42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Section 2000e-2(a)(1)'s prohibition of sex discrimination does not supersede a state restriction on minor girls' street trade employment enacted to protect juveniles.

Warshafsky v. the Journal Co. · filed 1974-04-02(a)(1)

We have reviewed the legislative history of Title VII as it applies to sexual discrimination and have found no evidence that Congress intended to limit in any fashion the historically valid state interest in protecting the health, safety and morals of its juveniles.

Section 2000e-2 bars enforcement of state premium overtime requirements for women when those requirements conflict with Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.

Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Industrial Welfare · filed 1974-12-31

We agree with the opinion of the district court, and affirm its holding that the statutes and orders in question conflict with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and therefore cannot be enforced against plaintiff-appellee Homemakers.

Section 2000e-2(i)’s reservation-related Indian employment preference remained in effect after the 1972 amendments extended Title VII to federal employment.

Morton v. Mancari · filed 1974-06-17(i)

The exemptions reveal a clear congressional sentiment that an Indian preference in the narrow context of tribal or reservation-related employment did not constitute racial discrimination of the type otherwise proscribed. In extending the general anti-discrimination machinery to federal employment in 1972, Congress in no way modified these private employment preferences built into the 1964 Act, and they are still in effect.

Section 2000e-2(i)'s Indian preference exemption can cover a museum-directed craft market near Indian reservations even when the artisans receive no salary.

Livingston v. Ewing · filed 1979-06-14(i)

Employment practice must be given a broad scope. It is not restricted to a servant situation. ... The fact is that they are engaged in employment and the fact is that the Museum is the director of this employment, and there is every reason to regard this as an employment practice. ... Their proximity to the reservations is sufficient so as to bring them within the protection of the exemption or preference statutes. ... In our opinion, the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i), which has received favorable comment from the Supreme Court in Mancari, is fully applicable here and is dispositive of this case.

Section 2000e-2(i) exempts publicly announced employment preferences for Indians living on or near a reservation by businesses or enterprises on or near that reservation.

Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe · filed 1980-06-17(i)

Thus, Indian tribes and businesses operating on or near Indian reservations are excluded from the employment discrimination prohibitions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(i) excludes a qualifying Indian employment preference from Title VII when a statutory preference requirement and the employer’s statement establish a publicly announced employment practice.

Little v. Devils Lake-Sioux Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1985-04-30(i)

This court holds the present case falls within the exclusion to Title VII in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i). The statutory preference requirement in 25 U.S.C. § 450e(b), in conjunction with the Chairman of the Board’s statement that Defendant had a publicly announced employment practice of giving preferential treatment to American Indians, are sufficient to meet the “publicly announced employment practice” element of the exclusion.

Section 2000e-2(i) permits employment preferences for Indians living on or near a reservation but does not exempt preferences for members of one tribe over other Indians.

Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District · filed 1998-09-14(i)

Based on our reading of the Indian Preferences exemption, and informed by the 1994 Amendment to the ISDA, we conclude that the exemption does not include preferences based on tribal affiliation.

Section 2000e-2(i) exempts qualifying Indian employment preferences from Title VII but does not itself give a borough a governmental interest in adopting one.

Malabed v. North Slope Borough · filed 2003-05-16(i)

Hence, although the 703(i) exception undoubtedly reflects Congress's strong desire to encourage preferences under the exception's specified circumstances, its mechanism is fundamentally passive: instead of actively creating employer interests, it presupposes that those interests already exist or will be offered elsewhere.

Section 2000e-2(i) exempts otherwise valid Native American employment preferences from Title VII but does not preempt state laws that prohibit them.

Malabed v. North Slope Borough, Morris David Welch v. North Slope Borough, Charles Michael Emerson v. North Slope · filed 2003-07-08(i)

Section 703(i) is not part of a comprehensive affirmative scheme like ANCSA. Rather, it reflects only the congressional judgment that Title VII should not extend to otherwise valid Native American employment preference programs. State laws that prohibit such preferences are not inconsistent with this purpose, and are not preempted.

Section 2000e-2(i) exempts publicly announced employment preferences for Indians living on or near a reservation when used by a business on or near that reservation.

Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Company, LLC · filed 2005-01-20(i)

Further, Title VII explicitly exempts from Title VII “any business or enterprise on or near and Indian Reservation with respect to any publically announced employment practice ... under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i). ... This evidence all supports a finding that the Defendant satisfied the statutory requirements and had sufficiently “publicly announced” its use of tribal preferences.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not prohibit tribal hiring preferences based on political affiliation in Interior-approved mineral leases.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Western Coal Co. · filed 2014-09-26(a)

We conclude that Title VII does not prohibit differential treatment based on tribal affiliation, the political classification at issue here.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an employer to disregard an employee’s sex when determining compensation and other terms or privileges of employment, including retirement benefits.

Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Company · filed 1974-07-25(a)(1)

The obligation created by Title VII is, in this instance, to ignore the sex of an employee ". . . with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . .”42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits an employer from setting different retirement ages or pension benefits for men and women.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer · filed 1974-09-16(a)(2)

The Connecticut retirement plan constitutes an unlawful employment practice, because it discriminates between men and women with regard to employment fringe benefits and is therefore found by the Court to be illegal and in violation of federal statutory law.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from requiring women to contribute more than men for equal retirement benefits based on women’s longer average life expectancy.

Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of W. & P. · filed 1975-01-15(a)(1)

Because the Department of Water and Power’s practice in question here violates these considerations by applying the general actuarial characteristic of female longevity to individual female employees who in reality may or may not outlive individual male employees, the court concludes that plaintiffs have established a case of discrimination under § 703(a)(1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from using sex-segregated life expectancy tables to calculate employees’ retirement annuity benefits.

Henderson v. Oregon ex rel. Bureau of Labor · filed 1975-12-10(a)(1)

I hold that plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the use of sex-segregated life expectancy tables in calculating refund annuity benefits for State employees.

Section 2000e-2(a) covers retirement benefits as compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Chastang v. Flynn · filed 1976-06-10(a)

It is well settled that retirement benefits are within the " compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" covered by § 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits setting retirement contribution rates based solely or predominantly on an employee’s sex, even when the rates reflect actuarial life expectancy.

Manhart v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1976-11-23(a)(1)

Our holding is limited to the proposition that when sex is singled out as the only, or as a predominant, factor, the employee is being treated in the manner which Title VII forbids.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits requiring women to contribute more to a retirement plan than similarly situated men solely because women have a longer average life expectancy.

Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power · filed 1977-05-05(a)(1)

To require every individual woman to contribute 15% more into the retirement fund than her male counterpart must contribute because women "on the average" live longer than men is just the kind of abstract generalization, applied to individual women because of their being women, which Title VII was designed to abolish.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a sex discrimination claim when an employer allegedly pays disability benefits for medically necessary vasectomies but denies them for medically necessary tubal ligations.

Grogg v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1978-01-27(a)

Since the benefits in question are ones which accrue to men and women alike, then Count III, in raising the issue of the evenhanded administration of such benefits between male and female employees, adequately states a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not provide relief for a pension disparity based solely on service before Title VII took effect when extending eligibility creates no disparity in benefits for later service.

Stuppiello v. ITT Avionics Division · filed 1978-04-03(a)

The Act may not be applied retrospectively and the extension of the eligibility date for early retirement involved no sexually discriminatory reduction in the amount of or entitlement to pensions based upon services after the effective date of the Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits requiring female employees to contribute more than comparable male employees to an employer pension fund because women, on average, live longer.

City of Los Angeles Department of Water v. Manhart · filed 1978-04-25(a)(1)

An employment practice that requires 2,000 individuals to contribute more money into a fund than 10,000 other employees simply because each of them is a woman, rather than a man, is in direct conflict with both the language and the policy of the Act.

Equal contributions do not by themselves defeat a sex discrimination claim when an employer-sponsored annuity plan pays women smaller monthly benefits than comparable men.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. COLBY COLLEGE Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1978-12-18(a)(1)

Nor can we accept the argument that, because equal contributions are made, there is not, in fact, any discrimination. ... Prima facie, Manhart compels us to vacate the district court's dismissal of the complaint.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based differences in employee pension benefits as discrimination in compensation.

Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n · filed 1979-09-12(a)(1)

Thus, absent some affirmative justification, the discrimination against individual women in pension benefits involved in the instant case is as unlawful under § 703(a)(1) as the discrimination in contributions challenged in Manhart.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a retirement plan from paying women smaller monthly annuities than similarly situated men based on sex-segregated mortality tables, even when contributions are equal.

Peters v. Wayne State University · filed 1979-09-25(a)(1)

Thus, we conclude that as to their Title VII count, plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that the defined contribution plan furnished WSU employees, like the defined benefit plan in Manhart, violates Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from paying women smaller monthly annuities than similarly situated men who contribute the same amount to a deferred compensation plan.

Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee · filed 1980-03-12(a)(1)

Any discrimination against a female employee in respect to compensation, conditions of employment, or privileges of employment solely because of her sex is a violation of Title VII, Section 703(a)(1) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1974. The administration of the Deferred Compensation Plan of the State of Arizona, which provides or permits smaller monthly annuity payments to a female employee than to a male employee contributing the same amount, is discriminatory and in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits paying women smaller monthly retirement benefits than similarly situated men based on sex-specific mortality tables.

Spirt v. Teachers Insurance And Annuity Association · filed 1982-09-29(a)(1)

Like the district judge, we can discern no meaningful distinction between the disparate treatment accorded the female employees in Manhart, who were required to contribute a larger percentage of their salaries while working in order to receive monthly retirement benefits equal in amount to those received by their male counterparts, and the disparate treatment accorded the female TIAA-CREF participants in this case. Although female TIAA-CREF participants make contributions to their retirement accounts that are equal in amount to those made by their male counterparts, they are paid a smaller monthly benefit upon retirement simply because they are women.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from offering a retirement plan that pays women lower monthly annuity benefits than men who made the same contributions, even when selected insurers provide the annuities.

Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris · filed 1983-07-06(a)(1)

The Court holds that this practice does constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, and that all retirement benefits derived from contributions made after the decision today must be calculated without regard to the sex of the beneficiary.

Section 2000e-2(h) protects differences in employment benefits only when they result from a qualifying statutory system and lack an intent to discriminate.

Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State University · filed 1983-06-06(h)

Section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), supra, does not, in the absence of “an intention to discriminate”, under its terms exclude from Title VII employment practices (here, allegedly, the pension plans) unless the different treatment results from a “bona fide seniority system”, or from “a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations”. For present purposes, the exclusion thus does not affect the retirement system for which hourly employees are eligible, since the alleged disparity in treatment between hourly employees hired pre-Title VII and other employees (post-Title VII hourly hires and all salaried employees) is not based on the statutory criteria above set forth.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from denying female employees health insurance benefits because of their sex.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Fremont Christian School · filed 1984-04-16(a)(1)

Here, the School’s policy is to provide health insurance only to a full-time employee who is the “head of the household.” However, the “head of the household” is conclusively presumed to be the husband, thus depriving females similarly situated from the benefits of health coverage.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from paying unequal retirement benefits based on an employee’s sex.

Retired Public Employees' Ass'n v. California · filed 1984-11-13(a)(1)

Title VII forbids discrimination against any individual with respect to his “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of such individual’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). ... It is undisputed that PERS pays monthly benefits based on sex-segregated actuarial tables to a class of pre-1977 retirees. This benefit calculation method violates Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits calculating retirement benefits with sex-based actuarial tables that give similarly situated employees different monthly payments based on sex.

Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement System · filed 1986-01-13(a)(1)

We find that the plan administered by STRS, like the plan in Norris, impermissibly discriminates on the basis of sex because a man and a woman who retire with the same unmodified monthly allowance and who choose to participate in either the Option 2 or Option 3 plan, naming identical beneficiaries, will not receive identical monthly benefits. An individual man may not be paid lower monthly benefits simply because men as a class live a shorter time than women.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from allocating employee health-plan benefits through a rule that discriminates on the basis of sex.

Reinforcing Iron Workers Local 426 Health & Welfare Fund v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1990-10-05(a)(1)

An employee benefit plan provided by the employer is covered by such language, as it is compensation or a term or privilege of the employment. ... The Court finds that the gender rule results in discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of both Title VII and the Elliott-Larsen Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit a gender-neutral medical and dental benefit buy-back that gives both spouses identical coverage and has no discriminatory effect based on sex.

Pawtucket Teachers Alliance v. Sch. Comm., Pawtucket, 91-8034 (1992) · filed 1992-09-18(a)(1)

Said article does not constitute discrimination because of sex within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or R.I.G.L. § 28-5-7 .

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require an employer to cover surgical impregnation when its insurance plan applies the same exclusion to male and female employees.

Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. · filed 2000-10-02(a)(1)

It is no answer to say that the excluded treatments can only be performed on women, because male employees can claim infertility-related benefits for treatments performed on their wives — and are, conversely, precluded from obtaining benefits for surgical impregnation of their wives. Thus, both males and females receive the same “compensation, terms, conditions [and] privileges of employment” under the Covey Plan, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim when an employer’s health plan allegedly excludes treatment for female hormonal disorders while covering treatment for male hormonal disorders.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2001-04-14(a)(1)

Taking the facts alleged in the EEOC’s Complaint as true, UPS’s Plan does not provide the same benefits and exclusions to male and female employees and their dependent spouses. The Plan excludes oral contraceptives for any reason, including treatment for female hormonal disorders, while medically necessary treatments for male hormonal disorders are not excluded. ... The Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges an intentional disparate treatment claim against UPS.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from excluding prescription contraceptives from a generally comprehensive drug plan when the exclusion gives female employees less comprehensive coverage than male employees.

Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. · filed 2001-06-12(a)(1)

The additional exclusion of prescription contraceptives, however, reduces the comprehensiveness of the coverage offered to female employees while leaving the coverage offered to male employees unchanged. As discussed above, such inequities are discriminatory and violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in employee health benefits when excluding a sex-specific condition leaves one sex with inferior coverage.

Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. And Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. · filed 2003-01-15(a)(1)

Under Title VII the proper inquiry in reviewing a sex discrimination challenge to a health benefits plan is whether sex-specific conditions exist, and if so, whether exclusion of benefits for those conditions results in a plan that provides inferior coverage to one sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a sex discrimination claim when an otherwise comprehensive employee health plan excludes prescription contraceptives and thereby provides women less comprehensive coverage.

Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2003-03-28(a)(1)

However, as prescription contraceptives are only available to women, the exclusion is not gender neutral because it only burdens female employees. ... This is sufficient to state a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII. Defendant's motion to dismiss that count is denied.

Section 2000e-2(h) permits sex-based compensation differences authorized by the Equal Pay Act, including differences arising from a gender-neutral survivor-benefit plan.

Wood v. City of San Diego · filed 2012-05-09(h)

Her argument is that a gender-neutral survivor benefit “itself violate[s] Title VII because of its disproportionately heavy impact on [female] employees.” Id. But this suggestion has been firmly rejected by the Supreme Court, based both on its own interpretation of disparate impact liability and on the Bennett Amendment to Title VII, which provides that a com- pensation differential based on sex is not unlawful if it is authorized by the Equal Pay Act.

Section 2000e-2(a), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, does not require an employer to credit pregnancy leave taken before the amendment became effective when calculating current retirement benefits.

Hulteen v. At&t Corporation · filed 2006-03-07(a)

It requires us to decide whether AT&T, in making current retirement benefits determinations, discriminates in violation of Title VII against women who took pregnancy-related leaves before 1979. ... Because the result reached by the district court gives the PDA impermissible retroactive effect under control- ling law today, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from excluding gender-affirming surgery from health coverage based on transgender status.

Lange v. Houston County, Georgia · filed 2024-05-13(a)(1)

We therefore affirm the district court’s finding that the Exclusion is facially discriminatory in violation of Title VII.

A Title VII promotion discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when evidence raises a triable issue that the employer’s stated reason for its decision was pretext for discrimination.

Telesford v. Provo · filed 2016-09-02(a)(1)

Here, Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence—mainly in the form of the deposition testimony of Dr. Janet Blackwood—to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ proffered non-discriminatory reason for promoting Madsen—that Brown selected him on the strength of his qualifications for the position—was pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) covers discriminatory failures to promote and unequal compensation because of sex.

Smallwood v. Liberty Mutual Ins. · filed 2000-03-06(a)(1)

Smallwood’s Title VII claim relates primarily to promotion and compensation, both of which constitute employment practices within the meaning of the Act.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not authorize affirmative relief for employment and promotion practices that have not been shown to violate Title VII.

Hull v. Cason · filed 1981-01-07(a)(1)

As we have pointed out, the City’s criticized fire fighter employment and promotion practices violated neither Fourteenth Amendment, nor Civil Rights Act, precepts. It may well have been that as to one or more of those practices there was, at least in some degree, no reasonable job relation. But the permissible remedy was not imposition of the drastic sanctions of the judgment.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits sex discrimination in promotion and upgrade practices.

Little v. Master-Bilt Products, Inc. · filed 1980-12-31

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” and also in an individual’s employment opportunities. ... We hold that plaintiffs have proved that Master-Bilt discriminates against women in its promotion and upgrade policies and practices.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in promotion; a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.

Grindstaff v. Burger King, Inc. · filed 1980-06-03(a)

The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits employers from denying employees equal opportunities to qualify for promotion because of race or color.

Senter v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, INLAND DIV. · filed 1974-09-11(a)(1)

Prior to September 1, 1971, defendant, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, discriminated against individuals with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race or color by denying such persons an equal and nondiscriminatory opportunity to qualify for promotions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits denying an employee a promotion because of sex.

McAleer v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1976-06-09(a)(2)

It is undisputed that plaintiff McAleer would have been promoted but for his gender. This is a classic case of sex discrimination within the meaning of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).

Section 2000e-2 protects an employee from discrimination in a promotional opportunity even if the position sought would not itself be covered by Title VII.

Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore · filed 1977-01-12(a)

The opportunity to be promoted to a position not itself covered by Title VII does not mean that discrimination in that promotion cannot be protected by Title VII.

Section 2000e-2 permits promotion decisions based on performance, ability, work record, and merit when they are not intended to discriminate because of race.

Kelley v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · filed 1977-03-07(h)

Selection of persons for promotion on the basis of performance, ability, work record and merit, so long as the selection of one over the other is not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, is not prohibited or contrary to the Civil Rights Act. The evidence clearly establishes that the promotions and acts of hiring were within the required standards.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make an employer liable for denying a promotion for legitimate reasons that are not a pretext for sex discrimination.

Cussler v. University of Maryland · filed 1977-04-14(a)

Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff satisfied her burden of establishing a prima facie case, the Court finds that defendant denied plaintiff’s promotion on the basis of legitimate reasons that were not a pretext for sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from using sex as an unjustified factor in a promotion decision, even if the employee would not have received the promotion otherwise.

Saracini v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1977-05-12(a)

This court finds that the evidence demonstrated a violation of the dictates of Title VII in this case. In reaching this conclusion, it is not necessary to consider whether absent considerations of sex, Mrs. Saracini would have been awarded the position. The fact that sex was an admitted basis on which the employer’s decision was made, and that there was no justification for use of this factor, is sufficient to establish discrimination as a matter of law.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits sex discrimination in promotion; an employer violates it when it denies qualified women promotion opportunities and offers no explanation for its decisions.

Chapman v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1978-05-16(a)

The Court further finds and concludes that as to plaintiffs Cochran and Chapman, defendant Pacific violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex; a failure-to-promote plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Lee v. Bolger · filed 1978-06-29(a)(1)

I find that plaintiff has not met his prima facie burden under the Title VII claim. ... This does not strike me as a predisposition to discriminate against members of the black race or male gender.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits an employer from denying promotions because of sex.

Williams v. Hoffmeister · filed 1981-06-23(a)

The Master treated plaintiff’s case under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (k) and not under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, although plaintiff sought relief under both. ... Specifically, the Master found that defendants intentionally discriminated against plaintiff on account of her sex in connection with the July, 1979 vacancy in the assistant principalship at Halls Middle School, the August, 1979 vacancy in the assistant principalship at Earns Middle School and the August, 1980 vacancy in the principalship at Cedar Bluff Intermediate School. ... Therefore, the Court, with considerable hesitation, is constrained to approve the findings and conclusions in favor of the plaintiff, and also the findings and conclusions in favor of the defendants on the question of back pay.

A failure-to-promote claim under § 2000e-2 can proceed without a formal application if the employer’s promotion practices do not require one.

Ombu v. Children's Television Workshop · filed 1981-06-15

Plaintiff thus raises material factual issues as to CTW’s promotion practices. If his contentions are true, his failure to apply for the Assistant Director position cannot be held against him. Accordingly, summary judgment on the issue of promotion must be denied.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence of discrimination to support a failure-to-promote claim.

Ferrara v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. · filed 1981-08-07(a)

Thus, there is no basis for a claim that plaintiff was adversely affected by the delay in updating her job description or that there was any discriminatory basis for defendant’s failure to promote plaintiff to the position of junior accountant.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff must show she was qualified for the job to establish a prima facie sex-discrimination case; an employer may justify hiring another candidate for a legitimate business reason.

Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Company, a Corporation, and Wynn's International, Inc., a Corporation · filed 1981-08-17(a)

We hold that the district court was not clearly in error in finding, first, that Fernandez was unqualified and had accordingly failed to allege a prima facie case and, second, that sound business practice justified Borrello’s decision to hire Matthews.

A discriminatory failure-to-promote claim under § 2000e-2(a)(1) requires an available position of the type sought.

McDonald v. Commonwealth Gas Co. · filed 1982-01-26(a)(1)

Since Commonwealth had no position of the type sought by plaintiff, he cannot make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on the company’s failure to promote him.

A plaintiff alleging a discriminatory denial of promotion must show that he applied for and was qualified for the position to establish a prima facie case.

Colucci v. New York Times Co. · filed 1982-02-19(a)(1)

Essential elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case are proof that he applied for and was qualified for the position in question. At the outset, plaintiff’s discrimination charge fails since after the posting of the notice he never applied for the position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based employment and promotion policies that exclude qualified women from correctional positions without a valid occupational qualification.

Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 1982-11-12(a)(1)

The Defendants’ employment and promotional policies and practices at the Jackson, Ionia, and Marquette correctional facilities constitute illegal sex-based discrimination against Griffin, Anderson and the Plaintiff class, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit denying promotions for poor performance and lesser qualifications when race and sex played no part in the decisions.

Brisbane v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 1982-06-17

It was equally clear that, contrary to the allegations in her complaint, her failure to advance was in no way connected to her race or gender.

In a failure-to-promote sex discrimination claim, subjective qualifications are considered after the prima facie stage, when the employer gives its reason and the plaintiff may show pretext.

Jewel BURRUS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY OF KANSAS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-07-22(a)(1)

Although the trial court in this case found that Burrus was objectively qualified for the position, it improperly concluded on the basis of subjective criteria that Burrus failed to establish a prima facie case.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from using discriminatory supervisory evaluations in an employment decision unless the employee had a reasonable opportunity to inspect and correct them.

Stoller v. John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army · filed 1982-06-22(a)(1)

Title VII is violated when an employing organization uses discriminatory evaluations of an employee which were prepared by its own supervisory personnel, unless its procedures have given the employee a reasonable opportunity to inspect and correct these evaluations.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits denying an employee promotions because of her sex.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hay Associates · filed 1982-08-20(a)

We hold that Bay did not receive these promotions because of her sex in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require an employer to prefer a qualified minority candidate over a qualified non-minority candidate for a competitive promotion.

Sales v. Department of Justice · filed 1982-10-20(a)(1)

Title VII does not require an employer to prefer a qualified minority candidate over a qualified non-minority candidate in selection for competitive promotion.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits employers from denying promotions because of race; selecting better-qualified candidates for reasons unrelated to race does not violate it.

Warrick v. Pierce · filed 1983-01-05(a)

The Court, cognizant of the fact that the Indianapolis HUD Area Office departed at times from the Civil Service merit staffing .procedures during the relevant period here involved, finds that with regard to the four positions in question, the plaintiff was not discriminated against on the basis of race, but he was denied details and promotions because of his narrow technical field of expertise. The evidence shows that the persons selected over him were better qualified for the positions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not support a sex-discrimination claim based solely on allegations that an employer promoted younger women over the plaintiff, without alleging different treatment of men.

Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 1983-03-31(a)(1)

The district court concluded, however, that, as pleaded, the complaint did not state a claim under Title VII. ... We agree that, as pleaded, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action and we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the district court.

Under § 2000e-2(a)(1), once an employer gives legitimate reasons for denying a promotion, the employee must prove those reasons were pretextual and that the decision was intentionally discriminatory.

Betts v. Sperry Division of Sperry Rand Corp. · filed 1983-01-31(a)(1)

If the defendants articulate non-discriminatory, legitimate reasons for their actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the alleged justifications are pretextual, and that she was the victim of intentional discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not make a promotion decision discriminatory when the employer rejects an applicant because it believes she is unqualified, even if the decision violates civil service rules.

Almendral v. New York State Office of Mental Health · filed 1983-07-29(a)

Accordingly, the Court finds that, while some of the defendants may have deprived plaintiff of her statutory right to be considered for the promotion in violation of the Civil Service Law, they did so because they felt that she was not qualified to do the job. It follows that plaintiff was not discriminated against because of her national origin.

An employer’s failure to post a supervisory vacancy does not by itself violate § 2000e-2(a).

Clay v. Consumer Programs, Inc. · filed 1983-09-28(a)

The Court finds untenable plaintiff's position that defendant's policy of not posting notices of vacant supervisory positions is, in itself, sufficient to constitute a violation of Title VII.

Under § 2000e-2(a), a discriminatory failure-to-promote claim may proceed to trial when the employer gives nondiscriminatory reasons but a genuine credibility issue remains about whether those reasons are pretextual.

Ibrahim v. New York State Department of Health · filed 1984-01-26(a)

Although the record contains a wealth of circumstantial evidence tending to support Mr. Gormley’s denial, his credibility on this crucial issue creates an issue that may not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. In attempting to demonstrate that the DOH, OHSM’s explanations are pretextual, plaintiff should be allowed to probe Mr. Gormley’s motivation at trial.

A discriminatory failure-to-promote claim fails when the employer gives legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and the employee does not show they are pretextual.

Love v. Alamance County Board of Education · filed 1984-02-29(a)(1)

Defendant has presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting plaintiff into the administrative positions in question. (The same is true for those positions for which plaintiff failed to establish an initial prima facie case.) Plaintiff failed to demonstrate these reasons to be pretextual.

A discriminatory failure-to-promote claim requires the employee to identify an available promotion for which the employee applied and was denied.

Elam v. C & P TELEPHONE CO. · filed 1984-03-02(a)

Initially, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to establish á prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation with respect to the promotion claim. Plaintiff, at no time, pointed to any specific promotion which was vacant or for which he applied and was denied.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a qualified employee to establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim when she is effectively rejected for a promotion, even if the employer later abolishes the position’s title while its duties continue.

Geisler v. Folsom · filed 1984-06-01(a)

Ms. Geisler applied for a vacant position for which she was qualified. One week later the qualifications for the position were changed, she says, for the purpose of excluding her. She was never contacted or interviewed for the position and she was not advised that it was being kept open until a Director was appointed. She was effectively rejected for the position and it remained open until her resignation. The titles of Engineer I and II were abolished in the reorganization, but there was no proof that the duties formerly carried out by Mitckes as Engineer II were eliminated. We believe the plaintiff established a prima facie case of failure to promote to Engineer II and that a remand for further proceedings on this issue is required.

A qualified applicant can establish a prima facie sex discrimination claim for failure to promote when an employer changes the qualifications for a vacant position and effectively rejects her application.

Geisler v. Folsom · filed 1984-07-03(a)

Ms. Geisler applied for a vacant position for which she was qualified. One week later the qualifications for the position were changed, she says, for the purpose of excluding her. She was never contacted or interviewed for the position and she was not advised that it was being kept open until a Director was appointed. She was effectively rejected for the position and it remained open until her resignation. The titles of Engineer I and II were abolished in the reorganization, but there was no proof that the duties formerly carried out by Mitckes as Engineer II were eliminated. We believe the plaintiff established a prima facie case of failure to promote to Engineer II and that a remand for further proceedings on this issue is required.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a prima facie claim of discriminatory failure to promote when a qualified member of a protected group is rejected in favor of a comparably qualified candidate.

John JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RKO BOTTLERS OF TOLEDO, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-08-30(a)

Plaintiff did in fact establish a prima facie case: he was a member of a protected group, applied for promotion to a job for which he was qualified and was rejected in favor of Kerner, who had comparable qualifications.

Section 2000e-2 requires positive proof that sexual conduct or attraction influenced a promotion when an employee claims a coworker received favored treatment because of a supervisor’s attraction.

King v. Palmer · filed 1984-09-10(a)(1)

Where a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII is made by a plaintiff contending that one of the same sex was given favored treatment because allegedly the discriminator was sexually attracted to the favored employee, courts must proceed with great caution given the vagaries and infinite manifestations of sexual stimulation. ... Cases in this category must not rest on rumor, knowing winks and purient overtones or on inferences allowed in divorce law. Plaintiff offered no positive proof of sexual conduct or sexual attractiveness as between Grant and the doctors who promoted her. She has therefore failed to meet her burden.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in employment decisions, including promotions.

Holsey v. Armour & Co. · filed 1984-09-13(a)

The provisions of the judgment pertaining to discrimination and retaliation in violation of Secs. 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a) and Sec. 2000e-3(a) against the individual complainants are affirmed with the exception of those concerning Laura E. Harvey's claims about overtime work and switchboard training. ... The findings of a pattern and practice of discrimination because of race with regard to promotions into sales and supervisory positions, and of retaliation in violation of Sec. 704(a) are not clearly erroneous.

Subjective promotion criteria require strict scrutiny, but evidence that the selected candidates were better qualified can rebut a prima facie discrimination case.

Love v. The Alamance County Board of Education · filed 1985-03-27(a)(1)

In sum, we believe that under the strict scrutiny required by the Board’s use of subjective criteria, the Board’s reason that Love was less qualified rebutted her prima facie case and was not pretextual.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits denying an employee a promotion because of sex, even when the employer offers a performance reason that the court finds pretextual.

Easley v. Empire Incorporated and Empiregas, Inc. Of Wheaton · filed 1985-04-24

While there may have been some testimony favorable to Empire, the finding of the district court that Empire intentionally discriminated against Easley on the basis of sex in failing to give her the retail manager’s job is not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not require an employer to promote an applicant who fails to meet objective, reasonable job qualifications.

Delores H. HICKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLOOD & PETERSON INSURANCE, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-06-24(a)(1)

Employers are given wide discretion in setting job standards and requirements and in deciding whether applicants meet those standards. ... The employer here set objective, reasonable employment standards which appellant simply did not meet.

Section 2000e-2 covers an employer’s denial of promotion because of an employee’s race or color.

Keller v. Prince George's County Department of Social Services · filed 1985-08-19

The plaintiff, Mazie Keller, alleges that she was denied a promotion by her employer because of her race or color (black). This allegation, of course, falls within the scope of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits race from playing a discernible part in a promotion process, even if the employee would not have received the promotion anyway.

Thomas O. Bibbs, Jr. v. John Block, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture · filed 1985-12-11(a)(2)

Forcing Bibbs to be considered for promotion in a process in which race plays a discernible part is itself a violation of law, regardless of the outcome of the process. At the very least, such a process "tend[s] to deprive" him of an "employment opportunit[y]." Section 703(a)(2).

When an employer does not solicit promotion applications, a nonapplicant must identify the openings she would have sought had she known about them to establish a prima facie case under Title VII.

Box v. A & P Tea Co. · filed 1985-09-05

Although, as we held above, a nonapplicant plaintiff can establish a prima facie case if the employer did not solicit applications, such a plaintiff must show what positions she would have applied for had she known of the openings.

Section 2000e-2 does not prohibit denying a promotion because of an employee’s perceived attitude rather than her sex.

Kellner v. General Refractories Co. · filed 1986-03-03

Fowler’s decision not to promote the plaintiff was based on her perceived “attitude” — not her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires proof that race caused an employer’s failure to promote an employee.

Autry v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources · filed 1986-08-22(a)(1)

Accordingly, the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant intentionally failed to promote her because she was black, not that it failed to promote her and she was black.

Under § 2000e-2, once an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying a promotion, the employee must show that the reason was a pretext for race discrimination.

Ecila R. Tuck v. The Hoover Company · filed 1986-09-16

Once the district court deemed that Hoover had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Tuck, the burden fell on her to persuade the court that Hoover's stated reasons were a pretext for race discrimination. Tuck, however, failed to come forward with proper evidence.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits an employer from denying a white employee promotion because it favors candidates of another race.

MacHakos v. Meese · filed 1986-11-03(a)(1)

Essentially, Title VII prohibits an employer from considering an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in making any decision related to the compensation, terms and conditions, or privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. ... Their testimony has persuaded the Court that a discriminatory animus likely motivated the defendants to subvert Ms. Machakos’ efforts for promotion and that the proffered reasons for her nonselection in each instance are unworthy of credence.

Section 2000e-2 requires an employer responding to a discriminatory promotion claim to give a nondiscriminatory reason for its choice, but does not require proof that it chose the objectively best candidate.

Davis v. State University of New York · filed 1986-10-03

The employer need not prove that the person promoted had superior objective qualifications, or that it made the wisest choice, but only that the reasons for the decision were nondiscriminatory.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racially discriminatory promotion decisions; a plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reasons were pretexts for discrimination.

Schwenke v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. · filed 1986-10-24(a)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds as a matter of law that plaintiff has not demonstrated that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated defendant in failing to promote plaintiff to the position of supervisor of the sales audit department of defendant’s corporate office in January of 1985 or that defendant’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted with regard to plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(2) does not support a sex discrimination claim for a denied promotion when the employee was unqualified for the position and was not similarly situated to the proposed comparator.

Nielsen v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1987-02-19(a)(2)

Thus, the District Court's conclusion that plaintiff and Phillips were not similarly situated with respect to educational qualifications and engineering experience and that plaintiff was not qualified for a level 7 engineering position is not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2 requires a plaintiff alleging race discrimination in a promotion to show a connection between race and the denial of the promotion.

Omega R. AUTRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1987-06-25

In order to establish a case of race discrimination, however, Plaintiff would have to be able to show a connection between her race and her failure to be promoted.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires a plaintiff claiming discriminatory failure to promote to prove intentional discrimination because of race or sex.

Carter v. Sea Land Services, Inc. · filed 1987-04-30(a)

To establish a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII, Carter was required to show that Sea-Land intentionally discriminated against her, because of her race or sex, by failing to promote her to assistant marine manager.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a promotion because of race; a plaintiff must show discriminatory intent to prevail on that claim.

Starostka v. Illinois, Department of Public Aid · filed 1987-06-29(a)(1)

Finding no genuine issue of material fact on the question of discriminatory intent, we grant Defendant’s motion and enter summary judgment for the State of Illinois Department of Public Aid.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in employment, but a denied promotion violates it only when the evidence connects the decision to race.

Coleman v. Wayne State University · filed 1987-07-07(a)(1)

As for Wayne State University’s treatment of Coleman regarding job promotions, the Court finds there was insufficient evidence that Coleman was denied promotions in violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) requires a failure-to-promote plaintiff alleging disparate treatment to prove intentional discrimination.

Baldwin v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. · filed 1988-02-02(a)(1)

Since the court finds Walsh made the selections because he honestly believed that Haulbrook and Parker were more qualified, Plaintiff has failed to show that discrimination was the motivating factor behind Walsh’s decision, or that Defendant intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff in promoting Haulbrook and Parker to the Account Executive positions ahead of Plaintiff.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence connecting unequal consideration for a promotion to the employee’s race; the candidates’ different races alone do not establish that connection.

Hale v. Cuyahoga County Welfare Department · filed 1988-08-12(a)

Mrs. Hale has established that she is black and that Mr. Hanna is white but no evidence has been presented from which it can be inferred that Mrs. Hale was not considered seriously or was not promoted because of her race.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a promotion because of sex when the employer’s stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.

Bruhwiler v. University of Tennessee and Dr. D.T. Stafford · filed 1988-12-01(a)(1)

The district court plausibly found that Bruhwiler was fully qualified and that the defendant's proffered reason for non-promotion was pretext for discriminatory action. Consequently, the district court's finding of discriminatory non-promotion cannot be set aside.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based promotion decisions, and inconsistent treatment of applicants’ qualifications can create a triable issue of discriminatory motive.

Wilburn v. Dial Corp. · filed 1989-09-11(a)(1)

In contrast, although an employer may be entitled to select among applicants on the basis of his personal business judgment, Title VII and section 1981 preclude such a selection to be based upon an applicant's race. A review of the facts and documents submitted to this court by both parties, viewed under the McDonnell-Burdine framework in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, suggests that the trier of fact could find that the plaintiff's race was the motivating factor in the defendant's refusal to promote the plaintiff to the position of production manager.

Section 2000e-2 does not support a failure-to-promote claim when no rational factfinder could infer that discrimination affected the decision.

Subhash C. MALHOTRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COTTER & COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1989-09-12

No rational trier of fact could have inferred that prejudice was a factor in denying Malhotra promotion to Finance Manager.

In a race discrimination claim for failure to promote under § 2000e-2, an employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason after the employee establishes a prima facie case; the employee may then prove that reason is pretextual.

Green v. Kinney Shoe Corp. · filed 1989-09-15

Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the failure to promote the plaintiff. If this is shown, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to try to prove that the proferred nondiscriminatory reason is actually a pretext for discrimination.

A court may consider bona fide subjective job qualifications when deciding whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote.

Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company · filed 1989-10-10(a)(1)

In contrast, under the circumstances of this case, it was within the district court's role and capabilities to assess whether the subjective employment qualification was bona fide and whether an employer's testimony that the plaintiff did not possess the qualification was credible.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) permits a prima facie discriminatory hiring claim without a formal job application when the claimant made every reasonable attempt to convey interest in the job to the employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Metal Service Company · filed 1990-01-03(a)(1)

With this principle as our touchstone, we believe the EEOC has established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. Courts have generally held that the failure to formally apply for a job opening will not bar a Title VII plaintiff from establishing a prima facie claim of discriminatory hiring, as long as the plaintiff made every reasonable attempt to convey his interest in the job to the employer.

Section 2000e-2 prohibits intentional sex discrimination in promotions, including rejecting a qualified applicant for pretextual reasons.

Willis v. Watson Chapel School District · filed 1990-04-02

The record amply supports the district court's determination that the reasons the School gave for failing to promote Willis were pretextual in at least four instances. In our view, the court's finding of intentional sex discrimination is not clearly erroneous.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits racially discriminatory employee evaluations and promotion decisions.

Alex Ingram, Jr., Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., Appellant/cross-Appellee · filed 1990-04-20(a)(1)

The record leaves little doubt but that some other factor was operating in Hart’s mind which resulted in a negative recommendation for Ingram. We agree with the district court that the other factor was racial discrimination violative of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a promotion because of religion; an employer’s stated reasons may be found pretextual when the evidence shows discriminatory intent.

Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp. · filed 1990-09-26(a)(1)

Despite the fact that we find Parker Hannifan’s stated reasons for denying the promotion to Weiss to be legitimate, we conclude that Weiss has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that these reasons are merely pretextual.

For a discriminatory promotion claim under § 2000e-2(a), an employee seeking a lateral transfer is not similarly situated to an employee seeking promotion through a competitive process.

Lacey v. Marsh · filed 1990-07-11(a)

It was not a promotion for Jean Trende. Plaintiff, however, as a GS-4 employee, could only apply for the position as a promotion through a competitive register. Deborah Lacey was similarly situated with the other thirteen employees selected for the competitive register. She was not similarly situated with Jean Trende. As such, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.

A failure-to-promote plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of sex-based disparate treatment under § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Robert P. PETITTI, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1990-07-23(a)(1)

Because appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate treatment as a result of unlawful sexual discrimination, we need go no further and therefore we affirm the district court’s granting of summary judgment on the discrimination case.

A refusal to promote violates § 2000e-2(a)(1) when the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual and discrimination more likely than not motivated its decision.

Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College · filed 1991-03-14(a)(1)

Thus, Alvarado met his burden of establishing that the College’s reasons for not promoting him were not supported by the facts and were therefore merely pretextual. We conclude that it was more likely than not that a discriminatory reason motivated the College in its refusal to promote Alvarado.

Section 2000e-2(a) permits a disparate treatment claim based on a discriminatory failure to promote.

Sinha v. State University of New York at Farmingdale · filed 1991-06-10(a)

A claim of disparate treatment, by reason of failure to promote, is actionable under Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) does not require a failure-to-promote plaintiff to prove she was the best qualified candidate to establish a prima facie case; she need only show she was qualified.

Perkins v. District of Columbia · filed 1991-07-29(a)

This argument must be rejected since Title VII does not require a plaintiff to prove that she was the best qualified candidate for the position. To establish a prima facie case, Perkins need only show that she was among those qualified.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from denying a promotion because of race.

Bachman v. BD. OF TR. OF U. OF DIST. OF COLUMBIA · filed 1991-11-08(a)(1)

Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of race in violation of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race discrimination in promotions, including practices proved through disparate impact or a pattern of discriminatory treatment.

William O. Mozee, Gregory L. Rankin, Frederick Williams v. American Commercial Marine Service Company · filed 1991-08-14(a)

The class claims against Jeffboat for Title VII violations in its promotion practice — both through disparate impact and pattern or practice liability — are Affirmed; those claims regarding discipline are Vacated and Remanded with instructions.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) does not prohibit promotion decisions based on personal favoritism or cronyism absent sex discrimination.

Savko v. Port Authority · filed 1992-07-31(a)(1)

Instead, plaintiff asserts that Tipton promoted Lutheran because of their personal relationship or cronyism. Even were that the reason, such favoritism does not violate Title VII.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a promotion because of sex; a qualified applicant may prove discrimination by showing that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Martin Marietta Corp. · filed 1993-03-03(a)(1)

The articulated and actual process and reasoning show that Rambo was not fairly considered as an initial matter and that the later expressed reasons for her rejection were pretextual. Under McDonnell Douglas, this means Rambo has demonstrated that she was unlawfully discriminated against even in the absence of direct proof of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits a pattern or practice of denying women promotions because of sex.

Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. · filed 1993-05-14(a)(1)

In summary, Plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that Eveleth Mines engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against women in promotions to step-up foreman and foreman on the basis of their sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in promotion decisions, and evidence that an employer’s stated reasons were pretextual can require a trial.

Thelma W. Batey, an Individual A/K/A Virginia Batey v. M.P.W. Stone, Secretary of the Army, an Agency of the United Stat · filed 1994-07-05(a)(1)

In this case, the appellee’s rationales for the disparate treatment of Batey were undercut by other evidence in the record showing that the justifications were pretext for sex discrimination. The trier of fact must decide the issue of pretext by examining all the available evidence and giving it whatever weight it deserves. We cannot say as a matter of law that all the evidence compels judgment for the appellee. Consequently, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Batey’s sex discrimination claims, and a full hearing on the merits is, therefore, necessary under the circumstances here.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a qualified employee a promotion because of her gender.

Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, Inc. · filed 1995-09-29(a)(1)

This court finds that the evidence clearly supports the jury’s verdict that defendant intentionally and maliciously, or at least, with reckless indifference for plaintiffs rights, engaged in the unlawful employment practice of discriminating against plaintiff because of her gender as to the three promotions upon which the jury found in plaintiffs favor.

Section 2000e-2(a) allows a race discrimination claim over a promotion decision to proceed against an employer when a genuine factual dispute remains.

Beckett v. Dept. of Corrections of Delaware · filed 1997-10-22(a)

Summary judgment is granted for the Department of Corrections on plaintiffs § 1983 claim and denied for the Department on plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from denying promotions because of an employee’s sex.

Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken · filed 1999-09-08(a)(1)

As an initial matter, the jury legitimately found that SNY officials intentionally refused to promote Greenbaum because of her sex on many occasions.

Section 2000e-2(a) addresses employment discrimination based on protected characteristics; flaws in a promotion process alone do not establish a violation.

Langerman v. Thompson · filed 2001-08-17(a)

While Plaintiff is undoubtedly upset that he did not make the top five list, he must bear in mind that Title VII is only designed to remedy discrimination based on one’s sex, race or other protected category. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The statute is not meant to remedy every procedural flaw that exists in an employer’s selection process.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in promotions; a plaintiff must present evidence that the promotion occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Kent v. General Motors Regional Personnel Center-East Region · filed 2001-10-31(a)(1)

In the absence of any credible evidence to provide a reasonable basis for a trier of fact to conclude that African-American employees were not given the same opportunities as White employees for the training, education, and experience necessary to obtain proficiency promotions, plaintiff cannot meet even the minimal ... burden of showing that Ms. Fehringer’s May 1994 promotion occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a promotion because of race; an employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason can defeat a claim when the employee offers insufficient evidence of pretext.

Pittman v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF SOUTH BEND · filed 2010-02-17(a)(1)

In so doing, the court finds that the summary judgment ruling would still stand: the SBHA has set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for promoting Boone and not Pittman, and Pittman has offered insufficient evidence of pretext.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race discrimination in promotions, and a qualified applicant may establish a prima facie case when an employer promotes someone outside her protected class.

Brown v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2010-02-23(a)(1)

Brown established a prima facie case of discrimination concerning the promotion of Mike Mahaffey, a white male, to the position of Assistant Division Engineer for the Third Division on March 20, 2004.

Section 2000e-2 protects male employees from sex discrimination in promotion decisions.

Bartlett v. Secretary of Defense · filed 2010-11-15

A prima facie case of discrimination exists here because Plaintiff is a male born in 1946 and therefore is a member of a protected class under Title VII and the ADEA, respectively. See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2 (covering the sexes) and 29 U.S.C. § 631 (covering persons over 40).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits an employer from making promotion decisions based on race.

Finch v. City of Indianapolis · filed 2012-08-10(a)(1)

I. The plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment against the City on their claims for race discrimination under Title VII. ... At least three candidates for promotion to captain were promoted ahead of plaintiffs Hensley, Finch, and Mungovan because they are African American.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) allows a sex discrimination claim over a promotion decision to reach a jury when evidence supports an inference that interview scores reflected gender stereotypes.

Geraty v. Village of Antioch · filed 2013-04-18(a)(1)

First, the court finds that a jury could infer from the commissioners’ explanations of Geraty’s interview score that the Board relied on quintessentially gendered characteristics in ranking the sergeant candidates.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits race-based promotion decisions; a discrimination claim fails when the employee has no evidence that the employer's stated reasons were false or that race played a role.

Williams v. Donahoe · filed 2013-06-03(a)(1)

Williams conceded that he lacked evidence suggesting that (1) the two women were lying when they explained their race-neutral reasons for selecting Garcia and Sanchez or (2) race played a role in the selection process. Those concessions defeat his speculations about race bias and doom his discrimination claim.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based promotion decisions, but a plaintiff must offer evidence from which a jury could infer that sex caused a delayed or denied promotion.

Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2013-12-23(a)(1)

Langenbach has failed to produce circumstantial evidence that would permit a jury to infer that Wal-Mart delayed her promotion to Assistant Manager, or failed to promote her beyond Assistant Manager, because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in promotions; evidence that an employer sought a male candidate can create a triable issue of discrimination.

FOY v. RESOLUTE ACQUISITION CORPORATION INC · filed 2021-02-24(a)(1)

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees because of their sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ... Less than a week after applying, she asked Mr. Hanni, the Director of Nursing, if the position was still available and was told "yes" but that he "was looking for a male for the position." Id. at 111–12. That is enough to show a triable issue of fact on discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) prohibits race-based employment discrimination; a failure-to-promote claimant must show that the employer’s stated legitimate reason was a pretext for discrimination.

Mills v. Finish Line Incorporated · filed 2021-08-12(a)

Nor has he provided sufficient circumstantial evidence that Defendant’s rationale for not promoting him was pretext for discrimination.

Section 2000e-2(a) requires evidence that sex discrimination caused an adverse employment action to sustain a discriminatory promotion claim.

Boshaw v. Midland Brewing Co. · filed 2022-04-26(a)

But to survive a motion for summary judgment, Boshaw must offer evidence that would permit a rational trier of fact to find that Reynolds’s animus caused Boshaw to suffer an adverse employment action (in this case, the delay or denial of a promotion). ... All things considered, Boshaw’s rapid rise shows that Midland did not delay or deny his promotions because of sex discrimination. No rational trier of fact could find otherwise.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex-based promotion decisions; a plaintiff challenging an employer’s stated reason must offer evidence that it was pretextual and that sex motivated the decision.

Velez v. Whitley · filed 2022-07-29(a)(1)

Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Velez, no rational jury could find that Pekatos’s reasons were pretextual or that Pekatos did not hire Velez because of her sex.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of sex, including in promotion decisions.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ferman Management Services Corporation · filed 2023-04-05(a)(1)

Title VII generally prohibits an employer from discriminating against its employees because of their sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits denying a promotion because of sex. Under the McDonnell Douglas method, a claimant must show that the employer selected a similarly or less qualified person outside her protected class and, if the employer gives a legitimate reason, offer evidence of pretext.

Kinney v. St. Mary's Health, Inc. · filed 2023-08-07(a)(1)

Under Title VII, an employer may not fail to promote an individual because of that person’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1). ... We agree that Kinney failed to offer evidence of pretext and affirm on that ground.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits sex discrimination in promotion decisions; a plaintiff relying on indirect evidence must show that the employer’s stated reason was pretext for discrimination.

Stuart v. Topeka, Kansas, City of · filed 2024-08-09(a)(1)

All three Plaintiffs assert that the City discriminated against them in violation of Title VII by failing to promote them to certain positions because of their sex. To succeed on this claim, a plaintiff “must prove that intent to discriminate based upon [the] plaintiff's protected class characteristics was the determining factor for the allegedly illegal employment decision.” ... The court finds the City has met its burden by putting forth a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the selection of Haltom for the position.

Section 2000e-2(a)(1) prohibits employers from denying promotions, pay, or benefits because of an employee’s race; allegations that those opportunities went to workers of another race can state a claim.

Davis v. Pete's Fresh Market 4700 Corporation · filed 2025-03-03(a)(1)

She alleges that promotions and “higher levels of salary and other benefits” went to younger employees of a different race than herself due to Pete’s discrimination. See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15-16, 26-27. That suffices to allege claims under the ADEA and Title VII for age- and race-based discrimination, respectively.

A sex discrimination claim based on a denied promotion can survive summary judgment when the evidence creates a genuine dispute about whether the employer denied it because of sex.

Hollis v. Morgan State University · filed 2025-08-27(a)(1)

But here, we have held already that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether, but for sex discrimination, MSU would have granted Dr. Hollis’s 2016 promotion application, which would have brought with it a raise in salary.

Section 2000e-2(b) does not require an employment agency that makes nondiscriminatory referrals to investigate employers accused of discrimination.

Kaplowitz v. University of Chicago · filed 1974-10-22(b)

At a minimum we are unwilling to impose this burden on employment agencies without a much clearer indication that such was Congress’ intent.

Section 2000e-2(b) covers an organization that regularly refers workers to employment opportunities.

Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n · filed 1979-10-11(b)

As she has alleged that defendant Georgia Section has a “principal function” of “referring” the Court concludes that she has sufficiently alleged a “regular undertaking ... to procure for employees opportunities to work. . . ”

Section 2000e-2(b) prohibits employment agencies from discriminating in referrals based on sex or race.

Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Service · filed 1983-03-11(b)

Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on their claim of classwide sex discrimination during the limited period for which a pattern of disparate treatment was established.

Section 2000e-2 does not impose liability on a nurse referral service that is neither a covered employer nor an employment agency when it refers nurses only to individual patients or their representatives.

Cecil C. Shrock, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Altru Nurses Registry, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant · filed 1987-01-20

Unless Altru in 1983 was an employer, an employment agency, or a labor union, it cannot be liable to Shrock under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, e-3. ... Since — according to affidavits that Shrock failed to rebut in the manner prescribed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 — Altru refers nurses only to individual patients and to persons (mainly doctors) acting on behalf of individual patients, and since neither patient nor doctor is a Title VII employer, the district court was unquestionably correct in granting Altru’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint.

Section 2000e-2(b) gives employment agency testers who seek referrals a right to nondiscriminatory referrals, even if they would not accept a job.

Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp. · filed 1993-06-18(b)

Section 2000e-2(b), however, protects the right to nondiscriminatory referrals, and because the plaintiffs in this case did seek referrals, they can claim injury resulting from the defendants’ failure to provide those referrals.

Section 2000e-2(b) prohibits employment agencies from discriminating in referrals but does not cover practices prohibited only to employers under subsection (a).

Kellam v. Snelling Personnel Services · filed 1994-10-17(b)

This Court understands the language “or otherwise to discriminate” to modify the phrase “to fail or refuse to refer for employment” and thereby to encompass prohibited discrimination with respect to referrals that fall short of failure or refusal to refer. It is clear then that the practices prohibited to “employment agencies” do not encompass the practices prohibited to “employers.”

Section 2000e-2(b) requires employment agencies to make job assignments without discrimination; knowledge of pregnancy and offers of unsuitable positions alone do not establish discriminatory assignment.

Medina v. Adecco · filed 2008-06-12(b)

The record is devoid of evidence to support Medina’s claim that Adecco intentionally, and because of her pregnancy, denied her suitable assignments. The only facts in the record establish that Adecco was aware of Medina’s pregnancy; Adecco offered Medina two job assignments; Medina’s health circumstances made the assignments difficult; and Medina rejected the positions. No reasonable jury could conclude, based on these facts alone, that Adecco engaged in pregnancy-based discriminatory assignment practices against Medina. Accordingly, summary judgment in Adecco’s favor is appropriate.

Section 2000e-2(b) permits liability when an employment agency discriminates in employment referrals based on a protected characteristic, but the claim must allege facts supporting that liability.

VALENTIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF PA. · filed 2024-05-06(b)

An employment agency may be liable under Title VII if it fails or refuses to refer an individual for employment or classifies that individual in a referral on the basis of race, color or other immutable characteristics. ... Although § 2000e-2 is one of the many statutory sections Mr. Valentin excerpted in the “Memorandum” portion of his Amended Complaint, there are no factual allegations to support liability under that portion of the statute.