42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period can be tolled by a motion for reinstatement when the plaintiff acts diligently and the defendant receives adequate notice.

Nottelson v. A. O. Smith Corp. · filed 1976-12-20(f)(1)

Similarly, the ninety-day statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), was tolled when plaintiff filed his motion for reinstatement on July 22, 1975. The problems which kept the plaintiff from filing his amended complaint until October 29, 1975 were not a result of inaction on his part, and because of defendant’s involvement with these disputes, adequate notice was provided by the motion.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires suit within ninety days of receiving a Right-to-Sue letter; a timely suit later dismissed without prejudice does not restart that period.

Evans v. Little Flower Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 1977-01-05(f)(1)

The statute requires that plaintiff filed suit within ninety days of receipt of the Right-to-Sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... It is irrelevant that another-suit, since dismissed, was timely filed. That does not serve to revive the 90-day period anew upon dismissal.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not permit the EEOC to let a claimant control when the 90-day filing period begins by splitting its required notice into two letters.

Gloria ZAMBUTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a Foreign Corp., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1977-01-10(f)(1)

To the extent that EEOC has adopted a practice which places the commencement of this 90-day period within the claimant’s power by bifurcating the statutory notice, it is an invalid procedure which is counter to the plain language of the statute and to the Congressional purpose undergirding it.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) entitles an aggrieved person to a right-to-sue notice if no other action is taken within 180 days after the applicable state referral period expires.

Berg v. LaCrosse Cooler Co. · filed 1977-01-21(f)(1)

Title VII provides that if other action is not taken within 180 days from the expiration of a “period of reference,” the EEOC shall notify the person aggrieved (i. e., send a right-to-sue notice) § 2000e-5(f)(1). The period of reference where the practice occurred in a state or subdivision in which a state or local law authorizes an agency to grant or seek relief from such practice is undoubtedly the 60 days provided by § 2000e-5(c) or (d).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice if no other action is taken within 180 days after the period of reference expires.

14 Fair empl.prac.cas. 618, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,431 Laurel B. Berg v. Lacrosse Cooler Company · filed 1977-03-17(f)(1)

As of November 25, 1976, however, the passage of time has cleared the way for plaintiff to obtain a right-to-sue notice, amend her complaint accordingly, and renew her motion for preliminary relief. Title VII provides that if other action is not taken within 180 days from the expiration of a "period of reference," the EEOC shall notify the person aggrieved (i. e., send a right-to-sue notice) § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period does not begin when an EEOC letter merely reports failed conciliation and tells the claimant to request a right-to-sue notice.

Weaver v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. · filed 1977-03-17(f)(1)

As we read the first letter it gave to appellants notice, at most, that efforts at conciliation had failed and that each was required to request a Notice of Right-to-Sue in the event that person desired to proceed further in district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period begins when the EEOC gives notice that it found no probable cause against a respondent, effectively dismissing the charge against that respondent.

Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp. · filed 1977-01-27(f)(1)

Since notice of no probable cause is, in effect, a dismissal of the action against the party complained of, we find that the August 22, 1973, determination of the EEOC in favor of the Union triggered the 90-day period in plaintiffs action against the defendant Union.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period must be assessed using the notice the claimant actually received.

Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp. · filed 1977-03-09(f)(1)

The essence of the claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), is the notice given to the claimant. ... The threshold question, and one which has not been considered by the district court, is the nature of the notice plaintiff actually received.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a civil action within 90 days after the EEOC dismisses a charge; it does not require suit within 270 days after the charge was filed.

Kennerly v. Aro, Inc. · filed 1977-02-09(f)(1)

There likewise is obviously no merit in the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff was required to commence this action within 270 days from the date that his charge was filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such contention totally misconstrues the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... Here, the complaint was filed within 90 days after the dismissal of the charge by the Commission, which is all that is required under the aforecited statute.

Once a plaintiff shows that she filed suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter, the defendant bears the burden of showing that she had to file earlier.

Josephine WELLS, Appellant, v. SHERWOOD MEDICAL INDUSTRIES, INC., Et Al., Appellees · filed 1977-02-23(f)(1)

In our view, once Wells established that she filed this action within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter, the burden shifted to Sherwood to demonstrate she was obligated to file the action at an earlier date.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an individual to bring a Title VII lawsuit despite procedural failures by the EEOC or an adverse agency finding.

Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc. · filed 1977-03-14(f)(1)

It is established beyond the question that an individual litigant is not barred from filing suit under Title VII by a procedural failing on the part of the EEOC. ... Even if the administrative proceedings had been flawless and even if the Commission found against Fesel, Fesel would have been free to file ... this very same lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a complainant to sue within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter; a letter received after filing can validate a pending action.

Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Department, Inc v. Civil Service Commission of New York · filed 1977-03-17(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) provides that if complainants wish to bring suit on the basis of the alleged discriminatory acts described in their charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), they must do so within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s “notice of right to sue” letter. ... As for the Guardians Association, it is properly before the court for two reasons. First, the issuance of a “suit” letter by the EEOC validates a pending action brought by a complainant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file the complaint within 90 days of receiving notice of the right to sue; service may occur later.

Dixon v. Universal Atlas Cement Division · filed 1977-04-07(f)(1)

While there are no cases on this point, it is clear that filing a complaint is the crucial act which must be performed within the 90-day period. Section 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) provides that “a civil action may be brought” within 90 days and Rule 3 FRCP makes it clear that a civil action commences with filing of the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file a Title VII action.

Pierce v. Catalytic, Inc. · filed 1977-04-26(f)(1)

However, it is clear that while plaintiff did institute proceedings over two years after the discharge date, he also filed within 90 days of receipt of his “Conciliation Failure, Notice of Right to Sue”, which is the time period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period begins when the EEOC’s notice communicates that it has completed its efforts and decided not to sue; notice that conciliation failed alone is insufficient.

Heath v. D. H. Baldwin Co. · filed 1977-04-29(f)(1)

However, like Mrs. Zambuto’s first notice, Heath’s First Letter does not satisfy the statutory requirements because it does not specifically inform Heath that the EEOC has administratively closed his case. The letter only states that conciliation has failed but this is not sufficient because it does not indicate that the EEOC had decided not to sue.

A Title VII claimant’s failure to request a right-to-sue letter after 180 days does not by itself make an EEOC delay inexcusable for laches purposes.

Richardson v. Delta Drayage Co. · filed 1977-04-29

However, failure to utilize this mechanism for expediting the claim does not per se constitute inexcusable delay.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an individual bringing a Title VII action to receive a right-to-sue letter before invoking federal jurisdiction.

McGee v. Purolator Courier Corp. · filed 1977-05-03(f)(1)

But in the instant action racial discrimination is not an issue and the procedural route under § 2000e-5(f)(1) has not been followed. ... Therefore, because Mrs. McGee has neither received a right to sue letter nor demonstrated an independent basis for jurisdiction for this action, the court concludes that it is without jurisdiction to hear this action and that this action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to sue within 90 days after the EEOC gives notice of its final action; a later right-to-sue letter does not restart that period.

Key v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc. · filed 1977-05-26(f)(1)

In that the April 17,1975, letter complies with the requirements of the statute, the plaintiff, in order to maintain an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, would have to have filed this action within 90 days of April 17, 1975.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a related retaliation charge to relate back to an earlier discrimination charge when determining whether the waiting period for court relief has passed.

Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1977-07-08(f)(1)

This Court determined that the 180 days deferral on the petition for temporary relief was not necessary since the retaliatory discharge claim is part of the underlying sex discrimination claim filed on May 5,1976, on which a Right To Sue letter has been issued. The retaliatory discharge action claim is not an independent action, but one that arises out of the original sex discrimination charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the claimant receives notice that the EEOC has completed its administrative efforts, including its decision not to sue.

Page v. U. S. Industries · filed 1977-07-25(f)(1)

To begin the 90-day limitation period, the complainant must receive notice that the EEOC has completed its administrative efforts. See Zambuto, supra at 1335. The March 25 letter only related that conciliation efforts had failed; it did not inform her that the EEOC had decided not to sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period begins only when the claimant receives notice that the EEOC has completed its administrative efforts.

Page v. U. S. Industries, Inc. · filed 1977-07-25(f)(1)

To begin the 90-day limitation period, the complainant must receive notice that the EEOC has completed its administrative efforts. ... The 90-day period did not begin running from the date of Ms. Williams’ receipt of the March 25 letter; only the May 6 letter provided adequate notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period begins only after the charging party receives adequate notice that the EEOC has ended its efforts and will not sue.

Turner v. Texas Instruments · filed 1977-08-08(f)(1)

Only after Turner requested and received a right-to-sue letter did he obtain the required notice that the EEOC would not bring suit and that his case was administratively closed. Turner timely filed his Title VII action after receiving this complete statutory notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when a person of suitable age and discretion at the plaintiff’s dwelling receives the right-to-sue letter, unless delayed actual notice prejudices the plaintiff’s ability to file on time.

Krieger v. Republic Van Lines of Southwest, Inc. · filed 1977-08-15(f)(1)

If the suit letter is left with and signed for by a person of suitable age and discretion who resides at plaintiff’s dwelling, then the 90-day period begins to run from the date of receipt by that person, unless plaintiff received actual notice at such a late date as to prejudice plaintiff in trying to timely file suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff ninety days to file suit after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice; if the ninetieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, the deadline extends to the end of the next day that is none of those three.

Pearson v. Furnco Construction Company · filed 1977-08-25(f)(1)

We think that in the light of the purposes intended to be served by Title VII, it is a sound interpretation of congressional intent that the party plaintiff is to have a full span of ninety days in which to file his action, and that accordingly, when the ninetieth calendar day is a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, the period does not expire until the end of the next day which is none of these three.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) ordinarily requires a claimant to wait 180 days before suing, but when a court properly hears a request for preliminary relief, the passage of 180 days before a dismissal hearing can cure a premature claim for permanent relief.

Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee · filed 1977-11-03(f)(1)

However, in the circumstances of this case the Court agrees that jurisdiction was properly assumed to entertain those motions, and that the passage of 180 days prior to hearing on a motion to dismiss cured the jurisdictional defect that would otherwise have required dismissal of the action for permanent relief.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing deadline did not bar a claimant who relied on an earlier EEOC notice stating that the period would begin upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter.

Geronymo v. Joseph Horne Co. · filed 1977-11-21(f)(1)

Since the notice of the EEOC’s intention not to litigate, indicating that plaintiff would have an additional ninety days from receipt of his right to sue letter in which to file suit was received prior to May 7, 1975, and, giving the decisions referred to in Wilson prospective effect only, plaintiff’s Complaint is timely under the Act.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing a private action begins when the charging party receives notice of the right to sue.

Lynn v. Western Gillette · filed 1977-11-21(f)(1)

We conclude that the ninety-day period does not begin until the charging party receives a letter specifically informing him of his right to sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for a private action begins when the charging party receives notice of the right to sue.

Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc. · filed 1977-11-21(f)(1)

We conclude that the ninety-day period does not begin until the charging party receives a letter specifically informing him of his right to sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period applies when an EEOC letter adequately informs a claimant of the right to sue, even if it does not identify a change in the employer’s ownership.

Evans v. McCluskey · filed 1977-12-07(f)(1)

The present action was filed more than ninety days after Ms. Evans received her right-to-sue letter on December 19, 1974. ... The EEOC’s letter adequately informed Ms. Evans of her right to sue; the only defect, if any, was in the notice of whom to sue. That defect, however, cannot be attributed to the EEOC, which merely named the employer Ms. Evans had named in her charge of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period begins when the EEOC adequately informs a claimant of the right to sue, even if the notice does not identify a change in the employer's ownership.

EVANS v. McCLUSKEY · filed 1978-01-09(f)(1)

We agree with the district court. The present action was filed more than ninety days after Ms. Evans received her right-to-sue letter on December 19, 1974. ... The EEOC's letter adequately informed Ms. Evans of her right to sue ; the only defect, if any, was in the notice of whom to sue. That defect, however, cannot be attributed to the EEOC, which merely named the employer Ms. Evans had named in her charge of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a complainant ninety days after receiving notice to file a civil action.

Goodman v. Platt · filed 1978-01-24(f)(1)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) specifically provides that a complainant thereunder will be given notice to sue when, among other things, the voluntary compliance efforts of the administrative agency have failed. The complainant is then specifically given ninety (90) days from his receipt of notice in which to file a civil action.

When the EEOC sends separate notices of failed conciliation and the right to sue, Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins with the right-to-sue notice.

Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego · filed 1978-02-03(f)(1)

Since the decision of the district court, this court has held in Lynn v. Western Gilette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977), that when this two-letter procedure was followed the 90-day period starts to run from the second, or right-to-sue, letter. Accordingly the district court must be reversed on this ruling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing suit begins with the right-to-sue letter when the EEOC sends separate notices of failed conciliation and the right to sue.

BRADSHAW v. ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO · filed 1978-02-17(f)(1)

Since the decision of the district court, this court has held in Lynn v. Western Gilette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977), that when this two-letter procedure was followed the 90-day period starts to run from the second, or right-to-sue, letter. Accordingly the district court must be reversed on this ruling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an early right-to-sue letter when a consent decree prevents the EEOC from providing relief.

Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1978-03-23(f)(1)

They filed before the EEOC, but the EEOC was bound by the consent decree and could afford them no relief. It would have been a futile gesture for EEOC to hold onto the case for the full 180 days before issuing a right to sue letter. Therefore, we reject Defendant’s objection on this ground.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a private Title VII plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC and wait 180 days before requesting a right-to-sue letter.

Shepard v. Fox River Foods Co. · filed 1978-03-31(f)(1)

Pursuant to Title VII, plaintiff had to file first a complaint with the EEOC before he could institute his private lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Moreover, plaintiff was required to wait 180 days until he could request a right-to-sue letter authorizing the institution of his private discrimination suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing deadline does not bar an amendment that clarifies an existing complaint without adding a new cause of action.

Johnson v. AAA Trucking Co. · filed 1978-04-28(f)(1)

This argument relies on the 90 day limit for filing a suit following notice of right to sue from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... This argument has no basis in fact. The purpose of the amended complaint was to clarify the three items detailed in the Order of February 2, 1977. It does not constitute a new cause of action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) provides a 90-day period to sue after effective notice that EEOC proceedings have ended, including for charges pending when the 1972 amendments took effect.

HEBERT v. MONSANTO COMPANY · filed 1978-07-10(f)(1)

Because Hebert did not receive notice of exhaustion until 1974, as far as he or the world knew, his charge was still pending before the commission. Hence, the 1972 amendments are applicable. Because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) was amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) to provide a 90-day filing period, appellant timely filed and jurisdiction exists in the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person 90 days to file suit after receiving the required notice.

Hebert v. Monsanto Co. · filed 1978-07-10(f)(1)

Because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) was amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) to provide a 90-day filing period, appellant timely filed and jurisdiction exists in the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a private claimant to wait 180 days after filing an EEOC charge before bringing suit; a charge cannot support a suit filed earlier.

Plummer v. CHICAGO JOURNEYMAN PLUMBERS, ETC. · filed 1978-07-24(f)(1)

The failure of Plummer and Eggleston to wait 180 days after filing their charges before proceeding in this court will result in their charges being unavailable to serve as the basis of the plaintiffs' action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require a plaintiff to refile a suit begun before receiving a right-to-sue notice when the EEOC mistakenly said it had already issued the notice.

Wilson v. Allied Chemical Corp. · filed 1978-07-28(f)(1)

The Court is of the opinion that, under the facts alleged, plaintiff Collins has complied with both the spirit and intent of § 2000e-5. It would be manifestly unjust to hold Collins responsible for the Commission’s negligence, or to require her now to refile her suit simply because the instant suit was filed prior to receipt of the notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to establish the right-to-sue prerequisites within 90 days after the letter issues; a later amendment cannot cure the defect by relating back.

Stewart v. City of Pontotoc, Miss. · filed 1978-08-16(f)(1)

So long as the curative steps are taken within 90 days after the right-to-sue letter issued, we encounter no difficulty with the “relation back” of the Title VII claim to the date of filing of the original complaint, as expressly recognized by Rule 15(c). Plaintiff, however, would stretch the doctrine beyond its permissible limits, and in disregard of the congressional grant of Title VII jurisdiction, by arguing for its application to the present case where the jurisdictional prerequisites were first alleged in an amendatory pleading filed long after the expiration of 90 days from the date of issuance of the right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day period for filing suit begins when the claimant actually receives the EEOC's right-to-sue notice.

Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union · filed 1978-09-14(f)(1)

Therefore, we hold that the ninety-day period of limitation set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) begins to run on the date on which a claimant actually receives from the EEOC his notice of right-to-sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice before 180 days have passed; an early notice does not bar the claimant’s Title VII suit.

BRYANT v. CALIFORNIA BREWERS ASSOCIATION · filed 1978-11-03(f)(1)

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) simply requires the EEOC to issue a notice of right-to-sue if it has failed to file suit or arrange a conciliation agreement within 180 days. Nowhere does the statute prohibit the EEOC from issuing such notice before the expiration of the 180-day period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires the EEOC’s 180-day period to run before a claimant may sue, unless the EEOC dismisses the charge sooner.

Loney v. Carr-Lowrey Glass Co. · filed 1978-09-26(f)(1)

That this court’s dismissal of this action is without prejudice to the right of the plaintiffs to refile this action when the remainder of the 180-day period referred to in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) has run or when their charges have been dismissed by the EEOC, without the necessity of obtaining another “Notice of Right to Sue.” The Notices of Right to Sue previously issued shall be deemed to have been sent on the 180th day of the 180-day period referred to in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) or on the date(s) their charges are dismissed, whichever occurs first.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the complainant actually receives notice of the right-to-sue letter.

King v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1978-10-04(f)(1)

Since the 90-day filing requirement of § 2000e-5(f)(1) begins to run only after actual notice of the right to sue letter has been received by the complainant, the allegations permit an inference that less than 90 days transpired between receipt and filing. The allegations therefore survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day period to file suit begins when the claimant actually receives the EEOC's right-to-sue notice.

Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers And Warehouse Workers Union · filed 1978-11-01(f)(1)

Therefore, we hold that the ninety-day period of limitation set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) begins to run on the date on which a claimant actually receives from the EEOC his notice of right-to-sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s right-to-sue notice requirement can be satisfied after a lawsuit is filed if the EEOC issues the notice while the action is pending.

Linder v. Litton Systems, Inc. Amecom Division · filed 1978-11-24(f)(1)

Although plaintiff had not received his right-to-sue letter when he filed this suit, the EEOC’s subsequent issuance of the letter sufficiently cured any jurisdictional defect in the pending action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue notice pertinent to the claims in the civil action and filing within 90 days after receipt of that notice.

Price v. Service Technology Corp. · filed 1978-12-15(f)(1)

This notice was issued on April 29,1974, and was only pertinent to her charge of retaliation. Therefore, she has not received a notice of right to sue as to allegations that she has made in the complaint in this civil action. The Court cannot therefore find that she has received a notice to sue as to these charges or that she filed this civil action within 90 days of the receipt of a pertinent notice of right to sue and must conclude that it does not have jurisdiction over Mrs. Shaw.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period runs from an effective right-to-sue notice even when the EEOC relied on state findings that were still under appeal.

Douglas E. COTTRELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEWSPAPER AGENCY CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-01-08(f)(1)

We therefore conclude that the EEOC may afford substantial weight to non-final state findings in determining whether reasonable cause exists to believe that a charged party has violated Title VII and inform the charging party of that reliance without thereby impairing the effectiveness of its notice of right to sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC before a plaintiff may amend a complaint to add a Title VII claim.

Flynn v. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NY · filed 1979-01-08(f)(1)

Leave to amend the complaint to include a cause of action under Title VII cannot be granted until plaintiff has received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Within ninety days of receipt of such a letter plaintiff may move for leave to amend.

Section 2000e-5(f) bars a Title VII claim filed after the right-to-sue period when an earlier complaint was dismissed without prejudice and the plaintiff did not timely refile.

McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc. · filed 1979-03-09(f)

However, a dismissal without prejudice leaves an action in the same situation as if it had never been brought. ... However, significantly, he did not file the complaint within 90 days of the dismissal without prejudice. This he could have done. Certainly, he is now barred from maintaining this claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit is computed under Rule 6(a), which extends a deadline falling on a weekend or legal holiday.

Jordan v. Lewis Grocer Co. · filed 1979-03-27(f)(1)

We see no reason why Rule 6(a) should not be applied in computing the 90-day period in a Title VII case and hold, along with other courts which have considered the question, that application of the Rule harmonizes with the intent of Congress in granting a right of action under this remedial legislation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) starts the 90-day period to file a Title VII action when the claimant receives a right-to-sue letter.

Holden v. R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. · filed 1979-04-09(f)(1)

Receipt of the right-to-sue letter on January 17, 1976, activated the 90-day limitation period provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5 requires a right-to-sue letter for a Title VII claim against a governmental employer; filing the letter cures its omission from the complaint.

Oshiver v. Court of Common Pleas · filed 1979-04-27(f)(1)

But plaintiff has now filed with the Court a copy of her “right to sue” letter, curing the jurisdictional problem.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved person to sue without a right-to-sue notice when the person has requested it, otherwise complied with the requirements for suit, and the EEOC or Attorney General has failed to issue it within a reasonable time.

Stapper v. Texas Department of Human Resources · filed 1979-05-17(f)(1)

Contrary to the Magistrate’s recommendation to which no objections were filed, this Court holds that under the circumstances of this case, the failure by the EEOC or the Attorney General to issue a “right to sue” letter does not require dismissal and the complainant may proceed with suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period begins when a claimant's attorney receives notice of the right to sue, if the attorney requested the notice.

Robert M. GONZALEZ, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANFORD APPLIED ENGINEERING, INC., Et Al., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-06-01(f)(1)

We hold that when the request for issuance of a right to sue letter comes from a claimant's attorney, notice to the attorney that right to sue has been granted starts the time running.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the complainant receives effective notice that the EEOC dismissed the charge, even if a formal right-to-sue letter arrives later.

Mary SHEA, Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. PAUL, Appellee · filed 1979-06-22(f)(1)

Applying these principles, it is clear that Shea received actual and effective notification that administrative procedures had terminated and her charge was dismissed when the EEOC sent her the April 1, 1975 letter declining to reconsider the January 22, 1975 Determination and dismissal.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC right-to-sue letter; a comparable letter from a state agency does not satisfy that requirement.

Foreman v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1979-06-28(f)(1)

The requirement of an EEOC right-to-sue letter is not satisfied by a comparable letter from a state agency. There is no substitute for the required right-to-sue letter such as to confer Title VII jurisdiction herein.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to allege and prove a timely discrimination charge and receipt of, and action on, a right-to-sue notice.

UNITED BLACK FIREFIGHTERS OF NORFOLK Et Al., Appellants, v. Julian F. HIRST Et Al., Appellees · filed 1979-08-29(f)(1)

With regard to the applicants, a plaintiff in a civil action under Title VII must allege and prove filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Opportunity Commission together with receipt of, and action on, a statutory notice of his right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Neither the complaint nor the amended complaint alleges that any of the applicants-plaintiffs complied with these prerequisites. They were not entitled to sue under Title VII, and their claims were properly dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline for filing suit is nonjurisdictional and may be equitably tolled when the circumstances warrant it.

Trader v. Fiat Distributors, Inc. · filed 1979-08-23(f)(1)

Although I have held that the 90-day limitation for filing a federal action is not jurisdictional, it is concluded that the facts of this case do not warrant tolling the filing requirements.

Filing a right-to-sue notice within the ninety-day period tolls the filing deadline if the plaintiff files a complaint within a reasonable time afterward.

Metcalf v. Omaha Steel Castings Co. · filed 1979-08-31(f)(1)

In light of the Eight Circuit’s liberal construction of § 2000e-5(f)(1) and the district court opinions discussed above, this Court holds that the plaintiff’s filing of the Notice of Right to Sue on June 1, 1979, was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Since the plaintiff received his Notice of Right to Sue no earlier than March 5, 1979, the filing on June 1, 1979, was within the ninety (90) day limitation period. Notwithstanding this timely filing, the plaintiff was still required to file a complaint within a reasonable time of the filing of the Notice of Right to Sue in order to substantially comply with § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period begins when the claimant receives effective notice of the right to sue; a holiday on the final day extends the deadline to the next day.

Menn v. Amstar Corp. · filed 1979-09-11(f)(1)

The June 6, 1978, date upon which the plaintiff picked up the certified mailing of the Notice of Right to Sue is the only date which can properly be held to constitute notice to the plaintiff of the 90-day period in which to file an action. Ms. Menn filed her complaint in this action on September 5, 1978, 91 days after receipt of the notice. Since September 4th was Labor Day, the filing period was extended to the next day. Therefore this action was timely filed.

When a court has held the first right-to-sue letter invalid as premature, the 90-day filing period runs from a second, valid letter.

Hiduchenko v. Minneapolis Medical & Diagnostic Center, Ltd. · filed 1979-09-14(f)(1)

Therefore, the court finds that this action was properly commenced within ninety days of the only valid right-to-sue letter issued with respect to plaintiff’s charge.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a person to file a Title VII action on the next judicial day when the ninety-day period after receipt of a right-to-sue notice ends on a non-judicial day.

Bailey v. Boilermakers Local 667 of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers · filed 1979-11-29(e)

When the ninetieth day after receipt of notice of right to sue falls on a Sunday or other non-judicial day, the aggrieved person may yet institute his civil action on the next succeeding judicial day. An action filed on the first day open for judicial business following the ninetieth day (a non-judicial day) from receipt of notice of right to sue is filed timely within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and thus, not subject to a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period begins when the EEOC clearly notifies a claimant that its process has ended, even if the notice does not mention the right to sue.

Glenn N. HEFNER, Etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1979-11-01(f)(1)

We have previously held that the notice sent by the EEOC need not inform the complainant of his right to sue, and that it “need only inform the complainant that the administrative process is terminated.” ... The letter of May 22, 1974, sent to Hefner by the EEOC clearly met this test.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) starts the 90-day filing period for a suit against a governmental employer when the charging party receives notice of the right to sue from the Attorney General.

Osiecki v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority · filed 1979-12-26(f)(1)

The plain wording of Section 706(f) and the structure of the Title VII statutory scheme dictate that the 90 day jurisdictional period does not commence until the charging party receives a notice of the right to sue from the Attorney General in cases involving governmental employers.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC right-to-sue letter before a complainant may bring a Title VII action in federal district court.

Ludwig v. Quebecor Dailies, Inc. · filed 1980-01-16(f)(1)

It is only after the EEOC has issued a right to sue letter that a complainant before the EEOC may institute a Title VII action in a federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a second right-to-sue notice after reconsideration if it notified both parties of the reconsideration within the first notice’s ninety-day period.

Herman GONZALEZ, Etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-01-21(f)(1)

The EEOC may issue a second ninety-day right-to-sue notice upon completion of a discretionary reconsideration of a prior determination provided it has given notice to both parties of its decision to reconsider within the ninety-day period provided by the initial notice of right-to-sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period does not begin when an EEOC letter misleadingly suggests that the claimant must request a later right-to-sue notice.

Key v. Lumberjack Meats · filed 1980-02-11(f)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing Key's case for failure to file his suit within 90 days of receiving the April 17, 1975 letter. Because Key instituted this action within 90 days of his receipt of the EEOC's "Notice of Right to Sue," his suit was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the claimant actually receives the EEOC's Notice of Right to Sue.

Harris v. Warner-Lambert Co. · filed 1980-03-04(f)(1)

The statutory notification is complete only upon actual receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue letter and therefore the 90-day period for filing his action did not commence until Plaintiff actually received the Notice on July 28, 1979.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety day deadline for filing a civil action is tolled when a plaintiff files within that period in a state court reasonably believed to have jurisdiction.

Fox v. The Eaton Corporation · filed 1980-02-21(f)(1)

We only hold that the ninety day time limitation for filing a civil action is tolled by filing a civil action within ninety days in a state court which plaintiff reasonably believed possessed subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the claimant actually receives notice of the right to sue.

Harris v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1980-03-20(f)(1)

Under this criteria, the first Notice of the Right to Sue in the pending case was insufficient because the employee, Carol Anne Harris, never personally acknowledged its receipt. The 90-day statute of limitation period did not begin to run until she received the second Right to Sue letter sometime in the spring of 1978.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit within ninety days of notice of the right to sue; an amendment naming a defendant satisfies that deadline if it relates back to a timely complaint.

Howard v. Penn Central Transportation Co. · filed 1980-03-25(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) requires suit to be brought “within ninety days after the giving of such notice.” ... Because the requirements of Rule 15(c) are met, the amended complaint relates back to the date the original complaint was filed, and the Title VII claims against Conrail are therefore timely.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a Title VII complaint to be filed within 90 days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Jefferson v. H. K. Porter Co. · filed 1980-03-27(f)

A prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII action is the timely filing of the civil action complaint within 90 days after receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue authorization. Section 706(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). If the complaint is not filed within this period of time, the Court is without jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue letter after its suit is dismissed for a jurisdictional or procedural defect if the EEOC does not bring a second suit.

Mrs. Shirley Baker (TRUVILLION), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KING’S DAUGHTERS HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-03-28(f)(1)

To protect that option, we hold that where the E.E.O.C. brings a suit that is dismissed as jurisdictionally or procedurally defective, if the Commission does not bring a second suit, it may validly issue a right-to-sue letter to an aggrieved person.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period does not begin without unequivocal notice to the charging party that the EEOC will not sue.

22 Fair empl.prac.cas. 819, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,831 James E. Crawford v. Western Electric Company, Inc. · filed 1980-04-08(f)(1)

Therefore, the second factor indicative of the termination of the administrative process, that is, unequivocal notice that the EEOC would not sue respondent, is lacking in this case. Thus, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing the Title VII claims of plaintiffs Dupree, L. Hodge, Smith, and Tunsill.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to plead and prove receipt of a right-to-sue letter; this court treated failure to do so as a jurisdictional defect.

Pinson v. Hendrix · filed 1980-05-08(f)(1)

Failure to plead and prove the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is, therefore, a jurisdictional defect to plaintiffs Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action within ninety days after notice of the right to sue; filing an earlier action against different defendants does not toll that period.

Nilsen v. City of Moss Point · filed 1980-07-07(f)(1)

Nilsen II did not meet the jurisdictional and mandatory requirement of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) that civil actions be commenced within ninety days after receiving notice of the right to sue. ... The mere filing of the action against Holmberg and Smith did not toll the running of the statute against the City of Moss Point.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to rescind a right-to-sue notice during timely reconsideration and issue a second notice that starts a new 90-day filing period.

Trujillo v. General Electric Company · filed 1980-05-29(f)(1)

Our attention has not been directed to any statute or regulation expressly authorizing a Director to rescind a notice of right-to-sue, once issued. But we believe such power is implicit. ... As in Gonzalez, the EEOC in the present case advised the parties well within the initial 90-day period that it proposed to reconsider its earlier determination of no-cause. Indeed, the instant case would appear to be a bit stronger than Gonzalez, in that the EEOC in the instant case advised the parties well within the initial 90-day period that it was revoking its first notice of right-to-sue.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge and obtain and act on a right-to-sue letter before bringing suit.

22 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1010, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,863 Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1980-06-10

Congress has provided explicit jurisdictional requirements for Title VII in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, plaintiffs here had to meet a two-part requirement in order to maintain suit against GM. First, plaintiffs must have filed a charge with EEOC. Second, they must have received a right to sue letter from the EEOC and acted upon it.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit is equitably tolled while an indigent plaintiff’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis is pending.

Abram v. Wackenhut Corp. · filed 1980-08-08(f)(1)

An indigent plaintiff who cannot afford the filing fee is at an even greater disability, and must necessarily receive permission from the court to proceed without the necessity of paying filing fees before he is even able to file his complaint. The court doors are not open until the order is signed. It follows, therefore, that equitable considerations should again be applied to toll the statute of limitations in this situation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue letter before 180 days have elapsed after a charge is filed.

Wells v. Hutchinson · filed 1980-08-25(f)(1)

However, TAES is incorrect in asserting that the EEOC must await the passage of 180 days after a charge is filed before issuing a right-to-sue letter. Indeed, the express terms of Title VII indicate that a plaintiff may be entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter “within one hundred and eighty days from the filing” of his EEOC charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

A Title VII complaint filed within 90 days of an EEOC right-to-sue letter satisfies the filing deadline even if service occurs later.

Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co. · filed 1980-08-25(f)(1)

Under the analysis contained in the prior section of this opinion, Badillo’s filing of his original complaint within the ninety-day period satisfied the general jurisdictional requirement for Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5’s 90-day deadline is not tolled by filing a right-to-sue notice and request for counsel when none of the filed documents describes the discrimination claim.

Bousman v. Essex Group, Inc. · filed 1980-09-11(f)(1)

Here, one document filed did name the defendant and was apparently sent to the defendant, unlike Harris, but no document referred to the claim of discrimination. ... Since the facts in this case are analogous to Brady, the Court feels compelled to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue letter before a federal court can hear a Title VII retaliation claim.

Stutz v. Depository Trust Co. · filed 1980-10-09(f)(1)

However, without a right to sue letter, there is no jurisdiction over the retaliation claim, § 706(f)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and, unless the time requirements of the statute may be tolled, Stutz is barred from proceeding.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to file suit.

Stacy v. Michigan Employment Security Commission · filed 1980-11-13(f)(1)

Caroline Stacy has commenced her suit within the requisite 90 days after receipt of a right to sue letter, pursuant to the terms of the letter itself and the provisions of Section 706(f) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit extends through Monday when the ninetieth day falls on Sunday.

Estelle M. KANE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOUGLAS, ELLIMAN, HOLLYDAY & IVES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-11-26(f)(1)

Under Rule 6(a), the 90-day period for filing Kane’s complaint did not end on Sunday, April 27; instead, it ran “until the end of the next day,” Monday, April 28. Thus Kane’s complaint was properly filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to receive a right-to-sue letter before filing suit, even when seeking interim injunctive relief.

Fields v. Village of Skokie · filed 1980-12-03(f)(1)

As defendants properly point out, receipt of a right to sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing an action in federal court. ... Nothing in the statute (nor, in this Court’s view, in the particular circumstances of this case) suggests that a mere prayer for injunctive relief should allow a plaintiff to circumvent the administrative procedure required by the facially absolute language of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing a private suit begins when the charging party receives unambiguous notice that the EEOC has ended its proceedings and will not sue.

Doris WHITEHEAD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-12-08(f)(1)

There is no question from the record in this case but that Mrs. Whitehead never received sufficient notice that the EEOC’s processes had terminated and that it had decided not to file suit in her behalf. ... She filed suit well within the 90-day limitations period that began to run upon her receipt of the requested right to sue notice. Therefore, Mrs. Whitehead is not barred by the statute’s requirement that a private suit be filed in federal court within 90 days of receipt of the statutory notice.

Notice to an attorney formally representing a complainant in an EEOC proceeding starts the 90-day period for filing suit.

Katherine DECKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1980-12-17(f)(1)

As telegraphed by Franks, Huckeby and Mouriz, we now hold that for purposes of § 2000e-5(f)(1), notice to an attorney who is formally representing the complainant in an EEOC proceeding, constitutes notice to the complainant and begins the running of the 90 days allowed for the filing of suit.

A separate Title VII complaint tendered with a motion to intervene within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice satisfies Section 706(f)(1)'s filing deadline.

Howard KYLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST TENNESSEE BANK, N.A., Memphis, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-12-17(f)(1)

It would appear that the statutory time limit was complied with in that the separate complaint was tendered on June 16, 1978 when appellant sought intervention in the EEOC ease.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires suit within ninety days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter; a factual dispute about the receipt date precludes summary judgment on timeliness.

Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp. · filed 1980-12-19(f)(1)

Pretermitting any discussion of the United States Postal Service’s speed of mail delivery, plaintiff’s affidavit has created a factual issue for resolution at trial, the existence of which precludes summary judgment. Accordingly, the issue of whether plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter before or after March 28, 1980 must be resolved at trial, and summary judgment on this ground is DENIED.

Filing a right-to-sue notice and requesting counsel within ninety days of receiving the notice satisfies Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s deadline for bringing suit.

Washington v. Kroger Co. · filed 1981-03-02(f)(1)

Thus, plaintiff’s filing of her right-to-sue notice and request for counsel within ninety days after receiving the notice was sufficient to satisfy Title VII’s ninety-day filing requirement. Consequently, Union’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.

Filing a right-to-sue letter does not preserve a Title VII claim when the claimant misses the court’s deadline for filing a formal complaint.

Irby v. Shelby County Government · filed 1981-03-06(f)(1)

The operative date is June 26, 1980 when the right to sue letter was filed. The thirtieth day from June 26, 1980 fell on Saturday, July 26th, therefore giving plaintiff until Monday, July 28, 1980 to file his complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). The plaintiff did not consult an attorney until July 29,1980, after his time to file had already run, and the complaint was filed two days late, on July 30, 1980. ... This court is in accord with the wisdom of Judge Wellford’s decision. Therefore, the portion of the plaintiff’s complaint based upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 is dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit cannot be extended by filing a duplicative EEOC charge and obtaining another right-to-sue notice.

Dowdell v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. · filed 1981-04-23(f)(1)

Since Mr. Dowdell failed to file suit within ninety days following the receipt of the first rijght to sue letter, this court has no jurisdiction to consider his duplicated Title VII claims alleging discrimination in job assignment and discrimination by the union.

A Title VII suit brought ninety days after a right-to-sue notice is timely under § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Marin v. New York State Department of Labor · filed 1981-04-24(f)(1)

This action was commenced precisely ninety days later, within the period required.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s filing period begins when a claimant receives a facially valid right-to-sue notice, even if the EEOC later identifies an internal error and issues a second notice.

Brown v. Mead Corp. · filed 1981-04-13(f)(1)

We conclude, therefore, that the notice of right to sue issued in December of 1974 commenced the statutory period for appellant to bring suit in the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period does not bar class allegations that relate back to a timely complaint because they arise from the same employment practices.

Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co. · filed 1981-04-28(f)(1)

The amended pleading therefore “relates back” to the date of the original pleading under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which preserves the amended complaint from operation of the 90-day limitations period of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a Title VII suit within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue notice; an amended Title VII claim can meet that deadline by relating back to a timely complaint alleging the same discrimination.

Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital · filed 1981-06-26(f)

A Title VII claim must be filed within ninety days of receipt of the right-to-sue notice. ... We conclude that, by analogous reasoning, the relation-back doctrine makes a Title VII claim against a state employer timely despite the fact that the Section 1981 claim was barred by the eleventh amendment if both claims assert in essence the same charge of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing deadline is jurisdictional and subject to limited equitable tolling, but reliance on a court's unsolicited order extending the filing time can defeat a timeliness challenge.

Carlile v. South Routt School District RE 3-J · filed 1981-07-06(f)(1)

Thus, we hold that the 90-day filing requirement is jurisdictional, subject to potential equitable tolling only as recognized in Cottrell, supra. Applying the Cottrell test, we hold that Carlile's actions in the instant case do not merit application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. ... In light of Carlile's uncontested reliance on the Court's unilateral tolling of the time within which she could file a complaint, we must hold that School District's jurisdictional challenge must be rejected.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit runs from receipt of the EEOC notice, not its mailing.

Ferrell v. Busbee · filed 1981-08-19(f)(1)

It has been held that the 90-day period runs from the date of receipt and not from the date of mailing by the EEOC. ... As there is nothing to show that plaintiff did not receive the notice on or about July 14, defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit begins when an EEOC determination letter makes clear that the agency’s process has ended, even if a later right-to-sue notice is issued.

Monroe v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Dept. · filed 1981-09-30(f)

This Court does not have jurisdiction of plaintiff's Title VII claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). ... The Eighth Circuit held that plaintiff's action which was filed within 90 days of receipt of the notice of right to sue was not timely because the EEOC's determination letter triggered the running of the 90 day period since it informed plaintiff that the EEOC's administrative procedures had terminated and that plaintiff could not hope for any further assistance from the EEOC. Because the instant case is factually indistinguishable from Shea, plaintiff's claim under Title VII will be dismissed and judgment entered against plaintiff and for all defendants on plaintiff's claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period is not satisfied by presenting a right-to-sue letter to the court and then taking no further action for almost a year.

Potts v. Southern Railway Co. · filed 1981-10-06(f)(1)

In the case at bar, plaintiff’s conduct differs substantially from that of the plaintiffs in the above mentioned cases. After bringing his right-to-sue letter to this Court, plaintiff did nothing further for almost a year. The record does not contain one piece of correspondence from plaintiff to explain his lengthy inaction; nor does it contain a request for the appointment of counsel. Given this factual setting, the Court finds that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s deadline for filing suit may be equitably tolled when extraordinary circumstances justify it and the plaintiff diligently pursues the claim; moving or a marriage dissolution does not justify tolling.

Christopher v. General Motors Parts Division · filed 1981-10-27(f)(1)

It is, however, also quite clear that extraordinary circumstances must be present to justify a modification of the filing requirement. Furthermore, the plaintiff must be diligent in pursuing his claim, both before and after the limitation period has run. ... And it is abundantly clear that a change of residence or a marriage dissolution cannot justify tolling the Title VII federal court filing requirements.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue notice before a private Title VII suit; a voluntary conciliation agreement that prevents issuance of the notice bars a suit on the settled charge.

Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp. · filed 1981-10-29(f)(1)

Thus the Court will not exercise jurisdiction under Title VII because plaintiff has not received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC as required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f).

Under the former two-tier EEOC notice system, Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period does not begin until the claimant receives a clear indication of when it starts.

Victoria MISSIRLIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUNTINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-11-04(f)(1)

Instead, we hold that a Title VII plaintiff who receives a no-reasonable-cause determination or a notice of conciliation failure is entitled to a clear indication of when the ninety-day period commences.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period may be equitably tolled when an indigent plaintiff requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis within that period.

Yelverton v. Blue Bell, Inc. · filed 1982-01-22(f)(1)

Equitable grounds may serve to toll the running of this statute. ... Equitable principles dictate that the statute of limitations be tolled by her actions of 26 October 1981.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the plaintiff receives a right-to-sue letter; a later letter for a separate complaint does not restart it.

Jones v. Cryogenic Energy Co. · filed 1982-02-01(f)(1)

In the present case the EEOC never reconsidered or rescinded its first determination. It only issued the second letter because the plaintiff had filed another complaint. ... I therefore conclude that the 90-day statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff received the first letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file a complaint.

Holden v. Commission Against Discrimination of Massachusetts · filed 1982-02-17(f)(1)

The original complaint was filed on November 28, 1973, within 90 days after Holden had received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on September 4, 1973, thereby satisfying the limitations period of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a private Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Lecompte v. University of Houston System · filed 1982-04-01(f)(1)

A private person complaining of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act must file her complaint in federal court within 90 days of receipt of her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the complaint is not filed within 90 days, the suit is barred in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day deadline for filing suit extends to the next day when the last day falls on a Sunday.

Hudson v. Teamsters Local Union No. 957 · filed 1982-03-23(f)(1)

Plaintiff, however, points out that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), which governs the computation of time prescribed by “any applicable statute,” if the last day of a period falls on a Sunday, the period of time runs until the next day. December 7, 1980, was a Sunday, and the suit was filed the next day. This Court agrees with the Plaintiff that this procedure complied with the statute, as construed with Rule 6(a).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file suit; that deadline operates like a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional condition.

Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance · filed 1982-04-02(f)(1)

In addition, Zipes makes it clear that Title VII’s time limits are more like statutes of limitations than like conditions on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Although Zipes deals only with the time limit for filing charges of discrimination with the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), its logic extends to the time limit for filing suit after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, see-U.S. at-, 102 S.Ct. at 1132,1135.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period bars a claim against a newly added defendant when the amended complaint does not relate back to the original filing.

St. Cyr v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. · filed 1982-03-31(f)(1)

The short limitation period of 90 days in Title VII actions makes no difference in the application of Rule 15(c). ... On these facts the Court is compelled to conclude that the amended complaint does not relate back and therefore that plaintiff’s federal claim against McNear is untimely.

Section 2000e-5(f)'s 90-day filing period cannot support dismissal at the pleading stage when facts needed to determine when the period began remain undeveloped.

Paula I. WHATLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1982-04-23(f)

Concluding that it was inappropriate, in light of the undeveloped state of the facts as to the scope and extent of the attorney-client relationship here, to dispose of the Title VII claim on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we reverse and remand for development of the relevant facts, ... and for a determination of the law applicable to the facts thus developed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period can begin when notice is sent to a claimant’s last address known to the EEOC if the claimant failed to take reasonable steps to ensure delivery, unless circumstances beyond the claimant’s control prevented receipt.

Lewis v. Conners Steel Co. · filed 1982-04-23(f)(1)

We believe it to be fair and reasonable for the plaintiff, as suggested by the trial judge, to assume the burden of advising the EEOC of address changes or to take other reasonable steps to ensure delivery of the notice to his current address. ... If the plaintiff can establish that it was through no fault of his that the letter was sent to his temporary Birmingham address, then the plaintiff should not be held to a limitation period beginning to run at that time, unless, in spite of the incorrect address, he actually received the letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a civil action within 90 days after the EEOC gives a right-to-sue notice, subject to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.

Nash v. City of Oakwood, Ohio · filed 1982-04-29(f)(1)

Similarly, Title VII requires that any civil action be filed in federal court within 90 days after the EEOC has given a “right-to-sue” notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). This 90-day limit is also subject to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling. ... Such an escape valve should not apply in the case herein, since the facts in this case do not indicate that waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline to sue after EEOC notice is nonjurisdictional and may be waived or equitably tolled.

Marion S. RICE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NEW ENGLAND COLLEGE, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1982-05-03(f)(1)

We, accordingly, conclude that section 2000e-5(f)(1) is nonjurisdictional, and turn to consider, since the matter has been argued, what the district court did not reach, the question whether there was any waiver, estoppel, or equitable ground for tolling the statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows an individual 90 days after receiving notice of the right to sue to file a civil action; filing later bars the claim.

Yarbrough v. Illinois Department of Mental Health · filed 1982-05-12(f)(1)

If the EEOC cannot secure a conciliation agreement from the respondent and does not file a civil action, then it will notify the aggrieved person, and within 90 days after notice, the individual may bring a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... Here, Yarbrough received a Notice of Right to Sue on May 8, 1981, but she did not commence this suit until 94 days later, and therefore did not meet the 90-day time limitation.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s 90-day filing deadline is satisfied when a plaintiff moves for leave to amend a complaint within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice, even if the court grants leave later.

Pollard v. City of Hartford · filed 1982-06-01(f)

I conclude, therefore, that the remedial purposes of Title VII are best served by holding that, by filing a motion for leave to amend, the plaintiffs have complied with the 90-day limitations period and that their complaint is, therefore, timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a right-to-sue letter after an EEOC consent decree for a charging party who did not intervene in the agency action and declined an individual award under the decree.

Adams v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co. · filed 1982-05-18(f)(1)

We conclude instead that the statute contemplates that any charging party who has declined to intervene as a formal party in an agency action and who has also declined to accept any individual monetary award provided by a consent decree entered in the action may be issued a right-to-sue letter under § 706(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to rescind a right-to-sue notice when it decides to reconsider a complaint and informs all parties within 90 days of the original notice; it may then issue a second notice.

Sharon LUTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the SINGER COMPANY, Kearfott Division, a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-06-04(f)(1)

Both courts, however, have limited the EEOC's authority to rescind a Notice of Right to Sue to those cases in which the EEOC decides to reconsider and notifies all parties of its decision within 90 days after it first issues a Notice of Right to Sue. ... In light of these considerations, we are persuaded to adopt the rule of Trujillo and Gonzalez. ... On these facts, we hold that the EEOC had authority to issue the second Notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s right-to-sue notice requirement is a condition precedent that may be satisfied while a prematurely filed Title VII action remains pending.

Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard · filed 1982-06-10(f)(1)

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the receipt of statutory notice of the right to sue is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, which if not satisfied deprives courts of subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent, which on proper occasion may be equitably modified. Here, we hold that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter subsequent to the commencement of a Title VII action, but while the action remains pending, satisfies the precondition that a plaintiff obtain statutory notice of the right to sue before filing a civil action under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires Attorney General notice before a private suit against a governmental employer, but that requirement is nonjurisdictional and may be waived when the EEOC misleads the claimant.

English v. Ware County Department of Family & Children Services · filed 1982-08-05(f)(1)

The Court, therefore, concludes that both the spirit and letter of Title VII are served by a requirement that the Attorney General’s office notify claimants of the cessation of the administrative process and their right to sue in federal court when a governmental body is the respondent. ... Given this prejudice, and the broad purposes of Title VII, the Court thinks the requirement of notice by the Attorney General should be waived in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit within ninety days of notice, and incorrect advice from the clerk’s office on the last day does not, by itself, justify tolling.

Aljadir v. University of Pennsylvania · filed 1982-09-17(f)(1)

This allegation does not amount to active deception by the defendant or extraordinary circumstances necessitating the plaintiff’s delay in filing. Even by plaintiff’s own admission, during the period from April 20, 1982 to July 19, 1982 he made no effort to file the complaint. Consequently, where the court has not been apprised of any equitable considerations which would prompt a tolling of the Title VII time limitations, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a civil action to be filed within ninety days after the EEOC gives notice of the right to sue.

Weills v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. · filed 1982-11-30(f)(1)

That is, as the enforcement provisions require a civil action to be brought within ninety days after the giving of a notice of right to sue by the EEOC, this action is time-barred for purposes of “arising under” section 2000e-5(f)(l).

A Title VII suit filed within 90 days of receiving a right to sue letter tolls the filing period for the claims in the EEOC complaint and the court complaint while the suit is pending.

Rowe v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1982-09-23(f)(1)

It is clear that he filed Johnson v. General Motors within 90 days of his receipt of a right to sue letter, and that such filing tolled the statute of limitations as to the claims set forth in the EEOC complaint and the Court-filed Complaint until the suit was dismissed in December, 1980.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit after an EEOC right-to-sue letter is tolled for a class member when a Title VII class action is filed before the period expires.

Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education · filed 1982-09-28(f)(1)

Hence, the EEOC filing deadlines for Joanne Amspoker- were tolled upon the filing of the present class action on October 31,1980. On that date, the 90-day period of 42 U.S.C. § 2000eT5(f)(l) had not run for Dr. Amspoker. She properly intervened in this lawsuit by being named as a named plaintiff in a subsequent amended complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing suit begins when the claimant actually receives the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice.

Killingham v. Board of Governors of State Colleges · filed 1982-10-04(f)(1)

Accordingly the statutory 90-day period did not begin when Killingham’s mother went to the post office September 18, 1981 to sign for Killingham’s certified mail, but rather on September 19 when she handed the letter to Killingham.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period does not begin when an attorney’s employee receives a copy of the right-to-sue letter unless the claimant directed that notice be sent to the attorney and the attorney personally acknowledged receipt.

Eloise THOMAS, Appellant, v. KATV CHANNEL 7, Appellee · filed 1982-11-12(f)(1)

There is no evidence that appellant requested that the right to sue letter be sent to Hollingsworth or that he personally acknowledged receipt. Therefore, receipt by Hollingsworth’s employee of a copy of appellant’s right to sue letter did not trigger the running of the statutory ninety-day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) treats a claimant as entitled to a right-to-sue notice when an employer fails to perform a settlement agreement; that entitlement can support a discrimination suit even if the EEOC refuses to issue the notice.

Lexine PERDUE, Appellant, v. ROY STONE TRANSFER CORPORATION; Lonnie Hodges; Ben Koontz; Appellees · filed 1982-10-05(f)(1)

Thus, the policies undergirding the statutory "right to sue" notice indicate that the charging party should be deemed entitled to such notice when the employer neither performs nor tenders performance of a settlement agreement. Plaintiff's allegations of such a breach and of the exhaustion of administrative remedies, if true, establish her entitlement to such notice and, hence, properly invoke the jurisdiction of the district court under § 2000e-5(f)(1).

The 90-day period to file suit can begin when a claimant’s spouse receives the EEOC right-to-sue notice at the claimant’s residence.

James P. BELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EAGLE MOTOR LINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-12-16(f)(1)

Approaching the issue on a case by case basis as we did in Lewis, we find that the receipt of the EEOC notice by Bell’s wife at his residence triggered the running of the 90 day period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period runs from the claimant’s actual notice when the attorney’s receipt does not amount to constructive receipt.

Decker v. Anheuser-Busch · filed 1983-02-18(f)(1)

In sum, the Court concludes that based upon a consideration of all the unique facts of this case, it does not find that Decker constructively received the notice via Petersen. There is simply too many oddities in the Decker-Petersen relationship and deviations from what is presumably standard EEOC procedures to hold Decker to the severe result of constructive receipt.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) makes an EEOC right-to-sue letter a condition precedent to suit that may be modified on equitable grounds.

Black v. Brown University · filed 1983-01-27(f)(1)

The Court holds, therefore, that the right-to-sue letter is but a condition precedent to the commencement of suit, subject to equitable modification under appropriate circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period to sue begins when the person receives actual or constructive notice of the right to sue.

Motley v. Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1983-05-05(f)(1)

It makes eminent good sense to hold that the triggering- date is the date of receipt of the notice. The statute itself requires the Commission to “so notify the person aggrieved.” A person cannot be “notified” until he or she has actual or constructive notice.

Notice of an EEOC right-to-sue letter to a claimant’s attorney starts the 90-day period for filing suit.

Robin HARPER, Appellant, v. Wilton B. BURGESS, T/A Quik-E Food, Appellee · filed 1983-02-23(f)(1)

The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding the suit time barred, after concluding that notice to Harper’s counsel was notice to her for purposes of the 90-day filing period. We agree and rely upon the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s 90-day period for filing suit after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter may be equitably tolled when a substantially conforming complaint is submitted on time but rejected for technical defects.

Cox v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1983-02-25(f)

Title VII requires a plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of his receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). ... The court finds that the fundamental purpose underlying the 90-day period was satisfied under these facts, and equitable considerations support the tolling of the 90-day period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing suit after an EEOC right-to-sue letter may be equitably tolled when a diligent plaintiff reasonably relies on a court clerk’s assurance that time has stopped.

Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc. · filed 1983-03-21(f)(1)

The related Title VII filing period at issue here provides that a plaintiff may bring a civil action within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... We conclude as a matter of law that equitable tolling is applicable to the circumstances of this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period begins when the claimant receives a copy of the right-to-sue notice, even if it arrives through an intermediary.

Billings v. Wichita State University · filed 1983-03-03(f)(1)

While plaintiff contends that she did not receive the “notice” necessary to trigger the running of the ninety day period until July 12, 1981, this Court must disagree. The right to sue letter that plaintiff received from the Justice Department, through the agency of Congressman Dellums, in March 1981, was in every material respect identical to the letter sent January 31, 1979, and a right to sue letter is not a talisman whose power is lost if it is xeroxed or passed through a congressman’s hands.