42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

When the EEOC has not dismissed a charge, a right-to-sue notice issued before the 180-day period expires does not satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite to a private Title VII action.

Mills v. Jefferson Bank East · filed 1983-03-15(f)(1)

Other courts have held that to permit a notice of right to sue to issue from the EEOC prior to the expiration of the 180-day time period is inconsistent with congressional intent under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The notice is defective and does not satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites to private employment discrimination actions. Therefore any claims based on defective notice must be dismissed. ... Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Title VII claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day period for filing suit after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter may be equitably tolled when a court clerk's assurances reasonably delay a diligent plaintiff.

Balseyro v. Lenkurt · filed 1983-03-21(f)(1)

The related Title VII filing period at issue here provides that a plaintiff may bring a civil action within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). ... We conclude as a matter of law that equitable tolling is applicable to the circumstances of this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit filed on the next judicial day when the ninety-day filing period expires on a Sunday.

Bailey v. Southeastern Area Joint Apprenticeship Committee · filed 1983-04-05(f)(1)

Even though the ninety-day limitation period for the commencement of this civil action ... expired on Sunday, January 14,1979, it is nevertheless timely where it was filed on the next succeeding judicial day.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is not tolled because a plaintiff lives far from the district court or because a late filing did not harm the defendant.

Feleicia Malcolm DAVIS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1983-06-03(f)(1)

The other two grounds asserted by Davis as basis for tolling the statutory period are equally without merit. The distance between her home town and the location of the district court and the fact that the defendant suffered no harm from the late filing were specifically rejected in Rice as equitable grounds for extending or tolling the statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a Title VII plaintiff 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to file in federal court, subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Banks v. Teletype Corp. · filed 1983-06-03(f)(1)

A Title VII plaintiff has 90 days from the receipt of his/her right to sue letter to file a complaint in federal court. This 90 day limitation period is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing suit is tolled for putative class members while a class action is pending; after class certification is denied, they may file their own suits or intervene.

Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker · filed 1983-06-13(f)(1)

Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied. At that point, class members may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action. In this case, respondent clearly would have been a party in Pendleton if that suit had been permitted to continue as a class action. The filing of the Pendleton action thus tolled the statute of limitations for respondent and other members of the Pendleton class. Since respondent did not receive his Notice of Right to Sue until after the Pendleton action was filed, he retained a full 90 days in which to bring suit after class certification was denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action to be brought within 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue notice; a state saving clause does not extend that period.

Escelles GARRISON, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1983-08-16(f)(1)

Title VII actions are governed by a federal statute of limitations which requires that an action be brought within 90 days after the plaintiff receives notice of the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Because Title VII actions are governed by a federal statute of limitations, the Arkansas saving clause is inapplicable.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s ninety-day filing period begins when a claimant’s teenage son picks up the right-to-sue notice and brings it home, even if the claimant reads it later.

Eldridge LAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HERCULES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1983-08-29(f)

Eldridge Law was living at home at the time of the receipt of the letter, which was picked up by his seventeen year old son and placed on the kitchen table. To allow additional time based on a claim that the letter was not actually received by Eldridge Law until “one or two days later,” would be to foster a “manipulable open-ended time extension which would render the statutory limitation meaningless.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period does not bar intervention by putative class members excused from filing separate EEOC charges.

Shannon v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. · filed 1983-09-27(f)(1)

Defendant argues first that the proposed intervenors are time barred from participating in this suit because they did not seek intervention within the 90 day period for initiating an action set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). However having found that Dutton and Roberts were excused from the exhaustion requirements of Title VII, it would be illogical not to excuse them from the limitations period set forth therein.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an Attorney General right-to-sue notice for claims against government entities, but the requirement is nonjurisdictional and may be waived when a claimant diligently seeks the notice and the Attorney General refuses to issue it.

Diane FOUCHE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the JEKYLL ISLAND-STATE PARK AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1983-09-09(f)(1)

Having concluded that the requirement that the Attorney General issue the right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional, we must now decide whether the facts of this case warrant equitable modification of the statutory requirement. It is apparent that Fouche has diligently attempted to obtain the required notice, but the Attorney General has refused to issue it. To dismiss her Title VII claim for failure to receive the proper notice when she is unable to obtain it would obviously be unfair to Fouche. Therefore, the requirement that Fouche receive a right-to-sue notice from the Attorney General is waived.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an Attorney General right-to-sue notice for a Title VII action against a governmental unit, and a notice obtained after filing may cure its absence.

Dague v. Riverdale Athletic Ass'n · filed 1983-09-30(f)(1)

The court is convinced therefore that absent a notice from the Attorney General giving plaintiff a right to sue the City of Riverdale, plaintiff may not maintain this action against the City of River-dale. ... There is ample precedent for allowing a right to sue letter issued subsequent to the filing of the suit to cure a defect in the complaint.

A Title VII complaint delivered to the clerk within the 90-day filing period is timely even if it fails to meet a local rule’s paper-size requirement.

Loya v. Desert Sands Unified School District, a Governmental Agency & Harold Schoenfeld · filed 1983-12-02(f)(1)

We therefore hold that for purposes of the statute of limitations the district court should regard as “filed” a complaint which arrives in the custody of the clerk within the statutory period but fails to conform with formal requirements in local rules.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s requirement that the Attorney General issue a right-to-sue notice in a case against a governmental employer can be equitably waived when requiring another notice would cause delay and the employer suffered no prejudice.

Lawson v. Metropolitan Sanitary District · filed 1983-12-06(f)(1)

However, the court goes further and holds that the delay resulting from any order that Troutman and Walker apply for Notices from the Attorney General, coupled with the lack of prejudice to MSD resulting from their obtaining Notices only from the EEOC, mandate waiver of any requirement that Troutman and Walker receive Notices from the Attorney General as a condition precedent to maintaining this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period may be equitably tolled when a claimant diligently mails a complaint in time for expected filing and the respondent is not prejudiced.

Eva SUAREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LITTLE HAVANA ACTIVITIES and Nutrition Centers of Dade County, Inc., Defendants-Appe · filed 1983-12-12(f)(1)

Accordingly, we reject the rule 6(e) contention, but in the spirit of Fifth Circuit precedent, hold that the statute of limitations period prescribed by section 2000e-5 was equitably tolled under the circumstances in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing suit begins when the plaintiff actually receives the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Croffut v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1984-01-05(f)(1)

Plaintiff did not personally acknowledge receipt of his notice and, therefore, the ninety-day period did not begin to run until plaintiff actually, rather than constructively, received the notice.

The 90-day period for filing a Title VII action after a right-to-sue notice is an affirmative defense properly pleaded in an answer.

Deogracias RUIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHELBY COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-01-16(f)(1)

Therefore, at the outset, we hold that an alleged failure to comply with the 90 day filing period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) is an affirmative defense which is properly plead in an answer to the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a charging party to sue within ninety days of EEOC dismissal notice, and a factual dispute about the notice date can defeat summary judgment on timeliness.

Giannotti v. Foundry Cafe · filed 1984-02-10(f)(1)

Drawing, as the court must at this stage, all inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, this allegation states that the notice appended to the complaint was actually issued by the EEOC on a date different from that stamped upon the notice. This allegation is sufficient to raise a factual issue as to timeliness.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an Attorney General right-to-sue letter for a claim against a government defendant, but the requirement is not jurisdictional and may be modified on equitable grounds.

Lugo v. City of Charlotte · filed 1984-01-20(f)(1)

The language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) requires plaintiff first to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney General because this is a suit against a ... “government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.” ... The fact that plaintiff has not received a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney General does not, as the defendant asserts, however, deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction. ... Since the requirement is not jurisdictional, principles of equity may allow modification of the requirement. ... The facts of this case support an equitable modification of the requirement of a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney General.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires the Attorney General to issue a right-to-sue notice for a charge against a government employer, but receipt of that notice is subject to equitable waiver.

Woods v. State of Missouri Department of Mental Health · filed 1984-02-24(f)(1)

We are convinced that the statutory requirement of the receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney General is not jurisdictional. ... Given the broad purposes of Title VII, we conclude that the requirement of right-to-sue notice from the Attorney General should, as a matter of equity, be waived in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a person to file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice, subject to equitable relief in appropriate circumstances.

Mason v. State of Conn. · filed 1984-03-12(f)(1)

The Title VII claims stemming from the original sex discrimination charge involving the denial of tuition benefits, therefore, are not properly before the court, as plaintiff did not pursue her grievance in federal court as provided by law within ninety days of receipt of her right-to-sue letter and has offered no equitable considerations upon which to excuse this omission.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing deadline can be equitably tolled, but moving during that period does not justify tolling.

Hibbard v. Don Love, Inc. · filed 1984-04-25(f)(1)

Thus, the ninety-day filing cutoff can be equitably tolled. However, the circumstances Plaintiff describes to the Court, ... that she was moving during the ninety-day period, do not equitably toll the running of the statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period may be equitably waived when a diligent pro se claimant misses the deadline after denial of an in forma pauperis application.

Ortiz v. Clarence H. Hackett, Inc. · filed 1984-03-26(f)(1)

Mr. Ortiz presented his initial complaint to the Court within the ninety-day period. Given these substantial indications that he wished to seriously pursue this claim, a pro se litigant should not be penalized for failing to understand and conform to the intricacies of running and tolled limitations periods.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit after EEOC notice is subject to equitable tolling.

Addie JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AL TECH SPECIALTIES STEEL CORP., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-03-27(f)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that our prior indication in such cases as Kane & Elliman, supra, that the time limit may be equitably tolled accurately reflects how district courts should treat the 90-day rule.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to sue within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice; Rule 6(e) does not add three days to that period.

Norris v. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services · filed 1984-04-23(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1), the plaintiff must file suit within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue notice. ... We therefore reject Norris' argument that Rule 6(e) should be construed to add three days to the statutory 90-day time period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a Title VII complaint to be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue notice, subject to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.

Raphel R. ANOOYA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-04-26(f)(1)

In order to bring suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must generally file the complaint within 90 days of receipt of the notice of right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). According to the record, 91 days passed before Anooya filed his complaint and, absent special circumstances which give rise to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling of the 90 day period, the Title VII action is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s Attorney General right-to-sue notice requirement may be waived when an EEOC notice directs a claimant to file suit without mentioning that requirement.

Dillard v. Rumph · filed 1984-05-17(f)(1)

Following English, the Court concludes that the statutory requirement of notice by the Attorney General must be waived in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period begins when the claimant receives the right-to-sue notice; receipt by a former attorney who lacked authority to receive her mail does not give the claimant constructive notice.

Cumbow v. Vermont American Corp. · filed 1984-05-30(f)(1)

Receipt of the letter by Mr. Bradford is insufficient in this case to invoke constructive notice upon the plaintiff, especially since he and his law firm were not representing her at the time.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to file a civil action within ninety days of the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice; tendering only the notice does not sufficiently identify the facts and nature of the claim.

Lener T. MILLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LA POINTE’S FASHION STORE, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-07-03(f)(1)

At best, Millard may have tendered her right-to-sue letter when she spoke with the court clerk on August 10, 1981. Even if she had, however, it could not be said that she filed sufficient material with the District Court from which that Court could determine the relevant facts and nature of her claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to commence a civil action within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice; filing the notice alone does not commence an action or toll the deadline.

Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown · filed 1984-06-04(f)(1)

The issue before the Court of Appeals and before this Court is whether the filing of a right-to-sue letter with the District Court constituted the commencement of an action. The Court of Appeals held that it did and based its judgment on that ground. We reverse that judgment.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) sets a filing deadline for a Title VII suit after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter.

Geer v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1984-06-11(f)(1)

The EEOC issued a right to sue letter, with determination of no reasonable cause, on May 2, 1980. However, the instant suit was not filed until July 2, 1981. Therefore, any claim for relief under Title VII is now time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). For this reason, Mr. Winfrey’s Title VII claims were dismissed by the court at the conclusion of Plaintiff’s evidence at trial.

When the EEOC dismisses a charge against a government employer for lack of reasonable cause, it may issue the right-to-sue notice without notice from the Attorney General.

Flint v. State of Cal. · filed 1984-09-17(f)(1)

Thus, the EEOC properly notified plaintiff of its action in dismissing his charge. Because I hold that the statute does not require the notice to come from the Attorney General of the United States, the fact that it did not is irrelevant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s right-to-sue letter requirement is statutory rather than jurisdictional; a plaintiff need not plead issuance of the letter to maintain a Title VII suit.

Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co. · filed 1984-09-28(f)(1)

We believe that the same is true of the issuance of a right-to-sue letter; such a letter is not a "jurisdictional" requirement in the constitutional sense, but rather a statutory requirement designed to give the administrative process an opportunity to proceed before a lawsuit is filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the EEOC right-to-sue notice is received by either the claimant or the attorney representing the claimant in the Title VII action.

Jones v. Madison Service Corp. · filed 1984-10-02(f)(1)

We hold that the 90-day period of limitation set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) begins to run on the date that the EEOC right-to-sue notice is actually received either by the claimant or by the attorney representing him in the Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period begins when the claimant or the attorney representing the claimant receives the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Jones v. Madison Service Corp. · filed 1984-10-03(f)(1)

We hold that the 90-day period of limitation set forth in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) begins to run on the date that the EEOC right-to-sue notice is actually received either by the claimant or by the attorney representing him in the Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period begins when the EEOC delivers a right-to-sue notice to the claimant’s most recently provided address if the claimant failed to report a move.

St. Louis v. Alverno College · filed 1984-10-29(f)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the ninety-day limit began running on the date the notice was delivered to the most recent address plaintiff provided the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file a complaint within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter; filing only the letter and an explanatory affidavit does not commence the action.

Birge v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1984-11-19(f)(1)

The court must reject this argument as only the filing of a Complaint “commences” a civil action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”), even for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing suit begins when the plaintiff receives the right-to-sue letter.

Ahia v. Hawaii Protective Ass'n · filed 1984-12-12(f)(1)

The ninety-day period in § 706(f)(1) runs from the time of receipt, not the time of dispatch.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s Attorney General right-to-sue letter requirement is subject to equitable waiver, modification, or estoppel.

Lucius T. SOLOMON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C. Hugh HARDISON, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1985-01-10(f)(1)

Following the Fouche decision, we hold that the requirement of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(l) that a right-to-sue letter must be issued by the Attorney General is not jurisdictional, but instead is subject to equitable waiver, modification, or estoppel.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is tolled while a good-faith request for appointed counsel accompanied by a right-to-sue notice awaits the court’s decision.

Franklin BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.I. CASE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-01-17(f)(1)

The remedial purpose of Title VII and the special equitable circumstances raised by a request for appointment of counsel justify a general rule allowing a request for appointed counsel combined with presentation of a Notice of Right-to-Sue to toll the running of the ninety-day period until the court acts upon the counsel request.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to bring an action within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue notice; it does not require service on the defendant within that period.

Robert Lewis Robinson, Jr. v. City of Fairfield · filed 1985-01-21(f)(1)

To the city’s claim that the plaintiff never served upon it a copy of his application nor was service of the amended complaint made until well beyond the ninety-day period plus the court’s thirty-day extension, we respond first with the observation that the Civil Rights Act does not mandate service on the defendant within ninety days, but rather merely the bringing of an action within that period. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

A plaintiff entitled to a Title VII right-to-sue letter may bring suit even without receiving the letter.

Jack K. MOORE, Appellee, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, NC, Appellant, and Charlotte Police Department, Defendant · filed 1985-01-28(f)(1)

Entitlement to the letter, without actual receipt of it, is sufficient to support federal jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period runs from the aggrieved person's receipt of EEOC notice, and later receipt by counsel alone does not warrant equitable tolling.

Noe v. Ward · filed 1985-02-11(f)(1)

Plaintiff, the aggrieved party, was served with notice 94 days before the suit was brought. The claim that the receipt of the notice by her attorney seven days later, without more, gives rise to no reason for application of the principle of equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the aggrieved person receives the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice; later receipt by counsel does not restart it.

Noe v. Ward · filed 1985-02-11(f)(1)

In the instant case the plaintiff herself received notice more than 90 days before suit was filed. She may not now complain that the 90 days did not begin to run until the receipt of the “Right to Sue” letter by her attorney seven days later.

The ninety-day period for filing a Title VII action excludes the day the plaintiff receives the right-to-sue letter.

Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Center · filed 1985-02-19(f)(1)

Therefore this Court finds that the date of receipt of the Right to Sue letter is not to be included in computing the ninety-day limitations period and that the original Complaint was timely filed June 5, 1981.

The ninety-day period to file suit begins when notice reaches the address the claimant gave the EEOC, unless the claimant blamelessly fails to receive it or another equitable reason warrants tolling.

Richard G. ESPINOZA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-03-11(f)(1)

We hold that the giving of notice to the claimant at the address designated by him suffices to start the ninety-day period unless the claimant, through no fault of his own, failed to receive the right-to-sue letter or unless, for some other equitable reason, the statute should be tolled until he actually receives notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII civil action to be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right-to-sue notice.

Minor v. Northville Public Schools · filed 1985-03-28(f)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires that any civil action arising under the statute be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right to sue “notice.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice; filing only the notice and a request for counsel does not commence the action.

L. Hue Firle v. Mississippi State Department of Education · filed 1985-06-10(f)(1)

Under the holdings and expressions in Brown, the district court correctly held (a) that Firle’s filing of the right-to-sue notice and request for appointment of counsel were not an adequate pleading that timely commenced the action; and (b) that the amended complaint could not relate back to this original documentary filing.

Section 2000e-5(f)'s ninety-day filing limit applies to Rehabilitation Act employment-discrimination suits; a late filing requires an equitable basis for relief.

Tkac v. Veterans Administrator · filed 1985-06-20(f)

In this case, the ninety-day limit in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) was not satisfied. The Notice of Right to Sue was issued on May 12, 1983. This civil suit was filed on November 9, 1983, almost six months later. Although the filing time requirement is not jurisdictional, a plaintiff seeking to be excused from it must present a showing that he is entitled to equity. Mr. Tkac has offered no such showing. Therefore, the Court is constrained to find that Mr. Tkac’s claim of handicap discrimination is barred by his failure to comply with the ninety day requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a timely suit based on discrimination reasonably related to an earlier EEOC charge when the plaintiff files within ninety days of a valid right-to-sue letter on that charge, even after missing the deadline on a separate letter concerning the later incident.

Horace BROWN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL CAN COMPANY, Defendant/ Appellee · filed 1985-07-08(f)(1)

Brown, however, filed two separate charges with the EEOC upon which he received two different right-to-sue letters. Brown thus filed within ninety days of a valid right-to-sue letter upon a reasonably related after-occurring incident of discrimination, while Cleveland did not.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file an action in district court.

Rodgers v. Detroit Department of Transportation Div. 26, Amalgamated Transitunion, Afl-Cio · filed 1985-07-12(f)(1)

The appellant had 90 days from the notice of the right to sue to file the action in district court. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(F)(1). This action was not filed within the limitations period and was also correctly dismissed on this basis.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s ninety-day deadline for suing after receipt of a right-to-sue letter is nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling, which is applied restrictively.

May v. International Business Associates, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1985-08-01(f)

The ninety day time limit is not a jurisdictional requirement but is subject to equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). However, the use of equitable tolling is very restricted. Brown v. Mead Corp., 646 F.2d 1163, 1165 (6th Cir. 1981). We agree with the district court's conclusion that nothing in these records is sufficient to state a valid equitable tolling claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved person ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to file a civil action.

McPartland v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1985-08-02(f)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), an aggrieved individual has ninety days to file a civil action after receipt of a right to sue notice from the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a discrimination suit to be filed within ninety days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter; an untimely filing defeats district court jurisdiction.

Staton v. Newport News Cablevision (Nncv) (Formerly Hampton Roads Cablevision) · filed 1985-08-05(f)(1)

We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Staton’s action for failure to timely file his complaint ... which defeats the jurisdiction of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not make receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue notice a jurisdictional prerequisite when the plaintiff is entitled to the notice; later receipt can cure an early filing.

Bradford v. General Telephone Co. of Michigan · filed 1985-09-26(f)(1)

Since Plaintiff was entitled to receive a right to sue notice at the time he filed this suit, having exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court has jurisdiction over his Title VII claim against Defendant Company. Plaintiffs receipt of a right to sue notice subsequent to his filing of this complaint, on January 18, 1984, sufficed, moreover, to cure whatever impediment to the Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction may have existed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is subject to equitable modification, but an uncounseled belief that other EEOC charges must finish first does not justify an extension.

Ivy v. Meridian Coca-Cola Bottling Co. · filed 1985-10-30(f)(1)

Because the 90-day limitation period is not jurisdictional, it is subject to equitable modification. ... The court is unpersuaded that sufficient equitable considerations exist to permit Blanks to revive his charge of racially motivated discharge. Blanks was not acting upon the advice of anyone when he voluntarily chose to disregard the 90-day notice requirement in his right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Rev. George TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BUNGE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-10-31(f)(1)

The plaintiff was required to bring suit on his claims under Title VII within ninety days of his receipt of the Right-to-Sue letter issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline for filing suit after receipt of a right-to-sue letter may be extended by equitable principles.

Jackson v. Pala, Inc. · filed 1985-11-16(f)(1)

The law is clear that the 90 day period in which to file suit may be extended by equitable principles. ... However, there are no facts presented in this case which would permit the Court to extend the deadline for filing suit from September 4, 1983, the end of the 90 day period, to February 22, 1984, more than eight months after receipt of the right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action to be filed within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice; an earlier action dismissed after the plaintiff failed to serve the defendant diligently does not toll that period.

Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp. · filed 1985-12-13(f)(1)

Applying the reasoning set forth above to the instant action, this court concludes that the ninety-day period for filing an action under Title VII has not been tolled by the plaintiffs action. ... Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted and this case is dismissed for failing to comply with the ninety-day filing requirement set forth in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

For a Title VII claim against a governmental respondent, § 2000e-5(f)(1) gives the complainant 90 days to sue after the Justice Department issues notice of the right to sue.

Hendrix v. Memorial Hospital of Galveston County · filed 1985-11-19(f)(1)

Both the district court and the parties to the lawsuit overlooked the fact that a different statutory scheme, embodied within Section 2000e-5(f)(l) itself, applies when the respondent to the claim is a “government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.” ... The fact is, she did comply with the statute in timely filing suit after receipt of the Justice Department’s notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a civil action within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice; an application to proceed in forma pauperis tolls that period only while it is pending.

Coulibaly v. T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. · filed 1985-11-26(f)(1)

Under the 1972 Amendments, Title VII requires that a person claiming to be aggrieved commence any civil action within ninety (90) days after receipt of the EEOC’s notification of their right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This filing period is tolled where a plaintiff files an application to proceed in forma pauperis. However, this period is tolled only during the time the motion is pending; once the Court rules on the application to proceed in forma pauperis, the limitation period begins to run again.

Section 2000e-5 requires a private Title VII action to be filed within ninety days after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.

Tate v. Dravo Corp. · filed 1985-12-12(e)

Finally, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are barred because he failed to file his action in a timely fashion. Private actions based on Title VII must be commenced within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The Plaintiff filed his suit outside the prescribed ninety-day period.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a Title VII action within 90 days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter; equitable tolling depends on the plaintiff’s diligence, the cause of the delay, and prejudice to the defendant.

Westfield v. Rhodes-Perdue Furniture Co. of Greensboro, North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1985-12-18(f)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an individual must file a civil action within 90 days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). ... In the instant case, however, the interests of equity would not be served by treating the limitations period as tolled until August 15, the date the Court approved Plaintiff’s application for pauper status.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires suit within ninety days of a right-to-sue letter, but does not require notice to defendants within that period.

Salazar v. Furr's, Inc. · filed 1986-01-23(f)(1)

under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) Plaintiff was required to bring suit, not provide notice to Defendants, within ninety days of the right-to-sue letter. Because Plaintiffs amendment relates back to the commencement of the action, Furr’s, Inc. can be made a party without violating the ninety-day requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period does not bar a claimant who, through no fault of her own, did not receive the EEOC's right-to-sue letter or actual notice of the deadline.

Trinkle v. Bell Litho, Inc. · filed 1986-02-07(f)(1)

Using the “fault” approach here, we find plaintiff did not receive actual notice of the 90-day requirement until she received the letter. ... There is no evidence that she was at fault.

For a private-sector Title VII claim, receipt of a right-to-sue notice by the claimant’s counsel can start the 90-day period for filing suit, subject to equitable tolling.

Josiah-Faeduwor v. Communications Satellite Corp. · filed 1986-03-11(f)(1)(A)

Because Faeduwor has failed to show why notice should not be equitably imputed to her on the basis of her attorney’s receipt of the right-to-sue notice on June 26, 1984, or why the statutory time prescription should otherwise be equitably tolled, we hold that her court complaint, filed on October 10, 1984, was untimely under Section 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(A).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit within ninety days after receipt of a right-to-sue notice, subject to equitable tolling on recognized grounds.

Froneberger v. Yadkin County Schools · filed 1986-03-13(f)(1)

Plaintiff’s alleged excuses for failing to timely file his Title VII claim assuming they are true do not allege “recognized equitable grounds” for tolling the statute of limitations. ... Therefore, plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to create an issue of equitable tolling and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing condition may be pleaded generally without alleging the date of the EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Adwan v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center · filed 1986-03-14(f)(1)

With respect to the filing of a complaint in federal court within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue letter, Adwan has clearly alleged the performance of this condition. Furthermore, he need not allege the date of the right-to-sue letter where he has already alleged generally that he complied with the timeliness requirements.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s filing period runs from the first right-to-sue notice; a second notice based on the same facts does not restart it.

Soso Liang Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. · filed 1986-04-09(f)(1)

We hold that whether the present action is time barred must be determined with reference to only the first Notice of Right to Sue. Otherwise, the time limitations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) would be meaningless, because potential Title VII plaintiffs could evade those requirements simply by seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue whenever they pleased.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is tolled while a motion for appointment of counsel is pending and for a reasonable time, usually 30 days, afterward to allow counsel to file suit.

Wiley v. Central Ohio Transport Authority · filed 1986-04-24(f)(1)

The district court properly ruled that plaintiff's filing of her notice of right-to-sue letter and her motion for the appointment of counsel did not constitute the proper filing of a civil action under Rules 3 and 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1), within ninety days after plaintiff's receipt of the notice of her right-to-sue. ... In Harris, we ruled that the time for filing a suit under Title VII would be tolled while a motion for the appointment of counsel is pending; and it would continue to be tolled for a reasonable time, usually 30 days, to allow sufficient time for counsel to prepare and file the lawsuit. ... Pursuant to Baldwin and Harris, therefore, plaintiff's suit was timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII complaint to be filed within ninety days after the plaintiff actually receives notice of the EEOC’s decision; Rule 6(e) does not add three days to that period.

Mosel v. Hills Department Store, Inc. · filed 1986-05-01(f)(1)

The Title VII provision, in contrast, requires that a complaint be filed within ninety days after the plaintiff actually receives notice of the EEOC’s decision. An additional period to compensate for mailing time is irrelevant and inappropriate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit to be filed within ninety days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter, unless grounds for equitable tolling justify a later filing.

Bolling v. City of Denver ex rel. McNichols · filed 1986-05-07(f)(1)

We further conclude that Bolling’s Title VII claim is barred because it was not filed within ninety days of receipt of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission right-to-sue letter as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). ... In sum, Bolling presents no grounds justifying the application of equitable tolling of the limitation period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit is not jurisdictional.

Ford v. Temple Hospital · filed 1986-05-07(f)(1)

However, the 90 day period in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) is not jurisdictional.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) ordinarily requires an EEOC right-to-sue letter before filing suit, but a pro se plaintiff who receives the letter while the case is pending must have an opportunity to amend the complaint before dismissal with prejudice.

Jones v. Bechtel · filed 1986-04-25(f)(1)

At that point, it is clear that there was a jurisdictional defect because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) ordinarily requires that the EEOC issue a right-to-sue letter before the suit is filed. ... In this circumstance, with a pro se plaintiff, we hold that it was error to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to allege that the right-to-sue letter had been issued and thus cure the jurisdictional defect.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is not equitably tolled when a claimant’s failure to update his address delays receipt of the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice.

George HUNTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEPHENSON ROOFING, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-05-07(f)(1)

Our holding is that plaintiff did not receive EEOC notice promptly because he did not notify the EEOC of a change of address and that he may not therefore claim that this ninety day time period is equitably tolled.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a Title VII plaintiff to sue within ninety days of receiving a notice of right to sue.

Ruffin v. ITT Continental Baking Co. · filed 1986-06-16(f)

The defendants also contend that summary judgment should be granted as to the claims alleging Title VII violations (counts two and three) because the presént suit was not filed within ninety days of plaintiff’s receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue letter, as required by the statute of limitations provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff received his Notice of Right to Sue more than a year before the filing of the present complaint, it is clear that counts two and three are now time-barred and also will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)’s ninety-day period begins when the claimant receives the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice; a motion to amend filed within that period can preserve a Title VII claim.

Bunch v. Bullard · filed 1986-07-21(f)

Although this motion came ninety-one days after January 17, the court recognized that the relevant date was the date of receipt of the right to sue letter, and took judicial notice of the fact that ordinary mail does not travel from Washington to Mississippi in one day. Thus, the ninety-day clock did not start ticking until January 18, at the earliest, and the April 18 motion was timely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit begins when a right-to-sue notice is received at the claimant’s address by the claimant’s spouse, absent a reason for equitable tolling.

Sanderlin v. La Petite Academy, Inc. · filed 1986-06-21(f)(1)

Following the more recent decisions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, this Court finds that the 90-day time period in which to file an employment discrimination suit commenced when plaintiff’s husband signed for the EEOC letter on December 16, 1985. Consequently, plaintiff’s complaint which was filed on March 19, 1986 was filed 92 days after receipt of the notice and thus was untimely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit begins when the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the claimant or the office of formally designated counsel.

41 Fair empl.prac.cas. 801, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,550 Albert L. Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp., Dow Chemical, · filed 1986-08-11(f)(1)

We hold that the 90-day period of limitation established by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) begins to run on the date that the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the offices of formally designated counsel or to the claimant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to commence suit within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice; presenting a complaint with an IFP application to the Pro Se Office satisfies that deadline.

Nielsen v. Flower Hospital · filed 1986-07-14(f)(1)

By now it is well settled in this District that the presentation of a Title VII complaint to the Pro Se Clerk of the Court, if accompanied either by an application for leave to proceed IFP or the filing fee, represents the commencement of an action for purposes of satisfying the ninety-day filing requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after receiving the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Mabra Huff v. International Longshoremen's Association, Local # 24 · filed 1986-09-19(f)

Although not enunciated by the district court as a justification for dismissal or denial of the motion for reconsideration, Huff's complaint was untimely under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f). Section 2000e-5(f) requires that an aggrieved party, alleging a Title VII violation, bring suit within ninety days from notice of the right-to-sue letter issued by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling when a claimant diligently files a Title VII action in state court under a reasonable but mistaken belief that the court has jurisdiction.

Daryl Ford Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc. · filed 1986-10-08(f)(1)

Taken as a whole these cases firmly establish that the 90-day filing period is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances. ... We conclude that Valenzuela’s state court action tolled the running of the 90-day filing period on the facts before us.

The 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit begins when the plaintiff actually receives the EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Marino v. National RR Passenger Corp.(Amtrak) · filed 1986-10-14(f)(1)

Actual notice of the right to sue letter is necessary before the 90 day period begins to run.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to bring a Title VII claim within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter; an existing complaint that does not encompass the claim must be amended within that period.

Henry v. Gulf Coast Mosquito Control Commission · filed 1986-10-15(f)(1)

Inasmuch as the initial complaint, when considered in conjunction with the plaintiff’s deposition, failed to encompass the allegations contained in the EEOC charge of retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff was compelled to amend his complaint within ninety (90) days of receiving a right to sue letter on Charge of Discrimination # 044-85-0982 or face having his civil cause of action expire under the prescribed statute of limitations for Title VII actions. Having failed to amend, the plaintiff is now time barred from pursuing such a civil action in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit begins when the claimant acknowledges receipt of a right-to-sue notice sent by registered mail.

Webb v. American Red Cross · filed 1986-12-11(f)(1)

Based on the foregoing considerations, I find, as a matter of law, that the 90-day period did not begin to run until the plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the right to sue notice sent by registered mail. The acknowledgment was signed November 21, 1985. Consequently, this suit was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a claimant who has waited more than 180 days and requested a right-to-sue notice to proceed when the EEOC has not issued the notice.

Scott v. Carter-Wallace, Inc. · filed 1986-12-24(f)(1)

Plaintiff waited well over 180 days before commencing this action and has requested a right-to-sue notice. Plaintiff is obviously entitled to the notice and the Commission’s failure to issue her letter as of this date should not preclude plaintiffs action.

Section 2000e-5 sets a 90-day deadline to sue after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter and a 300-day deadline to file a charge; alleged facts supporting compliance with those deadlines can defeat dismissal.

Freeman v. Michigan, Department of State · filed 1987-01-08

In addition to pleading compliance with the 90-day provision of Title VII, the plaintiff filed an affidavit setting forth the precise date she claimed the right-to-sue letter was received, a date within 90 days of the filing of the complaint. ... The defendants also contend that dismissal of the action should be upheld because the plaintiff failed to file a charge within the prescribed state agency within the 300-day limit set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). This argument has no merit. ... As with the 90-day notice requirement, it cannot be said that the plaintiff could have proved no set of facts with respect to the 300-day filing requirement under which she could prevail.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s filing deadline is not tolled for mental illness when a plaintiff gives no strong reason why he could not sue despite counsel's assistance.

Lopez v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 1987-01-12(f)(1)

In sum, assuming for the sake of argument that mental illness might sometimes toll the statute of limitations, we find that it cannot do so where a plaintiff has presented no strong reason why, despite the assistance of counsel, he was unable to bring suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) makes receipt of a right-to-sue letter a condition precedent to a Title VII suit, subject to waiver, estoppel, or tolling for sufficient reason.

Hladki v. Jeffrey's Consolidated Ltd. · filed 1987-01-21(f)(1)

However, receipt of a right to sue letter is a statutory prerequisite— that is, a condition precedent — and is subject to waiver, estoppel, or tolling only upon a showing by plaintiff of a sufficient reason for such equitable modification.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue letter, but the requirement is less than jurisdictional; without equitable grounds to excuse the missing letter, the Title VII claim may be dismissed without prejudice.

Bintz v. Nsu Board Odu Board Governor of Virginia · filed 1987-02-02(f)(1)

However, when Bintz filed his complaint he had not obtained a right to sue letter from the EEOC as required by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Following the Supreme Court's holding in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982), that the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC is not jurisdictional, but is a requirement similar to a statute of limitations, and subject to waiver, estoppel or equitable tolling, the requirement of a right to sue letter has also been held to be less than jurisdictional. ... However, Bintz has not presented any equitable considerations which would warrant allowing him to proceed without a right to sue letter. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his Title VII claim without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days to file suit after receipt of a right-to-sue notice, subject to equitable tolling when the facts warrant it.

Nathaniel HARVEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW BERN POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1987-03-19(f)(1)

In a case such as the one at bar, district courts should conduct a thorough examination of the facts to determine if reasonable grounds exist for an equitable tolling of the filing period. After reviewing the record before us, we are persuaded that no such grounds are present. Mr. Harvey knew of the right to sue letter within six days of its arrival and this left him eighty-four days to file his complaint. There has been no showing that this was not sufficient time within which to act. These are not such facts as would support equitable tolling, therefore we affirm the decision of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is not tolled while a claimant pursues a different legal remedy in state court.

Sager v. Hunter Corp. · filed 1987-04-24(f)(1)

Thus, plaintiff's use of the state courts to bring his claim under a remedy other than Title VII in no way tolled the running of plaintiff’s ninety-day period for the filing of a Title VII suit.

A plaintiff can meet Title VII’s 90-day filing deadline by filing a right-to-sue letter together with an EEOC charge that states the facts of the claim.

Block v. Boeing Military Airplane Co. · filed 1987-05-22(f)(1)

Consistent with its statements from the bench, the court first finds that a right-to-sue letter and a copy of the EEOC charge together comprise a Rule 8(a) “complaint”, and thus the filing of these documents constitutes commencement of the action pursuant to Rule 3.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period is not equitably tolled when a claimant knows she can sue more than ninety days before filing and unjustifiably delays.

Charlene COOK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1987-06-01(f)(1)

After carefully considering Cook’s arguments, we conclude that the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply. Cook had actual knowledge, more than ninety days before she filed suit, that she could sue her former employer.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a private plaintiff to file a Title VII action within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Blocker v. AT & T TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS · filed 1987-07-16(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), a private plaintiff must file her Title VII action within ninety (90) days after receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. ... Accordingly, plaintiffs claims under Title VII are barred by the ninety-day time limit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days to sue after notice of the right to sue; when a claimant fails to update an address, the period begins five days after the EEOC mails notice to the last address given.

Banks v. Rockwell International North American Aircraft Operations · filed 1987-08-04(f)(1)

In conclusion, the undisputed facts before the Court establish that the ninety day period for filing a suit in federal court started to run five days after September 7, 1983, the date the E.E.O.C. mailed the right to sue letter to the claimant at the last address he had given the E.E.O.C. The fact that claimant’s attorney wrote letters which were never acknowledged by the E.E.O.C. is insufficient to establish equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s exhaustion requirement permits a Title VII suit filed before receipt of a right-to-sue letter to proceed when the letter is filed during the suit and early filing caused no administrative interference or prejudice.

Mabrey v. Roy Whites Florist, Inc., Roy White, Sr., Edward White, Margaret White, Jimmy White · filed 1987-07-07(f)(1)

Where, as here, a right to sue letter is filed in the district court prior to dismissal and there is no showing that early filing of the complaint has interfered with the administrative function or prejudiced the defendants, the complaint should not be dismissed as premature.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to sue within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Robert Barkins and Douglas Kellup v. International Inns, Inc. · filed 1987-08-27(f)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires plaintiffs to sue within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Barkins and Kellup’s original complaint fell within the ninety day period, and their amended complaint falls outside it.

The 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit is not equitably tolled by financial hardship or a clerk’s letter denying a pauper application when the complaint remains 134 days late.

Gardner v. U.S. Steel · filed 1987-09-24(f)(1)

Based on the facts of this case and in keeping with the procedural requirements for filing Title VII claims, the court holds that Gardner is not entitled to equitable tolling, especially for 134 days.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue notice to file suit; an amendment correcting the defendant’s identity may relate back if the intended defendant had timely notice.

Harmon v. Adams & Sons Roofing Co. · filed 1987-11-09(f)(1)

If the amendment does not relate back to the time of the filing of her complaint, her claim against the corporation would be untimely; more than ninety days have elapsed since Mrs. Harmon received notice of her right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... Because of the substantially close identity of interest apparent in the two entities, the defendant had the requisite notice of this action within the statutorily prescribed time limit. Therefore, amendment of the complaint does not offend the plain meaning of Rule 15(c).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a plaintiff 90 days after an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit, with a deadline falling on Sunday extended to the next filing day under Rule 6(a).

Flowers v. TRW Inc. · filed 1987-11-17(f)(1)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), a plaintiff may proceed with cause of action in federal court by filing a complaint within ninety (90) days of the issuance of a right to sue letter by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. ... Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) governs the computation of time under the statutes involved here. Under this rule, if the last day of a period to file is a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday, the period runs until the end of the next day on which filing is possible. Therefore, Plaintiff properly filed the instant action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice.

Comer v. Interstate United Corp. · filed 1987-11-23(f)(1)

Although the notice of right to sue clearly advised Comer of the Title VII 90-day filing requirement, Comer did not file his complaint until November 18, 1986, 92 days after he had received the notice of his right to sue. Comer has not invoked this Court’s jurisdiction because he failed to adhere to the Title VII filing requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a plaintiff to file suit on Monday when the ninety-day filing period ends on Sunday.

McCauley v. Greensboro City Board of Education · filed 1987-12-30(f)(1)

In the present case the ninetieth day fell on a Sunday and the Plaintiff filed this suit the next day. Numerous courts have confronted this situation and held that such a complaint is timely filed. ... This court agrees with the reasoning and policies discussed in these cases and holds that the complaint was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is satisfied when the clerk receives the complaint before the deadline and in forma pauperis relief is later granted.

Toliver v. County of Sullivan, Richard L. Green, Lloyd T. Shimer, Leon Siegel, Brian Ingber · filed 1988-03-07(f)(1)

At least where in forma pauperis relief is granted, the action should be treated as timely, provided the complaint was received by the clerk’s office prior to the expiration of the limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an applicant ninety days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice to sue; a later notice concerning a different defendant does not revive an expired claim.

Way v. Mueller Brass Company, Mississippi State Employment Service, and Judith Riley · filed 1988-03-23(f)(1)

Way has cited no authority, and we know of none, to support her assertion that the filing of her claim against the State Commission would revive the time-barred, hence extinct, claim against Mueller.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day period for filing suit after a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Rinaldi v. FCD Corp. · filed 1988-04-26(f)(1)

Under the rule of Johnson and Zipes, this court concludes that the fact that the complaint was not amended to name FCD within 90 days of plaintiff’s receipt of a right-to-sue letter does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII civil action to be filed within 90 days after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter.

Fluker v. Kenney's Franchise Corp. · filed 1988-05-04(f)(1)

Title VII requires that any civil action under Title VII must be filed within 90 days after the issuance of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. ... Therefore, plaintiffs Title VII agency theory of recovery, because it was not filed in the 90 day period, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s EEOC right-to-sue letter requirement is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Diem v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1988-06-08(f)(1)

The receipt of a right to sue letter from the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in federal court, but rather a requirement that is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a private Title VII action to be filed within ninety days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter; an earlier action dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute does not toll that period.

Price v. Digital Equipment Corporation · filed 1988-06-15(f)(1)

We agree with the district court that Price’s Title VII suit is time barred. A private civil action under Title VII must be brought within ninety days of a complainant’s receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. ... Price’s original Title VII claim was timely, but was dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution. That lawsuit did not toll the ninety-day period for the Title VII claim.

When a Title VII right-to-sue letter is addressed to the claimant, the 90-day period to file suit begins when the claimant receives it.

Hernandez v. Hill Country Telephone Cooperative, Inc. · filed 1988-06-17(f)

Hill Country errs. We have held repeatedly that when the right-to-sue letter is addressed to the claimant, the 90-day period begins to accrue when the claimant receives the notice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an early right-to-sue notice when the EEOC determines it cannot act within 180 days; the 180-day period is not an absolute jurisdictional bar.

Rolark v. University of Chicago Hospitals · filed 1988-06-30(f)(1)

We hold that the 180-day time period does not operate as an absolute jurisdictional bar. Plaintiff's cause of action is not restricted by the administrative decisions of the EEOC.

The ninety-day period for filing a Title VII action may be equitably tolled, but an erroneous state-court filing does not warrant tolling when the plaintiff lacked a reasonable basis for filing there and failed to pursue the state action.

Brown v. Reliable Sheet Metal Works · filed 1988-07-18(f)(1)

Equitable tolling is particularly inappropriate where Brown not only filed erroneously in state court despite abundant notice that she first needed to exhaust the IHRA's administrative requirements, but also where she failed even to pursue the state action she now claims, in equity, should permit her to refile in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a plaintiff ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter to bring a Title VII suit.

Cheryll GRAY, F/K/A Cheryll Lengyel, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DANE, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-07-28(f)(1)

Title VII allows plaintiffs only ninety days in which to bring suit following the receipt of a right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). Gray received a right to sue letter on or before June 15, 1987, and was therefore time-barred from filing a new Title VII claim by the time she filed her motion to dismiss on September 15, 1987.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an aggrieved party to sue within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice; the deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College District · filed 1988-08-17(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Civil a tion by Commission, Attorney General, o person aggrieved) requires that an aggriev ed party bring suit in court within 90 day of receipt of a "Right to Sue" notice. Th 90 day requirement is mandatory and juris dictional.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period is satisfied only provisionally when a Title VII complaint is filed; the action becomes time-barred if service is not made within 120 days, good cause is absent, and the filing period has expired.

Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Center · filed 1988-12-01(f)(1)

The result here is that the 90-day statute of limitations period prescribed by 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) expired between the September 12, 1985 commencement date of this Title VII action by Dr. Pardazi against Cullman Medical Center and the January 11, 1986 expiration date herein of the 120-day period of Rule 4(j), Fed.R.Civ.P., which prescribes time limit for service of the summons and copy of the complaint.

A complaint naming the wrong defendant does not satisfy Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing deadline without an amendment.

Daniel v. S.E.S. Development Co. · filed 1988-12-21(f)(1)

Daniel has not met the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Filing of a complaint incorrectly naming the defendant will not satisfy the 90 day filing requirement, because to allow it to satisfy the requirement would obviate the need for Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant 90 days to file suit after notice of the right to sue; counsel’s actual knowledge that the EEOC issued the notice can defeat equitable tolling.

Providencia Ball v. Abbott Advertising, Inc. · filed 1988-12-27(f)(1)

There is no question that in March of 1984 Ms. Ball received actual notice, through counsel, that the EEOC had issued the right-to-sue letter requested three months earlier. The courts are not required to proceed as if no such notice had been given, Ms. Ball’s lawyer having sworn in an affidavit that he knew it had been. The lawyer’s actual knowledge destroys any possible basis for applying the “equitable tolling” doctrine here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an aggrieved party to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice; the deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College District · filed 1989-01-11(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) (Civil action by Commission, Attorney General, or person aggrieved) requires that an aggrieved party bring suit in court within 90 days of receipt of a "Right to Sue" notice. The 90 day requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. ... We hold that the appellant is thus barred from raising his Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII civil action to be filed within 90 days after receipt of an EEOC Right-to-Sue letter, subject to equitable tolling in limited circumstances.

Levi B. Long v. General Motors Corporation, a Foreign Corporation · filed 1989-01-17(f)(1)

Thus, plaintiff's suit is barred because a civil action under Title VII must be filed within 90 days of the receipt of a Right-to-Sue letter from the EEOC.

A Justice Department right-to-sue notice does not restart section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day filing period after an earlier EEOC notice has expired.

Dougherty v. Barry · filed 1989-03-07(f)(1)

We therefore hold that the notice issued by the Justice Department did not revive appellees' right to sue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s ninety-day period for filing suit is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled in appropriate circumstances.

Hill v. Imports · filed 1989-03-13(f)(1)

We hold that the ninety-day limitation period of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to federal suit and is, therefore, subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline for filing suit after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice is subject to equitable tolling.

Hunter v. Countryside Ass'n for the Handicapped, Inc. · filed 1989-04-06(f)(1)

Under these circumstances, the court finds Hunter’s Title VII claim is not time-barred. The 90-day filing requirement is not absolute; like a statute of limitations, it is subject to equitable principles such as waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days of receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Mills v. Des Arc Convalescent Home · filed 1989-04-19(f)(1)

Given this finding, the court properly disposed of Mills’s complaint as untimely because it was filed ninety-two days later on October 30.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) starts the ninety-day period for filing a Title VII action when the EEOC gives notice, not when a designated state agency does.

Brooks v. Hartford, Inc. · filed 1989-06-09(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) plainly states that the EEOC is to notify the complainant that her case has been dismissed, and the complainant may then “within ninety days after the giving of such notice” file a Title VII action. Notice must come from the EEOC, not from a designated state agency.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires reasonable diligence in receiving a right-to-sue notice and filing a civil action within the statutory time limit.

Thomas v. A.T. & T. Co. · filed 1989-06-26(f)(1)

Although the Court is sympathetic with plaintiffs financial difficulties, this Court cannot find that plaintiff satisfied the implicit requirement of reasonable diligence imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Plaintiff could have and should have notified the EEOC of her whereabouts or at least have checked her mail box that she leased from Jim Harsh-man. The Court further finds that plaintiff could have and should have filed her Complaint within the time limits imposed by Congress. The Court will, therefore, grant defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment.

Section 2000e-5 requires a claimant who receives an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file suit within ninety days, regardless of the stage of state agency proceedings.

Riley v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1989-07-26(f)(1)

Having received the prerequisite notice from the EEOC (Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)), the plaintiff was required to file this Title YII action within ninety days, regardless of the stage of the ERD proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period begins when the EEOC sends a right-to-sue letter to the address the claimant furnished.

Griffin v. Prince William Hospital Corp. · filed 1989-07-20(f)(1)

And sensibly settled authority confirms that the EEOC is entitled to rely on the address plaintiff furnished and to start the running of the 90 day period by sending the right-to-sue letter to that address.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to file suit within ninety days of actual notice of the EEOC’s right-to-sue decision.

Tadros v. Coleman · filed 1989-08-15(f)(1)

In light of that proof, there is no genuine issue about the fact that by late February, 1988, at the latest, Dr. Tadros had actual notice from the EEOC of his right to sue Cornell. His complaint in this action was therefore untimely.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a Title VII claim to proceed when it relates back to an earlier complaint and the plaintiff later receives a right-to-sue notice, even though equitable tolling of the ninety-day filing period is unwarranted.

Wilburn v. Dial Corp. · filed 1989-09-11(f)(1)

Although this court finds that the plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling of the required ninety day period to file suit pursuant to Title VII, this court does find that the plaintiff's Title VII action relates back to the date of her original complaint and that the plaintiff's subsequent receipt of a notice of right to sue cures any defect caused by the plaintiff's premature filing of her Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a complaint within ninety days after actual receipt of the right-to-sue notice; mailing does not add three days under Rule 6(e).

Peete v. American Standard Graphic · filed 1989-09-19(f)(1)

In contrast with Rule 5(b), 2000e-5(f)(1) requires that a complaint be filed within ninety days after the right-to-sue notice is actually received.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue letter before a Title VII suit when no compelling circumstances justify waiver or equitable tolling.

Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co. · filed 1989-11-07(f)(1)

Equitable tolling or waiver, as Baldwin County made clear, is available only in compelling circumstances which justify a departure from established procedures. Thus, we conclude that a right-to-sue letter was a necessary prerequisite to filing suit pursuant to Title VII under the circumstances of this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline is satisfied when a Title VII complaint reaches the clerk within that period, even if the plaintiff files an in forma pauperis application later.

Van J. Robinson v. Yellow Freight System · filed 1989-12-01(f)(1)

Robinson received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on March 21, 1988, and was thus required to file a civil action within 90 days (June 20). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... We hold only that his failure to file timely an IFP application does not bar his otherwise timely filed complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day filing period may be equitably tolled, but notice sent to a claimant’s attorney is imputed to the claimant absent compelling circumstances.

Deskins v. Barry · filed 1989-12-04(f)(1)

The Court notes that the 90-day filing period is subject to equitable tolling in this Circuit in some instances. ... However, it is also clear that absent compelling circumstances, notice sent to a party’s attorney imputes notice to the party. ... Plaintiff has failed to meet any special exception which would justify equitable tolling. ... Accordingly, her Title VII claim is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII action to be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right to sue letter; an amendment that relates back to a timely complaint satisfies that deadline.

Edwards v. Occidental Chemical Corporation · filed 1990-01-09(f)(1)

An action brought under Title VII must be filed within ninety days of receipt of a right to sue letter from the EEOC or appropriate state agency. ... The amendment related back to the filing of Edwards’ original complaint, and as a result her Title VII claim was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require dismissal of a prematurely filed Title VII suit when the waiting period expires and right-to-sue letters issue while the suit is pending.

White v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 1990-01-30(f)(1)

While the suits were filed prematurely, no good or sufficient reason exists to require dismissal at this late date.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day deadline is satisfied by filing a complaint within that period; service of process is not required to satisfy it.

Dr. S.B. Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Center · filed 1990-03-22(f)(1)

We reject that position and hold instead that Pardazi fully satisfied section 2000e-5(f)(1) by filing a complaint within the ninety-day period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period following a first EEOC notice does not bar a timely suit based on a distinct second charge.

Goodluck v. Kelly Tractor Co. · filed 1990-03-27(f)(1)

In view of the fact that EEOC-1 and EEOC-2 were distinct enough to warrant disparate findings by the EEOC, the expiration of the limitations period set in motion by EEOC-1 should not preclude suit on EEOC-2.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII suit to be filed within ninety days after receipt of a right-to-sue notice, unless grounds for equitable tolling exist.

Alsup v. International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen · filed 1990-05-22(f)(1)

In its memorandum and order granting the Union's unopposed motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claims, the district court concluded that the undisputed facts indicated that Alsup failed to bring suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). Alsup received his right-to-sue letter on May 7, 1985, but this action was not initiated until August 8, 1985. We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that there were no grounds for equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires the EEOC to notify an individual of her right to sue when it neither files suit within 180 days of her charge nor enters into a conciliation agreement to which she is a party; a later EEOC suit does not cut off that right.

Nora E. Riddle v. Cerro Wire and Cable Group, Inc. · filed 1990-06-05(f)(1)

Under either interpretation of the statute, Riddle was entitled to a right-to-sue letter. The EEOC did, in fact, file suit against Cerro, but the suit was not brought within 180 days of the time Riddle filed her charge against Cerro. Thus, the “failure to file suit within 180 days” condition was met. In addition, the EEOC did not at any time enter into a conciliation agreement with Cerro to which Riddle was a party. Therefore, that condition was also met. Under the plain terms of the statute, therefore, the EEOC was obligated to notify Riddle of her right to sue Cerro.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) starts the 90-day period for filing suit when the claimant receives the EEOC right-to-sue notice, rather than when the EEOC issues it.

McKenzie v. Amtrak M of E · filed 1990-06-29(f)(1)

This makes the action timely as the 90-day period runs from plaintiffs receipt of the notice, not from the date of issuance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claim to be filed within ninety days after receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter.

Fluker v. Kenney's Franchise Corp. · filed 1990-07-10(f)(1)

Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) requires that any Title VII claim be filed within ninety days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a right-to-sue letter before filing a Title VII complaint; filing before receiving the letter is procedurally defective.

Coleman v. Wirtz · filed 1990-08-10(f)(1)

Thus, the Court agrees that the failure to obtain the right to sue letter was procedurally defective because this procedural error frustrates the Title VII administrative scheme favoring conciliation and mediation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day filing period may be equitably tolled when a plaintiff is unaware of the EEOC’s right-to-sue determination; disputed facts about notice can preclude summary judgment on timeliness.

Berry v. Chevrolet · filed 1990-09-12(f)(1)

I conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the right-to-sue letter was sent to Carter’s correct address and as to whether Carter received notice of the attempts to reach him by certified mail. Without deciding the issue on its merits, if Carter was unaware of the EEOC’s determinations of his right to sue he may rely on the doctrine of equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5 allows a retaliation claim to proceed without a separate right-to-sue notice when the plaintiff’s other Title VII claims are properly before the court.

Carter v. South Central Bell · filed 1990-09-27(f)(1)

He never filed this charge with the EEOC, and he never received a right to sue. Normally, a Notice of a Right to Sue is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII action. See Ray v. Freeman, 626 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 997, 101 S.Ct. 1701, 68 L.Ed.2d 198 (1981). But because Allen's other Title VII claims were properly before the magistrate, we believe that this Court has jurisdiction over Allen's retaliatory termination claim as well.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing limit is satisfied when the clerk receives a complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis by the deadline, if in forma pauperis relief is granted.

Toliver v. Sullivan Diagnostic Treatment Center · filed 1990-10-16(f)(1)

Plaintiff has adequately complied with the 90-day jurisdictional limit because his complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis were received in the pro se office on November 13, 1989, the last day of the 90-day period. Where in forma pauperis relief is granted, the action should be treated as timely provided the complaint was received in the clerk’s office prior to the expiration of the limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 90-day filing period begins on receipt of the right-to-sue letter; when the receipt date is disputed, receipt is presumed three days after mailing.

Ish v. Arlington County Virginia, William L. Hughes · filed 1990-11-21(f)(1)

We adopt the reconciliation of these positions suggested in Griffin v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 716 F.Supp. 919, 921 n. 7 (E.D.Va.1989), which held that although Rule 6(e) does not automatically provide a three-day extension to Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1), it does provide a presumption of receipt three days after mailing if the parties dispute the date of receipt.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a plaintiff to file with the EEOC and obtain a right-to-sue letter before bringing a Title VII action, absent exceptional circumstances.

Preston v. Virginia · filed 1990-12-27(e)

This court does not have jurisdiction over the Title VII claim presented by plaintiff. To maintain a Title VII action in federal court plaintiff must first file a complaint with the EEOC and obtain a Right to Sue letter. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988). Without such a letter, and barring exceptional circumstances, the court cannot properly exercise its jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim.