42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5 provides for an independent federal hearing of a Title VII claim even after state court review of the state agency’s decision.

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. · filed 1978-12-07

The policy embodied in Title VII was intended to be effectuated by the entire procedure set forth in § 2000e-5 including the provision for a second, independent federal hearing. Truncating the procedure on the grounds of res judicata under these circumstances is not mandated by Mitchell and would be contrary to the apparent intent of Congress.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state proceedings requirement can be satisfied when the EEOC forwards written charges to the appropriate state agency.

Vulcan Society of Westchester County v. Fire Department of White Plains · filed 1979-04-10(c)

In the instant action the Division of Human Rights received such written statements when the EEOC forwarded the charges to it. Such reference is appropriate and sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require dismissal of a Title VII action when the EEOC fails to complete state-agency deferral.

TYLER v. REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY · filed 1979-07-05(c)

We have previously held that where the EEOC has failed to follow42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) the district court should not dismiss the action.

A district court should retain a Title VII action while the EEOC completes the state agency deferral required by § 2000e-5(c).

Tyler v. Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 1979-07-05(c)

We have previously held that where the EEOC has failed to follow 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) the district court should not dismiss the action.

In a state with an agency that reviews employment discrimination claims, filing with the EEOC alone before state proceedings commence does not count as a timely charge.

Roberts v. Arizona Board of Regents · filed 1979-07-06(c)

It is clear that filing the charge with the EEOC alone did not constitute a filing in light of the provision in Title VII stating: ... Thus, any instance of discrimination in employment occurring prior to June 1, 1975, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(c) treats state proceedings as commenced when the EEOC forwards a charge to the state agency, regardless of state filing requirements.

Silver v. Mohasco Corp. · filed 1979-07-18(c)

We believe, however, that the state proceedings "commenced" under § 706(c) on June 15, 1976, when Silver's letter was forwarded to NYSDHR by the EEOC. That a state law may require a formal filing becomes irrelevant to a determination of when the state proceeding "commences" for purposes of the federal statute.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state agency deferral requirement is satisfied when the agency receives the charge and the EEOC waits 60 days, even if the agency lacks a sufficient opportunity to consider the grievance.

Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n · filed 1979-09-12(c)

Regardless then of whether the NYSDHR had a sufficient opportunity to consider Spirt’s grievance, it is clear under Oscar Mayer that the jurisdictional requirement of § 706(b) has been fulfilled.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a genuine first opportunity for a state or local agency to address a discrimination charge before the EEOC acts, and a later state filing cannot cure premature EEOC proceedings.

Albano v. GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUR., INC.(GAB) · filed 1979-11-01(c)

If the EEOC acts, as it did in the instant action, before the state agency has had such an opportunity, it has done so in derogation of section 706(b) and without the requisite jurisdiction. Such a failing cannot be cured by a subsequent filing with the state.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state deferral requirement does not make a state court’s review of an agency ruling a bar to a later federal Title VII action.

Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory · filed 1980-01-11(c)

Title VII’s requirement of first deferring to state remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), would be frustrated by applying a bar to federal actions because a state court had decided an appeal from a state agency decision.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state agency deferral requirement does not make state court review of an agency decision a bar to a later federal Title VII action.

Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory · filed 1980-02-05(c)

Title VII's requirement of first deferring to state remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), would be frustrated by applying a bar to federal actions because a state court had decided an appeal from a state agency decision.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not delay an EEOC charge’s filing date until the state-agency deferral period ends when the EEOC receives the charge and holds it during that period.

Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1980-04-24(c)

Moreover, contrary to the Company’s argument, then-current § 706(b) of Title VII, now found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), would not preclude a starting date prior to October 1, 1967. ... The court finds Silver persuasive and controlling in this action and that Price’s filing date is on or about March 15,1968.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires compliance with state or local administrative procedures before a Title VII suit, and the EEOC may satisfy that requirement for the complainant.

Huggler v. Elkins Stroud Suplee & Co. · filed 1980-07-11(c)

Compliance with Section 706(c) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the bringing of a Title VII action in federal district court. ... This prerequisite may be satisfied, though, by the EEOC by its internal procedures, pursuant to regulation, as well as by the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(c) allows a charging party who had counsel to rely on EEOC procedures for satisfying the state agency exhaustion requirement.

Heiniger v. City of Phoenix · filed 1980-07-21(c)

We hold that the availability of counsel does not foreclose appellants from reasonable reliance on EEOC-established procedures designed to insure compliance with Title VII’s exhaustion requirements and thus minimize the risk of accidental forfeiture of valuable federal rights.

In a deferral State, an EEOC charge cannot be filed until state proceedings end or 60 days pass, and the federal filing must occur within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice.

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver · filed 1980-06-23(c), (e)

Although as the Court held in Love v. Pullman Co., supra , it was proper for the EEOC to hold respondent's "complaint in `suspended animation,' automatically filing it upon termination of the State proceedings," [20] 404 U. S., at 526 (emphasis added), that means that the charge was filed on the 351st day, not the 291st. By that time, however, the 300-day period had run and the filing was therefore untimely.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a claimant to begin proceedings before an available state agency and wait 60 days before filing with the EEOC, unless the state proceedings end sooner.

Crutcher v. Kentucky · filed 1980-08-05(c)

When a state agency exists which may grant relief to plaintiff, no claim may be made to the EEOC until sixty (60) days after the commencement of proceedings before that state agency, unless such proceedings are terminated before the passing of the sixty (60) days. ... Thus, state remedies were properly exhausted, under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(c), on plaintiff’s claim that the Department for Human Resources discriminatorily failed to promote him.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not require federal courts to treat state administrative discrimination proceedings as a bar to a later Title VII action.

Smouse v. General Electric Company · filed 1980-08-05(b)

For example, Title VII states that the EEOC need not accord final weight to state proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The parties have cited to nothing in the language and legislative history, and we have discovered nothing, to indicate that Congress intended the courts to defer to state procedures while the EEOC need not.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires Title VII claimants to begin available state or local proceedings before filing with the EEOC.

Kralowec v. Prince George's County, Md. · filed 1980-11-17(c)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) requires that federal claimants institute proceedings under any available state or local law prior to commencing an action with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. ... Plaintiff, a county employee, followed this procedure, thus complying with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) as well as with the procedures specified in the Merit System Ordinance.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits a state agency to waive its 60-day deferral period, thereby terminating its proceedings.

Yeung v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc. · filed 1980-12-10(c)

Since the reason for the deferral period is to offer state agencies the initial opportunity to operate without federal intervention, the DFEP clearly could agree to waive the statutory period and thereby “terminate” its proceedings.

A pending state agency charge that reasonably includes later EEOC allegations can satisfy Title VII’s deferral requirement and support a properly filed EEOC complaint.

Headrick v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1980-12-12(e)

Thus, because the EEOC apparently believed adequate deferral had occurred and because it appears that deferral had in fact occurred by reason of the earlier claim filed and pending with the state agency, which claim reasonably would be read to include the subsequent specific allegations made in the EEOC complaint, it is concluded that the EEOC considered a properly filed complaint of Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(c) is satisfied when a state or local agency has an opportunity to act and then waives jurisdiction, even at the employee’s request.

McKeever v. Atlantic Spring & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1980-12-15(c)

Inasmuch as the purpose of § 2000e~ 5(c) is to give state and local authorities the opportunity to act, I am persuaded that I have jurisdiction over McKeever’s complaint, because the PCHR had such an opportunity here.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state agency deferral requirement is satisfied when the state agency investigates the charge before the EEOC acts, even if the charge was filed with the EEOC during the deferral period.

Metcalf v. Omaha Steel Castings Co. · filed 1981-02-04(c)

In this instance, the local agency did in fact investigate plaintiff’s allegations before the federal agency took any action. Thus, the Court feels that plaintiff has complied with the jurisdiction prerequisites of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), i. e., as those prerequisites have been construed by other federal courts.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state agency requirement may be satisfied when the EEOC refers a charge on the complainant's behalf and defers its proceedings to give the state agency the first opportunity to act.

Lazic v. University of Pennsylvania · filed 1981-04-27(c)

It is settled that the procedural requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) may be met where the EEOC “acting on behalf of the complainant,” referred the charge to the state agency and then deferred its own proceedings for the proper time so as to allow the state agency the first opportunity to act on the charge.

Section 2000e-5(e) extends the EEOC filing period from 180 to 300 days when a complainant's contacts sufficiently initiate state agency proceedings, even without a formal state complaint.

Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc. · filed 1981-05-15(e)

Clearly, initially instituting proceedings with the state agency means something less than a formal filing, especially where, as here, the state agency has procedures for acting on complaints prior to the filing of the formal complaint.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires an available state agency to have an opportunity to address a discrimination charge, but failure to refer the charge initially does not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction.

Mann v. Board of Education School District 149 · filed 1981-06-11(c)

The defendant’s contention that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, due to the plaintiff’s failure to file with the FEPC, is without merit. ... The plaintiff is directed to refer his charges of discrimination to the FEPC. This court will retain jurisdiction over the cause until further action by the FEPC.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a discrimination charge to be presented to an authorized state agency when state law prohibits the alleged practice and provides a remedy.

Cannon v. State of Del. · filed 1981-09-28(c)

The State Department of Labor is an agency with the authority to investigate and remedy plaintiff’s complaint against the Personnel Commission, and is therefore one to which her Title VII claim must be presented under Section 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) requires referral to state authorities only when state or local law prohibits the alleged employment practice and authorizes an authority to address it.

Duke v. University of Texas at El Paso · filed 1981-12-09(c)

If the unlawful employment practices charged by Dr. Duke are not within the ambit of the statute, then the failure to refer to state authorities is immaterial to her present action. ... From the analysis above, it seems reasonably clear that Dr. Duke’s assertions of discriminatory pay, promotion and assignment practices lie beyond the reach of Article 6252-16. We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred in entering summary judgment against her and remand the case to permit her to proceed with her claim for relief.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not bar a discrimination suit when the complainant files with the EEOC but the EEOC fails to refer the charge to the appropriate state agency.

Toombs v. Greer-Smyrna, Inc. · filed 1982-01-08(c)

When a complainant has done all that the Supreme Court has stated is required of her in filing a charge with the EEOC, she should not be penalized because the EEOC ignores its own regulations and fails to refer the charge to the appropriate state agency.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires referral to qualifying state authorities before the EEOC processes a charge, but premature EEOC action does not bar a complainant’s suit when referral later occurs.

Deborah DEYO, Carroll S. Flinn and Sheila Bradley Crenshaw, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF DEER PARK, Defendant-Appel · filed 1981-12-23(c)

By serving notices and questionnaires on the city in this case, the EEOC failed to allow the state the requisite period of exclusive jurisdiction under § 706(b) before taking action with respect to the charges. The appellants’ duties were satisfied, however, by the EEOC’s later referral of their charges to the district attorney. The appropriate Texas officials were afforded an opportunity to act upon the charges, but declined to do so. No further statutory barrier to the appellants’ invocation of EEOC assistance remained.

A state agency’s waiver of initial processing does not terminate its proceedings under § 2000e-5(c) when it retains the charge for later review.

Klausner v. Southern Oil Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1982-03-15(c)

Since this Court finds that the NYSDHR’s waiver of initial processing did not amount to a termination within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), and since the plaintiff has failed to present any equitable consideration which would warrant this Court’s interference with the time limitations established by Congress, her claim is barred.

Section 2000e-5 permits a claimant to file a charge with the EEOC for referral to a state agency.

Baruah v. Young · filed 1982-03-24(c)

Although neither side has submitted copies of the relevant administrative documents, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff filed his administrative charge on November 21, 1979, and that the EEOC then referred the charge to the MCHR. Such a procedure is permissible under section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state deferral requirement is met when the EEOC refers a charge to the state agency and waits sixty days before investigating.

Clarence WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-03-29(c)

we conclude that the EEOC referral of Wilson’s complaint to the Kansas Commission “commenced” the action under state or local law and met the requirements of section 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require state agency deferral when the agency has waived its first opportunity to process the charge through a worksharing agreement.

Douglas v. Red Carpet Corp. of America · filed 1982-05-14(c)

Under these circumstances, where the relevant state agency has, through a Worksharing Agreement negotiated with and entered into by the EEOC, waived its right to first consider the plaintiff’s complaint, the state deferral requirement of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) becomes meaningless.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s deferral requirement is satisfied when the state or local agency has an opportunity to investigate and conciliate the complaint.

Collins v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. · filed 1982-06-22(c)

Undisputed facts show that the NYCCHR was provided the opportunity to investigate and conciliate plaintiff’s claim, and that it in fact exercised that opportunity. Consequently, the deferral requirements of Title VII and the ADEA have been satisfied and the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is not lacking on this ground.

In a deferral state, a charge sent to the state agency qualifies for the 300-day EEOC filing period even if the EEOC receives it first.

Shaffer v. National Can Corp. · filed 1983-06-14(e)

If the EEOC is not able to file a complaint formally before the running of the 60 day period then, by necessity, a proceeding before the state agency will be commenced prior to the proceeding before the EEOC. Thus, the interplay between these two statutory sections dictates that where a charge is sent to a state agency it will always be “initially” filed, rendering the 300 day period applicable.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a claimant in a deferral state to use the 300-day federal filing period despite an untimely state filing, if the state filing leaves enough time for an effective EEOC filing.

Rasimas v. Michigan Department of Mental Health · filed 1983-07-28(e)

Accordingly, we hold that deferral state claimants are not required to make a timely filing with the state agency before the federal 300 day filing period applies. All that is required is that a filing with the state agency be made with sufficient time to allow an effective filing with the EEOC within 300 days after the discriminatory act.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows claimants in deferral states to use the extended EEOC filing period even if they miss the state agency’s filing deadline.

Soble v. University of Maryland · filed 1983-10-13(e)

After reviewing the cases decided under the ADEA and Title VII, this court concludes that grievants in deferral states need not file a charge with a state agency within the state limitations period in order to obtain the benefit of the extended period of filing with the EEOC available in Title VII under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC filing requirement is satisfied by filing with a local agency that acts as the EEOC’s agent for receiving charges.

Williams v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 1983-11-29(e)

If, in reality, the agreement established OHR as an agent of EEOC for filing purposes, the statutory EEOC filing requirement was in fact satisfied. Whether the agreement between OHR and EEOC did create an actual agency relationship is an issue of material fact that should be resolved.

Section 2000e-5 requires a complainant to begin with an authorized state agency when state law prohibits the alleged employment practice.

Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission · filed 1984-01-06(c), (d)

If a state has a law prohibiting an alleged unlawful employment practice and an agency authorized to grant or seek relief from such practice, then the complainant must first commence state resolution of the dispute prior to resort to the federal system.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s local agency review requirement is satisfied when a worksharing agreement assigns initial processing to the EEOC and the local agency waives its review period.

Thompson v. International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers · filed 1984-02-24(c)

In effect, by entering the worksharing agreement with EEOC, OHR is deemed to have “terminated” its review function within the meaning of § 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5 does not require a charge to meet a state's filing deadline to qualify for the extended federal filing period in a deferral state.

Smith v. Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n · filed 1984-04-09(c), (e)

Nothing in Title VII requires filing with the state or local agency (or the EEOC) within the time periods commanded by state law. Our understanding of employment discrimination law has been enhanced by Supreme Court decisions since Dubois; consequently, we cannot construe 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(c) or (e) to require filing within state specified time limits.

Section 2000e-5(c) and (e) do not require a complainant to meet a state filing deadline to preserve the extended federal filing period.

Smith v. Oral Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n · filed 1984-04-09(c), (e)

By its terms, then, Title VII requires only that state proceedings be commenced (or initially instituted) before federal consideration takes place. Specifically, there is no requirement that in order to “commence” state proceedings and thus preserve federal rights, the complainant must comply with state dictated time periods.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a complainant to give an authorized state agency sixty days to seek relief before filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC.

Grann v. City of Madison · filed 1984-06-25(c)

Section 706 of Title VII requires that when the state within which the employment discrimination took place has a state law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice and an agency authorized to enforce the law, then the complainant must pursue state remedies and allow the state sixty days to obtain relief before filing charges of violation of Title VII with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(c) allows the EEOC to begin proceedings within the sixty-day state deferral period when the state agency waives jurisdiction and thereby terminates its proceedings.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. · filed 1984-11-28(c)

Because of the relevant language contained in the worksharing agreement, this Court concludes that the state agency initially waived its jurisdiction over the charges made by Mr. Bobo, and thereby “terminated” its proceedings for purposes of section 706(c). Plaintiff therefore properly initiated its own proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state agency filing prerequisite is satisfied when the EEOC forwards the claimant’s charge to the state agency before suit.

Scott v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1985-03-25(c)

In accordance with established practice, EEOC forwarded Scott’s claim to FEPC (Scott Mem. Ex. A, date-stamped as received by FEPC September 1, 1981, nearly 11 months before Scott filed her suit). ... Thus Scott must be deemed to have satisfied—with EEOC’s help—the procedural prerequisites for a Title VII suit.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s sixty-day deferral to a state agency does not give a claimant a federal right to an effective state investigation.

Holt v. Continental Group, Inc. · filed 1985-05-15(c)

However, the requirement that the EEOC defer to a state agency for sixty days before asserting jurisdiction does not create a federal right to an effective investigation by the state agency.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires deferral only to a state or local agency that can grant or seek relief from the alleged unlawful employment practice.

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. County of Nassau · filed 1985-05-17(c)

In any event, neither the Nassau County Civil Service Commission nor the New York State Civil Service Commission qualify as deferral agencies under § 706(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a complainant to give state proceedings sixty days before filing an EEOC charge, unless those proceedings end sooner.

Patzer v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System and State Department of Administration · filed 1985-06-04(c)

An aggrieved person may not even file a charge with the EEOC until sixty days after proceedings had been commenced under state law (unless the proceedings are terminated earlier).

A state agency terminates proceedings under subsection (c) when it waives initial processing and suspends its work to let the EEOC proceed, even if it may later resume the case.

Isaac v. Harvard University · filed 1985-07-26(c)

In light of the legislative history’s emphasis on the temporary nature of the federal deferral, it seems only sensible to find that when a state agency acts in this manner — suspending the processing of a claim and looking to the EEOC for further action — the state agency has “terminated” its “proceedings” within the meaning of section 706(c).

In a deferral state with a state agency filing deadline shorter than 180 days, § 2000e-5(c) does not require a timely state charge to preserve federal rights.

38 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1361, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,615 · filed 1985-09-06(c)

Pending that day we think the best interpretation of Title VII is that, in a state that has an administrative statute of limitations shorter than 180 days, a timely filing is not required to preserve one's federal rights.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require a timely state agency charge to preserve federal Title VII rights when the state filing deadline is shorter than 180 days.

Martinez v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America · filed 1985-09-06(c)

Pending that day we think the best interpretation of Title VII is that, in a state that has an administrative statute of limitations shorter than 180 days, a timely filing is not required to preserve one’s federal rights.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires the EEOC to defer to a certified state agency for 60 days before addressing a discrimination charge.

Seattle Pacific University v. Haas · filed 1985-10-07(c)

The 60-day period is the required period of deferral to certified state agencies such as WSHRC.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s sixty-day state agency period can include the day a complaint is filed with the agency.

Webb v. Kroger Co. · filed 1985-11-12(c)

Although Kroger concludes that the West Virginia Human Rights Commission considered the matter for “only” 59 days before Webb withdrew his complaint, a more equitable computation would include the day on which Webb filed his complaint with the agency, that being the day upon which the agency could first begin “considering” the complaint. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that the jurisdictional prerequisites have been complied with by the Plaintiff, Webb.

Section 2000e-5(c) gives a state agency sixty days to dispose of a charge before it can be treated as filed with the EEOC.

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. · filed 1985-11-13(c)

Because the statute allows the state agency sixty days to dispose of a claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), the earliest that Hicks’ original charge could be considered filed with the EEOC was January 31, 1972.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires initial resort to state administrative remedies but does not require state judicial review before a federal Title VII hearing.

Lemon v. Tucker · filed 1985-11-18(c)

Unlike initial resort to state administrative remedies, state judicial review of state agency decisions is not a prerequisite to the exercise of Title VII hearing rights.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives complainants in deferral states 300 days to file an EEOC charge even if their state agency filing was untimely.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Tempel Steel Co. · filed 1986-02-18(e)

In sum, this Court holds, on the authority of Mohasco and its progeny, that the 300-day federal filing period is applicable to complainants in deferral states, regardless of the timeliness of a complainant’s state agency filing.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a claimant in a deferral state 300 days to file an EEOC charge after initially instituting state proceedings, even if the state charge was untimely.

Sere v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIVERSITY OF ILL. · filed 1986-02-28(e)

The statute does not provide that this 300-day filing period applies only to claimants in deferral states who “initially institute” timely state proceedings, nor does it relegate claimants whose state charges are untimely to a 180-day EEOC charge-filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge only when the complainant initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency; an informational transmittal does not qualify.

Dixon v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation · filed 1986-04-10(e)

We conclude that EEOC's transmittal of the charge to MCHR was for informational purposes only and did not constitute an "initially instituted" charge within the meaning of the statute. Dixon had not "initially instituted" proceedings with MCHR as required by Title VII and, consequently, she could not take advantage of the extended 300-day period for filing Title VII charges.

A Title VII charge filed with the EEOC after 180 days can be timely under § 2000e-5(e) because Puerto Rico qualifies as a deferral jurisdiction under subsection (c).

Calderón-Trujillo v. Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. · filed 1986-03-31(c), (e)

We hold, therefore, that Puerto Rico is a “deferral” state within the meaning of sections 706(c) and (e) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. sections 2003-5(c) and (e), and that the filing of a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 194 days after the alleged discriminatory practice was timely.

Section 2000e-5(e) does not require a charge to be timely filed with a state deferral agency for the extended federal filing period to apply.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Shamrock Optical Company · filed 1986-04-08(e)

The question presented is whether under section 706(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an aggrieved employee’s failure to timely institute discrimination proceedings with the state deferral agency renders the complaint time-barred for federal enforcement purposes. We believe that neither the language of the statute, nor the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court, or other circuit courts, demonstrates that such failure undermines EEOC jurisdiction.

A Title VII complaint need not allege that the plaintiff filed a state agency charge to satisfy the state deferral requirement.

Miller v. Advanced Studies, Inc. · filed 1986-05-08(c)

Thus, failure to mention the filing of a state agency charge does not bar the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a Title VII claimant in a deferral state to file a complaint with the state discrimination agency before bringing a Title VII action.

Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc. · filed 1986-06-16(c)

Moreover, because the MCAD is a State “deferral agency,” see Hadfield v. Mitre Corp., 562 F.2d 84 (1st Cir. 1977) (Massachusetts is a deferral State), Federal law requires a complaint to be filed with the MCAD before a Title VII action can be brought. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). ... The plaintiff does not claim to have complied with these procedures and we therefore do not consider her Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows the 300-day charge-filing period in a deferral state only when state proceedings have been instituted.

Hamel v. Prudential Insurance · filed 1986-06-30(e)

The unambiguous language of the statute directs that the 300 day limitations period is applicable only when state proceedings have been instituted.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state-agency exhaustion requirement is not absolute, and failure to satisfy it precisely does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction.

Porta v. Rollins Environmental Services (NJ), Inc. · filed 1987-03-06(c)

The exhaustion requirement is not absolute, and failure to satisfy its exact requirements does not deprive us of jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim, see Douglas v. Red Carpet Corp., 538 F.Supp. 1135, 1138 (E.D.Pa.1982), nor would any such dismissal be equitable.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require dismissal for failure to allege a local agency filing when undisputed exhibits establish compliance with its filing requirements.

Brown v. City of Miami Beach · filed 1988-04-20(c)

Where the plaintiff has supplied exhibits whose authenticity is not in dispute which demonstrate compliance with the filing requirements under section 2000e-5(c), the failure to allege such filing does not require dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to give substantial weight to state agency findings, but does not bind it to the agency’s conclusions of law when determining reasonable cause.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. · filed 1988-06-09(b)

In particular, the EEOC is not bound to accord any weight, for the purpose of applying Federal Law, to the state agency’s conclusions of law. ... For that reason, the court must find that the EEOC issued a valid reasonable cause determination and did afford substantial weight to the findings of the Broward County Human Rights Board.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits a local deferral agency to waive initial processing of charges through a worksharing agreement, allowing the EEOC’s action to proceed.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. · filed 1988-09-23(c)

JSI’s Affirmative Defense “F” alleges that this action cannot proceed because EEOC did not properly defer to the Jacksonville Equal Opportunity Commission (“JEOC”), an authorized “deferral” agency within the framework established by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). EEOC relies upon a worksharing agreement executed between it and JEOC and JEOC’s waiver of initial processing of the charges, pursuant thereto. JSI claims that EEOC cannot rely upon the worksharing agreement to establish that JEOC relinquished jurisdiction over the underlying charges in this action. JSI’s view has been rejected, and EEOC’s view adopted, by the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 1671, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988). The Court therefore will grant summary judgment in favor of EEOC on JSI’s Affirmative Defense “F”.

An EEOC referral of a charge to a state agency initially institutes state proceedings for purposes of the extended 300-day filing period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Metal Service Co. · filed 1989-01-06(c), (e)

Thus, we hold that the EEOC's routine transmittal of a copy of the complaint to the PHRC fulfills the requirement that aggrieved parties must initially institute proceedings with the 706 agency in order to qualify for the extended 300 day limitations period.

In a deferral state, a Title VII charge must be referred to the agency of the state where the alleged discrimination occurred before it can be effectively filed with the EEOC within the 300-day deadline.

Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1989-05-23(c), (e)

Thus, while the IDHR may receive a charge and, pursuant to the Work Sharing Agreement, immediately return it to the EEOC (which was done in this case), a charge cannot be effectively “filed” with the EEOC until first deferred to the IDHR.

An EEOC referral of a charge to a state agency institutes state proceedings for the 300-day federal filing period, even when the state agency has waived initial processing.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hacienda Hotel · filed 1989-08-10(e)

As in Commercial Office Products, the EEOC in this case referred copies of the claimants’ charges to the state agency. That is sufficient to “institute” proceedings with the state agency within the meaning of section 2000e-5(e).

A state agency’s self-executing waiver of its 60-day processing period in a worksharing agreement makes a charge received by that agency within 300 days timely filed with the EEOC.

Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools Los Angeles County Office of Education Los Angeles Cou · filed 1989-08-30(c), (e)

The DFEH’s waiver of the 60-day exclusive jurisdiction period in section III.C of the worksharing agreement is self-executing. When Green filed her charge with the DFEH 289 days after the last occurrence of alleged discrimination, it was constructively received and filed with the EEOC on that date. Green’s charge was therefore timely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

A state agency’s waiver of exclusive processing under a worksharing agreement can constructively terminate state proceedings, allowing an EEOC charge to be filed within the 300-day limit.

Griffin v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1989-10-20(c)

We conclude that the EEOC-FCHR worksharing agreement created an instantaneous “constructive termination” and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Griffin filed a timely EEOC claim.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows the 300-day filing period when a self-executing worksharing waiver commences and terminates state proceedings, even if the agencies do not strictly follow referral procedures.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Techalloy Maryland, Inc. · filed 1990-01-31(e)

In sum, we hold that the waiver provision in the EEOC-MCHR worksharing agreement is self-executing. As such, MCHR proceedings were commenced and terminated no later than the date MCHR received the charge, 299 days after the alleged act of discrimination. Consequently, the discrimination charge was timely filed under the 300-day time limit of § 706(e) of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to give substantial weight to state agency findings when deciding whether reasonable cause exists; findings concerning practices outside the scope of state law need not receive that weight.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. James Julian, Inc. · filed 1990-05-07(b)

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the Commission to accord “substantial weight” to the final findings and orders of State authorities “[i]n determining whether reasonable cause exists” to believe that the charges against the defendant are true. ... Those regulations provide that substantial weight should be accorded if, among other things, “[t]he practices prohibited by the State or local law are comparable in scope to the practices prohibited by Federal law.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(e)(2)(ii). As noted above, Delaware law does not provide for a claim of retaliatory discrimination in the manner provided under federal law. The Commission’s determination that conciliation or suit should be pursued, rather than refer the matter back to the DDOL, was based on this difference in the federal and state law. Therefore, this Court can find no procedural irregularity in the Commission’s exercise of its authority to file suit in this action.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a claimant to begin proceedings under an applicable state antidiscrimination law before filing a Title VII charge.

Driscoll v. Carpenters District Council · filed 1990-08-24(c)

Under Section 706(b) of the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), a claimant who wishes to seek redress under Title VII for a discriminatory employment practice occurring in a state which has a law prohibiting such practices must first commence proceedings under the state law.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits a worksharing agreement to terminate state proceedings when the EEOC identifies a charge as a state waiver case and the state agency tacitly accepts that designation.

Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh National Bank D/B/A Pnc Investment Company/pnb · filed 1990-11-28(c)

Based on the purpose of § 706(c) and Title VII and on the evident intent of the EEOC and the PHRC when they negotiated their agreement, we hold that the work-sharing agreement before us effected a “termination” for the purposes of § 706(c) when the EEOC identified the charge as a state waiver case in a communication to the PHRC and the PHRC tacitly acceded to that characterization.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a 60-day waiting period after a charge is filed with a state agency before it may be filed with the EEOC, but an amendment relating back to the original charge does not restart that period.

Kohn v. GTE North, Inc. · filed 1990-12-05(c)

Defendant correctly reads 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) which requires a waiting period of 60 days after filing with the appropriate state agency before filing with the EEOC, unless the state agency has acted prior to the end of the 60 day period. ... However, as enunciated above, amendments can relate back to the original filing, and in this case, a January 19, 1988, complaint is clearly 60 days past the June 29, 1987, initial OCRC charge.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits a worksharing agreement to waive a state agency’s initial processing period without a separate waiver or notice for each charge.

Jeffrey L. SOFFERIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., D.J. Nelson and H.R. Tourtellott, Defendants-Appel · filed 1991-01-29(c)

Nothing in Title VII requires the state agency to reiterate its waiver as to each charge or provide any particular kind of notice that it does not intend to process each charge.

Section 2000e-5 requires a timely discrimination charge with the proper agency before a Title VII suit; in Kansas, filing only with a city human relations commission does not satisfy that requirement.

Porter v. State of Kan. · filed 1991-02-28(e)

The court finds that plaintiff’s filing of a discrimination complaint with the Human Relations Commission of the City of Topeka, a complaint which was not forwarded to the KCCR or the EEOC and which was later closed upon plaintiff’s request, does not satisfy the charge-filing requirements of Title VII because, in Kansas, discrimination charges are to be filed with the KCCR.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a claimant to wait 60 days after starting state or local agency proceedings before filing an EEOC charge; the court concluded that the claimant must start or refer those proceedings within 240 days of the alleged violation.

Waller v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. · filed 1991-07-23(c)

Title VII mandates that no charge may be filed with the EEOC until 60 days have passed from the filing of proceedings with the state or local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Consequently, the claimant must file the charge with the state or local agency or have it referred by the EEOC within 240 days of the unlawful employment practice.

A plaintiff who timely files a discrimination charge with a state agency is not penalized when the agency fails to forward the charge to the EEOC.

Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago · filed 1991-09-04(c)

Title VII requires that a plaintiff in a state like Illinois (which has its own administrative mechanism for resolving complaints of discrimination) must give the state the first opportunity to resolve plaintiff’s claim by filing with the state before filing with the EEOC. The plaintiff may file a charge with the EEOC only after one of two conditions is met: 1) sixty days elapse after the filing of the state charge or 2) the state agency terminates its proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). ... These cases compel the conclusion that Ms. Weiss cannot be held accountable for IDHR’s failure to transfer the charge against Lawrence to the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state deferral requirement can be satisfied by a self-executing worksharing agreement that terminates the state agency’s role when a charge is filed with the EEOC.

Dee Bonnie MARLOWE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruno BOTTARELLI, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1991-09-10(c)

Under Title VII, Marlowe could not file with the EEOC until she filed with the state and either (1) 60 days elapsed or (2) the state terminated its interest in her complaint, whichever came first. ... Once Marlowe’s complaint was filed with the EEOC, the agreement worked “instantaneous ‘constructive termination’” of the state’s jurisdiction over her charges.

Section 2000e-5(c) allows a state agency’s self-executing waiver of its 60-day exclusive processing period to trigger immediate filing with the EEOC.

Hilda G. WORTHINGTON, Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Appellee · filed 1991-11-04(c)

We conclude, based on the express language of the worksharing agreement between the EEOC and NEOC and decisions of other courts interpreting similar agreements, that the NEOC’s waiver was self-executing and required no further action by the NEOC to be effective. The automatic waiver had the effect of immediately terminating state proceedings on the same day that Worthington filed her charge with the NEOC. ... Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(b)(1), the termination of state proceedings cuts off the state’s 60-day exclusive processing period and triggers immediate filing with EEOC.

A worksharing agreement that terminates state proceedings allows the EEOC to process a timely charge without waiting sixty days.

Brennan v. National Telephone Directory Corp. · filed 1994-04-28(c)

Thus, assuming plaintiffs charge with EEOC was properly filed within 300 days, which we must assume for purposes of this motion, EEOC could immediately begin processing the charge and need not wait sixty days.

A charge received by the EEOC as a state agency’s agent institutes state proceedings, extending the EEOC filing period to 300 days; the state agency’s waiver of exclusive jurisdiction immediately ends those proceedings.

Griffin v. City of Dallas · filed 1994-07-25(e)(1), (c)

Because the EEOC accepted Mr. Griffin's complaint as TCHR's agent, Mr. Griffin instituted state proceedings within the meaning of section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act. The institution of those proceedings extended the limitations period to 300 days. The TCHR's waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Griffin's claim terminated the state proceedings when Mr. Griffin filed his claim with the EEOC. Because Mr. Griffin filed his claim within the 300-day period, the State's waiver conferred upon the EEOC the authority to process the claim immediately.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires proceedings under applicable state law before the EEOC may process a Title VII charge; a state agency’s consideration of only the federal claim does not satisfy that requirement.

Davis v. North Carolina Department of Correction · filed 1995-03-02(c)

At the very least, we believe that where, as here, a complainant steadfastly maintains that he has brought only a Title VII claim and the state referral agency unequivocally addresses only that claim, proceedings under state law have not commenced for purposes of section 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) requires proceedings under applicable state discrimination law before the EEOC may process a Title VII charge.

Davis v. North Carolina Department of Correction · filed 1995-03-02(c)

Because North Carolina has a state law prohibiting employment discrimination by state agencies, see N.C.Gen.Stat. § 126-16, and a state agency established to process such claims, see id. § 7A-759, section 2000e-5(c) requires that proceedings under the state law be commenced before Title VII’s federal administrative process can begin.

Section 2000e-5(d) permits a state agency to waive the 60-day deferral period for a Commissioner's charge, allowing the EEOC to investigate immediately.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Applicant-Appellee v. Superior Temporary Services, Inc. · filed 1995-06-02(d)

This deferral provision was designed in part to promote "time economy and the expeditious handling of cases," 110 Cong Rec. 9790 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen), and plainly permits state and local agencies to waive the 60-day deferral period and thus to authorize EEOC to take immediate action to investigate a charge filed by a Commissioner.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a complainant to pursue a claim under state law when the state has a remedy for the alleged discrimination before the EEOC may issue a right-to-sue letter.

Henderson v. Employment Security Commission · filed 1995-10-18(c)

Henderson has never advanced, and the EEOC has never acted upon, any claim of sex discrimination under state law. Therefore, the requirements of § 2000e-5(c) have never been satisfied, Henderson is not entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a claimant in a deferral state to initiate state proceedings, directly or through an EEOC referral, to use the extended 300-day EEOC filing period.

Gorman v. Hughes Danbury Optical Systems · filed 1995-11-22(e)

The plain language of both the ADEA and Title VII, requires some state filing for purposes of the extended 300 day EEOC filing period in deferral states.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a sexual harassment claimant to file with an available local employment discrimination agency and wait sixty days before bringing a federal suit.

Codrington v. Virgin Islands Port Authority · filed 1996-01-17(c)

Federal procedures governing the filing of employment discrimination suits require that before an aggrieved person may bring a federal lawsuit for sexual harassment, that person must first file a complaint with the local agency that deals with employment discrimination, if one exists, and wait sixty days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) permits a state agency’s waiver in a worksharing agreement to terminate its exclusive processing period immediately, even if the agency continues investigating the charge.

George FORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BERNARD FINESON DEVELOPMENT CENTER, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1996-04-10(c)

We hold that a Worksharing Agreement may contain a self-executing waiver of a state agency’s right to exclusively handle discrimination claims for 60 days, and that this waiver may constitute “termination” of state agency proceedings under § 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5 can require Title VII claims to begin before a state agency competent to hear parallel state claims, but it does not give that agency jurisdiction over federal claims.

Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools, Dr. Strand Wedul and James Boettcher · filed 1996-07-29

Federal law does provide that claims under Tifie VII should begin their adjudication in a state administrative forum when that forum is competent to rule on state law claims that mirror Title VII claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This law does not, however, vest the state administrative body with jurisdiction to hear federal claims; the state legislature, not Congress, is the master of a state agency’s jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not bar an ADA suit when a plaintiff timely files an EEOC charge and the EEOC mishandles the required state referral without prejudicing the employer.

GADDY BY AND THROUGH GADDY v. Four B Corp. · filed 1997-01-02(c)

The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), “no charge may be filed ... by the person aggrieved ...” (emphasis added) seems to put the onus on the EEOC to reject a charge for filing if it is proffered improvidently. ... As a result, the court rejects the defendant’s exhaustion of administrative remedies argument with respect to the plaintiffs ADA claim because the plaintiff timely filed her disability discrimination charge with the EEOC, because any failure by the plaintiff to process her charge through the KHRC as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) was a result of the actions and omissions of the EEOC, and because the defendant has not shown that its rights were prejudiced as a result of the EEOC’s conduct.

A Title VII charge filed with a state agency can be deemed filed with the EEOC the same day when a worksharing agreement immediately waives the state agency’s exclusive processing period and the claimant requests dual filing.

Berkoski v. Ashland Regional Medical Center · filed 1997-01-16(c)

Given the worksharing agreement in this case coupled with Berkoski’s request for dual filing, the PHRC instantaneously waived its exclusive jurisdiction on the moment the charge was filed, the charge was deemed filed with the EEOC at the same moment, and the charge remained in a state of “suspended animation” until it was finally referred to the EEOC by the PHRC. Because the charge was deemed filed with the EEOC on the date that Berkoski filed it with the PHRC, it was filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action and is thus timely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) allows an EEOC charge to proceed when a state agency waives initial processing through a worksharing agreement, terminating its proceedings.

Woodson v. Scott Paper Co · filed 1997-04-03(c)

Through this worksharing agreement, therefore, Pennsylvania has waived its statutory right to initially process discrimination claims, and hence this agreement operates to “terminate” the PHRC proceedings with respect to those complaints that are filed first with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(c) treats a state agency’s waiver of initial review under a worksharing agreement as termination of its proceedings for charges filed first with the EEOC.

Woodson v. Scott Paper Co. · filed 1997-05-06(c)

Through this worksharing agreement, therefore, Pennsylvania has waived its statutory right to initially process discrimination claims, and hence this agreement operates to “terminate” the PHRC proceedings with respect to those complaints that are filed first with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a person in a state with an agency that can remedy discrimination to begin state proceedings and wait sixty days before filing an EEOC charge, unless the state proceedings end sooner.

Showers v. City of Bartow · filed 1997-09-24(c)

Title VII provides that if the alleged discrimination occurs in a state that has an agency that can provide a remedy against such discrimination, the victim cannot file a charge with the EEOC until sixty days after he begins a proceeding before the state agency, unless the proceeding ends before then. ... Plaintiff, however, does not properly allege that he filed with a state deferral agency, and, therefore, his claim is dismissed on those grounds without having to analyze whether his claim was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state filing requirement is satisfied when a worksharing agreement automatically files an EEOC charge with the state agency, even if the claimant requests filing only with the EEOC.

Cooper v. Lederle · filed 1999-01-26(c)

Under the Worksharing Agreement, however, a charge filed with one agency is automatically filed with the other. This dual filing is brought about by agency regulation, not personal preference.

A state agency’s waiver of its exclusive processing period under a worksharing agreement can terminate its proceedings, allowing an EEOC charge to be filed without the 60-day wait.

Fitzgerald v. Ford Marrin Esposito Witmeyer & Gleser, L.L.P. · filed 1999-02-23(c)

In accordance with these authorities, the court holds that at the time plaintiff submitted her charge to the EEOC, the waiver provision of the Worksharing Agreement was triggered and that it had the effect of “terminating” the DHR’s proceedings for purposes of § 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) requires proceedings under state law before the EEOC may act on a discrimination charge covered by that state's law.

Dodge v. Philip Morris Inc · filed 1999-03-25(c)

Under these circumstances, § 2000e-5 requires that Dodge commence proceedings under state law before the EEOC can act upon her federal discrimina- tion claims.

In a deferral state, an EEOC charge alleging facts that would establish discrimination under state law commences state proceedings through an agency work-sharing agreement, even if the claimant does not request referral to the state agency.

Carter v. Arlington Public School System · filed 2000-02-18(c)

The operation of the work-sharing agreement makes clear that claimants effectively commence proceedings under Virginia law for Title VII exhaustion purposes simply by filing a claim with the EEOC alleging facts that, if true, would state a claim for discrimination under Virginia law. And this conclusion holds true whether or not the claimant checks the box specifically requesting that the claims be forwarded to the VCHR because under the work-sharing agreement, the claim is automatically referred to the VCHR.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state proceeding requirement can be satisfied through an EEOC filing under a worksharing agreement even when the claimant does not request state referral on the charge form or prove that the state agency received it.

McIntyre-Handy v. West Telemarketing Corp. · filed 2000-05-19(c)

In light of the aforementioned authority, plaintiff has, at a threshold level, met her burden under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Neither the failure to check the box on Form 5, nor plaintiffs failure to prove that her claim was actually referred to the VCHR divests this court of jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits a charge filed with the EEOC to commence state proceedings when a worksharing agreement makes the EEOC the state agency’s agent for receiving charges.

Puryear v. County of Roanoke · filed 2000-06-13(c)

We therefore agree that the WSA's self- executing operation upon the filing of a complaint with the EEOC complies with Title VII's requirements for the commencement of pro- ceedings under state or local law.

A charge first filed with a state agency is constructively filed with the EEOC when the agency waives its 60-day exclusive processing period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellee v. Dinuba Medical Clinic, Defendant-Counter · filed 2000-08-24(c)

Under applicable law, the charge was constructively filed with the EEOC on October 19, 1994, when the DFEH agreed to waive its exclusive 60-day jurisdiction and relinquished processing responsibility to the EEOC. This constructive filing occurred 287 days after the date of the last discriminatory act; thus, it was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state agency filing requirement can be satisfied by filing with the EEOC when a worksharing agreement treats the charge as received by the state agency.

Fowler v. District of Columbia · filed 2000-11-20(c)

Thus, by filing a claim with the EEOC, the plaintiff commences proceedings with both the EEOC and the designated state agency— in this case, the OHR.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits a state agency to waive its sixty-day exclusive processing period through a work sharing agreement that automatically files charges with the EEOC.

Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc. · filed 2001-05-08(c)

The Court interprets that provision of the work sharing agreement to waive Maine’s exclusive sixty-day deferral period. Therefore, for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations in this case, Maine “terminated” its proceedings on December 21, 1998, and Plaintiff may be compensated for at least the incidents of discrimination that occurred in the three hundred days preceding December 21, 1998,—in other words, any incident after February 24, 1998.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires proceedings under applicable state law before the federal Title VII process begins; a state agency’s investigation and determination under state law satisfies that requirement even if the claimant did not expressly raise a state-law claim.

Morley v. NC, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2001-08-07(c)

Crucially, the OAH-CRD commenced proceedings under State law when it investigated Plaintiff's charges and determined that "there has been a Violation of Chapter 7A-759 of the North Carolina General Statutes concerning [Plaintiff's] claim of retaliation discrimination[.]" ... This fortuitous circumstance suffices to satisfy the requirement that proceedings be commenced under State law prior to bringing suit.

Section 2000e-5(c)'s state proceedings requirement is satisfied when the state agency investigates a charge and determines that state law was violated, even if the claimant did not expressly raise state law.

Morley v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services/Broughton Hospital · filed 2001-08-07(c)

This fortuitous circumstance suffices to satisfy the requirement that proceedings be commenced under State law prior to bringing suit.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires the EEOC to defer to a state agency for at least sixty days when the state has its own employment discrimination law and enforcement agency.

Williams v. Vought · filed 2001-07-10(c)

If a state has enacted its own anti-discrimination laws and created an agency to process claims under that law, as Texas has done, the EEOC must defer to the state agency for at least sixty days to allow investigation and resolution at the state level.

In a deferral state, § 2000e-5(c) requires state agency proceedings before an EEOC charge; when no state proceedings begin, claims are limited to acts within 240 days before the EEOC charge.

Snyder v. Boeing Co. · filed 2001-09-06(c)

Since plaintiff failed to ever file his charges with the relevant state agency, his claims are limited to those within the 240 days preceding his EEOC charge. Here, it is uncontroverted that no relevant events of alleged discrimination occurred within this period, either as to the claims of disability or age discrimination. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims on these grounds will be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5(c) treats a state agency’s waiver of its exclusive processing period under a self-executing worksharing agreement as terminating state proceedings when the charge is filed.

Johnson, Booker T. v. J. B. Hunt Transport · filed 2002-02-13(c)

Here, the worksharing agreement waived the ERD’s exclusive right to process the charge when the charge was filed with the ERD, and accordingly the charge was timely filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits a state agency complaint to toll the Title VII filing period only when the agency has authority to address the alleged discrimination.

O'BRIEN v. City of Springfield · filed 2003-08-12(e)(1)

It is the MCAD, not the MLRC, that is “a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief’ from employment practices that discriminate on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). Thus, only a complaint filed with that agency can toll the statutes of limitations for O’Brien’s Title VII religious discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require employees to pursue a state discrimination complaint to completion.

Antone GONSALVES, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. the ALPINE COUNTRY CLUB, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1984-02-09(c)

What is more, they were under no legal compulsion to press their RICHR complaint to a conclusion, see Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. at 1891 n. 8; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).

Section 2000e-5(b) permits the EEOC to hold a charge filed before the state proceedings period expires and process it when those proceedings end.

Wimbush v. Froug's Co. · filed 1972-02-24(b)

EEOC is then entitled, according to said decision, to hold such premature filing in “suspended animation” without action and revive and proceed with the same upon termination of the state proceedings.

Filing a Title VII civil action after receiving a right-to-sue letter does not divest a state or local agency of jurisdiction over the discrimination complaint.

Communications Workers v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights · filed 1976-12-22(f)(1)

Petitioner has referred to us no authority, and we have found none, to support the proposition that one who files an employment discrimination complaint with the EEOC pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which complaint is then referred to the complainant’s state or local administrative agency empowered to determine employment discrimination claims, divests that agency’s jurisdiction over the complaint merely by subsequently filing a civil action based on that discrimination in the appropriate federal district court.

Section 2000e-5(c) permits a worksharing agreement to initiate and terminate state proceedings when a charge is filed with the EEOC, allowing the complainant to proceed without a separate state filing or a sixty-day wait.

Young in Hong v. Children's Memorial Hospital · filed 1991-07-11(c)

We find this distinction unpersuasive. While Sofferin did not specifically speak to the validity of the agent designation, it did expressly validate the overarching proposition at issue here — that the workshare agreement can alone effect both initiation and termination of the state proceedings and that, as a result, plaintiffs may file with the EEOC without first filing with the IDHR.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires the EEOC to defer to a qualifying state or local proceeding for 60 days, but does not require that proceeding to end before the EEOC may authorize a federal suit.

Johnson v. Fleet · filed 2005-06-06(c)

Defendant does not argue that the EEOC did not comply with this 60-day deferral period, and nothing in the statutory framework suggests that further deference to state anti-discrimination agencies is necessary before the EEOC may authorize commencement of a federal suit.

Section 2000e-5’s deferral provisions give state and local agencies an initial opportunity to act on discrimination charges while preserving their independence from the EEOC.

EEOC v. Navy Federal Credit · filed 2005-09-13(c)-(d)

These provi- sions are best understood as creating a system of "cooperative federal- ism," under which, in the interests of comity, the EEOC and state and local authorities share primary responsibility to enforce the civil rights laws.

Section 2000e-5(c) delays an EEOC charge first filed with a state agency until the sixty-day state period expires or state proceedings end earlier, unless the state waives its exclusive period.

Morris v. Conagra Foods, Inc. · filed 2005-09-28(c)

Because Morris’s complaint does not fall within the ambit of a waiver situation, his complaint was not deemed to be filed with the EEOC until either the sixty-day exclusive state jurisdiction period expired or the state terminated its proceedings, whichever occurred first.

Section 2000e-5(c) defers EEOC filing for up to 60 days after state proceedings begin, unless those proceedings end sooner.

Garcia v. Los Banos Unified School District · filed 2006-02-17(c)

However, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), the charge cannot be considered “filed” with the EEOC “before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated.” ... Here, the state agency proceedings terminated on January 28, 2004, at which time the DFEH charge was deemed constructively filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(c)’s state or local proceedings requirement is satisfied when a worksharing agreement causes an EEOC filing to commence and terminate those proceedings simultaneously.

Lee v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-08-25(c)

Thus, the plaintiff constructively commenced and terminated his proceedings under District of Columbia law immediately upon filing his charge with the EEOC, satisfying the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).

Section 2000e-5(c) gives a state deferral agency sixty days to investigate a discrimination charge; when the agency was not notified, the court may toll the filing requirement and stay the suit to allow its review.

Collins v. Franklin County · filed 2012-05-04(c)

The OAH will then have sixty days to investigate the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). ... However, because it appears that the OAH was not notified of Collins’ charge, and therefore did not have an opportunity to review her claim and act on it, the Court will toll Collins’ state filing requirement and stay this action to allow the OAH to consider Collins’ claim.

Section 2000e-5(c) gives a state or local agency an exclusive opportunity to resolve a discrimination charge and requires the EEOC to defer action during that period.

Bagley v. Yale University · filed 2014-08-26(c)

The deferral period to which Judge Nev-as referred in Odili is found in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), which gives the state or local agency an exclusive opportunity to resolve the complaint and requires the EEOC to defer any action on its part.

Section 2000e-5(k) does not govern attorney’s fees in an enforcement action brought by a state human rights commission under state law.

Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights · filed 2015-05-15(k)

Section 2000e-5(k) governs only the jurisdiction of the EEOC,25 and the enforcement action in this case was brought by the Alaska State ... Commission for Human Rights pursuant to AS 18.80.220.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when a charge is first filed with an authorized state agency; the state filing may also affect whether the claimant exhausted administrative remedies.

Mirzoian v. El-Rahi · filed 2018-07-13(e)(1)

We therefore vacate the dismissal order and remand for the district court to ... consider whether Mirzoian could be deemed to have constructively filed his claims with the EEOC on the day he filed his charge with the CNMI Department of Labor, and therefore exhausted his administrative remedies at that time.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a Title VII plaintiff to satisfy the administrative charge filing requirement by filing with a state agency authorized to grant relief from employment discrimination.

Vann v. Persico · filed 2021-03-30(e)

Thus, for these claims, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff filed a charge with the state agency with authority to grant relief from employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(c) does not require a Title VII claimant to exhaust West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board procedures before suing in federal court.

Li v. Shepherd University · filed 2022-11-14(c)

Thus, we conclude that federal law did not require Li to comply with the PEGB procedures as a prerequisite to suit under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires state agency proceedings to begin before the EEOC investigates a charge; a worksharing agreement can eliminate the sixty-day waiting period but not the initiation requirement.

Tattrie v. CEI-Roanoke, LLC · filed 2023-11-30(c)

Third, the EEOC is unable to investigate claims until proceedings have been (1) initiated in the relevant state agency and (2) pending for sixty days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). The WSA eliminates the second requirement, but not the first.

Section 2000e-5(a) permits an EEOC commissioner to file a patterns discrimination charge that triggers an investigation.

Local Number 104, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1969-01-14(a)

After availing itself of the useful guidance of counsel for all parties in this case, the court has determined that section 2000e-5(a) was intended to allow a commissioner to file a patterns charge, with a consequent investigation by EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(a) requires a commissioner’s charge to state the facts on which it is based; a valid charge is required to initiate an EEOC investigation.

Bowaters Southern Paper Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1969-05-05(a)

As to what facts the Commissioner may have had as a basis for making these charges, there is not a word in the charge. The Court is accordingly of the opinion that the charge failed to comply with the requirements of § 2000e-5(a) of the Act. It is further clear from the statutory language that the filing of a valid charge is jurisdictional to the authority of the Commission to initiate an investigation.

A Commissioner’s charge states its factual basis when it identifies the challenged employment practices.

Bowaters Southern Paper Corporation v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1970-06-11(a)

It is our view that, after making the above charge, the Commissioner stated the facts on which it was based, as being maintenance of racially restricted job classifications; discriminatory use of tests, restricting Negro employees to lower-paying jobs; and denial to Negro employees of the opportunity to participate in apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs.

Section 2000e-5(a) permits a Commissioner’s charge to describe the alleged discrimination generally without a detailed bill of particulars.

Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1971-11-29(a)

To require the charge to contain a specific bill of particulars would necessarily limit the scope of the investigation to the particular transaction or transactions meticulously described, and at the same time would curtail the discovery mission of the Commission, whereby the function Congress charged it to carry out would surely fail.

Section 2000e-5(a) permits a Commissioner's charge to describe the types of discrimination generally without detailing the supporting evidence.

Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1972-07-31(a)

To require the charge to contain a specific bill of particulars would necessarily limit the scope of the investigation to the particular transaction or transactions meticulously described, and at the same time would curtail the discovery mission of the Commission, whereby the function Congress charged it to carry out would surely fail. ... Accordingly, we must hold that the charges in these two cases are sufficient and that the district court erred in dismissing the Commissioner's petitions for enforcement.

A Commissioner’s charge alleging discriminatory hiring, job classifications, and pre-employment judgments satisfies § 2000e-5(a)’s requirement to set forth the facts on which it is based.

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1972-08-08(a)

Based on the rationale of Sparton and the authorities cited therein, we hold that the charge in the instant case satisfies the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) that such charge set forth the facts upon which it is based.

Section 2000e-5(a) does not require a Commissioner's charge to set out supporting evidence in detail when its allegations sufficiently state the facts on which it is based.

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1972-09-06(a)

Based on the rationale of Sparton and the authorities cited therein, we hold that the charge in the instant case satisfies the requirement of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(a) that such charge set forth the facts upon which it is based.

Section 2000e-5(a) does not require the factual detail that the district court demanded of the Commissioner's charge.

ADOLPH COORS COMPANY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1972-10-04(a)

Without considering other questions raised by appellee's petition to set aside the Commission's demand, the District Court concluded that the initial Commissioner's charge was invalid for failing to state facts as required by 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-5(a), and that all proceedings based thereon were invalid. ... We are satisfied that the Sparton Southwest opinion controls here since the charges and the question of their sufficiency are substantially the same as here. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings and consideration of other issues relating to the Commission's demand.

Section 2000e-5(a) permits enforcement of an EEOC demand for evidence when the Commissioner’s charge alleges discriminatory recruiting, hiring, and promotion with sufficient specificity.

5 Fair empl.prac.cas. 957, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8579 United States Steel Corporation v. United States of America · filed 1973-05-10(a)

The sole issue before this court is whether the Commissioner’s charge sets forth facts with sufficient specificity to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) ... and thus warrant the enforcement of the Commissioner’s demand for access to evidence. ... These decisions control the present controversy. Accordingly, the judgment of the district .court is affirmed.

Under the pre-1972 version of § 2000e-5(a), a commissioner needed reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred and had to state the facts supporting the charge.

New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Brown · filed 1974-01-16(a)

To file such a charge on January 4, 1972, a commissioner first must have had reasonable cause to believe that the discriminatory practice actually did exist, and further, the Commission must have presented a concise statement of facts on which the charge rested.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows a Commissioner’s charge that identifies alleged discriminatory practices to start an EEOC investigation without first proving those practices occurred.

NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William H. BROWN, III, Chairman, Et Al., Etc., Defendants-Appel · filed 1975-03-19(b)

As we have stated the trial court cited no case, and none is cited by the appellant, to conflict with the plethora of cases holding that charges similar to that involved here, even without the statistical information which this charge contains, are sufficient to commence the investigatory procedures by the Commission, including the power to seek a subpoena for the kind of information sought here.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Commissioner’s charge to include a factual basis for the alleged unlawful employment practices.

Shell Oil Co. v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1982-04-28(b)

We hold that the Commissioner’s charge was deficient for failure to include a factual basis for the Commissioner’s belief that Shell engaged in unlawful employment practices.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a person covered by a Commissioner's class charge to sue without being individually named in the charge.

Larkin v. Pullman-Standard Division · filed 1988-09-21(f)(1)

Second, Pullman's claim that Swint had to be expressly named in the Commissioner's charge to qualify as an "aggrieved" individual under the statute is specious. The statute expresses a clear congressional intent that private suits be permitted to proceed on Commissioner's charges. Pullman's interpretation conflicts with that intent because it would essentially prohibit suits where a Commissioner acts on behalf of a class so large--such as "black employees of Pullman-Standard's Bessemer, Alabama plant"--that every member cannot be named.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Commissioner’s sworn charge to name the employer suspected of unlawful employment practices before the EEOC can enforce a subpoena against it.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BELLEMAR PARTS INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1989-03-03(b)

Here, appellant was not even charged, since the sworn oath of the Commissioner did not name appellant as a suspected offender.

A commissioner’s charge under § 2000e-5(b) need not identify affected job classifications if it otherwise describes the suspected discrimination and sufficiently limits the investigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Applicant-Appellee v. Quad/graphics, Incorporated · filed 1995-08-21(b)

Rather, the key inquiry must be whether the allegations in the charge, when assessed against these four factors, fulfill the legislative and regulatory command that the charging Commissioner identify as precisely as possible the appropriate area of inquiry to determine whether there is a violation of the Act.

A commissioner’s charge may support an EEOC investigation of conduct occurring after the charge was issued.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1999-12-15(b)

Furthermore, the EEOC has authority to seek information after the date the Charge was issued.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows the EEOC to file a commissioner’s charge to investigate suspected discrimination beyond an employee’s charge.

EEOC v. So Farm Bur Cas Ins · filed 2001-11-05(b)

When the EEOC discovered what it considered to be possible evidence of sex discrimination by Southern Farm, the EEOC could have exercised its authority under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-6(e) ... to file a commissioner’s charge alleging sex discrimination, thereby freeing the EEOC to demand information relevant to Southern Farm’s employment of women.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows the EEOC to file a commissioner’s charge alleging discrimination and seek information relevant to that charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance · filed 2001-11-05(b)

When the EEOC discovered what it considered to be possible evidence of sex discrimination by Southern Farm, the EEOC could have exercised its authority under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-6(e) to file a commissioner’s charge alleging sex discrimination, thereby freeing the EEOC to demand information relevant to Southern Farm’s employment of women.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits a commissioner to file a charge and requires the EEOC to investigate a filed charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bashas', Inc. · filed 2011-09-30(b)

Partially because Mr. Rahill was never asked what he meant by “compliance review,” and taking the record as a whole, including a description of how the entire EEOC investigative process unfolded, that excerpt does not convince this court that the EEOC was acting outside its statutory authority.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits an EEOC member to file a discrimination charge but does not require a separate commissioner’s charge to obtain company-wide information about the same kind of discrimination alleged in an individual charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Alliance Residential Co. · filed 2011-11-18(b)

The Court concludes the EEOC need not file a separate commissioner’s charge alleging systematic company-wide discrimination in order to obtain the company-wide information sought here.

Section 2000e-5(b) allows an EEOC member to file a Commissioner’s charge; the EEOC cannot bypass that procedure by seeking broad information through a subpoena in an individual-charge investigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD. · filed 2014-11-06(b)

The Commission has the ability to file a Commissioner’s charge alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination that could support a request for that information. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012) (providing that a discrimination charge may be filed “by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission”). In any case, the EEOC may not enforce a subpoena in the investigation of an individual charge merely as an expedient bypass of the mechanisms required to file a Commissioner’s charge.