42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2 allows a discrimination claim against a parent company if it and the subsidiary operate as a single employer; their control of employment decisions is central to that inquiry.

Gabriele v. Cole National Corp. · filed 1999-12-29

Accordingly, because of an absence of discovery on this issue and a factual disagreement between the parties about whether Cole National and Things Remembered operate as a single employer, the Court cannot conclude, at this preliminary stage of the litigation, that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact to support his contention that Cole National and Things Remembered are a single employer for the purposes of Title VII and N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.

Section 2000e-2(a) can apply to a temporary worker’s assignment at a staffing agency’s client when the client sufficiently controls the worker’s daily activities.

Freeman v. Kansas · filed 2001-01-29(a)

Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for “an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect .to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Under the totality of the circumstances, the court finds the State was plaintiffs employer for purposes of Title VII. Although plaintiff was a temporary employee of Key Staffing assigned to work at the State, the State exerted sufficient control by supervising plaintiffs daily activities and providing the place of work and the tools to work to conclude that the State was plaintiffs employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to an employer; employer status depends on the economic realities of the relationship and the degree of control exercised.

Heinemeier, Geri v. Chemetco Inc · filed 2001-04-18(a)(1)

When facing questions regarding the employee-employer relationship under Title VII or the ADEA, we "look to the ’economic realities’ of the relationship and the degree of control the employer exercises."

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) imposes liability on an employer; a company that neither pays a worker nor provides her benefits is not her employer under the remuneration test.

Tyszka v. Edward McMahon Agency · filed 2001-09-24(a)(1)

Under this remuneration test, it is also patently clear that Nationwide was not the employer of the Plaintiff herein.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination defendant to be the plaintiff's employer; a related entity with separate operations, labor relations, management, and finances does not qualify under the single employer test.

Ortiz v. Wingard · filed 2001-10-24(a)(1)

Under these circumstances, the City is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII claims because it was not Plaintiffs employer within the meaning of Title VII.

A plaintiff must show that the defendant was an employer under Section 2000e-2; interrelation of operations is a factor in deciding whether a parent and subsidiary are a single employer.

Rowland v. Franklin Career Services, LLC · filed 2003-07-17(a)(1)

Based on this record, the Court finds that plaintiff has created a material factual dispute with regard to the interrelation prong.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits liability for workplace discrimination when single or joint employer analysis establishes sufficient ties between a business and the plaintiff or her employer.

Lenoble v. Best Temps, Inc. · filed 2005-01-14(a)

This court uses the single and joint employer analy-ses to determine whether a non-employer has sufficient ties to a plaintiff or her employer to impose liability for workplace discrimination under Title VII and CFE-PA.

A parent company is an employer under Title VII if it operates as one entity with its subsidiary or controls the challenged employment decision.

Brown v. Fred's, Inc. · filed 2007-07-23

Title VII and the EPA apply to an “employer.” ... A parent company may employ its subsidiary’s employees if (a) the parent company so dominates the subsidiary’s operations that the two are one entity and therefore one employer, ... or (b) the parent company is linked to the alleged discriminatory action because it controls “individual employment decisions.”

Title VII may treat both a staffing agency and its client as employers; whether the client qualifies depends on its control over the worker's work.

Lorah v. TETRA TECH INC. · filed 2008-03-31

Under the case law, however, it is possible for both Synerfac and defendant to be “employers” and the record is insufficiently developed to determine if defendant exercised sufficient control over plaintiffs work, as in supervising her and monitoring her performance, to qualify as an employer.

An entity that controls the pay at issue in a discrimination claim and other personnel decisions can qualify as an employer under Title VII at the pleading stage.

Tamayo v. Blagojevich · filed 2008-05-27(a)

Here, Ms. Ta-mayo alleges that the IDOR controlled her salary — the basis of her alleged adverse employment action — as well as a number of other personnel decisions of the IGB. These allegations are more than sufficient to avoid dismissal of the IDOR as a defendant at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 2000e-2 permits a discrimination claim against an employer; a staffing agency’s client may fall outside that category when the agency controls the worker’s assignments and pay.

Shah v. Bank of America · filed 2009-02-18

Title VII authorizes a cause of action only against employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs. ... In considering the Darden factors and the undisputed evidence, the court concludes that defendant is not the employer of plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to an employer; a parent company is not liable without facts showing that it acted as the worker’s employer.

Oxford v. LINC GROUP, INC. · filed 2010-06-30(a)(1)

As for Title VII, Title VII permits a cause of action for certain employment discrimination against any entity defined as an “employer.” ... Oxford does not allege facts to indicate that Line, the parent company of OSS and LGS, acted as Oxford’s employer.

A discrimination claim against a franchisor requires facts plausibly showing that the franchisor was the plaintiff’s employer; a bare assertion of employer status is insufficient.

Bricker v. R & a PIZZA, INC. · filed 2011-04-08(a)(1)

Absent such factual allegations, the Brickers have failed to cross the line from the possibility to the plausibility that Domino’s is their employer for purposes of their Title VII and state statutory or common law claims.

Title VII harassment liability requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

Delia v. Verizon Communications Inc. · filed 2011-08-24(a)(1)

Verizon argues that it cannot be held liable under either statute because it is not DeLia’s "employer," within the meaning of either statute. The district court agreed, and so do we.

Title VII employer liability depends on control over the employment decisions at issue; handling payroll and benefits alone does not establish that control.

Robbins v. Chatham County · filed 2012-03-26

As previously discussed, these statutes impose liability on entities that enjoy authority or control over employment decisions. The facts Plaintiff has cited are related to particular administrative aspects of her employment, but are of no moment when assessing whether Defendant Chatham County possessed a level of control over Defendant Chisolm’s personnel decisions that would render it liable under either the ADEA or Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII claim against an employer to allege discriminatory action by that employer.

McAllister v. Connecticut Renaissance Inc. · filed 2012-09-11(a)

Both Title VII and the ADA require some allegedly discriminatory action on the part of the employer defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (ADA). Even when read with the special solicitude we show pro se pleadings, however, the Complaint is devoid of any allegation suggesting that ... GBAPP was McAllister’s employer, much less that it played a role in any of the discriminatory conduct he alleges.

Separate governmental entities are presumed distinct for Title VII employer liability unless evidence clearly overcomes that presumption by showing control over the employment relationship.

Dumas v. Hurley Medical Center · filed 2012-10-29(a)

In considering the totality of the circumstances, therefore, Plaintiff has not proffered sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Plaintiff has clearly overcome the presumption that the City and Hurley are separate and distinct and should not be aggregated for Title VII purposes.

An entity that was not the plaintiff’s employer cannot face an employer discrimination claim under § 2000e-2.

Konah v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-01-03

The District of Columbia was not Ms. Konah’s employer, which means that she cannot sue the District for gender discrimination under the DCHRA or Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits liability for employment discrimination only against the plaintiff’s employer.

McQueen v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage · filed 2013-06-28(a)

Only the plaintiffs “employer” may be held liable under Title VII for alleged discrimination against her.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose employer liability on an entity that gives a worker limited direction while another company controls her employment.

Plaso v. IJKG · filed 2014-01-21

Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s detailed consideration of Darden and Graves, respectively, and affirm its conclusions that BMC constitutes neither Plaso’s “employer” nor “joint employer” for purposes of Title VII.

A plaintiff alleging wage discrimination must prove the defendant was her employer.

Knitter v. Corvias Military Living, LLC · filed 2014-07-15(a)(1)

To make out a prima facie case of either wage discrimination or retaliatory termination under Title VII, a plaintiff must first prove the defendant was her employer.

A company may be liable under Title VII when its disregard of corporate formalities makes its actions inseparable from an affiliate that employed the plaintiff.

General Parker v. Scheck Mechanical, Corp. · filed 2014-12-01(a)

A defendant may be liable under Title VII if, by ignoring corporate formalities, its actions cannot be separated from an affiliate that employed the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a) can cover an entity that controls and interferes with a person’s employment relationship with a third party.

Scott v. Sarasota Doctors Hospital, Inc. · filed 2015-11-05(a)

Therefore, courts have found that the statute extends to the situation in which a defendant controls, and has interfered with, an individual’s employment relationship with a third party. ... These facts are sufficient to create an issue of fact on whether -the Hospital can be treated, for all intents and purposes, as Scott’s “employer.” Accordingly, the Hospital’s motion is denied with respect to this issue.

Section 2000e-2 permits a discrimination claim against an employer only when it employed the claimant directly or as a joint employer.

Bourne v. V.C. Enterprise/Kirby Home Cleaning System · filed 2016-01-20

At issue is whether The Kirby Company was Bourne’s employer within the meaning of Title VII. ... In light of the forgoing, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that The Kirby Company was Bourne’s employer or that it discriminated against Bourne in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits Title VII claims against employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs; a claim against an employer requires an employment or joint employment relationship.

Crenshaw v. Diamond State Port Corp. · filed 2016-08-11

Title VII regulates the relationship between employers and employees. It authorizes a cause of action only against employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... After careful consideration, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant was Plaintiffs joint employer. ... In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that Defendant was Plaintiffs employer. Thus, no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff on the retaliation claim (or any other Title VII claim).

Section 2000e-2 applies only to employers; an affiliated company is liable when it exercises sufficient control over the employee’s work.

Anwar v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 2017-11-30

As we have held, “Title VII applies only to ‘employers.’” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Sutherland v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 611 (6th Cir. 2003). ... Ultimately, even if Ramachandran was co-employed by MEG International and Dow through his employment with DCOMCO, Anwar fails to put forth evidence that her employment was controlled by Dow. Therefore, summary judgment on Anwar’s Title VII claim was appropriate.

An affiliated union may be treated as a Title VII employer if it exercises sufficient control over the worker’s employment relationship; directing a discriminatory act alone does not establish that relationship.

Morton v. Coli · filed 2018-01-22

Where Knight’s five “economic realities” fail to indicate a direct employment relationship in Title VII cases, the Seventh Circuit has routinely marshaled the Worth test to determine the level of influence exerted by parent corporations or affiliate organizations over a direct employer. ... Because Morton has failed to allege facts sufficient to raise the inference that an employee-employer relationship existed between he and Joint Council 25 under the existing standards promulgated in this circuit’s Knight and Worth decisions, his claim cannot survive.

A company is a joint employer for Title VII discrimination purposes only if it shares control over the worker’s essential terms and conditions of employment.

Hall v. Arkema Inc · filed 2020-12-23(a)(1)

Having considered all of the relevant factors, the Court concludes that Arkema was not Hall’s joint employer: Team was responsible for all compensation, benefits, and record keeping functions for Hall; Arkema’s supervision was limited to making sure safety rules were met and the purpose of its contract with Team was achieved; and Arkema did not set the essential terms and conditions of Hall’s employment.

Title VII employment discrimination liability requires a direct or indirect employer relationship with the plaintiff.

Green v. Illinois State Board of Educat · filed 2021-06-07

The district court also properly dismissed Green’s claims against the State Board of Education. As the district court explained, Green could not sue the Board for discrimination under Title VII or the ADEA because it was not his direct employer, and Green does not argue on appeal that the Board was his indirect employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits discrimination liability only against a plaintiff’s employer; a separate governmental entity is not liable when it did not employ the plaintiff or control her employment decisions.

Davis v. Gavin · filed 2021-08-12(a)

For these reasons, the Court finds that the Parish cannot be considered Davis’s employer for purposes of Title VII, and therefore, cannot be held liable to Davis under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination by employers, so an entity that does not employ the plaintiff is not liable under that provision.

Bradley v. Guardian Industries · filed 2021-08-18(a)

Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Report’s disposition that Guardian Industries is entitled to summary judgment on Bradley’s Title VII claims. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e(b) (providing that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination applies only to “employers” and defining the term).

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employee to bring a Title VII claim only against her employer.

Painter v. Midwest Health, Inc. · filed 2021-09-28(a)

This is so because an employee can assert a Title VII claim only against her employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support an employment discrimination claim against defendants who were not the plaintiff’s employer.

(PS) Ciurar v. Sodergren · filed 2021-10-25(a)(1)

The amended complaint, however, alleges that plaintiff’s employer was “CVS Pharmacy,” not the defendants. ... The amended complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim pursuant to Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the defendant was the plaintiff’s employer or joint employer.

ALBERT v. GRICE · filed 2022-01-13(a)

Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he was an employee of WSI or that WSI was a “joint employer” with Adecco, he has failed to state a claim against WSI under Title VII, and his claim against WSI is dismissed without prejudice.

Section 2000e-2(a)'s employer requirement cannot be met by combining employees of separate entities without facts supporting joint or single employer status.

Williams v. Kommunikare Therapy, PC · filed 2022-05-05(a)

The Court holds that the Complaint has not alleged facts sufficient to plausibly suggest that RMS Foods and Defendant KommuniKare are either joint employers or a single employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employment relationship; a defendant may be liable as a single or joint employer only when the alleged facts plausibly establish that relationship.

Britton v. Bronx Parent Housing Network · filed 2022-09-19(a)(1)

Crucially, Title VII pertains to discrimination by an employer. ... Britton’s attempt to plead that the City of New York is her joint employer alongside BPHN fails. Accordingly, Count One of Britton’s Complaint is dismissed as against the City of New York.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars discrimination by an employer; a franchisor may qualify as an employer depending on its control and supervision of the worker.

Teague v. Quad Cities Retail · filed 2023-02-16(a)(1)

A franchisor could, therefore, be considered an employer, although if it exercises little to no control over the employee, it is unlikely to be so found. ... Thus, it is simply not possible to conclude, merely by examining the complaint, that 7 Eleven exercised insufficient control or supervision over Plaintiff to be considered an employer.

A religious discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

Champaign v. CenturyLink Communications · filed 2023-03-01

Each of the claims that Mr. Champaign brings, except intentional infliction of emotional distress, are employment-based causes of action, and thus a necessary element of each claim is that the defendant was the plaintiff's employer. ... Here, the complaint fails to allege facts showing that CenturyLink and Lumen were Mr. Champaign’s employer or are otherwise liable for the misconduct alleged.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII discrimination claim to be brought against the plaintiff’s employer.

Singleton v. State of Louisiana · filed 2023-07-25(a)

In sum, the evidence shows that the Department (not the Commission) exercised exclusive control over the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment with the State, and therefore the Department (not the Commission) was Plaintiff’s “employer” under Title VII and the FMLA.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination claim against an entity to plausibly allege that the entity employed the plaintiff or controlled the challenged employment action.

Curtis v. Summit County Children Services · filed 2023-08-28(a)

Based on its review of the Complaint, the Court finds Ms. Curtis has failed to adequately and plausibly allege that the County was her employer, or that it otherwise exercised control over the employment actions challenged in the Complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim against a company to allege that the company was the plaintiff’s employer.

Moore v. Memphis Memory Gardens · filed 2023-09-28(a)(1)

Mr. Moore has failed to allege that MMG was his employer, a necessity for bringing a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a claim against a joint employer when the common-law agency factors establish an employment relationship, with control over the worker as the principal consideration.

Lopez v. Weyerhaeuser Company · filed 2023-10-13(a)(1)

On this record, the Court cannot find that, as a matter of law, Weyerhaeuser is plaintiff’s joint employer, as there is no evidence that it had any involvement in the claims and allegations raised in this lawsuit.

Separate restaurants cannot be treated as one employer under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without evidence that they operated as an integrated enterprise.

Villada v. Grand Canyon Diner · filed 2024-08-19(a)(1)

This lack of any direct interaction by Plaintiff with any of the restaurants beyond the Grand Canyon Diner leads the Court to conclude that the Corporate Defendants did not constitute a single integrated enterprise6, and therefore, even if aggregation were appropriate under Title VII, which is a question the Second Circuit has yet to answer, it would not be appropriate based on ... the facts of this case.

An entity must qualify as the plaintiff’s employer, including exercising substantial control over significant aspects of the employment, to face Title VII discrimination liability.

DALE v. NORTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS FOUNDATION · filed 2024-09-16(a)(1)

To be subjected to liability under Title VII, a defendant must (1) fall within the Title VII statutory definition of “employer,” and (2) have exercised substantial control over significant aspects of the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of plaintiff’s employment. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Foundation is her employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination to allege facts supporting an inference that the defendant was the plaintiff’s employer.

Dixon v. Royal Live Oaks Academy of the Arts & Sciences Charter School · filed 2024-09-25(a)

As an initial matter, Dixon does not allege facts sufficient for the court to infer that CIE is (or was) Dixon’s employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a Title VII defendant to be the plaintiff’s employer; employer status depends on control over the plaintiff’s work.

Taylor v. San Francisco Sheriff's Department · filed 2024-10-29(a)

Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that Alameda County is her employer.

An entity can be liable for employment discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) if it was the plaintiff’s employer.

Lopez v. Iaela-Tokugawa · filed 2025-01-22(a)

“Under Title VII, an entity can be held liable for discrimination ... if itis an ‘employer’ of the plaintiff.” ... While it appears one of the entity Defendants ... was allegedly Plaintiffs employer, the amended complaint fails to allege how these federal statutes ... apply to the other entity Defendants.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employee to sue an employer for unlawful employment practices; a defendant that is not the employee’s employer is not liable under Title VII.

Navarrete v. Whole Foods · filed 2025-01-30

The statutes underlying eight of plaintiff’s proposed amended claims – Title VII, the DCHRA, and the ADA – authorize an employee to bring a cause of action for relief against her “employer.” ... The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of defendant on Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen because it is not plaintiff’s employer.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an employment discrimination claim against a defendant only if the defendant was the plaintiff’s employer.

Mia Bird v. Mastery Charter Schools · filed 2025-04-30(a)

Those laws forbid such discrimination only by employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 43 Pa. Stat. § 955. ... Her employer was Nutrition Group, not Mastery.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from refusing to hire someone because of race; a disputed employer relationship may require discovery before dismissal.

Gardner v. Chevron · filed 2025-09-10(a)(1)

Because the Court must accept all alleged facts by Plaintiff as true and apply a liberal standard given his pro se status, it is premature to determine the relationship between Chevron and K Bilg Corporation absent discovery. ... Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as it relates to Plaintiff’s federal and state employment discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(k)(3) permits a rule barring employment because of drug use unless the rule is adopted or applied with discriminatory intent.

King v. Stanislaus Consolidated Fire Protection District · filed 1997-11-07(k)(3)

I note that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) provides that a rule barring employment because of drug use is not an unlawful employment practice unless it is adopted or applied with intent to discriminate. Plaintiff has also offered no evidence that this was the case.

Section 2000e-2 does not permit an inference of race discrimination from different discipline when the employees’ experience and conduct materially differ.

Foggey v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-01-13(a)(1)

In such circumstances, the fact that Foggey was disciplined and Hodzic was not does not support an inference that race was behind their difference in treatment.

A plaintiff using a comparator to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination must show that an employee outside the protected class was similarly situated in all material respects and treated more favorably.

Hester v. University of Alabama Birmingham Hospital · filed 2020-01-07(a)(1)

Under Lewis, Mr. Hester failed to show that Mr. Nash was similarly situated and that UABH treated him more favorably.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators must show that employees outside the protected class who were similarly situated in all material respects received more favorable treatment.

BLASH v. CITY OF HAWKINSVILLE AND PULASKI COUNTY GEORGIA SHERRIF'S OFFICE · filed 2019-12-30(a)(1)

In short, the Court concludes that Blash has not made a prima facie case because, under the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ guidance in Lewis I, he and his proffered comparators––Deputies Christ White and Jordan Peavy––are simply not “similarly situated in all material respects.”

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination through disparate treatment must identify a comparator similarly situated in all material respects; a comparator whose misconduct differs materially does not establish a prima facie case.

Jackson v. Blue Bird Corporation · filed 2019-11-15(a)(1)

In conclusion, because Jackson has failed to identify a comparator who is “similarly situated in all material respects” but received different treatment, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Jackson has thus failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; lighter discipline for other employees does not establish pretext when their misconduct is not comparable in seriousness or number.

Maben v. Southwestern Medical Clinic · filed 2015-11-04(a)(1)

In pertinent part, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... None of the four, however, engaged in acts that were of comparable seriousness or number to those that precipitated the plaintiff’s termination. The district court thus did not err in concluding that Maben failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants’ articulated reasons for her termination actually were pretexts to disguise racially discriminatory motives.

A plaintiff relying on comparators to prove race discrimination under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must identify employees who engaged in similar conduct but received more favorable treatment for the challenged employment action.

Blow v. Virginia College · filed 2015-07-24(a)(1)

Accordingly, the comparator employees are those who were “involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct” but were not terminated. ... Ms. Blow’s failure to identify comparators, and thus to make out a prima facie case, is fatal to her discrimination claim in this case.

A plaintiff using comparators to establish a circumstantial race discrimination claim must show more favorable treatment of employees whose conduct was nearly identical.

Peter Paske, Jr. v. Fitzgerald · filed 2015-05-04(a)(1)

Because Paske failed to adduce evidence that a comparator was treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances, he failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a race-discrimination plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to show that a similarly situated employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class received more favorable treatment.

Edwards v. Senatobia Muni School District · filed 2013-12-13(a)

Because Edwards and Wooten are both African American, Edwards cannot rely on the School District’s treatment of Wooten to establish the last element of his prima facie case. Edwards has neither argued nor offered any evidence showing that the School District treated a similarly situated non-African-American employee more favorably than Edwards, hence, he has not established a prima facie case of discrimination.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a coworker who shares the plaintiff’s race is not a proper comparator for proving race discrimination through disparate treatment.

Cherry v. CCA Properties of America, Ltd. Liability Corp. · filed 2011-08-22(a)

Like Cherry, however, Lacy is an African-American, so he is not a proper comparator for demonstrating that her termination was the product of racial discrimination ... by CCA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an inference of discrimination when an employer treats a similarly situated employee of a different protected class more favorably.

Adewole v. Psi Services, Inc. · filed 2011-07-18(a)(1)

Although a Title VII plaintiff can raise an inference of discrimination by presenting evidence that the employer treated other employees of a different protected class more favorably in the same factual circumstances, Kimbrough is not an adequate comparator.

In a race discrimination claim based on unequal discipline, a proposed comparator's misconduct must be nearly identical to the plaintiff's.

Young vs FEDEX Express · filed 2011-06-28(a)(1)

Indeed, even when considering the EEOC report, Young failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, because none of coworkers he proffered as comparators were nearly identical to him in the quality or quantity of their conduct.

In a work-rule discrimination claim, a Title VII plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing that employees outside the protected class were treated differently under nearly identical circumstances.

Burnett v. Thompson · filed 2002-02-07(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case in this manner, Burnett must show that employees not in the protected class were treated differently under circumstances “nearly identical” to hers.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff using indirect proof of discriminatory treatment to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Juana GONZALEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INGERSOLL MILLING MACHINE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-01-14(a)(1)

Also, the other employees cited by Gonzalez who had not been laid off, and who had less seniority then Gonzalez, all had higher work classifications than Gonzalez and, thus, were not similarly situated.

For a race-discrimination claim based on an attendance policy, the plaintiff must show that similarly situated employees of another race received more favorable treatment under the policy in effect at the time.

Black v. Wagner Brake Subsidiary · filed 1998-02-17(a)

However, plaintiff has failed to show the existence of substantial evidence of the fourth element of his prima facie case. In the circumstances of plaintiff’s case, he must show that similarly situated white employees were treated more favorably than he was in the application of the attendance policy after January 1996.

A plaintiff using circumstantial evidence to establish disparate treatment must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Medical · filed 1998-03-27(a)(1)

For Plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII, she must show—as a threshold matter under the circumstantial evidence framework—that nonminority, similarly situated employees were treated more favorably: an improper effect.

A plaintiff relying on comparators to establish sex discrimination must show that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.

Snoke v. Staff Leasing, Inc. · filed 1998-12-30(a)(1)

Accordingly, plaintiff may not rely on Webb and Hail as similarly situated persons to establish the third element of her prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming discriminatory reduction of job duties to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected group were treated more favorably.

Swanson v. Civil Air Patrol · filed 1999-01-07(a)(1)

Nor has she shown that a similarly-situated male was treated differently, i.e., that a man with a similar position at CAP was not relieved of job responsibilities. If the plaintiff fails to identify similarly situated, non-minority employees who were treated more favorably, her case must fail.

A plaintiff relying on coworker comparisons to show sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the employees were similarly situated in relevant respects.

Spence v. Panasonic Copier Co. · filed 1999-03-09(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not shown that his performance and the performance of any female sales representatives are comparable within the meaning of these precedents.

Employees with different job titles may be similarly situated for a racial discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp. · filed 1999-03-16(a)(1)

An employer cannot insulate itself from claims of racial discrimination simply by providing different job titles to each of its employees.

A plaintiff alleging sex discrimination must show different treatment from employees of another sex under similar circumstances; different treatment from another woman is insufficient.

Beverly BAUER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALBEMARLE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1999-03-15(a)(1)

However, to demonstrate gender discrimination, Mrs. Bauer must show that she was treated differently from male employees because of her gender under similar circumstances, not merely that she was treated differently from other female employees.

A circumstantial race-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails without evidence that similarly situated employees were treated differently.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. E.J. Sacco, Inc. · filed 1999-08-31(a)(1)

The Commission has produced no evidence of any kind that similarly-situated employees were treated differently than were Galloway and Thomas. Thus, the Commission has not established a prima facie case of discrimination.

Employees whose misconduct differs substantially are not similarly situated for a race discrimination claim.

McDaniel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2000-05-15(a)(1)

In assessing the conduct of the three loss prevention employees, WalMart had sufficient information to determine that McDaniel’s actions warranted dismissal while Mills and Jester engaged in conduct insufficient to justify discipline. Thus, McDaniel cannot show that he was treated differently than similarly-situated employees outside his class.

A plaintiff relying on co-worker comparisons to prove disparate treatment under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the workers were similarly situated in all respects.

Beene v. St. Vincent Mercy Medical Center · filed 2000-06-20(a)(1)

Under Title VII, when a plaintiff compares herself to the treatment received by co-employees, the comparison group must be similarly situated “in all respects.”

In a disparate discipline claim, the prima facie comparison uses factors entering the original disciplinary process; different outcomes in an intermediate appeal may be considered as an employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.

Jones v. Southwest Airlines · filed 2000-06-21

I conclude that the better rule is to consider at Step One of the McDonnell Douglas analysis only those factors that are inputs to the original disciplinary process in determining whether employees are similarly situated. An employer may offer at Step Two a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for taking the action it did, including different intermediate outcomes by partially or totally independent review boards.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting an inference of sex discrimination; employees who violated workplace rules are not similarly situated to a comparator who did not.

Darwin Anderson etc. v. State of NE · filed 2000-07-20(a)(1)

The female security specialist, on the other hand, had kept her patient in full view and had reported his escape immediately after he had climbed a wall. There was, moreover, no substantial evidence that she had violated any rule of the LRC that allowed her patient to effect his escape. The plaintiffs' sex discrimination claim therefore fails for lack of proof.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to prove sex discrimination must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

Sanguinetti v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2000-08-08(a)(1)

Thus, plaintiff has failed to establish the “similarly situated” prong of his prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators to show that the other employees were similarly situated.

Blalock v. United States · filed 2000-10-04(a)

Given this Court's stringent interpretation of "similarly situated,"15 Plaintiff fails to establish this crucial element of the prima facie case for discrimination.

A coworker is not similarly situated for a disparate-discipline claim when the employee’s misconduct differs in severity and frequency.

Vickers v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2000-10-26(a)(1)

Thus, in terms of the severity and quantity of the conduct (as measured in degree and frequency) Montelli was not similarly situated to the Plaintiff.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence for a Title VII race or sex discrimination claim must identify similarly situated employees outside the protected class who received more favorable treatment.

Dent v. Federal Mogul Corp. · filed 2001-01-25(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff has failed to identify similarly situated employees outside of his protected racial and gender classification who were treated more favorably, his Title VII race and sex discrimination claims must fail for a lack of a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employee claiming discriminatory discipline through comparison with coworkers to show that their misconduct was comparably serious.

Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2001-02-06

To show that she was "similarly situated," Cronquist must establish that she was treated differently from those employees whose violations were of "comparable seriousness."

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment; a disparate treatment claim depends on whether the employees being compared were similarly situated.

Kidd v. Illinois State Police · filed 2001-02-09(a)

After careful consideration of the evidence at issue, we reach the same conclusion and find in favor of the Illinois State Police. ... At the time of his discharge, Kidd was not performing at an acceptable level to become permanently employed as an officer with the Illinois State Police. ... Kidd’s essay was markedly more sophisticated in tenor than Tucker’s.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim requires evidence that male employees treated more favorably were in nearly identical circumstances.

Guerra v. United Parcel Svc · filed 2001-02-13(a)(1)

Guerra has not shown that a fact issue exists with respect to treatment of similarly situated employees and has not supported her prima facie case.

A racial discrimination claim based on different discipline requires the plaintiff to show that the other employee was similarly situated in all relevant aspects.

Silvera v. Orange County School Bd. · filed 2001-03-20(a)(1)

In order to meet the comparability requirement a plaintiff is required to show that he is similarly situated in all relevant aspects to the non-minority employee.

A plaintiff using the indirect method to prove sex discrimination must identify a similarly situated male employee who was treated more favorably.

Hoffman-Dombrowski v. Arlington Int'l Race · filed 2001-06-19(a)(1)

Dombrowski has not, however, met the fourth element of her prima facie case for either of the challenged actions because she has not named a similarly situated male that was treated more favorably.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on comparisons with other employees must show that employees outside the protected class who engaged in similar conduct received more favorable treatment.

Miller v. Delaware, Department of Probation & Parole · filed 2001-08-28(a)(1)

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Miller, the court concludes that Miller was not similarly situated to the white officers who also lost their guns. It is undisputed that Miller gave conflicting accounts of how he lost his weapon. Moreover, it is also undisputed that the two white officers who lost their guns, but were not suspended or fired, did not give conflicting accounts regarding the loss of their weapon.

An employee with less seniority than retained coworkers is not similarly situated to them for a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim arising from a seniority-based reduction in force.

Homes-Naples v. Girard Board of Education · filed 2001-11-30(a)(1)

As to the fourth prong of her prima facie racial discrimination claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not similarly situated to other non-protected employees because Plaintiff had less seniority than the other two white female building custodians who kept their positions after Defendant’s school closure and consolidation.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a comparator in a disparate treatment claim must be similarly situated to the plaintiff in all relevant respects.

Noble v. Brinker International, Inc. · filed 2001-12-12(a)(1)

Thus, for another employee to be “comparable” to a plaintiff, he must be similarly-situated in all relevant respects.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators must show that the employees are actually similarly situated to establish a prima facie case.

Henry v. City of Tallahassee · filed 2002-06-24(a)(1)

Nevertheless, whatever “similarly situated” may be, this is certainly not it.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on indirect evidence of race discrimination to show that similarly situated employees of another race were treated more favorably.

Bowen v. Celotex Corporation · filed 2002-07-10(a)(1)

Among other things, these productive burdens obligated Bowen to demonstrate that similarly-situated white employees were treated more favorably.

A promotion discrimination claim cannot rely on comparators who became eligible earlier by completing a required test before the plaintiff.

Montgomery v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc. · filed 2002-09-24(a)

We conclude that these three individuals are not similarly situated to Montgomery in that these associates started at or before the time that Montgomery began his employment with HAM, and took the weld test administered in August 1996. Consequently, these individuals were eligible for promotion well before Montgomery, as they had been employed in the weld department for over twelve months and took the required weld test nearly a year before Montgomery.

Section 2000e-2's disparate treatment analysis does not treat a probationary employee and a permanent employee with civil service rights as similarly situated comparators.

Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids · filed 2002-10-15

In that respect, the two were not similarly situated because Mercer was a probationary employee whereas Captain Peters had the Civil Service rights of a permanent employee. In these circumstances, the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing Mercer’s sex discrimination claims.

A racial disparate treatment plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received different treatment for the same or similar conduct.

Singfield v. Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 2003-05-20(a)(1)

Singfield cannot show that AMHA treated him differently from similarly situated employees when they suspended him for having an altercation with his supervisor and possessing six duplicate master keys.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff using the indirect method to show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class received better treatment; the comparison considers the employer’s honest belief about differences in conduct.

Bituin v. Supervalu, Holdings, Inc. · filed 2003-07-29(a)(1)

Accordingly, Mr. Bituin and Mr. Mayfield are distinguishable from the employer’s perspective, and therefore they are not “similarly situated.” The genuine issue of material fact that remains with regard to Mr. Bituin’s actual intent is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis of the fourth element of the prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. Because Mr. Bituin and Mr. Mayfield are not “similarly situated,” Plaintiff has failed to establish his prima facie case of discrimination and the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

A Title VII claimant relying on disparate treatment must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Hunter v. St. Francis Hospital · filed 2003-08-20(a)

In order to show such disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show that a similarly situated individual that is not in the plaintiffs protected class was more favorably treated.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that a similarly situated person outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

Maynard v. Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Florida Department of Education · filed 2003-08-22(a)(1)

We find that A.R.’s negative patient care results over an isolated period of time are not a basis for comparison with Maynard’s overall poor record over an extended period of time.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably; employees without a comparable disciplinary record or last chance agreement are not similarly situated.

Leong v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General · filed 2003-10-29(a)(1)

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably. ... Leong’s proposed comparators are not similarly situated because they were not subject to such agreements.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee with materially different job duties is not a similarly situated comparator for an indirect sex-discrimination claim.

Czerska v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2003-12-01(a)(1)

White can not be considered a similarly situated employee because he had substantial job duties in Chicago and throughout Europe while Plaintiff performed duties in Chicago only.

For a sex discrimination claim based on disparate treatment, a proposed comparator’s misconduct and punishment must be sufficiently similar to the plaintiff’s, though an exact match is unnecessary.

Bethel v. Porterfield · filed 2003-12-19(a)(1)

Further, I conclude that, while an exact correlation is unnecessary, the offenses and punishments must be “fair congeners” so that apples are compared to apples.

A plaintiff claiming race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

Crumpton v. Potter · filed 2004-02-25(a)

Because plaintiff has not identified any similarly situated non-protected person who was treated more favorably than he, he has failed to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination. Accordingly, I enter summary judgment in favor of defendant on this claim.

In a race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee must have a fair opportunity to develop evidence that other employees were similarly situated.

Jones v. City of Wilmington · filed 2004-01-08(a)(1)

Plaintiffs last point is persuasive to this extent: he must be allowed a fair opportunity to prove that he is similarly situated to the other WPD officers charged with dishonesty and/or inaccurate reporting, and thus establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff using other employees to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination to show that they were similarly situated under the relevant workplace rules.

Messina v. EI Du Pont De Nemours and Co. · filed 2004-03-09(a)(1)

Because Mr. Tate was- not subject to the Inviolable Safety Rules, or the more stringent work plan rules, he and Mr. Messina are not similarly situated. Therefore, Mr. Tate’s less severe punishment for violating DFS safety rules and procedures is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case that DFS discriminated against Mr. Messi-na on the basis of race.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff using indirect evidence to support a pay discrimination claim to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Jorden v. Walmart Stores, Inc. · filed 2004-03-29(a)(1)

As Jorden failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that any similarly situated employees outside of his protected class were treated differently, he has necessarily failed to present a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff using the indirect method to identify a similarly situated employee outside the protected class who was treated more favorably by the same decisionmaker.

Little, Greg v. IL Dept Revenue · filed 2004-05-27(a)(1)

A similarly-situated employee must have been disciplined, or not, by the same decisionmaker who imposed an adverse employment action on the plaintiff.

A race-discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method must identify a similarly situated employee outside the protected class who was treated more favorably by the same decisionmaker.

Little v. Illinois Department of Revenue, Illinois Gaming Board, Glen Bower, Individually and as Director of the Il · filed 2004-05-27(a)(1)

A similarly-situated employee must have been disciplined, or not, by the same decisionmaker who imposed an adverse employment action on the plaintiff. ... Because Little has not put forth competent evidence that he was treated differently than a similarly situated employee outside of either of his protected classes, he has failed to establish a prima facie case and summary judgment was proper for that reason alone.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination through disparate discipline must identify similarly situated employees whose misconduct is comparable in quantity and quality.

Mizell v. Miami-Dade County, Florida · filed 2004-10-22(a)(1)

In this case, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court concludes that the misconduct engaged in by Officers Beahn, Evelyn, Crosby, Jurney, Columbro, Simonton, and Peacock, and by Lieutenant Hafner, is easily distinguished from the misconduct engaged in by Mizell, on the basis of both the quantity and quality of the misconduct.

To establish a prima facie race discrimination claim through more favorable treatment of other employees, a plaintiff must show that the employees were similar in the conduct for which the plaintiff was disciplined.

Singfield v. Akron Metro Housing · filed 2004-11-10(a)(1)

Because none of the employees cited allegedly engaged in the range of activities for which Singfield was disciplined, no employee is similarly situated.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim based on disparate discipline to proceed when a worker of another race allegedly received lighter discipline for similar misconduct; whether the workers were similarly situated may await discovery.

Bond v. Potter · filed 2004-11-30(a)(1)

However, for his demotion claim to survive Bond must show that another supervisor, not a member of Bond’s protected class, was treated differently under circumstances similar to those leading to Bond’s demotion. Bond offers the affidavit of the local president of the National Association of Postal Supervisors, himself a former postal manager, stating that Dean Fields, a white supervisor, engaged in similar conduct to Bond and was not demoted. Whether or not this individual was similarly situated as Bond and whether Defendant can articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any different treatment of Bond are not now before the court and must await development of a more complete record. ... The court will, therefore, deny Defendant’s motion as to Bond’s disparate demotion claim.

In a disparate treatment claim involving separate incidents of misconduct, employees are similarly situated only if their circumstances, including their misconduct, are nearly identical.

Perez v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division · filed 2004-12-21(a)

In instructing, without more, that the employees’ underlying misconduct must be comparably serious, the district court erroneously suggested that comparably serious misconduct was by itself enough to make employees similarly situated. A correctly worded instruction would have made clear that the jury must find the employees’ circumstances to have been nearly identical in order to find them similarly situated.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff relying on other employees’ treatment to show that those employees were similarly situated in relevant respects.

Pighee v. L'OREAL USA [PRODUCTS], INC. · filed 2005-01-12(a)(1)

Because Davis and Richey were not similarly situated, the fact that neither was terminated is not material.

For a race discrimination claim based on unequal discipline, the plaintiff must identify similarly situated employees treated more favorably; employees disciplined by different supervisors ordinarily are not comparable.

Bradford v. City of Chicago · filed 2005-01-12(a)(1)

He does not dispute that those other employees were disciplined by different supervisors, nor does he provide any further information about their behavior, their circumstances, or the sanctions to which they were subjected. We find no reason that this case should be considered an exception to the general principle expressed in Radue.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination in pay to show that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class received more favorable treatment under nearly identical circumstances.

Eeoc v. Txi Operations, Lp · filed 2005-01-13(a)(1)

Rather, the Court reiterates that Schlenker's and Fundling's jobs were not substantially equal, and that under Title VII, Schlenker and Fundling were not similarly situated employees. Therefore, Fundling's Title VII claim also fails.

A sex discrimination claim based on discipline requires a similarly situated comparator; an employee who supervised the plaintiff during the disputed discipline does not qualify.

Jordan, Juanita v. Thompson, Donald L. · filed 2005-01-28(a)(1)

Therefore, because Carey was her superior at all times relevant to this facet of Jordan’s claim, and because we have held that Carey’s promotion was not itself an act of discrimination, Carey cannot be consid- ered to be “similarly situated” and Jordan’s claim must fail.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim that relies on a comparator requires an employee outside the protected class who is similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Cooley v. Great Southern Wood Preserving · filed 2005-05-18(a)(1)

Thus, whether we apply the “similar” or “nearly identical” analysis, Oliveira was not a proper comparator.

A race discrimination plaintiff may establish a prima facie disparate treatment case by showing that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably.

Bernadette D. Martin v. Rumsfeld · filed 2005-06-29(a)(1)

To do so, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she: (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; (3) was qualified to do her job; and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside of the protected class. ... Because there is evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Martin was similarly situated to Lee and/or Bayne, this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

A race discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Brummett, Tony v. Sinclair Broadcast · filed 2005-07-06(a)(1)

In sum, Mr. Brummett has not presented a similarly situated employee who was not in his protected class and who Sinclair treated better than him.

A plaintiff using coworker comparisons to show discrimination must identify employees outside the protected class who engaged in similar misconduct and received more favorable treatment.

Jeronimus v. Polk County Opportunity Council, Inc. · filed 2005-08-11(a)(1)

We first agree with the district court that Wiggs and Wooten were not similarly situated to Jeronimus because their performance issues were not as serious as Jeronimus’s performance issues.

A plaintiff claiming racial discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Tartt v. City of Clarksville · filed 2005-09-13(a)

Therefore, Tartt has failed entirely to present evidence that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees. We disagree with the district court’s assumption that Tartt made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

For a Title VII discrimination claim using the indirect method, a substantial difference in work experience can prevent another employee from being a similarly situated comparator.

Bio, Maman D. v. Federal Express Corp · filed 2005-09-16(a)(1)

This substantial gap in experience precludes a finding that the two were similarly situated.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination to show that similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s classification received more favorable treatment.

McDonell v. Attorney General · filed 2005-09-21(a)

Appellant failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie case, namely, that similarly situated non-white employees were treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances.

A race discrimination claim based on different treatment of coworkers requires the coworkers to be similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete · filed 2005-09-26(a)

We disagree that Schroeder and Spencer were similarly situated to Johnson in all relevant respects, as required to demonstrate race discrimination based on disparate treatment of fellow employees.

An employee relying on comparator evidence to prove discriminatory termination under Title VII must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Ramon v. Continental Airlines Inc. · filed 2005-10-31(a)(1)

To satisfy that burden, she must proffer evidence that a similarly situated employee from outside the protected class was not subjected to the adverse employment action. ... The undisputed evidence in this case reveals that neither Arbaney, Lakey, nor Couch was similarly situated to Ramon.

Under Section 2000e-2, a plaintiff using circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination must show that similarly-situated employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably.

Carter v. Bowman · filed 2005-12-09(a)(1)

The district court properly granted summary judgment to CSI as to Carter’s race discrimination claim because Carter failed to establish that similarly-situated employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on comparator evidence must show that employees involved in the same or similar conduct were disciplined differently.

Roy v. Broward Sheriff's Office · filed 2005-12-22

In determining whether employees are similarly situated, it is necessary to consider whether they were involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct but disciplined in different ways.

A sex discrimination plaintiff relying on comparator evidence must identify employees whose misconduct was nearly identical and who were treated more favorably.

Penn v. Department of Corrections · filed 2005-12-15(a)(1)

Officers Hartman, Walters, Armstrong, Barnes, and Jarrett, all of whom are male, arrived to overtime late, or failed to show up, on only one occasion, and no evidence in the record suggests that they persisted in their misconduct after a counseling session. Therefore, their misconduct was not of the same quantity or quality as Penn’s. Because their conduct was not nearly identical, they are not valid comparators.

A sex-discrimination plaintiff alleging unequal discipline must show that an employee outside the protected class engaged in similar misconduct and received less severe discipline.

Kathryn E. Boyce Camara v. Brinker Int'l. · filed 2006-01-09(a)

Despite Camara’s claims, Marks is not an appropriate comparator. Whereas Marks had made inappropriate comments to female employees, arrived at work inebriated, and fraternized with subordinates, certainly egregious conduct, Camara’s problems were in a different category, the area of employee relations. She had been harsh with staff, received numerous complaints from staff members, and criticized staff in front of guests. Accordingly, Marks and Camara were not similarly situated in all relevant respects, and the district court correctly held that Camara failed to establish her prima facie case.

A plaintiff using comparator evidence to establish race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must identify a similarly situated worker outside her protected class who was treated differently.

Floyd v. Communications Workers of America · filed 2006-03-17(a)(1)

Thus, this court is left with its earlier conclusion: the plaintiff has not identified a similarly situated person outside the plaintiffs protected class who was treated differently as to termination.

Under Title VII’s indirect method, a plaintiff must show that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class was treated differently.

Raymond, Wanda v. Ameritech Corp · filed 2006-03-29(a)(1)

Because there is no evidence that Raymond was treated differently than a similarly situated employee outside her protected class, she has not made her prima facie case of discrimination.

A plaintiff relying on other employees to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge must show that they received more favorable treatment for nearly identical misconduct.

Bouie v. Equistar Chemicals LP · filed 2006-06-22(a)(1)

We have held that, in order for circumstances to be nearly identical, the misconduct itself must be nearly identical.

Employees with different job titles may be similarly situated when their work and applicable standards are materially comparable.

Mason v. City of Chicago · filed 2006-06-23(a)(1)

However, Mason has presented enough evidence to raise an inference that his workload was sufficiently similar to that of a Personnel Analyst III to demonstrate that he and Opel are similarly situated.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence under § 2000e-2(a) must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Miller v. Potter · filed 2006-08-03(a)

Miller did not establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment because he failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he and other postal employees were similarly situated.

A plaintiff relying solely on comparator evidence to establish a prima facie Title VII sex discrimination case must identify similarly situated employees.

Dileo v. Ashcroft · filed 2006-08-03(a)(1)

She relied solely on “comparator evidence,” yet none of the three male employees whom Dileo offered as comparables were in fact “similarly situated.”

A plaintiff alleging race-based disparate treatment may establish a prima facie case by showing that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class received more favorable treatment, or by presenting other evidence of discrimination.

Davis v. Management Technology · filed 2006-08-16(a)(1)

In sum, we conclude that the district court correctly found that Davis failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment on the basis of his race because he did not show that a similarly-situated employee outside his protected class received more favorable treatment than he did, nor did he demonstrate racial discrimination in any other way.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a race discrimination plaintiff relying on a comparator to show that the other employee was similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Tribble v. Memphis City Schools · filed 2006-08-21(a)

We find that Plaintiff has failed to show that Stuart was similarly situated to Plaintiff.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must show that an employee treated more favorably was similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Roland v. United States Postal Service · filed 2006-10-11(a)

Simply put, Grier was not “similarly situated in all relevant respects” or “nearly identical” to Roland for purposes of Title VII.

A Title VII plaintiff alleging unequal discipline must show that an employee outside the protected class received less severe discipline for nearly identical misconduct.

McCalister v. Hillsborough County Sheriff · filed 2006-12-20(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McCalister, he has failed to present any evidence of similarly situated employees who were not members of a protected class, but who received less severe disciplinary sanctions. Therefore, he has failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination.

A racial discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence fails when the employee identifies no similarly situated comparator and presents no other evidence of discrimination.

Wright v. Sanders Lead Co. · filed 2007-02-15(a)(1)

We conclude that Wright failed to establish that he was similarly situated with Whitman.

When a national origin discrimination plaintiff relies on a coworker as a comparator, the coworker must have committed the same or a substantially similar violation and received different treatment.

Quintanilla v. AK TUBE LLC · filed 2007-03-12(a)(1)

To prevail, Quintanilla must show that he and Newman were “similarly situated” and treated disparately for the same or a substantially similar violation.

A plaintiff relying on other employees to establish a prima facie race discrimination claim must identify employees whose relevant misconduct and discipline are comparable.

Anderson v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2007-03-14(a)(1)

The failure to identify incidents involving the same conduct with the same supervisor regarding a similar work rule is fatal to establishing a prima facie case.

A plaintiff cannot establish racial discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) by comparing the employer’s treatment of employees whose disciplinary circumstances differ materially.

Black v. Sysco Foods of Houston · filed 2007-05-21(a)(1)

The two white employees that plaintiff alleges were treated more favorably were not similarly situated for the purposes of this analysis. Neither had a previous final warning and suspension on his record at the time of the disciplinary action. And neither employee had a criminal record showing a propensity for violent behavior. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and his claim fails as a matter of law.

Employees disciplined for the same rule violation are not necessarily similarly situated when their positions or conduct differ materially.

Perez, Marcos v. State of Illinois · filed 2007-06-08(a)(1)

While identical rule violations may be helpful in determining whether there has been discrimination, it is not dispositive of similarity.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of different treatment of similarly situated employees to support a disparate treatment claim.

Domai v. Discover Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2007-06-15(a)(1)

In short, the group he seeks to compare himself to is not “similarly situated,” and Domai’s evidence cannot support an inference of discrimination based on the Pure Flow data.

Prior disciplinary probation is relevant to whether employees are similarly situated in a Title VII disparate discipline claim.

Dawson v. Henry County Police Dept. · filed 2007-07-03(a)(1)

Dawson’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, probationary status imposed as a consequence of a disciplinary process is relevant to the “similarly-situated” analysis.

In a sex discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff relying on comparator evidence must show that a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably.

Cuevas v. American Express Travel Related Services Co. · filed 2007-09-19(a)(1)

Cuevas failed to show that her comparator, Octavio Cespedes, was similarly situated to her, and thus failed to establish a prima facie case. She also failed to raise an issue of material fact as to whether AMEX’s reasons for discharging her were pretextual. AMEX was therefore entitled to summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of race discrimination to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Frazier v. USF Holland, Inc. · filed 2007-10-04(a)

In sum, Frazier’s generalized and vague allegations that other non-minority casual employees were treated better than he was is not enough to make out a prima facie showing that he was denied further employment because of his race.

A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under Title VII must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

McDowell v. Southern Nuclear Operating · filed 2007-10-17(a)

The alleged comparators did not participate in any conduct that was considered to create or promote a hostile work environment, and therefore are not similarly situated for purposes of the fourth prong of a prima facie case.

A reverse race discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method must show that the employer treated similarly situated employees of another race more favorably.

Shefcik v. VILLAGE OP CALUMET PARK · filed 2007-11-07(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Officer Shefcik’s favor, his reverse race discrimination claim fails under the indirect method of proof ... because he has not presented sufficient evidence to fulfill the fourth prima facie element, namely, that Defendants treated similarly situated non-white police officers better than Officer Shefcik.

Employees with different formal classifications may be similarly situated under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when they share performance standards and a supervisor and the employer does not rely on those classifications in discipline.

Peirick v. Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis Athletics Department · filed 2007-12-14(a)(1)

So, in the context of this case, we consider whether Peirick and the three male coaches were similarly situated — though only Andrews was an hourly employee during his entire tenure. All three coaches were judged according to the same performance standards, were supervised by Moore, and had spotty performance histories. Yet only Peirick was terminated without the benefit of progressive discipline.

Under Title VII’s indirect method, an unequal pay claimant must identify a similarly situated employee treated more favorably; qualifications the employer considered can make employees materially different.

Warren v. Solo Cup Co. · filed 2008-02-20

Lorenz and Warren are not materially comparable in education, experience, and computer aptitude, and Solo considered these differences when deciding to pay Lorenz a higher hourly rate. Accordingly, Solo's motion for summary judgment on Warren's Title VII discriminatory pay claim was properly granted.

A gender discrimination claim based on unequal fringe benefits fails when the employee identifies no similarly situated men treated better and no other evidence of discrimination.

Carter v. Dayton Rogers Manufacturing Co. · filed 2008-03-20(a)(1)

Thus, Carter has not identified similarly-situated male Directors or Officers who were treated differently. Nothing else in the record points to gender discrimination in any manner. As a result, Carter has not established a prima facie case of gender discrimination and Dayton Rogers’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on Carter’s gender discrimination claims.