42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a defendant omitted from the EEOC charge when the substantial identity exception to its naming requirement is satisfied.

Harris v. VCU Health Systems Authority · filed 2023-10-30(f)(1)

In conclusion, because VCUHS and VCU share substantially similar interests under the circumstances and there is no demonstrable prejudice, Harris has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the substantial identity exception to the Title VII naming requirement at the 12(b)(6) Stage.

A party generally must be named in an EEOC charge before being sued under Title VII, but an unnamed party may be sued if it shares a clear identity of interest with a named party.

Sanner v. Harris · filed 2023-10-19(e)(1)

But an exception exists when there is “a clear identity of interest” between named and un-named parties. ... But the pleadings do not establish whether an identity of interest exists between Mr. Harris and Ziebart.

A Title VII plaintiff ordinarily may sue only a respondent named in the administrative charge, subject to a substantial identity exception.

Bolden v. CAEI, Inc. · filed 2023-09-12(f)(1)

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not name BGE in his charge of discrimination with the MCCR and the EEOC. ... Accordingly, unless the substantial identity exception applies, Plaintiff may not bring suit against BGE.

A Title VII claim may proceed against an employer omitted from the administrative complaint when the identity of interest exception satisfies the purposes of exhaustion.

Parlato v. East Haven · filed 2023-08-14(e)

The Court finds that the identity of interest exception applies here and, on balance, the relative weight of the factors counsels in favor of finding Plaintiff’s Title VII and CFEPA claims administratively exhausted despite that Plaintiff did not name the Town in the administrative complaint.

Section 2000e-5 generally requires a plaintiff to name a defendant in an EEOC charge before suing that defendant under Title VII, unless the named and unnamed parties have substantially identical interests.

ROBINSON v. COMPASS GROUP USA, INC. · filed 2023-04-28(f)(1)

As a result, Plaintiff was required to name the Hackensack Defendants in her initial EEOC charge. Since it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to name the Hackensack Defendants in the EEOC charge and failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as applied to the Hackensack Defendants, Count Two of the FAC against the Hackensack Defendants is dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires a Title VII administrative charge to name the defendant, but an unnamed party may be sued when it shares an identity of interests with a named party.

Pinero v. Long Island State Veterans Home · filed 2005-07-01(e)

A statutory prerequisite to commencing an action in federal court under Title VII is the filing of an administrative complaint with the EEOC or an authorized state agency that names the particular defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Applying these factors to the facts alleged in this case, it is clear that the Plaintiff can sustain a civil action under Title VII against the Defendant Stony Brook, even though it was not expressly named in the administrative complaint filed by the Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires an employer to be named in a verified EEOC charge before a Title VII action may be brought against it.

Christaldi-Smith v. JDJ, INC. · filed 2005-04-26(f)(1)

With respect to the defendants’ second argument, by not listing U.C.C. Total Home as her employer in any verified EEOC charge, plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1) which mandates that a civil action may only be brought against employers that are “named in the charge.”

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to name a defendant in the EEOC charge before suing that defendant.

Manos v. Geissler · filed 2004-06-14

However, plaintiffs 2002 EEOC complaint and the September 2002 right to sue letter issued in connection with that complaint did not name Geissler or Midas as respondents. Accordingly, Count IV of the Complaint, which alleges Title VII and NYHRL claims against Midas must be dismissed in its entirety for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge naming requirement does not automatically bar a claim against an unnamed party under the identity of interest exception merely because the complainant had counsel.

Olvera-Morales v. Sterling Onions, Inc. · filed 2004-06-01(e)

The Court concludes that it is not constrained to dismiss plaintiffs Title VII claims against NCGA and Del-Al solely on the basis that plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel at the EEOC stage.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff to name the defendant in the Commission charge and give the Commission an opportunity to seek conciliation before filing a civil action.

Gussie MICKEL, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE EMPLOYMENT SERVICE and/or Exide Battery Service, Appellees · filed 1967-05-03(e)

Be that as it may, it is a sufficient basis for our decision that Exide was not “named in the charge” filed with the Commission, and the Commission was not required to enter into any conciliatory negotiations with Exide.

Section 706(e) requires a defendant in a Title VII suit to have been named in the charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Moody v. Albemarle Paper Company · filed 1967-07-05(e)

Whether this be treated as a question of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, the requirement that all defendants be named in the charge filed with the Commission goes to the competence of a district court to entertain the action in respect to the party in question (international union), as defined in clear language of the statute.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a respondent to be named in an EEOC charge before a Title VII civil action may proceed against that respondent.

Local Union No. 329, International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. South Atlantic & Gulf Coast District of International Longsho · filed 1968-12-13(e)

The Commission should not have proceeded without the “necessary parties,” and this Court should not subvert the statutory requirement by allowing plaintiff to litigate its civil action without joining them as provided in the statute.

Section 706(e) does not bar a direct § 1981 suit against a party omitted from the EEOC charge when the plaintiff pleads a reasonable excuse for failing to exhaust EEOC remedies.

Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works Of International Harvester Company · filed 1970-04-28(e)

We hold such suits can be reconciled with section 706(e) and continue to exist in a limited class of cases. ... We hold, therefore, that an aggrieved person may sue directly under section 1981 if he pleads a reasonable excuse for his failure to exhaust EEOC remedies.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a party to be brought before the EEOC before it can be sued in a Title VII action.

Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co. · filed 1969-07-14(e)

Therefore, this court finds that joinder of the Union as a party to the proceeding brought by the plaintiffs before the EEOC is a condition precedent to joining the Union in the present case.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a party to be named as a respondent in an EEOC charge before that party may be sued under Title VII.

Butler v. Local No. 4 & Local No. 269, Laborers' International Union of North America · filed 1969-10-09(e)

It is the opinion of this Court that the District Council’s motion to dismiss must be granted. The language of the statute is clear and unequivocal that a party must be a respondent before the EEOC before he may be sued under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(a) does not make service of an EEOC charge on the employer a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit.

Johnson Ex Rel. Johnson v. ITT-Thompson Industries, Inc. · filed 1971-03-04(a)

Since it is not necessary to federal jurisdiction that EEOC attempt to conciliate, neither is service of the charge on the employer a jurisdictional requisite.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit only against a respondent named in the EEOC charge.

Le Beau v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Company · filed 1973-07-17(f)(1)

None of the complainants before the EEOC named the International Union as a respondent and that Union never appeared or participated before the Commission. Title VII employment discrimination suits are permitted only “against the respondent named in the charge” before the EEOC. 42 USC § 2000e-5(f) (1).

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII suit against trust committee members who were not named in the EEOC charge when they were substantially identical to the charged employer and the EEOC had an opportunity to seek voluntary compliance.

Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Company · filed 1973-10-26(b), (f)(1)

In a situation such as this where there is a substantial, if not complete, identity of parties before the EEOC and the court, it would require an unnecessarily technical and restrictive reading of 42. U.S.C. § 2000e-5 to hold that this court lacks jurisdiction over the members of the Trust Committee because they were not before the Commission in their capacity as such.

Section 2000e-5 permits a court to hear a retaliation claim without a separate EEOC charge when the claim is reasonably related to the charges already filed.

Held v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company · filed 1974-04-03

This Court concludes that ancillary jurisdiction does lie on a Section 704(a) claim under Title VII that is reasonably related to the scope of charges filed before the EEOC which form the basis of the action before this Court.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a court to join a party needed for complete relief under Rule 19(a) even if that party was not named in the EEOC charge, once the charge has been processed and suit has begun.

Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel Lorraine Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders · filed 1974-09-12(e)

However, we are not convinced that the value of conciliation supersedes the value of enforcement, to the end that after a charge has been processed before the EEOC and court action commenced, the district court is powerless to order joinder under Rule 19(a) and is further required to dismiss the action under the indispensable party provisions of Rule 19(b). ... We hold this action by the District Court within its jurisdiction and proper under the circumstances presented.

Section 2000e-5 does not require a second charge naming a successor employer that had notice of a charge against its predecessor.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc. · filed 1974-10-09(f)(1)

If the charging requirement is read in light of the statute of limitations, it is reasonable to assume, at least in the case of successor companies, that Congress only intended that a discriminatee be required to name those who were known to him and could have been charged within the period of limitations.

A Title VII plaintiff may sue respondents named in the EEOC charge; notice to a university alone does not make its individual trustees, officers, and employees proper defendants.

Scott v. University of Delaware · filed 1974-11-20(f)(1)

It appears Dr. Scott named only the University of Delaware in his charge filed with the regional EEOC office and that the latter provided notice of the charge only to the Executive Officer of the University. Under the circumstances, it does not appear the individually-named trustees, officers, and employees of the University knew or should have known of the EEOC proceeding or that their conduct might have been the subject of an EEOC inquiry. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the action filed pursuant to Title VII with respect to each named defendant save for the University itself.

Section 2000e-5(f) does not warrant joining unions as Title VII defendants for the limited purpose of interpreting a collective bargaining agreement when they remain in the case under § 1981 and can provide that assistance.

Holiday v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1974-12-31(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, the Court does not find that the joinder of defendants International and Southern Conference, even for the limited purposes permitted in Held, is warranted. The Court has previously held that these two defendants will remain parties to this- action with respect to claims premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and in this capacity will be available to assist in interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, joinder for the limited purposes permitted by this Court in Held is unnecessary. The motion to dismiss defendants International and Southern Conference is granted with respect to those claims premised upon Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally bars a Title VII suit against a party that was not brought before the EEOC and given an opportunity for conciliation.

Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Commission · filed 1975-02-28(e)

Although I do not believe that the failure to charge a party before the EEOC is an insurmountable barrier to the later joining of a party to a civil rights suit, plaintiff’s failure to bring the Association before the EEOC and afford the parties “at least an opportunity to reach a more amicable conciliation out of court,” Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Const. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), bars plaintiff from instituting suit pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars a Title VII suit against a party whom the EEOC charge neither names nor factually implicates.

Hardy v. Bucyrus-Erie Company · filed 1975-06-20(f)(1)

Section 706(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1), provides that if, after a charge of discrimination is filed, the EEOC is unable to achieve compliance with the Act, the person claiming to be aggrieved may, after a specified period of time, commence a civil action “against the respondent named in the charge.” ... The record herein discloses that no charge of discrimination against Local 1343 was ever filed by plaintiff with the EEOC. ... Having determined, therefore, that there exists a jurisdictional impediment to joinder of the union in plaintiff’s cause of action under Title VII, the Court must next consider the propriety of dismissal of such cause of action.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits joinder of a union omitted from an EEOC charge when the union is indispensable to interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Plaintiff-Appellant. v. McLEAN TRUCKING COMPANY Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1975-11-26(e)

The district court was of the view that the unions were indispensable parties who could not be joined because they had not been named as parties in the charge before EEOC. We agree that the unions are indispensable parties but believe that joinder of them is “feasible” at least for the purpose of interpreting the collective bargaining agreements.

Section 2000e-5’s charge requirement does not bar joinder of an uncharged union when the claim seeks declaratory relief concerning a collective bargaining agreement and does not allege discrimination by the union.

Southbridge Plastics Division, W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum · filed 1975-11-03

Considering first the motion to dismiss the EEOC’s cross-claim, the union argues that the claim is not maintainable because it is in effect an action by the EEOC pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 against a respondent (the union) which has not been the subject of a charge of discrimination as required in the aforementioned statute. The court, however, does not perceive the cross-claim filed by the EEOC to be in the nature of an action against the union. ... In the case at bar, the lack of a charge against the union does not prevent the court from considering the declaratory relief sought in the commission’s cross-claim insomuch as the issue is not whether the union has unlawfully discriminated against Southbridge’s female employees but, rather, whether the terms of the conciliation agreement override the terms of the bargaining agreement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits a Title VII suit to defendants named in the EEOC charge; an alleged agency relationship alone does not establish sufficient notice to unnamed defendants.

Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1975-12-12(f)(1)

The authority of two other cases persuades us to adopt defendants’ contention and to hold that we have no jurisdiction over those persons and that class of persons unnamed in plaintiff’s EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require dismissal of an owner omitted from the formal EEOC charge when the charge identifies the owner and no lack of notice or opportunity for conciliation is shown.

Holiday v. Belle's Restaurant · filed 1976-01-30(f)(1)

The pertinent section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved person to enter civil suit “against the respondent named in the charge” after certain procedural prerequisites have been met. ... The defendant Laux, although not named specifically in the charge, is alleged to be a partial owner and employee of the defendant, BAB, Inc. ... It would be difficult to comprehend a situation where the defendant Laux (1) did not have any notice of the asserted violation due to her position with the business, and (2) was not involved in any conciliation to prohibit further suit. ... I find that the plaintiff’s cause of action under Title VII does have proper subject matter jurisdiction before me and, accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge against a defendant before suing that defendant under Title VII.

Kutska v. California State College, Department of Education · filed 1976-03-31(f)(1)

Because of plaintiffs failure to comply with the procedural and jurisdictionál prerequisites set forth in 42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(f)(l), the Court is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs claim against all parties in Civil Action No. 75-114, except California State College, for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an employer to be named in an EEOC charge before it can be sued under Title VII.

Bernstein v. National Liberty International Corp. · filed 1976-04-07(f)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) provides, inter alia, that a civil action may only be brought against employers that are “named in the charge.” This has been interpreted as a jurisdictional prerequisite and, as such, an employer may not be named as a defendant in a civil action unless it has been the subject of a prior charge before the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against respondents named in the EEOC charge, so the court lacks jurisdiction over unnamed defendants under Title VII.

Beck v. Mather · filed 1976-06-10(f)(1)

Defendants’ Fourth Defense, which alleges no jurisdiction of this court over defendants Dillon, Katenkamp, Easter, McCauley and Lintecum pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., because they were not named respondents in the initial charge of discrimination filed with the E.E.O.C., has substantial merit. ... Accordingly, this court has no jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., over defendants Dillon, Katenkamp, Easter, McCauley and Lintecum.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII defendant to have been named in the EEOC charge before the district court has jurisdiction over that defendant.

Harris v. Commonwealth of Pa. · filed 1976-07-21(f)(1)

... we similarly conclude that jurisdiction does not exist over the individual defendants who were not named in plaintiff’s charges filed with the EEOC in the absence of compliance with the procedural and jurisdictional prerequisites set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII defendant to be named in the EEOC charge, but a naming difference does not require dismissal when the defendant had notice through the named entity.

Solin v. State University of New York · filed 1976-06-28(e)

Solin failed to comply with the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) that the defendant in a federal suit filed under Title VII be the respondent named in the charge before the EEOC. Although Solin specifically named “State University of New York, Purchase Campus” in her EEOC charge, the failure to name the identical defendant does not, under the circumstances, require a dismissal of the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a union omitted from an EEOC charge to be joined in a Title VII suit when it signed a collective bargaining agreement that may need to be interpreted or altered in the litigation.

Braxton v. Virginia Folding Box Co. · filed 1976-09-09(f)(1)

An exception to this general rule permits the joinder of a nonparticipating union when it is a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement containing provisions which may need to be interpreted or altered during the course of litigation. ... As the International is a signatory to the collective bargaining agreement whose provisions are subject interpretation and potential alteration in the instant litigation, it may be properly joined as a defendant to this action at least for the limited purposes heretofore alluded to.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s named-respondent requirement is satisfied when the EEOC and the parties are apprised of the alleged discrimination and the parties responsible for it.

Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes and Checkers of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union · filed 1976-09-29(f)(1)

ILWU contends that it is not a proper party to this action because it was not named in the charge filed by appellant Gibson with EEOC, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) confers jurisdiction only “against the respondent named in the charge.” ... It is evident from the record that EEOC and the parties were apprised of both the acts alleged to be discriminatory and the parties allegedly responsible for them. The purpose of the statute was therefore satisfied.

Section 2000e-5 requires a defendant to have been named in the EEOC proceedings before a plaintiff may sue that defendant.

Melanson v. Rantoul · filed 1976-10-19(f)(1)

Nor have the jurisdictional prerequisites of either § 2000e-5 or § 2000e-16 been met as to the Federal government, since the United States was not named as a respondent in plaintiffs’ proceedings before the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits suit against commissioners omitted from an EEOC charge when naming the agency gave them notice of the discrimination claim.

Skyers v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NY & NJ · filed 1976-12-28(f)(1)

Defendants further assert that this Court has no jurisdiction over the Port Authority Commissioners since they were not named by plaintiff in the original complaint filed with the EEOC, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... This contention is without merit. ... Notification to the Port Authority of a claim of discrimination is, therefore, notification to the Commissioners; the Commissioners are, in a real sense, the Port Authority itself.

Section 2000e-5 permits a suit against defendants omitted from the EEOC complaint when they knew of the administrative proceedings and had an opportunity to participate.

Oliver v. MOBERLY MISSOURI SCH. DIST. · filed 1977-01-03(f)(1)

Defendants' claim that plaintiffs did not name all of the present parties in their E.E.O.C. complaint must fail. Defendants were certainly aware of the administrative proceedings and had the opportunity to participate in them.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require a new EEOC charge against a successor employer that has a substantial or complete identity of interest with the charged employer.

Milner v. National School of Health Technology · filed 1977-02-07(f)(1)

Nor does the jurisdictional prerequisite of § 2000e-5(f)(l) require the plaintiff to refile against the corporation with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5 requires an EEOC charge against a defendant before suit; the charge and an incorporated letter may be read together to identify that defendant.

Tillman v. City of Boaz · filed 1977-03-11

The issue is whether Plaintiff complied with the administrative remedy provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 which require a charge to be filed initially with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereafter the EEOC) against each defendant before proceeding against them in the district court. ... Tillman's letter of March 13, 1975 specifically charges the City with an unlawful employment practice and is incorporated by reference into the charge form. The EEOC investigated the City and the Mayor. Thus, it is sufficiently clear from these documents that the charge was made against both the Mayor, acting as a city official, and the City.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against an individual omitted from the EEOC charge if the individual has a substantial identity of interest with the named respondent and knew or should have known of the EEOC proceedings.

Lewis v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1977-09-16(f)(1)

It is clear, however, that civil suit cannot be maintained against individuals unnamed before the EEOC just because they were employed where plaintiff worked — it is only if those newly-named defendants have a substantial identity of interest with the EEOC respondent and knew or should have known of the EEOC proceedings that they be subjected to a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s requirement to name a party in an EEOC charge may be excused after consideration of four factors concerning notice, conciliation, prejudice, and the parties’ relationship.

Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co. · filed 1977-08-08(f)(1)

If the court concludes that it is unable to determine whether the International had in fact been named, or it finds that International had not been named in the charge, it should determine, in a manner consistent with the four factors we have outlined above, whether compliance was unnecessary.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a person to be named as a respondent in the EEOC charge before a Title VII suit can seek to hold that person personally liable.

Travers v. Corning Glass Works · filed 1977-09-01(f)(1)

But the failure to charge Mustafa as a respondent if it was intended to hold him personally liable is not a procedural technicality but a matter of substance since if such were plaintiff’s purpose, Mustafa was entitled to notice under the statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s requirement to name a party in an EEOC charge is construed liberally, with four factors guiding whether naming the party was necessary.

Glus v. G. C. Murphy Company · filed 1977-11-09(f)(1)

In our view the district court should evaluate the failure to name the party before the EEOC by consulting the four factors discussed supra.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits suit against defendants omitted from an EEOC charge when they are substantially identical to the named respondent or controlled it and participated in conciliation.

Hill v. Singing Hills Funeral Home, Inc. · filed 1978-02-03(f)(1)

Here the defendants meet both tests. First, there is substantial identity among Singing Hills and the other defendants. ... Second, indisputedly, the parent corporation, Restland, controlled the activities of Singing Hills. The control is demonstrated by the conciliation process; Restland responded to the charge filed with the EEOC and the EEOC investigation encompassed all defendants. Finally, all defendants participated in the conciliation process.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a Title VII defendant to have been named in the EEOC charge; an unnamed defendant may be sued under the exceptions considered here if it had notice of the EEOC proceeding and participated in conciliation.

Schick v. Bronstein · filed 1978-03-10(f)(1)

The key to these theories, however, is a finding by the court that the defendant named only in the court action had notice of the EEOC proceeding and therefore participated in the conciliation process.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to name a defendant in the EEOC charge before suing that defendant in federal court.

Vogel v. Torrance Board of Education · filed 1978-03-01(f)(1)

The naming of a defendant in an EEOC complaint is a prerequisite to a Title VII action against that party in a Federal District Court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a defendant to be named in the EEOC charge, but omission does not require dismissal when the charge’s notice and conciliation purposes were fulfilled.

Williams v. Massachusetts General Hospital · filed 1978-04-20(f)(1)

Where it can be shown that these purposes have been realized even though a potential party-defendant was not named in a previously-filed EEOC complaint, the omission of that party’s name in the EEOC complaint has been held not to mandate a dismissal of the subsequent civil action. ... Thus, on the present state of the record of this case, each of the individual defendants stands as a person having actual knowledge of the charges filed with the EEOC. Accordingly, the motions to dismiss are denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) limits a Title VII civil action to parties named in the EEOC charge, so they receive notice and an opportunity for conciliation.

Batis v. GREAT AM. FEDERAL S & L ASS'N · filed 1978-07-03(f)(1)

Title VII provides, inter-alia, that a plaintiff may institute a civil action in federal court against only those employers which were respondents "named in the charge" filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). ... Therefore, the complaint against the individual defendants will be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against parties omitted from the EEOC charge when the charge gave them notice and an opportunity to conciliate.

Kelly v. Richland School District 2 · filed 1978-07-21(f)(1)

Since under statute, the District can act only through the local board of trustees in its initial hiring decision, notice to the District via the EEOC charge constituted notice of should have constituted notice to the Board of Trustees and its members, and provided the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate with the same. As such defendant’s motion to dismiss on grounds of subject matter jurisdiction is denied, the purposes of Title VII having been accomplished.

Section 2000e-5 generally limits Title VII suits to defendants named in the EEOC complaint, but the naming requirement can include individuals identified by title or who had actual notice and were reasonably necessary to conciliation.

Coley v. M & M MARS, INC. · filed 1978-12-06

This court’s Title VII jurisdiction extends only to those defendants named in plaintiff’s EEOC complaint. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5. Courts have liberally construed this requirement so as to include individuals mentioned by title or individuals who receive actual notice of the complaint and whose involvement in the EEOC conciliation process is reasonably necessary to adequately remedy the complaint’s allegations.

Section 2000e-5 generally requires a Title VII defendant to be named in the EEOC charge, but an exception may apply when the plaintiff alleges facts supporting it.

Williams v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1979-02-05(f)(1)

This Court does not believe that plaintiff’s failure to name the C.W.A. as a respondent in their charge with the EEOC automatically entitles the C.W.A. to relief. ... As the plaintiffs failed to respond to the “Letter Motion” of the C.W.A., and the complaint as drafted fails to disclose any facts which would satisfy the aforementioned factors, the Court will grant C.W. A.’s motion to dismiss as to it.

Section 2000e-5 permits a suit against an employer’s governing board when the EEOC charge named the employer and the board participated in the administrative proceedings.

Dr. Judith M. DAVIS v. WEIDNER · filed 1979-04-06(f)(1)

And despite the technical discrepancy in plaintiff's formal charges, the Board of Regents appeared by legal counsel through all the administrative proceedings prior to the suit in federal court. Thus, the dual objectives of the requirement that charges be filed with the EEOC were met. We are unwilling to penalize a layperson for failing to heed the precise EEOC filing requirements prior to a federal suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e Et seq. under these circumstances. ... Thus, we conclude that the district court's dismissal of the Board of Regents as a party defendant was improper.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally permits a Title VII suit only against a respondent named in the EEOC charge, subject to narrow exceptions.

Green v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1979-08-29(f)(1)

To hold in this case that the union need not have been named would be tantamount to holding that the union never need be named. We do not think that is what Congress intended when it enacted' the language quoted above.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII defendant to have been named in the EEOC charge so the defendant has an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Martin v. Easton Publishing Co. · filed 1979-10-17(f)(1)

To allow plaintiff to include defendants unnamed in the EEOC complaint denies them this valuable and salutary opportunity. ... Because plaintiff did not name the individual defendants other than Jodon and MacNeil, this Court lacks jurisdiction over these defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the defendants not named in the EEOC complaint will be granted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a private Title VII action only against a respondent named in the EEOC charge.

26 Fair empl.prac.cas. 783, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,290, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,000 · filed 1980-02-04(f)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), a private Title VII action may be brought only "against the respondent named in the charge" previously lodged with the EEOC. ... Thus, the district court correctly dismissed these plaintiffs' Title VII actions against the Union.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a Title VII defendant to be named in the EEOC charge, but omission of a defendant's name does not automatically require dismissal.

Romero v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1980-02-22(f)(1)

Although this court has not previously addressed the issue, we are inclined to agree that omission of a party's name from the EEOC charge does not automatically mandate dismissal of a subsequent action under Title VII. ... On this issue, therefore, we remand the case for further proceedings in the district court to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists under Title VII over the individual defendants.

An EEOC charge can satisfy the prerequisite for a Title VII suit against an unnamed person when it gives that person notice and an opportunity to conciliate.

Wong v. Calvin · filed 1980-07-15(f)(1)

I find that the jurisdictional prerequisite of an EEOC charge against Defendant Calvin has been satisfied and his motion to dismiss on that ground is denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a private Title VII action only against a respondent named in the EEOC charge.

Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1980-09-29(f)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), a private Title VII action may be brought only “against the respondent named in the charge” previously lodged with the EEOC. ... Thus, the district court correctly dismissed these plaintiffs’ Title VII actions against the Union.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a defendant omitted from the EEOC charge when that defendant is substantially identical to the charged party and the charging process afforded notice and an opportunity for conciliation.

Goodman v. Board of Trustees of Community College District 524 · filed 1980-10-20(f)(1)

In this regard, the defendants correctly state the general rule that, before a defendant may properly be sued under Title VII, he first must be administratively charged. ... In the case at bar, the court believes that the plaintiff’s complaint, when read in conjunction with evidentiary materials submitted by both sides, supports her contention that the defendants in this suit also are substantially identical. ... In summary, with respect to this motion of the defendants, as Judge Will noted in EEOC v. Rinella and Rinella, 401 F.Supp. 175, 188 (N.D.Ill.1975), although the court cannot discern what advantage will be gained by adding defendant Koeller, it will permit suit to proceed against him at this time.

Section 2000e-5(b)'s charge filing requirement is satisfied for employees named in an affidavit supporting another employee's EEOC charge, even if they file no individual charges.

Bret v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1980-12-16(b)

Additionally, plaintiffs Bret, Humeny, Stabler, and Molera, were all named in the affidavit of Jean Logan filed in support of her charge of discrimination. This latter fact is sufficient to secure the Title VII rights of these plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC charge against a party before that party may be sued under Title VII; a substantially identical defendant may satisfy that requirement.

Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc. · filed 1981-03-13(f)(1)

It is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit that a charge have been filed with EEOC against the party sued. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... However, Wright has failed to make any allegation or showing that would draw Hillerman and Adler into that net. In light of the jurisdictional nature of that defect, this Court dismisses defendants Hillerman and Adler from the action, subject to their possible rejoinder upon a proper showing.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against respondents identified by an EEOC charge, including parties reasonably implicated by its allegations.

Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. · filed 1981-05-14(f)(1)

Finally, the fact that the allegations in appellants’ 1969 EEOC charges did not clearly implicate the international unions causes us to hold that these charges did not trigger their liability at that time under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require dismissal of a Title VII claim against a defendant omitted from the EEOC charge when the complaint sufficiently links that defendant to the alleged discrimination.

Friedman v. Weiner · filed 1981-06-03(f)(1)

In light of the standards announced in Romero, the plaintiff Friedman has sufficiently pled a nexus between the defendants and the alleged discriminatory events. All of the defendants are associated in some way with the University of Colorado. None are separate entities. ... The motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a party omitted from the EEOC charge if that party had adequate notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130 · filed 1981-08-11(f)(1)

As to one exception of import here, this court has determined that where an unnamed party has been provided with adequate notice of the charge, under circumstances where the party has been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance, the charge is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over that party. ... Thus, the first prong of this exception, which would permit jurisdiction over the JAC, has been satisfied. ... While satisfaction of this prong presents some difficulty, we conclude that it also has been met.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a party omitted from the EEOC charge when that party had adequate notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130 · filed 1981-10-07(f)(1)

As to one exception of import here, this court has determined that where an unnamed party has been provided with adequate notice of the charge, under circumstances where the party has been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance, the charge is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over that party. ... Upon balancing these considerations, we find that the JAC has been presented with a sufficient opportunity to conciliate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a plaintiff to name an individual defendant in the EEOC complaint before suing that person under Title VII.

Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1981-12-01(f)(1)

Furthermore, neither of the individual defendants was named in plaintiff’s EEOC complaint, so the jurisdictional requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) has not been satisfied.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge against a party before suing that party, unless an exception applies.

Hawkins v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. · filed 1981-12-02(e)

Clearly, the general rule is that the filing of the charge against the party to be sued is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a suit under Title VII.

An EEOC charge satisfies subsection (f)(1)'s named-respondent requirement when it sufficiently identifies the employer despite a naming error.

Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co. · filed 1982-03-31(f)(1)

In the instant case, whether we apply 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) or 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1601.11, Appellants have adequately defined Wards as the defendant in their original EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge and generally permits suit only against a respondent named in that charge; an official-capacity claim may proceed against the agency named in the charge.

Maxey v. Thompson · filed 1982-06-16(f)(1)

The filing of such a charge is a prerequisite to suit, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and the suit may be brought only against “the respondent named in the charge,” id. The plaintiff’s EEOC charge named only the Illinois Department of Revenue. We think the district court was correct to dismiss the Title VII charges against Thompson and Boys on this ground, but not against Johnson, the “Successor-Director” of the Department of Revenue.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a noncharging plaintiff’s Title VII claim when it is not substantially identical to the claim of a plaintiff who filed a timely EEOC charge.

Jones v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1982-09-07(e)

The more liberal of the decisions have upheld the standing of a non-charging plaintiff if his (or her) claim is “substantially identical” with that of another plaintiff who has standing to sue. ... Ms. Leak’s claim under Title VII must therefore be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires the defendants in a Title VII suit to be the same parties named as respondents in the EEOC charge.

Manning v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction · filed 1983-02-01(f)(1)

Section 2000e-5(f)(l) requires that the respondents before the EEOC and the defendants in the court suit be the same.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a defendant omitted from the EEOC charge when the omission does not undermine conciliation or prejudice the defendant.

Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 1983-01-07(f)(1)

First, allowing the plaintiff to proceed against Ross despite her failure to name him as a respondent in the EEOC charge does not undermine the statutory goal of conciliation without resort to the federal courts because there was never any administrative investigation of the plaintiff’s charges, and thus, no conciliation efforts were ever made.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a Title VII defendant to be named in the EEOC charge, but allows exceptions when the charge requirement’s purposes are preserved.

Brewster v. Shockley · filed 1983-01-13(f)(1)

In this regard, the statute provides that “a civil action may be brought against [any] respondent named in the [E.E.O.C.] charge .... ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... The court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to come under either exception without frustrating the twofold purpose of the requirement.

Section 2000e-5 requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge against a party before bringing a Title VII suit against that party.

Dickey v. Greene · filed 1983-05-31(f)(1)

These statutory provisions leave no uncertainty that in order to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of a Title VII suit, a charge must first be filed with the EEOC against the party sued.

An employer omitted from an EEOC charge may be sued when it had notice of the charge and an opportunity for conciliation.

Lynn v. Jer Corp. · filed 1983-08-03(f)(1)

Where these purposes are fulfilled, a party unnamed in an EEOC charge is subject to the jurisdiction of federal courts.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) authorizes a Title VII suit against a respondent named in the EEOC charge; a charge does not support a suit against an unnamed defendant when a reasonable investigation would not have included that defendant.

Hamm v. Members of the Board of Regents of the State of Florida, Defendants · filed 1983-09-01(f)(1)

Title VII authorizes aggrieved persons to file a civil action against the respondent named in the EEOC charge. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... We affirm the dismissals. While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, particularly with regard to the Board of Regents, it is not at all clear in the record before us that the scope of an EEOC investigation which could have reasonably grown out of this administrative charge would have included the DOA or the Board of Regents.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a defendant to be named in the EEOC charge before a Title VII claim may proceed against that defendant.

Curtis v. Continental Illinois National Bank · filed 1983-08-17(f)(1)

Cothard was not a respondent in plaintiff’s charge before the EEOC, a normal prerequisite to filing suit in federal court on a Title VII claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). ... To allow a claim against Cothard to stand at this point would be to thwart that scheme in a fundamental manner.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII claim against a party omitted from the administrative charge when its interests are substantially similar to those of a named party and the omission causes no prejudice.

Watson v. Fuller Brush Co. · filed 1983-09-13(f)(1)

The Court is of the opinion that the factors set out in the second and third prongs outweigh the other factors and call for the denial of this aspect of defendants’ motion. ... In addition, it does not appear that Consolidated would have been prejudiced by not having been named before the EEOC— particularly since its interests undoubtedly would or could have been protected by Fuller.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits suit against an individual omitted from an EEOC charge when the individual had adequate notice and an opportunity to conciliate or was substantially identical to the named respondent.

Pauls v. Elaine Revell, Inc. · filed 1983-09-20(f)(1)

That “substantially identical” doctrine could not be more directly on point here, for Hokes were wholly responsible for Pauls’ discharge. Accordingly, both Eggleston and McDonald excuse Pauls’ failure to name Hokes in her EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a defendant only if the defendant was identified in the EEOC charge.

Kissi v. Wriston · filed 1983-12-16(f)(1)

The statutory basis of this action permits suit in federal court, but only after a defending party has been brought before the EEOC, nominally if not physically. ... As Wriston is nowhere mentioned either by name or otherwise in any portion of the charges filed before the EEOC, the Court is satisfied that the complaint must be dismissed against him.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against an individual omitted from the EEOC charge when the individual's interests are substantially similar to those of the named respondent and the omission caused no prejudice.

Vermett v. Hough · filed 1984-03-08(f)(1)

I am of the opinion that the factors set out in the second and third prongs outweigh the other factors and call for denial of this aspect of Defendants’ motion. The interests of the individual Defendants are substantially similar to those of the Department. In addition, it does not appear that the individual Defendants have been prejudiced by not having been specifically named before the EEOC — especially since their interests would or could have been protected by the Department. For these reasons, this portion of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally bars a Title VII suit against a party omitted from the EEOC charge unless an exception applies.

Jones v. Singer Career Systems · filed 1984-04-26(f)(1)

Moreover, even if somehow he could be so construed, the plaintiff’s EEOC charge omits any reference to Mr. Andrews. The general rule is that a Title VII suit may not be maintained against a party who is not named in the EEOC charge. ... In this case, however, none of the exceptions apply. Consequently, the plaintiffs Title VII claim against Mr. Andrews must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits a private Title VII action to respondents named in the EEOC charge.

Garcia v. Gardner's Nurseries, Inc. · filed 1984-04-25(f)(1)

It is the general rule that a private civil action may only be instituted “against the respondents] named in the charge” filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a party omitted from the EEOC charge if that party had notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Medina v. Spotnail, Inc. · filed 1984-06-12(f)(1)

Defendant Clark, having not been named as a respondent and having no opportunity to become involved in the conciliatory process crucial to the effectuation of Title VII, is dismissed from Count I.

Section 2000e-5 permits a plaintiff to bring retaliation and other discrimination claims that arise after an EEOC charge without filing a new charge.

Jones v. ITT Educational Services, Inc. · filed 1984-06-29

Furthermore, the exhaustion of administrative remedies for claims of retaliation is not required because such claims necessarily arise after the filing of the initial E.E.O.C. charge. ... There is no reason for distinguishing between retaliation claims and other claims which arise subsequent to the filing of administrative charges. Consequently, all claims of discrimination alleged in plaintiff's complaint will be considered by this Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against officials omitted from the EEOC charge when their interests coincide with the named employer’s and their omission caused no prejudice.

McAdoo v. Toll · filed 1984-08-07(f)(1)

Their interests would appear to be identical to those of their employer (the University of Maryland), which was named in the EEOC charge. ... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss all Title VII claims against the individual defendants on the grounds that they were not named in the original EEOC charge will be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an EEOC charge against a party before suit, unless that party shares a clear identity of interest with a named party or unfairly prevented the charge from being filed.

Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299 · filed 1984-11-29(f)(1)

Title VII provides that if after timely filing of a discrimination charge the EEOC is unable to obtain compliance with Title VII actions, "a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge" by the person claiming to be aggrieved. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). Filing an EEOC charge against a party is a necessary prerequisite to suit. It is well settled that a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title VII unless there is a clear identity of interest between it and a party named in the EEOC charge or it has unfairly prevented the filing of an EEOC charge.

A Title VII charge satisfies the filing requirement for a defendant clearly identified anywhere on the face of the EEOC charge form.

Dickey v. Greene · filed 1984-12-19(b)

The court holds that the jurisdictional requisites of Title VII are satisfied if the party or parties alleged to have discriminated against plaintiff are clearly identified by plaintiff anywhere on the face of the charge of discrimination form.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII suit against a person omitted from the EEOC charge’s respondent field when the investigation reasonably expected to follow from the charge would include that person.

Givan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1985-08-12(f)(1)

The scope of the EEOC investigation triggered by an EEOC charge defines the substantive limits of a subsequent Title VII action, and also the parties potentially liable in that action. ... The scope of the EEOC investigation which should have reasonably grown out of the administrative charge filed by plaintiff would have included Mr. Claud Czekaj and Mr. Dennis Yatteau.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a party omitted from the EEOC charge when that party had adequate notice and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Arenas v. Ladish Co. · filed 1985-10-10(f)(1)

Ordinarily a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title VII. ... The Court finds that even though Jarvis was not formally charged, he received adequate notice and opportunity to engage in conciliation efforts.

Section 2000e-5(f) permits a Title VII suit against a person identified in the body of an EEOC charge when that identification allows notice, investigation, and an opportunity for conciliation.

Acampora v. Boise Cascade Corp. · filed 1986-03-12(f)

First, plaintiff’s reference to defendant Tisony in the body of the EEOC charge was sufficient to notify the EEOC of the charges against Tisony, and to enable the EEOC to give proper notice to Tisony, investigate the charges, and to attempt to resolve the dispute prior to litigation.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge naming each defendant before a Title VII suit may proceed against that defendant.

Williams v. Hevi-Duty Electric Co. · filed 1986-03-28(e)

In examining the potential liability of the defendant, Gerald Block, the court notes initially that he was not named as a respondent in the EEOC charge filed by the plaintiff on January 24,1984. Title VII requires the timely filing of an EEOC charge against all named defendants as a prerequisite to bringing suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC charge requirement permits joinder of an indispensable defendant omitted from the charge when that defendant is needed for complete relief.

Baranek v. Kelly · filed 1986-03-20

Joinder of a defendant not named at the administrative stage but who is an indispensable party is therefore permissible and advisable, especially when the unnamed party is not being charged with a Title VII violation in the court action and the injunctive relief requested is necessary to prevent future discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires an employee to sue the respondent named in the EEOC charge within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice.

Norman A. Whaler, Jr. v. Melville Corporation D/B/A Chess King · filed 1986-05-13(f)(1)

Second, the employee must, within 90 days of receiving a right to sue notice, file his complaint 'against the respondent named in the [EEOC] charge.' 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1).

A defendant not named in the EEOC charge may be joined in a Title VII suit when joinder is necessary to preserve the plaintiff’s Title VII remedies.

Kritil v. Port East Transfer, Inc. · filed 1986-12-31(f)(1)

Hale has moved to dismiss the Title VII claims against him on the ground that he was not named in the charges which plaintiff filed with the EEOC. The motion is granted. ... This Court has previously ruled that where joinder of a new defendant not named in the EEOC charge is necessary to preserve a plaintiffs Title VII remedies, the joinder will be allowed but that where joinder of the new party is not necessary to preserve the plaintiff’s Title VII rights, joinder will not be allowed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) limits a private Title VII suit to respondents named in the EEOC charge; an unnamed company cannot remain a defendant without facts supporting its treatment as the same employer.

Saulsberry v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 1987-11-20(f)(1)

The right to proceed privately following issuance of a “right to sue” letter is limited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) to “the respondent named in the charge ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved.” ... The EEOC charge did not name Atlantic Richfield Company as an employer. ... The Title VII claims should proceed as to ARCO Chemical alone.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a Title VII defendant to be named in the EEOC charge, subject to an equitable exception that considers whether the plaintiff could identify the party, whether its interests aligned with a named party, and whether its omission caused prejudice.

Schaffrath v. Akron/Summit/Medina Private Industrial Council · filed 1987-12-14(f)(1)

The general rule is that the naming of a defendant in an EEOC charge is a prerequisite to a Title VII action against that party in a subsequent federal judicial complaint. ... However, this rule is not absolute. Certain factors are to be considered when determining whether the judicial complaint in a Title VII action may name individuals not named in the EEOC charge of discrimination. These factors are: (1) whether, through reasonable effort by the complainant, the role of the unnamed party could have been ascertained at the time of the Commission charge; (2) whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named party are so similar as the unnamed party’s that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the Commission proceedings; and (3) whether its absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the unnamed party in the Commission proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against defendants omitted from the EEOC charge when they had notice of and participated in the administrative proceedings and allowing the suit does not undermine conciliation.

Alcena v. Raine · filed 1988-08-10(f)(1)

Thus, it does not undermine the statutory goal of conciliation without resort to the federal courts to allow plaintiff to name as defendants Raine, Samiy and New York Hospital Cornell Medical Center, nor can they claim prejudice from lack of knowledge of the administrative complaint and investigation. Therefore, the court concludes defendants Raine, Samiy, and New York Hospital Cornell Medical Center are appropriately named as defendants in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a defendant omitted from the EEOC charge when the filing requirement’s notice and conciliation purposes are met.

Talley v. Leo J. Shapiro & Associates, Inc. · filed 1989-04-28(f)(1)

Accordingly, even though Shapiro, Rosen-baum, Johnson, and Smith are not named in Struble’s EEOC charge, the court will not dismiss them from Struble’s Title VII action.

A Title VII defendant omitted from an EEOC charge may still be sued if the defendant had actual notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in the EEOC proceedings.

Burrell v. Truman Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1989-09-27(f)(1)

If a defendant had actual notice of the EEOC charge and an opportunity to participate in the EEOC proceedings, the Court will exercise jurisdiction over that defendant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII action against a party omitted from the EEOC complaint when the purposes of notice and voluntary conciliation are otherwise satisfied.

Maturo v. National Graphics, Inc. · filed 1989-09-06(f)(1)

Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the underlying purposes of providing notice and encouraging conciliation were satisfied and that plaintiff should not be barred from proceeding because of a technical failure in the filing of her CHRO and EEOC complaints.

Section 2000e-5 generally requires a Title VII defendant to have been named in the EEOC charge, unless the unnamed party had adequate notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co. · filed 1989-10-05

Ordinarily, a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title VII. ... In Eggleston, we noted that an exception to the general rule that a party named in a Title VII suit must have been named in a previous EEOC charge exists where "an unnamed party has been provided with adequate notice of the charge, under circumstances where the party has been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance." ... Although HSSI had notice of the charges against Baskin, it did not thereby have any notice of any charges against it, nor did it have any opportunity to conciliate on its own behalf.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against an individual omitted from the EEOC charge when the individual had actual notice that the charge concerned the individual's conduct.

Giuntoli v. Garvin Guybutler Corp. · filed 1989-12-07(f)(1)

Under this test, where the alleged discrimination has been brought about at least in part through the conduct of an unnamed individual, and that individual has actual notice that this discrimination was the subject of an administrative complaint, ... a plaintiff should be permitted to sue that individual in federal court under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a Title VII suit against parties omitted from the EEOC charge when the omission causes no prejudice and does not frustrate conciliation.

Mayo v. Questech, Inc. · filed 1989-12-27(f)(1)

In sum, the naming requirement should serve as a bar to civil suit only where, as is not true here, (i) there is demonstrable prejudice to the unnamed parties or (ii) the interests of the named and unnamed parties are so distinct that inexcusable failure to name a party frustrates Title VII’s conciliation goals.

Section 2000e-5 generally requires a Title VII defendant to have been named in the EEOC charge, unless the unnamed defendant has a clear identity of interest with a named party.

Knafel v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers Of Akron, Inc. · filed 1990-03-27(f)(1)

A "clear identity of interest" implies that the named and unnamed parties are virtual alter egos. Pepsi and GCC are not alter egos; their relationship is that of subsidiary and parent. They are two distinct entities with different business operations. Naming Pepsi in the EEOC charge does not suffice to name GCC. GCC, therefore, cannot be sued on this Title VII claim. Knafel also cannot join the individual defendants in her Title VII action, as they are nowhere named in the EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally bars a Title VII suit against a party not named in the EEOC charge, unless that party had notice of the charge and an opportunity to conciliate.

Mufich v. Commonwealth Edison Co. · filed 1990-05-07(f)(1)

As a general rule, a party who is not named in an EEOC charge cannot be sued in a Title VII action. ... The Seventh Circuit, however, has recognized an exception to this general rule: an unnamed party may be sued under Title VII if that party was afforded sufficient notice of the charge and provided with an opportunity to participate in the conciliatory process.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits a private Title VII suit to respondents named in the EEOC charge, but an unnamed person may be sued when the charge and circumstances connect that person to the alleged discrimination.

Wangler v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc. · filed 1990-05-09(f)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), a private Title VII action may be brought only “against the respondent named in the charge” previously lodged with the EEOC. ... Although the court does not look favorably on plaintiffs failure to name these individual defendants in her EEOC charges, in light of all the circumstances presented and the remedial nature of Title VII, the court finds that plaintiffs failure to do so will not preclude her from suing them under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits a Title VII suit to parties named in an EEOC charge, with an exception when an unnamed party had notice and shared a commonality of interest with a named party.

Schafer v. Board Of Public Education Of The School District Of Pittsburgh, Pa. · filed 1990-05-17(f)(1)

A Title VII action ordinarily may be brought only against a party previously named in an EEOC action. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). Nevertheless, this court recognizes an exception when the unnamed party received notice and when there is a shared commonality of interest with the named party. ... As we read Goodman, the Federation and the Board do not share the commonality of interests and notice which would make the Glus exception applicable.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a person omitted from the administrative charge when the charge focuses on that person’s conduct and the person had notice and suffered no prejudice from the omission.

Kouri v. Todd · filed 1990-08-22(f)(1)

In sum, the Court finds that where, as here, a Title VII administrative charge names only a corporate employer, but the core of the charge concerns an individual employee’s conduct, and that employee receives notice and appears at an administrative hearing, the technical failure to name the employee in the EEOC charge, absent a showing of prejudice, will not bar a subsequent civil action against that individual.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits suit against individuals omitted as named respondents from an administrative charge when the charge describes their conduct and gives them notice and an opportunity to conciliate.

Kinnally v. Bell of Pennsylvania · filed 1990-10-17(f)(1)

In short, the individual defendants received ample notice of the need and opportunity to conciliate while this matter was still pending before the PHRC/EEOC. Accordingly, there is no reason to preclude suit against these defendants at this stage.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s requirement to sue a respondent named in the EEOC charge can be satisfied by specific or group references in the charge's body that give the respondent notice and an opportunity for conciliation.

Sandom v. Travelers Mortgage Services, Inc. · filed 1990-12-20(f)(1)

The rationale behind finding jurisdiction over defendants not specified in the EEOC charge section asking for the discriminatory parties, is that specific, as well as group, references to a party in the body of the charge is functionally analogous to being “named,” because the reference fulfills the statutory purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) ordinarily requires a Title VII defendant to have been named in the administrative charge, but permits suit against an unnamed party whose interests are sufficiently shared with a named party and who had notice and an opportunity to conciliate.

Garvey v. Dickinson College · filed 1991-04-11(f)(1)

Ordinarily, a Title YII action may only be filed against a party previously named in the administrative action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The Third Circuit, however, recognizes an exception to this rule if the unnamed party shares a commonality of interest with the named party. ... We find that Garvey’s charges filed with the PHRC contained sufficient references to Allan to satisfy these requirements.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires a plaintiff to name a defendant in an EEOC or authorized state agency charge before suing, subject to an identity of interest exception.

Johnson v. Palma · filed 1991-04-22(e)

A prerequisite to commencing a Title VII action against a defendant is the filing with the EEOC or authorized state agency of a complaint naming the defendant. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). ... This exception, termed the "identity of interest" exception, permits a Title VII action to proceed against an unnamed party where there is a clear identity of interest between the unnamed defendant and the party named in the administrative charge. ... We find that the agency complaints were insufficient to put the International Union on notice of the Title VII charges against it and that the subsequent communications failed to cure the defects in the administrative complaints.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a Title VII suit against parties omitted from the EEOC charge when their interests are substantially similar to those of named parties and the omission causes no demonstrable prejudice.

Nicol v. Imagematrix, Inc. · filed 1991-07-03(f)(1)

In sum, because the interests of the named and unnamed parties are substantially similar and there is no demonstrable prejudice to the unnamed parties, the naming requirement does not bar plaintiffs’ suit against the unnamed parties.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) ordinarily limits a Title VII suit to parties named in the EEOC charge, but an unnamed party may be sued if it had notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Stephenson v. CNA Financial Corp. · filed 1991-07-24(f)(1)

The factors used to determine if an exception to the general rule should be permitted are not applicable in this case. Noha, Tisch, Chookaszian, Igleski, and Demytrasz were never given notice of Stephenson’s EEOC charge, see Motion Exhs. B-F (affidavits), and Stephenson has brought forward no evidence showing that they had any opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally bars a Title VII suit against a party not named in the EEOC charge, subject to exceptions.

Perkins v. Silverstein · filed 1991-08-07(f)(1)

To the extent Perkins alleges any violation of Title VII by Dunne, the district court correctly concluded that her claims are barred by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). Perkins does not dispute the fact that George Dunne was not named in the charge which she filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits a Title VII suit to respondents named in the EEOC charge, but an unnamed individual may be sued if given actual notice that their conduct is under investigation and the corporate employer receives notice of intent to sue.

Drummer v. DCI Contracting Corp. · filed 1991-09-18(f)(1)

Under this exception, individuals not named in the EEOC charge may be sued in a subsequent civil action if they have been given actual notice that their conduct is being investigated and notice of intent to sue is given to the corporate employer. ... The court agrees with Drummer with respect to Rosenthal but not with respect to Morrissey.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits suit against a person not named in an EEOC charge if that person had adequate notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Hrabak v. Marquip, Inc. · filed 1992-01-02(f)(1)

However, where an unnamed party has been provided with adequate notice of the charge under circumstances where said party has been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings, the charge is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over that party. ... Given the relationship between Marschke and Mar-quip it is clear that Marschke had sufficient notice of the discrimination charge and an opportunity to participate in the conciliation efforts. His motion for summary judgment must be denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits a Title VII suit to parties named in the EEOC charge, but permits claims against an unnamed party with a substantial identity or agency relationship to a named party.

Gilmore v. Local 295, International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1992-08-06(f)(1)

In subsequent litigation of the claims, the district court generally has jurisdiction only over those parties named as respondents in the agency charge. ... To require the Union to defend against plaintiffs claim here would violate Title VII’s scheme for providing notice to respondents. Accordingly, plaintiffs Title VII claims against the Union defendants are dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits a Title VII suit to respondents named in the EEOC charge, but an identity of interest can excuse the failure to name a defendant.

Poulsen v. City of North Tonawanda, NY · filed 1993-01-26(f)(1)

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), provides that once administrative remedies are exhausted, an aggrieved party may bring a civil action “against the respondent named in the charge.” ... Application of the same factors to Lieutenant Sedlacek leads to the conclusion that Sedlacek was actually prejudiced by Poulsen’s failure to name him as a respondent, and he should be dismissed from the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits Title VII suits to parties named in an EEOC charge; an unnamed party may be sued if it had notice of the charge against it and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Allen v. City of Chicago · filed 1993-07-02(f)(1)

Ordinarily, a party not named as a respondent in án EEOC charge may not be sued in a Title VII action. ... Third, plaintiffs do not claim that either Daley or Carr was given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance. ... Accordingly, we dismiss Mayor Daley and. Commissioner Carr as defendants from Count I of plaintiffs’ amended complaint.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires a Title VII plaintiff to name a defendant in an EEOC charge before suing that defendant, subject to exceptions.

Dennis v. Burlington Northern Railroad Dennis Crossett Phil Thompson Bo Sanders Bill Bogan, Jim Saturday · filed 1993-07-06(e)

Initially, it is noted that because Dennis did not file charges with the EEOC against any of the individual defendants except Burlington, they are not proper parties to his employment discrimination case and no exceptions apply.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s EEOC charge naming requirement is not excused for omitted supervisors who cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.

Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enterprises · filed 1993-05-20(f)(1)

As such, we cannot excuse the failure tó name the individuals as respondents in the charge of discrimination as issued, despite the fact that such failure may be attributable solely to the EEOC policy.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits a Title VII suit to parties named in the EEOC complaint, but an unnamed party may be sued if it shares an identity of interest with a named party.

Goyette v. DCA Advertising Inc. · filed 1993-08-06(f)(1)

As a general rule, one may only sue in federal court under Title VII a party listed as a defendant on such a complaint. ... For the purposes of this action, we are satisfied that DCA and Dentsu share an identity of interest.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to name a defendant in the EEOC charge before suing that defendant.

Dreisbach v. Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc. · filed 1994-04-05(f)(1)

The provision requiring the naming of the respondent in the EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of suit against that party.

Section 2000e-5 does not treat naming an individual in a confidential affidavit accompanying an EEOC charge as sufficient notice by itself.

Bishop v. Okidata, Inc. · filed 1994-10-03(f)(1)

Thus, merely naming an individual defendant in an affidavit accompanying an EEOC charge is not by itself adequate notice.

An EEOC charge can satisfy the Title VII naming requirement by sufficiently alluding to a related defendant without formally naming that defendant.

Johnson v. County of Cook · filed 1994-10-06(f)(1)

In short, by naming the Cook County DOC, plaintiff sufficiently alluded to Cook County.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s EEOC charge requirement allows a Title VII claim against a party omitted from the charge when that party shares an identity of interest with a named party.

Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hospital · filed 1994-12-19(e)(1)

Applying the factors to this case, I find that the plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim against The City even though The City was not named in the EEOC complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars a Title VII action against defendants who were not named in the EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter.

Harris v. Lincoln County Residential States Facilities · filed 1995-02-24(f)(1)

Because LCRF was the only named respondent in Harris's EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter, this action is barred as to the other defendants. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a Title VII defendant to have been named in the EEOC charge, but a claim may proceed against an unnamed defendant substantially identified with a named party.

Collin v. Rector & Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 1995-01-03(f)(1)

Defendants Collins, Spain, Dotson, Phillips, and Lucy were not named in the EEOC complaint. Accordingly, the claims against these Defendants must be dismissed. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The claims against Dean Porter in his official capacity may be maintained, however, because he is substantially identified with the Department of Urban Planning, and the Department of Urban Planning was named in the EEOC complaint along with the Board.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits suit against an individual named in a statement attached to an EEOC charge, even if the charge does not list that individual as a respondent.

Singleterry v. Nashua Cartridge · filed 1995-02-09(f)(1)

The court finds that by naming Phillips in the statement appended to the charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC on June 1 0 , 1993, plaintiff "named" Phillips as one of the individuals who discriminated against him.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge before suing; defendants omitted from a charge may be dismissed when it gives them no notice or opportunity to conciliate.

Dubisar-Dewberry v. Folmar · filed 1995-04-14(f)(1)

In addition to dismissal of Folmar and Devane in their individual capacities, the court finds that said defendants are due to be dismissed as party-defendants because the plaintiff failed to name said defendants as respondents in the charge filed with the EEOC. Before an aggrieved employee may bring a Title VII suit in federal court, he or she must exhaust administrative remedies, which include filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against a defendant informally identified in the EEOC charge despite the charge’s failure to name it specifically.

Scales v. Sonic Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-05-01(f)(1)

Rather, the court finds that the first exception — whether Sonic was informally referred to in the body of the charge — is applicable under the facts of this case and it operates to relieve Scales from the strict naming requirement of section 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f) permits a Title VII action against a party omitted from the EEOC charge when that party shares an identity of interest with a named defendant.

Dortz v. City of New York · filed 1995-10-05(f)

One such exception allows a Title VII action to be maintained against a party not named in the EEOC charge where that party has an “identity of interest” with a defendant named in the charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally bars a Title VII suit against a party omitted from the EEOC charge, but an exception may apply if that party had notice and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Secrist v. Burns International Security Services · filed 1996-02-20(f)(1)

In general, a party not named as a respondent in an EEOC charge may not be sued in a Title VII or ADEA action. ... Rather, the case law reveals that an exception to the filing standards of Title VII and the ADEA is generally made where the unnamed party or parties had adequate notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a plaintiff to sue someone unnamed in the EEOC charge when joining that person is necessary to preserve the plaintiff’s Title VII rights.

Armstead v. Becton Dickinson Primary Care Diagnostics, Inc. · filed 1996-03-08(f)(1)

A plaintiff, however, is not completely barred from suing an unnamed party. If she can establish that inclusion of a party is necessary to preserve her Title VII rights, the Court will allow an unnamed party to be joined in a suit.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally permits a Title VII civil action only against a respondent named in the administrative charge.

Crosten v. Kamauf · filed 1996-03-25(f)(1)

Under Title VII, a civil action may be brought only “against the respondent named in the [administrative] charge.” ... In considering these factors, the Court finds that the narrow McAdoo exception to the naming requirement will not save Plaintiffs Title VII claims against Defendant Kamauf.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s requirement that a defendant be named in an EEOC charge does not require dismissal at this stage when the charge may have given the defendant notice and its omission did not impede conciliation.

Rivera v. Puerto Rican Home Attendants Services, Inc. · filed 1996-04-29(f)(1)

Application of the identity of interest test reinforces the conclusion that dismissal of the City based on plaintiffs’ failure to name it in the EEOC charge would be improper, at least at tins stage.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit against an unnamed party when that party has substantial identity with a respondent named in the administrative charge.

Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc. · filed 1996-04-18(f)(1)

In any event, the statutory naming requirement is no threshold bar to Tietgen’s claim because he has alleged the requisite “substantial identity.”

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII suit against a defendant omitted from the EEOC charge when that defendant shares sufficient identity of interest with the named respondent to receive notice and allow EEOC conciliation.

Hammer v. Hillsborough County · filed 1996-06-13(e)(1)

Pursuant to Chapter 78-523, Laws of Florida, there exists sufficient identity of interest between the County and the Commission, such that under Romero, as adopted by this Court in Wright, Title VIPs intent to provide Defendant with notice and the EEOC an opportunity to attempt conciliation is satisfied. Therefore, Plaintiff has satisfied all conditions precedent to the filing of a Title VII action, and this Court has subject matter jurisdiction as to Count I.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally requires a Title VII defendant to have been named as a respondent in the EEOC charge.

Stefanovic v. University of Tennessee · filed 1996-07-08(f)(1)

Therefore, as-sinning, arguendo, that the individual defendants could be held liable in their individual capacities under Title VII, plaintiffs failure to name them as respondents in his EEOC charge is a jurisdictional defect to his pending Title VII claim against them.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) generally limits an employment discrimination suit to parties named in the EEOC charge.

Johnson v. State of Md. · filed 1996-10-10(f)(1)

As a general rule, a civil action for employment discrimination may only be brought against the party named in the original administrative charges filed with the EEOC. ... Accordingly, having failed to comply with the ADA’s naming requirement, the claims against the seven individually named Defendants must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires a Title VII plaintiff to name defendants in an agency charge before suing them, but a suit may proceed against an unnamed defendant with a clear identity of interest with a named respondent.

Alfano v. Costello · filed 1996-10-16(e)

In order to satisfy the requirement of administrative exhaustion, plaintiffs lawsuit must be preceded by an EEOC or state agency charge naming the same defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). However, an exception exists to this rule, and a Title VII action may proceed against defendants not named in plaintifPs EEOC complaint if there is a “clear identity of interest between the unnamed defendant and the party named in the administrative charge.” ... Thus, defendants Brown, Countryman, Costello, Fenton and Deering are not dismissed from plaintiffs federal lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII suit against a party incorrectly named in an EEOC charge when the party had notice of the charge and an opportunity to participate in conciliation.

Garner v. Knoll Bros. Quick Marts, Inc. · filed 1997-04-04(f)(1)

Ordinarily, a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title VII. However, given the Civil Rights Act’s purposes, charges are to be construed with utmost liberality and parties sufficiently named or alluded to in the factual statement are to be joined. ... Therefore, plaintiffs incorrect naming of defendants in her EEOC charge is not fatal and does not require dismissal.