42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Direct evidence of discrimination must be connected to the employment decision the plaintiff challenges.

GULATI v. BUTTIGIEG · filed 2019-09-23(a)(1)

Second, direct evidence must be connected to the decision plaintiff challenges.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in hiring; evidence that requires an inference of discriminatory intent is circumstantial rather than direct evidence.

Stevens v. Mobile County Board of School Commissioners · filed 2019-10-15(a)(1)

The record fails to show direct discrimination because the evidence requires the factfinder infer or presume discrimination.

Direct evidence that an employer took an employee’s accounts because of her sex can support a Title VII discrimination claim without the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Williamson v. Digital Risk, LLC · filed 2020-01-28(a)(1)

Credited as true, the Plaintiff’s evidence indicates that Taylor took her accounts away solely on the basis of the Plaintiff’s sex. Accordingly, there is no need for the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework here; the Plaintiff need not go through additional steps to establish a prima facie case. The Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing for her claims of intentional discrimination to go to a jury.

An employer’s statement with a plausible nondiscriminatory meaning does not qualify as direct evidence of sex discrimination.

Thomas v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2020-03-26

One plausibly can interpret the comment as a reference to leadership skills—a nondiscriminatory meaning. Since the statement has a plausible non-discriminatory interpretation, it fails to qualify as direct evidence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; hearsay comments and stray remarks do not establish direct evidence of discrimination.

Wright v. United Parcel Service Inc (Ohio) · filed 2020-03-27(a)(1)

The Court finds that these hearsay comments are insufficient to establish direct evidence of discrimination.

Differential treatment is not direct evidence of sex discrimination when it requires inferences of bias and a connection to the employee’s discharge.

Hunter v. General Motors · filed 2020-04-13(a)(1)

An employer cannot discharge an employee based on her sex under Title VII or ELCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202(1)(a). ... Hunter points to Rurka’s differential treatment of male employees, Appellant Br. at 33–35, but this evidence requires us to draw inferences that the differential treatment reflects a bias against women and that this bias motivated Hunter’s discharge. Therefore, Hunter does not provide direct evidence of sex discrimination.

A Title VII plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination with circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is absent.

SHELLEY v. WESLEYAN COLLEGE · filed 2021-01-14

Absent direct evidence of intentional discrimination, a Title VII or a § 1981 plaintiff may prove her case circumstantially.

Evidence that White employees allegedly engaged in similar conduct but were retained is circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence of race discrimination.

Thomas v. Ashton & Company, Inc. · filed 2021-02-18(a)(1)

This is not direct evidence that Ashton terminated Thomas because of his race. Rather, it requires inference. Therefore, Thomas must rely on circumstantial evidence to support his discrimination claims.

A manager’s statement that Black employees should sit in back can constitute direct evidence of race discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Aldridge v. Rapid City Pierre & Eastern Railroad, Inc. · filed 2021-02-23(a)(1)

Even if the Court considers only Jaacks’s statement that blacks should sit in back, the Court concludes that it constitutes direct evidence of discrimination.

Discriminatory comments by someone who did not make the employment decision do not establish direct evidence of discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

EEOC v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company · filed 2021-03-11(a)(1)

Sexist comments by those who were not decisionmakers are irrelevant to the analysis.

Direct evidence of disparate treatment under Title VII must, if believed, require the conclusion that discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s action.

ROBINSON v. QUICKEN LOANS INC · filed 2021-03-23(a)(1)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, none of these instances compel the conclusion that Schiefer’s decision to discharge Plaintiff was motivated by racial or gender animus.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment; a remark is not direct evidence of discrimination when connecting it to an employment decision requires an inference.

Daniel v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and A & M College · filed 2021-08-25(a)

Because a presumption is required to arrive at that conclusion, Taboada’s remark is not direct evidence.

A Title VII discharge claim requires evidence of discriminatory intent; evidence that requires an inference does not qualify as direct evidence.

McDill v. State of Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles · filed 2022-02-28(a)(1)

None of these pieces of evidence, however, establishes the existence of discriminatory intent behind the defendants’ decision to terminate McDill’s employment absent inference or presumption.

A remark by someone who did not participate in the hiring decision is not direct evidence of race discrimination under Title VII.

ASSAD v. AIR LOGISTICS AND ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS, LLC · filed 2022-03-07(a)(1)

The Court can only conclude that Bolton did not participate in any way with the decision-making process as to whether to hire Plaintiff. As a result, the Court finds that Bolton’s email is not direct evidence of race discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging race or color discrimination can establish a triable claim through circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent without identifying a similarly situated comparator.

Keian Butts, Sr. v. Centrimark Roofing Corporation · filed 2022-03-30(a)

If a plaintiff cannot produce a comparator, he can still pre- sent a triable issue of fact through a “convincing mosaic” of circum- stantial evidence that would allow an inference of discriminatory intent. ... We also conclude that Butts did not present a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination.

A plaintiff with direct evidence of sex discrimination need not show that her replacement was outside her protected class.

Harrison v. Valley Packaging Corporation · filed 2022-04-06(a)(1)

A showing of being replaced by a person outside the protected class is only necessary when there is no direct evidence of discrimination.

In a sex discrimination claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), direct evidence places the burdens of production and persuasion on the employer.

Loranca v. Aerostar Airport Holdings, LLC · filed 2022-05-17(a)(1)

However, plaintiff’s direct evidence “imposes on the employer the burdens of production and persuasion, unlike the McDonnell Douglas model, which merely shifts to the employer the burden of producing admissible evidence to support a non-discriminatory reason for its actions.”

A coworker’s remark does not establish direct evidence of discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when the coworker did not make the challenged employment decision.

Ma v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Company · filed 2022-08-29(a)(1)

Here, the decision to terminate Ms. Ma was made by Ms. Slate, not by Mr. DiGirolamo. Accordingly, Ms. Ma has not presented direct evidence of race or national origin discrimination.

A facially neutral attendance policy that does not expressly rely on pregnancy is not direct evidence of disparate treatment under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Hills v. AT&T Mobility Services LLC · filed 2022-09-16(a)(1)

Because AT&T’s 2011 SAG is facially neutral, not expressly relying on any protected characteristic, the Court finds that it is not direct evidence of discrimination.

Alleged racist remarks do not establish direct evidence of discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) without a connection to the employment decision.

Ashanti v. City of Richmond School Board d/b/a Richmond Public Schools · filed 2023-01-30(a)(1)

Assuming arguendo that Tobe made these comments and showed friendliness or coldness to various people, and further assuming that these comments unambiguously betray racial animus, Ashanti’s reliance on them fails as direct evidence of discrimination. Ashanti does not argue that the comments bear on the decision to non-renew Ashanti’s contract.

A plaintiff alleging sex-based disparate treatment must present direct evidence of discriminatory intent to avoid the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Matthews v. Tempe, City of · filed 2023-02-17(a)(1)

Plaintiff has failed to offer any direct evidence that Defendants’ decision to deny Plaintiff’s requests to telecommute was “more likely than not” motivated by discriminatory reasons.

Derogatory comments can serve as direct evidence of national origin discrimination when they are sufficiently close in time to the adverse employment decision and meet the other requirements of the direct evidence test.

Alberti v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia · filed 2023-04-14(a)(1)

But Carta’s comments about the Swiss fail at the second requirement. None of Carta’s alleged statements were made proximate in time to the school’s decision to terminate Alberti from his research assistant position.

References to an employee’s temple or place of worship alone are not direct evidence of religious discrimination under section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Alzid v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan · filed 2023-05-02(a)(1)

Second, the fact that Plaintiff stated that he got documents from his temple and offered to refer Defendant to his place of worship regarding the documents does not constitute direct evidence of religious discrimination.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a decisionmaker’s remarks about race or sex can be direct evidence of discrimination when they relate to the employee and the challenged employment decision.

Wilkinson v. Pinnacle Lodging · filed 2023-10-05(a)(1)

Just like in Ryan’s Pointe and Jones, Rosa’s comments—which meet all four of our direct evidence factors—make this a quintessential “direct evidence” case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discrimination claim to proceed to trial when evidence of different treatment and pretext permits a jury to infer intentional discrimination.

Nesbitt v. Miami-Dade County, Florida · filed 2024-01-03(a)(1)

On these facts, a jury could infer that Defendant’s justifications for how it treated Plaintiff are pretextual. ... Consequently, the Court declines to grant summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claims.

Direct evidence of race discrimination must prove discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.

Edenfield v. New Orleans City · filed 2024-04-23(a)(1)

The Court finds that the evidence cited by Edenfield is not direct evidence of discrimination. As discussed above, direct evidence must prove discriminatory animus without inference or presumption.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires alleged direct evidence of sex discrimination to plausibly connect an employment decision to the employee’s sex.

Robertson v. The Visitors of Virginia State University · filed 2024-04-24(a)(1)

Plaintiff does not present direct evidence that Palm’s assertion regarding the necessity of tenure for serving as Chair somehow connected to Plaintiff’s sex, so even if viewing the alleged facts as true, the Court cannot plausibly infer that, standing alone, they give rise to Title VII liability.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires direct evidence of race discrimination to connect the alleged bias to the employment decision.

Rumph v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (CONSENT) · filed 2024-06-12(a)(1)

Accordingly, Rumph has not presented direct evidence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits religious discrimination in employment; direct evidence must explicitly and unequivocally show that an adverse action was because of religion.

Parker-Nashid v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2024-08-27(a)

While Supervisor Achinah’s statements (as provided by Parker-Nashid) are uncouth and may be evidence of a culture of discrimination, they are not the kind of explicit and unequivocal evidence that establishes Plaintiff was fired because of direct religious discrimination as required by Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Under Section 2000e-2(a)'s direct method of proof, a remark unrelated to the adverse employment decision is insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination.

SINGH v. COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK · filed 2024-12-23(a)

Because Dr. Volz's statement is not directly related to his suspension, this statement is insufficient evidence under the direct method of proof.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment; remarks unconnected to the challenged employment decision do not establish direct evidence of discrimination.

Latture v. Priority Life Care, LLC · filed 2025-03-28(a)(1)

Because Latture offers no “evident connection between [any] remark and the adverse employment [action]”—that is, her firing—she has not presented “direct evidence of discrimination.”

A discriminatory remark does not establish direct evidence of employment discrimination unless it is connected to a decisionmaker involved in the challenged action.

Walker v. Board of Education of Charles County · filed 2025-05-12(a)(1)

The record before the Court does not establish that Majors, or even Hollstein, were the actual decisionmakers who decided not to advance Plaintiff to the smaller candidate pool.

Statements made years before a termination and unconnected to it do not establish direct evidence of racial discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Rodriguez v. City of Galion, Ohio · filed 2025-06-24(a)(1)

The Court finds that the affidavit statements are too removed in time from the employment action at issue to be direct evidence of discrimination toward Mr. Rodriguez.

Rejecting a transgender professor’s application, without more, is not direct evidence of sex discrimination under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Patterson v. Kent State Univ. · filed 2025-09-12(a)(1)

Rejecting the application of a transgender professor is not direct evidence that the application was denied because the professor is transgender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits treating single men differently from single women, but does not protect marital status alone.

Longariello v. School Bd. of Monroe County Fla. · filed 1997-09-12(a)(1)

Thus, Title VII prohibits employers from treating single men differently than single women, but it does not protect marital status alone.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits discrimination against an employee because of the employee’s own sex; mistreatment based on the sex of the students she coaches does not qualify.

Lamb-Bowman v. Delaware State University · filed 2001-03-27(a)

Plaintiff was not discriminated against because of her sex. Rather, plaintiff claims that she suffered discrimination based on .the sex of her students, which is not prohibited by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a sex-based wage discrimination claim involving comparable jobs even when the jobs do not meet the Equal Pay Act’s stricter equal-work standard.

Commission on Human Rt. v. Chro., No. Cv 00 0500563s (Apr. 25, 2001) · filed 2001-04-25(a)

This approach fails to note the differences between the Equal Pay Act on the one hand and Title VII and the Connecticut law on the other; and that there may be a finding for the employee under one act and not another.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff challenging a sex-based pay disparity must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual.

Butler v. Albany International · filed 2003-07-29(a)(1)

With the burden returning to Plaintiffs shoulders, Plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that each of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons is pretextual. Plaintiff, however, fails to carry her burden.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits workplace harassment only when it is based on sex.

McCown v. St. John's Health System, Inc. · filed 2003-11-12(a)(1)

In other words, Title VII does not prohibit workplace harassment unless it is based on sex.

A woman paid less than men in similar jobs establishes a prima facie wage discrimination claim, but must show that the employer’s stated reason for the difference is pretextual.

Birks v. Jack Ingram Motors, Inc. · filed 2004-11-16(a)(1)

Birks has established a prima-facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII because she is a female who has demonstrated, as noted above, that the job she occupied was similar to higher paying jobs occupied by males. ... However this evidence is not convincing because it does not contradict or undermine Jack Ingram Motors’s argument that it rewarded greater experience. ... Birks has thus failed to present evidence contradicting Jack Ingram Motors’s evidence.

Section 2000e-2(h) does not require a plaintiff alleging sex-based wage discrimination to identify a higher-paid employee of the opposite sex doing equal work when other highly probative evidence shows that sex affected her pay.

Wanda Birch v. Cuyahoga County Probate Court John J. Donnelly, Presiding Judge · filed 2004-12-01(h)

Thus, Gunther instructs that a Title VII plaintiff suing for wage discrimination (and, by extension, a plaintiff suing under OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02) is not required, as part of her prima facie case, to point to a person of the opposite sex performing equal work for greater pay when there is other highly probative evidence that her salary would have been higher but for her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits refusing to hire someone because of sex stereotypes or a decision to transition from male to female.

Schroer v. Billington · filed 2008-09-19(a)(1)

In refusing to hire Diane Schroer because her appearance and background did not comport with the decisionmaker’s sex stereotypes about how men and women should act and appear, and in response to Schroer’s decision to transition, legally, culturally, and physically, from male to female, the Library of Congress violated Title VU’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 addresses workplace harassment when it is discriminatory and based on sex or another protected category.

King v. W. W. Grainger, Incorporated · filed 2012-11-06

In short, although King vaguely argues that he experienced “harassment” at Grainger, the harassment that Title VII is meant to remedy is more specific, namely discriminatory harassment on the basis of sex or another protected category. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim by an applicant who alleges rejection because of her transgender status.

Finkle v. Howard County · filed 2014-04-10(a)(1)

Therefore, on the basis of the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Water-house, and after careful consideration of its sister courts’ reasoned opinions, this Court finds that Plaintiffs claim that she was discriminated against “because of her obvious transgendered status” is a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination against an employee for being transgender because that is discrimination because of sex.

Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. · filed 2018-03-07(a)(1)

Because an employer cannot discriminate against an employee for being transgender without considering that employee’s biological sex, discrimination on the basis of transgender status necessarily entails discrimination on the basis of sex—no matter what sex the employee was born or wishes to be.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects transgender employees from sex discrimination, and pleading transgender status establishes membership in a protected class.

Parker v. Strawser Constr., Inc. · filed 2018-04-25(a)(1)

As a result, all Parker must plead in order to establish her membership in a protected class is that she is transgender. Her Amended Complaint clearly makes this allegation; accordingly, Parker has sufficiently pleaded that she is a member of a protected class under Title VII and Chapter 4112.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires alleged workplace harassment to be connected to a protected trait to state a discrimination claim.

Gove v. Sargento Foods Inc · filed 2019-07-26(a)

He didn’t say that Otte harassed him because of his national origin or religion or race. He said only that she harassed him at an event at Elkhart Lake. That is not enough to state a claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and a complaint must plausibly allege facts supporting status-based discrimination.

Iwaniszek v. Pride Transport, Inc. · filed 2021-02-17(a)

Here, plaintiff has not alleged a plausible status-based discrimination claim under Title VII. For the first element, plaintiff does not allege that he belongs to a protected class. Indeed, the complaint lacks any reference to plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing an employee because the employee is transgender, and a claim may proceed when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to find that was the reason.

Lammers v. Pathways to a Better Life, LLC · filed 2021-07-19(a)(1)

This evidence is more than sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Pathways fired Lammers because he identifies as a transgender person.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discriminatory employment conduct only when it is based on a protected status.

Harris v. Mayorkas · filed 2023-07-27(a)(1)

Here, even assuming Plaintiff had adequately alleged facts that satisfied the first three elements of that inquiry, her claims would still fail because she has not sufficiently tied the alleged harassment to her protected status. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting only discriminatory conduct that is based on a person’s protected status).

A plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must identify evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual to survive summary judgment on a Title VII discrimination claim.

Gazani v. City Of Houston · filed 2025-08-29(a)(1)

The Court finds that this conclusory argument is insufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the HPD’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for suspending and transferring Gazani was pretextual. Accordingly, Gazani’s discrimination claim under Title VII fails.

Documented dissatisfaction with an employee’s performance can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for demotion, shifting the burden to the employee to show pretext.

Kennedy v. Perdue · filed 2025-06-12(a)(1)

The agency points to a well-documented pattern of chronic performance issues. ... The burden therefore shifts to Kennedy to show that the agency’s asserted reasons for her demotion were pretextual.

A Title VII sex discrimination claim fails at summary judgment when the employee cannot show that sex motivated the termination or that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Briggs v. University Of New Mexico · filed 2025-05-23(a)(1)

As explained above, the Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to show that his sex was a motivating factor in his termination, or that Defendants’ legitimate reasons for the termination were pretextual. ... Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the same extensive analysis above also applies to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim. Therefore, the Court enters summary judgment and dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII claim (Count III) against Defendants UNM and UNM Board of Regents.

A plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual to survive summary judgment.

Porter v. Two Guys and a Calculator LLC · filed 2023-01-26(a)(1)

In the absence of other evidence tending to show that TGAC’s stated reason was pretext for unlawful discrimination, Ms. Porter’s claims cannot proceed. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Counts I and II.

An employee cannot defeat summary judgment on a sexual orientation discrimination claim without evidence that could show the employer’s stated lawful reason for discharge was pretextual.

Kilpatrick v. HCA Human Resources · filed 2023-02-13(a)(1)

But given the documents HCA had before it when it made its decisions, Kilpatrick’s allegations are insufficient for a factfinder to rule for him on his Title VII claim for discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Evidence of pervasive racial hostility can establish pretext for a discriminatory firing and defeat summary judgment under Section 2000e-2(a)(1).

Smith v. Kinsley Constuction, Inc. · filed 2022-03-28(a)(1)

In short, Smith’s testimony paints a grim picture of a workplace rife with racial hostility and could establish a “discriminatory atmosphere” for purposes of proving pretext. ... For these reasons, summary judgment is not warranted on Smith’s racial discrimination clams.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2 may proceed when evidence raises a genuine dispute about whether the employer’s stated reason for denying a promotion is pretextual.

Kelly v. McCarthy · filed 2022-02-14

“[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. Kelly has met his burden; summary judgment is denied as to Title VII race-based discrimination claim.

A discriminatory termination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) fails at summary judgment when the employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing the employee and the employee lacks sufficient evidence of pretext.

Taylor v. Lowe's Corporation · filed 2021-07-08(a)(1)

Lowe’s is entitled to summary judgment on Taylor’s claims that Lowe’s discriminated against him on the basis of race and age under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(2), in terminating his employment. Even assuming Taylor established a prima facie case of discrimination, Lowe’s proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing him: he committed a Class A violation of company policy. ... Taylor has not pointed to “specific and substantial” circumstantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that this proffered reason is pretext for discrimination.

An employer’s failure to place an employee on a formal improvement plan does not show racial discrimination without evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently.

Irving v. Georgia Pacific Corporation · filed 2021-06-15(a)(1)

Plaintiff herein did not argue or provide any evidence whatsoever that any formal or informal discipline policy was applied to Plaintiff differently than it was applied to similarly situated non-minority employees. Thus, the failure to place Plaintiff on a formal performance improvement plan does not constitute evidence of pretext.

An employee can show pretext for race discrimination under Title VII when a similarly situated employee of another race receives lighter discipline for the same offense.

Watkins v. Tregre · filed 2021-05-07(a)(1)

Because Joe Oubre was “counseled” for the same offense, we conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact on the question whether Sheriff Tregre’s proffered reason for firing Watkins is pretext for race discrimination.

An employee can overcome an employer’s asserted honest belief at summary judgment by showing a genuine factual dispute about whether the termination decision was reasonably informed and considered or involved an error too obvious to be unintentional.

Argryriou v. David A. Flynn, Inc. · filed 2021-02-26(a)

To overcome the evidence in the record supporting this belief, Plaintiff must identify a genuine issue of fact that her employer’s decision was not reasonably informed and considered or that it made an error too obvious to be unintentional, if she is to survive summary judgment. On this score, the record contains a genuine dispute of material fact.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows an individual discrimination claimant to use evidence of a broader pattern of discrimination to show pretext.

Vargas v. Price · filed 2021-02-23(a)(1)

Accordingly, Plaintiff may use pattern-or-practice evidence to support his individual claims.

An employee cannot establish pretext under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) merely by disputing misconduct that the employer honestly believed occurred.

Reed v. Millennia Housing Management, Ltd · filed 2019-11-12(a)(1)

Thus, it is irrelevant that Reed disputes he committed the misconduct for which he was terminated, because it is undisputed that Millennia honestly believed he did commit such misconduct.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee challenging a termination through circumstantial evidence must show that the employer’s stated reason was pretext for discrimination.

Brown v. Synovus Financial Corporation · filed 2019-08-19(a)(1)

Brown failed to demonstrate both that Synovus’s reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits firing an employee because of gender; when an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for the firing, the employee must show that reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Tebo v. City of Debary, Florida · filed 2019-09-03(a)

Here, assuming Tebo made a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, she failed to show that the City’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing her were pretext for gender discrimination.

When an employer gives a legitimate reason for an employment decision, a Title VII plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show that the reason was pretext for discrimination.

Vinh v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2018-03-19(a)(1)

In sum, the Court is not persuaded that any of the five comparators presented by the plaintiff are similarly situated such that they can prove that Chief Pavlik’s offered reason for his actions was pretextual.

Disputed facts about comparable treatment and whether an employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual can prevent summary judgment on a sex-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Armstrong v. Tennessee Education Lottery Corp. · filed 2016-10-21(a)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Armstrong, a jury could find that Hills and Armstrong are similarly situated. ... Even if that is sufficient to articulate its -legitimate non-discriminatory reason, there is a disputed issue of fact at the pretext stage. ... Accordingly, the Lottery Corporation’s motion for summary judgment is denied on Armstrong’s gender discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reason for an employment decision to show pretext; an honest belief about poor performance can support the decision even if the assessment was mistaken.

Holmes v. Jefferson County School District · filed 2016-07-29(a)(1)

The inquiry, however, is not whether Ms. Holmes’ work performance was in fact deficient, but rather whether Mr. Cooksey in good faith believed that Ms. Holmes’ work performance was poor and that such belief was the reason for her nonrenewal.

Evidence of sex discrimination at the pretext stage must be viewed as a whole when deciding whether a plaintiff’s claim can proceed to trial.

Walsh v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2016-07-07(a)(1)

The district court erred when it failed to view Walsh’s evidence as a whole and instead set aside each piece of evidence after deeming it insufficient to create a triable issue of fact that NYCHA’s refusal to hire Walsh was based in part on the fact that she is female.

An employee cannot show that a termination was discriminatory merely by questioning the employer’s business judgment; the evidence must support a finding of discriminatory motive.

Andersen v. Mack Trucks Inc · filed 2016-04-20(a)(1)

Andersen fails to make that showing. He cites many facts, but all of those facts are either irrelevant or attack the business judgment of his former employer. Unwise does not mean discriminatory.

A sex discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment when the employee offers no probative evidence of pretext or discriminatory animus.

Kohser v. Protective Life Corporation · filed 2016-05-05(a)(1)

Kohser did not provide before the district court any probative evidence that Protective’s reasons for demoting and terminating her were pretextual. Because Kohser presented no evidence showing that Protective Life was actually motivated by a discriminatory animus, the district court correctly concluded that no genuine dispute of material fact existed as to Kohser’s age and sex discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that a protected characteristic motivated an adverse employment action; showing that the employer lacked authority to act is insufficient.

Soliman V.clinton · filed 2016-03-29(a)(1)

That is, in a Title VII suit, the critical question is not whether an employer was authorized to terminate an employee, but whether the employer was motivated to terminate the employee “because of” the employee’s protected characteristic.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) requires evidence supporting an inference of discrimination; conclusory assertions cannot defeat summary judgment.

Brown v. Xerox Corp. · filed 2016-03-21(a)

Further, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably than him. Instead, Plaintiff has offered conclusory assertions of racial prejudice, which are insufficient to oppose summary judgment.

Pretext evidence in a Title VII termination claim must give a reasonable person grounds to disbelieve the employer’s stated reason.

Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. · filed 2016-01-26(a)(1)

Ms. Bagwe has not met that burden here. By the time Ms. Bagwe was terminated, Sedgwick had received multiple ... complaints about her inability to work with others.

A plaintiff alleging gender discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual when relying on circumstantial evidence.

Riley v. PNC Bank, National Ass'n · filed 2015-04-09(a)(1)

After reviewing the record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we agree with the district court that Riley has not presented evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the proffered non-discriminatory reasons were pretext for age or gender discrimination.

An employee alleging sex discrimination must present enough evidence for a jury to find that the employer’s stated reason for firing him was pretextual.

Smizer v. Community Mennonite Early Learning Center · filed 2013-10-25(a)(1)

The plaintiffs discrimination claim comes down to whether he submitted enough evidence to show that the Center’s reason was pretext, and he did not.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), once an employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, the employee must show that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Wojcik v. Brandiss · filed 2013-09-25(a)(1)

The only question with regard to Plaintiffs discrimination claim, therefore, is whether Defendants have articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiffs employment. The court finds that Defendants have done so. ... Thus, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to prove that Defendants’ stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

In a race discrimination claim, inconsistent hiring requirements, shifting explanations, and misstated qualifications can allow a jury to find that an employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Nesbitt v. Holder · filed 2013-09-05(a)(1)

And given (1) the inconsistent enforcement of the application requirements; (2) the inconsistent explanations offered by the defendant; and (3) the defendant’s misstatements of Mr. Nesbitt’s qualifications, a jury may reasonably find that the Department’s explanation is “unworthy of credence” and thus “probative of intentional discrimination.”

Replacement by someone outside an employee’s protected class can establish an initial inference of discrimination, but without more it does not show that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

Dabney v. Christmas Tree Shops · filed 2013-07-24(a)(1)

Although Plaintiffs replacement by a white employee was enough evidence to get her past the prima facie stage, without more a reasonable jury could not find that Defendants’ nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment was pretextual.

A sex discrimination plaintiff may show pretext by proving that he was substantially more qualified than the person hired or that the employer changed its hiring process to avoid selecting him.

Lane v. Vasquez · filed 2013-07-12(a)(1)

Relevant to this case, the plaintiff may show that he is substantially more qualified than the candidate ultimately hired or that the defendant modified the hiring process to avoid selecting the plaintiff.

An employer meets its burden of production on a Title VII discrimination claim by giving a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination, such as poor job performance.

Assariathu v. Lone Star Health Management Associates, L.P. · filed 2013-03-06(a)(1)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that poor job performance is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination. See Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991). Therefore, DRMC and HMA have met their burden of production with regard to Joseph.

A Title VII plaintiff can survive summary judgment by offering enough evidence to discredit the employer’s stated reason without additional evidence of discrimination beyond a prima facie case.

Burton v. Teleflex Inc · filed 2013-02-20

As we have explained, if a plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence to allow a finder of fact to discredit the employer‟s proffered justification, she need not present additional evidence of discrimination beyond her prima facie case to survive summary judgment.

An employer can rebut a prima facie discrimination case under § 2000e-2(a)(1) by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.

Yoselovsky v. Associated Press · filed 2013-01-18(a)(1)

The AP has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for why Yoselovsky was fired.

Title VII race discrimination claims based on indirect evidence follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and the employee must show that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Jones v. Western Reserve Transit Authority · filed 2012-01-11

The district court addressed each of Jones’s ADA, state disability law, Title VII, state race discrimination law, and federal retaliation claims separately. We need not do the same here. Our review of each of these claims applies the familiar tripartite burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), because Jones produces, at best, only indirect evidence of discrimination. ... Jones fails, however, to produce any evidence that WRTA’s stated reasons are pretextual.

Under § 2000e-2(a), violating an employer’s policy and exposing it to litigation risk can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Lee v. K Mart Corp. · filed 2011-12-21(a)

Kmart has set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Lee — Lee violated Kmart’s “Hands-Off’ Policy and subjected it to litigation risk.

A plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reasons for termination must show that those reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason.

Joseph v. Columbus Bank and Trust Company · filed 2011-11-18(a)(1)

In sum, because Joseph did not present evidence to show that CB&T’s reasons for her termination were both false and discriminatory, we affirm.

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination can defeat summary judgment with evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretext.

Ken Riddle v. Washington · filed 2011-10-21(a)(1)

This evidence, combined with the written documentation of Riddle’s job performance and the materially disputed aspects of his performance, viewed in the light most favorable to Riddle, could provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable juror to find that Appellees’ reasons for Riddle’s termination are pretext.

Under § 2000e-2(a), an employee challenging a demotion must present evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was pretext for race discrimination.

Blue v. Dunn Construction Company, Inc · filed 2011-11-23(a)

Assuming arguendo that the district court properly concluded that Blue established a prima facie case of discrimination, Blue still fails to present evidence that could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Dunn’s stated reasons for his demotion—poor performance and failure to control his crew—were pretext for race discrimination.

Management style and professional qualifications are legitimate reasons for an employment decision under § 2000e-2(a)(1) when the applicant offers no evidence of pretext or discriminatory motive.

Manora v. Donahoe · filed 2011-08-29(a)(1)

To summarize, USPS asserts that it selected Walker and Werking (and not Manora) for the Dallas and Arlington audit manager positions based on their particular management styles and professional qualifications. These are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for USPS’s employment action. Because Manora has not put forward any evidence that USPS’s reasons were a mere pretext for discrimination, nor that discrimination was a motivating factor for USPS’s employment action, USPS is entitled to summary judgment.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), superior qualifications show pretext in a race discrimination claim only when the disparity is so great that no reasonable person would have chosen the selected candidate.

Porter v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. · filed 2011-05-23(a)(1)

Furthermore, Porter failed to identify a disparity in qualifications such that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, would have promoted the other candidate over him.

Under § 2000e-2, different treatment of employees who are not similarly situated does not establish that an employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.

McDonald-Cuba v. Santa Fe Protective Services, Inc. · filed 2011-05-09

The evidence shows that Liming was not similarly situated to McDonald-Cuba and the differential treatment he allegedly received therefore does not demonstrate pretext.

A gender discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that the employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.

Smith v. Tulsa County · filed 2007-08-23(a)(1)

Because M s. Smith failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the reasons for her termination were a pretext for gender discrimination, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the District Attorney’s Office on her Title VII claim.

A discriminatory discharge claim can survive summary judgment when the employee establishes a prima facie case and presents evidence from which a jury could disbelieve the employer’s stated reason for firing him.

Williams v. Seven Seventeen HB, Philadelphia Corp. No. 2 · filed 1999-06-25(a)

In sum, I conclude that Williams has produced evidence such that a jury could reasonably infer that the defendants’ proffered reasons for their termination of Williams are not worthy of credence. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate.

A prima facie case of race discrimination does not establish liability under § 2000e-2(a) when the employee fails to raise a factual issue that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Dunn v. City of High Point · filed 1999-06-08(a)

The court concludes that although Dunn has established a prima facie case of discrimination, Dunn has failed to raise a factual issue as to whether the City’s action was a pretext for racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a national origin failure-to-hire claim to proceed when evidence creates a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Mohankumar v. Dunn · filed 1999-05-13(a)(1)

Applying these standards, the court finds that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether defendants’ proffered reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretextual.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging race-based termination to show that the employer's stated reasons were pretextual.

Trevillion v. Count of Marin · filed 1997-10-09

of course, when all is said and done, the burden of showing a violation of Title VII remained squarely upon him. ... In short, our review of the record satisfies us, as it did the district court, that no reasonable trier of fact could have found in his favor on his Title VII claim.

After an employer offers a legitimate reason for discharge, a Title VII plaintiff must show that the reason was pretext and that discrimination was the true motivation.

Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Centers, Inc. · filed 1997-10-10(a)(1)

Accordingly, the prima facie presumption of discrimination is dispelled and the burden shifts back to Lacoparra to offer evidence sufficient to require a jury to decide whether Pergament’s proffered justification is in fact a pretext for discrimination. Laco-parra must provide proof not only that Per-gament’s explanation is false, but also that unlawful discrimination was its true motivation in terminating her.

Subjective evaluation criteria do not establish pretext under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) without evidence that they concealed a race-based decision.

Guice v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons · filed 1997-10-29(a)(1)

Further, the use of some subjective criteria in the evaluation does not support a finding of pretext because Ms. Guise failed to present any evidence that the subjectiveness was used as a cover-up for a decision that was really based on race.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires an employee challenging an employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason for discipline to show that the reason was pretextual.

Armon Walker, III v. Marion County Sheriff's Department · filed 1997-12-11(a)

Once MCSD stated that Walker was disciplined for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, it was incumbent upon Walker to show that MCSD's actions were undertaken for reasons other than those claimed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employee challenging a discriminatory discharge to rebut the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination.

Knezevic v. Hipage Co Inc · filed 1997-11-21(a)(1)

Even assuming that Knezevic estab- lished a prima facie case of employment discrimination,1 we find that she failed to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons Defen- dant proffered to support its decision to terminate her.

Section 2000e-2 permits an inference of pretext when an employer fires an employee for deficiencies also present in other employees' files.

EEOC v. HBE Corp. · filed 1998-01-27

The exhibit supports an inference of pretext by showing that other employees kept their files in a manner similar to Helms. The fact that only he was discharged suggested that this was not the actual reason he was fired.

A plaintiff must establish a prima facie discrimination case, including that she met her employer's legitimate job expectations, before the court examines whether the employer's stated reasons were pretextual.

Adams v. Waupaca County · filed 1998-03-04(a)

In general, we note that the district court must examine whether the defendants' proffered reasons for terminating a plaintiff are pretextual only if the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination by proving that he or she was meeting the defendants' legitimate job expectations.

An employer does not violate the prohibition on race discrimination by ending a driver's employment because its insurer will not cover the driver, absent evidence that the reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Hunter v. Habegger Corporation · filed 1998-03-05(a)(1)

Hunter has been unable to show that he was terminated for any other reason. Furthermore, Habegger's reason for not continuing the employment of Hunter was not shown to be a pretext for discrimination or to violate any federal law.

A Title VII employee must provide specific, substantial evidence that the employer’s legitimate reason for termination was pretextual to defeat summary judgment.

Clermont v. Jerry Kangas, and Phoenix Memorial Hospital · filed 1998-03-17

Because Clermont failed to provide specific, substantial evidence that the Hospital's legitimate explanation for his termination was pretextual, the district court's grant of summary judgment on Clermont's Title VII claim was correct.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based discharge, but an employee challenging a stated nondiscriminatory reason must offer evidence that it was a pretext for discrimination.

Woods v. TX Dept Human Serv · filed 1998-04-07(a)

Woods has offered no evidence that DHS’s discharge based on repeated, significant errors in her work was merely a pretext for intentional discrimination.

A racial discharge claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate reason for discharge and the employee offers only conclusory assertions that the reason was pretextual.

Baker v. NC Dept Commerce · filed 1998-03-26(a)(1)

These conclusory assertions are insufficient to show pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of sex; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for discharge, an employee must offer evidence that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Lowry v. Cabletron Systems · filed 1998-04-27(a)(1)

M s . Lowry asserts claims of physical disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12100, et seq. (ADA), gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (ADEA). ... Although this statement may show pretext, it does not show pretext for illegal discrimination. ... Lowry therefore has failed to meet her burden under McDonnell Douglas, and summary judgment for Cabletron is appropriate.

A plaintiff challenging a discharge under § 2000e-2(a)(1) must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Crim v. Board of Education of Cairo School District No. 1, Charles Althoff, Individually, Kenneth R. Jones, Ind · filed 1998-05-29(a)(1)

The case law firmly establishes that, once a defendant employer produces evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, the employee must demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reason for the dismissal was not the actual reason and that it was only a pretext for discrimination.

An employee’s disagreement with an employer’s assessment of her performance does not, by itself, establish pretext for race discrimination.

Bibbs v. Board of Trustees for the University of Illinois · filed 1998-07-07(a)(1)

While Bibbs disagrees with Mitchell’s perception of her performance, her disagreement is insufficient to establish pretext. Therefore, Bibbs’ contention that her 1995 evaluation and pay increase constituted race discrimination under Title VII are without merit.

A Title VII plaintiff who challenges an employer’s stated reason at summary judgment must also present evidence that discrimination motivated the employment action.

Samuel Jr. GILLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BERKELEY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-07-09(a)(1)

Even if we assume that Gillins is correct, however, it makes no difference because creating a suspicion that BEC’s reasons for its actions are not credible is not enough to survive summary judgment. Gillins’s evidence must also raise a suspicion that race discrimination was at play in BEC’s decisionmaking, a suspicion that is completely absent from Gillins’s argument and the record before us.

Under § 2000e-2, once an employer gives a nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action, the employee must prove that the reason was pretextual and discrimination was the real reason.

Williams v. Dynatech · filed 1998-09-11

Once the defendant provides a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, as Dynatech has, the plaintiff must show by a prepon- ... derance of the evidence that the employer's asserted justification for taking adverse employment action was merely pretextual, and "that discrimination was the real reason" behind the adverse employment action.

A Title VII sex discrimination plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated reason for not hiring her was a pretext for discrimination.

Fowler v. Town of Seabrook · filed 1998-10-14(a)(1)

Based on the record presented for summary judgment, plaintiff has not shown a genuine factual dispute about defendants’ stated explanation for not hiring her. Although she disputes the truth of the accusations against her, she has not demonstrated a factual dispute about what the defendants believed she had done. Accordingly, plaintiff has not shown a factual issue for trial as to whether defendants’ stated reason for not hiring her was a pretext for discrimination.

An employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for discipline defeats a race or sex discrimination claim when the employee cannot show it was pretextual.

Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1998-11-25(a)(1)

However, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material facts as to whether the City’s stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were pretextual. As discussed above, it is undisputed that Lamar was disciplined for refusing to follow her supervisors’ instructions. Although the subject matter of the dispute between Lamar and her supervisors involved race and gender discrimination, the City’s actions with respect to Lamar herself were not due to her race or gender.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not make a pretext for termination actionable as race discrimination without evidence that the pretext was related to race.

McKenzie v. EAP Management Corp. · filed 1999-02-04(a)(1)

This type of pretext, absent any evidence of racial discrimination, is not actionable under Title VII, Section 1981 or the FCRA as race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a racial discrimination claim to proceed past summary judgment when the employee presents sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated reason for firing him was a pretext for a racially based decision.

Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp. · filed 1999-03-16(a)(1)

Johnson has therefore introduced sufficient evidence that Zema’s proffered nondiscriminatory explanation for his firing was pretext for its racially based decision to fire him to sustain his burden on summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2 requires employees challenging an allegedly discriminatory plant closure to rebut the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to avoid summary judgment.

Williams v. Earthgrains Company · filed 1999-04-21

Plaintiffs failed to rebut Earthgrains' legitimate, non- discriminatory reasons for closing the plant, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Earthgrains on their Title VII claim on this ground.

A reverse discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) fails when the employee cannot show that the employer’s stated reason for discharge was pretextual.

Burton v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-11-17(a)

However, the Court finds that Burton has failed to establish that Cellular One’s reasons for discharging him based upon his permitting Allen to falsify his time sheets and signing Allen’s fraudulent time sheets were pretextual.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a race discrimination plaintiff must offer evidence that undermines the employer’s legitimate explanation to show pretext.

Boykins v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. · filed 2000-01-10(a)

Although defendant does not challenge plaintiff at the pretext stage, plaintiff cannot demonstrate any inconsistencies, implausibilities, or weaknesses in what would be defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the cross-training program and the allowance of temporary assignments pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, that would render such reason pretextual.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits race-based termination, and evidence that an employer’s stated reason was a pretext for racial bias can create a jury question.

Helen J.M. Bassett v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2000-04-12(a)(1)

We hold sufficient evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the City’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason for termination was a pretext from which racial bias can clearly be inferred.

A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in a promotion decision must present evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Calvin v. Yellow Freight · filed 2000-07-20(a)

Having reviewed the case, we agree with the District Court's determination that Calvin failed to come forward with evidence to show that Yellow Freight's articulated reasons for selecting a person other than Calvin for the full-time job were a pretext for racial discrimination.

An employee alleging racial discrimination must produce evidence that the employer's stated reasons for its hiring decision were a pretext for discrimination to avoid summary judgment.

Calvin v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. · filed 2000-08-03(a)

Having reviewed the case, we agree with the District Court's determination that Calvin failed to come forward with evidence to show that Yellow Freight's articulated reasons for selecting a person other than Calvin for the full-time job were a pretext for racial discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual for a discrimination claim to survive summary judgment.

Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale · filed 2000-11-08(a)

Because Rice- Lamar has failed to present any evidence demonstrating that the City's proffered explanation is pretextual, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on her discrimination claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence that an employer’s stated reason for termination is a pretext for sex discrimination; an unwise or unenforceable employment agreement alone does not establish pretext.

O'Regan, Mary A. v. Arbitration Forums · filed 2001-04-09(a)(1)

O’Regan’s attacks on the employment agreement itself do not create a triable issue of pretext. The fact that the Agreement may have been unnecessary, ineffective or unenforceable would, at most, indicate that AF made a bad business decision. But it does not demonstrate that Weaver implemented the Agreement to justify the firing of older women.

A plaintiff’s prima facie case and evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false may support a finding of discrimination, but do not compel one.

Cha v. Henderson · filed 2001-07-09(a)

In other words, "a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated," but it does not necessarily compel such a finding.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff challenging a denied promotion to raise a factual dispute about each independent, legitimate reason the employer gives for its decision.

Pagsuberon v. Chicago Tribune Co. · filed 2001-08-16

Because Pagsuberon has failed to create a question of fact as to the Tribune’s honesty for all of the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons offered for denying him the promotion to Ad Creator, I GRANT the Tribune’s motion for summary judgment.

A race-discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that the employer’s stated reason for discipline was a pretext for discrimination.

Alexander v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, Susan Moritz, Claire Nagel · filed 2001-08-27(a)(1)

Notwithstanding the behavior of several of Alexander’s co-workers, however, we agree with the district court’s determination that Alexander “has offered no evidence that the disciplinary measures he is challenging were motivated by his race or by his complaints of discrimination rather than by defendants’] legitimate belief that such discipline was justified by Alexander’s conduct.”

Once an employer gives a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action, a plaintiff alleging race discrimination must prove that the reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Alexander, Robert E. v. WI Dept Health · filed 2001-08-27(a)(1)

Once such a reason is presented, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

A race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) cannot survive summary judgment without evidence that permits a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason or find discrimination more likely than not.

Rajbahadoorsingh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. · filed 2001-10-29(a)(1)

Accordingly, Rajbahadoorsingh has failed to provide evidence sufficient to permit this Court reasonably to “(1) disbelieve [Chase’s] articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of [Chase’s] action.”

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits gender discrimination in employment; a plaintiff opposing summary judgment must raise a genuine factual dispute about whether the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretext.

de la Cruz v. TX Visiting Nurse · filed 2001-10-01(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... After having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, we conclude that Mr. de la Cruz failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether TVNS’s nondiscriminatory reasons set forth for its actions were pretext.

Different discipline does not establish pretext under § 2000e-2(a) when employees have different supervisory duties and the employer has materially different evidence of their misconduct.

Watts v. City of Norman · filed 2001-11-05(a)

Because the City’s announced reason for disciplining Watts was failure to live up to responsibilities which were not a part of Wilson’s job, and because the evidence available to the City about the two men’s misconduct differed qualitatively, different treatment of the two men does not amount to evidence of pretext.

Once an employer offers legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, an employee pursuing a race discrimination claim must identify specific facts showing those reasons lack credibility or were racially motivated.

Thomas v. City of Wichita · filed 2002-01-30(a)

In light of this showing, the burden fell on Thomas to counter with specific facts showing that the City’s reasons for its appeal were unworthy of credence or racially motivated in some way.

An employer’s reason for a promotion decision need not be correct or fair if it was not racially motivated.

Cheney v. US Oncology Inc · filed 2002-03-26(a)(1)

An employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for making an adverse employment decision need not be correct or fair, so long as it is not racially motivated.

Under Title VII, more favorable treatment of employees whose misconduct was substantially less culpable does not establish pretext for discriminatory discipline.

McDaniel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2002-03-29(a)(1)

The fact that Jester rode along in the PLP, demonstrated a willingness to do what he could to ensure McDaniel’s safety, and complied with McDaniel’s requests for assistance, without more, does not show that Jester engaged in comparably culpable conduct to that of McDaniel.

Under Title VII, false or inconsistent statements may support an inference of discriminatory pretext only when made by a decisionmaker involved in the employment decision.

Krchnavy, Debra v. Limagrain Genetics · filed 2002-06-24(a)

Yet, as LG Seeds correctly points out, there is nothing in the record to suggest that either Anderson or Wittig par- ticipated in the decision to terminate her employment. An inference of pretext may be permissible only when deci- sionmakers make false or inconsistent statements about the circumstances of a particular employment decision.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff must show that national origin discrimination was the real reason for the employer’s decision, even if its stated reason was pretextual.

Samadi v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services · filed 2002-10-10(a)(1)

Here, even if defendants’ reasons for choosing Healy over Samadi are conceded to be pretextual, Samadi can point to no evidence that the real reason defendants chose Healy was discrimination against Samadi on the basis of his national origin, rather than some other grudge. For all these reasons, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on this claim.

A plaintiff challenging a discharge as race discrimination must provide evidence that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Staples, Alvin R. v. Pepsi-Cola General · filed 2002-12-03(a)(1)

As noted above, Mr. Staples bears the burden of showing that Pepsi’s proffered reason for his discharge is pretextual.

A general preference for female administrators does not establish pretext when it does not undermine the employer’s legitimate reason for a reassignment.

Spain v. Mecklenburg County School Board · filed 2002-12-23(a)(1)

Spain’s sole evidence of discriminatory intent is a purported comment by Perry that she prefers female administrators because they are better organized than men. But this general comment in no way suggests that the Board’s proffered explanation for the decision is a pretext for discrimination.

Unequal union dues do not establish discriminatory pretext without evidence that the union knew the lower-paying contractors met the same criterion for higher dues.

Ronald D. Smart, Doing Business as Paschall Electric v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 702 · filed 2003-01-09(c)(3)

And whether or not Smart has any statutory basis for his discrimination suit, he hasn't enough evidence to withstand summary judgment. ... There is no evidence that the union was aware that the two other contractors were "working with the tools," and in the absence of such evidence it is pure conjecture that the bylaws were enforced against Smart because he employs a black.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of pregnancy discrimination to produce substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Laxton v. Gap Inc. · filed 2003-06-06(a)

To carry this burden, the plaintiff must produce substantial evidence indicating that the proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Preselecting a candidate, even in violation of hiring procedures, does not by itself show that the employer's stated reason for hiring was a pretext for sex discrimination.

Mackay v. Shalala · filed 2004-03-16(a)(1)

Even if Mrs. Mackey's allegations are true, Bain's preselection is not sufficient evidence for jurors reasonably to conclude that HHS's explanation for Bain's hiring was pretext.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employee must offer sufficient evidence that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext for intentional race discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Lanita Cherry v. Ritenour School · filed 2004-03-17(a)(1)

In sum, there are no facts in this record that support the conclusion that the School District's stated reason for not renewing Cherry's contract was a pretext for intentional race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a discriminatory-discharge claim to proceed when a genuine factual dispute exists over whether the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Rajcoomar v. TJX Companies, Inc. · filed 2004-03-25(a)(1)

Accordingly, this Court finds that there is a material question of fact regarding whether or not the Defendant’s proffered reason was indeed the reason for the Plaintiffs’ termination, or whether it was a pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a sex discrimination plaintiff to show that an employer’s stated reason for refusing to rehire her was pretextual once the employer has produced that reason.

Johnson v. Seagram & Sons, Inc. · filed 2004-03-31(a)(1)

Once it does, Ms. Johnson must establish that the reasons proffered by the defendant were pre-textual. ... Consequently, we find the defendant has satisfied its burden of production and the plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of persuasion on pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose liability for an adverse employment decision when the employer’s stated reason is supported and the employee raises no genuine factual dispute that discrimination motivated the decision.

Ascione v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2004-04-02(a)(1)

Whether Ascione has made a prima facie case is ultimately immaterial because the Court concludes that Pfizer’s explanations for its employment decisions are compelling and that Ascione has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact suggesting that discrimination, rather than Pfizer’s stated reasons, motivated those employment decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a national origin failure-to-hire claim to reach a jury when weaknesses in the employer’s explanation could support a finding of pretext.

Goico v. Boeing Co. · filed 2004-07-15(a)

It similarly concedes there is a prima facie case of national origin discrimination regarding its selection of Tung and Joseph Goodlove for the January 2002 positions, but again argues there is no evidence of pretext. After considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concludes there are inconsistencies and weaknesses in Boeing’s explanation for its failure to hire the plaintiff for these positions such that a reasonable jury could find that the explanation is not worthy of credence.

A demotion claim under § 2000e-2(a) cannot survive summary judgment without evidence permitting a finding that discrimination, rather than the employer’s stated reason, motivated the decision.

Miller v. Firstar Bank N.A. · filed 2004-09-01(a)

In conclusion, we find that Miller has failed to produce evidence that permits a finding that the decision to demote her was more likely animated by impermissible motives than by Firstar’s proffered justification.

A plaintiff can show that an employer’s stated reason for an adverse action was pretextual by casting sufficient doubt on each stated reason or showing that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating cause.

Harrison v. Housing Authority · filed 2004-09-30(a)(1)

We agree with the District Court that Harrison failed to “1) cast[] sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or 2) allow[] the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action,” as required to show that the proffered non-discriminatory reason offered by the Housing Authority was simply pretext.

Section 2000e-2 requires evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated reason for termination was pretextual and that the termination was intentionally discriminatory.

Iuorno v. Dupont Pharmaceuticals Co. · filed 2005-01-31

In sum, because Iuorno has failed to adduce admissible evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that DuPont’s stated non-diseriminatory reason for terminating her was pretextual and that the real reason for her discharge was intentional discrimination based on race, national origin, or age, the judgment of the district court awarding summary judgment in favor of DuPont is hereby AFFIRMED.