42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(f)’s employee definition is assessed under common law agency principles and excludes independent contractors from Title VII claims.

Stetka v. Hunt Real Estate Corp. · filed 1994-07-29(f)

The court finds that, under the common law agency test as set forth in Darden, Reid, and Frankel, Plaintiff is an independent contractor, and therefore, may not bring an action against Defendant under Title VII or the New York Human Rights Law.

Section 2000e(f)'s definition of employee does not exclude workers whose fraud, misconduct, or lack of objective qualifications would have prevented their employment.

Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co. · filed 1994-08-01(f)

The result is no different if one focuses on the definition of "employee" rather than "individual," since both statutes define an "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f) (1981); 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(f) (1985). The point is that neither definition contains an exception for individuals who would not have been employed by the employer but for their fraud or misconduct, or for employees who measured against some objectively defined criteria are "unquali- fied."

Section 2000e(b) treats an employee with supervisory power over the plaintiff’s employment as an agent of the employer.

Verde v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1994-08-25(b)

Defendants are also correct in noting that, for purposes of Title VII, an “agent” of the employer is an employee who supervises other employees, particularly the plaintiff.

Section 2000e(f) can cover inmates whose work includes compensation or training, or resembles work release rather than forced labor.

Moyo v. Gomez · filed 1994-08-08(f)

As our decision in Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Center, 859 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.1988), makes clear, inmates performing work assignments that include compensation or training, or that resemble work release rather than forced labor, are employees entitled to Title VII protection. ... Thus, we cannot state with certainty at this stage of the proceedings that the inmates do not qualify as employees under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) includes a graduate assistant as an employee when the totality of the employment circumstances establishes that status.

Ivan v. Kent State University · filed 1994-09-14(f)

The totality of the circumstances of Ivan’s graduate assistantship demonstrates she was an employee under the terms of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) uses common-law agency principles to determine who is an employee, placing particular weight on the hiring party’s control over how the work is done.

Kellam v. Snelling Personnel Services · filed 1994-10-17(f)

Where a federal statute provides such an unhelpful definition of the term “employee,” the Supreme Court has directed that the common-law principles of agency shall apply in determining who is an employee. ... It is clear that, in light of the emphasis on the “control of the manner and means” factor, as well as the additional weight of the other factors, this Court is compelled to find that the temporary workers are not “employees” of the defendants within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e’s employer and employee definitions cover Nutrasweet and its former employees for Title VII purposes.

Wagner v. Nutrasweet Co. · filed 1994-12-05

First, Nutrasweet is an “employer,” and Wagner and the other members of her class are former “employees” of the company for purposes of both statutes.

Section 2000e(f) uses common-law agency principles to determine whether a worker is an employee covered by Title VII.

McFadden-Peel v. Staten Island Cable · filed 1994-12-29(f)

In order to determine whether McFadden was an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of the ADEA and Title VII, common-law agency principles are applicable. ... Examining the circumstances of this case in light of the following facts, this Court concludes that plaintiff was an “employee” within the meaning of the ADEA and Title VII.

Section 2000e’s definitions identify who qualifies as an employee and an employer under Title VII.

Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co. · filed 1994-12-21

Plaintiff Gipson is an “employee” within the meaning of Title VII. Defendant Borden, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under the law and is an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of “employee” is applied using the common-law agency test.

Walker v. Correctional Medical Systems · filed 1995-05-16(f)

This court believes that Darden requires application of the common-law agency test rather than a hybrid test in determining whether someone is an employee for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied using common-law agency principles, including the hiring party’s control over the work.

Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., Dba Circus Circus Hotel & Casino · filed 1995-10-16(f)

In a circular fashion, Title VII defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(f). ... Because the hybrid and common law agency approaches are virtually the same, we analyze Folkerson's status with reference to the common-law agency principles set forth in Darden.

Section 2000e(f) requires an employment relationship for Title VII coverage; a physician’s independent contractor relationship with patients does not qualify.

Johnson v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp. · filed 1995-10-19(f)

Dr. Johnson’s attempt to align his claim with the claim upheld in Sibley is not persuasive because, unlike the nurse in Sibley, Dr. Johnson’s relationship with his patients is not one of employment.

Title VII's definition of employee excludes an insurance agent once the working relationship makes him an independent contractor.

Wright v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1995-12-14(f)

For purposes of its Title VII analysis, the court concludes that the facts in the instant action, taken as a whole, establish that plaintiff ceased being defendants’ employee on the day he became an independent contractor— March 1, 1993. The court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs allegations of Title VII discriminatory conduct that occurred after that date.

Section 2000e(f) excludes Indiana deputy attorneys general from Title VII’s definition of “employee.”

Americanos v. Carter · filed 1996-01-09(f)

We hold that the district court properly dismissed Americanos’ age, gender, and national origin discrimination claims, for a DAG is not an “employee” Arithin the purview of either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the ADEA.

Section 2000e(f) distinguishes employees from independent contractors by considering the totality of the employment relationship, including control and tax treatment.

Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman · filed 1996-01-11(f)

We find that viewing the totality of the factors defined in Darden, Oshiver was not an employee of the Firm.

Section 2000e(f) excludes volunteers from Title VII’s definition of employee when they lack economic dependence on the organization and do not work in expectation of compensation.

Neff v. Civil Air Patrol · filed 1996-01-25(f)

Stated more broadly, Title VII will not protect volunteers who are not working “in expectation of compensation.” ... Under the language of Title VII and the interpretations before this Court, this case has but one resolution: Michelle Neff has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was an employee within the protection of the statute.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee covers a university assistant professor employed by the university.

Schneider v. Northwestern University · filed 1996-05-13(f)

At all times relevant and material to this action, plaintiff was an “employee” of defendant Northwestern University within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) limits Title VII’s protection to employees and excludes independent contractors.

Appel v. Reser's Fine Foods, Inc. · filed 1996-09-13(f)

Title VII protects workers who are employees, but it does not protect independent contractors. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... This court finds that the facts in this record support only the conclusion that Appel was an employee of Reser’s through July 8, 1994 and was an independent contractor thereafter.

Section 2000e(f) excludes certain government policy-making appointees from Title VII’s definition of employee; alleged duties implementing policy did not bring this plaintiff within that exclusion at the pleading stage.

McNulty v. NEW YORK DEPT. OF FINANCE · filed 1996-10-24(f)

Coupled with plaintiff's further description of her responsibilities, each of which better fits the role of one who implements rather than makes policy, we must conclude that plaintiff did not hold a confidential policy-making position, and that therefore she is protected under both Title VII and the ADEA.

Section 2000e(f) does not exclude a government personnel director from Title VII protection at the pleading stage when her alleged duties involve implementing rather than making policy.

McNulty v. New York City Department of Finance · filed 1996-10-24(f)

Coupled with plaintiffs further description of her responsibilities, each of which better fits the role of one who implements rather than makes policy, we must conclude that plaintiff did not hold a confidential policy-making position, and that therefore she is protected under both Title VII and the ADEA.

Whether a professional corporation’s shareholder-directors count as employees under Title VII depends on their actual management and ownership roles.

Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C. · filed 1996-12-30(b), (f)

In deciding whether the shareholder-directors are employees or employers, we look to the extent to which they manage and own the business. If the shareholder-directors manage and own SL & G, they should not be counted as employees.

Section 2000e(f) excludes independent contractors from the definition of employee; the main factor is control over the means and manner of their work.

Aguirre v. McCaw RCC Communications, Inc. · filed 1997-01-23(f)

Construing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concludes that because Cellular One does not control the means and manner of its dealers’ performance as required under the hybrid test, there is an absence of evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that a Cellular One dealer is a Cellular One employee for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(f) excludes independent contractors from its definition of employees; courts use common law control factors to determine a worker’s status.

Jones v. Seko Messenger, Inc. · filed 1997-01-30(f)

After analyzing each of the common law test factors, this Court concludes that Seko did not control Jones and that Jones is therefore not an employee covered by Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of “employee” has no temporal qualifier and is consistent with either current or past employment.

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1997-02-18(f)

Second, Title VII’s definition of “employee” likewise lacks any temporal qualifier and is consistent with either current or past employment. Section 701(f) defines “employee” for purposes of Title VII as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(f).

Section 701(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, subject to specified exemptions.

Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C. · filed 1997-07-02(f)

Section 701(f) of Title VII defines an employee as “an individual employed by an employer,” to which it specifies several exemptions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Neither this definition nor its exemptions address whether non-equity law firm partners qualify as employees. ... Here, where defendant is admittedly a professional corporation of which plaintiff is a non-equity partner, plaintiff is a corporate employee for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(f) treats a person employed in a foreign country as an employee only if the person is a U.S. citizen.

Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, NY · filed 1997-09-23(f)

Second, and perhaps more importantly, non-U.S. citizens employed outside of the United States are not deemed “employees” as that term is defined under Title VII. In fact, they are explicitly excluded under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term [“employee”] includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.”). Hence, even if SHB could be considered an employer, its non-U.S. citizen employees could not be deemed “employees” under the act, and therefore presumably could not be counted toward the aggregate number of employees for purposes of the statutory cap on punitive damages.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer.

O'COnnOr v. James Davis, Dr., Rockland Psychiatric Center, and State of New York · filed 1997-09-19(f)

The definition of the term “employee” provided in Title VII is circular: the Act states only that an “employee” is an “individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); ... Because the absence of either direct or indirect economic remuneration or the promise thereof is undisputed in this ease, we agree with the district court that O’Connor was not a Rockland employee within the meaning of Title VII and thus that her discrimination claim under that statute must fail.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied through a hybrid test that considers control over the worker and other aspects of the working relationship.

Moland v. Bil-Mar Foods · filed 1998-02-13(f)

While the hybrid test for determining employee status under Title VII cannot be applied with mathematical precision, after analyzing the applicable hybrid test factors the court concludes that neither Bil-Mar nor Sara Lee controlled Moland, and that Moland can not be deemed an employee of either defendant for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes independent contractors from Title VII’s definition of employee; hospital privileges alone do not make a physician an employee.

Bender v. Suburban Hospital · filed 1998-03-25(f)

An “employee” is “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... In this case, the factual elements have been stated with such particularity that the court can assume the veracity of Plaintiffs allegations and resolve that the allegations overwhelmingly demonstrate that Dr. Bender was, at most, an independent contractor.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee calls for the common-law agency test to determine employee status under Title VII.

Jean Anderson Hierarchy of Agents v. Allstate Life Insurance · filed 1998-04-06(f)

In application of the preceding principles, we first note that both Title VII and the FLSA/EPA state only that an employee “is an individual employed by an employer.” As the Supreme Court in Darden held this very same definition to be completely circular and explanatory of nothing (albeit in the context of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6)), we conclude that the common law agency test should be applied in this case.

Section 2000e(f) excludes an elected official’s appointee on the policymaking level from the definition of employee unless the appointee is covered by civil service laws.

Stitz v. City of Eureka Springs · filed 1998-06-12(f)

Therefore, because we conclude that plaintiff was an appointee on a policymaking level, and is not covered by defendant’s civil service laws, plaintiff is not protected by § 2000e of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) can cover an unpaid worker who receives significant job-related benefits, even when those benefits do not come directly from the alleged employer.

Pemrick v. Stracher · filed 1999-11-08(f)

Thus, where a so-called volunteer receives significant job-related benefits — even if those benefits are not obtained directly from the alleged employer—at the very least a fact question is created regarding the employment relationship.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is construed under common-law agency principles to distinguish employees from independent contractors.

Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Insurance Company of Nebraska Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company of West Des Moines, · filed 2000-03-23(f)

The statute’s nominal definition of an “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), “is completely circular and explains nothing.” ... In such circumstances we presume that “ ‘... Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.’ ”

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer; nurses employed by a staffing agency meet that definition.

Hunt v. State of Mo., Dept. of Corrections · filed 2000-08-30(f)

An employee is defined as an individual employed by an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Given the statutory definition, Plaintiffs clearly were employees at the time the alleged discrimination occurred. At a minimum, they were employees of Favorite Nurses.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is construed under common law agency principles when deciding whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

Lee v. Glessing · filed 2001-04-19(f)

In order to maintain a Title VII cause of action, a plaintiff must be considered an employee within the meaning of Title VII. Unfortunately, Title VII does not helpfully define the term “employee” as it merely refers to “an individual employed by an employer.” In such situations where the term “employee” is not well defined by a statute, courts presume that the common law definition of the term controls.

Section 2000e(f) defines a Title VII employee as an individual employed by an employer, with employee status determined under common law agency principles.

Farlow v. Wachovia Bank NC · filed 2001-08-06(f)

Whether a person is an employee depends on the common law of agency definition of employee. ... we conclude that the district court was correct, as a matter of law, in holding that Farlow was an independent contractor for Wachovia, and not its employee.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, with employee status determined under the common law agency test.

Holtzman v. the World Book Co., Inc. · filed 2001-08-13(f)

Unfortunately, Title VII vaguely defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer ...” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... The Supreme Court confirmed in Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202, 211, 117 S.Ct. 660, 136 L.Ed.2d 644 (1997), that the Darden analysis is the proper test to apply in ascertaining whether an individual is an employee within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) requires direct or significant indirect remuneration from an alleged employer for a person to qualify as its employee.

Tyszka v. Edward McMahon Agency · filed 2001-09-24(f)

Title VII defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Under this remuneration test, it is also patently clear that Nationwide was not the employer of the Plaintiff herein.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee is applied using a test that distinguishes employees from independent contractors.

Hanson v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia · filed 2002-01-10(f)

Based upon a de novo review of the record herein, the Court adopts the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation. ... Title VII defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f) (Supp.III). Given the absence of any helpful legislative guidance on the breadth of this circular definition, courts have developed tests to distinguish between employees and independent contractors. ... Applying the relevant factors, this Court concludes that Ms. Hanson is an independent contractor and not an employee of the Sinfonía.

Section 2000e(f) excludes appointees on the policymaking level from Title VII's definition of employee.

Costenbader-Jacobson v. Pennsylvania · filed 2002-06-06(f)

Upon examining the Executive Board’s analysis together with the undisputed facts of this case, the Court must conclude that Plaintiffs position as Deputy Director of thd Lottery was a poli-cymaking position, and that Plaintiff therefore is excluded from the definition of employee under Title VII.

The section defines a Title VII employee as an individual employed by an employer, and the court applies the common law agency definition to distinguish employees from independent contractors.

Hunt v. State of MO · filed 2002-07-22(f)

The law is well established that Title VII protects employees, not independent contractors, from discriminatory employment practices. See Schwieger, 207 F.3d at 483 (citing Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 104 (8th Cir. 1994) (Wilde)). In Schwieger, we observed that Title VII’s “nominal definition of an ‘employee’ as ‘an individual employed by an employer,’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), ‘is completely circular and explains nothing.’” Id. (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 323). We thus reasoned that Congress must have intended the term to be read according to the common law agency definition. See id. Determining whether a party is an employee or an independent contractor, we explained, requires a fact-intensive consideration of “‘all aspects of the working relationship’ between the parties.” Id. (quoting Wilde, 15 F.3d at 106). ... Applying the analysis set forth in Schwieger and similar precedents, we now hold that the district court did not err in concluding, based upon the control exercised by others over the terms and conditions of plaintiffs’ work, that at all relevant times plaintiffs worked at JCCC as employees rather than as independent contractors.

Section 2000e(f) excludes certain elected officials’ staff, policy making appointees, and immediate advisors from the definition of “employee.”

Heap v. County of Schenectady · filed 2002-08-13(f)

Title VII exempts from its statutory definition of “employee,” ... exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). ... Even a cursory review of the facts in this case demonstrate that the Personnel Administrator for the County of Schenectady is not within the scope of this exception. ... Accordingly, defendants’ first argument is rejected.

Section 2000e(f) defines “employee” to include a United States citizen employed abroad.

Shekoyan v. Sibley International Corp. · filed 2002-08-16(f)

First, the amended Act expands Title VII’s definition of “employee” to include United States citizens employed abroad. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“With respect to employment in a foreign county, such term [employee] includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.”).

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, interpreted under common law agency principles.

Rebecca Hunt, Susan Nurnberg v. State of Missouri, Department of Corrections · filed 2002-09-18(f)

The law is well established that Title VII protects employees, not independent contractors, from discriminatory employment practices. ... In Schwieger, we observed that Title VII’s “nominal definition of an ‘employee’ as ‘an individual employed by an employer,’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), ‘is completely circular and explains nothing.’ ” ... We thus reasoned that Congress must have intended the term to be read according to the common law agency definition. ... Applying the analysis set forth in Schwieger and similar precedents, we now hold that the district court did not err in concluding, based upon the control exercised by others over the terms and conditions of plaintiffs’ work, that at all relevant times plaintiffs worked at JCCC as employees rather than as independent contractors.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer; a graduate assistantship stipend does not by itself make a student an employee.

Washington v. Jackson State University · filed 2006-03-15(f)

When plaintiff was a graduate student at the University, he received a graduate assistantship stipend. This stipend was not payment of wages to an employee. Since plaintiff was not an employee of defendants, neither this court nor the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has jurisdiction over any Title VII claim he raises. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) clearly states, “[t]he term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an employer.” As a graduate student, plaintiff was not an employee of the University.

Section 2000e(f) excludes unpaid volunteers from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Pinchas v. USA Deaf Sports Federation, Inc. · filed 2006-10-12(f)

Eighth Circuit law is clear that volunteers are not employees for purposes of Title VII. As a non-employee, Pinchas does not have standing to bring a Title VII claim against the USADSF, and the USADSF is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 2000e(f) applies the common law agency test to decide whether a worker is an employee under Title VII.

Pagan-Alejandro v. PR ACDelco Service Center, Inc. · filed 2006-12-28(f)

Relying on Darden, the First Circuit has adopted the common law agency test to determine whether an individual is an employee under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) requires direct or indirect remuneration from the putative employer and an employment relationship assessed under agency factors.

Gaffney v. Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications · filed 2008-03-05(f)

First, as a threshold matter, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he received some form of direct or indirect remuneration from the putative employer. ... Stewart and Kalembwe were employees of Crosswalks and DoITT under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) limits Title VII to employees, whose status is determined under the common-law agency test with particular weight given to control over how they work.

Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hospital · filed 2008-04-22(f)

Title VII, by its terms, applies only to “employees,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), but the statute defines an employee circularly as “an individual employed by an employer.” ... While Darden addressed employment in the ERISA context, courts have adopted its reasoning to apply the common-law agency test to Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes. ... In contrast to the district court, we find the record on the first and most important factor — the “manner and means” test — contains significant contested facts, making summary judgment inappropriate.

Title VII employee status depends on common law agency principles, the employer’s right to control the worker, and the economic realities of their relationship.

Demers v. Adams Homes of Northwest Florida, Inc. · filed 2009-03-20(f)

The determinative factors are “common law principles of agency and the right of the employer to control the employee.” Id. at 341.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee presents a question about the merits of a Title VII claim, rather than a jurisdictional requirement.

Harris v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-09-24(f)

The definition of “employee” that the Court must consider in this case is in the same section of definitions that was at issue in Arbaugh. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Congress has not suggested that the definition of “employee” has any greater jurisdictional significance than the definition of “employer.”

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee includes former employees for Title VII retaliation claims; volunteer status alone does not qualify.

Gates v. Gadsden County School Board · filed 2010-08-18(f)

As to the first point, the circuit court was correct in finding volunteers do not qualify for protection under Title VII. However, Appellant is a former employee, and former employees enjoy Title VII protections where they can establish the requisite elements of a claim.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee limits Title VII coverage for noncitizens working abroad, but that limit is not jurisdictional.

Herrera v. NBS, INC. · filed 2010-08-25(f)

The Court finds that, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh, the Title VII provisions cited by the Defendant (§ 2000e(f) and § 2000e-l) are non-jurisdictional in nature because Congress has not clearly stated that these statutory limitations are jurisdictional.

Section 2000e(f) requires courts to weigh all aspects of a work relationship when deciding whether someone is an employee; remuneration is a factor, not a prerequisite.

Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. · filed 2011-09-02(f)

But no one factor, including remuneration, is decisive, and therefore no one factor is an independent antecedent requirement.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee excludes independent contractors from Title VII workplace discrimination and retaliation claims.

Khaksari v. Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors · filed 2011-10-28(f)

Because that decision has the force of precedent, see D.C.Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B), and because Khaksari has not alleged any materially different circumstance in her case, we hold she was an independent contractor and not an “employee” entitled to sue the BBG under Title VII for workplace discrimination or retaliation.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee makes appointee status relevant to Title VII coverage, and disputed facts about that status can preclude summary judgment.

Armstrong v. STATE EX REL. OKLAHOMA INS. · filed 2011-12-20(f)

Also, there are factual issues about whether Armstrong is an employee under federal law definitions, as opposed to being an appointee.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, requiring a direct employment relationship for a Title VII claim.

Delbert v. Duncan · filed 2013-02-14(f)

The individual bringing the Title VII claim must be an employee of the defendant, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an employer.”), meaning that Title VII covers only “employees in a direct employment relationship” with the employer. ... Absent a direct employment relationship, plaintiff’s Title VII claims against these agencies must fail.

Section 2000e(f) uses the Clackamas control test to determine whether a shareholder-director of a closely held corporation is an employee under Title VII.

Robert A. Mariotti, Sr. v. Mariotti Bldg Products · filed 2013-04-29(f)

Because Title VII‟s definition of employee is the same as the ADA‟s definition, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 12111(4), and because the EEOC‟s guidelines, on which the Clackamas Court relied, apply to coverage under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the Equal Pay Act, see Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449 n.7, we conclude that the analysis set out in Clackamas applies to Title VII as well.

Section 2000e(f) requires an employment relationship for a person to qualify as an employee of a particular defendant under Title VII.

Sharma v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2014-07-17(f)

To meet the statutory definition of “employee,” there must be some employment relationship between the employer and the aggrieved party.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee does not exclude someone solely because they were not on the employer’s payroll or paid money.

Stewart v. Morgan State University · filed 2014-09-03(f)

Accordingly, the fact that Plaintiff was not on Morgan State’s payroll as an employee and did not receive monetary compensation during his internship does not — in and of itself — disqualify him as an “employee” for purposes of Title VII, and summary judgment will not be granted on this basis.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, and volunteer benefits can be relevant to whether the person is covered under Title VII.

Williams v. Silver Spring Volunteer Fire Department · filed 2015-01-16(f)

Title VII defines an “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Because the statute’s tautological definition provides little guidance to courts, the Fourth Circuit has advanced an approach that “analyz[es] the facts of each employment relationship under a standard that incorporates both the common law test derived from principles of agency and the so-called ‘economic realities’ test.” Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir.1983).

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of “employee” is governed by the common law agency test.

Faush v. Tuesday Morning · filed 2015-11-18(f)

Because Title VII’s definition of “employee” is similarly devoid of content, the common-law test outlined in Darden governs in the Title VII context as well.

Section 2000e(f) defines “employee” circularly, so common-law agency principles, particularly control, determine whether an entity jointly employs a worker.

Mohamed Al-Saffy v. Vilsack · filed 2016-07-01(f)

Unfortunately, Title VII includes only a “completely circular” definition of the term “employee.” ... see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (defining “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer”). ... Accordingly, we must consult “traditional agency law principles” to determine whether Al-Saffy was an employee of the State Department. ... Hewing to common-law principles, we have recognized that an individual may be jointly employed by two or more entities. ... As their language indicates, in both cases the touchstone is control.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer, so a corporation cannot be counted as an employee.

Frey v. Hotel Coleman · filed 2018-09-11(f)

Title VII defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (emphasis ours).

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer for purposes of Title VII.

Nemo v. RR Donnelley Logistics Servs. · filed 2019-02-08(f)

Title VII and the ADEA apply to only employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) ; ... Title VII defines an employee as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

A Title VII claim requires facts establishing that the plaintiff is the defendant’s employee.

Dye v. Pompeo · filed 2019-11-14(f)

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that he is an employee of the State Department for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(f)’s employee definition excludes a former employer’s actions after the employment relationship ended from adverse employment actions.

Fulkerson v. Saul · filed 2021-01-07(f)

Defendant was no longer Plaintiff’s employer and, consequently, Defendant’s actions before the Merit Systems Protection Board were not adverse employment actions.

Section 2000e(f) covers a worker as an employee when the hiring party has the right to control how the worker performs the job; forming an LLC and submitting invoices do not necessarily defeat employee status.

WALKER v. LINDY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT COMPANY · filed 2021-01-29(f)

Ultimately, Walker’s allegations suffice to plausibly allege that Lindy Property had the “right to control the manner and means by which” she performed her job, and thus that she was a Lindy Property employee.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee may require a factual determination of whether a person served as a policymaking appointee.

Prosper v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2021-03-04(f)

Although Defendants attach to their Motion depositions and a job description of Assistant Prison Warden from the Bureau of Corrections that may help answer whether Prosper is an employee under Title VII or the GERA (i.e., whether Prosper served as an appointee on the policy making level), the Court cannot consider this extrinsic evidence during the motion to dismiss stage (see ECF Nos. 128-6, 128-7).

Section 2000e(f) requires remuneration to qualify as an employee under Title VII; unpaid medical leave and benefits supplied by others do not establish employee status.

Ayyaz v. New York Police Department · filed 2021-03-31(f)

Accordingly, the Court finds that neither Plaintiff’s option to take a medical leave of absence, nor her other alleged benefits, constitute remuneration sufficient to establish Plaintiff’s status as an “employee” entitled to the protections afforded under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) requires a Title VII claimant to allege an employment relationship with an employer.

Quintero II v. Merced Unified School District · filed 2021-04-12(f)

To state a claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that he was is an individual employed by an employer. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f); Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802 (10th Cir. 2008).

Section 2000e(f) excludes an appointed policymaking official from Title VII’s definition of employee when civil service laws do not apply to that official.

Prosper v. Government of the Virgin Islands · filed 2021-05-21(f)

Thus, if the civil service laws of the Government did not apply to Prosper, she would fall under the exemption to the definition of employee under Title VII. ... As a result, the Court cannot move onto the merits of a Title VII or an Equal Pay Act claim because Prosper did not constitute an employee under either statute.

Section 2000e’s definition of employee is assessed using the Darden common law factors, with no single factor decisive.

Edward Payne, Jr. v. Prevention Point Philadelphia · filed 2022-03-15(f)

To determine whether Payne was an employee of Prevention Point, the test of Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), applies. ... Although some aspects of Payne’s internship might suggest employment, the Darden factors weigh heavily against a finding that he was an employee.

Section 2000e(f)’s definition of employee includes HR managers.

Patterson v. Georgia Pacific, LLC · filed 2022-06-28(f)

HR managers fall into the category of “all employees,” and the statutory definition of “employee” does not have any carveout or exclusion of HR man- agers that would remove them from the protection of the opposi- tion clause. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e’s definition of employee requires an employment relationship; a student who does not allege that relationship cannot bring a Title VII hostile environment claim against the university.

Morin v. Fordham University · filed 2022-09-28(f)

Title VII applies to employment relationships. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West) (“The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an employer [.]”) Plaintiff does not allege that she was ever an employee of Defendant Fordham University. Thus, Title VII is inapplicable to the facts as alleged.

Title VII excludes a state juvenile judge appointed to a policymaking role from its definition of employee.

Wheale v. Polk County, Georgia · filed 2022-10-04(f)

Because Judge Wheale is an appointee ... engaged in policymaking, she is not an “employee” and not protected by Title VII or the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer.

Moore v. Memphis Memory Gardens · filed 2023-09-28(f)

Therefore, it appears that Title VII’s definition of employee as “an individual employed by an employer” does not apply to the relationship between Mr. Moore and MMG. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(f) defines an employee by reference to an employer; a Title VII claimant must plead facts showing that the defendant was her employer.

Jennings-Jones v. Sylacauga Health Care Authority(MAG+) · filed 2024-07-10(f)

Because Jones fails to plead facts that would prove CVMC or the 10 Individual Defendants were her employer for Title VII purposes, the court must dismiss all Title VII claims against them.

Title VII’s definition of employee requires an employment relationship with the defendant; incidental benefits received as a trainee do not establish employee status.

Joy v. Crime Victims Treatment Center · filed 2025-01-29(f)

At most, Ms. Joy’s allegations give rise to the inference that, while she was in the Training Program, she hoped to become a volunteer advocate for CVTC; any incidental benefits she received as a trainee were far from “the sort of substantial benefits” required to demonstrate status as an employee under Title VII.

Section 2000e(f) excludes elected officials and certain high-level officers and appointees from Title VII’s definition of employee.

Coates v. Charles Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs · filed 2025-06-30(f)

Admittedly, that sentence sounds somewhat circular, but for our purposes what matters is that the definition excludes elected officials and high-level officers working closely with them to conduct their official duties: [T]he term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office . . . by the qualified voters . . . or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.

Title VII liability requires an employment relationship between the claimant and the defendant.

Johnson v. City of Clifton · filed 2025-07-07(f)

We agree with the District Court that there is no evidence of an employment relationship between Johnson, Powell, or Powell and any of the defendants through which Title VII liability could attach.

Section 2000e(f) excludes foreign citizens living abroad from Title VII’s employee protections.

Khan v. Crossover Market · filed 2025-11-14(f)

Here, Title VII cannot apply to Khan, as he is a foreign citizen living abroad. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Title VII does not apply to employees overseas unless they are American citizens); Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Hou. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 524 n.34 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Title VII does not govern aliens employed outside the United States.”).

Title VII employee status depends on the degree of control a person exercises; an owner’s salary and an agreement calling him an employee do not alone establish that status.

Chalk v. Chalk · filed 2026-04-09(f)

The Court uses the Clackamas factors to determine whether Buff meets the definition of an employee under the ADEA, Title VII, and N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2. ... But these facts alone do not transform Buff into an employee under the anti-discrimination laws.

This court declined to use the integrated enterprise test to impose Title VII liability on a parent company for its subsidiary’s violation.

Nowick v. Gammell · filed 2004-08-24(b)

Although other Circuits have used the integrated enterprise test to establish the liability of a parent company for a subsidiary’s violation of Title VII, ... the Ninth Circuit has not done so, and the Court declines to extend the application of the test here.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII coverage, including related entities treated as one employer when their operations, management, labor control, and ownership are integrated.

Backus v. Mena Newspapers, Inc. · filed 2002-09-25(b)

In Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391-92 (8th Cir.1977), the Eighth Circuit observed that the definition of “employer” under Title VII should be given a liberal construction and held that the factors to be considered in determining whether to treat two entities as one employer are: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control of labor relations, and (4) common ownership or financial control. All of these factors are present with regard to WNI, MNI, and LMI. Further, other courts have applied these same factors and have held that the critical question to be answered is: “What entity made the final decision regarding employment matters related to the person claiming discrimination?” Vance v. Union Planters Corp., 279 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir.2002). LMI admits that in was responsible for the hiring and firing of WNI’s and MNI’s publishers. The Court concludes that the three entities should be treated as one and that together they have a sufficient number of employees to satisfy the requirements of Title YII and ACRA.

Related entities may be treated as a single employer under Title VII when the complaint alleges facts supporting that relationship.

Sheppard v. River Valley Fitness · filed 2000-05-18(b)

If credited as true, the factual allegations set forth in plaintiffs' second amended complaint describe a legally cognizable theory of recovery under Title VII against River Valley Club, Fitness Associates, and the LLC. Consequently, the motion to dismiss count one (sexual harassment) and count two (retaliation) of plaintiffs' complaint submitted by defendants Fitness Associates and the LLC is necessarily denied.

The related companies in this case were not a single integrated employer under Title VII.

Walker v. Toolpushers Supply Co. · filed 1997-02-10(b)

Having carefully considered the entire record on summary judgment, the court finds that defendants have met their burden on summary judgment of showing that there is no material issue of fact on the issue that they are not a single integrated enterprise that includes Toolpushers.

Section 2000e(b) permits an affiliated corporation to be treated as a Title VII employer when it controls another corporation’s employment decisions or so dominates that corporation that the two are effectively one entity.

Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc. · filed 1996-04-18(b)

And one corporate entity does not meet the definition merely by virtue of its affiliation with another corporation that is a statutory employer. Rather, the first entity will be deemed the employer of the second, affiliated entity only if (i) the first controls the second’s employment decisions, or (ii) the first so completely dominates the second that the two corporations are effectively the same entity.

Related corporations may count as one employer under Title VII when their operations, management, labor relations, and ownership are sufficiently integrated.

Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Centers, P.C. · filed 1996-03-12(b)

Thus, under the above four-part analysis, the corporate defendants, namely Foot First I, III, IV, and V, constituted a single employer for purposes of Title VII. The entities were sufficiently interrelated, under common management and ownership with centralized control of labor relations to confer subject matter jurisdiction and thus defeat corporate defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary Judgment As To Count I.

Related entities treated as a single employer under Title VII may face liability without allegations that each participated in the discriminatory decision.

Brower-Coad v. Fundamental Brokers, Inc. · filed 1993-04-01(b)

The MMAR defendants’ concession that they and the original defendants constitute a single employer within the meaning of the N.L.R.B. standard therefore requires that their motion to dismiss be denied.

A corporation and its subsidiaries may be considered a single employer when applying Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold.

Boyce v. Fleet Finance, Inc. · filed 1992-07-15(b)

However, a corporation and its subsidiaries may be considered a "single employer” for purposes of the Title VII jurisdictional requirement.

Section 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee threshold can be met by treating closely integrated companies as a single employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arlington Transit Mix Inc. · filed 1990-04-12(b)

Clearly, the operations of these two entities were extensively interrelated. Both ownership and management were common and labor relations were centralized. In this case, all four Armbruster factors are present. The two entities together employed over fifteen persons. Accordingly, the two are a single employer for Title VII jurisdictional purposes, and this Court had jurisdiction to hear this case.

Under § 2000e(b), businesses may be treated as a single employer based on their operations, control of labor relations, management, and ownership or financial control.

McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home · filed 1987-12-21(b)

The predominant trend in determining whether two businesses should be treated as a single or joint employer under Sec. 2000e(b) is to apply the standards promulgated by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). ... The NLRB factors include: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control.

Section 2000e(b)'s employee threshold can be met by treating related entities as a single employer based on their operations, management, labor relations, and ownership.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Financial Assurance, Inc. · filed 1985-09-24(b)

Here, although the question is difficult and the answer elusive, I conclude that the composite picture which emerges is such as to warrant treating Financial Assurance and the three Avenue Partner entities as a single employer entity for present purposes. ... I conclude, accordingly, that the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) are met.

A parent and subsidiary may count as one employer under § 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee threshold when their operations, management, labor relations, and ownership are sufficiently integrated.

Smith v. Jones Warehouse, Inc. · filed 1984-08-27(b)

“Employer” in Title VII terms means only (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” ... All four factors taken together present at least “a prima facie case” for disregarding the legal separateness of Jones and Greene.

Section 2000e(b) permits a parent and subsidiary with a normal corporate relationship and generally separate affairs to be treated as separate employers.

Hassell v. Harmon Foods · filed 1972-01-12(b)

The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether the two corporate defendants have requisite "substantial identity" such that they constitute a single employer as defined in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b). ... On this basis, the District Court specifically declined to find that the two corporations constituted a single employer for purposes of the EEOC action, and this finding is supported by evidence in the record.

Section 2000e(b) does not treat a parent and subsidiary as a single employer when their affairs are generally handled separately and the evidence supports their separate corporate status.

Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc. · filed 1972-01-12(b)

The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether the two corporate defendants have requisite “substantial identity” such that they constitute a single employer as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... He observed that the affairs of the two “are generally handled separately,” and that the subsidiary corporation was in legal contemplation a separate one “in that, for example, the parent would not be liable for the debts of the subsidiary and that the subsidiary would be recognized as a separate one for tax purposes.” On this basis, the District Court specifically declined to find that the two corporations constituted a single employer for purposes of the EEOC action, and this finding is supported by evidence in the record. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Section 2000e(b) permits related companies to be treated as one employer based on their interrelated operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership or financial control.

Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Company · filed 1977-08-11(b)

These cases hold that the standard to be employed to determine whether consolidation of separate entities is proper are the standards promulgated by the National Labor Relations Board: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or financial control. ... In view of the liberal treatment accorded to Title VII, we conclude that these factors should be applied in the determination of “employer” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Title VII's definition of employer permits parent corporations to be treated as one entity with a subsidiary for an employment discrimination action.

Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc. · filed 1979-05-18(b)

In light of the remedial na ture of the ADEA and Title VII, and the liberal interpretation to be granted accordingly, see e. g. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., supra, the court finds that EAC, American and EAC, Denmark, as parent corporations of Heidelberg, can be regarded as one entity for the purposes of this action.

Section 2000e(b) does not allow a subsidiary to count its parent corporations’ employees toward the fifteen-employee threshold when the corporations are separate entities.

Armbruster v. Quinn · filed 1980-10-09(b)

On the facts of this case, the Court is not willing to disregard Syntax Corporation as a “sham” entity in order to consolidate it with its parent corporations to satisfy the Title VII prerequisite of fifteen employees.

Section 2000e(b)’s employee threshold is satisfied when affiliated entities function as a single employer under Title VII.

Boyd v. James S. Hayes Living Health Care Agency, Inc. · filed 1987-05-13(b)

Because MHC and Hayes are a single employer, the jurisdictional requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) is met.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer can encompass nominally independent entities as a single employer, with centralized control of labor relations carrying the most weight.

Saulsberry v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 1987-11-20(b)

An employer is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” The definition of “employer” is to be liberally construed and nominally independent entities may be found to be a single employer upon showing of “(1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control.” The second factor, centralized control of labor relations, is to be accorded the most weight. ... To avoid summary judgment on this issue, the plaintiff had an obligation to designate facts showing that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was centralized control of labor relations between the two entities. This Saulsberry has entirely failed to do.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employment relationship for Title VII liability; a parent company with separate human resources and no centralized control of labor relations is not liable for its subsidiary’s employment decision.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. · filed 1993-05-03(b)

Under Title VII, an employment relationship is a prerequisite to maintaining an action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... While MCIC is the parent company of MCIT, they have different boards of directors and separate human resource functions; there is no centralized control of labor relations. Therefore, in this case, MCIC is not an appropriate defendant; only MCIT is a proper defendant.

Section 2000e(b) can treat a parent corporation as an employer when it interferes with its subsidiary’s employment policies, but a conclusory claim of corporate affiliation is insufficient.

Alie v. Nynex Corp. · filed 1994-08-05(b)

Under this formulation, a parent corporation that interferes with its subsidiary’s employment policies may be deemed an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII. ... The paucity of factual allegations detailing the relationship between defendants NYNEX and TRG is fatal to plaintiffs claims against NYNEX.

A parent company is not a Title VII employer solely because it owns the company that employed the plaintiff.

Hartman v. Smith & Davis Mfg. Co. · filed 1995-10-05(b)

A parent relationship alone is insufficient to impose liability on Everest-Jennings as Plaintiff's employer. ... Plaintiff does not allege that Everest-Jennings participated in or influenced the employment practices of Amedco. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a claim against Defendant Everest-Jennings.

A parent company may qualify as an employer under Title VII based on its relationship with a subsidiary, with particular attention to its control over labor relations.

Mary COOK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARROWSMITH SHELBURNE, INC., KDT Industries, Inc., and Clifton Lind, Defendants-Appell · filed 1995-11-08(b)

We believe that the appropriate test under Title VII for determining when parent companies may be considered employers of a subsidiary’s employees is the four-part test adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth circuits. We focus our inquiry, as those circuits do, on the second factor, centralized control of labor relations.

Common ownership alone is insufficient to treat a parent and subsidiary as a single employer under Title VII's employer definition.

Dewey v. PTT Telecom Netherlands, U.S., Inc. · filed 1996-07-02(b)

Finally, as to common ownership, although PTT Telecom is an indirect subsidiary of Royal PTT, this factor, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that the two companies are a single employer.

Separate entities may qualify as a single employer under Title VII when there is substantial identity between them.

Wickenhauser v. Edward D. Jones & Co. · filed 1996-11-19(b)

Separate entities may constitute a “single employer” for purposes of Title VII if there is “substantial identity” between the entities.

Section 2000e(b) permits a parent company to qualify as an employer of a subsidiary’s employees under the integrated enterprise test.

Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corporation · filed 1996-11-25(b)

Consistent With Every Court Of Appeals That Has Addressed The Issue, The Court Shall Apply The “Integrated Enterprise” Test To Determine If There Is A Genuine Issue That BAC Employs Or Employed The Plaintiffs.

A parent company may qualify as the plaintiff’s employer under Title VII when the evidence supports that relationship.

Bayard v. Riccitelli · filed 1997-01-24(b)

The factfinder could reasonably conclude that Getty Petroleum constituted plaintiffs’ employer under Title VII and New York’s Human Rights Law.

Section 2000e(b)’s employer definition permits two entities to be treated as a single employer based on their operations, management, control of labor relations, and ownership.

Tatum v. Everhart · filed 1997-02-03(b)

The Tenth Circuit has applied the following four factors, sometimes referred to as the integrated enterprise test, to determine whether two entities should be considered as one in employment discrimination actions: (1) interrelated operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership. ... Here, the evidence establishes that UWA and UWWC should not be viewed as a single employer for Title VII and ADEA purposes.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII purposes as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees, including an agent of that person.

Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corp., Inc. · filed 1997-09-10(b)

However, they have pointed to several facts suggesting that BAC has directly impacted material aspects of the plaintiffs’ employment with their respective subsidiaries, such as in the areas of performance evaluations, promotions, and transfers. There also is evidence of common ownership and common management in the human resources area. Because the plaintiffs appear to have raised a genuine issue as to three out of the four factors of the integrated enterprise test, particularly with regard to the most important factor (centralized control of labor relations), BAC’s summary judgment motion must be denied.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer can encompass a parent and subsidiary as a single employer when their operations are sufficiently integrated.

Thornton v. Mercantile Stores Co., Inc. · filed 1998-07-31(b)

After a review of the evidence in the record, and keeping in mind the liberal construction afforded the term “employer,” as well as Mercantile’s burden in establishing that it is entitled to summary judgment, the court finds that Mercantile has failed to meet its burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it and Gayfer’s should be considered a “single employer” for purposes of Title VII.

Related companies may be treated as a single employer under § 2000e(b) when they are sufficiently integrated, particularly in their control of the employment decisions at issue.

Herman v. Blockbuster Entertainment Group · filed 1998-08-25(b)

Thus, despite the egregiousness of the alleged discriminatory acts at Discovery Zone, the Court finds that Blockbuster played no part in the discriminatory conduct, and that Blockbuster is not sufficiently interrelated with Discovery Zone to be held liable for that conduct as Plaintiffs’ employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)'s 15-employee threshold does not count an affiliate's employees merely because the affiliate and the small employer share operations.

Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc. And Walsh Press Company, Inc., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Gjhsrt, In · filed 1999-03-18(b)

The claim that a group of affiliated corporations is “integrated,” the sort of claim that the four-factor test might be thought to support, not only is vague, but is unrelated to the act requirement just explained or to the policy behind the exemption for employers that have very few employees.

Section 2000e(b)'s employer definition can encompass an affiliated corporation when its operations and control of labor relations are sufficiently integrated with the direct employer.

Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp. · filed 1999-09-15(b)

In short, plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence of the interrelation of corporate operations or centralized control by Sumitomo over labor relations at Ipanema. Thus, Sumito-mo’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Separate companies may qualify as an integrated employer when common control over labor relations supports treating them as one enterprise.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Premier Operator Services, Inc. · filed 1999-10-19(b)

Understanding labor control to be the critical evidence, the fact that Mr. Brown maintained the employment and financial control over both companies raises a clear genuine issue of material fact as to Digital’s employer status.

A parent and subsidiary may be treated as a single employer under Title VII depending on how closely their operations and employment decisions are integrated.

Gabriele v. Cole National Corp. · filed 1999-12-29(b)

Accordingly, there is a considerable factual disagreement between the parties with respect to whether Cole National and Things Remembered operate as a single employer for purposes of the federal and state anti-discrimination laws.

Section 2000e(b) allows employees of sufficiently integrated businesses to be counted together when determining whether an employer meets Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold.

Jarred v. Walters Industrial Electronics, Inc. · filed 2001-07-27(b)

While evidence as to common ownership and financial control is less clearly developed in the record, the Court is of the opinion that the record supports a conclusion that Walters and T & M should be consolidated for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) permits an affiliate’s employees to count toward the 15-employee threshold when veil piercing is warranted, the entities were created to avoid antidiscrimination liability, or the affiliate directed the challenged discrimination.

Atkins v. Jad Hosiery, Inc. · filed 2001-09-17(b)

In Papa, we rejected the “integrated enterprise” theory and determined that there are three limited situations in which the presence of an affiliated corporation will vitiate the small-employer exemption: where the traditional conditions for piercing the corporate veil exist; where discrete entities are created for the express purpose of avoiding liability under the federal antidiscrimination laws; and where an affiliate directs the discriminatory act, practice, or policy. See id. at 940-43. As the district court correctly concluded, none of these situations was present here.

Separate entities may be treated as one employer under Title VII when their operations, labor decisions, management, or financial control are sufficiently integrated.

Harriel v. Dialtone, Inc. · filed 2001-09-26(b)

At the very least, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to every element of the “single employer” test, and, when viewed as a whole, the facts are such that a reasonable jury could find that AIM was Harriel’s employer.

A corporate parent is not an employer under Title VII merely because it promulgated workplace policies when it did not supervise the employee or decide her discipline or termination.

Caskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 2008-07-24(b)

Colgate was Hill’s corporate parent, and Caskey presents no evidence to suggest that Colgate supervised Caskey’s work or was the deci...sion-maker regarding Caskey’s discipline and termination. ... As in those cases, we need not mention Colgate again.

A corporate affiliate may be treated as a Title VII employer through veil piercing only when keeping the companies separate would sanction fraud or promote injustice.

Shearrow v. Easton Enterprises, LLC · filed 2012-09-10(b)

Assuming without deciding that plaintiff has established questions of material fact on the unity of interest and ownership prong of the veil-piercing test, the court nevertheless concludes that plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that would satisfy the second prong of the test, that is, a showing that failure to pierce the corporate veil would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.

A parent corporation may be treated as an employer under Title VII when it participates in or influences its subsidiary’s employment policies.

Lorona v. Arizona Summit Law School, LLC · filed 2015-12-16(b)

That allegation suffices to plead Infilaw’s liability as Lorona’s employer, with respect to her claims involving denial of a promotion.

Section 2000e(j) covers a vaccine objection that an employee plausibly alleges is based on a religious belief.

Bello · filed 2026-02-10(j)

Bello, particularly in view of his status as a pro se litigant, has met the standard for pleading a Title VII failure to accommodate claim by alleging that his request for an exemption from the Vaccination Policy was based on his religious belief—in particular, that his religion bars him from accepting an mRNA gene therapy drug that includes the use of an aborted fetal cell line.

Section 2000e(j) covers objections to vaccination that plausibly arise from an employee's religious beliefs, including beliefs about abortion or the sanctity of the body.

DeAngelis v. Hasbro, Inc. · filed 2026-01-29(j)

The plaintiffs here sufficiently alleged that their opposition to taking the COVID-19 vaccine was based on a comprehensive system of religious belief. No more is required at this stage.

Section 2000e(j) includes a religious objection to vaccination within its definition of religion.

O'Hara · filed 2025-11-26(j)

Because Title VII’s definition of religion extends to all aspects of religious observance, practice or belief, Plaintiff’s decision not to take the COVID-19 vaccine—which he objects to because of his religious beliefs—is considered an extension of his Roman Catholic religious practice, thereby entitling him to membership in a protected class.

Section 2000e(j) makes reasonable accommodation and undue hardship relevant to religious observance and practice, but provides no undue hardship defense for discrimination based on religious belief.

Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company · filed 2025-10-15(j)

As a result, reasonable accommodation and undue hardship are only relevant for claims based on observance or practice. No undue hardship defense exists for discriminating against an employee’s beliefs.

Section 2000e(j) can protect a sincere religious objection to vaccination even when the employee also has secular objections.

PRUITT v. T-MOBILE USA, INC. · filed 2025-10-06(j)

Even if some of her objections to vaccination can be construed as secular in nature, that alone does not defeat Pruitt’s claim of religious discrimination. ... A reasonable jury could find that her objection to vaccination is grounded in a sincere religious belief.

Section 2000e(j) requires an employee seeking a religious accommodation to plausibly connect the specific workplace objection to a religious belief; a broad religious principle alone does not make a secular preference religious.

Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center · filed 2025-09-23(j)

A plaintiff seeking a religious exemption must plead a sufficient nexus between her religion and the specific belief in conflict with the work requirement. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not establish her belief is consistent, widely held, or even rational. However, a complaint must connect the requested exemption with a truly religious principle. Invocations of broad, religious tenets cannot, on their own, convert a secular preference into a religious conviction.

Section 2000e(j) permits a religious accommodation claim based on a conflict with a workplace policy, but the employee must plead an actual conflict.

Hasia-Welch v. Disability Rights California · filed 2025-09-23(j)

Accordingly, the Court finds that a conflict with the Policy could be sufficient to state a claim under Title VII and FEHA. However, the SAC fails to plead such a conflict.

Section 2000e(j)’s definition of religion can encompass a pleaded Christian objection to vaccination and virus testing as religious observance, practice, or belief.

Stein v. Austin · filed 2025-02-14(j)

Mr. Stein’s allegations support an inference that his refusal to be vaccinated was an aspect of his religious observance or practice or belief. Likewise, he sufficiently alleges that testing for the virus also conflicted with a religious observance, practice, or belief.

Section 2000e(j) can cover a belief system against vaccination when the employee plausibly alleges that the belief is religious.

Miller v. King County · filed 2025-02-10(j)

But, taking the allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff has adequately alleged a religious belief system that requires him to forego vaccines in general and by which he has lived his life.

Section 2000e(j) covers a plausibly alleged religious belief that forbids vaccination and conflicts with an employer’s vaccination requirement.

Billings v. King County · filed 2025-02-07(j)

But, taking the allegations offered in this case in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff has adequately alleged a religious ... belief system that requires him to forego vaccines in general, beliefs by which he has lived ... for a number of years.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion broadly enough that an accommodation request based even partly on religious belief or practice can survive a motion to dismiss.

Fitch v. Cook County Health and Hospital System · filed 2025-01-16(j)

If an accommodation request can be read on its face as plausibly based even just in part of an aspect of the employee’s religious belief or practice, that is enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious beliefs within Title VII’s protection, and an employee can plausibly plead a religious objection to vaccination by connecting it to faith and prayer.

Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2025-01-16(j)

At this nascent stage of the litigation, Thornton need allege no more facts -- nor more specific ones -- to show that she holds sincere religious beliefs that conflicted with ... the vaccination requirement.

A belief qualifies as religion under Title VII when it is sincerely held and religious in nature.

Barnett v. INOVA Health Care Services · filed 2025-01-07(j)

To qualify for Title VII protection, a plaintiff must show her professed belief is (1) sincerely held and (2) religious in nature.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion to include all aspects of religious observance, practice, and belief, including a vaccine objection grounded in religious principles.

Kneisler v. Legacy Health · filed 2024-12-20(j)

Title VII defines religion expansively, including “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ... Plaintiff connects her objection to the vaccination to her religious principles, which is sufficient at this stage to show that her opposition to the vaccine was an “aspect” of her religious observance or belief.

A requested vaccine exemption must be plausibly based on an aspect of the employee's religious observance, practice, or belief; individualized prayer alone is insufficient.

Engstrom v. Air Line Pilots Association, International · filed 2024-12-10(j)

Individualized prayer, without more, is insufficient to plausibly allege a religious tenet that conflicts with the vaccine requirement such that it supports Title VII violations based on sincerely held religious beliefs.

Section 2000e(j) broadly defines religion to include observance, practice, and belief, but an accommodation claim must explain how a job requirement conflicts with a religious belief.

Jackson v. Amazon.com, Inc · filed 2024-12-05(j)

Title VII defines religion broadly to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). ... She does not, however, explain how testing conflicted with those beliefs.

Section 2000e(j) can protect an objection to vaccination based on religious beliefs about abortion even when the employee does not connect that objection to a wider set of religious convictions.

Brown v. MGM Grand Casino · filed 2024-11-18(j)

That Plaintiff did not connect this principle to a wider set of religious convictions does not doom his claim as a matter of law. This belief alone is sufficient for Plaintiff to survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e(j) can cover a need to pray at specified times when the timing is part of a sincerely held religious belief rather than a personal preference.

Zienni v. Mercedes-Benz US International Inc · filed 2024-11-19(j)

A reasonable jury considering the record as a whole could determine that Zienni’s asserted need to pray at specific times is part of his sincerely held religious belief, and is not just a personal preference.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious beliefs and practices, but merely describing a vaccine objection as spiritual does not establish that it is religious in nature.

Huber v. TIAA · filed 2024-11-14(j)

Her description of her beliefs as “spiritual” was only a conclusory allegation that her objection to the vaccine was religious. That is insufficient to trigger Title VII’s protections.

Section 2000e(j) defines religion broadly enough to include an employee’s objection to a work requirement that has both religious and secular reasons.

Harris v. Cook County · filed 2024-11-18(j)

The statutory definition of religion is expansive, and an employee’s religious objection to a work requirement may include both religious and secular reasons.

Section 2000e(j) includes religious beliefs and practices within the meaning of religion; a pleaded religious objection to vaccination can qualify.

Coates v. Legacy Health · filed 2024-10-03(j)

The term “religion” encompasses all aspects of religious practice and belief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 2004). ... Applying the above framework here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Hickman, Sigafoose, and Brenden’s allegations are sufficient to plead a bona fide religious belief in conflict with an employment duty.

Section 2000e(j) covers a sincerely held religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement, even when an employee’s exemption request also raises medical objections.

Zerveskes v. Mass General Brigham Incorporated · filed 2024-09-26(j)

The defendants’ argument that Zerveskes’ exemption request contains several vague assertions and largely raises medical, rather than religious, objections is well-taken. Nevertheless, at this stage of the litigation, at least some of the statements in Zerveskes’s exemption request and subsequent appeal and communications are sufficient to show that she had a sincerely held religious belief that conflicted with the vaccination policy.

The court found the employees’ pleaded accommodation requests religious in nature under Title VII’s definition of religion.

HALCZENKO v. ASCENSION HEALTH, INC. · filed 2024-09-25(j)

Title VII defines religion as "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ... So, as in Passarella, they have alleged accommodation requests that are "religious in nature within the meaning of Title VII." Id. at 1009.

Section 2000e(j) does not require an employee to provide documentation from a spiritual leader to establish a sincerely held religious belief for an accommodation claim.

Pinner v. American Association of Orthodontists · filed 2024-09-19(j)

Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim fails as a matter of law simply because she failed to provide the specific document demanded by defendant – namely, “documentation from one of your religion’s spiritual leaders about the nature of the accommodation needed.”

Section 2000e(j) covers a refusal to be vaccinated when the pleaded facts plausibly link that refusal to religious observance or belief.

Dickhudt v. COBX Co. · filed 2024-09-19(j)

In applying Lucky and Sturgill, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations in her proposed second amended complaint are enough to “establish, at the pleading stage, that her refusal to receive the vaccine was an ‘aspect’ of her religious observance or belief.”