a “recognized religion,” but whether Plaintiff’s specific beliefs, as alleged in her Request, are “religious.” Making all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that they are.

Section 2000e(j) includes sincerely held religious beliefs even when the person does not belong to an organized religion.

Palmer v. Rancho Sahuarita Management Company LLC · filed 2024-09-19(j)

While Plaintiff is not a part of an organized religion, Plaintiff alleges his belief is derived from Biblical teachings, which he sincerely holds.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion can cover an employee’s objection even when it has both religious and secular grounds.

Akers v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP · filed 2024-09-09(j)

Even if Akers’s objection was based both on religious and secular grounds, she has alleged facts permitting the plausible inference that her objection is tied to some aspect of “religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion covers a refusal to be vaccinated when the pleaded facts support an inference that the refusal is an aspect of religious observance, practice, or belief.

Eder v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan · filed 2024-09-10(j)

Her amended complaint “[pleads] facts supporting an inference that her refusal to be vaccinated for [COVID-19] was an ‘aspect’ of her ‘religious observance’ or ‘practice’ or ‘belief.’” Lucky, 103 F.4th at 1243 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

Section 2000e(j) covers a refusal to be vaccinated when the refusal is an aspect of the employee’s religious observance, practice, or belief.

Ford v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan · filed 2024-08-29(j)

Like Lucky, Plaintiff’s beliefs are religious. Her amended complaint “[pleads] facts supporting an inference that her refusal to be vaccinated for [COVID-19] was an ‘aspect’ of her ‘religious observance’ or ‘practice’ or ‘belief.’” Lucky, 103 F.4th at 1243 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

Section 2000e(j) covers a vaccination objection when the pleaded facts support an inference that the objection is an aspect of religious observance, practice, or belief.

Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan · filed 2024-08-29(j)

Like Lucky, Plaintiff’s beliefs are religious. Her amended complaint “[pleads] facts supporting an inference that her refusal to be vaccinated for [COVID-19] was an ‘aspect’ of her ‘religious observance’ or ‘practice’ or ‘belief.’” Lucky, 103 F.4th at 1243 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

Section 2000e(j) can protect a religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement even when the employee does not formally identify with an organized religion.

Farrell v. City of New York · filed 2024-08-16(j)

Even if Plaintiff does not formally identify as a Christian, bona fide religious “beliefs need not be consistent with the dogma of any organized religion” or dependent on “whether or not the plaintiff[] belong[s] to any recognized religious organization.” ... But at a motion to dismiss stage, reading Plaintiff’s pleading liberally, the Court holds that Plaintiff has overall plausibly alleged a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with the City Order.

Section 2000e(j) can cover a sincerely held religious objection even when it overlaps with secular concerns.

Hassett v. United Airlines Incorporated · filed 2024-08-16(j)

But the fact that Hassett's religious views may overlap with his other opinions does not mean that he cannot state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) includes all aspects of religious practice and belief in its definition of religion, but conclusory allegations of a religious belief and a conflict with an employment duty do not state a claim.

Beeching v. PeaceHealth · filed 2024-08-22(j)

The term “religion” encompasses all aspects of religious practice and belief. ... The Court concludes that the Complaint, as currently pleaded, fails to state a claim on its face because the allegations concerning Plaintiffs religious beliefs and the conflict between those beliefs and the vaccine mandate are conclusory.

Section 2000e(j) covers a pleaded religious belief that conflicts with an employment duty when the employee connects her objection to vaccination with her religious tenets.

Peterson v. One Community Health · filed 2024-08-22(j)

The Court concludes Plaintiff has met her burden to plead a bona fide religious belief in conflict with an employment duty.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance and practice as well as belief, protecting religiously motivated conduct.

Amos v. Lampo Group, LLC · filed 2024-08-06(j)

Title VII defines “religion” as “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate . . . [the] religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ... In short, Title VII does not treat religious discrimination based on a plaintiff’s belief simpliciter differently than discrimination based on some expression of the belief.

Section 2000e(j) covers an accommodation request plausibly based at least in part on religious belief or practice, even when the employee also has secular concerns.

Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc. · filed 2024-07-29(j)

We reverse and, aligned with the only two circuits to have considered the question, hold that an employee seeks accommodation because of their religion when their request, by its terms, is plausibly based at least in part on some aspect of their religious belief or practice.

Section 2000e(j) covers an accommodation request plausibly based at least in part on an employee’s religious belief or practice, even if the request also cites secular concerns.

Bube v. Aspirus Hospital, Inc · filed 2024-07-29(j)

The employee must allege facts plausibly permitting an inference that some “aspect[]” of the accommodation request is based on the employee’s “religious observance and practice” or “belief.”

Section 2000e(j) does not treat personal medical judgments about a vaccine as religious beliefs merely because the employee describes them in religious terms.

Cox v. Valley Health System · filed 2024-06-28(j)

Cox’s documents merely inform Valley Health that she refused the vaccine because of her personal medical judgments regarding the efficacy and safety of the vaccine, not because of her religious convictions.

Section 2000e(j) covers religious practice and belief broadly enough that a sparsely pleaded faith-based objection to a workplace vaccine requirement can satisfy the religious-belief element at the pleading stage.

Folin v. Asante · filed 2024-06-20(j)

The term “religion” encompasses all aspects of religious practice and belief. ... Plaintiff has pled that she expressed a religious conflict with receiving the COVID-19 vaccine, and she timely submitted her exemption request to Asante. She even alleges that Asante accepted her religious exemption, as she requested. Therefore, she has met her burden on this issue.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion broadly; at the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not satisfy a separate test for whether a professed belief is religious.

Tyiease v. Permanente · filed 2024-06-24(j)

This Court therefore declines to employ Africa or any other test that would require it to scrutinize whether Plaintiff’s beliefs are “religious” beliefs.

Section 2000e(j) covers religious practice and belief, but a vaccine objection based on health concerns rather than religion does not qualify.

Riser v. St. Charles Health System, Inc. · filed 2024-06-06(j)

The term “religion” encompasses all aspects of religious practice and belief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 2004). ... The Court concludes that Timms has failed to plausibly allege that her objection to the vaccine mandate was religious in nature or that there was a conflict between her beliefs and the vaccine mandate.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious beliefs within its definition of religion; a claimant seeking religious accommodation must identify the belief and explain how it conflicts with an employment requirement.

Palmer v. Rancho Sahuarita Management Company LLC · filed 2024-06-10(j)

Nonetheless, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for Title VII religious discrimination by failing to disclose his religious beliefs. Plaintiff must state his religious beliefs and explain how these beliefs conflict with Defendant’s employment requirement.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious observance, practice, and belief in Title VII’s definition of religion; a person’s prayer-based objection to vaccination can fall within that definition.

Najean Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C. · filed 2024-06-12(j)

The remaining question is whether Lucky pled facts supporting an inference that her refusal to be vaccinated for Covid was an “aspect” of her “religious observance” or “practice” or “belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Plainly she pled such facts.

At the pleading stage, objections to vaccination and testing can plausibly be religious when tied to an employee’s faith, even if the employee also raises concerns about efficacy and harm.

Larson v. Walz · filed 2024-06-12(j)

But these factual allegations do not render Mr. Larson’s beliefs about bodily autonomy non-religious. Rather, allegations as to the efficacy and perceived harm of COVID-19 vaccines and PCR tests seem to explain why Mr. Larson understood his refusal to comply with Policy # 1446 as a moral, religious duty.

Section 2000e(j) requires a religious accommodation claim to identify a religious observance, practice, or belief; a general request for an exemption on religious and philosophical grounds is insufficient.

Nelson-Godfrey v. Cook County Health and Hospital Systems · filed 2024-05-28(j)

This language is insufficient to support plaintiff’s claims because it does not identify a “religious observance,” “practice,” or “belief,” as required by the statute.

Section 2000e(j) can cover a sincere religious objection even when religion is a secondary or tertiary reason for the employee’s position.

Cesare v. PACT MSO, LLC · filed 2024-06-04(j)

Summary judgment is precluded where there are genuine disputes about whether a bona fide religious belief is a secondary, or even tertiary, reason for a party’s convictions.

Section 2000e(j) does not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s decision merely because the employee reached it through prayer.

Hurley v. Varian Medical Systems · filed 2024-05-23(j)

An employer is not required to accommodate an employee’s opinion or decision merely because the employee arrived at it through prayer.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion broadly to include sincerely held religious observance, practice, and belief.

Balchan v. New Rochelle City School District · filed 2024-05-07(j)

“Title VII defines religion capaciously to include ‘all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.’” Gardner-Alfred v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 651 F. Supp. 3d 695, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). ... Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly pled that she held a sincere religious belief requiring her to take leave during the Days of Awe.

Section 2000e(j) requires a claimed belief to be sincerely held and religious within the employee’s own scheme of things.

BLACKWELL v. LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK · filed 2023-01-23(j)

This Court’s inquiry into whether Plaintiff has plausibly plead the first prong of her prima facie religious discrimination claim is limited only “to determining whether the belief is (1) ‘sincerely held’ and (2) religious within the plaintiff’s ‘own scheme of things.’” Id. at *12 (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970)).

Section 2000e(j) includes religious observance and practice within the definition of religion.

Haley v. Community Hospital · filed 2023-01-25(j)

Religion includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ... Haley has presented evidence that his religious practice is to avoid taking into his body material that Leviticus 11 deems to be unclean. He brought this matter to Community Hospital’s attention through the religious exemption form and the letter he attached to it. The first two elements of the prima facie case are met.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include an employee’s non-affiliation with a religion.

Albro v. Del Toro · filed 2020-04-22(j)

In this context, religion includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,” including an employee’s non-religious affiliation.

Section 2000e(j) protects sincerely held religious beliefs even when an employer considers them mistaken or implausible.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Consol Energy, Inc. · filed 2017-06-12(j)

It is not Consol’s place as an employer, nor ours as a court, to question the correctness or even the plausibility of Butcher’s religious understandings.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion broadly enough to include Onionhead beliefs and practices.

Equal Opprtunity Employment Commission v. United Health Programs of America, Inc. · filed 2016-09-30(j)

Title VII provides that the “term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ... Accordingly, the court concludes that Onionhead is a religion for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion does not require a religious practice to have a textual basis.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. · filed 2011-07-13(j)

However, the broad definition of “religion” does not require that a belief have a textual basis.

Section 2000e’s definition of religion can cover Buddhist beliefs even when an employee describes Buddhism as a philosophy and does not practice it strictly.

Murdick v. Catalina Marketing Corp. · filed 2007-07-11(j)

That, together with his statement that he has to correct people who assume he is a Christian by telling them he is a Buddhist, and that he has claimed Buddhism since he was eighteen years old, can clearly be seen to imply that he holds religious belief, and that belief is Buddhism. ... This Court finds that Murdiek has provided evidence and established that there is a genuine issue of material fact on this first point within element one, such that it should survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion includes sincerely held matters of conscience when applying Title VII’s duty of religious accommodation.

O'BRIEN v. City of Springfield · filed 2003-08-12(j)

This argument ignores that courts construe the term “religion” under Title VII to include the “principle of supremacy of conscience.”

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance and practice that an employer can reasonably accommodate without undue hardship.

Rodriguez v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-08-11(j)

“Religion” is defined, however, to include only those “aspects of religious observance and practice” that an employer is able to “reasonably accommodate ... without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63 & n. 1, 107 S.Ct. 367, 369 & n. 1, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986).

Section 2000e(j) covers a religious practice when the employee provides enough information to connect it to the employee’s professed religion.

Vetter v. Farmland Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-05-01(j)

Thus, as to the first element of the prima facie case, the court concludes that a “sensible approach” would require the plaintiff to come forward with only enough information to demonstrate a connection between the employee’s practice and the employee’s professed religion.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion does not include the KKK.

Slater v. King Soopers, Inc. · filed 1992-12-31(j)

Based on the reasoning of that decision and Bellamy, I conclude that the KKK is not a religion for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate a prospective employee’s religious practice unless the employer proves that doing so would cause undue hardship.

Gordon v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. · filed 1992-06-03(j)

Under Title YII it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire an individual on the basis of that individual’s religious observances, practices or beliefs unless the employer demonstrates that it is unable to “reasonably accommodate” the prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l). ... In view of these material issues of fact, MCI has failed to establish that, as a matter of law, accommodating Gordon’s Sabbath observance practices would cause it to incur undue hardship.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to offer a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s religious practice; once it does, the employer need not show that every alternative would cause undue hardship.

Mann v. Frank · filed 1992-06-10(j)

An employer has met its obligation under § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee. The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship.

Section 2000e(j) permits unpaid leave as a reasonable religious accommodation when paid personal leave is limited by purpose and is not available for all secular purposes except religious ones.

Philbrook v. Ansonia Board Of Education · filed 1991-01-25(j)

Either may take excess days for these purposes, but without pay.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious practices within its definition of religion unless the employer shows it cannot reasonably accommodate them without undue hardship.

Joyner v. Garrett · filed 1990-11-26(j)

“Religion,” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 and protected from discrimination by Title VII, does not include those aspects of religious observance and practice as to which the “employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate ... without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance and practice unless the employer cannot reasonably accommodate it without undue hardship.

United States v. Board of Education · filed 1990-08-09(j)

Since the reasonable accommodation/undue hardship exception is contained within the definition of religion, it must be applied at the threshold of the court’s analysis. The import of the statute is clear: if public schools cannot accommodate the wearing of religious garb without undue burden, then the wearing of such garb is not “religion” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) covers a sincerely held religious practice even if the employee’s beliefs are internally inconsistent or not shared by others of the same faith.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J.C. Penney Co. · filed 1990-03-20(j)

The court is convinced that Mrs. Doughty honestly believes that the scriptures of her faith require that she abstain from work on Sunday, except as a church pianist. Her beliefs need not be internally consistent. Inconsistencies are merely evidence to be weighed in determining whether her belief is sincere. Nor is it necessary that others of her faith hold the same view.

Section 2000e(j) requires a corporate employer claiming spiritual hardship from a religious accommodation to show an adverse impact on its business.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1988-09-19(j)

Townley, the corporate entity, must connect the asserted spiritual hardship to an adverse impact on the conduct of the business.

Section 2000e(j) does not require an employer to force employees who expressly refuse to permanently switch from a day shift to a night shift to accommodate another employee’s Sabbath observance.

Wilton M. EVERSLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MBANK DALLAS, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-03-03(j)

In line with the above-quoted language from Hardison and our decision in Brener, we conclude that it is unreasonable and an undue hardship on an employer to require the employer to force employees, over their express refusal, to permanently switch from a daytime to a nighttime shift in order to accommodate another employee’s different Sabbath observation.

Section 2000e(j) does not require an employer to surrender control of its operations to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs.

Ali v. Southeast Neighborhood House · filed 1981-07-17(j)

Accommodation is not abdication. Title VII cannot and will not be so construed.

Section 2000e(j) does not require an employer to provide a religious accommodation that would impose undue hardship on its business.

Rising v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1981-07-15(j)

Although Rising clearly was discharged because his religious practices conflicted with Roadway’s work schedule, I have determined that there was no reasonable manner by which those practices could have been accommodated, without working an undue hardship on Roadway.

Section 2000e’s definition of religion does not cover an organization’s narrow, temporal and political racist and anti-semitic ideology.

Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc. · filed 1973-12-07(j)

Furthermore, the proclaimed racist and anti-semitic ideology of the organization to which Bellamy belongs takes on, as advanced by that organization, a narrow, temporal and political character inconsistent with the meaning of “religion” as used in § 2000e. Thus, plaintiff’s claim under § 2000e fails to allege facts which indicate discrimination on a basis prohibited by the act, and that claim is, in the Court’s view, without merit.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to prove that it reasonably accommodated an employee’s religious observance or could not do so without undue hardship.

Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc. · filed 1974-03-21(j)

Under this statute, the employer must prove either that he in fact made a reasonable accommodation, or that he was unable reasonably to accommodate to an employee’s religious observances.

Section 2000e(j)’s duty to accommodate religious practice serves a secular purpose and does not violate the Establishment Clause.

Hardison v. Trans World Airlines · filed 1974-05-15(j)

The duty to accommodate, as stated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), reflects the general secular legislative purpose of guaranteeing an employee that he will not be discharged from his job merely because of his religion. ... We find and conclude, therefore, that the interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination by reason of religion, as embodied in the E.E.O.C. regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Section 2000e(j) added a statutory religious accommodation requirement, but that requirement was not in force at the time of a 1969 discharge.

Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp. · filed 1974-07-25(j)

Although the requirement of accommodation is now a part of Title VII, there was clearly no statutory accommodation section at the time of Yott’s discharge.

Section 2000e(j) permits an employer to transfer an employee to accommodate a religious practice when keeping the employee in the original role would cause undue hardship.

Dixon v. Omaha Public Power District · filed 1974-10-30(j)

To accommodate the plaintiff further would clearly have worked an undue hardship on the defendant in the conduct of its business. ... The Court further concludes that the plaintiff was given every reasonable accommodation under the circumstances, both temporary and permanent.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion includes a minister’s attendance at meetings needed to carry out pastoral duties.

Weitkenaut v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company · filed 1974-09-26(j)

The Court is persuaded that the plaintiff’s absence for one evening a month to advance the organization, discipline and teaching of his church, constituted a protected aspect of religious practice within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance, practice, and belief, subject to reasonable accommodation unless undue hardship results.

Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank · filed 1975-03-19(j)

The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. ... Both 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) and EEOC Regulation 1605.1(b) require employers to accommodate both employees and prospective employees.

Section 2000e(j) requires reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religious observance unless further accommodation would impose undue hardship on the employer’s business.

United States v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1975-04-30(j)

This threshold issue is not ruled upon as dispositive, however, since we are persuaded that the Albuquerque Fire Department attempted to make reasonable accommodations to Zamora’s religious requirements; and further, that any further accommodations would have worked an undue hardship on the functions and business of the Fire Department. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). We prefer to base our holding on these grounds.

Section 2000e(j) requires reasonable accommodation of religious practice; coworkers' complaints alone do not establish undue hardship.

Paul CUMMINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARKER SEAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-05-23(j)

The objections and complaints of fellow employees, in and of themselves, do not constitute undue hardship in the conduct of an employer's business. If employees are disgruntled because an employer accommodates its work rules to the religious needs of one employee, under EEOC Regulation 1605 and § 2000e(j) such grumbling must yield to the single employee's right to practice his religion.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observance unless the employer shows undue hardship.

Ward v. ALLEGHENY LUDLUM STEEL CORPORATION · filed 1975-07-01(j)

Under 42 U.S.C.A., 2000e, et seq. of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the employer has the duty to reasonably accommodate an employee because of his religion; and where the employer does not, he (the employer) has the burden of showing that some undue hardship would result to his business. The 1972 amendment to the act clearly states that the burden to show undue hardship is on the employer, otherwise the employer must reasonably accommodate the employee.

Section 2000e(j)'s 1972 definition of religion cannot establish congressional intent for claims that arose under the 1964 Act.

McCann L. REID, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. MEMPHIS PUBLISHING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appe · filed 1975-08-20(j)

The subsequent enactment of § 2000e(j) in 1972 cannot be relied on to establish a Congressional intent with respect to the 1964 statute, which was not expressed in that statute.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observance unless the employer demonstrates undue hardship.

Larry G. HARDISON, Appellant, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., Et Al., Appellees · filed 1975-12-16(j)

29 C.F.R. § 1605.1, which we hold to be consistent with the statute, defines the parameters of the employer’s duty. ... An effort to accommodate the employee’s religious observances must be made. Such accommodation need only be a reasonable one. An accommodation alternative which imposes undue hardship upon the employer’s business is unreasonable and not required. The burden of demonstrating its inability to reasonably accommodate falls upon the employer.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practice unless the employer demonstrates undue hardship; what is reasonable depends on the circumstances.

Williams v. Southern Union Gas Company · filed 1976-01-21(j)

Under the applicable statute and regulations the question before the trial court was whether Southern Union demonstrated that it was unable to reasonably accommodate to Williams' religious practice without undue hardship in the conduct of its business. ... The phrases 'reasonably accommodate' and 'undue hardship' are relative terms and cannot be given any hard and fast meaning.

Section 2000e(j) requires reasonable accommodation of religious practices unless the employer demonstrates undue hardship; both terms depend on the circumstances.

Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co. · filed 1976-01-21(j)

The phrases “reasonably accommodate” and “undue hardship” are relative terms and cannot be given any hard and fast meaning. In a sense the case boils down to a determination as to whether Southern Union acted reasonably under all the circumstances.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless doing so would impose undue hardship on its business.

John H. DRAPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES PIPE AND FOUNDRY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1976-01-27(j)

The central issue in the case was whether the Company complied with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) and 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1974), both of which in effect require an employer to undertake a reasonable accommodation of its employees' religious practices unless such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship upon the employer's business. ... The Company did not undertake a reasonable accommodation of Draper's religious practices and observances, nor did it establish that such an accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship upon its business.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion extends beyond Sabbath observance to other religious beliefs and practices.

Cooper v. General Dynamics · filed 1976-06-09(j)

We are unable to reconcile with section 701(j)'s sweeping terms ("all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief . . . .") the Union's suggestion that Congress intended by it to protect Sabbath observance only.

Section 2000e(j) accommodation and undue-hardship determinations are factual findings reviewed for clear error.

United States v. City of Albuquerque · filed 1976-11-29(j)

We regard the trial court’s several conclusions as to “undue hardship,” as well as its earlier determination of “reasonable accommodation,” to be essentially findings of fact. On review such should be accepted unless they be deemed clearly erroneous. In our review such are not clearly erroneous and hence should be upheld.

Section 2000e(j) allows an employee with a religious objection to paying union dues to seek accommodation, subject to a showing of undue hardship.

Nottelson v. A. O. Smith Corp. · filed 1976-12-20(j)

If the enforcement of an accommodation under Title VII would cause undue hardship to the union shop created by A. O. Smith and Smith Steel Workers, that is a fact to be demonstrated at trial. But to say that plaintiff has no right to seek an accommodation with respect to his payment of dues, that is to deny the clear import of the act.

Section 2000e(j)’s religious accommodation requirement does not require an accommodation that would impose undue hardship on the union.

Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division · filed 1977-02-15(j)

In consideration of the above authorities and the interests of the parties, the Court must conclude that anything less than payment of the equivalent of dues to the Union for charitable purposes would impose an undue hardship on the Union.

Section 2000e(j)'s religious accommodation requirement does not require overriding other employees' contractual seniority rights.

HUSTON v. LOCAL NO. 93 · filed 1977-07-19(j)

Given the postulate of a seniority system, a statutory obligation to accommodate religious needs does not supersede the contractual seniority rights of other employees.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion excludes a mere personal preference, even when described as a religious creed.

Brown v. Pena · filed 1977-12-22(j)

The statutory definition is unenlightening: “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1974). ... Plaintiff’s “personal religious creed” concerning Kozy Kitten Cat Food can only be described as such a mere personal preference and, therefore, is beyond the parameters of the concept of religion as protected by the constitution or, by logical extension, by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 2000e(j) protects religious practices even when the employee’s religion does not prohibit the conflicting work.

Rodges REDMOND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GAF CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1978-04-10(j)

We are thus unable to agree with the suggestion made by GAF on appeal, that because Saturday work per se is not prohibited by plaintiff’s religion,' that the practices in question are outside the protection of Title VII. ... We conclude that the practices in question are within the protection offered by § 2000e(j) to “all aspects of religious observance and practice”.

Section 2000e(j) requires proof of undue hardship to deny a religious accommodation; assumptions, hypothetical facts, and employee grumbling are insufficient.

Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division · filed 1978-09-07(j)

Undue hardship means something greater than hardship. Undue hardship cannot be proved by assumptions nor by opinions based on hypothetical facts. Even proof that employees would grumble about a particular accommodation is not enough to establish undue hardship.

Section 2000e(j) requires proof of undue hardship to excuse a failure to accommodate religious practice; assumptions and hypothetical concerns do not suffice.

Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division · filed 1979-01-16(j)

Undue hardship means something greater than hardship. Undue hardship cannot be proved by assumptions nor by opinions based on hypothetical facts. Even proof that employees would grumble about a particular accommodation is not enough to establish undue hardship.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance, practice, and belief, subject to an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate them without undue hardship.

Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. · filed 1979-04-03(j)

Religion is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) as follows: (j) The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employefe’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. Thus, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of its employees.

Section 2000e(j) permits the practices of similarly situated employers to inform whether a religious accommodation is reasonable or would cause undue hardship.

Herbert MINKUS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. The METROPOLITAN SANITARY DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO ("MSD"); Board… · filed 1979-06-06(j)

The custom or practices of other similarly situated employers is probative of what is reasonable accommodation or undue hardship under the circumstances.

Section 2000e(j) allows an employer to satisfy its religious accommodation obligation without making an active accommodation effort if it proves that any accommodation would cause undue hardship.

Edwards v. School Bd. of City of Norton, Va. · filed 1980-01-18(j)

So, defendant’s failure in the case at bar to make an active accommodation effort does not preclude it from proving undue hardship in any accommodation and, thereby, satisfy its statutory obligation.

Section 2000e(j) permits an employer to establish undue hardship from the disruption caused by a religious absence even without a direct monetary cost.

Peter James HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAVERTY FURNITURE COMPANIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-04-07(j)

The fact that Haverty incurred no direct money cost from plaintiff’s absence is not controlling. The finding of the district court that there was undue hardship is well supported in the record and is not clearly erroneous. The district court did not err in concluding that Haverty did not violate Title VII by discharging plaintiff.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion does not treat the difference between a Methodist lay member and an ordained Methodist minister as a religious difference.

Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home of Va., Inc. · filed 1980-07-07(j)

Though a Methodist layman is, or may be assumed to be, a religious person, and a Methodist minister is, or may be assumed to be, a religious person, the difference between their respective status as layman or minister is not a religious difference. Hence, discrimination based on such difference in status is not discrimination based on religion.

Section 2000e(j)'s religious accommodation requirement applies to labor unions even without a collective bargaining agreement with an employer.

Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47 · filed 1980-12-08(j)

The Union claims that the statute's requirement that "an employer ... reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), does not apply to unions. ... We disagree. ... The addition of a requirement that there be a collective bargaining agreement for the duty to apply to a union would be inconsistent with the liberal construction to be given to a broad, remedial statute.

Section 2000e(j) defines “religion” to include religious observance, practice, and belief, unless an employer cannot reasonably accommodate it without undue hardship.

Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806 · filed 1981-02-27(j)

Inasmuch as the selective service exemption does not offend the Establishment Clause, see Gillette, supra, 401 U.S. at 448-460, 91 S.Ct. at 835-841, it follows necessarily that Section 701(j) on its face and as here applied does not either.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to make a good faith effort to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs and to show undue hardship if accommodation is unsuccessful.

Wangsness v. WATERTOWN SCHOOL DIST. NO. 14-4, ETC. · filed 1982-05-28(j)

Wangsness having established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the defendant school district to show that it made a good faith effort to accommodate the religious beliefs of Wangsness, and if those efforts were unsuccessful, to demonstrate that it was unable to reasonably accommodate his beliefs without undue hardship.

Section 2000e(j) does not require an employer to accommodate voluntary, social or family activities associated with a church event when they are not religious observance or practice.

Wessling v. Kroger Co. · filed 1982-09-28(j)

The plaintiff’s request to appear at the church hall to set up for the church play, receive the children, and decorate, was not a religious observance protected by Title VII. It was voluntary, others could have substituted. The early attendance at the church hall was social in nature. It was far more extensive in time than necessary for religion. It was family oriented, a family obligation, not a religious obligation.

Section 2000e(j) places the burden on an employer to show that accommodating an employee’s religious practice would cause undue hardship.

McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc., A/K/A Essex Wire, a Michigan Corporation, and International Association of · filed 1982-12-14(j)

The burden was on Essex to demonstrate that an accommodation to Ms. McDaniel’s religious convictions would have involved undue hardship.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer, once an employee establishes a prima facie religious accommodation claim, to show that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.

Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad · filed 1983-06-16(j)

When a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the employer to show it was unable to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff’s needs without undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion does not protect a personal preference to engage in adultery.

McCrory v. Rapides Regional Medical Center · filed 1986-01-27(j)

In essence then, plaintiffs’ claims translate into a cause of action under Title VII if, and only if, their belief in their right to commit adultery is a “religious belief” subject to protection. The Court cannot make such a finding.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practice unless doing so would impose undue hardship on its business.

Baz v. Walters · filed 1986-01-28(j)

Title VII forbids an employer from firing an employee solely on the basis of his religion, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1), unless the employer can demonstrate that "he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's ... religious observation or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business," 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(j).

Section 2000e(j) can be satisfied by a schedule that lets an employee observe religious holidays, even if the employee must use vacation days.

Getz, Susan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare · filed 1986-09-23(j)

We are satisfied that under the scheduling system, the Commonwealth has “reasonably accommodated” Getz’s religious observance. She is able to worship fully. Her only complaint is that she wants to have her religious holidays and keep her vacation days as well.

Section 2000e(j) lets an employer satisfy its religious accommodation duty by offering an employee a reasonable accommodation.

Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook · filed 1986-11-17(j)

We accordingly hold that an employer has met its obligation under § 701(j) when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee.

Section 2000e(j) requires reasonable accommodation of religious practice unless it would cause undue hardship to the employer’s business.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1987-02-13(j)

Thus, an employer is required under the law to make a reasonable accommodation to the religious beliefs and needs of its employees unless the accommodation would result in some “undue hardship” upon the operation of the employer’s business. ... The defendant could not have accommodated Mr. Karanovich without incurring additional economic hardship for itself and for the other employees at the Twins-burg facility.

Section 2000e(j) protects employees with religious objections to union membership even if they do not belong to an organized religion; section 19 of the NLRA does not supersede that protection.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Davey Tree Surgery Co. · filed 1987-04-16(j)

There is no indication that Congress intended section 19 to supersede the protections of Title VII. Thus, Mr. Davidson’s non-membership in the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in no way deprives him of the right to take advantage of the substituted charity accommodation under Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or lack of belief unless doing so would cause undue hardship to its business.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1987-05-11(j)

An employer must accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or lack thereof, unless the employer can demonstrate that it is unable do so without “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”

Section 2000e(j) allows an employer to show that a proposed religious accommodation would cause undue hardship without first trying it.

Depriest v. Department of Human Services of the State of Tennessee · filed 1987-10-01(j)

Surely Congress did not intend that an employer must actually undertake an accommodation that will inevitably cause undue hardship.

A shift swap that requires an employee to recruit his own replacement is not a reasonable accommodation when that act conflicts with his sincere religious beliefs.

Smith v. Pyro Mining Company · filed 1987-11-18(j)

However, where an employee sincerely believes that working on Sunday is morally wrong and that it is a sin to try to induce another to work in his stead, then an employer's attempt at accommodation that requires the employee to seek his own replacement is not reasonable.

Section 2000e(j) permits a union to accommodate an employee’s religious objection to union activities through a proportional rebate of agency fees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. University of Detroit · filed 1988-12-13(j)

However, on the basis of the record in the case at bar, this Court concludes that the UDPU’s offer of a proportional rebate of Roesser’s dues was a reasonable accommodation within the spirit of Philbrook.

A religious accommodation claim requires the employee to show a bona fide belief that conflicts with a work requirement, notice to the employer, and discipline for failing to comply with that requirement.

Kevin R. JENKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, Thru the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Et Al., Defendants-App · filed 1989-06-07(j)

An employee proves a prima facie case of religious discrimination by showing that the employee: (1) has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) informed the employer of this belief; and (3) was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. ... The district court held that Jenkins was not disciplined for failing to comply with an employment requirement that conflicted with his religious beliefs and we do not find this holding to be clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e(j) protects a bona fide religious belief or practice even if others do not widely recognize it as religious.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Reads, Inc. · filed 1991-03-25(j)

It is not necessary that the person’s belief or practice be widely held or recognized by others as religious.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion broadly to include religious practice as well as belief and affiliation, and its definition applies to Title VII’s religious employer exemptions.

Little v. Wuerl · filed 1991-04-03(j)

Section 701(j) of Title VII, which applies to both exemptions, defines religion broadly: ... But, taken as a whole, the definition seems intended to broaden the prohibition against discrimination--so that religious practice as well as religious belief and affiliation would be protected.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion protects employees who refuse to hold their employer's religious beliefs.

Shapolia v. Los Alamos National Laboratory, and John Whetten · filed 1993-04-27(j)

Religion includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Title VII has been interpreted to protect against requirements of religious conformity and as such protects those who refuse to hold, as well as those who hold, specific religious beliefs.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employer to accommodate an employee’s religious objection to both working a shift and asking someone else to cover it; merely allowing the employee to arrange a shift trade is insufficient.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. IBP, Inc. · filed 1993-05-07(j)

The Court finds that IBP was obligated to accommodate Plaintiffs belief that he should not ask another employee to work in his place on Saturday. This additional obligation thus required IBP to “make further efforts” to accommodate Plaintiff, beyond merely “allowing” Plaintiff to seek his own replacement.

Section 2000e(j) does not require a public employer to accommodate religious witnessing and prayer on work time when doing so would impose undue hardship on its duty of religious neutrality.

Brown v. Polk County, Iowa · filed 1993-08-11(j)

Allowing supervisors and employees to witness and pray on County time would work an undue hardship on the County’s duty of religious neutrality.

Section 2000e(j) does not require an employer to violate a valid labor agreement to accommodate an employee’s religious practices.

Lee v. Abf Freight System, Inc. · filed 1994-04-26(j)

Nor does Title VII require an employer to violate a valid labor agreement to accommodate an employee.

Section 2000e(j) includes an employee’s sincerely held practice of wearing a particular anti-abortion button within its definition of religion.

Wilson v. US West Communications, Inc. · filed 1994-06-06(j)

Her practice of wearing the particular button which is the subject of this dispute is a practice included within the statutory definition of “religion” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).

Once an employer reasonably accommodates an employee’s religious practices, § 2000e(j) does not require the employer to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation.

Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department · filed 1994-08-23(j)

Because we find that the Department reasonably accommodated Beadle’s religious practices for purposes of Title VII, we are not required to further consider whether any or all of the accommodations suggested by Beadle would also qualify as “reasonable” under the statute, or whether they would likely result in “undue hardship” to the employer.

Section 2000e(j) protects religious observance, practice, and belief, but a preference for parochial schooling need not itself qualify.

Joyce Brooks Janes v. Bardstown City Schools Board of Education · filed 1996-09-20(j)

It is true that Title VII defines religion broadly, extending protection to "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). But the record before us does not demonstrate that in sending her children to parochial schools Mrs. Janes was engaging in the type of "observance or practice" entitled to protection under the Act. Neither does the record show that she was motivated by religious belief. She has presented no evidence that her faith calls upon her to patronize parochial schools. She and her husband may have made the choice they did for the purpose of obtaining a religious education for their children, as alleged in paragraph 11 of the verified complaint, but a preference for such an education need not itself be an aspect of religious observance, practice, or belief.

Section 2000e(j) covers religious beliefs even if no religious group espouses or accepts them.

Van Koten v. Family Health Management, Inc. · filed 1997-01-10(j)

Therefore, a religious belief does not have to be espoused by or accepted by any religious group to fall within the definition of “religion” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) permits a union to inquire whether a member’s objection to paying dues rests on a sincere religious belief before its duty to accommodate arises.

Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers · filed 2001-10-02(j)

Given the purpose of the protections and special accommodations afforded by Title VII, the court concludes that Title VII does permit an inquiry into the sincerity and religious nature of an employee or member’s purported beliefs before the duty to accommodate such a belief arises, as further explained below.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include belief and limits the undue hardship accommodation exception to religious observance or practice.

Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc. · filed 2002-06-03(j)

Thus, under the canon of statutory interpretation expressio unis, I must conclude that a religious belief is never exempted from the definition of “religion” under Title VII and, therefore, cannot lawfully form the basis for an adverse employment action.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion protects people who do not belong to an organized religious group, including atheists.

Tillery v. ATSI, INC. · filed 2003-01-15(j)

The term “religion” is defined as including “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless the employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ... Even so, Title VII protects persons who are not members of organized religious groups, ... as well as atheists.

Section 2000e(j) covers allegations of anti-Semitic discrimination as religious discrimination under Title VII.

Finkelshteyn v. Staten Island University Hospital · filed 2009-03-31(j)

With respect to Finkelshteyn’s prima facie ease, there is no question that (1) Title VIPs protections apply to allegations of anti-Semitic discrimination (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Leifer v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 04-CV-571, 2007 WL 203961, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2007) (applying Title VII protections to claims of anti-Semitic conduct); (2) that apart from certain absences, SIUH does not contest Finkelshteyn’s adequate performance as a nurse; and that (3) his two-day suspension qualifies as an adverse employment action) (see, e.g., Satterfield v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 00-CV-7190, 2003 WL 22251314, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003)).

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion can encompass a bona fide religious belief even when its subject overlaps with a social or political issue.

Gadling-Cole v. West Chester University · filed 2012-03-30(j)

While Plaintiffs claims for religious discrimination are based on the single religious belief that a man should not lay with another man, this does not make Plaintiffs claim any less cognizable under Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) can protect a sincerely held religious belief even if it is not required by a faith’s formal doctrine.

Telfair v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2013-03-28(j)

While such evidence might have tangential relevance to the question of the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, it does not convert the plaintiffs’ asserted belief system into a “personal preference” as a matter of law, as urged by FedEx.

Section 2000e(j) covers an employee’s sincerely held religious belief even when the particular observance is not a formal religious tenet.

Davis v. Fort Bend County · filed 2014-08-26(j)

A showing of sincerity, however, does not require proof that the July 3rd church event was in itself a true religious tenet, but only that Davis sincerely believed it to be religious in her own scheme of things.

Section 2000e(j) protects atheistic beliefs on the same terms as other religious beliefs.

Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. · filed 2016-01-26(j)

Under Title VII, atheists are entitled to the exact same protection as members of other religions.

Section 2000e(j) does not protect opposition to vaccination based solely on personal, political, sociological, or economic beliefs rather than a sincere religious belief.

Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania · filed 2016-08-09(j)

To adopt Fallon’s argument that he need only show a strongly held moral or ethical belief in lieu of a sincere religious belief would contravene Third Circuit and Supreme Court precedent and would potentially entitle anyone with “strongly held” beliefs on any topic to protection under Title VII’s religious discrimination provision.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance and practice as well as belief; firing an employee for not going to church can be religious discrimination.

Canfield v. Office of the Secretary of State · filed 2016-08-30(j)

Religion includes “ ‘all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.’ ” Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat. Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir.1993)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). ... A relatively short time after deciding to terminate plaintiff, the individual who has stated he made the decision, told a witness that part of the reason for terminating plaintiff was that she did not go to church. This statement, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory termination without inference or presumption.

A sincere objection to vaccination based on health concerns and an isolated moral teaching does not qualify as religion under § 2000e(j).

Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania · filed 2017-12-14(j)

For this reason, because Fallon’s beliefs do not satisfy any of the Africa factors, Fallon’s beliefs do not occupy a place in his life similar to that occupied by a more traditional faith. His objection to vaccination is therefore not religious and not protected by Title VII.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance and practice and requires reasonable accommodation unless it would cause undue hardship.

Ramseur v. Concentrix CVG Customer Management Group Inc. · filed 2020-06-15(j)

Title VII further defines religion to “includ[e] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Id. § 2000e(j) (emphasis added). “Because this definition includes a requirement that an employer ‘accommodate’ an employee’s religious expression,” an employee alleging intentional discrimination under §2000e–2(a)(1) can bring suit based on a disparate-treatment theory or a failure-to-accommodate theory.

Section 2000e(j) protects religious beliefs, but a personal medical judgment does not become religious merely because it is expressed in religious terms.

Passarella, Megan v. Aspirus, Inc. · filed 2023-03-10(j)

The court concludes that Dottenwhy and Passarella refused the vaccine based on their personal judgments about vaccine safety and not for religious reasons. They couched their requests in religious terms, claiming that their decisions had been ratified by prayer. But the use of religious vocabulary does not elevate a personal medical judgment to a matter of protected religion.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious belief and practice within Title VII’s protection; plausible allegations of religious discrimination can survive dismissal.

Welcome v. Amplity Inc. · filed 2023-03-16(j)

Title VII defines the term “religious” as encompassing “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ... The Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged at this early stage in litigation a Title VII religious discrimination claim in both Count II (disparate treatment) and Count V (disparate impact) sufficient to withstand Amplity’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

A Title VII religious discrimination claim fails when the alleged objection to workplace testing does not rest on a religious belief under § 2000e(j).

ULRICH v. LANCASTER GENERAL HEALTH · filed 2023-04-13(j)

Because Ulrich has not alleged discrimination on the basis of a religious belief, she has not set forth a sufficient case of religious discrimination under Title VII or PHRA.

A vaccine objection supports a Title VII religious discrimination claim only if the pleaded facts permit a reasonable inference that it arises from a sincerely held religious belief.

WINANS v. COX AUTOMOTIVE INC. · filed 2023-04-17(j)

Consequently, we conclude that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that he has a sincerely held religious belief that could support a claim for relief under Title VII or the PHRA under any theory of liability.

Section 2000e(j) requires a plaintiff seeking religious accommodation to allege facts identifying a sincerely held religious belief that conflicts with a work requirement.

MCKINLEY v. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY · filed 2023-04-28(j)

Without Plaintiff providing facts showing what sincerely held religious belief she holds that prevented her from complying with the COVID-19 Policies, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a cognizable claim for religious discrimination, therefore, Defendant’s motion is granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of Counts I and III.

An objection to vaccination based on safety concerns is not a religious belief under § 2000e(j), even when the employee describes it in religious terms.

Ellison v. Inova Health System Foundation · filed 2023-07-19(j)

Based on Ellison’s own stated reason, the Court finds that, though couched in religious terms, Ellison refused the vaccines based on concerns of vaccine safety.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employee seeking a religious accommodation to plausibly allege that an employment requirement conflicts with a specific religious tenet or principle.

Griffin v. Massachusetts Department of Revenue · filed 2023-07-20(j)

Accordingly, a plaintiff who claims exemption from an employment requirement for religious reasons must plead some modicum of plausible facts sufficient to create an inference that the conflict arises from some specific religious tenet or principle.

A reasonable alternative that eliminates the conflict between an employment requirement and a religious practice satisfies § 2000e(j)’s accommodation duty.

Cole v. Group Health Plan, Inc. · filed 2023-08-10(j)

Because that option “eliminate[d] the conflict between [HealthPartners’] employment requirements and [Cole’s] religious practices,” it was reasonable.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion does not include political, sociological, or philosophical objections to an employer's mask policy.

Vanwyckhouse v. Tessy Plastics · filed 2023-08-24(j)

And as argued by Defendant, Plaintiff's authorities demonstrate that he is improperly attempting to expand the definition of religion to include political, sociological, or philosophical beliefs.

Section 2000e(j) does not treat objections to nasal swab testing based on its invasiveness or perceived ineffectiveness as religious beliefs.

BLACKWELL v. LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK · filed 2023-09-07(j)

Therefore, Plaintiff again fails to plausibly plead the first prong of her prima facie religious discrimination claim because, under the Third Circuit’s test established in Africa v. Commw. of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), Plaintiff’s objections to biweekly COVID-19 testing by way of a nasal swab on the grounds that such testing is a violation of her sincerely held religious beliefs against “being subjected to invasive COVID-19 testing via nasal swab,” and pursuant to her beliefs that such testing is “ineffective” are not religious beliefs under law.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include religious observance, practice, and belief, including sincerely held beliefs that may be unfamiliar to others.

Langer v. Hartland Board of Education · filed 2023-09-20(j)

The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.

Section 2000e(j) does not protect an objection based on personal choice or free will without facts showing a sincere religious conflict.

Nogowski v. St Charles Medical Center · filed 2023-10-24(j)

Plaintiff’s allegations about her purported beliefs giving rise to her opposition to the COVID-19 vaccine are closer to personal beliefs or “isolated moral teachings,” as seen in cases cited above, rather than religious beliefs afforded protection under Title VII or Oregon law.

Section 2000e(j) covers religious beliefs and practices, but a religious accommodation claim must plausibly allege how a belief or practice conflicts with an employment requirement.

Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2023-10-26(j)

Title VII’s definition of religion includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (“[R]eligious practices . . . include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.”). ... Here, the second amended complaint contains only conclusory allegations that Thornton requested to be exempt from the Vaccination Policy due to her “sincerely held religious beliefs” but does not state what those beliefs were or how they relate to vaccines generally or the COVID-19 vaccine specifically.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employee seeking a religious accommodation to have a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement.

Colson v. Hennepin County · filed 2023-12-12(j)

Even when the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in Borgheiinck’s favor, the Court cannot conclude that Borgheiinck’s objections to the vaccine and weekly testing arise from a bona fide religious belief.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion can cover a sincerely held objection to vaccination grounded in a person’s broader faith and belief about salvation.

Bey v. Pocono Medical Center · filed 2023-12-12(j)

As pled Bey’s belief about vaccines is sincerely held and religious in nature.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion can cover an employee’s abortion-related objection to vaccination when the objection is plausibly rooted in religious faith.

Witham v. Hershey Company, The · filed 2023-12-15(j)

The first answer to this argument is that it does not address Witham’s abortion-specific concerns. Those concerns are (at least) plausibly religious. And those concerns mean the claim survives.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion can cover a vaccine objection adequately linked to an employee's religious beliefs.

Hernandez v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-25(j)

I find that Plaintiff has adequately linked her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiffs Christian faith.

Section 2000e(j) includes an employee’s objection to vaccination within its definition of religion when the employee plausibly connects the objection to beliefs rooted in her faith.

Massotti v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-25(j)

I find that Plaintiff has adequately linked her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiffs Christian faith.

Section 2000e(j) does not treat a vaccine objection based on medical safety concerns as religious unless the objection is connected to the employee’s religious beliefs.

McDowell v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-25(j)

Plaintiff has failed to adequately link her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiff's Christian faith.

Section 2000e(j) includes an employee’s religious beliefs and practices within Title VII’s definition of religion; an objection to vaccination can qualify when adequately linked to those beliefs.

Proud v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-25(j)

I find that Plaintiff has adequately linked her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiff's Christian faith.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion can cover a vaccine objection adequately linked to an employee's faith.

White v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-26(j)

I find that Plaintiff has adequately linked her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiff's Christian faith.

Section 2000e(j) includes beliefs tied to an employee’s faith within its definition of religion.

Griffin v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-29(j)

I find that Plaintiff has adequately linked her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiff's Christian faith.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion covers a vaccine objection plausibly linked to an employee's religious beliefs.

Wharton v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-29(j)

I find that Plaintiff has adequately linked her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiff's Catholic faith.

Section 2000e(j) includes a sincerely held objection to vaccination within its definition of religion when the objection is adequately connected to the employee’s religious faith.

Thornton v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-29(j)

I find that Plaintiff has adequately linked his objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiff's Christian faith.

Section 2000e(j)'s definition of religion can cover a vaccine objection plausibly linked to an employee's Christian beliefs about abortion and murder.

Thompson v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-29(j)

I find that Plaintiff has adequately linked her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from Plaintiff's Christian faith.

An employee’s objection to vaccination can qualify as a religious belief when she plausibly connects it to her faith.

Aiken v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-25(j)

For the reasons stated above, I find Plaintiff's Complaint plausibly alleges that she had a “sincerely held religious belief, and that [her] objection to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine was based on that belief.” Aliano, 2023 WL 4398493, at *4. I therefore will not dismiss Plaintiffs Title VII failure to accommodate claim.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employee seeking religious accommodation to connect the objection to a religious belief.

Osborne v. Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2024-01-25(j)

Plaintiff fails to adequately link her objection to the COVID-19 vaccines to religious beliefs stemming from her Christian faith.