42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Greathouse v. Baptist Health · filed 2023-11-22(e)(1)

The charge must be filed within 180 days of the discriminatory acts at issue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ... Consequently, the charge was not filed in time for her to pursue this claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged act when a state agency enforces discrimination laws.

Aletum v. Wesco Inc. · filed 2023-11-28(e)(1)

Where, as here, a state agency exists to enforce discrimination laws, the charge must be filed “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful unemployment practice occurred.” ... Accordingly, Aletum had 300 days from that date, or until August 27, 2020, to file the Charge. Under either Aletum’s claimed filing date (August 28, 2020) or the date reflected in the Activity Log (August 31, 2020), the Charge was not timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff who initially files with a qualifying state agency to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Ma v. San Francisco Estuary Institute · filed 2023-12-22(e)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), a Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred” if it occurred in a State that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice and the employee initially filed a grievance with that agency.

In a deferral state like New Jersey, a Title VII discrimination charge must be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

ORTIZ v. SUMITOMO MITSUI TRUST BANK (U.S.A.) LIMITED · filed 2023-12-27(e)(1)

Plaintiffs living in a “deferral state” like New Jersey, however, may file the charge within 300 days of the occurrence.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a claimant in a deferral state to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, subject to the continuing violation doctrine.

WALTON v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY · filed 2024-01-03(e)(1)

Hence, any alleged Title VII violations that predate December 1, 2018 are time barred unless the continuing violation doctrine applies to save the claims.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits consideration of an entire hostile work environment when at least one act in the same ongoing practice occurred within the 300-day filing period.

Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc. · filed 2024-01-04(e)(1)

Thus, to satisfy the continuing violations doctrine, she had to show that at least one act of harassment occurred during the limitations period, and that the act was part of the same, ongoing unlawful employment practice as the earlier alleged acts of harassment. Instruction No. 13 required that showing and accurately captured the elements of a Title VII hostile work environment claim as set forth by the Supreme Court in Morgan.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to file an administrative charge within 300 days after the allegedly discriminatory act.

Amos-Arr v. Illinois Department of Innovation and Technology · filed 2024-01-08(e)(1)

For Title VII claims, a plaintiff must file his complaint with the EEOC or other applicable state body (the IDHR in this case) no more than 300 days after the allegedly discriminatory act occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (giving “the person aggrieved . . . three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice” to file the administrative charge); Koelsch v. Beltone Elec. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1995).

A discrete discriminatory act within the charge-filing period can make a hostile work environment claim timely if it is part of the ongoing discriminatory conduct.

King v. Aramark Services Inc. · filed 2024-03-20(e)(1)

We hold that this same principle applies in Title VII cases: A discrete discriminatory act, such as termination, within the limitations period may not only support a claim for damages, it may also render a hostile work environment claim timely if it is shown to be part of the course of discriminatory conduct that underlies the hostile work environment claim.

For a Title VII hostile work environment claim subject to a 300-day charge-filing period, at least one contributing act must occur within that period.

King v. Cellco Partnership · filed 2024-03-25(e)(1)

the charge must be filed within 300 days of “the alleged unlawful employment practice,” events that occurred on or after June 11, 2015 fit within the look-back period for a Title VII claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ... Thus, in order to fit her hostile work environment claim within the statutory look-back period, King must identify at least one act that contributed to the alleged hostile work environment that occurred on or after June 11, 2015.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff in Mississippi to file an EEOC charge within 180 days; earlier acts may be considered as part of a continuing hostile work environment claim.

Palmer v. Ahern Rentals, Inc. · filed 2024-03-25(e)(1)

To bring a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). For a hostile work environment claim, however, a “plaintiff is not limited to filing suit on events that fall within this statutory time period because h[is] claim ‘is comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.’” ... For now, the Court resolves all reasonable inferences in favor of Palmer and finds that the pleadings do not prevent the application of the continuing violation doctrine.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s filing period permits a Title VII plaintiff to rely on earlier acts under the continuing violation doctrine only if those acts are linked to conduct within the filing period.

Jones v. Local 798 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of t · filed 2024-03-26(e)(1)

Even when the doctrine is applied in the Title VII context, a plaintiff must still plead a link between the pre- and post-limitation conduct for the doctrine to apply. ... The doctrine cannot apply where there is no allegation supporting a relationship between the events.

The continuing-violation doctrine does not preserve earlier alleged acts under § 2000e-5(e)(1) when they lack similar conduct by the same individuals.

Oldham v. Division of State Police, Department of Safety & Homeland Security, State of Delaware · filed 2024-05-17(e)(1)

The continuing violation approach fails because there is no similar conduct by the same individuals.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely administrative charge for each alleged unlawful employment practice; the applicable filing period may be 300 days.

Jones v. Olin Winchester, LLC · filed 2024-05-22(e)(1)

Under the applicable statutes of limitation, Plaintiff had 300 days to preserve her federal claims and 180 days to preserve her state law claims for each alleged unlawful employment practice.

A timely EEOC charge challenging an allegedly unlawful termination leaves the related ADA claim unbarred under § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Cumby v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. · filed 2024-05-28(e)(1)

Because Plaintiff has plausibly alleged, as explained in this Order, that his termination was unlawful, and his EEOC charge was timely filed in connection with his termination, Plaintiff’s ADEA and ADA claims are not time-barred by 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) makes a hostile work environment charge timely when filed within 300 days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment.

Deasy v. Northern Arizona Healthcare Corporation · filed 2024-06-05(e)(1)

But for a hostile work environment “charge to be timely, the employee need only file a charge within . . . 300 days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Thus, having established that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim is premised on, and supported by evidence of, events that occurred continuously at least until she transferred departments in July 2019, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are timely.

A Title VII charge must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

BAKER v. REGAN · filed 2024-06-10(e)(1)

Additionally, the Amendment Motions both seek to raise claims regarding events that happened between November 2016 and early January 2017. ... “A charge under [Title VII must] be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). According to the Complaint, however, Plaintiff did not file a charge with the EEOC until January 2020.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1), incorporated into Title I of the ADA, requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of each alleged discrete discriminatory act.

Irvin v. Versatrim, LLC · filed 2024-06-12(e)(1)

Irvin had to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of each alleged discrete act of discrimination under Title I of the ADA. See 42 US.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 121 17(a).

A Title VII charge must be filed within 180 days of a refusal to hire; an employer’s later refusal to reconsider does not restart that period.

Edward Eaves, Jr. v. Rockdale County Sheriff's Office · filed 2024-06-17(e)(1)

The refusal to hire Eaves on May 28, 2019 was the discrete act that triggered the 180-day period to file the charge with the commission. ... And the Sheriff’s Office’s refusal to rectify its past decision did not restart the clock with an additional 180 days to file the charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge only when a state or local agency has authority to grant or seek relief; otherwise, the 180-day period applies.

Britt v. Wmata Metro Transit Police · filed 2024-07-23(e)(1)

Accordingly, the 300-day provision is inapplicable and the 180-day provision controls.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely Title VII charge; in Kansas, a claimant has 300 days to file, and earlier hostile environment acts may count if connected to an act within that period.

Blaine v. Mystere Living & Healthcare, Inc. · filed 2024-07-25(e)(1)

Plaintiffs must file timely Title VII charges with the EEOC or state agencies before suing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). Kansas plaintiffs have 300 days to file a timely charge. ... In short, Blaine can include all of her experiences at Wellsville when arguing for her claims.

In a deferral state, Title VII claims must be charged with the EEOC within 300 days of the challenged act; an inquiry or intake questionnaire counts only if it qualifies as a charge.

Jones v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2024-08-05(e)(1)

Jones filed his EEOC Charge, the only operative charge, on February 7, 2022. Therefore, his only actionable claims under Title VII are those that arose on or after April 13, 2021 (300 days before February 7, 2022)).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits a court to consider earlier acts as part of a hostile work environment claim when a contributing act occurs within the 300-day charge-filing period.

Brooks v. Unified Government of Kansas City/Wyandotte County, Kansas · filed 2024-08-06(e)(1)

Because plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim includes events that could have occurred within the filing period (i.e. after June 23, 2021), the Court may consider events that contribute to the hostile work environment even if they fall outside the 300-day period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice when a state agency enforces the applicable discrimination law.

Matthews v. Legacy Health · filed 2024-08-26(e)(1)

Under Title VII, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ... Because the New Claims brought under Title VII are time-barred, those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows a hostile work environment claim when an act contributing to it occurs within the EEOC charge-filing period, even if other acts occurred earlier.

Head v. Coastal Alabama Community College · filed 2024-09-03(e)(1)

Plaintiff’s termination occurred on November 29, 2021, within 180 days of her EEOC charge filed on May 6, 2022. Plaintiff clearly alleges that her termination was a part of the ongoing harassment that makes up her hostile work environment claim. Thus, at this stage, the Court determines Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim was timely filed and the motions to dismiss are denied as to their timeliness arguments.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 300 days when the charge is also filed with a state or local agency; earlier acts may be considered as part of a hostile work environment claim if a contributing act occurred within that period.

Rosenbaum v. Bank of America NA · filed 2024-09-12(e)(1)

Any conduct that occurred over 300 days prior, or before October 5, 2021, is time-barred, unless Plaintiff has a claim based on a “hostile work environment.”

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day filing period runs separately for discrete acts of discrimination; a later reinstatement offer does not revive untimely claims.

O'Leary v. The New York City Department of Investigation · filed 2024-09-12(e)(1)

Accordingly, as plaintiff failed to timely file EEOC charges with respect to his first three claimed acts of discrimination, each of which is a discrete act, and since the offer of reinstatement is likewise a discrete act not within the continuing violation exception, plaintiff’s Title VII claims premised on his RA Request, the denial of his Appeal, and his termination are dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a complainant in a deferral state to file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

GAMBILL v. CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTERS, INC. · filed 2024-09-16(e)(1)

Because August 18-19, 2022 is more than a year beyond the August 8, 2021 deadline for filing class-based EEOC discrimination charges, Plaintiffs’ present class-based claims are facially time-barred.

In a deferral state, § 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory employment action.

Grant v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund · filed 2024-09-17(e)(1)

In a deferral state like Louisiana, Title VII plaintiffs must file an EEOC charge no more than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory employment action occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a plaintiff 180 days to file a discrimination charge, or 300 days when cross-filing in a deferral state with a parallel state agency.

Goughenour v. PNC Bank, National Association · filed 2024-09-17(e)(1)

The charge of discrimination must be filed within 180 days after the last alleged unlawful employment practice or if the plaintiff is cross-filing in a “deferral state” with a parallel state agency, the | charge of discrimination must be filed within 300 days from the last unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows earlier harassment to support a hostile work environment claim when a related act falls within the 300-day charge-filing period in Florida.

Rivera v. The CSI Companies Inc · filed 2024-09-23(e)(1)

With these two sentences, the Court finds the prior instances of harassment are “sufficiently related” to at least one timely adverse act (i.e., Plaintiff’s termination), such that they support the same hostile work environment claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits older incidents to be considered as part of a hostile work environment claim when a contributing act occurs within the filing period and the incidents are adequately linked.

Jackson v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-09-27(e)(1)

Because a hostile work environment claim is “composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice’ . . . [i]t does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). ... Mr. Jackson has therefore administratively exhausted the first five incidents listed above as they relate to his race- and reprisal-based hostile work environment claims.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff in the District of Columbia to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the discriminatory act.

Robinson v. Dc Government · filed 2024-11-08(e)(1)

Where the allegedly discriminatory act occurs in the District of Columbia, an EEOC charge must be filed no more than 300 days after such an act occurs.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Missouri Title VII claimant to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Curry v. Bi-State Development · filed 2024-11-14(e)(1)

Because Curry failed to timely file an EEOC charge of discrimination for the Title VII claim raised in this case, he is barred from bringing this action for failure to exhaust the required administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a plaintiff who first files with a state agency 300 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice to file an EEOC charge.

Cartagena-Cordero v. R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC · filed 2024-11-15(e)(1)

As an initial matter, Mr. Cartagena-Cordero alleges that he was terminated on October 17, 2022, well within the 300-day period of the Amended CHRO Complaint.

An earlier act of harassment may be considered as part of a hostile work environment claim when a related act occurs within the applicable EEOC charge filing period.

LiVolsi v. University of Texas At Austin · filed 2024-11-15(e)(1)

Since some of Turci-Escobar’s actions occurred within 300 days of LiVolsi’s EEOC complaint, the entire period LiVolsi alleges she was subject to the hostile work environment may be considered.

For a hostile work environment claim, the 300-day charge-filing deadline is satisfied if any act contributing to the claim occurred within that period.

Brenner v. Town of Middletown · filed 2024-11-22(e)(1)

In other words, for the charge to be timely, the Plaintiff need only file a charge within 300-days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment claim. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claims in Counts J, II, and IV as time-barred is DENIED without prejudice.

A proposed Title VII claim based on a discrete act outside the 300-day period before the EEOC charge is time barred.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fred Meyer Stores Inc · filed 2024-12-11(e)(1)

Therefore, claims that do not include a discrete act occurring on or after March 11, 2021, 300 days before the date of Lozano’s filing, are time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows untimely incidents to support a hostile work environment claim when they are sufficiently related to a timely incident.

Smith v. DeJoy · filed 2024-12-17(e)(1)

Hostile work environment claims can be based on untimely incidents if they are sufficiently related to timely incidents. However, Plaintiff has failed to show that the four untimely asserted touching incidents are sufficiently related to her Removal to form part of a continuing hostile work environment claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits a court to consider an earlier act contributing to a hostile work environment claim when an act contributing to that claim occurs within the charge-filing period.

Hardy v. D&D Management 2 · filed 2024-12-20(e)(1)

Therefore, although the summer 2021 statement falls outside of the 300-day time period, the Court will consider the comment because it contributes to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.

A Title VII hostile work environment claim is timely when an act within the charge-filing period is part of the same ongoing discriminatory practice.

Troeger v. JetBlue Airways Corporation · filed 2024-12-17(e)(1)

Because Troeger plausibly alleges pervasive anti-gay, anti-atheistic discrimination at JetBlue culminating in some discrete discriminatory actions that occurred during the limitations period, the Court concludes his Title VII hostile work environment claim is timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows at most 300 days to file an EEOC charge after an allegedly unlawful employment practice.

Marigny v. McDonough · filed 2024-12-23(e)(1)

Any EEOC complaint based on that act, or on a series of acts ending in March 2022, was therefore due in January 2023.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day filing period permits consideration of an earlier hostile work environment only when an act within that period continues the same hostile environment.

Pitts v. Baltimore City, Maryland; Baltimore Police Department · filed 2025-01-02(e)(1)

Judge Bennett’s determination that Pitts’ 2020 termination sufficed to anchor Pitts’ hostile work environment claim within the 300-day limitations period was predicated solely on the allegations set forth in her Complaint—as is appropriate when deciding a motion to dismiss. However, in order to survive BPD’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Pitts must now set forth specific facts demonstrating her 2020 termination is a continuation of the hostile work environment she alleges occurred between 2014 and 2018. She has failed to do so.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an ADA plaintiff to file an administrative charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or within 300 days if filing with a state agency.

Jason v. Adobe, Inc. · filed 2025-01-10(e)(1)

Under federal law, plaintiff is required to file charges with the EEOC or a state agency within 180 or 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Plaintiff concedes that he did not do so and, as previously discussed, his claims under the ADA are foreclosed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows a 300-day charge filing period in a deferral state only when the claimant initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency; otherwise, the period is 180 days.

Sales v. Booz Allen & Hamilton, Inc. · filed 2025-01-16(e)(1)

Therefore, in the instant matter, a 180-day lookback period applies.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) did not bar the hostile work environment claim under the continuing violations doctrine.

CROMWELL v. SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY · filed 2025-04-15(e)(1)

As a preliminary matter, Cromwell’s hostile work environment claim is timely under the continuing violations doctrine.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars an untimely harassment incident from a hostile work environment claim when a lengthy gap separates it from the timely alleged conduct.

METZGER v. COOPERSBURG & LIBERTY KENWORTH, INC. · filed 2025-07-01(e)(1)

Under Title VII, claims must be filed with the EEOC within three hundred days of the alleged discrimination occurring. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1). ... Given the lengthy gap between the allegations, the earlier one cannot be included under the continuing violations theory and the expired statute of limitations bars it from being actionable.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an employee in a deferral state to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC or an appropriate state agency within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice.

Cooper v. TWU/IAM Association · filed 2025-07-11(e)(1)

In a deferral state such as Oklahoma, an aggrieved employee must file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or an appropriate state agency within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII charge in a deferral state to be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory conduct; the deadline may be equitably tolled in rare circumstances.

Ball v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2025-07-21(e)(1)

Under Title VII, a charge of discrimination must be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory conduct in a deferral state such as Oklahoma. ... Plaintiff’s EEOC charges was not filed within 300 days of his resignation, and his Title VII claim (count I) is dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to timely exhaust his administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an employee to file a Title VII administrative claim within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

MAYHEW v. IDEXX LABORATORIES INC · filed 2025-07-18(e)(1)

For Title VII claims to be timely, the employee alleging a violation must file an administrative claim with the appropriate state agency “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) bars claims based on discriminatory acts outside the applicable 300-day filing period.

King v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2025-07-24(e)(1)

Here, King filed her second NYSDHR complaint on November 8, 2022. As such, any claims that accrued prior to January 12, 2022 (300 days prior to November 8, 2022), are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 12117(a); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue notice; mediation efforts alone do not excuse a late filing.

Dudley v. Seed School of Washington D.C. · filed 2025-07-25(f)(1)

Mr. Dudley thus filed his Complaint one day beyond the statutory deadline, which is fatal.

Section 2000e-5(e) imposes a 300-day filing period for a discrimination charge, but earlier acts may serve as background evidence for a timely claim.

NOVAK v. TORCON, INC. · filed 2025-07-28(e)

Finally, we deny Torcon’s argument that Ms. Novak’s sex discrimination claim is barred by the applicable 300-day statute of limitations because Ms. Novak’s claims hinge on her termination, which is within the 300-day statutory period.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file suit within ninety days after receiving the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter.

Evans v. Thomas Concrete Inc. · filed 2025-07-31(f)(1)

An action such as this must be brought by the plaintiff within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII). ... This is ninety-two days after he received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to sue within 90 days of receiving an EEOC dismissal and right-to-sue notice; a second notice issued after that period expires does not restart it.

King v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC · filed 2025-08-05(f)(1)

Simply put, the EEOC’s second right to sue notice failed to revive King’s already-expired limitation period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an employee to file a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Seredina v. W.L. Gore & Associates Incorporated · filed 2025-08-07(e)(1)

An employee must file a charge of discrimination within three hundred days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). ... However, the Court agrees with Defendant that any claims based on a denial of promotions must be dismissed as untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge in a deferral state to be filed within 300 days of a discrete discriminatory act.

Matthews v. Detroit Police Department · filed 2025-08-08(e)(1)

Thus in this case, only discrete acts that occurred after May 18, 2022, are timely brought, which means the dispute centers, in essence, on the benefits status change on May 31, 2022.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows a hostile work environment claim when at least one act falls within the charge-filing period, even if other acts occurred earlier.

Green v. iMentor, Inc. · filed 2025-08-08(e)(1)

Ms. Green’s termination occurred on June 30, 2022, which is well within the 300-day period to file an EEOC Charge under Title VII, and her allegations of gender and race discrimination and harassment prior to her termination are part of her claims for hostile work environment based on race and gender discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims under Title VII (Counts VII and IX) are not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives an employee in a deferral jurisdiction 300 days to file an EEOC discrimination charge; an untimely charge bars an ADA employment claim.

Socrates v. Manpower Group · filed 2025-08-08(e)(1)

Because more than 300 days elapsed between the alleged discriminatory conduct and Socrates’s filing of the EEOC charge, he failed to timely exhaust the administrative remedies necessary to pursue an ADA claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) generally requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of an alleged unlawful employment practice.

Watkins v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2025-08-15(e)(1)

Plaintiff filed her First EEOC Charge on August 13, 2012 and amended that charge on February 5, 2013, Pl.’s SOF Resp. ¶ 113, so any discrete discriminatory act exhausted by that charge must have occurred on or after February 15, 2012.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day filing limit does not bar earlier discriminatory pay claims when related discriminatory payments continue into the filing period.

Tardiff v. Laborers International Union of North America, Local 609 · filed 2025-08-15(e)(1)

The regular payments of a wage below her male-counterparts due to past discrimination would invoke the continuing violation doctrine and therefore are not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows a discrimination claim based on one unlawful employment practice to include older acts if at least one act occurred within the charge-filing period.

McKay v. City Of Chicago · filed 2025-08-20(e)(1)

But more importantly, a discrimination claim will not be time-barred so long as (1) all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice and (2) at least one act falls within the time period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows consideration of harassment before the charge-filing period when a jury could find it part of the same hostile work environment as conduct within that period.

EEOC v. BNSF Railway Company · filed 2025-08-28(e)(1)

We hold that the district court erred in excluding evidence outside the limitations period because a reasonable jury could find that conduct outside the limitations period was “similar in nature, frequency, and severity” such that they are “part and parcel of the hostile work environment.” Wilkie, 638 F.3d at 951 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits earlier acts to support a timely hostile work environment charge only when they are part of the same unlawful employment practice as later acts.

Meister v. Rockford Public Schools Dist. 205 · filed 2025-09-05(e)(1)

Each predicate act in a hostile work environment claim must be part of the same “unlawful employment practice,” meaning that they must bear some relation to one another. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1).

In a state with an agency authorized to handle discrimination claims, Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a charge within 300 days of a discrete discriminatory act.

Wolek v. University of Louisville · filed 2025-08-21(e)(1)

To the extent that those alleged discrete acts of discrimination occurred prior to July 14, 2022, Wolek cannot rely on those events to support a disparate treatment claim, and the University’s motion is granted.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely charge for each separate hostile work environment practice.

RACHWALSKI v. GARLAND · filed 2025-08-21(e)(1)

O'Neal ceased supervising Rachwalski in January 2021, and she did not file her EEOC complaint until October 18, 2021, well past the timely filing requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). ... Her hostile work environment claim concerning O'Neal's conduct is therefore time barred, and the Court may only analyze her claim based on Brooks' actions.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) imposes a filing deadline that can make earlier alleged harassment untimely.

Yahne v. City and County of Denver Department of Human Services · filed 2025-08-26(e)(1)

This creates a substantial barrier for Plaintiff as these earlier complaints about Marson’s conduct—whatever their nature—are untimely. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge; when timely filing presents a potential factual dispute, the court may allow discovery before resolving exhaustion.

Prescott v. Sonshine Therapy, LLC · filed 2025-08-28(e)(1)

This charge must be “filed within [180] days after the alleged ... unlawful employment practice occurred . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). ... At this stage of the proceedings and given Defendant’s position that further evidence and verification needs to be gathered on the issue, the Court finds it appropriate to deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss so that the parties can develop the record on what currently appears to be a potential factual dispute.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day deadline for filing a discrimination charge applies to ADA claims through section 12117(a).

Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc. · filed 2025-09-04(e)(1)

A “claimant who wishes to bring a lawsuit claiming a violation of the ADA must file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.” Parry, 236 F.3d at 309; see 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (noting procedures from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) apply to ADA claims). ... He filed neither the Questionnaire nor the Charge by September 2020 and therefore exceeded the 300-day limit.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a Title VII claimant in New York to file an EEOC charge within 300 days; a timely termination makes an earlier hostile work environment claim timely only if it was part of the same discriminatory practice.

McFarlane · filed 2025-12-15(e)(1)

In New York, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... It’s on the basis of this limitation that plaintiff fails to invoke the continuing violation doctrine for purposes of Title VII. Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that her termination was part of the same “ongoing, discriminatory practice that created [the] hostile work environment.”

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows earlier acts to support a timely hostile work environment claim when they are part of the same actionable practice, but bars untimely discrete discrimination and retaliation claims.

Browning · filed 2026-03-09(e)(1)

Accordingly, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that allegations predating October 14, 2022, may be used to analyze his hostile work environment claim, but not in assessing Plaintiff’s claims of racial discrimination and retaliation.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) generally requires an EEOC charge within 180 days; the period extends to 300 days when the EEOC has a work-sharing agreement with a state counterpart.

Ajisafe v. Government of the District of Columbia · filed 2026-03-13(e)(1)

The court agrees that Mr. Ajisafe’s claim based on the District’s failure to extend his accommodation is time-barred. However, Mr. Ajisafe’s other alleged adverse actions are timely. ... An aggrieved party typically has 180 days to file a charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). But “when the EEOC has a work-sharing agreement with its state counterpart, as it does with the District of Columbia, this deadline is extended to 300 days.”

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a person who files with a state or local agency 300 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice to file an EEOC charge.

Richards-Smith · filed 2026-03-17(e)(1)

Because Ms. Richards Smith filed a charge with the local agency (the Montgomery County Office of Human Rights) at the same time as with the EEOC, only acts that occurred within 300 days prior to the filing of that charge are considered timely.

An untimely Title VII charge can warrant dismissal at the pleading stage when the complaint shows the delay and equitable tolling does not apply.

Rubio v. Credence Management Solutions, LLC · filed 2026-04-30(e)(1)

Thus, it is “clear from the face of the complaint[,]” Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 578, that his claims are untimely under Title VII’s statutory deadline for filing an EEOC charge, and thus, the Court must dismiss those claims even at this early stage of the case unless equitable tolling is applicable.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a claimant covered by applicable state discrimination law to commence state proceedings and wait 60 days before filing an EEOC charge.

Greene v. Swain County Partnership for Health · filed 2004-10-06(c)

Because Plaintiffs charges had not been considered under state law, the EEOC could not issue a valid right to sue letter, and the Court does not have jurisdiction over her Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a claimant alleging discrimination involving a state to file with an appropriate state agency and give it at least sixty days to resolve the claim before filing with the EEOC, unless the agency dismisses the claim earlier.

Tucker v. Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment · filed 2004-07-22(c)

Section 706(c) of Title VII provides that, in cases alleging discrimination involving a state, a claimant may not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC unless she has first filed a claim with an appropriate state agency and given that agency at least sixty days to attempt to resolve the matter (unless the state agency dismisses the claim earlier).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows the 300-day EEOC filing period when a worksharing agreement makes the EEOC’s receipt of a charge initiate state-agency proceedings, even without proof that the charge was transmitted to the state agency.

Torrico v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 2004-03-09(e)(1)

IBM’s objection that no evidence establishes that the EEOC in fact transmitted Torrico’s complaint to the NYSDHR is unavailing, for under federal law, and as expressly provided in the worksharing agreement, one agency’s receipt of a charge automatically initiates proceedings in both agencies for purposes of the timeliness of the charges.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars an EEOC charge filed before the state agency’s proceedings end or the required waiting period expires.

Washington v. Aerojet-General Corporation · filed 1968-03-29(b)

This being so, it is unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff’s letter received by the EEOC on October 2, 1967, can be considered to establish a new filing date or whether the filing date must be considered September 6, 1967, for in either event plaintiff acted and brought his case before the EEOC at a date which was impermissible under Section 706(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b).

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a complainant to begin proceedings with an available state agency before filing an EEOC charge based on discrimination covered by state law.

Edwards v. North American Rockwell Corp. · filed 1968-08-09(b)

Section 706(b) of the Act requires that an alleged unlawful employment practice based upon race be made the subject of a complaint to the Cal. FEPC before a charge based upon such alleged discrimination can validly be filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a person to pursue state remedies before filing an EEOC charge when state law offers substantial relief against the alleged discrimination.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Appellant, v. UNION BANK, a Corporation, Appellee · filed 1969-02-13(b)

In the light of all of the foregoing, we hold that where, as here, substantial relief against the alleged discrimination is available under state law, the person aggrieved must pursue state remedies before a valid complaint may be filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to defer to a state agency for no more than sixty days and does not require reconsideration of the state agency's decision before a federal suit.

Bremer v. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad Company · filed 1969-12-23(b)

Plaintiff's failure to request reconsideration of the Missouri Commission's decision does not deprive this court of jurisdiction. There is no provision in the Act which makes termination of state proceedings, much less reconsideration, a prerequisite to action by the EEOC or judicial relief, and defendant has cited no authority in support of its contention. Section 706(b) 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to defer to the state agency for a maximum period of sixty days. After the expiration of sixty days, the EEOC may assert its own jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(b) gives a state agency an opportunity to seek voluntary compliance when it can pursue conciliation, even if it cannot award the remedies available in federal court.

Erlene Crosslin and Robert Crosslin, Her Husband v. The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company · filed 1970-03-30(b)

The phrase “grant or seek relief,” if it is to be sensibly construed, must, then, be read with the sixty-day time period in mind and the relief that the state agency may seek under subsection (b) must reasonably be read to encompass those means most likely to produce results in the time allowed. Since the modest grace period for state action is hardly likely to accommodate coerced compliance, the opportunity afforded the states is realistically one to achieve voluntary compliance.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires an eligible state agency to have the first opportunity to consider a charge; the EEOC cannot satisfy that sequence by notifying the state of a charge already sent to the EEOC and then automatically proceeding.

LOVE v. The PULLMAN COMPANY · filed 1970-07-30(b)

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is precise in its requirements that the States with adequate statutes and machinery have the first opportunity to consider complaints. This first opportunity is a clear requirement in the sequences set out in the Act. This opportunity cannot come by an advice from the EEOC that a complaint has already been filed with it. This practice seeks to channel complaints first to the EEOC which then "advises" the State agency, gives it sixty days, and then the EEOC automatically proceeds. The statute does not contemplate this procedure.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a complainant to begin available state proceedings for each distinct discrimination claim before bringing it to the EEOC.

Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp. · filed 1970-12-23(b)

Thus, an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of the claims of this suit was the filing of a charge by the plaintiff on such claims with the FEPC. ... Since the plaintiff is relying upon alleged acts of discrimination which have not been the subject of a complaint to the FEPC he has failed to meet the requirements necessary for this court to assert subject matter jurisdiction and such claims must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits a prematurely filed federal charge to proceed when the Federal Commission waits until the state proceedings end before acting.

Fix v. Swinerton and Walberg Company · filed 1970-11-13(b)

The Court finds there has been substantial compliance with the procedural requirements. Although the plaintiff filed his complaint with the Federal Commission prematurely, the Federal Commission did not proceed to act until after the State Commission had notified the Federal Commission of the termination of its investigation. Substantial compliance with the procedural requirement is sufficient, and the motion to dismiss should be denied.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows an oral complaint to commence required state proceedings when state law does not require a written complaint.

Tidwell v. American Oil Company · filed 1971-09-02(b)

This court holds that plaintiff’s oral complaint was sufficient to “commence” state proceedings as required by Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits the EEOC to refer a charge filed first with it to a state agency and process the charge after the deferral period.

Watson v. Limbach Company · filed 1971-10-27(b)

Although courts are not unanimous in their views towards this question, this Court holds that the deferral procedure adopted and employed by the EEOC is within the intent of the statute and was properly utilized in the handling of plaintiff’s charge.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits an EEOC charge submitted before the state deferral period expires to be treated as filed when state proceedings end or the 60-day period passes.

Marina VOUTSIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1971-12-03(b)

Our conclusion that the complaint was properly filed pursuant to the statute is made easier by the EEOC regulation. ... Under the regulation, a copy of a complaint filed prematurely with the Commission is promptly transmitted to the appropriate local or state agency, ... while the complaint itself is held by the EEOC until termination of the local or state proceedings or the lapse of the 60-day statutory waiting period, whichever occurs first, and then it is considered to be filed.

Section 2000e-5(b) and (d) allow the EEOC to refer a charge to a state agency and file it when the state proceedings end without requiring the complainant to file again.

Love v. Pullman Co. · filed 1972-01-17(b), (d)

We see no reason why further action by the aggrieved party should be required. The procedure complies with the purpose both of § 706 (b), to give state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints, and of § 706 (d), to ensure expedition in the filing and handling of those complaints.

Section 2000e-5(b) and (d) require submission to the appropriate state agency when the state prohibits the alleged employment practice and has an authority empowered to seek or grant relief.

Page v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation · filed 1971-10-18(b), (d)

Submission is required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) and (d) if the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs in a state having a law prohibiting the practice and establishing a state authority to grant or seek relief from such a practice. New Jersey is such a state.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires an EEOC commissioner to notify an authorized state agency before commencing an unfair employment practice charge.

MOTOROLA, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Et Al., Defenda · filed 1972-05-15(c)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), an EEOC commissioner may not commence an unfair employment practice charge without first filing notice of such charge before a state agency which is authorized “to grant or seek relief from such practice.”

Section 2000e-5(b) permits a federal charge after state proceedings terminate, even if the state's efforts were inadequate.

Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Quinn · filed 1972-06-30(b)

If state representatives fail to live up to apparent state expectations, or even the clear requirements of state law, a state problem may be presented but nothing of federal concern. The state has had its opportunity and the requirements of the Act have been satisfied.

Section 2000e-5(b)'s state agency deferral requirement is satisfied when the state agency receives the charge and has an opportunity to act before the EEOC processes it.

Nazario BARELA, Plaintiff-Appellee (Cross-Appellant), v. UNITED NUCLEAR CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant (Cross-Appellee · filed 1972-07-20(b)

The New Mexico Commission in this case was apprised of the charge whereby it could take action if it chose to do so, and E.E.O.C. accepted the case for processing only after the state had had its opportunity to pursue it. Therefore, the spirit of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) was satisfied.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires referral to available state procedures before a federal Title VII suit, but EEOC's failure to refer a charge does not forfeit the employee's claim.

Mrs. Jane MITCHELL Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MID-CONTINENT SPRING COMPANY OF KENTUCKY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1972-08-11(b)

We agree with the District Court that referral of the charge to Kentucky authorities was required before initiating this action in the District Court, but vacate the order of dismissal and remand for the reasons stated in this opinion. ... It is clear that Mrs. Mitchell should not lose her cause of action because of the failure of EEOC to refer her complaint to a State agency.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not require a complaint to a state agency before an EEOC charge when that agency lacks authority over the alleged discrimination.

Donohue v. Shoe Corporation of America · filed 1972-02-18(b)

Therefore the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not require plaintiff to complain to the FEPC before turning to the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a charging party to begin with an available state agency and wait 60 days, unless the state proceeding ends earlier, before filing with the EEOC.

Baker v. California Land Title Company · filed 1972-05-01(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) requires the charging party to commence his proceeding with the state agency, where one exists (in California the F.E. P.C.), and provides that he may not file with the E.E.O.C. before 60 days have expired or until the state proceeding shall have been earlier terminated. There is no allegation in the complaint that this was done. However, in plaintiff’s reply memorandum he has attached exhibits which indicate that there was, in fact, a compliance with this section and since the authenticity of these exhibits is not controverted, and treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, I hold that jurisdictional requirements have been met and that this court does have subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires substantial weight to be given to final state or local agency findings; the court adopted that standard for federal courts considering prior state agency decisions in Title VII suits.

Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., Tobacco Workers International Union Local No. 16 · filed 1972-06-29(b)

For these reasons we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for an evidentiary hearing during which the District Judge shall “accord substantial weight to final findings and orders” previously entered in the premises by the Kentucky Human Rights Commission.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits an aggrieved person to file an EEOC charge once the state terminates its proceedings, even if the state took little or no action.

Pacific Maritime Association v. Quinn · filed 1972-10-10(b)

The federal purpose is to give respectful but modest deference to a state that has evidenced interest: sixty days within which to do whatever it chooses in order to accomplish its own resolution of the dispute. If (notwithstanding sufficient expression of state interest) state representatives choose to do nothing with a complaint duly filed with them and accordingly terminate state proceedings-whether with a helpless shrug of the shoulders or a turning out of pockets, or with no explanation whatsoever-the federal purpose has been fully met.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires available state remedies to be pursued before an EEOC charge may proceed and, under this decision, before a federal court has jurisdiction.

Abshire v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. · filed 1972-12-11(b)

Since the plaintiff has failed to exhaust, or even begin to exhaust his state remedy, as required by § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the EEOC cannot file the plaintiff’s complaint relating to alleged discrimination. Jurisdiction does not lie in this Court until state remedies have been exhausted.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a plaintiff to pursue EEOC procedures before bringing a Title VII suit.

O'BRIEN v. Shimp · filed 1973-01-12(e)

Plaintiff cannot bring Count II as a Title VII suit because she has failed to follow the exhaustion procedures required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e).

Section 2000e-5(b)'s filing prerequisite is satisfied when a plaintiff first gives a local agency an opportunity to consider a discrimination charge and files an amended EEOC charge more than 60 days later.

McFadden v. Baltimore Steamship Trade Association · filed 1973-01-03(b)

This Court is satisfied that the procedure followed by plaintiff complied with the purpose of § 2000e-5(b) and of other provisions of the Act to give state or local agencies a prior opportunity to consider such complaints and then to permit the EEOC to attempt to resolve the charges without litigation.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not require the EEOC to return a newly discovered discrimination ground to a state agency after the EEOC has properly begun its investigation.

Latino v. Rainbo Bakers, Inc. · filed 1973-04-09(b)

Since the Commission had properly assumed jurisdiction and commenced its own investigation, we find nothing in the language of section 2000e-5(b) which requires the EEOC to surrender jurisdiction to the state agency.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require the EEOC to defer a charge to a state agency that lacks authority to grant or seek relief on that charge.

Bauman v. Union Oil Company · filed 1973-07-18(c)

Since § 1420 does not make retaliation for filing complaints with the Commission unlawful, and since § 1419(f) does not empower the FEPC to investigate or pass upon charges of retaliation for filing complaints with it, FEPC is not a state agency established or authorized to grant or seek relief as to those charges. Consequently, the Commission was not required to defer the claim of retaliatory discharge to the FEPC by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--5(c).

Section 2000e-5(b) does not require dismissal of a Title VII action because the plaintiffs failed to notify the state before filing.

Josephine PARKER and Judi Greenlee, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF the NORTHWEST, INC., Defendan · filed 1973-04-11(b)

The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to notify the state of their claims, and that such notice was necessary, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), as a preliminary to federal jurisdiction. We find that the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint was in error.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s state agency referral requirement is satisfied when the EEOC refers a charge to the state agency and formally files it after that agency declines to act.

Willis v. Chicago Extruded Metals Company · filed 1973-04-25(b)

The jurisdictional requirements of the statute are fulfilled when, as in the instant case, a charge is filed with the EEOC prior to exhaustion of the state remedy, is referred by EEOC to the state agency, and then is formally filed after the state agency has indicated that it would decline to take action.

Under the version of Section 706(b) governing this case, an EEOC referral to a state or local agency satisfied the prerequisite for filing a federal charge.

Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co. · filed 1973-06-25(b)

But it is equally clear that the EEOC forwarded said charge to the appropriate agency for State or local consideration. Thus the policy of Section 706(b) was complied with. ... Reference by the EEOC is entirely consistent with the requirement stated, as has been seen, in the passive voice.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows a Title VII suit to include later incidents reasonably related to a charge filed with a state agency without requiring a new state filing for each incident.

Steven OUBICHON, Appellant, v. NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1973-07-10(b)

When an employee seeks judicial relief for incidents not listed in his original charge to the EEOC, the judicial complaint nevertheless may encompass any discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge, including new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge before the EEOC. ... The same standard should govern when the charge is first filed with a state agency.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires deference to state proceedings only when the state has established or authorized an agency to act on the alleged employment practice; a prosecutor’s general authority to bring criminal cases does not suffice.

GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellan · filed 1974-01-15(b)

We reject the argument of appellee that the state or county prosecuting attorney can qualify as such agency through his general authority to institute criminal proceedings. What the section requires is a showing of such state concern in the specific area of unfair employment practices as to result in the establishment or authorizing of an agency to act in this area.

Section 2000e-5 requires referral of EEOC complaints to a state agency, but a pending agency proceeding does not prevent an individual from suing within the Act’s time limit.

Gilinsky v. Columbia University · filed 1974-02-11(b)

Referral of EEOC complaints to the state agency is mandated by the statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)), but the continued pen-dency of agency proceedings does not deprive an individual of the statutory right to sue within the time frame established by the Act.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state agency deferral requirement is satisfied for a related amended charge when the state agency has already terminated proceedings on substantially the same complaint.

Black Musicians v. Local 60-471, American Federation of Musicians · filed 1974-05-08(c)

Therefore, once the PHRC terminated its jurisdiction over substantially the same employment complaint we see no reason why deferral should have been made again. We hold that under these facts the policy of deferral to state agencies has been sufficiently satisfied to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires deferral when state law prohibits the alleged discrimination and a state authority can seek relief or institute criminal proceedings.

Nueces County Hospital District v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1974-02-26(c)

The statutory language is also clear that deferral is required if a state authority can seek relief or institute criminal proceedings. Use of the word “or” indicates deferral is required if the state can accomplish either.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits an EEOC charge after 60 days of state proceedings; later withdrawal of the state complaint does not defeat exhaustion.

Presseisen v. Swarthmore College · filed 1974-12-13(c)

Section 2000e-5(c) provides that no charge may be filed with the Federal Commission before the expiration of 60 days after proceedings have been commenced under state law. As previously discussed, plaintiff filed her complaint with the state commission on June 2, 1972. There can be no question that the required 60 days had elapsed prior to the filing of the charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC. The withdrawal of the state commission complaint in May of 1974 does not support a finding that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust her state administrative remedies, particularly in light of the fact that the state commission had almost two years to consider the discrimination complaint.

Section 2000e-5 provides a federal remedy independent of state discrimination proceedings, allowing a federal court to hear a Title VII claim de novo after state proceedings.

Benneci v. Department of Labor, New York State Division of Employment · filed 1975-01-09

A review of some of the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 demonstrates clearly that Congress intended the federal remedy to be separate and independent from any state remedy. ... The fact that the Appellate Division affirmed the state agency’s determination is of no consequence.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a Title VII claimant to pursue an available local grievance process before suing, unless that process would be meaningless for the challenged city policy.

Padilla v. Stringer · filed 1974-12-31(c)

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c) provides that a person must initially institute proceedings with the state or local authority which is vested with the power to grant or seek relief from unlawful employment practices or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto. ... Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his local administrative remedies as to his Title VII claims against the defendants. This is dispositive of all of plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, except that based upon the requirement of a high school degree for certain positions. ... Therefore as to that one claim it would be meaningless to require pursuit of the city grievance procedure.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires proceedings before an authorized state agency before a charge is filed with the EEOC, followed by a 60-day deferral period unless the state proceedings end sooner.

Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc. · filed 1975-03-14(c)

Subsection (c) is mandatory in providing that where there is a State law “prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice” no charge may be filed by or with the Commission “before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated”.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires deferral to the state agency and expiration of the sixty-day deferral period before a right-to-sue letter may issue in Arizona cases.

Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft Co. · filed 1975-04-03(c)

The existence and service of a properly issued right-to-sue letter, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to plaintiff’s suit. Such letter can only be issued in Arizona cases after deferral to the state and after expiration of the sixty day deferral period.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s deferral requirement is satisfied when the EEOC refers a charge to a local agency, gives it an opportunity to act, and the agency does not act before the EEOC resumes the charge.

Winsey v. Pace College · filed 1975-05-06(c)

In the instant case, the City Commission had notice in writing from the EEOC of the charge and they acknowledged in writing receipt of the complaint. The City Commission had the opportunity to act in the first instance since the EEOC charge was held in abeyance pending a resolution by the City Commission. The City Commission neglected to act and the EEOC automatically reactivated the complaint, found reasonable cause, and notified Winsey of her right to sue. This procedure was sufficient and no further action by Winsey is required.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require separate state agency deferral of an amended EEOC charge that relates back to a properly deferred charge.

Cook v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1975-07-17(c)

The effect of reaching this conclusion is to obviate the need for a deferral of the second charge by allowing it to relate back to the properly deferred first charge.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires deferral only when state or local law prohibits the unlawful employment practice alleged in the charge.

Nueces County Hospital District v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1975-09-04(c)

It follows that the Texas statute fails to meet the deferral requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) as applied in this case. Texas did not have a law prohibiting the unlawful retaliation included in Marta Glueck's original charge. The Commission was authorized to assume the duty of investigating that charge and to issue the subpoena duces tecum.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s federal filing period governs the availability of a Title VII remedy even when a shorter state filing deadline has expired.

Joe E. DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VALLEY DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-09-15(e)

The remaining question is whether appellant’s federal judicial remedy is barred because he failed to file his complaint with the Arizona Commission within the 60-day state limitation period. We conclude that it is not.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state agency deferral requirement is satisfied when a complainant attempts to present a discrimination claim to the state agency but the agency fails to recognize it.

Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Company, Inc. · filed 1975-12-12(c)

Therefore, we construe Mr. Faraci’s attempt to proceed before the Division' as sufficient to comply with the deferral requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state agency deferral requirement may be satisfied even when the charging party later withdraws the state charge.

Guse v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1976-01-07(c)

The defendant complains that the plaintiff’s voluntary withdrawal of the charge pending before the state has so frustrated the title VII policy of the deferral to local authorities for conciliation efforts that jurisdiction should not be exercised. Nevertheless, the record reveals that the deferral requirements contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) has been met.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a retaliation charge to be referred to a state authority empowered to investigate it, even when another state agency has waived jurisdiction.

Greenlow v. California Department of Benefit Payments · filed 1976-01-16(c)

Since the waiver by the FEPC of the retaliation charges constituted termination within the meaning of § 2000e-5(c), consideration must be given to defendants’ second contention, that the charge should have been referred to (or filed with, by plaintiff) the SPB. ... It appears therefore, that plaintiff’s recourse should have been to the SPB rather than to the FEPC, since it is a State authority which has power to investigate § 704(a) claims.

Section 2000e-5 requires an initial referral to the state agency, but does not require a second referral when the EEOC later discovers additional grounds for discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Raymond Metal Products Co. · filed 1976-01-26(c) and (d)

The initial charge was referred to the Maryland commission, but that agency waived jurisdiction. When the federal commission later discovered reasonable cause to believe that the company engaged in race and sex discrimination, it did not refer the case again to the Maryland commission. We find no error in this procedure. One purpose of the statute is to give state agencies an opportunity to settle disputes before the federal government steps in. This purpose, however, is adequately served by the initial referral which affords the state agency an opportunity to undertake a full investigation of the company’s practices.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires EEOC to give substantial weight to a state agency’s final findings, but does not require a written explanation when EEOC reaches contrary factual conclusions.

United States v. Sweet Home Central School District · filed 1976-01-28(b)

Defendants do not cite any authority (they note the absence of any reported case) for their contention that the giving by EEOC of substantial weight to the final findings of a state agency requires a written explanation by EEOC of contrary factual conclusions. The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), does not demand that procedure.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to give substantial weight to state or local findings when making a reasonable cause determination, but does not bar a separate EEOC investigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1976-05-04(b)

This statute provides that the Commission shall give “substantial weight” to state or local findings when making a reasonable cause determination and not when deciding whether to investigate a charge. This provision does not require the Commission to refrain from investigating a charge which has been subject to a prior finding by a state or local agency.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows the 300-day EEOC filing period when proceedings are first instituted with a state agency, even if the state charge is filed more than 180 days after the alleged discrimination.

Doski v. M. Goldseker Co. · filed 1976-06-30(e)

While it clearly states that unless this procedure is followed charges must be filed within 180 days with the EEOC, it does not on its face require or in any way intimate that charges with the State or local agency must be initially instituted within 180 days.

Section 2000e-5(e) extends the EEOC charge filing period when a person first seeks relief from a state or local agency authorized to address the alleged employment discrimination.

St. Aubin v. Transcon Lines, Inc. · filed 1976-10-14(e)

The Court finds that within one month of his discharge he sought the aid of a local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from discriminatory employment practices, and that he thereby became entitled to the statutory extension of time in which to file his complaint with the EEOC. That complaint was therefore timely.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires deferral to the appropriate state agency; if the EEOC fails to comply, the district court should retain jurisdiction while the agency has its statutory period to act.

Gallego v. Arthur G. McKee & Co. · filed 1977-01-25(c)

As a matter of equity, where the EEOC has failed to follow section 2000e-5(c), the district court should retain jurisdiction for a period of time sufficient to allow the EEOC to notify the appropriate state agency and to allow that agency the statutory deferral period in which to act. If the state agency elects not to act, the district court should then proceed as the rights of the parties demand.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires state agency deferral, and when the EEOC fails to comply, the district court should retain jurisdiction long enough for the agency to receive notice and have its statutory period to act.

14 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1824, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,618 · filed 1977-03-24(c)

As a matter of equity, where the EEOC has failed to follow section 2000e-5(c), the district court should retain jurisdiction for a period of time sufficient to allow the EEOC to notify the appropriate state agency and to allow that agency the statutory deferral period in which to act.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires charges to be presented to an authorized state agency before they are brought to the EEOC; a complaint that does not show state exhaustion is subject to dismissal without prejudice.

Trent v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. · filed 1977-05-06(c)

Section 2000e-5(c) provides that in states that have state agencies with authority to seek or grant the relief requested, charges must be filed with that state agency to give the local officials an opportunity before charges may be brought with the EEOC to resolve the matter. ... Under these circumstances, we must dismiss the Complaint without prejudice to renew in order to show state exhaustion or to renew the suit upon first exhausting the state remedy and then properly presenting the charges to the EEOC for conciliation and investigation.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires deferral to state agency proceedings but does not require a claimant to seek state judicial review of the agency’s ruling.

Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co. · filed 1977-04-06(c)

The deferral requirements of Title VII do not contemplate resort to state judicial review and thus, in the circumstances of this case where resort to the Appellate Division is a decisive factor, it cannot be argued that bringing a Title VII claim and undergoing deferral must automatically foreclose the remedies available under § 1981.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a state agency filing only if an effective state or local law prohibits the alleged employment practice.

Leis v. Opportunity Consultants · filed 1977-06-27(c)

The Court concludes that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) must be read as providing that a charge must be filed with the state agency if the state has an effective or operative state or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a 60-day deferral to state or local proceedings, but does not require those proceedings to be exhausted before federal action may continue.

Darlene GUSE Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1977-08-11(c)

This objection is insubstantial; the Congressional policy of deference to state and local agencies is embodied in the limited form of a 60-day no-action period. Nothing in § 2000e-5(c) even remotely suggests that state procedures must be exhausted before federal action may continue.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state agency deferral does not deprive a Title VII claimant of a federal trial de novo when the respondent appeals the agency decision to state court.

Gilinsky v. Columbia University in City of New York · filed 1977-11-15(c)

Once Columbia appealed the agency decision, Gilinsky had no choice but to defend her position. ... While we are aware that Mitchell suggests a claimant may waive this right by appealing to the state courts, the opinion in no way implies that a person may involuntarily be deprived of a trial de novo.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits an EEOC charge when the state agency waives jurisdiction, terminating state proceedings.

Morgan v. Sharon Pennsylvania Board of Education · filed 1978-01-05(c)

By waiving jurisdiction, “such proceedings have been earlier terminated,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), thereby validating the EEOC charges.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a charging party to notify the proper state officials and allow the state sixty days to act when its law prohibits the alleged discrimination and provides a qualifying remedy.

Mrs. Patsy Ruth White v. Dallas Independent School District · filed 1978-01-26(c)

We are of the opinion that the Texas statute meets this Title VII requirement for deferral. Before a charging party can be given authority to sue the state or one of its subdivisions, the proper local officials must be notified by either the EEOC or the aggrieved party. The first opportunity to act is to be afforded the state.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require a claimant to file an untimely state agency complaint before seeking federal relief when the state remedy has expired.

Stringer v. COM. OF PA., DEPT. OF COM. AFF., ETC. · filed 1978-03-14(c)

Plaintiff should not be compelled to go through the futile gesture of filing a complaint with the PHRC that would inevitably be rejected as untimely before seeking relief under the federal act. Nor should Plaintiffs federal statutory rights be foreclosed by her failure to file within the significantly shorter state limitation period.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require filing with a state agency in every state before plaintiffs who satisfied the filing prerequisites may represent a national class challenging a nationwide corporate policy.

Karan v. Nabisco, Inc. · filed 1978-03-23(c)

Thus, the failure to utilize state remedies in other states where such relief was available does not present a jurisdictional barrier to these Plaintiffs’ representation of a national class.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a claimant to seek relief from an available state agency before bringing a Title VII suit in federal court, and compliance is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Bell v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1978-04-13(c)

We hold that compliance with § 706(c), the deferral provision of Title VII, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII suit in the district court. Bell’s failure to present his claim to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission constitutes noncompliance with the § 706(c) jurisdictional prerequisite.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state deferral requirement is satisfied when the EEOC waits sixty days after referral, even if the claimant does not cooperate with the state agency.

Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No. 130 · filed 1978-04-21(c)

Although the court deplores plaintiffs Taylor’s and Viera’s total noncooperation with the Illinois FEPC impeding potential conciliation, the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) for state deferral of EEOC charges requires no more than a sixty-day no-action period by the EEOC to satisfy this jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires sixty-day deferral when state law prohibits the alleged discrimination and authorizes state or local officials to seek relief or institute criminal proceedings.

Mrs. Patsy Ruth WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1978-10-06(c)

We hold that the Texas statute is sufficient to require sixty-day deferral to district and county attorneys to permit them to institute criminal proceedings under it 7 if the complained of acts are prohibited by the statute.

Section 2000e-5(c) prevents the EEOC from treating a charge as filed before the 60-day state agency deferral period ends, unless the state proceedings end sooner.

Silver v. Mohasco Corp. · filed 1978-10-17(c)

Therefore, while recognizing that the law in this area seems unsettled and confused, it is my judgment that to the extent 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(1)(v)(A) (1977) seems contrary to the plain, although still complicated, language of § 2000e-5(c) and § 2000e-5(e) of Title VII, I find this regulation to be unauthorized by the statute.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not bar a diligent complainant’s suit when the EEOC mistakenly defers the charge to the wrong state agency.

Cummings v. D'Ambrosio · filed 1978-10-20(c)

In sum, the plaintiff should not have to bear the burden of the EEOC mistakes in deferral when the plaintiff relies on the EEOC to defer the case rather than implementing the state procedures himself.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not bar a Title VII claim when the EEOC fails to refer the original charge to a state agency but later refers a technical amendment to that charge.

Frank I. RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. NATIONAL DISTILLERS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1978-11-30(c)

Ramirez’s second charge was referred to the California Fair Employment Practices Commission by the EEOC. Because the second charge was merely an amendment to the first, the EEOC’s failure to refer the original charge to the state agency can have no effect on Ramirez’s right to pursue a Title VII claim with respect to the 1974 layoff.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a Title VII claimant to defer to state authorities when state law prohibits the employment practice challenged; failure to do so can bar the claim.

Henry v. Texas Tech University · filed 1979-01-25(c)

It is not denied that Dr. Henry failed to timely inform the district attorney in Lubbock of his charges. The EEOC did not recognize the district attorney as an “official 706 agency,” so it did not defer to the Texas authorities but merely sent them a courtesy notice of Dr. Henry’s charges. Consequently, this court finds that Dr. Henry’s Title VII charges involving discharge and refusal to hire are barred.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state agency requirement is satisfied when the state agency voluntarily gives up its opportunity to investigate under an agreement with the EEOC.

Lombardi v. Margolis Wines & Spirits, Inc. · filed 1979-02-02(c)

However, by signing the agreement, the HRC voluntarily relinquished that opportunity, as well as the opportunity to decide any other case that, for “special circumstances,” the EEOC desired to process. This case therefore concerns a voluntary waiver of jurisdiction by the state agency, rather than the kind of jurisdictional usurpation with which Congress was concerned when it enacted § 2000e-5(c).