42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Once an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing an employee, the employee must show a genuine factual dispute over whether that reason was pretextual to survive summary judgment.

Green v. New Mexico Dept. · filed 2005-08-30(a)(1)

The DOL has therefore met its burden to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for firing Ms. Green. As a result, the burden shifts back to Ms. Green to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the DOL’s proffered reasons are pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to rely on subjective interview assessments; their use alone does not establish discriminatory pretext.

Goodman v. Southwestern · filed 2005-09-06(a)(1)

The fact that the university’s hiring decision was based in part on subjective factors is not evidence of pretext. Goodman’s poor interview performance is a valid reason for the defendants not to hire him.

A race-discrimination plaintiff must produce evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for termination was pretextual to avoid summary judgment.

Baker v. Randstad North America, L.P. · filed 2005-10-13(a)(1)

Baker fails to point to any summary judgment evidence sufficient to create an issue of material fact whether Randstad’s ... articulated reason for terminating him was a pretext for race discrimination.

An employee may show pretext for race discrimination when supervisors report her misconduct for termination but fail to report comparable misconduct by white employees.

Dickson v. LABCORP · filed 2005-10-18(a)(1)

Accordingly, the proper pretext inquiry here is Elliot and Brink’s decision not to report similar conduct of white employees to Flanagan. ... Accordingly, the court concludes that a reasonable fact-finder could find that the different treatment was “because of’ Dickson’s race and LabCorp’s proffered reason is pretextual.

A race discrimination plaintiff must directly rebut the employer’s stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to show pretext; evidence of superior qualifications does not suffice when it fails to address that reason.

Kondrak v. Principi · filed 2005-12-27(a)

Thus, summary judgment was actually appropriate on Kondrak’s 1997 race discrimination claim simply because Kondrak’s argument that he was more qualified for the position than Alston failed to meet “head on” the VA’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.

An employee claiming gender discrimination must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for its action was pretextual.

Surratt v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 2006-01-17

Surratt has failed to prove that the CTA’s explanation for placing her in “Area 605” was pretextual. There simply is no evidence here to suggest that the CTA made its move (even if it was ill-advised) because Surratt is a woman.

A plaintiff cannot establish discriminatory hiring pretext merely by claiming to be better qualified; the evidence must support an illegal motive.

Carl B. Hillemann, Jr. v. Univ. of Central Florida · filed 2006-01-18(a)(1)

A plaintiff cannot establish pretext merely by showing he or she was better qualified than the hired candidate; the plaintiff must show the hiring decision was made because of an illegal motive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a termination as race discrimination to raise a genuine factual dispute about pretext when the employer gives reasons for the firing.

Douglas v. Alabama Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation · filed 2006-03-01(a)(1)

However, Douglas failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Department’s articulated reasons for her termination were pretextual.

A gender discrimination claim over a denied promotion fails when the employee does not show that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Baker v. Prince George's County · filed 2006-03-06(a)(1)

The district court held that Baker’s gender discrimination claim failed because she had not shown that the nondiscriminatory reasons given by the County for not promoting her were pretextual. ... After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we conclude that the district court correctly decided the issues before it. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employee to show that an employer’s stated legitimate reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Carter v. Bowman · filed 2006-03-06

However, CSI offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Carter’s termination, namely, his refusal to submit to the required drug test after Carter reported his on-the-job injury. Carter offered insufficient evidence to indicate that CSI’s proferred reason for terminating him was a pretext for discrimination.

A plaintiff must offer specific facts showing pretext to avoid summary judgment after the employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for a hiring decision.

Smith v. Harvey · filed 2006-03-14

For plaintiff to survive summary judgment after the defendant has produced evidence of “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action”, he must “present concrete evidence in the form of specific facts which show the defendant’s proffered reason is mere pretext.”

Once an employer gives reasons for a challenged employment decision, the employee must show those reasons were a pretext for discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Begovic v. Water Pik Tech. Inc. · filed 2006-04-17

Even on the arguendo assumption that plaintiff had established a prima facie case in each instance, such evidence put the burden back on him to show that defendant’s cited reasons were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. ... Because plaintiff proffered virtually no evidence in this regard, the award of summary judgment was appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence connecting an employment decision to sex discrimination; a former supervisor’s alleged bias does not show pretext without evidence that it reached the decision maker.

Whittle v. GMJ Ltd. · filed 2006-06-15(a)(1)

The first three pieces of evidence are irrelevant because Becerra, not Mroczkowski, was the decision maker. Moreover, if Mroczkowski harbored an intent to discriminate against Whittle because she was pregnant, there is no evidence that he communicated such intent to Becerra.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination must discredit the employer’s stated reason for termination and show circumstances supporting an inference that race was the real reason.

Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co. · filed 2006-09-12(a)(1)

To prove pretext, a plaintiff must both discredit an employer’s asserted reason for termination and show that the circumstances permit drawing the reasonable inference that the real reason for terminating the plaintiff was her race.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), remarks outside the decision process, without more, do not establish pretext when the employer has offered evidence of poor job performance.

Ramirez v. GenCorp · filed 2006-09-14(a)(1)

Given the evidence presented by GDX regarding Ramirez’s poor job performance, the remarks made by Mills outside of the decisional process are insufficient without more to generate a genuine issue of fact on the question of pretext.

A plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment on a discriminatory discharge claim without evidence creating a genuine factual dispute that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Johnson v. Switch and Data Mgmt. · filed 2006-10-03(a)(1)

Johnson is unable to create a genuine issue of material fact that Switch and Data’s reason for termination was pretext, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racial discrimination in employment; an employee challenging a discharge must show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Haughton v. Orchid Automation · filed 2006-11-20(a)(1)

Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to the case at bar, we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant because, even drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, he cannot show pretext.

A plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reasons for discharge must present sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment on a discrimination claim.

Bojd v. Golder Associates, Inc. · filed 2006-12-26(a)

Assuming, arguendo, that Bojd established prima facie cases of religious and national origin discrimination, we hold that Bojd’s claims fail because he has not presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.

A worker alleging race discrimination in a discharge must present evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find that the employer’s stated reason is unworthy of credence or that discrimination more likely motivated the decision.

Smith v. Hewlett-Packard Co. · filed 2007-03-06(a)(1)

Concluding that plaintiff has not met this burden, the court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismisses this case with prejudice. ... Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Smith must produce evidence that is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find either that HP’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated HP’s decision to terminate him.

A plaintiff does not establish pretext under Title VII merely by arguing that the employer’s decision was mistaken.

Yates v. Hall · filed 2007-03-30(a)(1)

A plaintiff does not establish pretext by arguing that the defendant’s decision was mistaken.

A plaintiff pursuing a gender discrimination claim through indirect proof must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for its decision was pretextual.

Barricks, Lena C. v. Eli Lilly & Company · filed 2007-04-04(a)(1)

Even assuming that Swick and Barricks are similarly situated, however, Barricks has failed to show that Lilly’s stated reason for denying her a raise was pretextual.

A Title VII discrimination claim fails when the plaintiff has no evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Fox v. Wichita State University · filed 2007-05-23(a)(1)

Therefore, there is no evidence that defendant’s proffered reason for plaintiffs termination was pretextual. As such, summary judgment is granted in defendant’s favor on plaintiffs Title VII claims.

A sex-discrimination plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason for its decision is unworthy of credence or that discrimination more likely motivated the decision.

Menta v. Community College of Beaver County · filed 2007-05-25(a)

After considering the evidence, the court finds that the plaintiff did not meet his burden to show defendant’s reason was unworthy of credence.

An employee’s denial of misconduct does not establish pretext without evidence that the employer did not believe the misconduct occurred when it decided to fire the employee.

Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc. · filed 2007-05-25(a)(1)

Unfortunately for Holland, he has not put forth sufficient evidence showing that Washington Homes’ proffered legitimate explanation was false. Aside from his denials as to the threats (which we accept as true), nothing in the record supports an inference that DeCesaris’s explanation was pretextual, or perhaps more on point, that DeCesaris did not believe that Holland had threatened Peck when he made the decision to fire him.

Under § 2000e-2, a religious discrimination plaintiff may raise a triable issue of pretext through direct evidence of discriminatory motive or indirect evidence undermining the employer’s stated reason.

Noyes v. Kelly Services · filed 2007-05-29

We reiterate that at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff may raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext via (1) direct evidence of the employer’s discriminatory motive or (2) indirect evidence that undermines the credibility of the employer’s articulated reasons.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee alleging sex discrimination through circumstantial evidence must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chemicals Corp. · filed 2007-07-12(a)(1)

Ciba has met its burden of producing a legitimate reason, which is that Nasti submitted a false call report. Accordingly, Nasti must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this explanation is merely pretext, such that a reasonable factfinder could infer discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that an employer’s stated reason for denying tenure was a pretext for religious discrimination when the employer offers a nondiscriminatory explanation.

Adelman-Reyes v. Saint Xavier University · filed 2007-09-14

Adelman-Reyes’s evidence is simply too weak to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reason she was denied tenure— that she showed insufficient promise of continued contribution to the University’s intellectual community — was a cover for religious discrimination. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the University on Adelman-Reyes’s Title VII claim.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a failure-to-hire plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual once the employer offers those reasons.

Thomas v. Utility Trailer Manufacturing · filed 2007-12-14(a)(1)

The burden shifted to Thomas to show that the reasons Utility Trailer proffered for making its decision are pretextual. She did not carry that burden.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence of pretext when an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a challenged termination.

Cashman v. University of Alabama Board of Trustees · filed 2007-12-21(a)

Cashman did not provide evidence showing that this reason was a pretext for gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to show pretext when the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc. · filed 2008-01-16(a)(1)

Taking the analysis to its logical conclusion, however, the summary judgment ruling still would stand: Caterpillar has set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Gates’ suspension and subsequent termination and Gates has offered insufficient evidence of pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits summary judgment on a race discrimination claim when the employee fails to show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Pitts v. The Housing Authority · filed 2008-01-18(a)

After a de novo review of the record, we discern no error in the district court’s conclusion that even assuming Pitts established a prima facie case of race discrimination, the Housing Authority was entitled to summary judgment based on Pitts’s failure to establish, at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas test, pretext.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), different treatment of employees who are not similarly situated does not establish that an employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

Conley v. City of Findlay · filed 2008-01-28(a)(1)

However, disparate treatment of employees who are not similarly situated does not establish that the City’s proffered reasons for termination were pretextual.

A Title VII racial discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee lacks sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reasons for firing him were pretextual.

Sydney v. ConMed Electrical Surgery · filed 2008-04-18(a)(1)

In sum, Sydney failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of pretext. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order granting ConMed summary judgment on Sydney’s Title VII and § 1981 claims.

A Title VII race discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reasons for discharge were pretextual.

Terrell v. City of Harrisburg Police Department · filed 2008-04-30(a)(1)

After evaluating plaintiffs' proffered evidence of discrimination, no reasonable jury could conclude that defendants’ asserted reasons for discharging plaintiffs were pretextual. Plaintiffs’ failure to establish pretext provides an appropriate alternative ground for disposition of the motion for summary judgment.

An employer’s mistaken but honestly held belief that an employee broke a work rule can support a nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.

Taylor v. On Tap Unlimited, Inc. · filed 2008-06-24(a)(1)

A mistaken but honestly held belief of an employee’s wrongdoing will not vitiate the work rule defense.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee must offer evidence that an employer’s stated legitimate reason for an employment decision is a pretext for discrimination.

Cooper v. Connecticut Public Defenders Office · filed 2008-05-28(a)(1)

Cooper has failed to come forwai’d with any evidence that defendant’s proffered, non-discriminatory reason, i.e. that she failed to follow a directive of a superior, is a mere pretext for actual discrimination. She has therefore failed to prove pretext, and defendant is entitled to a grant of summary judgment.

A Title VII religious-discrimination plaintiff must offer evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual to survive summary judgment.

Larson, Esselona v. Portage Township Sch · filed 2008-08-22

Larson, who bears the burden of proving pretext, has not countered Portage Township’s explanation for her termination with any evidence sufficient to create a factual dispute regarding whether it was the true ground for its decision.

An employee challenging an employer’s stated reasons for an employment decision must present evidence that those reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Sunny Ekokotu v. Federal Express Corporation · filed 2008-09-24(a)(1)

Ekokotu has not produced evidence to establish that FedEx’s reasons were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

Once an employer gives a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal, the employee must show that the reason is pretextual.

Hasson v. Glendale School District · filed 2008-10-10(a)

Because Glendale demonstrates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Hasson’s dismissal, the burden shifts back to Hasson to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Glendale’s explanation is pretextual.

An employer’s perception that an employee was unwilling to accept its authority can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.

Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies (GTCYS) · filed 2008-08-28(a)(1)

Regardless of whether Montes, an employee of the board, was unwilling to accept the board’s authority, the board members’ perception that he was unwilling is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Montes’s termination.

Evidence that white employees were not disciplined for substantially identical conduct can support a finding that an employer’s stated reason for firing a Black employee was a pretext for race discrimination.

Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Service Department · filed 2008-11-25(a)(1)

Turning to the third Manzer factor, we believe that a reasonable factfinder could find that CWS’s proffered reason was insufficient to motivate Madden’s discharge.

A plaintiff with a timely discriminatory termination claim may use older incidents as background evidence of pretext.

Clack v. Rock-Tenn Company, Mill Divisi · filed 2008-12-22(a)(1)

Here, Clack is not attempting to recover based on Murphy’s past statements but, as explicitly allowed by Morgan, is simply using them as background evidence to prove pretext.

A Title VII national origin discrimination claim fails if the plaintiff cannot show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was pretextual.

Clair v. Agusta Aerospace Corp. · filed 2009-01-07

To demonstrate pretext, plaintiff must provide evidence that would allow a fact finder reasonably to “(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not the motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” ... Clair’s claim fails at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

A Title VII race or sex discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee does not show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Williams-Windom v. Potter · filed 2009-02-12(a)(1)

The district court did not err by granting the USPS’s summary judgment motion on Williams-Windom’s claims of discrimination based on race, gender, and age in violation of Title VII and the ADEA, and her retaliation claim. Williams-Windom ... failed to show that the USPS’s articulated reasons were pretextual.

An employer does not violate Section 2000e-2(a)(1) by making a mistaken termination decision if it honestly relies on nondiscriminatory reasons.

Sheaffer v. State Ex Rel. University of Wyoming Ex Rel. Board of Trustees · filed 2009-02-18(a)(1)

Again, UW is not required to be correct in its assessment that Sheaffer was, in fact, dishonest and deceitful; it is only required to have come to its conclusions in good faith and in a non-discriminatory manner.

An employee cannot establish pretext under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) merely by disputing whether her conduct violated company policy when the employer reasonably investigated and honestly believed that it did.

Sybrandt v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2009-03-26(a)(1)

She has essentially based her case on the assertion that her activities were not clearly prohibited by the self-service rule. But this alone, without other evidence of employer unreasonableness or dishonesty — especially where a reasonable investigation has been conducted — does not suffice under our precedents to create a material dispute over whether Home Depot’s proffered explanation was merely a pretext for an unlawful business practice.

High sales figures alone do not establish that an employer’s stated reason for firing a salesperson was a pretext for race discrimination when undisputed evidence shows the salesperson neglected reasonable job duties.

Taylor v. Peerless Industries Inc. · filed 2009-03-30(a)(1)

The mere fact that a salesperson has achieved high sales numbers over a relatively short period of time—here, less than two years—does not mean that a salesperson is effective in the field if the undisputed evidence shows that the salesperson has neglected to do the reasonable tasks requested by his employer in order to maintain or increase sales in the future and to allow the employer to develop and execute sales strategies and ensure compliance with those strategies.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that sex discrimination motivated an adverse employment action; an employer’s good-faith belief in employee misconduct can justify discharge.

McCullough v. University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences · filed 2009-03-23(a)(1)

A plaintiff seeking to survive an employer’s motion for summary judgment must therefore show a genuine issue for trial about whether the employer acted based on an intent to discriminate rather than on a good-faith belief that the employee committed misconduct justifying termination. ... McCullough has failed to do so here.

An employee opposing summary judgment on a sex discrimination claim must show a genuine dispute over whether discriminatory intent, rather than an employer’s good-faith belief in misconduct, motivated the discharge.

Al McCullough v. University of Arkansas etc. · filed 2009-03-23(a)(1)

A plaintiff seeking to survive an employer’s motion for summary judgment must therefore show a genuine issue for trial about whether the employer acted based on an intent to discriminate rather than on a good-faith belief that the employee committed misconduct justifying termination.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an employer to rebut a race discrimination claim by articulating legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for a demotion or termination, including poor leadership, missed assignments, and poor communication.

Brown v. Ohio State University · filed 2009-03-23(a)

Reasons such as lack of leadership and management skills, the failure to accept problems within her responsibility, untimely completion of assignments, and poor communication are legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an employee’s demotion or termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reason for termination to present evidence linking the termination to a protected trait; showing pretext alone is insufficient.

Martin v. Waring Investments Inc. · filed 2009-04-20(a)(1)

Demonstrating a “pretext” without providing evidence that Martin’s suspension and termination were related to his race, sex, or age does not allow Martin to clear the hurdles necessary to rebut Waring’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason within Title VII and the ADEA.

An employer’s belief that an employee misused a workplace computer provides a nondiscriminatory reason for firing him unless he shows that the reason was pretext for sex discrimination.

Farr v. St. Francis Hospital & Health Centers · filed 2009-06-29(a)(1)

Such activities provide a nondiscriminatory basis for the employer’s action. Farr does not show in any way that the employer’s belief was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires employees challenging unequal training opportunities to show that an employer’s stated legitimate reasons are pretextual.

Whitmire v. Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard · filed 2009-07-14(a)

Glenn and Whitmire have failed to show that these reasons were merely pretextual.

A discrimination plaintiff must present evidence creating a genuine factual dispute that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Patel v. University of Kansas Hospital Authority · filed 2009-09-04

For substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s summary-judgment decision, we agree that Ms. Patel has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.

A plaintiff may show pretext in a sex discrimination hiring claim by presenting employer explanations so inconsistent or contradictory that a jury could find them unbelievable.

Peck v. Elyria Foundry Co. · filed 2009-09-08(a)(1)

But at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff may meet her burden of demonstrating pretext by showing, in addition to proffered evidence, that an employer’s reasons are so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational jury could conclude the ... reasons were not believable.

Under Title VII, evidence that an employee was more qualified than the person promoted can, in some circumstances, show that the employer's stated reason was pretextual.

Risch v. Royal Oak Police Department · filed 2009-09-23(a)(1)

Evidence that the plaintiff was more qualified than the successful applicant can in some circumstances be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the employer's proffered explanation is pretextual.

A discriminatory termination claim fails when the employee does not show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Jiann Min Chang v. Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University · filed 2009-10-23(a)(1)

Thus, Chang has neither shown that AAMU’s proffered reason is unworthy of credence or provided evidence that a discriminatory reason motivated AAMU, and in turn, his discrimination termination claim fails because he has not shown that AAMU’s proffered reason for its employment action was a pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that the employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment action was not the actual reason and that discrimination motivated the action.

Beyah v. Walker · filed 2009-10-26(a)(1)

The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to “produce sufficient evidence that his employer’s asserted legitimate non-discriminatory reason[s] . . . [were] not the actual reason[s] and that [plaintiff] suffered discrimination on an impermissible ground.”

Under § 2000e-2, an employer is entitled to summary judgment on a failure-to-hire discrimination claim when the applicant leaves its nondiscriminatory reasons unrebutted.

McKinzy, Sr. v. Norfolk Southern Railroad · filed 2009-12-02

Having failed to respond to Norfolk Southern’s summary judgment motion, McKinzy left the company’s nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring him completely unrebutted. ... We conclude this alone was sufficient to warrant summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern.

A plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reasons for limiting salary increases must present evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that those reasons were fabricated.

Lindsay v. Pennsylvania State University · filed 2010-03-04

We agree with the District Court that plaintiff pointed to no “evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the [University’s] proffered reasons” for limiting her salary increases — her already substantial salary and comparatively weaker performance— “were fabricated.”

An employer’s consideration of candidates outside its formal interview process does not, by itself, show pretext in a failure-to-promote claim.

Stockwell v. City of Harvey · filed 2010-03-12(a)(1)

The fact that Chief Bell went outside the interview process in an attempt to find individuals who did not present these negative attributes and were a better fit for the position does not show pretext.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on pretext must rebut each legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason the employer gives for its decision.

Kretchmer v. Eveden Inc · filed 2010-03-16(a)(1)

Kretchmer has failed to rebut one of the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by Eveden, namely, that Eveden was realigning the sales territory and recognized that Kretchmer would not be an effective sales manager for two major accounts. We need not address his arguments to rebut the other reasons Eveden presented. See Wallace, 271 F.3d at 220 (“The plaintiff must put forward evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer articulates.”). Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Kretchmer’s claims of age and religious discrimination against Eveden.

A plaintiff may challenge an employer’s qualification preference as evidence of racial discrimination when its unreasonableness suggests that the stated reason for a promotion decision was pretextual.

Ross v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2010-03-23(a)(1)

Thus, a plaintiff may attack the reasonableness of an employer’s qualification preferences only insofar as an unreasonable business justification could be a sign of pretext for illegal discrimination.

An employee challenging a stated performance reason must show that it concealed discrimination; the employer’s mistaken or unfair dissatisfaction alone does not establish a violation.

Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc. · filed 2010-07-02(a)(1)

The question is whether her employers were dissatisfied with her for these or other non-discriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or unfairly so, or instead merely used those complaints about Alvarez as cover for discriminating against her because of her Cuban origin.

In a race-based discharge claim, a remark does not show pretext unless it suggests that race motivated the firing.

Fore v. Lakeside Buses of Wisconsin, Inc. · filed 2010-07-15(a)(1)

The remark — “It’s not hard to hate Tony” — is hardly evidence that Lakeside lied about its reasons for firing Fore. And even if it were, it would not suggest that race was the motivating factor in his discharge, as is required to show pretext.

Under § 2000e-2, an employee must show that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action was a pretext for discrimination.

Cotton v. G.S. Development · filed 2010-08-02

Because Cotton has not shown that his employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions was merely a pretext for discrimination, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to his wrongful demotion, termination, and failure to promote claims.

A possible error in an employer’s stated reason does not establish discrimination without evidence that the error concealed a discriminatory motive.

Anderson v. Potter · filed 2010-07-13(a)(1)

At most, Anderson has established a misapplication of the CBA and related rules—a mere “business error.” Anderson has not provided any evidence to suggest that the USPS made the business error because it was motivated by discrimination or that the business error was a cover for discrimination. As matter of law, no jury could reasonably infer the contrary.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must rebut each of the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons to survive summary judgment.

Jackson v. Watkins · filed 2010-09-13(a)

Because our precedent is clear that a plaintiff asserting a Title VII claim must rebut each of the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons in order to survive summary judgment, Jackson’s contention that he is required to rebut only some of Watkins’s reasons is without merit.

Once an employer gives a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for selecting another candidate, a Title VII plaintiff must show that reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Lee v. City of Corpus Christi · filed 2010-09-03

Because defendant has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for choosing de la Pena over plaintiff, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination.

A sex discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence requires sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Cole v. Mountain View Marketing, Inc. · filed 2010-10-05(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Cole as the non-moving party, the Court finds that she has failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Mountain View’s articulated reasons are a pretext for gender discrimination.

A discriminatory termination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee offers only conclusory allegations, rather than evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Tighe v. Worldspan, L.P. · filed 2010-10-05(a)

Tighe failed to establish that Worldspan’s articulated reason was a pretext for either discrimination or retaliation, as she offered no evidence beyond her conclusory allegations that its explanation was not true and merely quarreled with the wisdom of its decision.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on religion or national origin; an employee challenging an employer’s stated reasons must produce evidence that permits a reasonable finding of pretext.

Darvishian v. Geren · filed 2010-12-14(a)(1)

To rebut these legitimate reasons for his removal, Darvishian was required to produce a record that would permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the justifications stated by the Agency were merely a pretext for discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. We conclude that Darvishian has failed to satisfy this burden.

In a disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), evidence that would let a jury disbelieve an employer’s stated reasons for termination can support a finding of pretext.

Lawson v. KFH INDUSTRIES, INC. · filed 2011-01-24(a)(1)

The court concludes that there is at least a genuine issue of fact as to whether KFH’s proffered reasons for termination were the truth. A reasonable jury might find, based on the evidence presented and a consideration of credibility, that Louis DeRosier was actually the one who sent Corbitt home. If a jury were to find that fact, it could rationally disbelieve both of KFH’s proffered reasons for terminating Plaintiffs.

For a Title VII claim based on circumstantial evidence, an employer can meet its summary judgment burden by identifying legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions and showing that the employee cannot establish pretext.

Jackson v. Sara Lee Bakery Group · filed 2011-01-18(a)

In this case, Sara Lee met its initial summary judgment burden by identifying legitimate nondiseriminatory reasons for the employment decisions, and then demonstrating to the district court that Jackson was unable to establish that those reasons were mere pretext for illegal discrimination.

Title VII gender-discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, under which an employee must show that the employer’s stated reason for its action is a pretext for discrimination.

Wilson v. Mobilex USA, Inc. · filed 2011-01-28

ADEA and Title VII claims are governed by the familiar burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ... We assume arguendo that Wilson made out a prima facie case of age and gender discrimination. Even so, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to rebut Mobilex’s explanation that she was fired, not because of age or gender, but because of poor performance, as detailed above. The District Court thus correctly granted Mobilex’s motion for summary judgment.

A Title VII plaintiff can show that a layoff reason was pretextual by proving she was clearly better qualified than the employee retained.

Baumeister v. AIG Global Investment Corp. · filed 2011-03-29(a)(1)

We can infer pretext if the plaintiff was “clearly better qualified than the employee[]” who was not laid off.

A sex-discrimination claim can proceed when the employee raises a genuine issue of fact about whether the employer’s stated reason for its action was a pretext for discrimination.

Abbey v. HAWAII EMPLOYERS MUT. INS. CO.(HEMIC) · filed 2011-02-07(a)(1)

The court found that Abbey raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether HEMIC’s proffered reason for its actions were a pretext for sex discrimination.

A plaintiff who argues that an employer’s promotion decision was pretextual because the selected candidate was less qualified bears the burden of showing that difference in qualifications.

Brooks v. South Plains Ass'n of Governments · filed 2011-02-28(a)(1)

Brooks miscomprehends the law: he, not SPAG, bears the burden of showing that Castro was a less qualified applicant.

A Title VII discrimination plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment with only conclusory allegations that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Lu v. Chase Investment Services Corp. · filed 2011-03-08(a)(1)

Lu has offered no evidence, aside from her own conclusory allegations, to establish that this proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a race-discrimination claim to proceed when evidence could show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Marin v. BLOOM ROOFING SYSTEMS, INC. · filed 2011-06-10(a)

Because Marin and Garcia present evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that Bloom’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating them was pretextual, the motion will be denied as to the discrimination claims.

A Title VII plaintiff challenging a promotion decision must provide evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for gender discrimination.

McGuigan v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury · filed 2011-06-21

At bottom, all the evidence provided by McGuigan, evaluated in the light most favorable to her, does not establish that Zuckerman’s reasons for choosing DelSignore were a pretext for unlawful discrimination on the basis of age or gender.

A plaintiff who fails to show that an employer’s stated reason for declining to renew her contract was pretextual cannot sustain a sex-discrimination claim.

Cypert v. Independent School District · filed 2011-08-15

Cypert failed to establish defendants’ proffered reason for not renewing her contract was a pretext for gender or age discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee relying on circumstantial evidence to show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Jones v. Fulton County, Georgia · filed 2011-11-02(a)

Under this framework, when an employer offers legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for an alleged discriminatory or retaliatory termination, plaintiff must then prove that the reason offered was a mere pretext for an illegal motive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race discrimination claim to proceed to trial when evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason for firing the employee was a pretext.

Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank · filed 2011-12-21(a)(1)

This evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Woodforest’s explanation is not the true reason for firing Vaughn but rather pretext for race discrimination.

A sex discrimination claim based on a hiring decision fails when the employee does not show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Boese v. Fort Hays State University · filed 2012-02-09(a)(1)

We agree with the district court’s determination that Ms. Boese failed to show that FHSU’s reason for not hiring her was pretextual and that the August 2008 complaint and the March 2009 performance review appeal were not protected activities.

A Title VII discrimination claim based on discipline fails when the employee does not adequately rebut the employer’s legitimate reason for the discipline.

Moore v. Hale · filed 2012-03-19(a)

Having reviewed this record, and considered the oral argument of counsel, we do not find reversible error in the rulings of the district court that: ... and (3) Fitts’ Title VII and § 1983 claims of discrimination based on a reprimand in 2007 must be dismissed because Fitts failed to adequately rebut the legitimate reason presented by Hale for the reprimand.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that an employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment decision was a pretext for discrimination.

Turner v. NYU Hospitals Center · filed 2012-04-02(a)

Because the evidence does not demonstrate Turner’s clear superiority, a reasonable jury could not infer from DeGazon’s maintenance of this view through the challenged dismissal that this reason was a pretext for discrimination or that retaliation was a substantial reason for Turner’s termination.

A plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence that an employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were a pretext for race discrimination.

Johnson v. Douglas County School District · filed 2012-04-17

Upon reviewing the record, reading the briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we find that Johnson has not provided sufficient evidence to indicate that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons provided by Defendants were a pretext for race or age discrimination.

An employee must present evidence that would permit a jury to find that the employer’s stated reasons for discharge were a pretext for race discrimination.

Jones v. Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals · filed 2012-06-14(a)(1)

Jones’s contentions do not suffice to carry her burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext. Her partial rebuttals of DHH’s proffered reasons would not permit a jury to conclude that those were “not the real reason[s] for the adverse employment action.” Consequently, there is no basis for inferring a discriminatory motive and no basis for allowing the claim to go to trial.

A Title VII plaintiff cannot establish pretext through proposed comparators who were not similarly situated or an unsupported challenge to the employer’s explanation.

Parker-Darby v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2012-06-19(a)

As Plaintiff has not established that she was similarly situated to any of her alleged comparators or that Defendant’s explanations are not credible, she has not produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find pretext.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a plaintiff fails to show pretext when she identifies no flaws in the employer’s stated reason for termination and offers no other evidence of discrimination.

Norman v. Kmart Corp · filed 2012-06-27(a)

Because Norman is unable to point to any inconsistencies or contradictions in Kmart’s proffered reason and has failed to bring forth any other evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to find that this explanation was a pretext, she has failed to meet her burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Adequate performance does not establish pretext for sex discrimination when the employer gives economic reasons for a termination.

Trapani v. Greatwide Logistics Services, LLC · filed 2012-06-29(a)(1)

The District Court, however, properly determined that “the fact that Chandler considered the plaintiff’s work to be adequate is consistent with the defendants’ proffered rationale that the plaintiff was terminated for economic reasons . . . .”.

An employee claiming disparate treatment under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must present evidence that the employer’s stated reason for an adverse action was a pretext for discrimination.

White v. Tapella · filed 2012-07-11(a)(1)

However, there is no record evidence to support White’s argument of pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to show that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action is pretextual after the employer offers that reason.

Mitchell v. Miller · filed 2012-08-03(a)(1)

If the defendant articulates legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs adverse treatment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the reasons given by the defendant for such treatment are merely a pretext for unlawful employment discrimination.

Under § 2000e-2(a), an employee challenging a demotion as race discrimination must offer evidence of pretext once the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

Whitaker v. Fedex Freight, Inc. · filed 2012-09-26(a)

Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for demoting her was pretextual, and she has therefore failed to meet the burden of evidence required of her in order to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment on race and age-based discrimination.

A plaintiff challenging a termination as race discrimination must present concrete evidence that the employer’s legitimate reason was a pretext.

Lucy v. Georgia Pacific Corrugated I, LLC · filed 2012-11-15(a)(1)

In short, Lucy failed to meet his burden of presenting concrete evidence showing that Georgia-Pacific’s legitimate reason for his termination was a pretext for race discrimination.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee does not show pretext merely by disputing the fairness of a discharge when the employer honestly believed its stated reason.

Kaiser v. Colorado Department of Corrections · filed 2012-12-05(a)(1)

But again none of these arguments suggests Mr. Hand’s proffered reason for letting Mr. Kaiser go was pretextual. As we have explained, it is not our function under the federal discrimination laws to tell employers how best to go about their jobs, but to ask whether the employer’s proffered reasons for firing an employee were held in good faith or, instead, subterfuge for possible discrimination.

Evidence of a general discriminatory atmosphere alone does not establish pretext in a Title VII failure-to-promote claim without other evidence bearing on the decisionmaker’s motive.

Ahmed v. Napolitano · filed 2012-12-17(a)(1)

Since Ahmed fails to show any other evidence bearing directly on Chadbourne’s motive, evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere alone does not create a genuine issue of fact as to pretext.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race and sex discrimination in employment; when an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for firing an employee, the employee must offer evidence that the reason was pretext for discrimination.

Clarke v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2012-11-14(a)(1)

Considering the totality of the evidence, the court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s stated reasons for firing the plaintiff were merely pretext for discrimination on the basis of race or gender.

A Title VII employee cannot establish pretext for discriminatory discharge through a subjective belief of discrimination alone.

Dees v. United Rentals North America · filed 2013-01-02(a)

Dees’ subjective belief that United Rentals discriminated against him is clearly insufficient to demonstrate pretext.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason for firing her was a pretext for sex discrimination.

Chavez v. URS Federal Technical Services, Inc. · filed 2013-01-03(a)(1)

Although Ms. Chavez satisfied her initial burden of proving a prima facie case of sex discrimination, URS also satisfied its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her: a reduction-in-force due to budget cuts. The floor therefore shifts back to Ms. Chavez, who must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether URS’s proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. She has not done so.

A Title VII discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee offers no evidence creating a factual dispute over the employer’s legitimate reasons for its actions.

Daniel v. Universal ENSCO, Incorporated · filed 2013-01-15

Even if we assume Daniel has established prima facie cases of discrimination and retaliation, the district court properly found that he did not provide evidence to create an issue of fact concerning the legitimate reasons UEI puts forward for its actions.

To show pretext under Title VII, an employee must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason is a lie masking discriminatory intent.

Jones v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority · filed 2013-01-31(a)(1)

To demonstrate pretext, Jones was required to show that the nondiscriminatory reason given for firing her is a lie masking discriminatory intent.

A Title VII plaintiff must rebut all of the employer’s stated reasons for an adverse employment action to survive summary judgment on a claim of pretext.

Rawls v. State of Alabama Department of Human Resources · filed 2013-02-11(a)

In any event, Rawls cannot survive summary judgment unless her evidence rebuts all of DHR’s proffered reasons.

An employee’s denial of misconduct allegations alone does not establish that an employer’s stated reason for discharge was a pretext for racial discrimination.

Toy A. Collins v. American Red Cross · filed 2013-03-08(a)(1)

Accordingly, merely denying the employer’s allegations, as Collins does here, is not enough to survive summary judgment under the indirect method.

An employee does not establish pretext for race discrimination when she admits violating the cited work rule and the employer fires all employees found violating it.

Addison v. Ingles Markets Inc. · filed 2013-04-05(a)(1)

On these facts, Addison did not demonstrate that Ingles more likely than not acted with discriminatory animus or that Ingles’s stated reason for her termination was unworthy of credence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employer to act on its decisionmakers’ genuine belief that an employee engaged in misconduct, even if the underlying complaints were false.

Gillems v. Hapag-Lloyd (America) Inc. · filed 2013-04-16(a)(1)

Thus, even if Ross had fabricated all of the other complaints against Gillems, as long as Burtin and Smerdon — the decisionmakers — genuinely believed that Gillems acted inappropriately, they were entitled to act on that belief.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer’s honestly held nondiscriminatory reason for an employment action is not pretextual.

Suriya H. Smiley v. Columbia College Chicago · filed 2013-04-30(a)(1)

Pretext does not exist if the decision-maker honestly believed the nondiscriminatory reason for its employ- ment action. ... On this record, we conclude that Smiley has not provided suffi- cient evidence of pretext and that summary judgment was proper.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to show that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Johnson-Mosley v. Alabama Unified Judicial System · filed 2013-05-09(a)(1)

The plaintiff must then provide evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant’s articulated, nondiscriminatory reasons are, instead, a pretext for unlawful race or sex discrimination.

A Title VII discriminatory termination claim fails at summary judgment if the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for firing was pretextual, even assuming a prima facie case.

Tucker v. Sejong Alabama, LLC · filed 2013-05-23(a)

Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Tucker established a prima facie case for his discrimination and retaliation claims, the district court did not err in granting Sejong’s motion for summary judgment because Tucker did not show that Sejong’s reason for firing him was pretextual.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Turner v. Bob Inzer · filed 2013-06-04(a)(1)

Turner produced no evidence to rebut the Clerk’s proffered reasons for her suspension, transfer, and termination. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Clerk on all counts.

A plaintiff cannot establish pretext under § 2000e-2(a)(1) by offering an alternative account of the employer’s actions without rebutting its stated nondiscriminatory reasons.

Fichter v. AMG Resources Corporation · filed 2013-06-12(a)(1)

In so arguing, Fichter does not rebut AMG‘s proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons; rather, she advances an alternative theory of AMG‘s actions.

A national origin discrimination claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate reason for termination and the employees do not show that reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Aranda v. Renown South Meadows Medical Center · filed 2013-07-30(a)(1)

Even if plaintiffs established a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973), they failed to show that Renown’s proffered “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for terminating them—sleeping on duty—was a “pretext for unlawful discrimination.”

An employee’s denial of misconduct does not show pretext under § 2000e-2(a) without evidence that the employer lacked a good faith belief that the misconduct occurred.

Borwick v. T-Mobile West Corporation · filed 2013-08-07(a)

Though she denies that she hung up on customers, there is no evidence that T-Mobile did not have a good faith belief that she had.

A plaintiff claiming race discrimination must show that the employer fired her because of race; showing that the employer was mistaken is insufficient to establish pretext.

Deanes v. North Mississippi State Hosp · filed 2013-10-17(a)(1)

To demonstrate pretext, Deanes must do more than merely show that NMSH was mistaken in firing her, even by its own terms; she must establish that it fired her on account of race.

A plaintiff can defeat summary judgment on a Title VII discrimination claim by showing that the employer’s stated reason is false, without proving actual discriminatory motive at that stage.

Wright v. City of Topeka, Kansas · filed 2013-11-01(a)(1)

A showing that the employer’s proffered reason is false is sufficient to defeat summary judgment; plaintiff need not prove that discrimination or retaliation was the actual motivation at this stage.

When an employer gives a legitimate reason for termination, a Title VII plaintiff must produce evidence of pretext.

Robert Ray, Sr. v. GEO Group, Incorporated · filed 2013-11-01

We first turn to Ray’s claims that his employer impermissibly dismissed him from his position in violation of either Title VII or the FLSA. It is undisputed that the employer has offered an ostensibly legitimate reason for termination. Ray thus bears the burden of producing evidence of pretext.

Under Title VII, an employee challenging several stated reasons for termination generally must offer evidence that each reason is pretextual.

Lobato v. New Mexico Environment Department · filed 2013-11-05(a)(1)

Where, as here, an employer advances a number of reasons for an adverse employment action, we have adopted a “general rule” that “an employee must proffer evidence that shows each of the employer’s justifications is pretextual.”

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails at summary judgment when the employee cannot show a genuine dispute that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Carroll v. State of Ohio Dep't of Admin. Servs. · filed 2014-02-05(a)(1)

Accordingly, even were Carroll able to prove her prima facie case of discrimination, her claim fails because she cannot show a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.

A plaintiff challenging a tenure denial as sex discrimination must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was false and that sex discrimination was the real reason.

Ragozzine v. Youngstown State University · filed 2014-02-24(a)(1)

The Court need not address this issue because, assuming arguendo that Ragoz-zine has established a prima facie case, he has not shown that, pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, YSU’s stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is false, and that unlawful sex discrimination was the real reason he was denied tenure.

A plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge cannot establish pretext at summary judgment through conclusory statements disputing the employer’s stated reasons.

Mimi Ma v. Westinghouse Electric Co., LLC · filed 2014-03-18(a)(1)

We agree with Westinghouse, because the “evidence” to which Ma points consists of her own conclusory statements and opinions, which are legally insufficient to support an inference of pretext.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), evidence that an employer failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision can undermine its honest-belief explanation for a termination.

Simmons v. American Apartment Management Co. · filed 2014-02-26(a)(1)

There is sufficient proof in this record for a factfinder to infer that Defendant failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision when relying on its investigation to justify the termination of Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for promotion or discipline to raise a triable issue that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Lam v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 2014-03-25(a)(1)

But we conclude, as did the district court, that Appellants have not raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether the City’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for its promotion and disciplinary practices were a “mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.”

Disputing an employer’s investigative conclusion does not establish pretext under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when the employer reasonably and sincerely believed it.

Burley v. National Passenger Rail Corp. · filed 2014-03-31(a)(1)

The fact that Amtrak’s conclusion was not the only possible conclusion does not cast doubt on the sincerity of its belief.

In a discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer meets its burden of production by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its personnel decision.

Khan v. Gonzales · filed 2014-03-31(a)(1)

The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its personnel decision. ... In this case, the Court finds defendant has articulated a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for taking the actions it did.

A Title VII plaintiff alleging pretext must raise a factual dispute that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating factor.

Paul v. Hovensa · filed 2014-04-04

The District Court explicitly stated that it was the plaintiff’s ... burden to demonstrate pretext by showing a factual dispute that discrimination was “more likely than not a motivating factor.” Its analysis was consistent with this standard.

A Title VII race-discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee does not raise a genuine issue of fact that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Tanisha C. Foster v. Biolife Plasma Services, LP · filed 2014-05-15(a)(1)

In short, Foster did not show that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether BioLife’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her was pretextual, and summary judgment was proper.

Stray remarks unrelated to a termination do not establish pretext for race or national origin discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Songa v. Sunrise Senior Living Investments Inc. · filed 2014-05-16(a)(1)

In sum, the comments at issue are stray remarks and are not indicative of pretext. As a result, Songa has not raised a material fact issue as to whether Sunrise discriminated against her because of her national origin or race, and summary judgment is warranted.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute over whether an employer’s stated reason for an employment decision was pretext for race or sex discrimination.

Cheeks v. General Dynamics · filed 2014-05-19(a)

Because Plaintiff appears to rest her pretext argument solely upon this perceived contradiction, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not introduced evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer’s reason was pretex-tual.

An employee alleging sex discrimination must rebut each legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason the employer gives for termination to show pretext.

Nicole v. King v. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2014-06-04(a)(1)

Here, Ferguson presented eight legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating King and Tahan, and although King and Tahan provided evidence to call into question some of Ferguson’s proffered reasons, they failed to show that each of Ferguson’s reasons were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a pregnancy discrimination claim based on a refusal to rehire to survive summary judgment when inconsistencies in the employer’s stated reasons support an inference of pretext.

Roney v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit · filed 2014-06-11(a)(1)

Roney has adduced sufficient inconsistencies and contradictions to discredit AIU’s proffered reason for its failure to rehire her.

A discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 cannot survive summary judgment when no reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated reason for firing the employee was a pretext for discrimination.

Coyaso v. Bradley Pacific Aviation · filed 2014-06-16

For the same reason, summary judgment was proper on Coyaso’s discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and Hawai’i state law. No reasonable jury could find that Bradley’s stated reason for firing Coyaso was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

When an employer gives a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action, a Title VII plaintiff must offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the reason was pretext for intentional discrimination.

Bruder v. Moniz · filed 2014-07-02(a)(1)

Bruder fails, however, to submit evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that DOE's explanation is pretext for intentional discrimination, and therefore the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of DOE.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence that an employer’s stated reason for an adverse action concealed race or sex discrimination; speculation alone does not establish pretext.

Smith v. City of St. Martinville · filed 2014-07-17(a)(1)

Under the circumstances, Smith has failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the City’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was actually a pretext for discriminating against him due to his race or sex.

An employer’s honest and reasonable belief in reported misconduct can defeat a claim that its stated reason for discharge was a pretext for race discrimination.

Wheeler v. Georgetown University Hospital · filed 2014-06-27(a)(1)

Whether and how these incidents occurred, then, is largely beside the point. Rather, this case turns on whether Wheeler has produced enough evidence to undermine the conclusion that Hollandsworth honestly and reasonably believed that Plaintiff had mistreated patients.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racial discrimination in employment; an employee relying on circumstantial evidence must show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Carson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority · filed 2014-07-25(a)(1)

Here, in light of all the evidence, the district court did not err in concluding that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate pretext as to Carson’s discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge; a claim can survive summary judgment when disputed evidence could show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Deron King v. Butts County Georgia · filed 2014-08-13(a)(1)

Because King raised sufficient evidence to establish genuine issues of material fact as to pretext, the district court’s granting of Butts County and Whaler’s motion for summary judgment as to King’s TitleVII claims for retaliation and discrimination, and King’s identical § 1981 claims against Whaler, was error.

A plaintiff cannot establish pretext under Title VII when one of the employer’s stated reasons for termination remains unrebutted.

Archie v. Frank Cockrell Body Shop, Inc. · filed 2014-09-16(a)(1)

Since Archie has not shown pretext as to one of Cockrell’s reasons for his termination it is irrelevant whether Archie has shown pretext as to Cockrell’s additional reasons.

Section 2000e-2 allows a gender discrimination claim to reach a jury when the employee establishes a prima facie case and presents sufficient evidence of pretext.

Wright v. University of Cincinnati · filed 2014-09-30

In the end, however, Plaintiff has adduced some evidence of pretext. That, coupled with her ability to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, is sufficient to present her claim to a jury.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national-origin discrimination, but a discharge claim fails when no reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Dipigney v. AutoZoners · filed 2014-10-02(a)(1)

In short, because no reasonable jury could conclude that Thompson did not believe the reason he gave for discharging Dipigney, AutoZoners is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Dipigney’s discrimination claims.

Selective application of a facially neutral employment policy can be evidence that an employer’s stated reason for an adverse action is pretext for discrimination.

Lyons v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2014-09-09(a)(1)

An employer’s selective application of a facially neutral policy is evidence of pretext, as many courts have concluded.

A Title VII failure-to-promote plaintiff must rebut each legitimate reason the employer gives for choosing another candidate to establish pretext.

Daniel v. Dekalb County School District · filed 2014-12-23(a)(1)

Ms. Roberts’ statement of discriminatory animus even when taken at face value, does ... not allow Ms. Daniel to establish pretext without rebutting each of the reasons proffered by the School District.

A nationality discrimination claim fails when the employer gives legitimate reasons for its decisions and the employee offers no evidence that those reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

Fodor v. Eastern Shipbuilding Group · filed 2015-02-03(a)

He has not presented any evidence that those reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Eastern was entitled to summary judgment on his nationality and disability discrimination claims.

Preselecting a candidate based on qualifications does not violate Section 2000e-2(a)(1); preselection supports an inference of race discrimination when it reflects discriminatory motive or disguises discrimination.

Kilby-Robb v. Duncan · filed 2015-01-08(a)(1)

For preselection to raise an inference of discrimination, evidence must demonstrate that the employer preselected a candidate out of a discriminatory motive or that the employer broadly uses preselection as a method of disguising discrimination and did so in a particular case.

A sex discrimination claim may proceed when evidence of departures from hiring procedures creates a factual dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Shaw v. Mobile County Public School System · filed 2015-02-02(a)(1)

Thus Plaintiff has created an issue of fact as to whether the Defendant’s reason was untrue and discrimination occurred. As a result, Plaintiff has satisfied her pretext burden.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; an employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for discharge must show that the reason was pretext for discrimination.

Benjamin v. Chemtall Inc. · filed 2015-03-11(a)(1)

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment because the court properly found that Benjamin failed to demonstrate that Chemtall’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.

Selection-process irregularities that are not probative of racial discrimination are insufficient to establish pretext under Title VII.

Bush v. Carter · filed 2015-03-16(a)(1)

Bush’s contentions that there were inconsistencies and irregularities in the application and selection process were properly discounted by the district court as failing to demonstrate that they were probative of racial discrimination and as insufficient as a matter of law to establish pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim based on a promotion decision, but an applicant’s higher ranking alone does not establish pretext when the employer has discretion to choose among ranked candidates.

Tillis v. Sheriff of Indian River County · filed 2015-03-10(a)(1)

The fact that Tillis and Stewart ranked first and second on the promotional list while Bailey ranked third also does not show pretext.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), disputing the facts behind an employer’s stated reason does not establish pretext without evidence that the decision maker did not sincerely believe those facts.

Wellons v. Miami Dade County · filed 2015-04-30(a)(1)

Because Mr. Wellons did not challenge Mr. Muntan’s sincere belief about the facts leading to the suspension, he did not create a genuine issue of pretext by challenging the factual accuracy of the reasons for the suspension.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a race discrimination plaintiff must offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could reject the employer’s legitimate explanation as pretextual.

Amos v. McNairy County · filed 2015-08-10(a)

The evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Amos, would not lead a reasonable jury to conclude that McNairy County’s proffered reasons for Amos’s transfer or subsequent probation were pretextual.