42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

A worker can support a race discrimination claim by showing that an employee of another race accused of comparably serious misconduct received more favorable discipline.

Levy v. Wilkie · filed 2021-01-07(a)(1)

Because Levy and Kolbe were accused of breaking the same rule, pursuing their accusers in close physical proximity, describing their body parts verbally, and striking similar fears in them, a jury reasonably could find that they were similarly situated, even if their actions were not identical or committed at the same time of day.

A Title VII pay-discrimination claimant relying on a comparator must show that the comparator is similarly situated in all material respects, including employment history and applicable pay policies.

Earle v. Birmingham Board of Education · filed 2021-01-19(a)(1)

Earle and Evans failed to establish a prima facie case of race or sex-based discrimination because they did not point to a similarly situated comparator.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to prove employment discrimination must show that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.

Taylor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc · filed 2021-01-28(a)

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to similarly situated individuals treated more favorably on the basis of race or sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a race-discrimination plaintiff to use a similarly situated comparator, but the comparator’s misconduct is relevant only if the decisionmaker knew about it.

Holley v. Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2021-02-12(a)(1)

The fact that Franklin actually had been on probation is irrelevant because it’s undisputed that Payne wasn’t aware of it when he made the decision to promote Franklin to the position initially offered to Holley.

A Title VII race discrimination plaintiff cannot establish disparate treatment through coworkers whose conduct was not nearly identical to the conduct that led to the plaintiff’s discharge.

Hardmon v. Coleman · filed 2021-02-16(a)(1)

Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated white co-worker because he was not terminated for conduct that was nearly identical to that of Mike or Thomas.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on comparators must show that similarly situated employees of another sex were treated more favorably to establish a prima facie discrimination case.

Slaton v. L.L.O., Inc. · filed 2021-03-16

The district court correctly concluded that Slaton failed to carry her initial burden to establish that similarly situated men were treated more favorably than her, which was an essential element of her prima facie case.

A plaintiff relying on a prima facie case of discrimination must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Shalati v. Callisto Integration, Inc. · filed 2021-06-03(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiff fails to establish the fourth element of his prima facie case — that similarly-situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based discharge; under the McDonnell Douglas method, a plaintiff must show that similarly situated employees outside her protected class received better treatment.

GRIFFIN v. COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK · filed 2021-07-14(a)(1)

However, the Court has already determined that Griffin cannot demonstrate there were other similarly-situated, non-African- American employees who received better treatment and thus, she cannot prevail on her racial discrimination claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on another employee to show race discrimination to establish that the employee was similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Lane v. Mack Ball, Jr. · filed 2021-07-26(a)(1)

One is a claim for race discrimination based on the denial of an accommodation, which she tried to prove by identifying a similarly situated employee who received more favorable treatment. ... Still, the assistant was not “similarly situated in all relevant respects” because her job involved less interaction with the public and she worked out the flexible schedule before she was hired.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a comparison offered to show discrimination must involve employees who are similarly situated in relevant respects.

GIBBS v. BRENNAN · filed 2021-08-18(a)(1)

Gibbs and Nesheiwat, however, are not similarly situated individuals for purposes of Title VII.

A sex discrimination claim fails at the prima facie stage when the employee has no evidence that a similarly situated man received more favorable treatment.

Kinsella v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company · filed 2021-08-24(a)(1)

Kinsella’s sex discrimination claim fails at the prima facie stage because she adduces no evidence that any similarly situated man received more favorable treatment than she did.

A Title VII race discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence fails when the plaintiff cannot show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Jackson v. FCA US LLC · filed 2021-09-13(a)(1)

First, Jackson cannot make a prima facie case for race discrimination because Jackson’s only proposed comparators—John and Brian—were not similarly situated.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff proving disparate treatment through circumstantial evidence to show that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment; employees of a different company with different supervisors do not qualify as comparators.

Miller v. Aerotek Scientific · filed 2021-09-15

Indeed, the plaintiff and the similarly situated employee must have the same supervisor. ... In his objection, Plaintiff does not dispute that Trixie and Cheryl had different employers than he did. ... As a result, Plaintiff fails to state a disparate treatment claim.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to establish racial discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must identify employees who are similarly situated in material respects.

Simmons v. Mercedes-Benz US International Inc · filed 2021-09-20(a)(1)

However, this Court finds that none of the proffered colleagues were “similarly situated” in “material respects” to Simmons.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires meaningful similarity between employees before different discipline can support an inference of race or sex discrimination.

Rogers v. Brennan · filed 2021-09-23(a)(1)

Here, too, Plaintiff had a history of previous discipline while her comparators did not, and she herself received the same discipline as those comparators after her first infraction. The three comparators are therefore not similarly situated to Plaintiff.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework must identify a similarly situated employee treated more favorably to establish a prima facie discrimination claim.

Skelton v. Birmingham Airport Authority · filed 2021-09-30(a)

Skelton’s claim fails under the McDonnell Douglas framework because Skelton failed to identify any comparators under the third prong.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging race discrimination through disparate discipline to show that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class received more favorable treatment for comparably serious conduct.

Bolden v. Lake County Board of Education · filed 2021-10-21(a)(1)

The Court holds that Bolden has not cited any evidence to show how she and Mills were comparable in all relevant respects. ... Without that evidence, Bolden has not shown why this is a case of disparate discipline where two employees were treated differently because of their race.

In a disparate-treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a coworker with the same supervisors and a similar reason for termination may serve as a comparator despite differences in their performance problems.

Cruz v. St. John's School · filed 2021-11-10(a)(1)

On this first point, the Court cannot hold as a matter of law that Block cannot serve as an adequate comparator. Like Cruz, Block worked in the IT department and had his employment involuntarily terminated for reasons of “poor performance and lack of professional behavior.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; comparator evidence must show that a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably.

Martin v. Clark County · filed 2021-12-22(a)(1)

While Carlisle may have participated in similar conduct, he was not treated more favorably than Daniel.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a disparate-treatment claim based on coworkers’ treatment requires evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Olicia v. The Methodist Hospital · filed 2022-01-24(a)(1)

Olicia has not pointed to evidence of similarly situated employees outside her protected class who received more favorable treatment under similar circumstances.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based employment discrimination; a plaintiff relying on a comparator must show that the comparator engaged in comparable misconduct and received more favorable treatment.

Flores v. CFI Resorts Management, Inc. · filed 2022-02-14(a)(1)

However, there is no evidence that Tenerio stole from Defendant or committed some other terminable misconduct and kept her job. Thus, Flores’ claim falters at the first hurdle.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on comparisons with other employees must show that they had comparable disciplinary histories and performance deficiencies.

Godfrey v. Honeywell International Inc · filed 2022-02-17(a)(1)

Although some of the alleged misconduct of the proposed comparators is similar to certain items in Godfrey’s PIP, these proposed comparators do not have similar disciplinary records or alleged performance deficiencies such that a jury could conclude they received preferential treatment with respect to termination decisions.

A plaintiff using more favorable treatment of another employee to prove race discrimination must show that the employee was similarly situated in all material respects.

Steele v. Birmingham Jefferson Civic Center Authority · filed 2022-03-14(a)(1)

When a plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination with evidence that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class was treated more favorably than she was, she must show that the comparator was “similarly situated in all material respects.”

Ambiguous testimony about a male comparator does not defeat a sex discrimination claim at summary judgment when its meaning is a question for the jury.

Mangum v. United States Steel Corporation · filed 2022-03-18(a)(1)

Although she stated she was treated unfairly “with the exception of [Callaway]”, the statement was made while discussing race, not gender. Context is always important. And this context creates an ambiguity that the Court cannot resolve on summary judgment. This type of a question is for a jury. Accordingly, U.S. Steel’s argument fails on this front.

A plaintiff using coworker comparisons to support a race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 must identify employees who are similar in all material respects.

Minard v. Sam's East, Inc. · filed 2022-03-23

Another employee is “similarly situated” to a plaintiff only when she is similar in “all material respects,” meaning she “cannot reasonably be distinguished.” Id. at 1227–28 (quotation omitted). ... These material distinctions show that neither Bowler nor Smith was similarly situated to Minard.

Employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement were not similarly situated to an at-will deputy chief for this reverse race discrimination claim.

Loizon v. Evans · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1)

This difference in employment status precludes a finding that these probation officers were similarly situated to Loizon.

Section 2000e-2 permits different treatment of employees whose conduct differs materially; such employees are not valid comparators in a discrimination claim.

Riley v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2022-03-31

Because “[a]n employer is well within its rights to accord different treatment to employees . . . who engaged in different conduct,” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1228, the magistrate judge properly concluded that Hollinhead was not a valid comparator for establishing either a prima facie case or a genuine triable issue of discrimination.

In a disparate-treatment sex-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), proposed comparators must be similar in all relevant respects, including relevant differences in training and performance.

Drerup v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. · filed 2022-05-02(a)(1)

Below the surface, however, Ms. Drerup has failed to demonstrate that she was similar to those three male pilots in all relevant respects. ... Moreover, Ms. Drerup has not presented any evidence that the male pilots struggled during simulator training, failed check rides, declined to continue, and refused additional training.

In a § 2000e-2 disparate treatment claim, disciplinary records of similarly situated employees are relevant comparator evidence.

Stainsby v. Oklahoma Health Care Authority · filed 2022-05-31

Because discriminatory treatment of a plaintiff is shown through comparison to similarly situated employees, it follows that the disciplinary records of employees who are not similarly situated are not relevant to the claims.

A plaintiff relying on comparators to establish a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim must show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Enriquez v. Scottsdale, City of · filed 2022-06-01(a)(1)

Although Plaintiff has presented multiple proposed comparators, the Court is not persuaded that the proffered individuals are similarly situated to Plaintiff.

A race discrimination claimant who relies on comparators must identify proper comparators to establish a prima facie case.

Carlisle v. Rhodes & Rhodes Family Dentistry · filed 2022-06-02(a)(1)

As a result, Plaintiff fails to show proper comparators to establish a prima facie case.

A prima facie race discrimination claim requires an employee to show that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.

Butler v. Constellium · filed 2022-06-24(a)(1)

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, Butler must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) Constellium subjected him to an adverse employment action, (3) he was qualified to perform the job in question, and (4) Constellium treated “similarly situated” employees outside of his protected class more favorably.

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination when the selected applicant has similar qualifications, even if their technical knowledge differs.

Bryant v. Wilkie · filed 2022-08-30(a)(1)

The Court concludes that Bryant was similarly situated to the Selected Candidate in this case and, therefore, establishes her prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; when a complaint relies on a comparator, it must allege enough similarity to support a plausible inference of discrimination.

Lee v. Stegall, Inc. · filed 2022-08-31(a)(1)

The court agrees with BRTC that Lee has failed to identify a sufficiently similar comparator to give rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII.

A plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to prove race or sex discrimination must show that the other employees were similar in all relevant respects.

Robinson v. Quicken Loans, LLC · filed 2022-09-14(a)(1)

Because Robinson’s comparators were not similar “in all relevant respects,” Robinson has not satisfied the similarly-situated element and cannot establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff relying on a comparator to prove race discrimination to identify an employee similarly situated in all material respects.

Jones v. Birmingham, City of · filed 2022-09-23(a)

To satisfy the fourth element of this test, he must point to a “comparator” who is “similarly situated in all material respects.” ... As just explained, Mason is not an adequate comparator in this case.

A plaintiff relying on comparators to prove race or sex discrimination must show that they are similarly situated in all material respects, including relevant disciplinary history.

McNeal v. International Paper · filed 2022-10-07(a)(1)

McNeal also fails to provide information related to the timing of these incidents and the individuals’ disciplinary history. Without such information, the individuals offered by McNeal cannot serve as comparators. And without such comparators, McNeal cannot make a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination.

A race discrimination claim needs facts supporting an inference that the employer treated the employee less favorably because of race; subordinates in different jobs are not similarly situated comparators.

PRINCE v. TRUMARK FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2022-10-18(a)(1)

They cannot be comparators because they do not hold the same job as Mr. Prince.

A plaintiff using comparators to prove race or sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that they are similarly situated in all material respects.

Thomas v. Pettway · filed 2022-10-20(a)(1)

To establish the fourth element of a prima facie case, Mr. Thomas must demonstrate that he and at least one comparator for both his race and sex claims are “similarly situated in all material respects.” ... Therefore, Mr. Thomas has not established a prima facie case of racial or sex discrimination.

A sex discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators must show that employees outside the protected class were similarly situated in all material respects; differences in duties and misconduct can defeat that showing.

Carter v. Coquille School District 8 · filed 2022-10-31(a)(1)

Those additional acts were not attributed to Jones, Usrey, or Rilatos and, together with the differences in positions and responsibilities, take Jones, Usrey, and Rilatos out of the realm of “similarly situated” employees.

A race discrimination plaintiff may use employees who engaged in the same conduct as comparators even when their employment status differs.

Mzozoyana v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs · filed 2022-11-10(a)(1)

Based upon the cautionary language in both Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352, and Jackson, 518 F.3d at 396, the Court finds both Associate Director Kuhne and Director Hepker to be similarly situated to Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff using a coworker to show disparate treatment to establish that they were similarly situated; different job responsibilities can defeat that comparison.

Forbis v. Exeter Finance · filed 2022-12-29(a)(1)

But this difference in job responsibilities – namely, that Zajac worked on more manual and time-consuming reconciliations, not projects, and that Forbis worked on more repetitious and less time-consuming reconciliations and projects assigned to boost his chances at promotion – illustrates why Zajac is not a comparator as a matter of law.

A sex discrimination claim based on unequal treatment requires a plausible allegation that a similarly situated employee of another sex received more favorable treatment; having the same job does not suffice when their conduct differs.

Bennett v. Tarrant County College District · filed 2023-02-07(a)(1)

Assuming without deciding that Dr. Bennett could satisfy the first three requirements of a prima facie discrimination case, she has not sufficiently pleaded that she was treated differently than a similarly situated male.

A sex discrimination plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing that similarly situated employees outside the protected group received more favorable treatment.

Mosley v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2023-02-09(a)(1)

The court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim, therefore, focuses on this element—whether Plaintiff was “treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.” Morris, 827 F.3d at 400.

For a prima facie sex discrimination claim based on comparator employees, Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that employees of another sex with similar jobs and conduct received more favorable treatment.

Mokiao v. Hawaiian Electric Light Company, Inc. · filed 2023-03-24(a)

Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case because she fails to show that similarly situated men were treated more favorably.

A plaintiff using comparators to establish sex discrimination must identify an employee of another sex who engaged in comparable misconduct and received better treatment.

McDonald v. DuPage Public Safety Communications d/b/a DU-COMM · filed 2023-04-19(a)(1)

This means that McDonald must identify a comparison employee who is male, worked as a telecommunicator, engaged in the same or comparable misconduct, and was treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on comparators to show less favorable treatment than similarly situated employees outside her protected class.

Davis v. Archrock, Inc. · filed 2023-06-15(a)(1)

The record contains no evidence showing that Davis was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees. Accordingly, the evidence in the summary judgment record does not establish a triable fact issue on Davis’s gender discrimination claim.

Employees whose different physical characteristics similarly prevent them from safely performing the same job can be comparators in a sex discrimination claim.

Drerup v. NetJets Aviation, Inc. · filed 2023-06-27(a)(1)

Because Drerup correctly uses the three tall male pilots who were accommodated based on their stature as comparators for her claim, she has satisfied the similarly-situated requirement and made out her prima facie case of discrimination.

A Title VII disparate treatment claim requires facts supporting an inference that similarly situated employees engaged in similar conduct but received more favorable treatment.

Dahl v. CIty of Houston Fire Department EMS · filed 2023-08-09(a)

There is no basis for an inference that there are other firefighters who were similarly situated and made similar comments about their wives or black women but who were not disciplined.

A discriminatory discharge claim based on comparator evidence requires proof that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class received more favorable treatment for comparably serious conduct.

Petett v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs · filed 2023-09-05(a)(1)

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a similarly situated non-protected employee was treated more favorably than her. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Under the Title VII prima facie framework, a race discrimination plaintiff must show that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class received more favorable treatment.

Jackson v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital · filed 2023-09-12(a)(1)

The Court finds, based on the evidence, that Jackson has not identified any similarly situated employees outside of her protected class that were treated more favorably than she was treated.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff using male comparators to prove sex discrimination to show that they were similarly situated in all material respects.

Collins v. Peco Foods Inc · filed 2023-09-22(a)

Hill was a supervisor who had permission to leave the premises to attend to his duties. (Doc. 13 at 12 n.7.) Little was a non-probationary employee not subject to Peco’s probationary rules, and he is further protected by a collective bargaining agreement. (Id.) As such, neither Hill nor Little suffice as comparators.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on a comparator must show that the other employee was similarly situated in all material respects, including disciplinary history.

Hodges v. Miami-Dade County, Florida · filed 2023-10-09(a)(1)

Plaintiff has shown commonalities between himself and Captain Brunetti, but ultimately fails to show that Captain Brunetti is a similarly situated employee. The distinctions between Plaintiff’s and Captain Brunetti’s disciplinary history are fatal to Plaintiff’s prima facie racial discrimination claim.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on the McDonnell Douglas framework must show that the employer treated similarly situated employees outside the protected class more favorably.

Thomas v. Auburn University · filed 2023-11-01(a)(1)

In short, Thomas has not identified a proper comparator, and thus has failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

A plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of discrimination must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated differently.

Rush v. US Army, Secretary of · filed 2023-11-09(a)(1)

Because of these differences, Nguyen is not similarly situated to plaintiff for purposes of making a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination claimant relying on an employee comparison to show a materially similar comparator or other circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Hughes v. Pacific University · filed 2023-11-13(a)(1)

Ross’s remote work expectations for his job are unlike Hughes’s because they are not similarly situated. Hughes offers no “other circumstances” of the remote work policy that could give rise to an inference of discrimination.

A disparate treatment complaint based on more favorable treatment of coworkers must allege facts showing that the coworkers were similarly situated.

Turner v. City of Dallas · filed 2023-12-19(a)(1)

Without an adequate comparator, the complaint does not plead any facts that would permit a reasonable inference that Turner was fired because of her gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators to show more favorable treatment of employees outside the protected class under nearly identical circumstances.

Daywalker v. UTMB · filed 2024-01-09(a)(1)

To survive summary judgment, she must show that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who were not members of her protected class, under nearly identical circumstances.

A plaintiff using other employees to establish a prima facie discrimination case must show that they were similarly situated in relevant respects.

Yao v. Oakland Univ. · filed 2024-01-19(a)(1)

As Yao’s comparators fared better in this respect, she fails to establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination.

A sex discrimination plaintiff relying on disparate treatment must identify employees who are similarly situated in material respects; differences in job roles and disciplinary histories can defeat that showing.

Lodato v. DeJoy · filed 2024-01-19(a)(1)

As the plaintiff is unable to identify similarly situated comparators, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of sex and grants summary judgment to the defendants.

A national-origin discrimination claim based on unequal pay requires a similarly situated comparator; when the dean decides raise requests, the comparator must have dealt with the same dean.

Zandvakili v. Univ. of Cincinnati · filed 2024-01-25(a)(1)

Therefore, contrary to Zandvakili’s argument, adhering to the “same-supervisor rule” makes more sense in this context. Thus, Zandvakili fails at the fourth prong of his prima facie case because he cannot point to a “same supervisor.”

A race discrimination plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework must identify a comparator who is similarly situated in all material respects.

Hall v. Coal Bed Services Inc. · filed 2024-02-02(a)(1)

Because Plaintiff’s proffered comparator is not “similarly situated in all material respects,” Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff relying on comparator evidence to show more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee outside the protected class.

Hill v. Ohio Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services · filed 2024-02-08(a)(1)

Thus, Mr. Hill has failed to establish that his proposed comparators engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it. Accordingly, Mr. Hill has failed to establish his prima facie case for his race discrimination claim, and MHAS is entitled to summary judgment on Count I.

A Title VII plaintiff using another employee to show that a stated reason for termination was a pretext for race discrimination must show that the employees were similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Albert Collins, Jr. v. K.C. MO Public School District · filed 2024-02-12(a)(1)

The district court correctly held that Collins and Bishop were not similarly situated enough to permit a reasonable jury to find that race motivated the school district's decision.

A Title VII race discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the evidence shows neither less favorable treatment than similarly situated employees nor satisfactory job performance.

Ko v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-03-11(a)

Even when given the benefit of reasonable inferences in his favor, a reasonable jury could not find that Ko was discriminated against on the basis of his race because there is no evidence showing that he was treated worse than a similarly situated individual or that he was performing to his employer’s legitimate expectations.

A plaintiff using a comparator to establish sex or race discrimination must show that a similarly situated employee received more favorable treatment.

Detillion v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction · filed 2024-03-25(a)(1)

Ms. Detillion cannot meet the fourth element of her prima facie case when they were treated the same.

A Title VII plaintiff relying on comparators must provide enough facts to show that the employees engaged in comparably serious conduct.

Youte v. Greater Bridgeport Transit Authority · filed 2024-03-29(a)(1)

As such, it is impossible to determine whether these individuals engaged in comparably severe conduct as did Plaintiff. Accordingly, the court finds as a matter of law that Plaintiff has failed to adduce sufficient facts about these two bus operators to show that either is a viable comparator.

In a discriminatory termination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), proposed comparators must have comparable performance concerns to be similarly situated.

Bommiasamy v. NES Oklahoma, Inc. · filed 2024-03-29(a)(1)

Because neither physician “had a comparable set of failings,” neither of them are “similarly situated.” Burks, 464 F.3d at 752 (quotation marks omitted).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a race discrimination claim to reach a jury when evidence that a comparable employee received more favorable discipline could support an inference of discrimination.

Goodwin v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC · filed 2024-04-26(a)(1)

When considering the facts in the light most favorable to Goodwin, a jury could reasonably conclude that Adams was treated more favorably for infractions of comparable or even worse severity.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a race discrimination plaintiff relying on a comparator to show that the employees were similarly situated; employees of different ranks cannot satisfy that requirement.

Harris v. Louisiana Department Of Public Safety and Corrections · filed 2024-04-26(a)(1)

Plaintiff and his comparator must be “nearly identical”65 under the circumstances and as ... a matter of law, employees of different rank or status cannot be similarly situated.66 Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead facts to establish his prima facie case.

A race discrimination plaintiff using the indirect method must show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

MCBEATH v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS · filed 2024-04-29(a)(1)

McBeath has not presented a similarly situated white employee who was treated more favorably; thus, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 allows a sex discrimination plaintiff to compare her pay with that of employees subject to the same standards and compensation scheme despite different professional backgrounds.

Hricenak v. Mickey Truck Bodies · filed 2024-04-12(a)(1)

They are therefore appropriately similarly situated for this analysis.

A race discrimination claim based on different treatment of employees requires a comparison that supports an inference of discrimination; materially different reasons for seeking reinstatement can defeat that inference.

Miller v. Chao · filed 2024-05-08(a)(1)

The Court finds that Ms. Miller has failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. ... Ms. Miller and Ms. Bostic were not similarly situated in this critical respect.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race and sex discrimination in employment; a discrimination claim needs facts supporting an inference of unequal treatment.

Meinen v. Bi-State Development Agency · filed 2024-05-16(a)(1)

Meinen’s claim that Bi-State showed a “pattern” of terminating similarly situated employees is conclusory and unsupported by any factual allegation. Without more, Meinen’s complaint is insufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination. The district court did not err in dismissing Meinen’s race and gender discrimination claims.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a discriminatory discharge claim based on comparator evidence requires a comparison of the seriousness of the employees’ misconduct.

Walenciej v. Eastern Ohio Correction Center · filed 2024-05-30(a)(1)

That Mr. Gallo engaged in no such relationship is a material difference in the severity and quality of their misconduct.

Section 2000e-2 requires a sex-discrimination plaintiff using the McDonnell Douglas framework to show that a similarly situated employee outside the protected group was treated more favorably.

Butcher v. UCW-CWA Local 3865 (TV2) · filed 2024-05-30(a)(1)

But her sex discrimination claim nevertheless fails because there is no evidence that a similarly situated non-protected employee was treated more favorably than she was. See Jackson, 814 F.3d at 776. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary: Mr. Jones, a male, received the same treatment as plaintiff.

A race or sex discrimination claim based on unequal discipline requires a comparator who engaged in misconduct of comparable seriousness.

Pruett v. TE Connectivity Corporation · filed 2024-06-10(a)(1)

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because her comparator was not “engaged in the same conduct.”

A discrimination plaintiff may use a similarly situated employee outside her protected class who received less severe discipline as a comparator.

Beny v. University of Michigan · filed 2024-07-17(a)(1)

Professor Reimann easily satisfies the requirements of an out-of-class comparator who was treated less severely than the plaintiff.

Under § 2000e-2(a), employees whose accommodation requests are governed by different legal standards are not similarly situated comparators for a disparate-treatment claim.

Speer v. UCOR LLC · filed 2024-10-01(a)

Because these employees were not “subject to the same standards” as Plaintiffs, they are not similarly situated comparators.

A Title VII plaintiff cannot establish disparate treatment using comparators whose misconduct differs in seriousness.

Hicks v. Lake County Sheriff Department · filed 2024-10-08(a)(1)

But here, the Plaintiff fails to raise such an inference because the two Caucasian male correctional officers are not similarly situated comparators.

A religious disparate-treatment plaintiff must show that a proposed comparator is similarly situated in relevant respects; different job duties and accommodation circumstances can defeat that showing.

Brown v. MGM Grand Casino · filed 2024-11-18(a)

Ultimately, Plaintiff is unable to show that the Dealer Trainee was similarly situated to him.

A sex discrimination plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must identify a similarly situated employee outside her protected class who was treated more favorably to establish a prima facie case.

Dixon v. Garland · filed 2024-12-03(a)(1)

Because Dixon fails to identify a similarly situated employee outside of her protected class, she cannot demonstrate a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a disparate treatment claim to proceed at the pleading stage when the plaintiff alleges that similarly situated employees outside her protected class received more favorable treatment.

GADDY v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYSTEM · filed 2024-12-03(a)

The fourth comparator is also similarly situated to Gaddy.

A race discrimination plaintiff’s proposed comparator should be subject to the same employment policies.

Ferguson v. City of Montgomery · filed 2024-12-10(a)

Therefore, Ferguson’s and Herman’s conduct were governed by different MPD policies, which cuts against Herman serving as a valid comparator.

A Title VII discrimination plaintiff must identify a similarly situated employee outside the protected class who received more favorable treatment to establish a prima facie case.

Johnson v. Epsilon Data Management, LLC · filed 2024-12-27

Because the Fifth Circuit continues to require proof of a similarly situated comparator in the Title VII context, this court does the same.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; a claimant relying on circumstantial evidence must show replacement by someone outside the protected class or less favorable treatment than a similarly situated worker outside it.

Sanner v. Harris · filed 2025-01-07(a)(1)

Mr. Sanner establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the job; 3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated, non-protected individual. ... Accordingly, Mr. Sanner has failed to establish his prima facie case and Mr. Harris’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Title VII Race Discrimination claim is GRANTED.

A plaintiff alleging race discrimination through disparate treatment must present evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected group received more favorable treatment.

Faulk v. Owens Corning Roofing and Asphalt LLC · filed 2025-02-18(a)(1)

The record presents little to no evidence on the job title, duties, supervisor, or job status of Probst, Villegas, or any other potential comparators. Therefore, the Court cannot compare these individuals to Faulk, and Faulk fails to carry his prima facie burden of showing he was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees.

A disparate treatment claim based on reassignment must plausibly identify similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class who were treated more favorably.

Hampton v. Tempe, City of · filed 2025-03-14(a)(1)

But because Hampton’s claim hinges on her reassignment after the AZ POST decided to pursue discipline against her, she needed to point to comparators who were investigated and disciplined but not reassigned.

Under § 2000e-2(a), an employee in a materially different role is not a valid comparator for a race discrimination claim.

Iris N. Wilson v. CSXT · filed 2025-03-31(a)

Next, Strachan is also not a valid comparator because he was employed in a different role.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a discrimination claim based on indirect evidence fails when the plaintiff offers no evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.

Brown v. FCA US LLC/Stellantis · filed 2025-03-31(a)(1)

The Court concludes that although Brown’s placement on a PIP and eventual termination qualifies as adverse employment action, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination because she has offered no evidence of similarly-situated employees from non-protected classes who were treated differently.

A sex discrimination claim based on unequal treatment requires a comparator whose relevant conduct was similar in kind and severity.

Thomas v. Findlay Recovery Center, LLC · filed 2025-04-16(a)(1)

The caselaw requires that Thomas present a comparator who engaged in like conduct of similar severity, but she failed to do so.

Section 2000e-2 requires a disparate-treatment plaintiff relying on a comparator to show that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class was treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances.

Spann v. FedEx Freight · filed 2025-07-15(a)(1)

Thus, Spann was not similarly situated to Walters, because the latter had clearly not reached MMI and her eligibility was therefore apparent on the face of her request.

Employees are not similarly situated for a Title VII discrimination claim when a material difference in their observed conduct explains why the employer treated them differently.

Lohmeier v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital · filed 2025-08-14(a)(1)

Because Lohmeier’s observed behavior differentiates her from all of her proposed comparators, she fails to meet her prima facie burden under McDonnell Douglas.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must identify a similarly situated employee outside the protected class who received better treatment to establish a prima facie discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Vargas v. Northern Illinois Foot & Ankle Specialists, Ltd. · filed 2025-09-16(a)(1)

Vargas’s prima facie case fails because she does not identify any similarly situated individual outside her protected class treated more favorably.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a sex discrimination claim based on better treatment of coworkers who did not engage in comparable misconduct.

Rabenhorst v. Noem · filed 2025-12-22(a)(1)

Likewise, Rabenhorst failed to show that there were younger and/or female workers who were similarly situated to him, in that they engaged in comparable misconduct, but who were treated more favorably.

A Title VII race discrimination claim based on unequal treatment requires evidence of an appropriate comparator; an employee who was also required to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination does not establish less favorable treatment.

Perry · filed 2026-01-23(a)(1)

But even assuming that Perry is also basing his race-discrimination claims on an allegedly discriminatory use of fitness-for-duty examinations, those claims still fail because Perry has not identified an appropriate comparator.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) treats invasive preemployment medical testing imposed on the basis of race or sex as a discriminatory condition of employment, even if the testing is not unconstitutional.

Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory · filed 1998-02-03(a)(1)

An additional “term or condition” requiring an unconstitutional invasion of privacy is, without doubt, actionable under Title VII. Furthermore, even if the intrusions did not rise to the level of unconstitutionality, they would still be a “term” or “condition” based on an illicit category as described by the statute and thus a proper basis for a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require majority-group plaintiffs to show special background circumstances to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services · filed 2025-06-05(a)(1)

The Sixth Circuit has implemented a rule that requires certain Title VII plaintiffs—those who are members of ma- jority groups—to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard in order to carry their burden under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. We conclude that Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority- group plaintiffs.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a white employee to state a race discrimination claim by alleging that his employer terminated him because of his race.

Blumenthal v. Murray · filed 1998-02-11(a)(1)

The liberal standard of notice pleading, as set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), requires only that plaintiff plead that he was treated differently because of his race. Here, plaintiff alleges that he was terminated because he is white. That states a claim.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that the employer's stated reason for termination was pretextual and that the employer intentionally discriminated against her.

Willis v. IA · filed 1998-10-19

If the employer articulates a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is pretextual and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. ... In sum, we agree with the district court's careful analysis and conclusion that Willis has failed to produce evidence to demonstrate that the non-discriminatory reasons for her termination offered by the Commission are pretextual.

A plaintiff relying on unequal discipline to establish a prima facie case under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that employees outside the protected class who engaged in substantially similar conduct were treated better.

Ishman v. NATIONAL BIOLOGICAL CORP./ETA SYSTEMS · filed 1999-05-12(a)(1)

Plaintiff Ishman has the burden of showing that others who engaged in substantially the same behavior as him were treated differently. Ishman must show that non-protected employees with a similar history of assaulting and/or threatening coworkers were not terminated.

Under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination does not defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for race discrimination.

Love-Lane v. Martin · filed 2004-01-22(a)(1)

We conclude in this case, for the reasons set forth below, that while Love-Lane establishes a prima facie case of race discrimination, she does not proffer sufficient evidence of pretext to overcome the defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their decision to demote her.

A white employee alleging discriminatory denial of promotion must show circumstances supporting an inference of racial discrimination.

Hairsine v. James · filed 2007-06-19(a)(1)

Mr. Hairsine correctly notes that Mr. Hall did not discuss the candidates with Mr. Young or interview them, but those facts do not raise any inference of discrimination or disparate treatment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects white employees from race-based employment discrimination.

Riley v. HSBC USA, INC. · filed 2011-03-17(a)(1)

Accordingly, that Plaintiff is white and not a member of a minority group does not foreclose a finding of race-based employment discrimination.

A race discrimination plaintiff relying on a comparator must show more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee outside the protected class under nearly identical circumstances.

Hutcherson v. Siemens Industry, Inc. · filed 2020-03-03(a)(1)

Thus, to the extent that plaintiff and East may have been similarly situated before being placed on their respective performance improvement plans, they were not thereafter similarly situated in that East chose to resign; plaintiff did not. Plaintiff thus cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and Siemens is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

When an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for firing an employee, a Title VII race-discrimination plaintiff must present evidence that the reason was pretext for race discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Woods v. Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. · filed 2022-06-24(a)(1)

And the district court did not err in ... granting summary judgment to Waste Pro because Woods did not present evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on pretext, as he did not show that Waste Pro’s real reason for terminating him was race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; an employee relying on indirect evidence must show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Royles v. Trihealth, Inc. · filed 2024-08-22(a)(1)

Both Title VII and Ohio law prohibit employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A). ... Thus, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show pretext for her Ohio and Title VII race discrimination claims or her FMLA retaliation claim.

Section 2000e-2 applies when a covered employer denies an individual access to employment opportunities for a prohibited reason, even if that employer does not employ the individual.

Moland v. Bil-Mar Foods · filed 1998-02-13(a)(1)

Guided by Sibley, and those decisions following Sibley, the court concludes that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 applies where an employer controls an individual’s access to employment opportunities and denies that access based on unlawful criteria even though the individual is not an employee of that employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) may impose liability on a covered employer that discriminatorily interferes with a person’s employment opportunities with third parties, even if it does not employ that person.

Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n · filed 1998-08-06(a)(1)

Under § 2000e-2(a)(l), defendant’s interference with plaintiffs outside employment relationships may be an independent basis for Title VII liability, where the defendant controls access to employment opportunities with third parties.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment on unsupported assertions of disparate treatment without evidence of discriminatory intent.

Turnbow v. Sibley Memorial Hospital · filed 2025-06-05(a)(1)

Bare assertions of disparate treatment, without support such as comparator evidence, are not enough to defeat Sibley’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a discharge was tied to race or national origin; personal dislike alone does not establish discrimination.

Wily v. Third District Court for Salt Lake County, The · filed 2022-03-21(a)(1)

But generic dislike is not discrimination.

A discrimination complaint can plausibly allege discriminatory motive by describing less favorable treatment than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class received.

Smith v. Wilkie · filed 2022-03-07(a)(1)

The Court therefore finds that, in his revised SAC, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated, younger, non-African American co-worker, which plausibly raises an inference of discriminatory motivation.

A Title VII race-discrimination claim must allege facts supporting a plausible inference of discrimination; allegations about better treatment of other employees must identify similarly situated comparators.

McKinney v. State Of New York · filed 2022-03-01(a)(1)

As discussed infra III.a., Plaintiff has not pled facts to show a plausible inference of discrimination because she has not identified other similarly situated white or non-black employees who received the half pay sick leave or other work accommodations.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination; different investigation procedures do not establish that inference when employees accused of the same misconduct receive the same ultimate treatment.

Moleni v. Delta Air Lines · filed 2022-03-10(a)(1)

The fact that Delta took a slightly different path as to each employee as it investigated and reached the same ultimate conclusion does not indicate racial discrimination.

A race or national origin discrimination claim requires facts supporting an inference of discriminatory motivation, assessed from the allegations as a whole.

Mansaray v. Krous Security Service · filed 2022-02-14(a)(1)

In sum, the Court again finds that the only arguable inferences of discrimination are undercut by other allegations such that, viewing Plaintiff’s pleadings as a whole, he still fails to make out a prima facie case of national origin or racial discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence connecting an adverse employment action to race; an unsupported allegation of discriminatory motive is insufficient.

Klanderud v. Postmaster General of the United States of America · filed 2021-06-29(a)

Plaintiff argues the basis for her termination was her race, age, and disability, but there are no facts that support that conclusion.

An isolated racial remark by a coworker with no authority over an employee, made two years before termination, does not establish an inference of discriminatory firing under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Jackson v. Sheraton New York Times Square Hotel · filed 2021-06-03(a)(1)

That statement, while certainly inappropriate and upsetting, does not raise a plausible inference that the defendant fired the plaintiff because of her membership in a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race motivated an adverse employment action; a personal vendetta unrelated to race does not establish discrimination.

Moses v. Kerry · filed 2015-06-23(a)(1)

Neither Title VII nor the ADEA protects Mr. Moses from a co- worker’s personal vendetta that is motivated by neither race nor age.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that race or sex motivated an employment termination.

Smith v. Global Staffing · filed 2015-06-17(a)

Indeed, there is some evidence suggesting Smith may have been terminated from that position, but the evidence on point, considered as a whole, was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude his race, his sex, or his disability was a motivating factor even if it was a termination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that an adverse employment action was motivated by a protected characteristic.

Robles v. Green Bay Area Public School District · filed 2015-04-14(a)

And in any event, the judge was correct to conclude that there is no evidence that the school district’s adverse employment actions against Robles were motivated by her being Hispanic.

A race or national origin discrimination claim under Title VII cannot survive summary judgment without sufficient evidence to permit a finding of discrimination.

Tarshis v. Riese Organization · filed 2002-04-02(a)(1)

While plaintiffs Memorandum of Law is full of eonclusory allegations of discrimination, it fails to identify sufficient evidence to permit a finding of discrimination in violation of Title VII.

Under § 2000e-2, evidence that an employer considered an applicant’s sex in hiring can create a factual dispute over discriminatory intent and pretext that defeats summary judgment.

Lawrence Withers, an Individual v. Hearst Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, D/B/A Seattle Post-Intelligencer · filed 1998-02-26

Withers raised a factual question about whether this reason was pretextual by presenting the publisher's deposition testimony that her female voice and the "fact that she is female," were factors in the hiring decision and that the P-I was seeking to expand and diversify its readership and workplace, both of which are predominately male. This is direct evidence that raises an inference of discriminatory motive.

Ambiguous comments about a protected trait during a tenure review do not, by themselves, support a rational inference of discriminatory animus.

Jalal v. Columbia University in the City of New York · filed 1998-03-09(a)(1)

Courts must therefore be wary of finding that merely because a comment by a decisionmaker is ambiguous and addresses a colleague’s membership in a class protected by Title VII, a rational inference of discriminatory animus can therefore be drawn.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires facts connecting an employer’s conduct to a protected trait; a plaintiff’s belief about discriminatory motive is insufficient.

Mobley v. Dillon Companies · filed 1998-05-29(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Neither these allegations, nor the other facts Ms. Mobley contained in her complaint establish that any of the alleged illegal actions were taken due to her race or gender or in retaliation for statutorily protected activities.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit an adverse employment action motivated by personal animus rather than the employee’s sex.

Hyre v. University of Illinois · filed 1998-09-21

At worst, the University deferred to a co-worker’s personal animus against the plaintiff and forced him to resign, underhandedly using an unfounded sexual harassment charge as a pretext. That action might have been unfair, but nothing suggests that the plaintiffs gender motivated it.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a causal link between racial remarks and the challenged employment decision for those remarks to support a discrimination claim.

Boyd v. State Farm Insurance Companies, State Farm Insurance Companies · filed 1998-11-03(a)

Absent a causal link between the references and the conduct complained of, such epithets become stray remarks that cannot support a discrimination verdict.

An affirmative action coordinator’s statement that an employer wanted to promote someone of a particular race can create a triable issue of race discrimination even when the coordinator’s role in the decision is unclear.

Fisher v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 1999-03-05(a)(1)

Although the Affirmative Action Coordinator’s role in the promotion process is not clear from the record before us, we. must resolve this ambiguity against the movant and assume that remarks made by the Affirmative Action Coordinator about the decision in question is probative of the Department’s hiring practices. Affirmative Action Coordinators are more likely than other low-level employees to have an influence over personnel decisions, or at least to have knowledge regarding the decision maker’s objectives. Because this evidence raises a genuine issue for trial regarding the motives behind Department’s decision not to promote Fisher, we deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the race discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reason for discipline to show that it was a pretext for race or sex discrimination.

Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2000-03-21(a)

Thus, Straughn must not only put forth evidence which suggests that Delta’s proffered explanation is a pretext; she must also show that it is a pretext for illegal race or gender-based discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race was the real reason for a termination, even when an employee raises a factual dispute about the employer’s stated reasons.

Martin v. Orthodontic Ctrs · filed 2000-03-24(a)(1)

On review of the magistrate judge's report, the district court granted summary judgment to Appellees, reasoning that even if Mar- tin could establish a prima facie case of discrimination and create a material issue of fact as to whether the reasons for her termination were pretextual, she had failed to offer evidence that race was the real reason for her termination. ... Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence from which a jury could find that an employer acted because of an employee’s race or color; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Ofudu v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2000-06-02(a)

The prima facie case now becomes irrelevant; Plaintiff must establish his right to a jury trial by proffering some evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that he was criticized and ultimately fired because of his race/color. But he has not offered so much as a scintilla of evidence from which a jury could conclude that Defendant’s actions were race-based.

Unequal work assignments and deadlines can help establish discriminatory motive under § 2000e-2(a).

Cancel De Rugg v. West · filed 2000-07-10(a)

These assertions, particularly the first two, if true, would help Plaintiff carry her burden of demonstrating disparate impact and discriminatory motive.

A race-based discharge claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment without sufficient admissible evidence of discriminatory intent.

Carter v. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California · filed 2001-10-16(a)(1)

We agree that Carter produced insufficient admissible evidence of discriminatory intent to survive summary judgment on his claims of race-based discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and under California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence sufficient to support an inference that national origin discrimination caused an adverse employment action; weak evidence of pretext alone may be insufficient.

Zapata-Matos v. Reckitt & Colman · filed 2002-01-14

The question on summary judgment is whether the slight suggestion of pretext present here, absent other evidence from which discrimination can be inferred, meets plaintiff’s ultimate burden. We hold it cannot.

A plaintiff claiming race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must prove that the employer acted with discriminatory intent.

Sharp v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. · filed 2002-08-21(a)(1)

As the Magistrate Judge discussed in her Report and Recommendation, to prevail on a claim of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

A claim under § 2000e-2(c)(3) cannot survive summary judgment without evidence connecting the union’s conduct to racial animus; mistreatment alone is insufficient.

Smart, Ronald D. v. Int'l Brohd Elec 702 · filed 2002-11-15(c)(3)

And whether or not Smart has any statutory basis for his discrimination suit, he hasn’t enough evidence to withstand summary judgment. That he was mistreated by the union is not evidence of racial animus.

A race-related remark supports a discriminatory discharge claim only when it is connected to the adverse employment action.

Tullo v. City of Mount Vernon · filed 2002-12-19(a)(1)

As the comment was neither close in time nor otherwise related to plaintiffs’ suspensions, it does not constitute evidence of race discrimination on the part of defendants in this case.

Under Title VII, workplace remarks must be sufficiently connected to the employment decision to support an inference of discrimination.

Trotter v. BPB America, Inc. · filed 2004-08-04

Even reading the evidence in a light most favorable to Trotter, these offensive remarks constitute nothing more than “stray remarks” and cannot be considered sufficient to meet Trotter’s burden of production, nor do they create a genuine issue of fact that merits a jury trial.

Disbelieving an employer's stated reason for discharge alone is insufficient to establish intentional race discrimination under Title VII.

Noble v. Brinker International, Inc. · filed 2004-12-03(a)(1)

Reeves did not, however, abrogate the Court's holding in Hicks that mere disbelief of an employer's proffered reason is insufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars race-based employment discrimination, but a termination claim requires sufficient evidence of unlawful discrimination to proceed to trial.

Jamison v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 2005-01-13(a)(1)

The Court finds that the plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to warrant a trial on the question of whether his termination was a result of illegal discrimination under federal or state law.

An isolated remark about an applicant’s accent does not establish race discrimination in hiring without a link to the hiring decision.

Lochard v. Provena Saint Joseph Medical Center · filed 2005-04-22(a)(1)

In opposing Provena’s motion for summary judgment, Lochard has failed to provide the requisite nexus between Klima’s written statement noting Lochard’s heavy accent and Provena’s decision not to hire him. Thus, Klima’s remarks, without more, do not give rise to an inference of race discrimination or establish pretext herein.

Race-neutral comments without factual support for a racial motive do not establish discriminatory intent under Title VII.

Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co. · filed 2005-12-12(a)(1)

None of the comments above have anything, facially, to do with race, and Twymon has failed to identify factual support for her contention that they do.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent to prevail.

Kimsey v. Akstein · filed 2005-12-30(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prevail on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent in a Title VII employment discrimination claim.

Smith v. Akstein · filed 2005-12-30(a)(1)

To prevail on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

An employer’s failure to specify performance expectations does not itself establish discriminatory intent in a race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Billeigh H. Riser v. Target Corp. · filed 2006-08-17(a)(1)

However, the fact that Target might not have specifically set forth each task it was using to measure the competency demonstrated by Riser as an ETL-IT, does not carry the day for Riser in creating a reasonable inference that race was a determinative factor in his termination.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit a nondiscriminatory demotion merely because it fails to comply with a desegregation order.

Barnes v. Simmons · filed 2006-08-24

TISD’s de- cision to demote Barnes satisfies title VII if it was non-discriminatory, and whether the de- motion complies with the 1970 order is irrele- vant to that question.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff challenging a discharge to show discriminatory motive; whether the employee actually violated the employer’s policy is not dispositive.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Trans States Airlines, Inc. · filed 2006-09-19

Whether Hussein actually violated the company policy by appearing in the bar in uniform is not dispositive. The relevant question is whether the Plaintiffs can show that Trans States was motivated by discriminatory animus, rather than solely by its belief that Hussein violated company policy.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race motivated a termination; a mistaken employment decision alone does not establish race discrimination.

Henry v. Jones · filed 2007-11-01(a)(1)

The decision in this case, whether correct or not, does not raise a triable question as to whether it was made on account of Henry’s race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination in employment terms because of sex, and a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent to prevail.

Richardson v. Jackson · filed 2008-02-26(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prevail on a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer acted because of sex; evidence that a supervisor favored friends does not establish intentional sex discrimination.

Greene v. Potter · filed 2009-03-05(a)(1)

However, that same evidence demonstrated that Rendleman manipulated the overtime procedures in order to benefit a few of his friends, not out of a desire to discriminate against female employees. Greene’s evidence of gender discrimination came from two male employees who claimed that Rendleman treated them unfairly in order to give overtime to Buckingham and Connors.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that challenged employment conduct was based on a protected characteristic; anti-union motive alone does not support a discrimination claim.

Clemente v. New York State Division of Parole · filed 2010-02-09(a)(1)

Most importantly, each requires a showing that the employer’s allegedly wrongful conduct derived from a specifically prohibited factor — namely, “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Employer discrimination, hostility, and retaliation based on other, non-enumerated factors, including union membership, will not support a claim under Title VII.