42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2 permits a same-sex sexual harassment claim when the harassment is based on sex.

McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. · filed 1995-03-10(a)(1)

Also, the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 does not limit Title VII to heterosexual harassment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex workplace harassment when the harassment is based on the victim's gender.

Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc. · filed 1995-04-03(a)(1)

That means that a man can state a claim under Title VII for sexual harassment by another man only if he is being harassed because he is a man.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers same-sex sexual harassment when the employee is subjected to the conduct because of the employee’s sex.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Walden Book Co. · filed 1995-05-04(a)(1)

Thus, this Court finds that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits same-sex sexual harassment when the harassment is because of the employee’s sex.

Griffith v. Keystone Steel and Wire · filed 1995-05-12(a)(1)

After considering the statute and the applicable case law, the Court holds that same-sex sexual harassment is prohibited by Title VII for several reasons.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires same-sex harassment to be based on the employee’s gender; sexual remarks alone do not establish a claim.

Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corp. · filed 1995-05-23(a)(1)

There was no offer of evidence that Mr. Feltner was discriminated against because he was a man, and that precludes his claim under Title VII.

An employer notified of harassment because of sex must take prompt, appropriate action reasonably calculated to stop it; reasonable efforts to identify an unknown perpetrator can satisfy that duty.

Ward v. City of Streetsboro Sally Hensel, Mayor Gerald Vicha, Fire Chief · filed 1996-06-24(a)(1)

When an employer is placed on notice of harassing conduct directed at an employee because of sex, the employer is obligated to take prompt and appropriate action reasonably calculated to put a halt to this conduct. ... We believe the district court properly concluded that an employer could not be expected to do more than these defendants did in their numerous efforts to ascertain the identity of the perpetrator and to halt the harassing conduct.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit workplace profanity alone; harassment must discriminate based on sex.

Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of AL · filed 2007-03-19(a)(1)

Title VII does not prohibit profanity alone, however profane.

Sexual harassment supports a sex discrimination claim only when the conduct occurred because of the employee’s sex.

Clarke v. Bank of Commerce · filed 2007-03-30(a)(1)

Here, there is no evidence that Rossman showed her tattoo to Wolfard because she was a woman. On the contrary, Rossman offered to show her tattoo to anyone who was present — men and women.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires sexual harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment.

Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc. · filed 2007-06-28(a)(1)

Even if being called “Dolly,” Stinson’s comment that he would get in trouble if he said why Henderson’s presence made him nervous, and having one’s hair pulled and commented upon in this manner is sexual in nature, these incidents are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions of employment.

Religious harassment can violate Title VII when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter employment conditions and create an abusive work environment.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. · filed 2008-03-31(a)(1)

Viewed on summary judgment, the evidence establishes that Ingram persistently suffered from religious harassment of the most demeaning, degrading, and damaging sort. The district court erred when it held the EEOC had failed to satisfy this requirement.

Section 2000e-2 does not treat a policy violation as harassment unless the conduct concerns a protected characteristic.

Cooper v. Illinois Department of Human · filed 2019-03-28

But the violation of a department policy in itself is not harassment under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which concerns only discrimination based on an individual’s membership in a protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a supervisor harassment claim to involve unwelcome conduct based on a protected characteristic that affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Bohemond v. City of Dallas Texas · filed 2025-01-10(a)(1)

A prima facie case of harassment stemming from a supervisor’s conduct under Title VII must contain the following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a reverse discrimination refusal-to-hire claim when no one was hired for the job sought.

Taterka v. WISCONSIN TELEPHONE COMPANY · filed 1975-05-01(a)(1)

In my opinion, the complaint fails to allege facts which, if proved, would establish the existence of elements (2) and (3) of a reverse discrimination cause of action. The .complaint contains no allegation that the position sought by the plaintiff was filled by an off-the-street or non-employee applicant. Under these circumstances, a person who applies for a job cannot complain of being discriminated against when no one has been hired for that job.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects male and white employees from discrimination on the same terms as other employees.

Harry Daniel HICKS, Appellant, v. ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellee · filed 1978-01-19(a)(1)

This section applies on the same terms to discrimination against males or whites as it does to discrimination against women or racial and ethnic minorities.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based adjustments to promotion exam scores when the employer cannot justify them as prospective compliance with Title VII.

Bushey v. New York State Civil Service Commission · filed 1983-10-03(a)

Accordingly, the scoring adjustment to Examination No. 37-526 is declared to be in violation of Title VII and defendants are enjoined from making appointments based on the adjusted results.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows white employees to bring racial discrimination claims under the same standards that apply to other employees.

Kelly v. American Federation of Musicians' & Employers' Pension Welfare Fund · filed 1985-01-03(a)(1)

It should be noted at the outset that a white male has the same right to bring a Title VII action as does any other person.

A male claimant can establish the protected-group element of a Title VII sex-discrimination claim without showing background circumstances suggesting bias against the majority.

Collins v. School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. · filed 1990-01-04

Therefore, any Title VII claimant before this Court can establish the first prong of his prima facie case by showing membership in a protected group.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects white employees against race discrimination in employment.

Silver v. City University of New York · filed 1991-04-22(a)

Pursuant to Title VII, Silver is obviously a member of a protected class in the disparate treatment and reverse discrimination arena.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits reverse sex discrimination claims, but a supervisor and a subordinate are not similarly situated merely because both are subject to the same harassment policy.

Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Insurance · filed 1993-06-25(a)

However, Pierce and Kennedy were not similarly situated. Unlike Ms. Kennedy, Pierce was a member of management, having authority over several subordinates, and responsibility for maintaining a respectful, respectable, and decorous office. Thus, defendant had reason to treat Pierce differently than his subordinates, in requiring a larger measure of sensitivity and decorum.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects white employees from race discrimination, but they must show that race motivated the adverse employment decision.

Pilditch v. Board of Education · filed 1993-08-27(a)(1)

The only way to conclude based on this paltry record that the plaintiff was discriminated against because he was white is to make the illogical and insupportable assumption that every time a black council member votes against a white candidate, the decision is motivated by race. This is impermissible.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers reverse employment discrimination; a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case and, when the employer offers nondiscriminatory reasons, produce evidence of pretext.

Murphy v. Housing Authority & Urban Redevelopment Agency · filed 1999-01-27(a)

For the reasons set forth above, I shall grant the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Counts I, II and IV of the Amended Complaint, because Murhpy cannot establish a prima facie case of unlawful reverse employment discrimination in violation of Title VII or the NJLAD, and, in the alternative, because Murphy has failed to produce even a scintilla of evidence tending to show that the Defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment decisions were merely a pretext for invidious discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination against white applicants, and direct evidence of reverse discrimination can support a claim.

McGarry v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1999-04-29(a)(1)

Doing so, we hold that there was sufficient direct evidence of reverse discrimination to survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a reverse-discrimination claim, but the selecting officials' race alone does not establish a prima facie case.

Iadimarco v. Runyon · filed 1999-09-08(a)(1)

We agree that the race of the selecting officials is not a sufficient circumstance to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by itself.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees of every race from discriminatory discharge; a white employee need not be a racial minority at work to satisfy the protected-group element.

Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. · filed 2000-04-24(a)(1)

Accordingly, we hold that the fact that Byers was not a racial minority in his workplace does not prevent him from making a prima facie case of reverse discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects job applicants against race discrimination regardless of whether they belong to a historically disadvantaged group.

DeWeese v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2000-11-13(a)(1)

Although Title VII and Section 1981 have been applied to protect members of historically discriminated-against groups, their protections are not limited to those in such groups.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects white and male employees without requiring them to allege special circumstances to support a discrimination claim.

Tappe v. Alliance Capital Management L.P. · filed 2001-10-25(a)

For the reasons fully discussed below, although Tappe is a young white male, he is not required to allege any “special circumstances” to support his claims of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination against white employees as well as minority employees.

McDonald v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2002-01-10(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes unlawful an employer’s failure or refusal “to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Title VII prohibits discrimination against whites as well as minorities.

A plaintiff claiming reverse sex discrimination under § 2000e-2(a) must show that similarly situated employees of the other sex received different treatment.

Thompson v. City of Memphis · filed 2004-01-12(a)

Thompson cannot prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination because he has not produced evidence that he was treated differently than similarly situated female employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits reverse race discrimination claims, but an employee proceeding under the indirect method must show that the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual.

Ballance, David v. Springfield Police · filed 2005-09-19(a)(1)

We find that although Ballance has established his prima facie case, he has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the police department’s legiti- mate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating him were pretextual, and therefore, affirm.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination against Caucasian employees as well as non-Caucasian employees.

Tyree v. Department of Transp., New Mexico · filed 2006-05-26(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits discrimination against Caucasians (“reverse discrimination”) as well as non-Caucasians.

Section 2000e-2 protects employees alleging reverse discrimination; in a discriminatory discipline claim, the similarity of the employees’ conduct and punishment is central.

Lightner v. City of Wilmington, North Carolina · filed 2007-03-30(a)(1)

However, Title VII protects those arguing under the theory of “reverse discrimination,” and therefore the critical issues are the similarity of conduct and punishment.

A white employee alleging racial discrimination must present evidence that the employer treated him less favorably because of his race.

Barnes v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2010-04-05(a)(1)

Plaintiff has tendered no evidence to demonstrate that he was treated less favorably because of his race. To the contrary, he has only shown that he received exactly the same treatment as a similarly situated African-American corrections officer.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects members of historically favored groups from employment discrimination.

Bradley v. Denver Health & Hospital Authority · filed 2010-08-24(a)(1)

Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination protects members of both historically disfavored groups and historically favored ones.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a reverse race discrimination claim over a termination to proceed when the evidence supports an inference of discrimination and pretext.

Brooks v. Dent · filed 2011-06-10(a)(1)

With respect to plaintiffs claims of reverse race discrimination and retaliation in Counts One, Three, and Four, plaintiff has made a prima facie case. Although defendants have stated non-discriminatory reasons for Brooks’ termination, plaintiff has sufficiently shown, for purposes of withstanding summary judgment, that these reasons were pretextual.

A male employee alleging sex discrimination must plead facts supporting an inference that his employer treated him less favorably because of his sex.

Roller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco · filed 2012-02-28(a)

However, with regard to the third requirement that “the evidence is adequate to create an inference that the adverse employment action [or less favorable treatment] was based on a trait protected by Title VII,” Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails.

Section 2000e-2 requires a reverse racial discrimination claimant using indirect proof to show circumstances suggesting bias against whites and more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee of another race.

Formella v. Brennan · filed 2016-03-10

Because Formella failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination, summary judgment in favor of USPS was proper.

A reverse race discrimination plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show an adverse employment decision and different treatment from similarly situated employees of another race.

Fletcher v. U.S. Renal Care, Inc. · filed 2017-03-02(a)(1)

However, the Court need not reach a definitive conclusion on the first element because Fletcher has not put forward sufficient evidence to prove the third or fourth elements.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a claim that an employer discriminated against an employee for not sharing the employer's religious beliefs; the employee must show an adverse action, satisfactory job performance, and evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory motive.

Ramirez v. Kingman Hosp. Inc. · filed 2019-03-15(a)(1)

Thus, to make a prima facie showing of discrimination based on Plaintiff's failure to adhere to his employer's religious beliefs, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he was subjected to an adverse employment action; (2) at the time the employment action was taken, his job performance was satisfactory; and (3) some additional evidence to support the inference that the employment action was taken because of a discriminatory motive based upon the employee's failure to hold or follow his employer's religious beliefs.

Section 2000e-2 allows a reverse sex discrimination claim to proceed when the complaint alleges facts that make discrimination plausible; the plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage.

Dorson v. Z2 Systems, Inc. · filed 2019-10-01

While Dorson need not establish a prima facie case of discrimination at this juncture, he must allege enough factual details to support a plausible reverse discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff alleging reverse religious discrimination to plead that the employer acted because of the plaintiff's religion.

Cocca-Rau v. The Standard Life Insurance Company of New York · filed 2020-07-22(a)(1)

A reverse discrimination claim cannot lie if the plaintiff does not allege that they faced discrimination because of a protected characteristic. Plaintiff could, of course, allege that she faced discrimination based on her Catholic religion. However, Plaintiff makes no such allegation here and the Court therefore cannot plausibly infer that her religion was a motivating factor in her termination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a male employee’s failure-to-promote sex discrimination claim to proceed when the alleged circumstances raise an inference of discrimination, even if the employer promoted other men.

GARDNER v. SEPTA · filed 2021-08-03(a)(1)

Based on the foregoing allegations, and notwithstanding the fact that defendant promoted two male employees in 2019, Horace Smith and Kevin Strong, the Court concludes that plaintiff has adequately alleged that defendant’s failure to promote him to Light Rail Control Center Manager in August 2020 raises an inference of discrimination based on sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects majority-group employees from race discrimination, but a reverse discrimination claim requires evidence supporting an inference that race motivated the employer’s action.

BETHURAM v. CATHEDRAL TRUSTEES INC. · filed 2021-11-05(a)(1)

Upon careful review we find, however, that the background circumstances and chronology of events before us, when viewed as a whole, fall well short of demonstrating that Cathedral had a reason or inclination to discriminate against people of Ms. Bethuram's race (Caucasian) nor does this evidence reveal that something "fishy" was at hand when Cathedral eliminated Ms. Bethuram's position. Accordingly, Ms. Bethuram's reverse discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based employment decisions; a reverse-race discrimination claim fails when the evidence as a whole could not permit a jury to find that race caused the decision.

Frakes v. Northeast Illinois Railroad Corp. · filed 2021-11-29(a)(1)

A jury, considering the evidence as a whole, could not conclude that Frakes was demoted because of his race.

A reverse discrimination plaintiff must present facts supporting an inference that the employer would not have fired her but for her protected status.

Gerovic v. City and County of Denver · filed 2022-01-04(a)(1)

Thus, the Court finds these incidents do not provide a basis for establishing that Plaintiff would not have been fired if she were not non-Hispanic, and Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of reverse discrimination.

A reverse race discrimination claim fails when the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case.

Smyer v. Kroger Limited Partnership I · filed 2022-07-14(a)

He has thus failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of reverse race discrimination. Kroger is entitled to summary judgment on Smyer’s Count 9 and his Count 10 related to aiding and abetting reverse race discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects employees from race and sex discrimination regardless of whether they belong to a majority group.

Smyer v. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I · filed 2024-03-08(a)

Smyer uses the term “reverse” discrimination, so we will follow his usage, though Title VII has no such qualifier. All claims of race and sex discrimination are actionable under its terms.

A reverse race discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of an adverse employment action that gives rise to an inference of discrimination.

MCCREESH v. ULTA BEAUTY, INC. · filed 2024-07-15(a)(1)

Here, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff was qualified for her position. However, Plaintiff’s claim of reverse race discrimination falls short with respect to the last two prongs.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits an employer to consider a heavy accent when effective communication is reasonably related to job performance.

Gonzalez v. Florida Department of Management Services · filed 2015-08-25(a)

However, an employee’s heavy accent can be a legitimate basis for adverse employment action where effective communication skills are reasonably related to job performance.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to consider an applicant’s accent when it affects the applicant’s ability to perform the job effectively.

Madiebo v. Division of Medicaid/State of Mississippi · filed 1997-07-09(a)(1)

In the context of national origin discrimination, unlawful discrimination does not occur when a plaintiffs manner of speaking or “accent affects his ability to perform his job effectively.”

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin.

Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp. · filed 1975-07-16

Unlike 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of national origin; a discharge based on a sincere, nondiscriminatory safety reason does not violate it.

Josef R. SILBERHORN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL IRON WORKS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1978-10-12(a)(1)

The record is devoid of any evidence that the discharge resulted because of Silberhorn’s national origin. The court found that the discharge resulted from a “good faith, sincere belief that a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for discharge existed. . . .” This finding is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national origin discrimination in discharge and employment conditions; an employee must show that the employer's stated legitimate reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Morales v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc. · filed 1979-03-29(a)(1)

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court has concluded that the plaintiff was not discharged or discriminated against in the conditions of his employment because of his Cuban ancestry. Rather, the defendant’s treatment of plaintiff was based on legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, and these reasons were not shown to be a pretext for prohibited national origin discrimination. Accordingly, there has been no conduct by the defendant which constitutes an unlawful employment practice violative of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit an employer from requiring bilingual employees to speak English in public work areas while on duty.

Hector GARCIA, Etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alton v. W. GLOOR Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-01-04(a)(1)

We hold only that an employer’s rule forbidding a bilingual employee to speak anything but English in public areas while on the job is not discrimination based on national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects employees of Acadian ancestry from national origin discrimination even though Acadia was never an independent country.

Roach v. Dresser Industrial Valve & Instrument Division · filed 1980-07-17(a)(1)

We conclude that plaintiff is protected by Title VII’s ban on national origin discrimination. ... He is given only the same protection as those with English, Spanish, French, Iranian, Czechoslavakian, Portuguese, Polish, Mexican, Italian, Irish, et al., ancestors.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharging employees because they were born in the United States as national origin discrimination.

Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co. · filed 1984-03-14(a)(1)

Thus, employment discrimination against American citizens based merely on country of birth, whether that birthplace is the United States or elsewhere, contradicts the purpose and intent of Title VII, as well as notions of fairness and equality. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that plaintiffs were discharged solely because they were born in the United States. We believe this is sufficient to state a Title VII cause of action based on national origin discrimination. Accordingly, we deny defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VII claim for relief.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from rejecting an applicant because of national origin, including when its stated reason for the decision is pretextual.

Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area · filed 1984-07-17(a)(1)

We affirm the district court's holding that Briseno was the victim of disparate treatment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976), and modify the relief granted.

Discrimination because of an employee’s foreign accent can establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Bell v. Home Life Insurance · filed 1984-11-15(a)(1)

Although this issue has never arisen in this Circuit, this Court concludes that if plaintiff could prove that he had been discriminated against because of his accent, he would establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination. Plaintiff has failed to convince the Court, however, that any such discrimination took place.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits adverse employment decisions based on a foreign accent that does not interfere with the employee’s job duties.

Donaciano CARINO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. the UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA BOARD OF REGENTS, Defendants-Appellants · filed 1984-12-17(a)

A foreign accent that does not interfere with a Title VII claimant’s ability to perform duties of the position he has been denied is not a legitimate justification for adverse employment decisions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discrimination against an employee for being born American.

Bilka v. Pepe's Inc. · filed 1985-01-09(a)(1)

Specifically, Pepe’s argues that national origin discrimination against Americans is not actionable under Title VII. We disagree. Title VII outlaws, without exception, discrimination based on “national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). We see no reason for reading an exception into the statute.

A national-origin termination claim under § 2000e-2 fails when the employee offers no evidence of discriminatory motive and does not rebut evidence of poor job performance.

Violante v. Bolger · filed 1985-02-28

As the Magistrate noted, plaintiff provided no evidence which indicated a discriminatory motivation on the part of his supervisors and plaintiff again offered no evidence to rebut the evidence of his poor job performance.

Section 2000e-2 makes national origin discrimination in employment actionable.

Sere v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIVERSITY OF ILL. · filed 1986-02-28

Count I properly states a claim of national origin discrimination, however, which is actionable under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits firing someone because of national origin, including birth in the United States.

Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd. And Robertson Research (u.s.), Inc. · filed 1986-08-27(a)(1)

We agree that employment discrimination based only on one’s country of birth, “whether that birthplace is the United States or elsewhere, contradicts the purpose and intent of Title VIL” Rohner-Gehrig, 582 F.Supp. at 675.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits denying a promotion because of national origin.

Colon v. Sorensen · filed 1987-03-02

Colon is entitled to a declaration that he was discriminated against on the basis of his national origin, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1981).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin.

Trevino v. Holly Sugar Corp. · filed 1987-03-09

National origin discrimination is expressly forbidden by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of national origin; a plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer discriminatory motive.

Khan v. Grotnes Metalforming Systems, Inc. · filed 1988-01-27(a)(1)

Plaintiffs’ evidence amounts to mere speculation and opinion. Consequently, summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim of national origin discrimination under Title VII must be granted in defendants’ favor.

Section 2000e-2 protects against national origin discrimination based on ancestry from a country that no longer exists.

Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc. · filed 1988-02-24(a), (c)

Given world history, Title VII cannot be read to limit "countries" to those with modern boundaries, or to require their existence for a certain time length before it will prohibit discrimination. Animus based on national origin can persist long after new political structures and boundaries are established. Therefore, Serbians are a protected class, and Pejic meets the first requirement for a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects Hispanic employees from employment discrimination based on national or ethnic origin.

Perez v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 1989-02-07(a)

Some class members born in Latin American Countries and naturalized citizens are covered by the prohibition against national origin discrimination. The majority of the class members are native U.S. citizens; they are covered by the prohibition against ethnic origin discrimination. For the purposes of this class, the appellation “Hispanic” will signify ethnic and national origin categories.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects a person considered a Gypsy from employment discrimination based on ethnic ancestry.

Janko v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority · filed 1989-02-27(a)(1)

This would include discrimination today by members of the majority against those among us who are considered Gypsies. In this respect, and all other respects, the plaintiff has adequately pleaded her complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of national origin; a discharge for insubordination does not violate it when national origin played no role.

Bowman v. Bank of Delaware · filed 1989-05-17(a)(1)

The Bank placed Bowman on probation not because of his national origin but because of his discussion of his personal affairs and job complaints with customers. He violated the clear terms of his probation by calling a customer at home and complaining about his problems at the Bank. This resulted in his firing by the Bank, and there is no evidence that national origin played any role in that decision.

A national origin disparate treatment claim under § 2000e-2(a) fails when the employee does not prove intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

Lu v. Woods · filed 1989-07-14(a)

Dr. Lu claims in this action that AID, by referring to his accent in several different employee evaluations, and by otherwise treating him in a disparate manner, has discriminated against him on the basis of national origin in violation of sections 703(a) and 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-16. ... On the basis of the evidence adduced in that proceeding, the Court concludes that Dr. Lu has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that AID intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of national origin, or that he was the object of retaliation.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits an employer to consider an applicant’s accent only when it materially interferes with job performance.

Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu Eileen Anderson Peter Leong Dennis Kamimura George Kuwahara Kalani McC · filed 1989-10-23(a)(1)

An adverse employment decision may be predicated upon an individual’s accent when — but only when — it interferes materially with job performance.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from limiting a person’s employment terms or opportunities because of national origin.

Derechin v. State University of New York · filed 1989-12-07(a)

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual with respect to his terms, conditions and privileges of employment or to limit his employment opportunities because of his national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ... Here the plaintiff has alleged that he is the only Argentinean national in his department and likewise the only faculty member in his department without office space or laboratory facilities. An inference of invidious discrimination therefrom is justified.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits employers from segregating or classifying employees by national origin in ways that harm their employment opportunities.

Fortino v. Quasar Co. · filed 1990-12-07(a)(2)

Quasar accomplished its discrimination by reserving certain of its managerial positions for employees of Japanese national origin, by evaluating and paying Quasar’s managerial employees of Japanese national origin on an entirely different basis from that used to evaluate and pay Quasar’s managerial employees of American national origin, and by exempting all of its managerial employees of Japanese national origin from Quasar’s RIF, all without lawful justification.

Section 2000e-2's national-origin discrimination prohibition does not bar a Philippine airline from preferring its citizens for key positions covered by Article 8(2) of the U.S.–Philippines Air Transport Agreement.

Lemnitzer v. Philippine Airlines · filed 1991-08-23(a)(1)

Instead, the Court finds that the ATA between the United States and the Philippines permits PAL to prefer its citizens to key positions falling under Article 8(2) of the ATA without implicating the national origin provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits national origin discrimination in employment, but discrimination based solely on citizenship does not violate it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Switching Systems Division of Rockwell International Corp. · filed 1992-01-16(a)

As the Court has discussed above, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination grounded solely on the citizenship status of the individual affected.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting an inference of national origin discrimination to establish a prima facie discriminatory discharge claim.

Rovtar v. Union Bank of Switzerland · filed 1994-01-14(a)(1)

Moreover, this court is hard-pressed to find from the list of involuntary terminations submitted by plaintiff that defendant has terminated a disparate number of Americans. ... For these reasons, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not permit a national origin discrimination claim to reach trial when the evidence of differing discipline does not support a reasonable inference of discrimination.

Garduno v. Quaker Oats Co. · filed 1994-09-01(a)(1)

Although strictly speaking, an issue of fact exists (if the statements concerning Knox and Brown are admissible), the most plaintiff can establish is that one non-Mexican-American was known to have falsified his expense accounts and was not fired while two other non-Mexican-Americans were known to have falsified their expense accounts and were fired, along with plaintiff, a Mexican-Ameriean who was also fired for that reason. The court concludes that plaintiff does not on this evidence have a reasonable prospect of prevailing before a reasonable jury. For this reason, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII claim will be granted.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits citizenship preferences when they have the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin.

Fred Lemnitzer and Ken Green v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. · filed 1995-04-18(a)(1)

Title VII, however, prohibits discrimination based upon citizenship whenever it has the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence of discriminatory motive to support a national-origin discrimination claim.

Gomez v. Allegheny Health Services, Inc. · filed 1995-11-15(a)

After a trial, the district court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the hospital concluding that the evidence failed to establish impermissible discrimination. We agree and will affirm.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not treat an employee’s Spanish translation duties during regular work hours, without extra credit, as national origin discrimination by themselves.

Hernandez v. Muns · filed 1996-10-21(a)

Thus, Hernandez was not discriminated against simply because she was denied extra “credit” for her translation work.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require a worker alleging national origin discrimination to prove replacement or more favorable treatment of a similarly situated worker when other evidence establishes discrimination.

Robert WALLACE, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SMC PNEUMATICS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1997-01-10(a)(1)

But the judge was wrong to think that evidence either of replacement or of more favorable treatment of a similarly situated employee was essential to Wallace’s case. It was essential to Wallace’s McDonnell Douglas approach but it is not an ingredient of the statute. If an American employee is mistreated because he is American, the fact that Japanese employees are also treated badly would not be a defense.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) protects job applicants from discrimination based on race or national origin.

Kipkirwa v. Santa Clara County Probation Dept. · filed 1997-04-25(a)(1)

Here, Kipkirwa carried the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. As a black person of Kenyan national origin Kipkirwa belongs to a class protected by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Williams, 792 F.2d at 1485.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of national origin; an employee challenging an employer’s stated reason for discharge must prove it was a pretext for discrimination.

Valentin v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center · filed 1997-11-03(a)(1)

Valentin did not present sufficient evidence to justify the jury’s finding of liability on her national origin discrimination claim. Crozer offered a legitimate, non-diseriminatory reason for firing her: her encouragement of other employees not to report laboratory errors. Valentin did not carry her burden of proving Crozer’s decision to terminate her was a pretext for discrimination because of her Puerto Rican national origin. The court will grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of Crozer on Valentin’s national origin discrimination claim and conditionally grant a new trial on liability and damages.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge when national origin is a motivating factor, even if the employer also had other reasons.

Cartagena v. Ogden Services Corp. · filed 1998-03-11(a)(1)

The Court cannot say that a jury, upon a finding that Lehigh made the remarks alleged, would be behaving unreasonably were it to conclude that Lehigh fired Cartagena at least in part because he is Puerto Rican.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit an employment benefit based on residence or domicile without evidence that the distinction discriminates based on national origin.

Barnett v. Technology International, Inc. · filed 1998-04-08(a)

Rather, the undisputed evidence reveals that any differentiation that occurred in this case was because of residence or domicile, not because of membership in a class protected by the provisions of Title VII.

A national origin discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the employer fired the employee because of national origin.

Vidal-Soto v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya-Puerto Rico · filed 1998-04-24(a)(1)

Looking at the record, we find it devoid of adequate evidence of Defendant’s discriminatory intent requiring a trial on the merits. Plaintiff simply has not provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to draw a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was fired due to his age or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not treat discrimination based solely on citizenship as national origin discrimination.

Damron v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. · filed 1998-06-26(a)(1)

To the extent that Damron makes a claim of discrimination under Title VII based solely on his status as a United States citizen, such a citizenship discrimination claim is not actionable as alleged national origin discrimination under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of national origin; a discharge based on poor performance does not violate it.

Diaz v. City of Springfield, Illinois, And, the Joint Apprentice Training Committee for the City of Springfield, · filed 1998-07-02(a)(1)

The district court thus did not clearly err in discounting Diaz's argument about the comparative treatment of white and minority apprentices, and concluding that Diaz had not been terminated because of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from terminating an employee because of national origin; an employee may prove a violation by showing that the employer’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Alizai v. MVM, Inc. · filed 1998-07-15(a)

Finally, the Court finds that Alizai has sufficiently proven that these false reasons are a pretext for discrimination and that the actual reason MVM terminated his employment is unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment discrimination against a Jamaican worker based on race or national origin.

Stephens v. City of Topeka, Kan. · filed 1999-01-15(a)

Title VII, nevertheless, prohibits discriminatory employment practices based upon the race, color, or national origin of an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). It thus prohibits the alleged discriminatory practices of defendant, whether plaintiff proceeds on the basis of race or national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a national origin discrimination claim to proceed when a jury could find that the employer’s stated reason for an adverse employment decision was pretext and that discrimination motivated the decision.

Gonzales v. Western Resources, Inc. · filed 1999-02-04(a)(1)

The court finds that if these allegations are viewed as truthful by a jury, a reasonable jury could find that the offered reason for the employment actions of the defendant were pretext, and that discrimination was a motivating factor in the decisions. ... Based on the findings on this matter, the court finds that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be denied as it relates to the plaintiffs Title VII claim of discrimination based on national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a) protects against national origin discrimination when skin color is a defining characteristic of the employee’s national origin.

LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc. · filed 1999-03-26(a)

The plaintiff also claims that he was subjected to adverse terms, conditions and privileges of employment due to the color of his skin. I shall not address this contention, however, because the plaintiff qualifies for Title VII protection on the basis of national origin, a defining characteristic of which is the dark color of his skin.

A race or national origin discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a) fails when the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case or rebut the employer’s stated reason for discharge.

Blair v. Colonnas Shipyard Inc. · filed 1999-07-07(a)

Because Blair cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, cannot rebut the evidence showing that his discharge resulted from his violations of the Shipyard’s disciplinary policy, and cannot evade the applicable Title VII time bar, the Court will GRANT summary judgment.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits proof of national-origin discrimination through either direct or indirect evidence.

Hasham v. California State Board of Equalization · filed 2000-01-05(a)

The two accepted ways of establishing that an employer violated this prohibition are: first, by direct evidence (taking the form of, “I did not promote you because of your national origin”) or second, indirect evidence.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires evidence of intentional national origin discrimination; termination for violating an English-only policy alone does not establish it.

Velasquez v. Goldwater Memorial Hospital · filed 2000-03-16(a)(1)

Accordingly, this Court finds that even if Velasquez has raised a material dispute as to whether or not there was an English-only policy and that she was terminated for violating this policy, this would not constitute sufficient evidence by itself to raise an inference of discriminatory animus on the basis of national origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national origin discrimination but does not prohibit employment decisions based on citizenship or residency.

Norbuta v. Loctite Corp. · filed 2001-01-08(a)(1)

Employment decisions made on the basis of citizenship or residency are not illegal; at best, this is all that Norbuta reasonably can prove.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires national origin harassment to interfere with work performance or create a severe or pervasive hostile work environment.

Gray v. United States Postal Service · filed 2001-02-22(a)(1)

Assuming, arguendo, that Gray is able to satisfy the other elements of national origin harassment, she has advanced absolutely no evidence to satisfy the requirement that the harassment interfered with her work performance or created a hostile environment that was severe or pervasive.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national origin discrimination in employment and requires proof of discriminatory intent, either directly or through a burden-shifting method.

Bernales v. Cook County · filed 2001-04-16(a)(1)

To prevail in an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had an intent to discriminate; such a showing may be made directly, or indirectly, through use of an inferential burden-shifting method.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a plaintiff to prove national origin discrimination through a prima facie case that includes more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class.

Glebocki v. City of Chicago · filed 2002-03-19(a)(1)

His failure to identify a similarly situated employee not of Polish national origin thus also dooms his Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence of discriminatory animus to support a national origin discrimination claim.

Ramirez-Ferrer v. SONY PUERTO RICO, INC. · filed 2002-03-20(a)

The Court finds there is a dearth of evidence on discriminatory animus which fully justifies brevis disposition.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging race or national origin discrimination to establish a prima facie case and, when the employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason, produce evidence of pretext.

Kim v. Maxey Training School · filed 2002-05-22

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Maxey. Kim failed to establish a prima facie case of race and national origin discrimination and did not offer any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Maxe/s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.

A plaintiff alleging national origin discrimination must produce evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate reason for discharge was a pretext for discrimination.

Das v. Ohio State University · filed 2003-02-06(a)(1)

By contrast, Das, who at trial would bear the evidentiary burden of disproving her former employer’s proffered legitimate reason for her discharge and proving its actual discriminatory motive, produced no competent objective material evidence that the defendant’s articulated explanation was a mere pretext masking actual discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming national origin discrimination to make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination by the employer.

Untalan v. Kapiolani Medical Center · filed 2003-06-13(a)(1)

Untalan failed to make out a prima facie case that her employer intentionally discriminated against her because she is Filipino.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a national origin discrimination claim based on direct African descent without identifying a specific country of origin.

Kanaji v. Children's Hospital of Philadelphia · filed 2003-08-13(a)(1)

Therefore, it is the Court’s opinion that Plaintiffs Title VII claim for “national origin” discrimination cannot fail merely because he identifies himself in the Amended Complaint as being “of direct African descent,” and does not specify a nation or country of origin.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires national origin harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim; two isolated comments were insufficient here.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Rotary Corp. · filed 2003-12-29(a)(1)

Thus, without more than these two isolated comments, Flores cannot maintain her national origin discrimination claim under Title VII or the NYHRL.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of national origin, and direct evidence that a decision-maker’s discriminatory animus played a role in the discharge can establish a prima facie claim.

Dicarlo v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General · filed 2004-02-20(a)(1)

Because we conclude that DiCarlo has presented evidence that Bailey had discriminatory animus against DiCarlo, and that this predisposition to discriminate played a role in the decision to terminate DiCarlo, the plaintiff has successfully established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of national origin through the use of direct evidence.

Section 2000e-2(m) permits a national-origin discrimination claim to proceed to trial when circumstantial evidence creates a genuine issue about whether national origin motivated a termination.

Herawi v. State of Alabama Dept. of Forensic Sciences · filed 2004-04-05(m)

The court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate because Ward’s comments to Herawi are sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue for trial as to whether Herawi’s national origin was a motivating factor in the department’s decision to terminate her.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits discharge because of national origin; workplace insults alone do not establish a discriminatory discharge without evidence linking them to the decision.

Ramirez-Aguirre v. Ranger American Armored Services, Inc. · filed 2004-08-11(a)(1)

This Court has sought and sifted for evidence in the record of a link between the alleged insults, the alleged hostile work environment, and the rationale of the relevant decisionmaker who discharged Ramirez. The record evinces none. Absent authoritative weight, Ramirez’s allegations of nationality-based discrimination are bereft of Title VII meaning, and his claim must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not permit a discrimination claim based solely on an employer’s mistaken belief about an employee’s race or national origin.

Butler v. Potter · filed 2004-11-22(a)(1)

As defendant points out, Title VII protects those persons that belong to a protected class, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and says nothing about protection of persons who are perceived to belong to a protected class. ... For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff cannot state a claim for discrimination based on his perceived race and/or national origin and summary judgment will be granted on these claims.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a plaintiff claiming national origin discrimination to show, as part of a prima facie case, that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment.

Torrez v. Milk Products, L.P. · filed 2005-05-11(a)(1)

With regard to Plaintiffs claim for national origin discrimination, the Court holds that Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish a prima facie case because he has not raised a genuine issue' of material fact that similarly situated employees were more favorably treated.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits national origin discrimination in promotion, but a claim fails when the employer gives a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and the employee presents insufficient evidence of pretext.

Venugopal v. Shire Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2005-06-16(a)(1)

Further, the court determined that Venugopal had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether Shire’s proffered reason was pretextual. ... After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court correctly decided the issues before it. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

General, conclusory assertions do not establish the discriminatory intent required for a national origin discrimination claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Roney v. Illinois Department of Transportation · filed 2005-07-11(a)(1)

The Court finds that Roney has failed to establish national origin discrimination under the direct method because, as discussed in footnote 16 of this opinion, the statement of facts he references are general, conclusory statements which are inadequate to prove discriminatory animus on the part of IDOT.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on national origin to show an adverse job action and less favorable treatment than a similarly situated person outside the protected class.

Amos v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2005-10-31(a)

To succeed with their disparate treatment claim, appellants had to show that: (1) they were members of a protected class; (2) they were subjected to adverse job action; (3) they were qualified to do the job; and (4) they were treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside their protected class.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a national origin discrimination claim to proceed when evidence of more favorable treatment of similarly situated coworkers supports an inference of discrimination.

Klimczak v. Shoe Show Companies · filed 2005-11-03(a)

Reviewing the evidence offered by Plaintiff in the light most favorable to her, Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment decisions made because of an individual’s national origin; a plaintiff must offer evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that motive.

Wu v. Tyson Foods Inc · filed 2006-06-22(a)(1)

We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on the May 2001 national-origin-discrimination claim on the alternative ground that Wu failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that his position was eliminated for that reason. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (declaring unlawful employment decisions that are made “because of [an] individual’s . . . national origin”).

Section 2000e-2 prohibits national-origin discrimination in employment; a plaintiff challenging a termination must offer evidence from which a jury could reject the employer’s stated reason and infer intentional discrimination.

Abdulnour v. Campbell Soup Supply Co., LLC · filed 2006-10-31

In sum, Plaintiff fails to establish sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably reject Defendants’ reason and infer that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff to show that an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual when the employer offers that reason for an adverse employment action.

Sulich v. Intermountain · filed 2007-07-24(a)

W e need not discuss whether M r. Sulich established a prima facie case because we affirm on the basis that he failed to show that Sysco’s stated reason for removing him from the driver check-in job was a pretext for national-origin discrimination.

A national origin discrimination claim based on indirect evidence requires proof that the employer replaced the employee with someone outside the protected class or treated the employee differently from similarly situated employees outside it.

DiPietro v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. · filed 2007-10-16(a)(1)

In the instant case, there is no genuine issue of fact but that Morgan Stanley did not replace DiPietro with someone outside the protected class and did not treat DiPietro differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or national origin, and factual disputes about the basis of alleged slurs can preclude summary judgment.

Alvarado v. Shipley Donut Flour & Supply Co., Inc. · filed 2007-11-30(a)(1)

The Court holds that the basis for the alleged discrimination involves fact questions that cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage. Defendant’s summary judgment argument is rejected.