42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to sue within ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice; a later claim against a new defendant is barred if the amendment does not relate back.

Washington v. McComb Motel Co. · filed 1990-12-12(f)(1)

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that McComb Motel neither knew nor should have known within the ninety-day limitations period of plaintiffs suit. See Barkins, 825 F.2d at 906-07. Therefore, plaintiff’s amended complaint naming McComb Motel as defendant does not relate back to the original filing against Holiday Inns, Inc., and his failure to bring this action against McComb Motel within ninety days of his receipt of notice from the EEOC of his right to sue bars the present action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) imposes a 90-day time limit for filing a Title VII employment-discrimination complaint.

Rhonda R. Brown v. Prince George's County Health Department, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene · filed 1991-01-28(f)(1)

Brown filed her complaint outside of the 90-day EEOC time limit as required under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file suit within ninety days of receiving notice of the right to sue; a continuing violation does not extend that deadline.

Brown v. Hartshorne Public School District 1, Janie Trueblood Lorraine Hollis Jack Holloway Tommy McCullar Dr. · filed 1991-02-20(f)(1)

However, the continuing violation theory does not eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff file a judicial action within ninety days of receipt of notice of the right to sue. Accordingly, we conclude that Brown’s Title VII action is barred by her failure to file it within the requisite period of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action to be filed within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice, subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Robinson v. Central Brass Manufacturing Co. · filed 1991-04-11(f)(1)

Title VII requires that an action be filed with the federal court within 90 days from receipt of the notice of right to sue from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). This is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit, but is analogous to a statute of limitations which is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action to be filed within ninety days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue notice, subject to equitable tolling.

Nix v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States · filed 1991-05-03(f)(1)

The statute clearly provides that a legal action pursuant to Title VII must be filed within ninety days of the receipt of the right to sue notice from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Although that time period is not jurisdictional, plaintiff does not claim the occurrence of any of the circumstances which would support equitable tolling of the time period by this Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit may be equitably tolled when the EEOC fails to respond to a request to review dismissed charges.

Salamat v. Village Inn Pancake Houses, Inc. · filed 1991-03-01(f)(1)

Thus, as there is no other evidence that plaintiff was informed before January 1 and 3, 1990 (the dates on which the 90-day periods would have otherwise expired to sue on charges 203 and 269) that his request for review of charges 203 and 269 had been denied, the Court finds that the 90-day periods should be equitably tolled, and that the 90-day periods only began to run with the notice of dismissal of charge 175 in the September 17, 1990 letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an attorney general right-to-sue letter for a Title VII suit against a governmental agency, but the requirement may be waived when a plaintiff diligently tries and cannot obtain one.

Townsend v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Oklahoma Military Department · filed 1991-03-12(f)(1)

As a statutory condition precedent to a Title VII lawsuit against a governmental agency, a plaintiff is required to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the attorney general. The requirement is subject to equitable doctrines including waiver, estoppel, or modification. The Court is waiving the requirement because the attorney general has refused to issue the letter despite Townsend’s diligent attempt to comply with the statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file a complaint within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter.

McGill v. General Electric Company · filed 1991-04-24(f)(1)

Pearlie M. McGill appeals from the district court's order dismissing her employment discrimination action for failure to file a complaint within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). Our review of the record and the district court's opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period begins when a claimant’s failure to take reasonable steps to receive a right-to-sue letter causes the delay.

Bond v. American Medical Ass'n · filed 1991-05-23(f)(1)

Since plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to insure receipt of her right to sue letter in June of 1986, the ninety day period began to run on June 19, 1986, and expired in September of 1986.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins upon receipt of a right-to-sue notice, determined case by case in light of the claimant’s minimal responsibility to ensure delivery.

Stallworth v. Wells Fargo Armored Services Corp. · filed 1991-07-22(f)(1)

Under the law of our circuit, the 90-day statute of limitations commences upon receipt of the right-to-sue letter. However, a plaintiff is required to assume some minimal responsibility to ensure receipt. The court has adopted a case-by-case approach in determining what constitutes receipt and when the time is triggered. ... We agree with Stallworth that she has satisfied the minimum burden imposed upon her by the law of this circuit. It is reasonable to continue to receive mail at one's permanent home address during a temporary absence. Nor is it unreasonable to check for the mail there six times during the crucial month, when the family practice is to leave the mail in a designated place. We conclude that the primary fault for the failed delivery in this case rests upon the EEOC because of its failure to mail a copy of the right-to-sue letter to Stallworth's attorney.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII plaintiff 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file an action.

White v. SKF Aerospace, Inc. · filed 1991-07-29(f)(1)

The statute of limitations for a Title VII action is 90 days after plaintiff’s receipt of a Right to Sue Notice, which is issued after an EEOC hearing is dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s ninety-day filing period begins when the claimant’s attorney receives the right-to-sue notice.

Wagher v. Guy's Foods, Inc. · filed 1991-07-31(f)

Section 2000e-5(f) does not expressly eliminate the common practice of giving notice through an attorney. For these reasons, the court finds the plaintiff Wagher received the right-to-sue letter on October 7 or 8, 1990, through her attorney so as to trigger the running of the ninety-day period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit within ninety days of the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Tillman v. New York State Department of Mental Health · filed 1991-11-09(f)(1)

Plaintiff had ninety days from the issuance of the right to sue letter on April 30, 1986 to file suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII civil action to be brought within 90 days after the EEOC dismisses the charge.

Mumphrey v. James River Paper Co., Inc. · filed 1991-11-15(f)(1)

Defendant James River Paper first contends that Ms. Mumphrey’s complaints of race and sex discrimination under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), are barred because her “civil action” was not “brought” within 90 days of the EEOC’s dismissal of her charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Under controlling precedent, the court has no choice except to agree.

The deadline for filing a Title VII suit under § 2000e-5(f)(1) may be equitably tolled only when the claimant was actively deceived about procedural prerequisites.

W.M. Scheerer v. Rose State College Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Donald Burris, and Evan Kemp · filed 1991-12-04(f)(1)

Finally, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's Title VII claim of race discrimination as untimely filed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... We agree. “[I]n this circuit, a Title VII time limit will be tolled only if there has been ‘active deception’ ” of the claimant regarding procedural prerequisites.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing deadline may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff reasonably relies on an incorrect deadline supplied by the EEOC and the defendant shows no prejudice.

Bracey v. Helene Curtis, Inc. · filed 1992-01-13(f)(1)

Bracey was required to file her complaint within 90 days after she was given notice of the EEOC’s dismissal of her charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The 90-day filing requirement is not jurisdictional and is therefore subject to equitable tolling, estoppel and waiver. ... In this case, where no prejudice to HCI has been shown, one-day equitable tolling is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter is delivered to the claimant’s residence and signed for by a family member, even if the claimant reads it later.

Aurelia SCHOLAR, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. PACIFIC BELL, a Pacific Telesis Company, a Corporation, Defendant/Appellee · filed 1992-04-30(f)(1)

The language of the statute establishes the 90-day period as running from the “giving of such notice” rather than from the date claimant actually “receives” notice in hand. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Ms. Scholar was given notice when the right-to-sue letter sent certified mail by EEOC was received and signed for by Ms. Scholar’s daughter November 1, 1988, at Ms. Scholar’s place of residence; thus, expiration of the 90-day period was January 30, 1989.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period may be equitably tolled for excusable neglect in a Title VII suit against a private employer.

Fellows v. Earth Construction, Inc. · filed 1992-02-26(f)(1)

Because this case represents classic excusable neglect coupled with a private defendant, the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled as to plaintiffs Title VII claim, and defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to that claim is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing deadline is met when a plaintiff lodges a complaint with the clerk on time and promptly signs it after being told the signature is missing.

Adams v. Perloff Brothers, Inc. · filed 1992-02-28(f)(1)

This Court finds that plaintiff Adams’ execution of the complaint was prompt for purposes of Rule 11, and, therefore, that the complaint should be treated as having been lodged with the Court on April 30, 1991 when it was first given to the Clerk of Court. ... Because plaintiff’s complaint was therefore timely filed, his Title VII action may proceed.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled when a state agency’s procedural error, through no fault of the claimant, would otherwise bar the claim.

Johnny C. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ann CROWE, Defendant, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1992-05-11(e)

We apply the doctrine of equitable tolling and hold that the statutory period of Title VII is tolled where, through no fault of the plaintiff, the procedural errors of a state administrative agency would otherwise defeat the plaintiff’s right to litigate his case.

A Title VII plaintiff has 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit.

Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. · filed 1992-04-08(f)(1)

The EEOC right to sue letter, as set forth above, states that suit shall be filed within 90 days of the charging party’s receipt of the letter. ... Accordingly, I conclude that defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed as time barred is likewise without merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days to file a Title VII suit after receiving a right-to-sue letter.

Winbush v. Normal Life of Louisiana, Inc. · filed 1992-05-20(f)(1)

Normal Life of Louisiana argues Winbush's claim has prescribed because it was not filed within the time limitations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), which governs employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ... Winbush did not file a federal lawsuit within the 90 day period; instead, he filed the instant suit in state court after the 90 days had expired but within one year of his termination. We agree with the defendant that any Title VII claims that Winbush may have as a result of his May 22, 1986 termination have prescribed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s right-to-sue-letter requirement applies to Title I ADA suits, and a suit filed without the letter may be dismissed without prejudice.

Kent v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Elem. & SEC. Educ. · filed 1992-06-02(f)(1)

The procedures of § 2000e-5 are applicable to a proceeding under the Americans with Disabilities Act brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). That being the case, the petitioner does not possess the requisite authority to initiate this suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit to be filed within ninety days after the employee receives a right-to-sue letter, unless equitable tolling applies.

Boyce v. Fleet Finance, Inc. · filed 1992-07-15(f)(1)

Even if plaintiff were able to assert all claims of discrimination, however, his claims would be barred because he failed to file his claim within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter.

A Title VII plaintiff must obtain a proper right-to-sue letter; a state deferral agency’s letter does not satisfy the federal requirement.

Marrero-Rivera v. Department of Justice · filed 1992-07-23(f)(1)

Under the law and regulations, the ADU letter does not fulfill the requirement for a right-to-sue letter for suit under Title VII against either the Department of Justice as a government agency or the other defendants.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to file suit; the deadline may be equitably tolled when the claimant shows sufficient grounds.

Butler v. San Francisco Unified School District · filed 1992-07-29(f)(1)

We conclude that Butler failed to provide a sufficient explanation to justify an equitable tolling of the ninety-day deadline to allow filing of his Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII complaint to be filed within ninety days after receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue notice, subject to waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling.

Fischer v. Jenkins · filed 1992-08-10(f)(1)

A complaint filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act must be filed within ninety days after the right-to-sue notice from the EEOC is actually received. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Peete, 885 F.2d at 331. The time limit can be extended only when warranted on grounds of waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII claimant 90 days to file suit after a right-to-sue letter.

Beresiwsky v. University of Hawaii · filed 1992-08-05(f)(1)

There is no dispute that Beresiwsky failed to file suit until May 13, 1986, well beyond the 90-day limit of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after a right-to-sue notice to file a private action.

Wilson v. Amtrak National Railroad · filed 1992-08-20(f)(1)

Pursuant to Title VII, the plaintiff was notified in 1988 that should he wish to pursue the matter further, he could file a private action in the Federal District Court within 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Having waited until 1991 to file an action, he is barred from asserting those allegations at this time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is satisfied when the clerk receives a pro se Title VII complaint with an in forma pauperis application in time, even if the court grants the application later.

White v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1992-09-15(f)(1)

Although neither of these cases mentioned an explicit instruction sheet that requires a court order to proceed in forma pauperis before the complaint is actually filed, this court finds such an equitable approach more grounded in law than blind adherence to an instruction sheet that has little or no legal force. ... Following the equitable approach of other courts, this court finds that on August 22, 1991, 93 days after the EEOC sent the letter, Mr. White’s complaint was validly filed. ... Therefore, following the reasoning of other courts in civil rights cases where the plaintiff is pro se, this court finds that Mr. White’s claim is not barred by the 90-day limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period is tolled while an in forma pauperis petition is pending; a complaint lodged with the clerk within the remaining period is timely despite later payment of the filing fee.

Johnson v. Brown · filed 1992-09-28(f)(1)

Accordingly, the court concludes that the limitations period was tolled on December 27, when Mr. Johnson filed his petition to proceed in forma pauperis. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that Mr. Johnson’s ninety-day period resumed operation on January 17, when the court denied the pauper petition. ... Thus, Mr. Johnson’s complaint should be deemed filed by January 21 at' the latest, notwithstanding his failure to pay the filing fee until February 6.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file a complaint within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice; an in forma pauperis petition that alleges no discrimination does not satisfy that requirement.

Aleman v. State · filed 1992-10-08(f)(1)

Therefore, this Court finds that Ale-man’s ifp petition does not constitute a complaint sufficient to satisfy the ninety-day filing requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling, but ordinary attorney neglect does not justify tolling.

Fellows v. Earth Construction, Inc. · filed 1992-10-16(f)(1)

Title VII provides that within ninety days after the issuance of a right to sue letter, “a civil action may be brought against the respondent.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... This case, unlike the cases cited above, is a matter of simple attorney neglect. ... As such, there is no basis for the application of the principles of equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII claimant 90 days to file suit after the EEOC dismisses the claim, subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.

Gulbenkian v. T.Y. Lin International & E.E.O.C., Chairman · filed 1992-09-29(f)(1)

The 90-day filing period is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances. ... Clearly, his filing was untimely. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Because Gulbenkian has made no showing to justify invocation of the doctrine of equitable tolling, the district court did not err by refusing to allow Gulbenkian to file his complaint. See id.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge-filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling when an employer leads an employee to believe that unfair treatment will be corrected.

Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., Karen Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc. · filed 1992-10-28(e)

The requirement of timely filing a charge with the EEOC is not jurisdictional; rather, it is a statutory limitation that is subject to equitable tolling. ... In this case, as in Reeb, tolling is appropriate because the trial court found that the plaintiff was led by the defendant to believe that the unfair treatment would be rectified.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a Title VII suit to be filed within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter; filing a suit that is later dismissed does not toll that period.

Gemeral Earnest Berry, Jr. v. Cigna/rsi-Cigna · filed 1992-10-29(f)

If a Title VII complaint is timely filed pursuant to an EEOC right-to-sue letter and is later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not toll the ninety-day limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving notice of the right to sue to file a Title VII action, subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.

Fleming v. Alcoa Building Products · filed 1992-12-11(f)(1)

Clearly the plaintiff has filed his complaint outside the ninety-day period specified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... As a result, this court finds that Mr. Fleming did not act diligently to protect his legal rights. ... Furthermore, the facts in this ease do not reflect a situation which has been recognized by the Supreme Court or this circuit as warranting equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file suit and provides no grace period.

Blondine Swain v. New York Life Insurance Co. · filed 1992-11-18(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) permits just 90 days and does not mention a grace period. Swain's claims were properly dismissed without a determination on the merits because they were time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) sets a ninety-day deadline for filing a Title VII suit after the EEOC review period expires.

Higgs v. Streets Service Center, Inc., and Jerry Lecentburg, Owner · filed 1992-12-09(f)(1)

Because plaintiff did not file the present suit until May of 1992, his Title VII claim is clearly time-barred by the limitations period in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require an EEOC right-to-sue notice to be signed.

Love v. Harsh Investment Corporation · filed 1993-01-12(f)(1)

Because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require the notice letter to be signed, the absence of Michael Dougherty's signature did not affect the validity of the final Letter of Determination received by Love on December 5, 1990.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit.

Brown v. Consolidated Freightway · filed 1993-03-29(f)(1)

The notice provided by the EEOC to the complaining party is commonly referred to as a right to sue letter. It is the established authority of this circuit that the 90 day statute of limitations for filing suit commences upon the receipt of this letter by the complainant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file a Title VII action within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice, subject to equitable tolling.

Keim v. National Super Markets, Inc. United Food and Commercial Workers' Union, Local No. 88 · filed 1993-02-19(f)(1)

The district court correctly held that Keim's race discrimination claim is barred as untimely because he failed to file this action within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and he has shown no basis for equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing deadline is nonjurisdictional and may be tolled while a petition to proceed in forma pauperis is pending.

Washington v. Foresman · filed 1993-03-16(f)(1)

The ninety day limit of § 2000e-5(f)(1) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Instead it is more like a statute of limitations. ... However, based upon the authorities and statutes cited and the reasons stated above, this court has determined that Washington timely filed his complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a complaint to be filed within ninety days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter, subject to equitable tolling.

Gibson v. R.J. Frazier, Co. · filed 1993-03-31(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) mandates a ninety day limitation period for the filing of a complaint after a right to sue letter is received from the EEOC. ... Therefore, the ninety day period is subject to waiver and equitable tolling. ... We agree with the district court that Gibson showed a marked lack of diligence in pursuing his claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day deadline for filing suit is subject to equitable tolling, but bad advice from counsel and a dismissal without prejudice do not justify tolling.

Woods v. Denver Department of Revenue · filed 1993-04-15(f)(1)

The statute of limitations set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) is not jurisdictional and is subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. ... Because the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply, Plaintiffs Title VII claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

A second EEOC right-to-sue letter does not restart the ninety-day filing period unless the EEOC indicates that it revoked the first letter.

Lee v. Alta Pacific Group · filed 1993-04-07(f)(1)

The second right-to-sue letter was without effect as there was no indication that the EEOC intended to revoke its first right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a complaint within ninety days; filing a right-to-sue letter alone neither commences the action nor tolls that period.

Fitzpatrick v. Standard Register Company · filed 1993-04-09(f)(1)

The Supreme Court has held that filing a copy of a right to sue letter is not sufficient to commence an action under Title VII, and does not toll the ninety day period for filing a complaint. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam). Accordingly, it is concluded that the district court correctly dismissed this complaint based on the information submitted to it.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a civil suit to be filed within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter.

Berkowski v. St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners · filed 1993-06-08(f)(1)

Both the federal and state statutes require a civil suit to be filed within 90 days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter. § 213.111.1 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The state statute further provides that a civil suit shall not be filed later than two years after the discriminatory act occurred. The legal file and pleadings demonstrate plaintiff did not file an action against the individual defendants until May 16, 1990, more than ninety days after receipt of her right-to-sue letter on November 30, 1989, and more than two years after her discharge. Plaintiff’s action is accordingly time barred against the individual defendants.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after the EEOC gives notice of the right to sue.

Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital · filed 1993-06-10(f)(1)

In Title VII and ADEA cases the plaintiff must file suit in federal court no later than 90 days after the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has given notice of the plaintiffs right to sue. ... That requirement is not satisfied by any of the claims against the defendants that Vakharia named for the first time in the amended complaints.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter; the deadline is not tolled when the plaintiff's lack of diligence causes the delay.

Kennedy v. Steel Warehouse Company, Inc. · filed 1993-06-17(f)(1)

Title VII requires litigants to file suit in district courts within ninety days after receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Since no event beyond Kennedy's control prevented him from filing a timely suit, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal with prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is not satisfied by filing an EEOC right-to-sue determination that does not meet the requirements for a complaint.

Williams v. Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. · filed 1993-06-22(f)(1)

The Court considered Defendant’s motion without the benefit of a response from Plaintiff and on May 7, 1993, entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order in which the Court found that because the EEOC letter filed by Plaintiff within the allotted 90 day period was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1), this action should be dismissed. ... While Plaintiff expresses disagreement with the determination of the Court that she did not commence this action in a timely manner, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the May 7, 1993, ruling of the Court rises to the level of a clear error of law or manifest injustice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day deadline to sue after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter is subject to equitable tolling.

Richardson v. Diagnostic Rehabilitation Center · filed 1993-07-27(f)(1)

We conclude that the complaint, although formally filed approximately four months after the expiration of Title VU’s ninety day statute of limitations, was nevertheless timely because the ninety day limit was tolled during the intervening period. Therefore, DRC’s motion to dismiss the Title VII claim must be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff timely files a defective pleading and the court leads her to believe the filing is effective.

Goldsmith v. City of Atmore · filed 1993-08-04(f)(1)

Despite this deficiency in Goldsmith's first attempt at filing, we hold that Goldsmith's action was timely filed under the principles of equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff files a defective pleading within that period and the court leads her to believe it was effective.

Goldsmith v. City of Atmore · filed 1993-08-04(f)(1)

Under these circumstances, ... we hold that the expiration of the 90 day limitations period was equitably tolled through September 28, 1990, by virtue of the district court’s order, and that Goldsmith’s filing on that date was timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling, but an attorney's misstatement of the deadline does not excuse a plaintiff's failure to act diligently.

Fleming v. Alcoa Building Products · filed 1993-10-06(f)(1)

Under Title VII, "a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge" within 90 days after issuance of the notice of right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Fleming asserts that his lack of diligence should be excused because of alleged misrepresentations by Fleming's attorney concerning the limitations period. This argument is without merit. In this Circuit an attorney's conduct is imputed to the client in any context.

The court measured § 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period from the EEOC’s issuance of the right-to-sue letter when assessing the amended complaint.

Diaz v. City of Miami Beach · filed 1993-07-30(f)(1)

However, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file a suit such as this one within 90 days of the date the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issues a right-to-sue letter. This second approach would result in a finding that the 90-day period of limitations had expired prior to the commencement of the action by the filing of the Amended Complaint.

The court treated a Title VII complaint filed within ninety days of the EEOC’s issuance of a right-to-sue letter as timely under § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Brown v. Bronx Cross County Medical Group · filed 1993-10-14(f)(1)

Ms. Brown filed her complaint with this Court on December 6,1991, within 90 days of the EEOC’s issuance of the “right-to-sue” letter. Thus, her Title VII claim is timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing suit is not tolled by an earlier timely complaint dismissed without prejudice.

Wilford v. Charles Slusher Walgreen Drug Store · filed 1993-08-13(f)(1)

A timely complaint later dismissed without prejudice does not toll the 90-day filing period under Title VII, see Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp., 815 F.2d 26, 28 (6th Cir.1987) (per curiam), because such a dismissal leaves the situation the same as if the suit had never been brought.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period begins when the Postal Service delivers notice that a right-to-sue letter is available for pickup.

Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family Crisis Center, (Two Cases). Sonja Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family Cris · filed 1993-09-15(f)(1)

These same considerations persuade us to find that the limitations period is triggered when the Postal Service delivers notice to a plaintiff that the right-to-sue letter is available for pickup, and not when the letter is actually picked up.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to commence a civil action within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice.

Williams v. Related Management Corp. · filed 1993-09-27(f)(1)

Title VII provides that within ninety (90) days after the issuance of a right-to-sue notice, “a civil action may be brought against the respondent.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Williams received his right-to-sue notice on May 20, 1991. Williams July Aff. ¶ 1. Therefore, in order to preserve his right to bring suit against his employer, Williams must have commenced suit by August 18, 1991.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter unless the filing period is tolled.

Shieh v. David Ebershoff Fulbright & Jaworski Paul S. Blencowe Tim C. Bruinsma · filed 1993-12-30(f)(1)

Finally, the district court was correct in concluding that Shieh's Title VII claims were time barred. Shieh received his right to sue letter on December 5, 1990, and did not file his complaint in federal court until October 7, 1991. Because Shieh has not alleged that the statute of limitations was tolled for any reason, these claims are barred by the 90-day time limit for filing a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the plaintiff or her attorney receives the EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Saxton v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Successor to at & T Bell Laboratories · filed 1993-12-03(f)(1)

Although section 2000e-5(£)(l) requires that a plaintiff file suit "within ninety days after the giving of” notice by the EEOC of her right to sue, the ninety-day period does not begin to run until the plaintiff or her attorney receives the right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Fields v. Service Employees International Union, Local 47 Michael P. Murphy, President · filed 1993-12-09(f)(1)

Fields did not file his Title VII complaint within 90 days of his receipt of the right to sue letter from the EEOC. See Freeman v. Michigan Dep't of State, 808 F.2d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir.1987). Thus, his action is time barred pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the appropriate agency within the prescribed time.

Presley v. Local 181, Operating Engineers · filed 1994-03-14(e)

Plaintiff failed to file a charge of discrimination with the appropriate agency within the time required under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit after an EEOC right-to-sue notice is nonjurisdictional and may be equitably tolled.

Roush v. Kartridge Pak Co. · filed 1993-12-14(f)(1)

Therefore, this court concludes that the 90-day filing restriction contained in § 2000e-5(f)(1) is not jurisdictional and may be tolled for equitable considerations.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is satisfied when an amended complaint naming the proper defendant relates back to a timely original complaint.

Jacobi v. Blocker · filed 1994-01-25(f)(1)

Accordingly, the naming of Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc., as the party defendant relates back to May 26, 1993, the date of the original Complaint, and the filing of this suit falls within the 90-day period allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a plaintiff to rely on a three-day presumption of receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter only after the plaintiff and counsel state when each received it or that they cannot recall the date.

Stambaugh v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 1994-01-27(f)(1)

In line with these decisions, the court holds that a plaintiff here cannot rely on the three-day presumption unless that plaintiff and her attorney first aver the date on which the EEOC’s right-to-sue was actually received by each or aver the fact that they are unable to recall the actual date.

This court read § 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period to run from the EEOC’s giving of notice rather than actual hand receipt.

O'Neal v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. · filed 1994-03-31(f)(1)

In addition, upon a careful reading of the language of § 2000e-5(f)(l), it is apparent that the ninety day period runs from “the giving of such notice,” rather than from the date the claimant actually “receives” notice in hand.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an employee 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file suit; claims based on a charge are barred if the employee misses that deadline.

Shirley A. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. LITTLE ROCK MUNICIPAL WATER WORKS, Appellee · filed 1994-05-05(f)(1)

Once an individual receives notice of the right to sue, she has 90 days in which to file suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In the present case, it is undisputed that Williams did not file suit within 90 days of receiving notice of the right to sue on her January 1987 EEOC charge alleging race discrimination. For that reason, claims based on events which prompted Williams’ first EEOC charge are barred by statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period is tolled while a request to proceed in forma pauperis is pending, but a pending request for counsel does not toll it under these facts.

Jarrett v. Us Sprint Communications Company · filed 1994-04-26(f)(1)

Congress has granted ninety days as a Title VII filing limitation, and the time is extended while the IFP petition pends, but only during that time. ... We hold that the pending of a motion for counsel under these facts does not toll the ninety-day limitation period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an aggrieved party to bring an action within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter.

Al-Hadad v. State of Cal. · filed 1994-04-29(f)(1)

The facts pertaining to the earlier denials of promotion to full professorship cannot be the basis of this suit, since they would be untimely under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1), which requires that an aggrieved party bring an action in court within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter.

A second EEOC right-to-sue notice issued solely to extend the filing period does not restart the time to bring a Title VII action.

Thompkins v. Firestone Steel Products Co., Doing Business as Accuride Corp. Gerald Wayne Douglas Uaw Local 2 · filed 1994-05-02(f)(1)

It is clear from the record that the second notice was issued in Thompkins's case solely to extend the initial notice period. Thompkins does not even allege that he asked for reconsideration of the EEOC's initial determination; in fact, he merely requested a copy of the 1983 notice. Consequently, the timeliness of Thompkins's Title VII action must be considered in light of the initial 1983 notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period does not impose a new deadline when a claimant receives a right-to-sue letter for claims reasonably related to a timely Title VII suit.

Cornwell v. Robinson · filed 1994-05-03(f)(1)

Accordingly, Cornwell could have amended her original complaint to assert the claims of 1986 wrongdoing even if she had not filed additional charges with EEOC. Since this is so, we can see no basis in Title VII or in reason for concluding that the agency's response to her unnecessary administrative claim imposed on her time constraints to which she would not have been subject had she not filed the unnecessary claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is not equitably tolled when counsel’s late attempt to commence the action amounts to excusable neglect rather than due diligence.

Will South, Jr. v. Saab Cars Usa, Inc. · filed 1994-06-28(f)(1)

Plaintiff-appellee’s explanation for the late filing of the complaint discloses conduct that, in the words of the Supreme Court, “is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect,” which fails to justify equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing deadline may be equitably tolled when active deception misleads a claimant or lulls her into inaction.

Simons v. Southwest Petro-Chem · filed 1994-06-30(f)(1)

Merely acknowledging counsel's representations that a second suit would be forthcoming does not rise to the level of active deception necessary to support application of equitable tolling. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Ms. Simons' Title VII claims were not timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC filing deadline may be equitably tolled, but a plaintiff who makes no effort to confirm or monitor the filing of her charge cannot obtain tolling based on a state agency’s failure to cross-file it.

Breen v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A. · filed 1994-07-22(e)

Because Breen made no effort to confirm the filing of her charge with the EEOC or monitor its progress, the Court will not excuse her failure to meet the requisite filing requirements. Therefore, Count III of Breen’s complaint alleging a violation of Title VII will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing deadline is not equitably tolled when an employee knows he can contest his discharge and is familiar with the available forums.

Lawrence A. Hamilton, Jr. v. Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary of the Army · filed 1994-07-26(e)

Hamilton filed his Title VII claims attacking the legality of his termination in December 1991, well after the 180-day period in which such claims must normally be filed. ... Hamilton knew he could contest his discharge and was familiar with the fora in which to bring his claims. This knowledge is sufficient to preclude equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s 90-day filing period is satisfied when the clerk receives a complaint, even if a request to proceed in forma pauperis is later denied, provided the filing fee is paid within a reasonable time.

Rounds v. Milwaukee County Community Correctional Center · filed 1994-08-29(f)

I find that, under the circumstances in this case, the complaint is filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when it is originally received. Denial of leave to proceed in for-ma pauperis does not affect that fact where, as here, the fee is paid within a reasonable time thereafter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action to be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC or an appropriate state agency.

Etemad v. State of California, Department of Toxic Substance Control (Dtsc) · filed 1994-09-02(f)(1)

An action under Title VII must be filed within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter from the EEOC or appropriate state agency. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Because it was filed beyond the 90-day statute of limitations, the second amended complaint is time-barred, unless the amendment relates back to the date of the original complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a civil action within 90 days after EEOC notice but does not prescribe how an action filed in state court must be commenced.

Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co. · filed 1994-11-25(f)(1)

Thus, the statute requires only that a civil action be brought within the 90-day limitations period, but it does not specify the manner of commencing the “civil action.” As an initial matter, then, nothing in § 2000e-5(f)(1) itself rules out the commencement of an ADA action by the means employed by Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit to be filed within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter, unless grounds for equitable tolling exist.

Childrey v. United Insurance Company of America · filed 1994-12-15(f)(1)

The district court dismissed her suit because she filed it 91 days after receiving her right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) (90 day statute of limitations). We affirm. ... Childrey filed a day late, and the statute of limitations bars her suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved party ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file a civil action.

Alford v. City of Montgomery, Alabama · filed 1995-02-06(f)(1)

Once an aggrieved party has received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC, the party has ninety days to bring a civil action against the respondent named in the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The ninety-day time frame is jurisdictional, and with a few exceptions not relevant here, the ninety-day period begins to run from the date the plaintiff receives the notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to sue the respondent named in the charge.

Grooms v. Wiregrass Electric Cooperative, Inc. · filed 1995-02-17(f)(1)

After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit within ninety days. ... Once an aggrieved party has received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC, the party has ninety days to bring a civil action against the respondent named in the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue notice is subject to equitable tolling when the plaintiff fails to receive the notice through no fault of her own.

Ryczek v. Guest Services, Inc. · filed 1995-02-27(f)(1)

Ordinarily, a Title VII suit must be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right to sue notice from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). However, this 90 day period is like a statute of limitations and subject to equitable tolling. ... The Court finds that this declaration is adequate to justify equitable tolling in this case. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss this case on timeliness grounds.

A Title VII claim must be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.

Smith v. Local Union 28 Sheet Metal Workers · filed 1995-02-28(f)(1)

In order to be timely, a Title VII claim must be filed within 90 days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter. ... Since the instant action was not commenced until June 16, 1992, or at least 95 days later under any view of the facts, the Title VII claims are time-barred as to all defendants.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period for a claim is not restarted by a later right-to-sue notice addressing different claims.

Cofield v. Banc One Corporation/bank One of Arizona · filed 1995-03-09(f)(1)

Because the second right to sue notice did not invalidate the first notice, to file a timely action with respect to her initial claims Cofield was required to file her complaint in district court within ninety days of the EEOC's September 29, 1993 determination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Witt v. Roadway Express · filed 1995-03-17(f)(1)

Plaintiff has not carried his burden in this case, and the court concludes that plaintiffs complaint was not filed within 90 days after receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice if the complaint is filed within ninety days; an amended complaint filed in that period satisfies the requirement.

Cross v. Alabama · filed 1995-04-06(f)(1)

The Notice[s] of Right To Sue gave appellees the immediate right to file suit in federal district court. Appellees filed their First Amendment to Complaint in the district court on September 18, 1991, after the EEOC issued the notices and prior to the expiration of ninety days. Based on the above, Horsley's arguments are without merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a claimant to sue within ninety days after an EEOC right-to-sue notice; a timely amended complaint filed after the notice can satisfy that requirement.

Cross v. Alabama, State Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation · filed 1995-04-06(f)(1)

The Notice[s] of Right To Sue gave appellees the immediate right to file suit in federal district court. Appellees filed their First Amendment to Complaint in the district court on September 18, 1991, after the EEOC issued the notices and prior to the expiration of rnnety days. Based on the above, Horsley’s arguments are without merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to sue within 90 days after receiving a notice of right to sue, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving timely filing.

Martinez v. United States Sugar Corp. · filed 1995-03-16(f)(1)

Title VII requires a plaintiff to sue within ninety (90) days of receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Plaintiff has the burden to prove that he has adhered to the requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when a claimant receives notice of the right to sue if the claimant took reasonable steps to receive it.

Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype · filed 1995-03-23(f)(1)

Accordingly, the court rules that the 90-day time period for plaintiff to file her Title VII and ADA claims did not begin to run until October 2 5 , 1993, and finds that plaintiff's claims, filed December 2 9 , 1993, were timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person to bring a Title VII action within ninety days after receiving notice from the EEOC.

Douglas v. Evans · filed 1995-05-12(f)(1)

Here, Douglas received notice from the EEOC on April 1, 1994, and amended her complaint on May 3, 1994, to include the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to file suit within ninety days.

Thomas v. TRW, Inc. · filed 1995-05-15(f)(1)

First, Thomas failed to timely file his Title VII claims within the ninety-day statutory period. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988); see Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-52 (1984); Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family Crisis Ctr., 7 F.3d 40, 42 (4th Cir.1993).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing Rodmen · filed 1995-05-18(f)(1)

Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim under Title VII, the Court is precluded from entertaining the instant action by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1), which requires Title VII litigants to file their civil actions within ninety days of receipt of an EEOC Determination. Plaintiff filed his Complaint more than ninety days after his presumptive receipt of the EEOC letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Olds v. Alamo Group (KS), Inc. · filed 1995-06-28(f)(1)

“Title VII, in particular 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), requires that the plaintiff bring the civil suit within ninety days of receipt of a right to sue letter.” ... In short, based upon the information and arguments presented, the court concludes that Olds commenced this action within the statutory periods applicable to his claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows 90 days after EEOC notice to file suit, and equitable tolling does not excuse a failure to take ordinary precautions.

Luckett v. Rent-A-Center, Incorporated, and Tom Fleissner · filed 1995-06-09(f)(1)

Equitable tolling does not protect a party who omits ordinary precautions. ... Luckett waited far longer before inquiring of the court, and the statute of limitations prevents a party who has neglected to protect her own interests from shifting the onus of the delay to the other side.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline for filing a Title VII suit may be equitably tolled, but neglecting a clear deadline does not justify tolling.

White v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1995-06-28(f)(1)

Plaintiff fails to make any showing sufficient to invoke equitable tolling under Baldwin. The notices in both the EEOC letter and Judge Fisher’s order were clear, straightforward, and easy to understand.

The 180-day EEOC charge filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling, but a claimant's lack of diligence defeats tolling.

Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Development Corporation · filed 1995-07-19(e)

This cause will be remanded to allow Cantrell an opportunity to present evidence of his attorney's mental state within the 180-day filing period. Also, as lack of diligence by a claimant acts to defeat his claim for equitable tolling, Cantrell should be required to present evidence of his diligence in pursuing the claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing limit is nonjurisdictional and subject to waiver.

Wilton v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1995-07-07(f)(1)

However, we have held that the 90-day limit is not jurisdictional; thus, it is subject to waiver. Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1172-74 (9th Cir.1986), amended, 815 F.2d 570 (1987); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). Given the City's failure to argue the expiration of the 90-day period on appeal, we deem it waived.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period runs from receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue letter, not a state agency's letter.

Muth v. Cobro Corp. · filed 1995-08-11(f)(1)

§ 2000e-5(f)(1) explicitly states that the 90 days limitation period runs from receipt of the EEOC "Right-to-Sue" letter only, not from a letter received by the EEOC or any applicable state agency.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day period for filing suit after an EEOC right-to-sue notice is treated as a statute of limitations; dismissal for missing it is on the merits for res judicata purposes.

Lee v. Kroger Co. · filed 1995-09-15(f)(1)

Consequently, the dismissal of a Title VII cause of action based on the failure to file a complaint within the ninety-day period is a disposition on the merits for res judicata purposes.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit within ninety days of a right-to-sue letter, subject to equitable tolling when the facts justify it.

Roberson v. Bowie State University · filed 1995-09-28(f)(1)

A Title VII action must be brought within ninety days after the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). In this case, Plaintiff filed his suit one day late. ... The Court must examine the facts to determine if reasonable grounds exist for an equitable tolling on the filing period. ... Plaintiffs Title VII claim is thus untimely and must be dismissed as to all Defendants.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires suit within 90 days after notice of the EEOC’s dismissal; a plaintiff seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of showing why the delay should be excused.

Thornton v. South Central Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1995-08-31(f)(1)

While it is conceivable that mental capacity may toll the statute of limitations in an employment discrimination action, plaintiff in the instant action has not met her burden of proof of showing that equitable tolling is warranted to excuse the two-year and seven-month delay in filing her Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to commence a civil action within ninety days, but does not specify which counts the action must include.

Berthiaume v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car · filed 1995-10-10(f)(1)

The statute does not specify the types of counts which might be brought; it merely requires the commencement of a civil action, which Plaintiff accomplished in a timely manner.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period is satisfied when a complaint reaches the clerk within that period, even if a later amendment must cure its pleading deficiencies.

McClellon v. Lone Star Gas Co. · filed 1995-10-11(f)(1)

Therefore, we further hold that McClellon filed her complaint on May 27, well within the 90 day statutory period.

A claimant whose right-to-sue letter is returned unclaimed must challenge whether it was sent or show that she was not at fault for failing to claim it.

Trask v. James Foster, Illinois Department of Rehabilitative Services, and Delores Showalter · filed 1995-11-17(f)(1)

It is now incumbent upon Trask either to challenge the sending of the March letter or to show that she was not at fault for failing to claim it.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period begins when a right-to-sue letter is delivered or delivery is attempted at the claimant's home, subject to equitable tolling.

Bennett v. Federal Paper Board Company, Incorporated · filed 1995-12-21(f)(1)

We reiterate our holdings in Watts-Means and Harvey that delivery (or attempted delivery) of a right-to-sue letter to a claimant's home, not actual receipt of that letter by the claimant, triggers the commencement of the ninety day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter; a one-day delay is fatal absent grounds for equitable tolling.

Wilson v. Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park · filed 1996-01-03(f)(1)

All EEOC right-to-sue letters specify plainly (in accordance with Section 2000e—5(f)(1)) that the aggrieved employee or ex-employee must file suit within ... 90 ... days after receiving EEOC’s letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period does not begin when the EEOC delivers its decision to a former attorney who lacks authority to receive notice for the claimant.

Coates v. Shalala · filed 1996-01-25(f)(1)

Coates’ former attorney did not have the authority to accept correspondence for plaintiff nor act as his representative. Thus, delivery to Coates’ former attorney did not constitute notice to plaintiff, and the ninety day time limitation did not begin to run until Coates receive the Decision himself.

A factual dispute over when the right-to-sue letter was received precludes summary judgment on whether a Title VII suit meets the 90-day filing deadline.

Holmes v. NBC/GE · filed 1996-02-08(f)(1)

Accordingly, because a triable issue of fact exists concerning the date of receipt of the right-to-sue letter, the motion for summary judgment on this matter must be denied.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows a 300-day filing period when state agency proceedings are initiated; a factual dispute over the agency’s receipt of a charge can prevent summary judgment on timeliness.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald E. GREEN, Law Offices, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1996-02-09(e)(1)

Whether Osinubi’s charge enjoys the extended limitations period and is thereby timely filed depends on whether the MCAD ... received a copy of Osinubi's charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a private Title VII suit to be filed within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice.

Taye v. Amundson · filed 1995-12-22(f)(1)

It is a clear requirement of Title VII that a private suit to enforce a claim arising under Title VII must be filed within 90 days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Although plaintiff had adequate notice of this requirement, he neither filed within the allotted time nor adequately explained his failure to do so.

Once a defendant raises the ninety-day filing deadline, a Title VII plaintiff bears the burden of proving the complaint was timely filed.

Williams v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Norfolk/Richmond · filed 1995-12-29(f)(1)

Thus the Court is persuaded that the burden of proving that the limitations period has been satisfied falls on the plaintiff once the issue has been appropriately raised by the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days to sue after right-to-sue notice; when the claimant is at fault for failing to collect the letter, the period begins when the initial letter reaches the address the claimant provided.

Simmons v. Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities · filed 1996-01-18(f)(1)

Nevertheless, these subsequent actions do not create an exception to the rule that under the fault prong of the analysis, the 90-day limit begins to run on the date the initial right to sue letter was delivered to the most recent address provided by the plaintiff.

The ninety-day filing period may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff reasonably relies on a court order delaying refiling; affirmative misrepresentation by the employer is not required.

Soofi v. Kfc National Management Company · filed 1996-01-24(f)(1)

Nor did the district court make any findings as to whether Soofi reasonably relied on the order in delaying the refiling of his claim to the extent that equitable tolling should apply under the factors stated in Andrews. We express no opinion on whether Soofi still has a cause of action, but we disagree with the per se approach used by the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a Title VII civil action within ninety days after the EEOC gives notice of the right to sue.

Fields v. Marvin Runyon, United States Postmaster · filed 1996-01-30(f)(1)

In addition, although the district court did not specifically address the issue of timeliness, it should be noted that Fields's complaint was untimely. Title VII provides that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) shall notify the person aggrieved of his rights to sue and that within ninety days after the giving of such notice, a civil action may be brought. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see Hunter v. Stephenson Roofing, Inc., 790 F.2d 472, 474 (6th Cir.1986). ... Fields filed suit in the district court on February 23, 1995, approximately twenty months after his filing period had expired. The record does not indicate that any tolling principle applies in this case as it appears that Fields was not misled nor does it appear that he was incarcerated or otherwise incompetent to file suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to sue within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter; an amended claim can meet that deadline by relating back to a timely original complaint.

Spillman v. Carter · filed 1996-02-20(f)(1)

Plaintiffs claims under Title VII and the ADA must be filed with 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). ... The court concludes that plaintiffs claims relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Thus, plaintiff has complied with the 90-day filing requirement and her claims are not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is not tolled for mental illness when the claimant can pursue the claim and counsel has time to file.

Biester v. Midwest Health Services, Inc. · filed 1996-02-26(f)(1)

Under the circumstances presented by this case, we decline to toll the statute applicable to Mr. Biester’s case based upon his claim of mental illness.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period begins when the EEOC right-to-sue letter is received at the plaintiff's residence.

Begay v. St. Joseph's Indian School · filed 1996-04-09(f)(1)

The ninety day period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 begins to run upon receipt of a certified letter at plaintiffs residence.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter; submission of a complaint for in forma pauperis review counts as filing.

Philippeaux v. County of Nassau · filed 1996-04-10(f)(1)

It is well established that a plaintiff generally must file a lawsuit under Title VII in federal district court within 90 days after receipt of a “right-to-sue letter” from the EEOC. ... Accordingly, even under the defendants’ proposed analysis, the plaintiff’s complaint was timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to file suit within 90 days of receiving notice that the EEOC dismissed the charge.

Ellison v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1996-05-08(f)(1)

Title VII provides that an action must be filed within 90 days of the “giving of ... notice” of the EEOC’s dismissal of a claimant’s charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiffs complaint was filed outside the applicable 90 day period and therefore is barred as untimely—unless equitable tolling applies.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter.

Kearney v. Department of Industrial Relations, State of Ohio · filed 1996-05-31(f)(1)

Kearney filed his suit on September 9, 1993. Thus, his wrongful discharge claim is time-barred because he did not file suit within ninety days after he received his right-to-sue letter, dated October 7, 1992. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit within 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter, and admissible evidence of delayed mailing or receipt can rebut the usual presumption of receipt.

Elizabeth SHERLOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1996-05-10(f)(1)

If a claimant presents sworn testimony or other admissible evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred either that the notice was mailed later than its typewritten date or that it took longer than three days to reach her by mail, the initial presumption is not dispositive.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to file suit within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Dade v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1996-05-30(f)(1)

As in Title VII cases, Plaintiff must file her complaint within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue letter, or suit will be untimely. ... Therefore, Dade is foreclosed from seeking a remedy in this action on her first and amended EEOC charges due to Dade’s failure to comply with the timing requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), and summary judgment in favor of Defendant is proper.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) sets a 90-day deadline for filing a civil action, but an amendment filed after that deadline is timely if it relates back to a timely original complaint.

Kaup v. First Bank System, Inc. · filed 1996-05-22(f)(1)

If a proposed amended complaint is filed after the 90-day limitations period prescribed by Title VII, the complaint will nevertheless be considered timely if it relates back to an original complaint filed within the 90-day period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file a Title VII suit; filing a complaint with a request to proceed in forma pauperis tolls that period while the request is pending.

Madison v. BP Oil Co. · filed 1996-05-30(f)(1)

An individual has ninety days from receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter to bring a Title VII claim in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). This 90-day period is tolled, however, from the constructive filing of a complaint, accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed IFP, until the IFP motion is ruled upon and the plaintiff has complied with the dictates of the ruling or the time limit set forth in the ruling has expired.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a person ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file a civil action against the respondent named in the charge.

Wright v. Butts · filed 1996-07-31(f)(1)

Once an aggrieved party has received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC, the party has ninety days to bring a civil action against the respondent named in the charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline to sue after receiving a right-to-sue letter is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional requirement.

Vitello v. Liturgy Training Publications · filed 1996-07-19(f)(1)

However, Title VII’s and the ADEA’s 90-day filing requirement is not jurisdictional but instead acts as a statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to sue within ninety days of right-to-sue notice, subject to equitable tolling for active deception about filing requirements.

McCue v. State of Kansas, Dept. of Human Resources · filed 1996-08-08(f)(1)

Thus, even if the defendants’ statements to the plaintiff tolled the § 2000e-5(f)(l) limitation, the ninety-day period for filing suit would have expired in November 1993, some sixteen months before Ms. McCue filed her complaint. The plaintiffs Title VII claim for harassment is therefore barred by § 2000e-5(f)(l)’s ninety-day limitation period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to sue within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice; a filing mistake by counsel’s employee does not justify equitable tolling.

Merrill v. Cintas Corp. · filed 1996-09-19(f)(1)

As a result, because the plaintiffs equitable tolling argument is without merit and because the plaintiff failed to file her lawsuit within ninety days of receiving her right to sue notice as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the court grants the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) sets a filing deadline for employment discrimination suits, and a suit filed too late may be dismissed.

McCabe v. Dibert Valve and Fitting Company, Incorporated · filed 1996-10-23(f)(1)

Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing her employment discrimination case as barred by the statute of limitations embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days to sue after a right-to-sue notice; a second notice does not revive that right when the first notice was not properly revoked.

Davidson v. Service Corp. International · filed 1996-10-23(f)(1)

Title VII provides that after EEOC’s dismissal of a charge, the EEOC “shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of the notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(f)(1). ... The EEOC did not issue a notice of intent to reconsider in this case. Therefore, because the original notice was not properly revoked, Thompson cannot claim that her right to sue was revived by the issuance of the second notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after notice of the right to sue reaches the plaintiff’s household, absent grounds for equitable tolling.

Thomas v. Exxon, U.S.A. · filed 1996-11-06(f)(1)

In order to comply with the ninety-day limitation period, Thomas was required to file suit on or before March 22,1995. Thomas’s complaint, however, was not filed until March 28, 1995. Because Thomas’s complaint was untimely, her Title VII claims of raee/national origin discrimination and retaliation are foreclosed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving notice of the right to sue.

Dunham v. City of O'Fallon, Mo. · filed 1996-11-13(f)(1)

Defendants correctly point out that a plaintiff alleging claims under the ADEA, Title VII, the ADA, and the MHRA must file a complaint within 90 days of receiving notice of the right to sue. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Mo. Rev.Stat. § 213.111.1.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period does not bar an amended Title VII complaint that relates back to a timely complaint alleging the same discrimination.

Kun v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner · filed 1996-12-19(f)(1)

Moreover, the plaintiff’s amended complaint of September 12, 1996 was not barred by the statute of limitations because that complaint sought recovery for the same alleged acts of employment discrimination set forth in the timely-filed August 7 complaint, and, therefore, related back to that complaint.

Section 2000e-5’s 90-day period for filing suit is not jurisdictional and may be waived or subject to equitable estoppel.

Smith v. Sofco, Inc. · filed 1996-12-31(f)(1)

Smith correctly points out that the 90 day period for filing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 is not jurisdictional, but is subject to waiver or equitable estoppel. However, he has presented no evidence demonstrating that Sofco of Ohio, Inc. has waived the time limit or is equitably estopped from asserting it. Therefore, plaintiffs claim against Sofco of Ohio, Inc. are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to sue within ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Avie v. Marley Cooling Tower Co. · filed 1997-02-03(f)(1)

The ninety-day period begins to run from the date either the claimants or their designated counsel received the right-to-sue letters. In this case, by their own admission, Plaintiffs’ received the letters on November 6, 1995, and the ninety-day period began to run from that date. When the suit was filed on February 6,1996, ninety-two days had passed from the receipt of Plaintiffs’ right-to-sue letters. Therefore, this suit was not timely filed as required by Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) is satisfied when a plaintiff delivers a Rule 8 complaint to the court within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter.

Lowery v. Carrier Corp. · filed 1997-02-11(f)(1)

Therefore, under Fifth Circuit precedent, delivering a complaint to the court for filing within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue-letter is all that is required for purposes of bringing an action under Title VII, as long as the complaint complies with the pleading requirements of Rule 8.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period cannot be equitably tolled for a claimant who fails to act diligently.

Thomas v. Ryan · filed 1997-01-22(f)(1)

Thus, as “[o]ne who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence,”3 we see no basis for equitably tolling the 90-day filing period in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit within ninety days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter; the period may be equitably tolled, but inadvertence by an attorney’s staff does not justify tolling.

Kaura v. Pinkerton Security and Investigation Services · filed 1997-02-21(f)(1)

Plaintiff is correct that the ninety-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling. ... Therefore, since it is undisputed that plaintiff received the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s right-to-sue letter on or about April 5,1996; that plaintiff’s complaint was not filed until July 8, 1996, some ninety-four (94) days after plaintiff had received the right-to-sue letter; that plaintiff’s excuse is simply inadvertence of her attorney’s staff, an excuse which this court does not construe here as falling within the doctrine of equitable tolling, this court finds that plaintiff’s complaint was untimely filed and must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives ADA claimants ninety days to file suit after an EEOC right-to-sue notice; equitable tolling does not excuse a claimant's lack of diligence.

Houdeshell v. Artery Property Management, Incorporated Fairland Gardens Associates, Limited · filed 1997-02-27(f)(1)

An ADA claimant who fails to file a complaint within the ninety-day statutory time period mandated by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f) (1994), * generally forfeits the right to pursue his claim. ... Although the ninety-day time period is subject to equitable tolling, one who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse lack of diligence. ... We find that the district court performed a thorough hearing and correctly found no grounds which would require an equitable tolling of the filing period.

A Title VII complaint is timely when a plaintiff delivers it to a member of the clerk’s office within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter, even if the court dockets it later.

Kassman v. Qualified Services · filed 1997-03-13(f)(1)

Since plaintiff filed her complaint with a member of the Clerk’s Office within the statutory time limit, her action is not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5’s filing deadlines are subject to equitable tolling, but a plaintiff who knew of her rights and allowed the deadlines to pass cannot rely on tolling.

Rice v. Golf Enterprises, Inc. (In re McElhanon) · filed 1997-03-17

Despite this knowledge and information, the plaintiff allowed the statute of limitations to lapse. Accordingly, the doctrine of equitable tolling is not available to prevent dismissal of the Title VII action. Since the doctrine of equitable tolling is not applicable, the statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of the Title VII action such that it will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Hurley v. Tennessee Department of Human Services · filed 1997-03-27(f)(1)

Hurley did not file her complaint within ninety days after she had received her right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Peete v. American Standard Graphic, 885 F.2d 331, 332 (6th Cir.1989).

Section 2000e-5 requires a plaintiff to file a Title VII suit within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Foreman v. Farmer Jack Grocery Stores Borman's Foods Borman's Inc. · filed 1997-03-21(f)(1)

Before filing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must receive a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and then file suit within 90 days after receiving the right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). Foreman admittedly received a right-to-sue notification from the EEOC on August 25, 1994, yet he did not file the present lawsuit until December 27, 1994, 124 days later. Therefore, Foreman's complaint was untimely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter; an unreasonable delay in paying the filing fee after denial of an application to proceed in forma pauperis can make the complaint untimely.

Truitt v. County of Wayne · filed 1997-04-03(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) provides that a plaintiff must file suit within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue letter. ... Accordingly, this court finds that plaintiffs four month delay in paying the filing fee after IFP status was denied was unreasonable and dismissal is therefore warranted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Wright v. Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department · filed 1997-04-22(f)(1)

To maintain an action under Title VII, a plaintiff must file suit within ninety days after receiving the EEOC’s right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Failure to adhere to this time limitation bars the claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing suit begins when delivery of the right-to-sue notice is attempted at the claimant’s address of record with the EEOC.

Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc. · filed 1997-04-29(f)(1)

We hold that the ninety-day period within which to file suit began running when delivery of the right-to-sue notice was attempted at the address of record with the EEOC and that Nelmida’s Title VII action is therefore time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action to be filed within 90 days of the right-to-sue letter; Rule 4(m) governs the time for service.

Pineda v. Almacenes Pitusa, Inc. · filed 1997-05-06(f)(1)

The defendant acknowledges that the plaintiff filed her complaint eighty-nine (89) days after E.E.O.C. issued her a right to sue letter, which is within the ninety (90) day statutory limit proscribed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... Given that the plaintiff complied with both the statutory and procedural time limits, the defendant’s timeliness argument is without merit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit is not equitably tolled when a claimant’s failure to keep the EEOC informed of her current address delays receipt of the right-to-sue notice.

Crittendon v. American National Insurance · filed 1997-06-25(f)(1)

Failing to provide the EEOC with a current mailing address, thus jeopardizing the claimant’s ability to receive the EEOC’s notice of right-to-sue, represents one such circumstance that does not justify equitable tolling.