42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

When an employer gives several legitimate reasons for a termination, a Title VII plaintiff must show that each reason is not credible and that intentional discrimination was the true reason.

Eubanks v. Henry County · filed 2015-09-09(a)(1)

In sum, although Eubanks has cast some doubt upon some of the County’s reasons for terminating her instead of Friel, she has failed to show that all of its reasons were unworthy of credence and, importantly, that the reasons were a pretext for intentional discrimination.

For a race-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff must offer enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Morrissey v. ASD Shared Services, LLC, eta l · filed 2015-09-17(a)(1)

Overall, Morrissey has not presented sufficient evidence, considered singly or in combination, for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Employers’ stated reason for her termination was pretextual. Consequently, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Employers on Morrissey’s Title VII claim of race discrimination.

A race discrimination plaintiff seeking to prove pretext must present evidence that the employer acted in bad faith or with discriminatory animus when terminating the employee.

Pete Keller, Jr. v. Coastal Bend College · filed 2015-10-26(a)(1)

To show pretext by a preponderance of the evidence, this court requires a plaintiff to present evidence supporting an inference that the employer acted in bad faith or was motivated by discriminatory animus when terminating an employee.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff to show that an employer’s stated legitimate reason for pay or promotion differences was pretextual.

Dhar v. New York City Department of Transportation · filed 2015-11-10(a)

Upon review of the federal and NYSHRL claims, we agree that Dhar’s claims of pay discrimination and denial of promotion opportunities fail because the defendants had a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the differences in salaries and promotions between Dhar and his comparators, and Dhar failed to present any evidence that their legitimate reason—differing education and experience—was pretextual.

Under Title VII, consistent explanations for a termination do not establish pretext merely because the employer later gives more detail.

Gunn v. Senior Services of N. Ky. · filed 2015-12-07(a)(1)

Here, no inference of pretext is warranted because each of SSNK’s stated reasons is consistent with the others, and all relate to the same basic concept: plaintiff failed to adequately perform as President and CEO.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on sex or religion; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for termination, the employee must produce specific, substantial evidence of pretext.

Fleming v. Iasis Healthcare Corp. · filed 2015-12-22(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”),' prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual because of the individual’s “sex” or “religion,” among other factors. ... In sum, Fleming has not produced specific, substantial evidence of pretext. The record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier) of fact to find for Fleming with respect to his discrimination claims.

When an employer cites poor performance as its reason for firing an employee, a discrimination plaintiff can show pretext with evidence that the employer did not honestly believe the employee was performing poorly.

Alade v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc · filed 2016-02-22(a)

With the question of pretext, to defeat summary judgment, Alade needed to show that his supervisor did not honestly believe that he was performing poorly, which Alade could do by presenting some evidence that his performance problems had no basis in fact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) focuses a race discrimination pretext inquiry on whether the employer honestly believed its stated reason for firing an employee.

Mann v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2016-03-08(a)(1)

As the Court of Appeals has made clear, “[o]nce the employer has articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action . . . the issue is not the correctness or desirability of the reasons offered but whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.” Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence linking protected-class bias to the challenged employment decision or casting doubt on the employer’s stated reason.

Liu v. Cook County, Illinois · filed 2016-03-15(a)

Dr. Liu has presented only the sparsest evidence of animus based on her race, sex, and national origin, none of it linked to the de- cisions at issue. She has also failed to present evidence creat- ing a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the defendants’ stated reasons for disciplining her were honest.

Section 2000e-2 requires a race discrimination plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reason for its decision to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Hollis v. Aerotek, Inc. · filed 2016-07-19

We conclude Mr. Hollis’s characterization of the evidence would not persuade a reasonable jury that Mr. Mulcahy’s remarks and offer of an alternative job were a disguise for race or disability discrimination.

An employer’s reliance on documented employee misconduct does not support an inference of race discrimination merely because the employee characterizes the decision as subjective.

Ladson v. George Washington University · filed 2016-09-01(a)

There is nothing “subjective”—in the Aka sense—about the foregoing evidence, and thus there is nothing about GW’s reliance on such evidence that would give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex; an employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for termination must present evidence that the reason was pretextual.

McDaniel v. Vilsack · filed 2016-09-23(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits adverse ... employment actions on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... For all of these reasons, Mr. McDaniel’s effort to show that the reasons given for his termination were pretext for unlawful discrimination fail.

A Title VII discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee fails to raise a genuine factual dispute that the employer’s reasons for firing him were pretextual.

Ibim Harry v. Dallas Housing Authority · filed 2016-10-24

Therefore, Harry has not met his summary judgment burden to establish a genuine issue of material fact that DHA’s proffered reasons for firing him were pretextual.

A sex discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence fails when the employer gives legitimate reasons for its action and the employee does not show those reasons were pretextual.

Kirkland v. James · filed 2016-11-03(a)(1)

The evidence Kirkland offers fails to meet her burden of showing that the defendant removed leave from her account as a pretext for either sex discrimination or retaliation.

A plaintiff challenging a discharge under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot establish pretext merely by disputing the alleged misconduct; the issue is whether the employer honestly and reasonably believed it occurred.

Evans v. District of Columbia · filed 2016-12-01(a)(1)

The question here, then, is not whether Plaintiff in fact violated MPD policies, but whether MPD decision-makers honestly and reasonably believed that he did so.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reasons for discipline were a pretext for discrimination.

Vaughan v. Boeing Co. · filed 2017-01-19(a)(1)

Title VII forbids an employer “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Even accepting Vaughan’s version of events, I conclude he has failed to show pretext. For this reason, his discrimination claims fail as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; an employer’s good-faith belief that an employee committed misconduct can defeat a claim that its stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

McNeal v. University of Minnesota Physicians · filed 2017-01-23(a)(1)

As already noted, UMP has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge, namely, he engaged in inappropriate conduct, as detailed in the Littler Report. Accordingly, the dispositive question is: has McNeal proffered sufficient evidence to show UMP’s reason is a pretext for discrimination or retaliation? In the Court’s view, the answer is a resounding “No.”

When an employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination, a Title VII race discrimination claim survives summary judgment only if the employee can show those reasons are pretextual.

Gadling-Cole v. Lagory · filed 2017-01-27(a)(1)

Once a defendant employer under Title VII has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating an employee, the plaintiffs claim survives summary judgment only if the plaintiff can rebut these reasons as pretextual. Plaintiff has failed to rebut as pretextual Defendant’s reasons for her termination, and so the district court properly granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make an employer’s failure to give discretionary warnings sufficient evidence that its stated reason for firing was pretextual.

Gonzalez v. State of Florida Department of Management Services · filed 2017-03-23(a)(1)

Because counseling and formal warnings were discretionary options, the Department’s failure to provide them does not raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether its stated reasons for terminating Gonzalez were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; a claim cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Gilson v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2017-01-23(a)(1)

Here, even assuming that Gilson could establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination (an issue seriously in doubt), the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the PSP Defendants because the record is devoid of any evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that the PSP’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Gilson’s termination was pretext for gender discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of discriminatory remarks and the circumstances of a firing raise a genuine dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Mayes v. Winco Holdings, Inc. · filed 2017-02-03(a)(1)

In sum, circumstantial evidence raises a material dispute of fact regarding pretext. This is particularly true when the circumstantial evidence is viewed in conjunction with the powerful direct evidence of Steen’s discriminatory comments. It was error to dismiss Mayes’s discrimination claims.

In a disparate-treatment claim, courts must assess pretext using the plaintiff’s evidence as a whole, including discriminatory remarks.

Dotson v. City of Syracuse · filed 2017-04-24

When evaluating pretext, a court must consider the plaintiff’s evidence as a whole, see Walsh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 828 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 2016), including evidence of discriminatory or disparaging language, see Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998).

A race or sex discrimination claim fails when the applicant cannot show that the employer’s stated hiring reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Drummond v. Stackley · filed 2017-04-28(a)(1)

The record, however, does not suggest that this criteria had any use or purpose to discriminate between applicants on the basis of race or sex. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Secretary.

For a circumstantial discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee must raise a genuine factual dispute that the employer’s stated reason for firing her was a pretext for discrimination.

Soulinthong v. Excelerate Discovery, LLC · filed 2017-06-13(a)(1)

Soulinthong has failed to offer evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue that TrustPoint’s reasons for firing her were a pretext for gender discrimination.

A stated reason for termination may be pretextual without violating Title VII if the actual reasons are lawful and do not involve sex discrimination.

Adkins v. University of Ozarks · filed 2017-06-30(a)(1)

However, issues with winning games, graduation rates of players, and running a sports team in a way that increases parent complaints are all permissible reasons for terminating employment. Termination for these reasons does not necessarily tend to show discrimination based on gender, and the fact that they entered the decision making process is not prohibited by law. Therefore, to the extent that the' Plaintiff showed pretext, the stated reason was pretext for other legal reasons, not for an impermissible reason.

In a race discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, an employer may offer a legitimate reason for discharge, and the employee must then show that reason is pretextual.

Thom Parson v. Vanguard Group Inc · filed 2017-08-01(a)(1)

After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that Parson has failed to show that Vanguard’s proffered reason for his termination — poor performance — is merely pretext for intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employee claiming pretext to offer evidence from which a factfinder could disbelieve each of the employer’s stated reasons for firing him.

Abdel-Ghaffar v. Illinois Tool Works Inc. · filed 2017-09-05

That alone defeats his claim of pretext, since he loses unless a factfinder could disbelieve each of ITW’s reasons for firing him.

An employer’s honestly held, documented nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action defeats a race-discrimination claim when the employee fails to show pretext.

Block v. Meharry Med. College · filed 2018-01-22(a)

Together, this evidence shows Meharry’s honest belief in its non-discriminatory reason for removal of Block’s chair position.

A national-origin discrimination claim fails when the employee does not rebut the employer’s stated reasons for firing him or show that those reasons are false.

Moreno v. Serco Inc. · filed 2018-05-11(a)(1)

Thus, none of the instances to which Moreno points—however troubling—establishes pretext, because they do not rebut Serco’s stated reasons for firing him or demonstrate that those reasons are false.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that an employer’s stated reason for written reprimands was a pretext for national origin discrimination.

Abboud v. Cnty. of Onondaga · filed 2018-09-27(a)(1)

As Abboud fails to offer sufficient evidence that could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that defendants' articulated rationale for subjecting him to written reprimands was a pretext for unlawful discrimination, these national origin discrimination claims are dismissed.

Errors in an employee’s performance evaluations alone do not establish that an employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for race discrimination under Title VII.

McCurdy v. State of Alabama Disability Determination Service · filed 2018-10-23(a)(1)

Moreover, even if McCurdy could show mistakes in her job evaluations, mistakes alone would not be sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.

An employee claiming race discrimination in discipline must offer evidence that could allow a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s stated reason; disagreement with the employer’s decision is insufficient.

Jones v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2018-11-20(a)

But Jones merely quarrels with the wisdom of CSXT’s decision to discipline an Employee-In-Charge differently than other crew members. He offers no basis on which a reasonable factfinder could find CSXT’s explanation for imposing disparate discipline unworthy of credence.

Under § 2000e-2, mistaken reliance on a transfer agreement does not establish pretext without evidence that the stated reason was dishonest.

Davis v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2019-02-12

But even if the transfer agreement lacked consideration (a point we need not decide), Davis argues only that the defendants mistakenly relied on it—not that they did so dishonestly. A mistake is not pretext; “pretext means a lie.” ... Davis furnished no evidence that the defendants lied about the agreement’s enforceability. Thus, summary judgment was proper.

A national-origin discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when no reasonable jury could find the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Ortiz v. Cedar Crest College · filed 2019-03-12(a)(1)

He asserts a claim of national-origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and a claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. ... On this record, no reasonable jury could find the College’s stated reason for terminating Ortiz was pretextual. We therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.

A Title VII discrimination claimant must show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason.

Ameer Siddiqui v. Netjets Aviation, Inc. · filed 2019-05-31(a)(1)

Siddiqui’s argument that the district court failed to resolve all inferences in his favor, improperly weighed the evidence, and made credibility determinations is unavailing because he has not presented evidence to support a finding that NetJets’s reasons for placing him on administrative leave, extending his leave period, and eventually terminating him were pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason.

A Title VII race discrimination plaintiff must rebut every legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason the employer gives for firing him to show pretext.

Husk v. Talladega, Alabama, The City of · filed 2019-06-24(a)(1)

However, Mr. Husk is required to rebut all of Talladega’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for firing him.

A plaintiff challenging a hiring decision as race discrimination must show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Thompson v. Jewell · filed 2019-07-09(a)(1)

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of showing that the proffered reason for hiring Ms. Hampton instead of Plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in compensation and discharge; a claim fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

North v. General Plastics and Composites, L.P. · filed 2019-08-02(a)

The Court need not answer whether North successfully established a prima facie case because, even assuming arguendo that he can do so, his claim nonetheless fails because he cannot establish pretext for General Plastic’s ultimate employment decision to terminate him for cause.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute that the employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment action was a pretext for discrimination.

Bosnak v. City & County of S.F. · filed 2019-09-09(a)

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bosnak’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code § 12940, as Bosnak failed to make a sufficient showing of pretext2 to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of discrimination or retaliation.

Under § 2000e-2(a), an employee using the McDonnell Douglas framework must show that the employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment action was a pretext for discrimination.

Pearson v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel County · filed 2019-09-10(a)

Dr. Pearson fails to meet her burden of establishing that the Board’s reason for eliminating her position was a pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, the court will grant summary judgment on this claim.

An employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons defeat a Title VII discrimination claim when the evidence as a whole does not support a rational finding of pretext.

Melton v. Poughkeepsie City School District · filed 2019-09-24(a)(1)

Moreover, plaintiff’s evidence, when looked at as a whole, does not support a rational finding that PCSD’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual.

When an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for termination, the employee must present sufficient evidence that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Mercedes v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. · filed 2019-10-07(a)(1)

We find that Mercedes failed to offer sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that DOE’s nondiscriminatory reasons for Mercedes’s termination were in fact a mere pretext for discrimination.

An employer may prefer a candidate with a certification even when the certification is not required for the job; a plaintiff must show that the stated reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason.

Bruno v. Greene County School District · filed 2020-02-03(a)(1)

Even if Bruno is entirely correct, and the School District did not require the certificate, it is still entitled to prefer a candidate who has a certificate over one who does not. The evidence shows that Curry-Hutchins had a leadership certificate, and Bruno did not. This is a plainly nondiscriminatory reason upon which to base a hiring decision and Bruno has not met her burden of providing evidence that (1) the reason was false and (2) discrimination was the real reason.

A race discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee fails to show a genuine factual dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Williams v. Texas Children's Hospit · filed 2020-02-05(a)(1)

For these reasons, we hold that Eaglin failed to show that TCH’s proffered justification for firing her was pretextual.

When an employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, a plaintiff claiming race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must offer evidence that those reasons are pretext for discrimination.

Hood v. Marlboro County Sheriffs Office · filed 2020-04-01(a)(1)

To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must come forward with evidence that the defendant’s asserted reasons for its actions are mere pretext for its true discriminatory motives and that the actions of the defendant were really based on race.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee must rebut each legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason an employer gives for an adverse employment decision to survive summary judgment.

Cotton v. ENMARKET INC · filed 2020-04-30(a)(1)

If the defendant has articulated more than one legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must rebut each of the reasons to survive summary judgment. ... Because, among other things, Cotton failed to rebut Enmarket’s claim that Morgan’s experience made her better suited for the role, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Enmarket on this claim.

A plaintiff may show pretext under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) through disparate treatment of similarly situated employees, and a genuine factual dispute about pretext can defeat summary judgment.

Weikel v. Jackson Public School District · filed 2020-04-27(a)(1)

Weikel may show pretext through proof of disparate treatment, and that is the approach he pursued in his summary-judgment response. ... Weikel has created a fact question regarding pretext; summary judgment is denied.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; an employee cannot establish pretext merely by showing that the employer’s honest reason for termination was mistaken or unfair, even when based on firsthand observations.

Main v. Ozark Health Inc · filed 2020-05-11(a)(1)

Therefore, while a plaintiff may establish pretext by showing that the employer did not truly believe the employee engaged in the conduct justifying termination, a plaintiff may not establish pretext simply by showing that the employer’s “honest” belief was erroneous, unwise, or even unfair. This is true regardless of whether the employer’s explanation is based on first-hand knowledge or third-party reports.

Section 2000e-2 permits an employee to show pretext through disparate treatment, but employees whose misconduct differs are not similarly situated on that basis.

Findlator v. Allina Health Clinics · filed 2020-05-27

Because Findlator and Baruch engaged in different types of misconduct and were not similarly situated, omission of the Violence-Free Workplace policy on Baruch’s corrective action notice does not show disparate treatment. Allina’s rationale for terminating Findlator and suspending Baruch would apply with the same force regardless of whether Baruch’s notice included a violation of the Violence-Free Workplace policy. Findlator did not present sufficient evidence of pretext and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Allina.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin; an employee relying on indirect evidence must show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

AFRASIABIPOUR v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION · filed 2020-06-26(a)

Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of race and national origin discrimination under Title VII, the Court concludes that plaintiff fails to show that defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment was pretextual.

Evidence casting doubt on an employer’s investigation and stated reason for firing can create a triable issue of discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

McGuffey v. Hamilton County Sheriff's Office · filed 2020-07-29(a)(1)

The Court concludes that both the IA conclusions and the unusual nature of the IA investigation itself raise genuine issues of material fact from which jurors could reasonably doubt the employer’s stated explanation.

A plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of race discrimination must show that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her was pretextual.

McConico v. City of Tampa · filed 2020-08-06(a)(1)

But even though McConico made a prima facie case of discrimination, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the City. This is because the City proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her, which McConico failed to show was pretextual.

A Title VII discriminatory termination claim cannot survive on disparaging remarks that do not cast doubt on the employer’s legitimate reasons.

Zheng-Smith v. Nassau County · filed 2020-09-14(m)

Here, Plaintiff alleges disparaging remarks by Dr. Riggs that do not, on their own, suggest that Defendants’ proffered legitimate reasons for termination were pretextual.

Under § 2000e-2(a), disputing whether misconduct occurred does not establish pretext when the employer honestly believed it occurred.

Edwards v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. · filed 2020-09-15(a)

The inquiry is whether Defendant believed Plaintiff had been insubordinate.

A discriminatory-discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee offers no evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretext for discrimination.

Graves v. Kephaco Corporation · filed 2020-09-24(a)(1)

However, the Court need not address these arguments because, even assuming arguendo that she can establish her prima facie case, Ms. Graves has failed to proffer evidence that Defendants’ stated reason for terminating her employment is pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of race; inconsistencies that do not undermine an employer’s core reason for discharge do not establish pretext.

Donald Hennessey, Jr. v. Dollar Bank, FSB · filed 2020-11-19(a)(1)

That we do not focus on ancillary or incidental facts, but instead, on core facts, is sensible since the law applicable to this case prohibits employers from discriminating only “because of [an] individual’s race,” and not for any other reason.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer’s stated reason for an adverse action was a pretext for racial discrimination.

English v. Small Business Administration · filed 2021-01-05(a)(1)

The court properly reviewed the evidence allegedly showing pretext and explained that English had not presented any evidence that the reasons given by the defendants for any adverse employment actions were a pretext for unlawful racial discrimination or retaliation.

An employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for termination must show that the reason was false and that racial discrimination was the real reason.

Willis v. Koch Agronomic Services, LLC · filed 2021-02-11(a)(1)

Willis failed to introduce any evidence that Koch’s proffered reason was false and that the real reason for his termination was racial discrimination.

Under § 2000e-2, a plaintiff must offer evidence that permits a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s stated reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

Ward v. Troup County School District · filed 2021-04-01

On this record, Plaintiff has failed to show that the School District’s proffered reasons were so implausible, inconsistent, or incoherent that a reasonable factfinder could infer that the reasons were not the true reasons and were, instead, a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

When an employer gives multiple independent legitimate reasons for an adverse action, it can obtain summary judgment on a Title VII race discrimination claim by showing the employee cannot establish pretext as to at least one reason.

Blancher v. Birmingham, City of · filed 2021-05-28(a)(1)

Under these legal standards, to prevail on its motion for summary judgment, the City must demonstrate that with regard to at least one of its proffered reasons for investigating and terminating Officer Blancher, Officer Blancher cannot establish that the reason is pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff relying on indirect evidence of discrimination to show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

Buj v. Psychiatry Residency Training · filed 2021-06-09(a)

After reviewing the record, we agree with the District Court that no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Buj rebutted Rutgers’ non-discriminatory explanation that the ... selecting physicians reasonably evaluated Dr. Buj as less qualified than other applicants.

Once an employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for a reassignment, the burden shifts back to the Title VII plaintiff to show pretext.

Butler v. Salt Lake City School District · filed 2021-06-17(a)(1)

These are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons that support the decision to reassign Plaintiff. Therefore, the burden shifts back to her to demonstrate pretext.

A racial termination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that could raise a triable question whether the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Deana Brown v. Denis McDonough, Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2021-07-14(a)(1)

I examine each violation that the Board sustained in turn and conclude that Brown’s evidence does not give rise to a triable claim that her termination was pretextual.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim to reach a jury when evidence raises a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext.

Serrano-Colon v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2021-07-19(a)(1)

... the evidence provided by Plaintiff is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether her attendance record was a pretext used by Defendants as the basis for her termination. As such, Plaintiff should be able to take her claim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII to a jury.

A discrimination plaintiff must produce substantial evidence of pretext and rebut each nondiscriminatory reason the employer gives for termination.

Jones v. Gulf Coast Restaurant · filed 2021-08-06(a)(1)

To the point, Jones has failed to show that the restaurant’s asserted reasons for his ... termination were pretextual.

Once an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision, the employee must present a genuine factual dispute that the reason was pretext for race discrimination.

Yerbro Turner v. McCullough-Hyde Mem'l Hosp. · filed 2021-08-18(a)(1)

The burden thus shifts back to Turner to present a genuine dispute of material fact that the justifications proffered by McCullough-Hyde were pretext for race discrimination.

An employee challenging a discharge under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must offer evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Lighty v. Hudson · filed 2021-09-28(a)(1)

But Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence to support his allegation that Defendant's stated, legitimate business reasons were not its actual reasons for his termination. He has therefore failed to carry his burden at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of discriminatory animus; showing that an employer’s stated reason was pretextual is insufficient by itself.

Asantewaa v. Wilkie · filed 2021-09-22(a)(1)

Regardless of whether plaintiff has offered enough evidence for a jury to find that Bartlett Duda was selected for the Nurse Manager position due to problems with a co-worker, plaintiff’s theory, if proven, would only show pretext and not discriminatory animus.

A race discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when the evidence permits a jury to find that the employer did not honestly believe its stated reason for firing the employee.

Evans v. Pathway Management LLC · filed 2021-09-29(a)(1)

What is more, given that Evans’s actions did not actually violate company policy, a rational jury could find that Rogers terminated him for some reason other than an honest belief that she had.

A discriminatory termination claim can survive summary judgment when a reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Barnes v. Mars Pet Care, Inc. · filed 2021-11-17(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Barnes, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could determine that Mars’ proffered reason was pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, Mars’ motion for summary judgment will be denied.

A Title VII discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment when the employee fails to raise a genuine dispute that the employer’s stated reasons for firing her were pretextual.

Siff v. Audiology Distribution, LLC · filed 2022-01-07(a)(1)

Even so, summary judgment for ADL was appropriate because Ms. Siff failed to show a genuine dispute existed over whether ADL’s reasons for firing her were pretextual.

A Title VII discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when a reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated reason was pretext for discrimination.

Murray v. Meharry Medical College · filed 2022-01-10(a)(1)

The Court finds that a reasonable jury could determine that Meharry’s proffered reason was pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, Meharry’s and Dr. Murray’s motions for summary judgment will be denied as to the discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a) bars race discrimination in employment; when an employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, the employee must show those reasons were pretextual.

Cobb v. Floyd · filed 2022-03-23(a)

Accordingly, because Cobb failed to rebut Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her transfer, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Cobb’s Title VII claim.

When an employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for adverse actions, a Title VII discrimination claim requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find those reasons pretextual.

Danzy v. Iatse Local 22 · filed 2022-03-24(a)(1)

There is no evidence to indicate that this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is a pretext for racial or sexist discrimination, and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race discrimination in employment; a plaintiff relying on superior qualifications to show discrimination must establish that she was clearly better qualified and that the employer’s explanation was pretextual.

Robinson v. Calcasieu Parish School Board · filed 2022-04-22

Plaintiff Dr. Robinson has not met her burden for proving that she is clearly better qualified and has not shown by competent evidence that the explanations given by Defendants are pretextual.

A plaintiff alleging discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) can survive summary judgment by raising a genuine question about the employer’s stated reason for not rehiring him.

(PS) Ramirez v. Haaland · filed 2022-06-15(a)

In light of the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has carried his burden in bringing into question the veracity of Defendant’s decision to no longer rehire Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant’s motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

Under § 2000e-2, a plaintiff must show that an employer’s stated legitimate reasons were pretext for discrimination.

Warren v. South Carolina Department of Corrections · filed 2022-06-29

In sum, the Report properly found that the evidence presented by Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendants’ proffered reasons were pretext for discrimination under Title VII.

In a Title VII race-discrimination trial, an employer may present evidence that it honestly believed its stated reason for firing the employee; the jury decides whether race motivated the discharge.

Spratt v. FCA US LLC · filed 2022-07-07(a)(1)

Accordingly, the Court will permit FCA to argue and present evidence of its honest belief that Spratt committed the misconduct that led to his termination, and that this misconduct was worse than Bergin’s misconduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on protected traits; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for its action, the plaintiff must present evidence supporting an inference of pretext and discrimination.

Melton v. Poughkeepsie City School District · filed 2022-08-08(a)(1)

Assuming plaintiff has stated a prima facie case, PCSD presented evidence it removed plaintiff from the training because plaintiff informed PCSD she no longer wanted the role. That two Caucasian employees were permitted to finish the training, which occurred nearly a year after plaintiff last engaged in protected activity, and plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that PCSD lied about the events surrounding her removal, are insufficient to support a rational finding that PCSD’s proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for removing her from the training were pretextual.

When an employer gives multiple legitimate reasons for an adverse employment action, a race discrimination plaintiff must rebut each reason to show pretext.

Reyes v. Federal Express Corporation · filed 2022-08-30(a)(1)

Accordingly, he could not show a genuine issue as to pretext because he did not meet head on and rebut each of FedEx’s other proffered reasons for terminating him or show that those reasons were a ruse.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an employee to show pretext through better treatment of similarly situated employees outside her protected class, even if she did not meet the employer's expectations.

Schroeder v. Board of Education for Community Consolidated School District 21 · filed 2022-09-01(a)

The differential treatment is enough to create a genuine factual dispute regarding whether the Board's stated reason for not renewing her was pretextual. The Board is not entitled to summary judgment on Schroeder's Title VII and ADEA claims.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the plaintiff cannot show that the employer’s stated reasons were false and that race was the real reason for its actions.

Blake v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. · filed 2022-09-12(a)(1)

Finally, not only has Ms. Blake not presented evidence that any of FedEx’s five explanations are false, she also has not presented evidence that her race was the real reason for any of FedEx’s decisions.

When an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for nonrenewal, a race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires competent evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment.

Shannon v. Cherry Creek School District · filed 2022-09-21(a)(1)

Like the Magistrate Judge found in the Recommendation, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not produce competent, admissible evidence that the reasons for her nonrenewal were pretextual.

Once an employer offers a legitimate reason for termination, a plaintiff bringing a sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the reason was pretextual to survive summary judgment.

Dijon v. Central Ohio Transit Authority · filed 2022-09-26(a)(1)

The burden shifts back to Ms. Dijon “to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. ... Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Ms. Dijon’s discrimination claim. Summary judgment is GRANTED to COTA on Count I.

A race discrimination plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual to survive summary judgment under either the McDonnell Douglas framework or the convincing mosaic approach.

Christen Robinson Kelley v. Howden · filed 2022-11-29(a)

Ms. Kelley seems to invoke both the McDonnell Douglas framework and the “convincing mosaic” test in her brief, but her claims fail under either approach because she did not show that the defendants’ proffered reason was pretextual.

A plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reason for denying overtime must present evidence that the real reason was sex discrimination.

Baggett v. City of Cincinnati, Ohio · filed 2022-11-30(a)(1)

And Baggett has put forth no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that the City’s real reason for not allocating overtime to her was gender discrimination.

An employee’s admission that the employer’s stated reason for termination was accurate and valid under company policy can defeat a claim that the reason was a pretext for sex discrimination.

Bart v. Golub Corp · filed 2023-01-20(a)(1)

To the contrary, Plaintiff’s acknowledgement that the reason provided for her termination was factually accurate and valid under Defendant’s policies and procedures, is dispositive of the pretext issue.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) bars sex discrimination in employment; a claim fails when the employee lacks sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Walker-Swinton v. Philander Smith College · filed 2023-03-13(a)(1)

Walker-Swinton has not put forward sufficient evidence of pretext. So summary judgment marks the end of the road for her sex-discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because of race or national origin; when an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason, the employee must show it was pretext for discrimination.

Adams v. Sky Lease 1, Inc. · filed 2023-03-15(a)(1)

In light of the record evidence indicating complaints about the imposition of an “English Only” policy, see ECF No. [27-1] at 6, the Court does not find that Defendant’s proffered reasons for Plaintiff’s termination are pretextual.

Once an employer gives a legitimate reason for an alleged adverse action, an employee pursuing a gender discrimination claim must raise a triable issue that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Radmacher v. DeJoy · filed 2023-03-30(a)(1)

Here, assuming without deciding that Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the Court finds Defendant articulates legitimate reasons for the alleged adverse actions, and Plaintiff does not raise a triable issue as to whether Defendant’s actions were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

An employee alleging religious discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the employer’s stated reason for firing him was a pretext for discrimination; an honestly held but mistaken belief does not suffice.

Bhuiyan v. PNC Bank, National Association · filed 2023-03-31(a)(1)

PNC can be mistaken in its belief about the false nature of Bhuiyan’s referrals, so long as that asserted belief is not a pretext for impermissible action.

A pregnancy discrimination plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Romero v. St. Vincent's Services, Inc. · filed 2023-05-16(a)(1)

On this record, Romero has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence “that the employer’s justification is a pretext for discrimination.” Legg, 820 F.3d at 73–74.

A Title VII sex discrimination plaintiff must show that an employer’s stated legitimate reason for termination was pretext for discrimination.

Dijon v. Central Ohio Transit Authority · filed 2023-06-20(a)(1)

Dijon does not meet her burden to establish that COTA’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination was pretext for unlawful discrimination. Thus, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment in COTA’s favor on Dijon’s sex discrimination claim.

Evidence used to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination may also be used to show that an employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Kozak v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2023-08-01(a)(1)

The same evidence may be used for a prima facie case and to show pretext.

An employer is entitled to summary judgment on a discriminatory termination claim when the employee fails to raise a genuine dispute that its stated reason was pretext for discrimination.

Stephens v. BMAG Management Company LLC · filed 2023-08-28(a)(1)

In summary, there is no evidence of record that BMAG’s decision to terminate Ms. Stephens’ employment was a mere pretext for discrimination or sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual dispute regarding pretext. Accordingly, BMAG is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Stephens’ racially discriminatory wrongful termination claims under Title VII and under the OADA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-hire plaintiff relying on pretext to show that the employer’s stated reason was false and discrimination was the real reason.

Hassan v. North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2023-09-26(a)(1)

As required, pretext stands or falls on Hassan providing evidence that (1) Helgeson’s reason was false and (2) discrimination was the actual reason for not being hired.

For a Title VII national origin claim, an employee cannot establish pretext merely by showing that the employer’s honestly held reason for termination was mistaken.

Morgan v. DS Smith Holdings, Inc. · filed 2023-09-26(a)(1)

This decision to terminate Morgan for what IRI believed to be the cause of NAPP’s poor performance does not constitute pretext, even if Morgan’s management ultimately was not the actual cause.

A Title VII plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment by disputing the accuracy of an employer’s stated reason without evidence that the employer acted with a discriminatory motive.

Sharma v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2023-09-29(a)(1)

But a plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment merely by raising a dispute as to the accuracy of the reasoning behind an adverse employment action—there must be evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer acted with an illegal discriminatory motive. ... The Court begins and ends with pretext, which is dispositive here.

Evidence of discrimination against other employees, combined with doubts about an employer’s stated reason for denying a promotion, can raise a triable issue of pretext under Title VII.

Anigbogu v. Mayorkas · filed 2023-11-22(a)(1)

While Anigbogu will be required to produce the evidence of Bardini’s discriminatory conduct against other employees in an admissible form, at the summary judgment stage the Court finds this “me too” evidence, coupled with disputed evidence over the legitimacy of at least some of Bardini’s stated reasons for not promoting Anigbogu, to be sufficient to raise a question of fact as to pretext.

A departure from standard hiring practices can establish or support pretext and defeat summary judgment under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Barnes-Staples v. Carnahan · filed 2023-12-18(a)(1)

Still, it is true that an employer’s divergence from its standard hiring practices can establish, or at least be evidence of, pretext and defeat summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a national origin discrimination plaintiff to raise a genuine issue that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual to survive summary judgment.

Caliwag v. C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. · filed 2024-01-12(a)(1)

Plaintiff has not met his burden in raising a genuine issue of material fact ... for trial as the question of whether Defendant’s reason for terminating his employment was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination under Title VII and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 fail as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex, including pregnancy; an employee must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse action is pretextual.

Tieu v. New York City Economic Development Corporation · filed 2024-02-13(a)(1)

Considering the record in its entirety and granting Tieu all the inferences to which she is entitled, the Court finds that Tieu has not produced evidence to support a finding that her performance reviews or workload reduction were influenced by discrimination on the basis of her race, gender, or pregnancy. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claims is GRANTED.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex, including sexual orientation; a claim based on circumstantial evidence fails when the employee cannot establish a prima facie case or show pretext.

Leeth v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs · filed 2024-02-12(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from “discharge[ing] any individual […] because of such individual’s […] sex[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Thus, Leeth “has not presented evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that that [the Secretary’s] reasons for [his] termination were pretextual[,]” and his claim fails on the merits.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for termination to present evidence that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Patel v. CF Fresh LLC · filed 2024-03-06

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on the employee’s protected status, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, or to “discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). ... Nevertheless, his claims fail because he did not present evidence to demonstrate that CF Fresh’s articulated reasons for terminating his employment were a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

When an employer gives a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an employment decision, the employee must present evidence of pretext sufficient to raise a triable issue of discriminatory intent.

Weatherly v. ABC Legal, Inc. · filed 2024-05-24(a)(1)

So the burden shifted to Weatherly to present evidence of pretext in that rationale and other evidence sufficient to create “a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1240 (quotation marks omitted).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits summary judgment on an employment discrimination claim when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination and the employees fail to show pretext.

Michel v. Workrise Technologies Inc. · filed 2024-06-11(a)(1)

To recap, Defendants have provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that that reason is a pretextual basis for discrimination. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 153, be GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff to show pretext after the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action.

Mitwaruciu v. State of Nebraska · filed 2024-08-08(a)(1)

Because Defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for its decision to change Plaintiff’s position, Plaintiff must now demonstrate that the stated non-discriminatory rationale is a pretext for discrimination.

Past performance appraisals may help show whether an employer genuinely believed its stated reason for termination.

Rene Galvan, Jr. v. State of Indiana · filed 2024-09-11(a)(1)

Consideration of past appraisals can, however, provide some relevant context and can elucidate the expectations of behavior that the employer deemed deficient in the past. If the more recent negative appraisals were a stark contrast with the expectations expressed previously, that could be some evi- dence that the new evaluations were not genuine reflections of the employer’s actual expectations, absent some explana- tion for the change.

A discriminatory termination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the employee offers no evidence to rebut it.

Bell v. Cactus Wellhead L L C · filed 2024-09-12(a)(1)

A legitimate reason for termination, unrebutted by the plaintiff, negates Mr. Bell’s claims under either Title VII or the FMLA.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an employment discrimination claim based on indirect evidence to survive summary judgment when the employee raises a genuine dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Halimeh v. Jungle Jim's Market Inc. · filed 2024-09-27(a)(1)

Both Title VII and Ohio law prohibit employers from discriminating against their employees because of race, national origin, or religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A). ... As there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reason for termination was pretextual, summary judgment is not appropriate on Plaintiff's race/ national origin, religion, and retaliation claims related to his termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a protected trait motivated an adverse employment action; an employer’s possible mistake alone does not establish pretext.

Vassileva v. City of Chicago · filed 2024-10-01(a)(1)

Perhaps Wise erred in 2018, not 2016, as Vassileva claims, but even then, error is not enough to show pretext. Vassileva offers no evidence of impermissible motiva- tion, which dooms her discrimination claim.

An employer’s use of subjective hiring criteria alone does not establish pretext in a race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Solis v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr. · filed 2024-10-25(a)(1)

While we agree that the hospital used some subjective criteria in its candidate evaluation process, doing so does not demonstrate pretext.

A Title VII sex-discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment on conclusory assertions that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Serrano Colon v. Dep't of Homeland Security · filed 2024-11-13(a)

That conjecture is not enough to support a finding of pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a discrimination plaintiff to present evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was pretextual to survive summary judgment.

Khan v. City Of Houston · filed 2024-11-19(a)(1)

This conclusory statement is insufficient to meet Khan’s burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework and does not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action is pretext. Accordingly, the remainder of Khan’s claims under Title VII are appropriate for summary judgment.

A sex discrimination plaintiff relying on comparators to show pretext must identify a similarly situated employee who was treated differently.

Hunter v. Kentucky Wesleyan College · filed 2024-12-26(a)(1)

Because no male coach had a similar record to Hunter, Hunter fails to provide sufficient evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated male individual. As a result, Hunter has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that KWC’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual to sex discrimination.

A sex-discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence fails at summary judgment when the employer gives legitimate reasons for discharge and the employee does not present enough evidence of pretext.

Walenciej v. E. Ohio Corr. Ctr. · filed 2025-03-12(a)(1)

And because Walenciej failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the EOCC.

An employer’s honest and reasonable belief that an employee violated company policy can defeat a race discrimination claim when the employee cannot show that the stated reason was pretextual.

Dieng v. American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences · filed 2025-04-08(a)(1)

The question is not whether Ms. Dieng actually violated the policy, but rather “whether [AIR] honestly and reasonably believed that the underlying [PCB violation] occurred.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 496. Ms. Dieng has not produced any evidence demonstrating that Ms. Tolosa, Mr. Kromer, or Mr. Burger knew that she did not violate the PCB Policy or that their belief that the violation occurred was unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Ms. Dieng has not provided sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that AIR did not honestly believe that Ms. Dieng violated the PCB Policy, such that this evidence shows pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; a discrimination claim fails when the evidence does not support a factual dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Russo v. New Hampshire Neurospine Institute, P.A. · filed 2025-04-24(a)(1)

Russo’s theory about Dr. Ahn’s stereotypical view of women in general does not demonstrate that the Institute’s reason for terminating her employment was pretextual, or that Dr. Ahn could be found to harbor such views (on the evidence presented) and manipulated the practice into firing Russo because of his discriminatory views.

An employee challenging a hiring decision under Title VII must present evidence that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Franks v. City of Oxford, MS · filed 2025-05-20(a)

The district court correctly determined that Franks did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons offered for Pruitt’s selection as the Resident Security and Services Coordinator were a pretext for discrimination.

In a pregnancy discrimination claim, the truth of complaints cited for termination does not establish pretext if the employer reasonably believed them and acted in good faith.

Richmond v. Team One Contract · filed 2025-08-04(a)(1)

The issue is not whether these complaints were true—it is whether TeamOne “reasonably believed” them and “acted on [them] in good faith.” Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To this, Richmond gives no response.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discrimination claim to proceed to trial when circumstantial evidence could let a reasonable jury find that an employer’s stated reasons for layoffs were a pretext for discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R&R Janitorial Painting and Building Services, Inc. · filed 2025-08-20(a)(1)

The Court finds that, although the EEOC has not presented direct evidence of discrimination, it has produced circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that R&R’s stated reasons for the layoffs were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

A circumstantial race discrimination claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and the employee raises no genuine issue that the reason is pretextual.

Emanuel v. Nelson · filed 2025-09-08(a)(1)

The Court finds that Emanuel fails to create a genuine issue as to whether NASA’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions towards him is pretextual. Accordingly, Emanuel’s discrimination claims under Title VII and the ADEA fail.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit firing an employee for a mistaken reason unless the employer's actual reason is discriminatory.

Favier v. Dart Container Corporation · filed 2025-09-08(a)

Even if Defendant was incorrect about the phone’s location, that would not by itself support a finding that Defendant’s stated reason was pretextual because an employer may fire an employee for a “reason based on erroneous facts” without violating Title VII.

A court may proceed directly to pretext in a Title VII discrimination claim when job performance and pretext turn on essentially the same evidence.

Xi v. The Trustees of Purdue University · filed 2025-09-08(a)(1)

So, courts may “proceed directly to the issue of pretext” given the second element of the McDonnell Douglas framework and considerations of pretext focus on essentially the same inquiry and evidence.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee relying on indirect evidence must rebut each legitimate nondiscriminatory reason the employer gives for its action to show pretext.

Pauliah · filed 2025-10-23(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to rebut either of the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons proffered by Defendants. His failure to satisfy the burden-shifting framework requires the entry of judgment for Defendants on these claims.

A race discrimination claim fails when the employee cannot raise a genuine dispute that the employer’s stated reason for firing her was pretextual.

Goolsby v. City of Monroe · filed 2025-10-28(a)(1)

So Goolsby failed to establish a genuine issue of pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that race motivated a challenged employment decision when the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for it.

Dyer · filed 2025-12-12(a)(1)

The Court finds that even viewing the cited evidence in the light most favorable to Dyer, he cannot possibly show that NOFD’s explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination.

An employee may bring a Title VII discrimination claim without first exhausting arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.

Chopra v. Display Producers, Inc. · filed 1997-10-14(a)(1)

This motion for summary judgment raises the issue of whether an employee who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration provision is required to arbitrate her sexual harassment and discrimination claims prior to filing suit under Title VII. Because I find that such an employee need not first submit her claims to arbitration, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 2000e-2(h) gives seniority provisions special treatment, but other collective bargaining terms do not excuse an employer’s Title VII violation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. · filed 2001-06-27(h)

Seniority provisions in collective bargaining provisions receive special treatment under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h), 2000e-5(e). This strongly implies that other terms of labor agreements do not exculpate conduct that would violate Title VII if prescribed unilaterally by employers.

An employer must have notice that reported harassment is sex based before it can be liable for failing to stop it.

Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc. · filed 2013-04-10(a)(1)

We say only that she had to say something to put MVM on notice that the complained-of harassment was sex-based.

An employee can notify an employer of sexual harassment without using the words “sexual harassment.”

Gentry, Lesley v. Export Packaging Co · filed 2001-01-25(a)(1)

While certainly not an untenable position, it must be noted that there is no legal mandate that an employee use the specific term "sexual harassment" in order to inform his or her employer about a harasser in the workplace.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires workplace harassment to be because of sex; unwanted touching alone does not establish discrimination.

Campbell v. United States Postal Service · filed 2001-03-02(a)(1)

In the context described by plaintiff, however, the conduct simply does not constitute discrimination “because of sex.”

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer that receives a sexual harassment complaint to exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassment.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lane · filed 2000-11-09(a)(1)

Upon receiving a complaint of sexual harassment, an employer has an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior.

An employer’s response to reported hostile environment sexual harassment must be an actual response to the complaint to count as adequate remedial action.

Snapp-Foust v. National Construction, LLC · filed 1997-10-15(a)(1)

First, Defendant ignores a fundamental premise of the remedial standard: for an employer’s “response” to be considered “adequate,” it must first be established that there was actually any “response” at all.

Title VII requires an employer responding to coworker sexual harassment to take measures reasonably calculated to end the harassment and deter future harassment.

Sarro v. City of Sacramento · filed 1999-12-22

In addition to ending the current harassment, an employer’s actions must also be reasonably calculated to deter future harassment from the same offender or others. ... Looking at the actions taken by the City as a whole, including the manner in which the investigation was conducted, its potential effect on the City’s findings in this case and future victims of harassment and the lack of evidence as to whether the discipline imposed was proportionate to the conduct, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sarro, a reasonable jury could find that the actions taken were not reasonably calculated to deter future harassment by Cooper or others.

An employer defeats a hostile work environment claim based on coworker harassment when it responds promptly and adequately to incidents reported to management.

Robinson v. Valmont Industries · filed 2000-10-16(a)(1)

Because Robinson offers nothing to dispute either the promptness or adequacy of Val-mont’s investigative and corrective actions, the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Valmont was correct.

An employer’s response to co-worker sexual harassment avoids liability when its remedy does not show indifference and permissiveness amounting to discrimination.

Gwen v. Regional Transit Authority · filed 2001-03-27(a)(1)

Thus, the question we are faced with is not whether the RTA responded to Gwen’s complaint in a manner Gwen found satisfactory, but rather, whether the RTA failed to act in good faith by fashioning a remedy so inadequate and inappropriate that it displayed an attitude of permissiveness amounting to discrimination. Although transferring Gwen as requested certainly would have been a reasonable response to her complaint, there simply is no evidence that the RTA failed to act in good faith or that it was so indifferent to Gwen’s concerns that it essentially permitted the harassment to continue.

An employer takes prompt remedial action under Title VII when its response is reasonably calculated to end the harassment; it need not fire the harasser or stop the conduct instantly.

Kreamer v. Henry's Towing · filed 2005-10-21(a)(1)

Based on our review of the undisputed factual record, we hold that Tetra took prompt remedial action as a matter of law and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2 permits employer liability for sexual harassment when the employer reasonably should have anticipated it, even without actual notice.

Sandoval v. American Building Maintenance Industries, Inc. · filed 2009-08-26

Title VII adopts ordinary tort principles of negligence in evaluating employer liability for sexual harassment, Engel v. Rapid City School District, 506 F.3d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir.2007), and an employer may be negligent although it did not have actual notice if it reasonably should have anticipated the harassment, i.e., if it had constructive notice.

In a Title VII hostile work environment claim, harassment of other employees may help show whether the employer should have discovered the harassment, even if the plaintiff did not know of those incidents.

Sandoval v. American Building, etc. · filed 2009-08-26

A plaintiff, however, is not limited to offering such evidence only to prove the subjective component of a sexual harassment claim. Irrespective of whether a plaintiff was aware of the other incidents, the evidence is highly probative of the type of workplace environment she was subjected to, and whether a reasonable employer should have discovered the sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires employers to impose appropriate discipline for proven sexual harassment.

Matter of Phillips v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth. · filed 2015-08-18(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex (42 USC § 2000e-2 [a] [1]). ... If forced to honor the arbitration award, the Transit Authority will not be complying with title VII and the New York State and New York City Human Rights Law, each of which requires that an employer impose appropriate discipline for proven cases of sexual harassment in order to ensure a safe work environment free of sexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows an employer to avoid liability for a racially hostile work environment through prompt remedial action even if it cannot identify the harasser.

Riley v. Shell Chemical LP · filed 2021-11-09(a)

However, finding the culprit behind racially noxious harassment is not a necessary condition for an employer’s actions to be prompt and remedial.

An employer’s prompt response to anonymous racist harassment satisfies Title VII when it is reasonably calculated to end the harassment.

Washington v. Offender Aid and Restoration of Charlottesville-Albemarle, Inc. · filed 2023-06-15(a)

Unlike Pryor, the undisputed facts establish that OAR’s response to the anonymous letters was reasonably calculated to end the harassment.

Sexual harassment outside working hours can affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Pfau v. Reed · filed 1997-10-27(a)(1)

Clearly, the “gauntlet of sexual abuse” that an employee is required to run need not be confined to working hours in order to affect a ‘“term, condition, or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.”

For a sex discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), the NLRB factors inform whether multiple governmental entities acted as a single employer.

Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, FL · filed 1997-11-05(a)(1)

Accordingly, because treating public and private employers alike comports with Title VII and because Dumas is not to the contrary, we hold that the NLRB factors must inform a court’s inquiry when a plaintiff alleges that multiple governmental entities acted as a single employer and in a discriminatory fashion.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires the defendant in a discrimination claim to be the plaintiff’s employer; nominally separate entities may be treated as one employer under a four-factor test.

Vandermeer v. Douglas County · filed 1998-07-15(a)

In determining whether two or more nominally separate entities should be treated as one employer for purposes of Title VII, the Ninth Circuit uses the four-part test initially adopted by the NLRB in labor cases.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff bringing a sex harassment claim to prove that the defendant was her employer.

Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc. · filed 1998-12-14(a)

In order to establish a prima facie case under Title VII, Ms. Lockard was required to prove, among other things, that Pizza Hut, Inc., was her employer. ... Nonetheless, even assuming the lenient single employer test applies here, Ms. Lockard has failed to meet her burden of establishing that Pizza Hut was her employer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) applies to discriminatory employment practices by an employer; a discrimination claim against an entity that did not employ the plaintiff fails.

Jones v. Sabis Educational Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-06-01(a)(1)

These exhibits illustrate that SABIS was plaintiffs only employer, and that the Foundation’s only employee is its executive director. Because the Foundation was not plaintiffs employer (and in any event, has less than 15 employees), the Foundation’s motion to dismiss count V(A) is granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) generally requires the defendant to have been the plaintiff’s employer when the alleged discrimination occurred; separate businesses may be treated as one employer under a four-factor test.

Alberter v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1999-09-20(a)(1)

In order to determine whether two or more separate business entities should be treated as one employer for purposes of Title VII, the Ninth Circuit applies the four-part test initially formulated by the National Labor Relations Board for use in labor cases.

A defendant that does not employ a worker under common-law agency principles is not liable as that worker’s employer under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Rodriguez v. Lauren · filed 1999-12-03(a)(1)

We therefore find that Title VII liability does not attach to Polo as plaintiffs employer and will grant summary judgment to Polo on the Title VII claims.